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CMRR Backgrounder 4 25 12.P65 The CMRR-NuclearTHE CMRR-NUCLEAR Facility: FACILITY 1 Why a Delay Makes Sense BACKGROUNDER APRIL 2012 LISBETH GRONLUND & STEPHEN YOUNG Executive Summary Looking ahead two decades, we find that the only plau- sible need to increase pit production capacity above the cur- In its FY2013 budget request, the Obama administration rent level is to support the upcoming life extension programs announced a delay of at least five years in the construction (LEP) for the W78 and W88 warheads—if they use newly built of a proposed new facility at the Los Alamos National Labo- pits. (A LEP could simply refurbish the existing warhead and ratory (LANL)—the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research use the existing pit, or could use an existing pit from another Replacement-Nuclear Facility warhead type.) However, even in this (CMRR-NF). Our analysis finds case, an annual production capacity of There will be no adverse effects that there will be no adverse effects 40-45 pits would be adequate, and this of delaying construction. More- of delaying construction. could be accomplished without build- over, there is no clear need for the Moreover, there is no clear need ing a new CMRR-NF. If the United CMRR-NF as currently proposed. for the CMRR-NF as currently States reduced its arsenal below 3,500 Delaying construction will also al- proposed. weapons over the next few decades, low the National Nuclear Security an even lower annual production ca- Administration (NNSA) to fully pacity could be sufficient. assess alternatives to building To date, NNSA has not made a CMRR-NF and to take into account forthcoming changes decision about whether it will use new pits for the W78 and to U.S. nuclear weapons policy. W88 LEPs. The studies and engineering phase for the W78 There are three primary reasons the administration wants will not be complete until FY2021. Thus, there is as yet no to build the CMRR-NF: (1) to allow an increase in the ca- specific need for an increase in pit production capacity. pacity to produce to produce plutonium “pits,” which are The CMRR-NF would also provide additional labora- at the core of all U.S. nuclear weapons; (2) to provide re- tory and storage space for handling plutonium and other ra- placement laboratory space for activities now undertaken at dioactive materials. However, there are other, less expensive aging facilities at LANL; and (3) to provide additional stor- approaches, and a delay in the CMRR-NF will allow these age space for plutonium and other nuclear materials. other options to be assessed. For example, the administra- The United States produces pits at LANL’s Plutonium Facility-4 (PF-4) at a current rate of 10-20 annually. This 1. Introduction 3 rate could be increased to 50 annually without building the 2. Background 3 CMRR-NF. According to NNSA, increasing the pit pro- 3. Pit Production 6 duction capacity to 50-80 annually would require the CMRR- Replacing Pits at the End of Their NF, which would accommodate some of the activities now Lifetime 6 conducted at PF-4, thus making room for additional pit Replacing Pits Destroyed under the production at PF-4. The administration has not clearly de- Stockpile Stewardship Program 7 fined the future need for pits, but has suggested the United Increasing the Arsenal 8 States will need an annual production capacity of 50-80. Replacing a Class of Defective Given the estimated lifetime of current pits, there is no Warheads 9 need to replace them due to aging for at least many de- New Pits for Life Extension Programs 10 cades. Nor is there a need to increase pit production capac- 4. Modern Laboratories and Nuclear ity above the current level to replace pits destroyed for sur- Facilities 13 veillance purposes under the Stockpile Stewardship Program, 5. Plutonium Storage 15 to increase the arsenal, or to replace a class of defective 6. Conclusions 16 Glossary 18 warheads. 2 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS tion has already indicated that a new safety analysis its forthcoming changes in nuclear weapons will allow the first phase of the CMRR project— policy. a radiological laboratory that is already built— To address these issues, we recommend that to take on a significant portion of the work Congress: planned for the Nuclear Facility. The adminis- • Require an independent study to: (1) deter- tration has also identified an option for storing mine the materials analysis and other pluto- nuclear material in Nevada. Moreover, one of nium science-related capabilities that are re- the factors driving the high costs of CMRR-NF quired to maintain the nuclear stockpile (2) as- is its location along a seis- sess whether existing mic fault line. A delay facilities at Los Alamos would also allow consid- Delaying construction will or elsewhere could eration of design options provide time for the Obama meet those require- that could lower the costs adminisration to take into ments on an ongoing of construction. account the implications of its basis, and (3) provide Plans for the CMRR- forthcoming changes in nuclear cost estimates for these NF were made long be- options. The NNSA is weapons policy. fore the New START currently undertaking a agreement was negotiated study like this, due for and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review was com- completion in April 2012. However, an inde- pleted. Following a lengthy Pentagon-led review pendent study would ensure that all the op- of options, later this year the President will make tions are thoroughly considered. decisions about the size, structure and mission • Require an independent study to assess the of U.S. nuclear forces. It is likely that the admin- future need for production of plutonium pits, istration will decide the United States can de- once the administration makes pending deci- crease its nuclear arsenal; the Pentagon has re- sions on U.S. nuclear policy. cently stated that “It is possible that our deterrence • Require that NNSA update its findings on the goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force.”1 (Em- lifetimes of plutonium pits and request the phasis in the original.) Thus, delaying construc- JASON panel to review that assessment. This tion will provide time for the Obama adminis- assessment by NNSA and review by the JA- tration to take into account the implications of SON panel should occur periodically. 1Department of Defense (DOD). 2012. Sustaining U.S. global leadership: Priorities for 21st century defense. Washing- ton, DC: Department of Defense, 5. Online at: www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf THE CMRR-NUCLEAR FACILITY 3 1. Introduction square feet of radiological laboratory space. Workers are still installing the equipment for the In its FY2013 budget request, the Obama ad- lab, which is slated for completion this year, ministration announced it will delay for at least slightly ahead of schedule. five years construction of a proposed new facil- Phase two is the Nuclear Facility—the so- ity at the Los Alamos National Laboratory called CMRR-NF. Before this delay, it was slated (LANL)—the Chemistry and Metallurgy Re- to begin operations in 2024. While pits would search Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR- not be produced in the CMRR-NF, its construc- NF). tion would allow Los Alamos to increase the This report examines the consequences of capacity of the current pit production facility— that decision. It first provides background on LANL’s Plutonium Facility-4 (PF-4). The the facility and then considers the three primary planned CMRR-NF, with almost 400,000 square reasons the NNSA proposes to build the CMRR- feet of floor space, would be located next to NF. They are: PF-4 and the two facilities would be connected • To support an increase in the capacity to pro- via an underground tunnel and share a vault ca- duce new plutonium pits pable of holding up to six metric tons of pluto- • To acquire new, modern laboratories to per- nium. All pits would continue to be produced in form the analytical work currently done in the PF-4, but some of the activities now conducted CMR there would be moved to the CMRR-NF and • To create a secure storage vault that will allow some of the materials stored in PF-4 would be consolidation of nuclear materials, particularly moved to the shared vault, allowing pit produc- plutonium. tion in PF-4 to expand. According to the National Nuclear Security Finally, the report makes recommendations Administration (NNSA), the semi-autonomous about how to move forward. agency within the Department of Energy (DOE) that oversees the weapons labs, producing up to 80 pits per year will only be possible by building 2. Background the Nuclear Facility and upgrading PF-4.2 How- ever, the NNSA has also indicated that pit pro- The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replace- duction could be increased without building ment (CMRR) Project at Los Alamos National CMRR-NF. The NNSA’s FY2012 plan for main- Laboratory (LANL) is designed to replace the taining the stockpile states, “One strategy for in- existing Chemistry and Metallurgy Research creasing this [pit] production capability is to add (CMR) building, where scientists conduct tech- equipment to augment the existing manufactur- nical analyses on a variety of materials used in ing processes co-located inside a dedicated room nuclear weapons, with particular emphasis on in PF-4.”3 plutonium. Furthermore, when the Bush administration The CMRR project consists of two phases. was planning to build significant numbers of Construction of the first phase was completed Reliable Replacement Warheads (RRWs) that in 2010. The 200,000 square-foot CMRR Ra- would have required new pits, the FY2008 bud- diological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building get request stated that LANL would “work to (RLUOB) contains office space and 20,000 increase the pit manufacturing capacity to 30 to 2 Department of Energy (DOE).
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