TLO-Policy Brief / 2 December 2009

Tribal Jurisdiction and Agreements The Key to Sub-National Governance in South- eastern Afghanistan

1 Introduction Summary In many parts of Afghanistan, non-state • Tribal agreements in South-eastern Afghanistan continue to be an institutions remain relevant to security important means to establish and stability, despite repeated and binding rules within and between concerted state-led attempts from the tribal groups and to negotiate th governance and security issues late 19 century onward to expand its between tribes and the Afghan administrative influence, including control government (and supporting over the provision of security and the international military forces). administration of justice. In the East and • International actors promoting Southeast, these relatively autonomous such local security arrangements need to understand existing local structures are very much a present day institutions, the geographic reality and largely linked to Pashtun concepts of tribal jurisdiction tribes and the influence of individual (manteqas /wandas ) and the level of tribal fragmentation. elders. It is important to emphasize that • Only where tribal institutions are tribal security and governance never was still very much intact, links geared toward undermining the state. In between formal and informal contrast, tribes and their elders tried to security institutions can strengthen cooperate with the state whenever Afghan government structures. possible to improve governance and

reduce conflict in their areas, taking on

state roles during times of state failure.

The Liaison Office is grateful to The importance of local customary funding provided by the Heinrich structures has not been lost on Böll Stiftung to its’ programmes in Paktia and Nangarhar. 2

policymakers of late. 1 The “US negotiate local governance and maintain Government Integrated Civilian-Military security at the sub-national level. Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan”, written in August 2009 with the collaboration of United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), acknowledges the Pashtuns’ guarded independence “against the perception of a predatory central government” and the Afghan government’s “inability or perceived unwillingness to ensure security and justice” as “major dynamics” within Afghanistan.

In order to compensate for this latter Map 1: Location of Ahmad Aba District, Paktia gap, the report promotes employing “community security arrangements when Using the case study of Ahmad Aba local conditions necessitate and in district in Paktia, specifically field association with Afghan National Security research among the Ahmadzai tribe in Forces (ANSF).” 2 June 2009, this policy brief examines the historical background of tribal contracts, Such generalized policy prescriptions to to what extent they still play a role in security issues, however, are not without local governance today, and what dangers if implemented with ignorance of implications can be drawn for the current existing local institution and a lacking promotion of community governance understanding of the fragmentation of arrangements. communal structures in some parts of Afghanistan (especially the North and 2 Tribal contracts in brief South). Tribal contracts mostly pertain to Many community security arrangements maintaining security and/or the are contiguous to a specific local context administration of justice in the specific such as Eastern and South-eastern areas where a tribe or sub-tribe holds Afghanistan, where relationships between jurisdiction. In principle, however, any state and non-state actors are regulated social and political issue can be regulated through so called "tribal contracts or through such contracts. agreements" used by local representatives of the Afghan state to Various external pressures and local complexities influence elders to establish

TLO Policy Brief 1 / December 2009

3

tribal agreements, such as to fill power on an oral culture, tribal agreements are vacuums or respond to state requests. written documents signed off by From the state’s perspective, local responsible elders (e.g., signature or government representatives use tribal fingerprint). In addition to spelling out agreements to negotiate governance and rules, the agreements also define maintain security. The aims and sanctions for violations, ranging from emphases of the agreements change monetary fines or burning down the according to the given political house of the offender up to ostracising environment. him from the tribe.

The strength of the state determines its level of involvement in the agreement 3 Tribal Agreement prior to 2001 with a positive correlation between the Agreements between tribes and two. When the state is weak it has a government have a long history in minimal or non-existent role. As a matter Eastern and South-eastern Afghanistan. of fact, tribes often establish agreements Many foreign invaders from Alexander the when the formal governance system has Great to the British in the 19 th century failed. By contrast, when the state is also brokered contracts with local tribes strong, it signs agreements with tribes to levy armed tribesmen for the that oblige them to maintain security (or protection of logistical supply routes. other state policies) within specified areas When Afghan rulers started to consolidate of tribal jurisdiction in exchange for the Afghan state and attempted to resources and a degree of local expand their administrative influence into autonomy. rural areas in the late 19 th century non- The agreements are established through state institutions still provided local jirgas on the basis of consent by tribal governance, including the administration elders and apply to all members of the of security and justice, in large parts of tribes and sub-tribes represented by the the country. In order to increase state jirga . influence and centralise its policies, While elders (the white-bearded spin giri ) Afghan kings began to enter into usually negotiate tribal agreements on agreements with local tribes. behalf of their tribes and are held One of the older and more renown ones is accountable by other tribes, or the state, the mawad-e sang (stone agreement) in in case of a breach of contract, the the Eastern Nangarhar Province. responsibility for implementation of rules Negotiated between King Zahir Shah spelled out equally lies with all members (1963-1973) and Shinwari as well as of the community. Mohmand elders, this agreement details While much of the customary structure in the rights and responsibilities of the Eastern and Southern Afghanistan relies tribes vis-à-vis the state. In return for

TLO Policy Brief 1 / December 2009

4

regulatory autonomy and especially the Arbakai - The Tribal Police of right to resolve disputes according to South-eastern Afghanistan their own customary practises, the The notion of an arbakai is an old Shinwari and Mohmand tribes were concept in rural Pashtun Afghanistan responsible for maintaining security in best compared to community-based specified manteqas (tribal areas of policing. It is important to draw a clear jurisdiction). For this purpose, they were line between the arbakai and militias of asked to raise an arbakai (tribal police, any sort that are associated with strongman and commanders: see box below) or shilgun (another form • of tribal police) to guard roads and The arbakai are a very temporary body that is only established for solving generally enforce jirga (ad-hoc decisions- specific problems, and only for the length 3 making body) decisions. While the of time required to do so. agreement was formally written down • The size of the arbaka i depends on under Zahir Shah’s rule, a witness to the the kind of operation, in many cases it is signature ceremony claimed that it had simply for the purpose of dispute already been in force in verbal form since resolution or executing the decision of a the reign of Ahmad Shah Abdali (1747- jirga or shura . 1773), the founder of the Durrani • Despite the fact that each arbakai Empire. 4 has a clear leader ( mir ), the accountability goes back to the tribal council ( jirga or The oldest agreements that elders in shura ) that called upon the arbakai , which Ahmad Aba recall were established under in turn is accountable to its own community. the reign of Zahir Shah (1933-1973) during the period when Mohammed • Arbakai only function in the very limited realm of the tribe they represent. Daoud Khan was royal prime minister Their fighters are volunteers from within (1953-1963). In these agreements, the the community and are paid for by the tribal elders pledged to provide security community. This emphasises again that and policing, particularly from robberies. their loyalty lies with their communities, The state, in turn, allowed tribes to and not an individual leader. govern day-to-day issues with their • Due to the association with customary mechanisms. 5 Similarly to the customary mechanisms, arbakai can only function in areas with strong and cohesive mawad-e sang agreement in the East, the tribal structures. agreements was enforced by an arbakai .

Source: Susanne Schmeidl and Masood Karokhail, 2009, This formalisation of tribal governance “The Role of Non-State Actors in 'Community-Based arrangements came to a temporary halt Policing' - An Exploration of the Arbakai (Tribal Police) in South-Eastern Afghanistan,” Contemporary Security when Daoud Khan overthrew the Policy , Vol. 30(2): 318-342. monarchy and became the first President of Afghanistan in 1973. 6

TLO Policy Brief 1 / December 2009

5

His regime and the subsequent rule of the attempt to set up a Paktia-wide People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan agreement to stop factional fighting, (PDPA), which came to power after the however, failed. 10 saur (April) revolution of 1978, brought Such a shura was successfully established the Eastern and South-eastern tribes into in the East by long strongmen in order to increasing opposition with the state. With maintain stability. This Shura-i-Mashriqi the full onset of the jihad , the central was commonly referred to as Jalalabad or government lost most of its ability to Eastern Shura and lasted until the arrival intervene by means of force and exercise of the Taliban. 11 administrative control outside urban centres. Rural areas became contested During the Taliban rule in Paktia (1995- between the PDPA and the resisting 2001), tribal agreements once again fell mujahideen groups causing massive out of use. Even though civil disputes and forced displacement to Pakistan, minor criminal transgressions were still especially of traditional leadership. resolved by traditional jirgas , the influence of community leaders declined. Especially the South-eastern Loya The Taliban established a monopoly over (Greater) Paktia region 7 witnessed some the trials of criminals, especially thieves of the fiercest fighting in Afghanistan and murderers using sharia law. 12 Local during the jihad . This led to agreements arbakai were dismantled, with the Taliban between tribes in order to keep a to a large extent taking over the minimum of governance and security in provision of security. their areas.

In Ahmad Aba, for example, an oral 4 Tribal Agreements in Ahmad Aba agreement among the Machalgho sub- after 2001 tribes of the Ahmadzai stipulated rules to The security and governance vacuum that avoid infighting between different occurred after the ousting of the Taliban mujahideen factions as well as sub- regime in late-2001 prompted the entire tribes. 8 In the agreement, mujahideen Ahmadzai tribe to draw up a written from the area pledged not to fight each agreement specific to Ahmad Aba. It other, dismantle checkpoints and reign in remained in force until the Afghan abuses of civilians. Blood-feud-related Transitional Government with Hamid killings were banned for all tribesmen Karzai as Interim President was set up in from the Machalgho area. As a result, June 2002. The main provisions were Machalgho remained relatively peaceful strikingly similar to the post-jihad and stable, compared to surrounding agreement and essentially aimed at areas where fighters of mujahideen stabilisation. factions preyed on travellers at illegal checkpoints and countless feuds between As before, the agreement prohibited sub-tribes erupted in violent clashes. 9 An revenge-killings, bringing blood feuds to a

TLO Policy Brief 1 / December 2009

6

temporary halt. Conflicts over land and sub-tribes in Ahmad Aba district are other resources were equally frozen and linked to the jurisdiction of sub-tribes competing claimants asked to hold back within their respective manteqas or area until the overall political situation of influence. One has been set up by the stabilised and a new government was elders of the manteqas of Gharook and announced. Machalgho, one by the Salamkhel elders of Rood manteqa and one by the The Ahmadzai elders also vowed to stand Kamelkhel elders of Rood manteqa .16 united to defend their area against any Jointly the three agreements cover the outsiders. This was crucial as the Taliban entire district area and the communities insurgency started to regroup quickly. For within it. that purpose in particular and the enforcement of the agreement in general, The central component of all three an arbakai was set up, with the names of agreements is the provision of security, its members written into the contract. 13 each dedicating several articles with specific rules to this topic. This includes Once the state re-established its the prevention of non-state actor activity administrative capacity, this more general in general and attacks on foreign troops, agreement fell out of use and was government officials and non- superseded by three more specific governmental (NGO) workers in contracts on a mantega (specific particular. 17 In order to avoid open geographic territory defining tribal confrontation with the Taliban insurgency, jurisdiction) or wanda (smaller area the agreements do not explicitly name defining jurisdiction at a sub-tribal them. level), 14 which are still in force today. Other security threats are more These three contracts, focussing overall specifically targeted to the particular on an improvement of governance and needs of each area. The Salam Khail security, exclusively regulate the relations agreement, for example, explicitly among the members of the different prohibits abductions and bans ‘the tribes in Ahmad Aba. In an cultivation, trade and consumption of acknowledgement of the renewed state- drugs’. 18 The Kamel Khail agreement building efforts the contracts spell out the regulates ‘murder (and incitement to responsibilities of each tribal member to murder)’, and the Machalgho-Gharook the tribe and also the state. In order to agreement makes ‘the provision of cooperate with government actors and misinformation about other residents to ensure transparency, tribes asked either the government out of private interest’ a the district or provincial governor to sign punishable offence. off on the agreement. 15 In terms of crime prevention, the The three written tribal agreements Machalgho agreement emphasizes currently in force among the Ahmadzai

TLO Policy Brief 1 / December 2009

7

punishments for ‘robbers or thieves’ and The general mandate of this arbakai is to the Salam Khail one prohibits ‘extortion prevent security threats “from Al Qaida to and robbery’. fights between cousins”. 21 The Machalgho arbakai cooperate particularly closely with The Salam Khail and the Kamel Khail the state: 12 men formally work for the agreements also contain more general district police and wear uniforms, in order rules pertaining to wider social practices, to avoid being mistaken for insurgents such as limiting the expenses to be made and attacked by US-forces. A single mir at social occasions (i.e., marriages or for the entire manteqa operates as funerals). 19 constant liaison point between district In addition to spelling out rules and administration and manteqa-shura . regulations, all three agreements also specify punishments for transgressions. 4.1 Reasons for establishing Tribal This includes, among others, heavy fines Agreements of up to Afs. 100,000 (about USD 2,000), burning the house of offenders and The establishment of the current three banishing offenders and their family from agreements by Ahmad Aba elders reflects the tribe. The latter is the worst a response to a mixture of external punishment as it essentially strips pressures and local dynamics. As noted, individuals of their tribal citizenship. the core of all agreements is to ensure local security (e.g., crime and blood The rules are to be enforced, and feuds) and guard against foreign attacks punishments implemented, by arbakai . (insurgency, but also international For the Salam Khail in Rood, the arbakai forces). They might also be used as a is established through the agreement bargaining chip to attract state and itself, which specifies the names of its 18 foreign assistance (security and curbing members and the commanding mir . drug cultivation in exchange for projects). Although the Machalgho-Gharook Lastly some also address social issues. agreement makes no explicit mention of arbakai , the already existing one is as Guarding against external ‘threats’ – responsible for its enforcement. 20 insurgency, air strikes, civilian These arbakai of 5-10 men per wanda casualties and detention by were set up in the Machalgho and international forces: The motivation for Gharook manteqas after 2001 and never preventing insurgent activity in Ahmad dismantled as these two mountainous Aba neither stems from ideological areas are riddled with numerous illegal conviction nor from positive incentives smuggling routes and vulnerable to offered by government or international 22 insurgency and other criminal threats. military forces to tribes. It is a self- protective measure as tribes fear indiscriminate revenge attacks by US and

TLO Policy Brief 1 / December 2009

8

Afghan National Security forces, should escalated tensions into a blood feud there be any assaults on government between the leading families of both officials, aid workers or foreign troops in tribes. 25 A district official asserted that their district. 23 the Tota Khail strongman is waiting for a chance to take revenge. 26 This comes from several hard-learned lessons starting with a group of Loya The Machalgho tribal agreement drawn Paktia elders on their way to attend the up several years after the shootout inauguration ceremony of President strengthens the commitment of the Karzai being bombed by US forces as different sub-tribes to act united in case they were misinformed by a close Afghan of outside intrusion, by making ally identifying it as an insurgency references to robbers. 27 Some allege that convoy. Furthermore, there were the agreement also serves to protect frequent night raids and detentions of Machalgho families in their blood feud local elders due to misinformation that with Tota Khail families. 28 can be traced back to animosities between clans, individuals and/or Attracting development aid: Elders in opportunistic criminal elements that were Ahmad Aba also tried to use increased trying to take advantage of the post- security and the banning of drug Taliban power vacuum. cultivation in order to attract development funds, especially alternative Guarding internal security: The livelihood initiatives. The concessions on Machalgho area has also been plagued by drug cultivation was clearly used as tensions between the Machalgho (and bargaining chip as, the Machalgho tribes also neighbouring Mangal) and Tota Khail offered the ban on cannabis-cultivation to tribes. This was aggravated in 2002 when government officials on their own young men from the Tota Khail tribe initiative, requesting development started robbing travellers in an area resources and jobs for the area’s young belonging to Ahmadzai and Mangal tribes. men in return. 29 It is alleged that the robbers were backed So far, however, elders are dissatisfied by a Tota Khail jihadi commander with with the level and quality of assistance good relations to an infamous regional and projects provided to their areas. A strongman. dam for a hydroelectric plant recently Mangal and Machalgho elders approached completed by the US-led Provincial Tota Khail elders who agreed to reign in Reconstruction Team in the Machalgho their fellow tribesmen, but ultimately area, for instance, does not operate were unable to do so. 24 The subsequent effectively. 30 Improved wheat seeds killing of four members of the Tota Khail provided by the Department of tribe (including the son of said jihadi Agriculture are said to have been commander) by Machalgho tribesmen provided in insufficient quantities.

TLO Policy Brief 1 / December 2009

9

Another larger dam financed by USAID endorsed by all members of the tribe, and to be implemented by the Ministry of which they are through the agreement. Rehabilitation and Rural Development That the elders are perceived as (MRRD) is yet to be constructed. legitimate, in turn, renders the agreements more effective. Citing the absence of improvement in the employment situation of young men as Second, the agreements effectively main factor, an elder claimed that the communicate support of the Afghan Machalgho area will soon have no choice government and its allies by endorsing but to resume the cultivation and their policies. In turn they demand smuggling of Marijuana. 31 The times it did actions and exemptions that allow the happen, the Afghan National Police (ANP) elders to sell the rules of the agreements went in and destroyed the crop. So far to their clients. tribes have not reacted to this, fearing Third, the agreements help to establish that any form of violence could lead to the arbakai , which take on policing duties the involvement of US troops. on a day-to-day basis. If needs be they can also be rapidly mobilised as

4.2 The limits of tribal agreement in substantial community defence force. maintaining security Many elders have gained considerable In the past three years the current experience as commanders during the Ahmad Aba district governor has been in civil war, and weapons, including heavy office, there were no serious incidents ones, are also available. 33 involving insurgents in the district; The relative calm of Ahmad Aba, despite the fact that insurgency influence however, could change if insurgents is growing in neighbouring Sayed Karam manage to isolate the district by 32 district. Thus, the tribal agreements controlling all surrounding areas. This that signal the allegiance of local elders process has already started, as in many with the state and provide arbakai other districts of Paktia the insurgency structures in support represent the has been embraced by individual families sufficient if not the necessary condition or sub-tribes to gain an advantage in for the resilience of Ahmad Aba. local conflicts. Ahmad Aba elders, as There are three key reasons for the recently as spring 2009, are periodically functioning of tribal agreements in Ahmad approached by insurgents and asked for Aba. access and support. 34

First, even though the elders who are the If this process continues it could driving force behind their establishment marginalize influential elders, who may wield considerable influence in the loose the support of their constituency if district, their authority and the rules they they are no longer able to control the enforce only become legitimate if formally district.

TLO Policy Brief 1 / December 2009

10

5 Can Tribal Agreements Work important compared to access to the Elsewhere? mujahideen parties in Pakistan, arms and ammunition, and the ability to fight. This The existence and functioning of tribal played into the hands of younger contracts rests very much on tribal commanders and in many places shifted cohesion and the strength of customary village level power relations in their mechanisms. In contrast to other areas favour. (especially the South), the tribal system is still comparatively strong in The Tota Khail elders of the area Afghanistan’s East and Southeast in neighbouring Ahmad Aba, for example, general, and Ahmad Aba in particular. An lost much of their influence during the important contributing factor for this is jihad . The family of a particular jihadi the relatively equal distribution of land: commander profited greatly from their “[t]he Ghilzai in Afghanistan have a alliance with a regional strongman. As a […] productive agriculture base […], result, as noted earlier, Tota Khail elders but it was a production system that are now unable to exert influence over provided little scope for class the young men of the tribe, e.g. for distinctions. They maintained an egalitarian political order that was as reigning in robberies. opposed to the power of its own This does not mean that tribal leaders as it was to attempts by governments to centralize power in agreements cannot work elsewhere, but Kabul.” 35 that any effort to engage tribal actors This setting has produced the specific mix through them needs to be based on a of dependency and accountability that thorough analysis of district-level politics. allows tribal leaders to acquire authority Despite the vagueness of the 2004 but not hegemonic power over other Afghan constitution on the matter of tribesmen. In many other regions of governmental-tribal interactions, there is Afghanistan power is much more clear evidence that such contracts are centralised and local leaders less also being reactivated in Afghanistan’s dependent on the approval of the local Eastern region. population. 36 As in the past, these agreements regulate In comparison to other tribes in Paktia, the geographical areas where local the authority of Ahmadzai elders is governance is provided by the tribes, particularly strong and for the most part granting a degree of autonomy from state goes uncontested. In many other tribes, intervention to the tribes in exchange for the influence of elders was severely the provision of security. curtailed during the jihad . During this A recent agreement signed by Shinwar time, the classical patronage-role of elders and the governors of the five managing relations with the central Shinwari districts in Nangarhar is a good government became substantially less

TLO Policy Brief 1 / December 2009

11

example. The tribe is held accountable non-state actors in terms acceptable to through fines if criminal offences occur in the local population. Acknowledging this areas controlled by them. A murder, for calls for a constructive engagement with example, ‘costs’ Afs. 180,000 (about USD tribal actors. 3,600). 37 Furthermore, Article 16 (of 20 This has certainly drawn the attention of stipulated) binds the entire tribe to policy makers interested in stabilisation ‘support all policies of the government’, policies to confront the continuing and to support the government against all deterioration of the security situation in those ‘who oppose government policies’, Afghanistan in general, for example i.e. insurgents. through the very recently promoted In exchange, the state is willing to Community Defence Initiative (CDI). If support governance provided by local actors promoting such initiatives, elders. however, want to ensure the buy-in of tribes (and not jihadi networks) they Article 20 of the agreement allows the need to properly understand and utilize state to intervene in disputes, if one or the geographic concepts of tribal both of the disputants do not agree to an jurisdiction: manteqas and wandas . informal settlement procedure endorsed by local elders within four months. In this Wanda basically represents the share in case, the government is permitted to loss and profit of a community within the imprison the defiant party. This is a ‘stick’ jurisdiction of the sub-tribe that inhabits used by government actors and tribal a specific region. It also reflects the elders to keep communities in check, and population size of a tribe and its’ overall helps to strengthen elders who are party input/output into the social fabric of the to the agreement. district. For this reason, any shura at a district level allocates the number of 6 CONCLUSION representatives per tribe based on its population. The same formula is used The weakness of the Afghan government, when a tribe raises its a rbakai . especially at a sub-national level, and the Government assistance or development strength of tribal structures and funds are distributed on the same ratio. mechanisms in South-eastern Manteqas are usually comprised of Afghanistan are realities that are not several wandas – hence several elders going to change any time soon. Tribal may share jurisdiction of a manteqa , agreements continue to be an important while each holds power in their respective means to establish general and binding wanda . rules within and between tribal groups and to negotiate governance and security The Ahmad Aba case shows that each issues between the Afghan government wanda enjoys its own autonomy in (and currently also its allies) and local decision-making and tends to develop an

TLO Policy Brief 1 / December 2009

12

internal agreement before signing Finally, the failure of the Afghan anything at the manteqa or district level. government and international actors to reign in on the expanding insurgency put Usually the strength of a tribe or sub- local leaders under too much pressure for tribe is judged by other tribes as to how it keeping up an agreement involving the can enforce a decision in its own wanda . Afghan government and foreign entities If elders are unable to yield influence in (UNAMA, PRT). their own wanda , they are likely also weak at a manteqa and district level. In Ahmad Aba district, in contrast, tribal Thus before any agreements are made, agreements are local, self-driven the responsibility of sub-tribes and in initiatives embedded in a relatively their specific area of jurisdiction needs to cohesive tribal structure with rigorous be clarified if agreements are not to accountability mechanisms. The relatively backfire. intact tribal structures of Ahmad Aba in particular have allowed local leaders to Since 2003 several agreements were create communal consensus and security signed in Paktia under the auspices of the within their respective areas of influence provincial government and backed by the (manteqa or wanda ) and to jointly local PRT and the regional office of the prevent insurgency activity in the district. United Nations Assistance Mission to The strong leadership in turn makes the Afghanistan (UNAMA). The Zadran- tribe confident to provide arbakai as stability pact is likely the most known deemed necessary by the shura of a one. 38 There are four key reasons why given wanda or manteqa . none of these agreements really worked. This illustrates the willingness and ability First, they were seen as driven by of each individual sub-tribe to take external (international) actors rather than responsibility and to join forces in the local communities themselves. form of an Ahmadzai district-level tribal Second, the agreements focused on a shura that can sign further agreements general level, failed to first broker sub- with the Afghan state. As long as such tribal agreements at the wanda and cohesion remains, it is difficult for manteqa level. insurgents or criminal gang to find in- Third, there was a failure to ascertain the roads. Knowing this, insurgents tend to cohesion and strength of local leadership, target community leaders in an attempt and how to deal with fragmentation. In to fragment tribes and subdue them. some areas, such as Zurmat district in In light of the above, the tribal Paktia for examples, tribal leadership is agreements of Ahmad Aba are not quite weak and mullah network yield necessarily replicable in other, especially more power and influence. more fragmented, areas. Endorsing them as a matter of general policy would be

TLO Policy Brief 1 / December 2009

13

ineffective at best and harmful at the • Classify manteqas and wandas as to worst. Policy-makers should rather their level of tribal cohesion and establish a legal basis with general strength of communal structures. guidelines for formal agreements with • Explore ways on how to engage with tribal actors and leave the specific key actors and local communities in implementation to provincial and district such areas in order to strengthen administrations. cohesion and community-lead security Overall, however, the Afghan state, as mechanisms. well as external actors, needs to • Explore ways of how to strengthen understand that constructive engagement peace-oriented elders in their mission with Pashtun tribes aimed at achieving a to contribute to local community- proper, long-term buy-in into the current based governance in collaboration Afghan state-building effort, require less with the state. This may include the stick and more carrot. increase of service delivery and In the short-term this means more development projects in exchange for development aid, importantly aimed at security provision. creating employment and providing • Develop general guidelines for valued services like electricity. After all, brokering formal agreements with in traditional Pashtun culture the tribal actors and rules for specific relationship between the traditional implementation at the provincial and patrons ( khans ) and their clients is district administrations. complex, with leaders needing to deliver services to their communities to remain Endnotes in power. The Ahmad Aba case illustrates that tribal agreements are a good way to 1 Embassy of the United States in Afghanistan and U.S. Forces Afghanistan, 2009, United States Government support such leaders and ensure security. Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan . 10 August 2009, p. 2. http://www.politico.com/static/PPM130_civ- 7 Recommendations mil_plan_afghanistan_090907.html (accessed 12 November 2009) In order to improve understanding of the 2 Ibid, p. 1, 2, 22 3 Interview with Shinwar Senator and head of the link between tribal areas of jurisdiction Shinwari qawmi shura , Kabul, 29 April 2009. and representation and local security and 4 Ibid 5 governance in Loya Paktia, we propose to Interview with Mangal elder, Gardez, 18 June 2009. 6 Interview with Shinwar Senator and head of the conduct an in-depth study of manteqas Shinwari qawmi shura , Kabul, 29 April 2009. 7 and wandas : Including Khost, Paktia, Paktika and parts of Ghazni 8 A similar agreement among Mangal tribe as well as • Identify existing manteqas and between Mangal and Ahmadzai tribes also existed in other areas of Paktia. wandas and associated tribal 9 Interview with Rood elder, Gardez, 18 June 2009. 10 leadership. Interview with Machalgho elder, Gardez, 16 June 2009. 11 After the collapse of Taliban many of the Eastern shura members individually assisted the Coalition Forces to

TLO Policy Brief 1 / December 2009

14

capture and kill Al Qaeda remnants in eastern 28 Ibid, Interview with Machalgho elder, Gardez, 18 June Afghanistan. 2009. 12 They meted out their typical severe punishments and 29 Interview with Machalgho elder, Gardez, 18 June 2009. as a result, elders say, the incidence of robberies and 30 Interview with Machalgho elder, Gardez 18 June 2009. murders dropped dramatically during this period. 31 Interview with Machalgho elder, Gardez, 18 June 2009. Interview with Machalgho-elder, 18 June 2009, Gardez. 32 13 Interview with Machalgho (Rood) elder, Gardez, 18 Interview with Ahmad Aba government official, Gardez, June 2009. The generally cooperative atmosphere early 17 June 2009. An incident in early June 2009 which the after 2001 is also illustrated by the fact that all tribes of governor classified as an insurgency attack was Paktia were able to agree on an interim governor, attributed to feuding families by Ahmadzai elders. Saifullah. He remained in office until the interim 33 Heavy weapons including RPGs and machine guns were government had been set up in Kabul and had appointed fired frequently at wedding parties or other festive a provincial governor of its own. occasions in Ahmad Aba until 2008, when elders 14 A mantega is made up of several wandas . promised to the provincial governor to stop this practice. However, TLO staff still witnessed the firing of a heavy 15 The elders deny that suggestions of the district machine gun from a compound after a son had been born administration were taken into account, but the district to the family living there. governor himself claims to have been shown the 34 agreement before its official endorsement for his Interview with Machalgho elder, Gardez, 16 June 2009. approval. 35 Thomas J Barfield, 2007, “Pashtun Agrarian Structure 16 All three written agreements were established recently. and Tribal Organization for Times of War & Peace“, Paper The current, manteqa -level agreement for Machalgho was presented at the Boston University, for Agrarian Studies signed by representatives of all sub-tribes in late 2008. Colloquium Series Hinterlands, Frontiers, Cities and According to Salam Khail and Kamel Khail elders, the States: Transactions and Identities at Yale University, 23 other subtribes in Rood follow their agreements in all February, p.3. central points. Interview with Kamel Khail elder, 23 June http://www.yale.edu/agrarianstudies/papers/19weapons. 2009, Kabul. pdf (accessed 5 February 2010) 36 17 Interviews with Machalgho-elders, Gardez 16 and 18 Past state-building exercises have fragmented tribes in June 2009; Rood-elder, Gardez, 18 June 2009. the South far more than in the Southeast and East, furthermore the impact of the Afghan wars has been far 18 Interview with Machalgho elder, 18 June 2009, Gardez. more damaging with new (religious) leaders being able to 19 Handing out expensive gifts at ritual occasions is an supersede traditional elders in South. important way of demonstrating hospitality and 37 Some of the provisions clearly contradict international enhancing one’s status. Wealthier individuals thus set a human rights obligations of the Afghan government. very high bar that are difficult for poorer families to Adultery, for instance, is punishable by death and the reach. Thus, in order to avoid the shame of being agreement specifies that in this case no fine for murder considered less hospitable, often with ruinous results, the will have to be paid. tribal agreements impose spending limits on funerals and 38 weddings in order to curb this mutual outbidding that can Another one was meant to settle a land conflict lead to internal tensions; Interview with Kamel Khail between the Sabari and Balkahil on the border of Paktia elder, Kabul 23 June 2009. and Khost. 20 Interview with Machalgho elder, Gardez, 16 June 2009. 21 Ibid 22 Interview with Rood elder, Gardez, 18 June 2009. 23 American soldiers have a fearful reputation in Paktia. The Special Operation Forces (SOF) who comprised the main presence of the US in the early months of the invasion often beat up prisoners severely, killing at least one in custody. Cf. Farah Stockman, 2007. “US behind warlord’s rise, fall”, Boston Globe , 12 August 2007. http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/08/12 /us_behind_afghan_warlords_rise_fall/ (accessed 5 February 2010) 24 Interviews with Machalgho and Mangal elders Gardez, 18 June 2009 and Tota Khail elder, Gardez, 19 June 2009. 25 In 2004, a similar incident led to a full-scale war between the Mangal and Tota Khail tribes. That was finally stopped due to the intervention of the provincial government and a jirga was called to settle the opposing claims. 26 Interview with Ahmad Aba district official, Gardez, 17 June 2009. 27 Ibid

TLO Policy Brief 1 / December 2009