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Easo Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan Taliban Strategies European Asylum Support Office Bureau Européen d’Appui pour l’Asile BZ-30-12-564-EN-C EASO Country of Origin Information report Afghanistan Taliban Strategies – Recruitment July 2012 doi:10.2847/13321 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS Free publications: • via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu); • at the European Union’s representations or delegations. You can obtain their contact details on the Internet (http://ec.europa.eu) or by sending a fax to +352 2929-42758. Priced publications: • via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu). Priced subscriptions (e.g. annual series of the Official Journal of the European Union and reports of cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union): • via one of the sales agents of the Publications Office of the European Union (http://publications.europa.eu/others/agents/index_en.htm). European Asylum Asylum Support Support Office Office EASO CountryCountry of of Origin Origin Information Information report methodology Afghanistan: Taliban Strategies - Recruitment Luxembourg: Publications Publications Offi Officece of theof theEuropean European Union Union 2012 — 32 pp. — 21 x 29.7 cm 2012 — 52 pp. — 21 x 29.7 cm ISBN 978-92-9507911-3 doi:10.2847/17644ISBN 978-92-9507906-9 doi:10.2847/13321 European Asylum Support Office Bureau Européen d’Appui pour l’Asile EASO EASO Country of Origin Information report Afghanistan Taliban strategies – Recruitment July 2012 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union. Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers or these calls may be billed. More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2012 ISBN 978-92-9507906-9 doi:10.2847/13321 For Public Use Prepared in accordance with the EASO COI Report Methodology © European Asylum Support Office, 2012 Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained therein. Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. Printed in Luxembourg PRINTED ON PROCESS CHLORINE-FREE RECYCLED PAPER (PCF) COI Report Afghanistan: Taliban Strategies — Recruitment — 3 Contents Contents .............................................................................................................................................................. 3 Disclaimer ............................................................................................................................................................ 5 Terms of reference ............................................................................................................................................... 7 Executive summary ............................................................................................................................................. 9 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................... 11 Synthesis of information .................................................................................................................................... 13 1. Brief history of the recent conflict in Afghanistan .................................................................................................13 1.1 Communism v Islamism (1978–92) ..................................................................................................................13 1.2 The Civil War (1992–96) ................................................................................................................................... 14 1.3 Taliban (1996–2001) ........................................................................................................................................15 1.4 The Karzai government, international forces and insurgency (2001–12) ........................................................16 Summary — A Brief history ..................................................................................................................................... 17 2. The Taliban organisation after 2001 .......................................................................................................................18 2.1 Definition of Taliban .........................................................................................................................................18 2.2 General structure .............................................................................................................................................18 2.3 Operational methods and structures ...............................................................................................................19 2.3.1 Infiltrating a territory and connecting to the population ......................................................................19 2.3.2 Bad governance v shadow governance .................................................................................................19 2.3.3 Military structure ...................................................................................................................................20 2.3.4 Funding ...................................................................................................................................................20 2.3.5 Propaganda............................................................................................................................................21 2.3.6 Pakistan ..................................................................................................................................................22 Summary — Structure and modus operandi of the Taliban ............................................................................22 2.4 A religious organisation ...................................................................................................................................22 2.5 The Taliban: A Pashtun movement? .................................................................................................................23 2.5.1 The 1990s ...............................................................................................................................................23 2.5.2 Post 2001................................................................................................................................................23 Summary — A Pashtun movement? ................................................................................................................24 2.6 Different insurgent groups ............................................................................................................................... 24 3. The recruitment of fighters ....................................................................................................................................25 3.1 General .............................................................................................................................................................25 Summary — General recruitment ....................................................................................................................26 3.2 Drivers and mechanisms for recruitment.........................................................................................................26 3.2.1 Economic incentives ...............................................................................................................................26 Summary — Economic incentives ....................................................................................................................28 3.2.2 Honour and prestige ..............................................................................................................................28 3.2.3 Individual threats, the use of force and coercion by Taliban .................................................................28 Summary — Individual threats, use of force and coercion by Taliban ............................................................30 3.2.4 Kinship and tribal loyalty or tradition ....................................................................................................30 Summary — Kinship and tribe .......................................................................................................................... 31 3.2.5 Religious persuasion .............................................................................................................................. 31 3.2.6 Revenge (badal) .....................................................................................................................................32 3.2.7 Geographical situation ...........................................................................................................................32 3.2.8 Government inefficiency and corruption ...............................................................................................33 3.3 Minors ..............................................................................................................................................................33 3.4 Suicide bombers ...............................................................................................................................................34
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