Tribes and Intrastate Conflict: Using Indigenous Methods for Conflict Resolution in Pakistan’s Tribal Frontier
Farooq Yousaf
Master of Public Policy (M.P.P) - University of Erfurt (Germany)
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics
The University of Newcastle
January 2019
This research was supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program (RTP) Scholarship Statement of Originality
I hereby certify that the work embodied in the thesis is my own work, conducted under
normal supervision. The thesis contains no material which has been accepted, or is being
examined, for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made. I give consent to the final version of my thesis being made available worldwide when deposited in the University’s Digital Repository, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968 and any approved embargo.
Farooq Yousaf
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Acknowledgements
I would like to, first of all, thank my primary supervisor, Dr Tod Moore, for his never-ending
support and feedback on my thesis since April 2015. It was due to his support that for I never
felt pressured and stressed throughout the writing process of my thesis. Dr Moore always
remained available to give me feedback not only my thesis but other academic works as well.
Secondly, I would like to thank my second supervisor, Dr John Tate, who, in the final part of my PhD, spent a lot of time to give me constructive feedback on my work. I understand that he came on board late due to various reasons, however, I am greatly thankful to him for his constructive feedback on my thesis. His feedback, in limited time, helped me further improve my thesis.
I am also thankful to the Australian Government and the University of Newcastle for funding my PhD study through the Research Training Programme (RTP) scholarship. Without this funding, I could have never fulfilled my dream of pursuing a PhD from a well-reputed university. I would also like to thank the UoN FBL staff, who have always helped me with all my issues and enquiries.
I would also like to thank my former second supervisor, Dr Rob Imre, because of whom I came to Newcastle in the first place. It was Dr Imre who responded to my PhD supervision enquiry email and not only agreed to supervise me, but also encouraged me to apply for the University of Newcastle (UoN) PhD funding.
At the Politics department at UoN, I would especially like to thank Dr Jim Jose and Mr Japhace
Poncian. Dr Jose, even though not my supervisor, was always available for advice and feedback whenever I called upon him. On the other hand, Mr Poncian was not only a colleague but also a friend, who not only taught me a lot but also co-authored two papers with me. His iii
friendship and on and off feedback on my work helped me further evaluate and improve my
thesis.
I would like to especially thank Dr Furrukh Zad, whom I have known since 2012 in Germany
and who was my second supervisor for my Master’s thesis. It was Dr Zad who formally taught
me social science research and gave me insights on various theoretical approaches in Political
Science and IR. Even today, Dr Zad is always available to help and guide me. Dr Zad has also
played an important role in my academic journey.
I would also like to thank Mr Imtiaz Gul, Executive Director CRSS, because of whom I started
“writing” formally, which ultimately led me to this PhD. Because of his mentoring, for the past
8 years, I was able to “write” and develop an interest in political science and conflict studies.
He might not know this, but after my parents, it is Mr Gul who played the most important role in my personal and professional development.
Most importantly, I am indebted, forever, to my parents and my brother – my father Yousaf
Jamal, my mother Khalida Yousaf and my brother Omer Yousaf – for their support, love and
care. Without them, I would have never made it this far in life. Also without my parents’ sacrifices, I would have never been able to pursue quality higher education. It is them who give me the motivation to carry on in life. In short, I owe them everything.
I am also thankful to my Mother (in Law), Shayne Englebrecht, who gave me a home away from home in Singleton. She welcomed me in her family at a very critical time in my life, and therefore gave me a safety net that I could fall back on in times of stress or need. She has always treated me like her son and made me feel home in Australia.
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Finally, I would like to thank my wife Lacey, who had to bear with me during my thesis writing and submission process. Without her love, care and support, finishing this thesis would have been a lot harder than it ultimately was for me. Her support throughout the last 12 months kept me going during the final stages of my thesis.
Farooq Yousaf
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Table of Contents
STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS III
GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS IX
LIST OF CHARTS XI
LIST OF MAPS XI
LIST OF TABLES XI
LIST OF RELATED PUBLICATIONS XII
ABSTRACT XIII
INTRODUCTION 2
BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE 2 RESEARCH PROBLEM STATEMENT 7 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 8 LIMITS OF THE RESEARCH DATA 10 STRUCTURE OF CHAPTER EIGHT 11 RESEARCH DESIGN OVERVIEW 11 CHAPTER OUTLINE 12
1.0. LITERATURE REVIEW 19
1.1. TRIBAL SOCIETIES, CULTURE, AND INDIGENOUS CONFLICT RESOLUTION 20 1.1.1. TRIBAL SOCIETIES 20 1.1.2. SEGMENTARY LINEAGE AND TRIBAL SOCIETIES 24 1.1.3. CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND CULTURE 30 1.1.4. POSTCOLONIALISM AND INDIGENOUS CONFLICT RESOLUTION 33 1.2. PAKISTAN’S COLONIAL LEGACY AND PASHTUN TRIBAL AREAS 37 1.2.1. PAKISTAN’S COLONIAL LEGACY 37 1.2.2. THE PASHTUN JIRGA AND PASHTUNWALI 38 1.2.3. CONFLICT IN THE FATA REGION 40 1.3. GAP IN LITERATURE 42 1.4. CONCLUSION 48
2.0. RESEARCH DESIGN 51
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2.1. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 51 2.2. POSTCOLONIALISM AS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 56 2.3. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND PROBLEMS OCCURRED 58 2.4. CONCLUSION 59
3.0. PASHTUNS: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 62
3.1. A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO PASHTUNS 62 3.2. PASHTUNWALI – THE WAY OF THE PASHTUNS 74 3.2.1. PROBLEMS WITH PASHTUNWALI 85 3.3. PASHTUNS AND SEGMENTARY LINEAGE 88 3.4. CONCLUSION 95
4.0. INDIGENOUS CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PASHTUN JIRGA 98
4.1. INDIGENOUS CONFLICT RESOLUTION AROUND THE WORLD 98 4.2. THE PASHTUN JIRGA 101 4.2.1. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO PASHTUN JIRGA 101 4.2.2. LEVELS OF JIRGA 104 4.2.3. JIRGA’S HISTORICAL ROLE IN TRIBAL AREAS AND AFGHANISTAN 108 4.3. LASHKAR 113 4.4 CRITIQUE OF JIRGA AND LASHKAR 115 4.5. CONCLUSION 116
5.0. PAKISTAN’S POSTCOLONIAL PREDICAMENT IN THE PASHTUN TRIBAL AREAS 119
5.1. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO POSTCOLONIALISM 119 5.1.1. WHAT IS POSTCOLONIALISM? 119 5.1.2. POSTCOLONIALISM AND ALTERITY 123 5.1.3. POSTCOLONIALISM AND INDIGENOUS CONFLICT RESOLUTION 124 5.1.4. CRITIQUE ON POSTCOLONIAL THEORY / POSTCOLONIALISM 127 5.2. “TRIBAL” PASHTUNS, COLONIAL LITERATURE AND THEIR REPRESENTATION 129 5.3. PAKISTAN – A POSTCOLONIAL STATE? 133 5.3.1. PAKISTAN’S POSTCOLONIAL DILEMMA 133 5.3.2. THE FRONTIER CRIMES REGULATION (FCR), FATA AND PASHTUN JIRGA 145 5.4. CONCLUSION 158
6.0. FATA - COLONIAL LEGACIES LEADING TO MILITANCY 160
6.1 FATA’S ACCESSION TO PAKISTAN 161 6.2. MILITANCY AND VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN’S PASHTUN TRIBAL AREAS 164 6.2.1. PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS (1947 -1979) 164 6.2.2. PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS (1979-1989) 167 6.2.3. OSAMA BIN LADEN AND THE MUJAHEDEEN 170 6.2.4. MILITANCY IN FATA POST-SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN (1989-2001) 172 6.2.5. MILITANCY IN FATA REGION (2001-PRESENT) 174
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6.2.6. US DRONE STRIKES IN FATA 180 6.3. MILITANT GROUPS IN FATA 184 6.3.1. TRANSNATIONAL GROUPS 184 6.3.2. PAKISTANI TALIBAN 188 6.4. CONCLUSION 194
7.0. MILITARY OPERATIONS AND PEACE DEALS IN THE TRIBAL AREAS 197
7.1. PAKISTANI MILITARY OPERATIONS IN FATA (2002-2017) 198 7.1.1. MILITARY ACTIONS 199 7.1.2. PAKISTANI MILITARY STRATEGY IN FATA (2002-PRESENT) 206 7.1.3. EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 208 7.2. MAJOR PEACE DEALS IN FATA SINCE 2001 226 7.3.1. THE SHAKAI PEACE AGREEMENT (2004) 228 7.3.2. SARAROGHA PEACE AGREEMENT (2005) 231 7.3.3. WAZIRISTAN (MIRANSHAH) ACCORD (2006) 234 7.3.4. OTHER PEACE DEALS, UNDERSTANDINGS AND EFFORTS 237 7.3.5. FAILURE OF PEACE EFFORTS 239 7.3. CONCLUSION 243
8.0. ROLE OF JIRGA TOWARDS PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE TRIBAL AREAS 246
8.1. JIRGA’S ENGAGEMENT IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE TRIBAL AREAS 247 8.1.1. JIRGA AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE TRIBAL AREAS 247 8.1.2. LASHKARS ENGAGED IN FIGHTING MILITANTS 258 8.1.3. CONSTRAINTS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF JIRGA AND LASHKARS 271 8.2. PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR JIRGA 280 8.3. CONCLUSION 287
CONCLUSION 290
IMPORTANT FINDINGS 291 THE RESEARCH QUESTION 293 SCOPE FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 295
BIBLIOGRAPHY 297
ANNEX 334
ANNEX 1: A BRIEF HISTORY OF PASHTUN TRIBAL AREAS 335 ANNEX BIBLIOGRAPHY 344
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Glossary and Acronyms
Aitbar Trust
Badal Reciprocity
Badragga Safe conduct
Balandra Collective action
Baramta Taking hostages as a form of security deposit/assurance/bond
Belga Stolen items
BiJ Bureau of Investigative Journalism
Bota Security deposit/assurance/bond in form of seizure of land
CAMP Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme
Chigha To shout
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FCR Frontier Crimes Regulations
FRC FATA Research Centre
Gundi Group of people/personal or tribal rivalry
Hamsaya Neighbour
Hujra Common social sitting place among Pashtuns
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence
IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Jirga Pashtun tribal council and conflict resolution mechanism
Lashkar Pashtun tribal militia
LeT Lashkar e Taiba
Mashar Pashtun elder
Maulvi / Mullah Cleric
Melmastya Hospitality
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NAF New America Foundation
Nagha Fine imposed by the Jirga
Nanawatay Forgiveness or pardoning of the enemy
Nang Honour
Narkh Penalty rates (for fines) set by the Jirga
PA Political Agent
Pashtunwali Pashtun cultural code
SATP South Asia Terrorism Portal
Saz Blood money/reconciliation
Siyali Competition among extended family
Speen-Geeri White-bearded (denotes respected elders who are part of the Jirga)
Tarboorwali Agnatic rivalry
Tarr A ban on a certain activity, imposed by the Jirga
Tiga Stone/formal truce
Tor Black
TTP Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan
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List of Charts
Chart 8.2: Support for Jirga in former-FATA
List of Maps
Map 3.1: Afghanistan pre-Durand Line
Map 3.2: Durand Line (border) between Afghanistan and Pakistan
List of Tables
Table i: Militant Violence Fatalities (January 2000 – December 2017)
Table 7.1.: Internally Displaced Families from FATA as of October 2017
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List of Related Publications
Even though this research was conducted as a traditional dissertation, I, over the course of the research, also published papers, directly and indirectly, related to this research. A list of these publications is as follows:
1. (Forthcoming) Yousaf, F. (2019). Counter-terrorism in Pakistan’s Pashtun Tribal
Frontier. Peace Review, 31(4).
2. Yousaf, F. (2018). Pakistan’s Colonial Legacy: FCR and Postcolonial Governance in the
Pashtun Tribal Frontier. Interventions. (published online, volume and issue to be assigned
later) Doi:10.1080/1369801X.2018.1487322
3. Yousaf, F., & Poncian, J. (2018). Detriments of colonialism on indigenous conflict
resolution: An Analysis of Pakistan and Tanzania. Contemporary Justice Review. 21(4),
doi:10.1080/10282580.2018.1532795
4. Ahmed, Z. S., & Yousaf, F. (2018). Pashtun Jirgas, Their Potential in Pak-Afghan
Reconciliation and National Reconstruction. South Asia Research, 38(1), 57-74.
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Abstract
Pakistan’s Pashtun ‘tribal’ areas, formerly known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA), have faced a constant wave of militancy and violence since the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan in October 2001. This wave of militancy has not only affected the socio-political and cultural dynamics of the Pashtun ‘tribal’ areas but has also directly affected the security situation in Pakistan. This thesis discusses the history and background of the former-FATA region, the role of Pashtun conflict resolution mechanism of Jirga, along with the persistence of colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) in the region. The thesis argues that persistence of colonial legacies in the Pashtun ‘tribal’ areas coupled with the overarching influence of the military on security policy had negatively impacted the security situation in the region. By focusing on the Jirga and Jirga-based Lashkars (or Pashtun militias), the thesis shows how, despite obstacles, limitations and attacks from militants, Pashtuns have engaged in their own initiatives to deal with the rise of militancy in their region.
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Introduction
1
Introduction
This introduction provides the necessary background and rationale for this research. This
background and rationale involve a brief discussion on the rise of militancy and extremism in
the Pashtun tribal areas of Pakistan and why this is a significant problem worthy of research.
The introduction then identifies the research questions and objectives that the thesis will
investigate. It then provides a brief outline of the research design and methodology the thesis
will employ to investigate these questions but only as a prelude to the more substantial
discussion of research design and methodology in the second chapter. The introduction then
provides a brief description of the findings and conclusions that the investigation will reach
and a brief account of how the thesis is able to reach these conclusions given the research
design and methodology it employs. Finally, the introduction provides a brief outline of the
content of each of the chapters of the thesis and explains how this content is related to the
research questions, relevant to those questions, and how it contributes to answering those
questions.
Background and Rationale
Since the beginning of the Global War on Terror that arose after the 9/11 attacks in the United
States in 2001, Pakistan has also faced a wave of militancy and extremism after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. This wave has not only hurt the country in terms of security but has also inflicted economic misery, where the country saw a drastic decline in foreign direct investment as well as export demands, along with incurring losses of over $123 billion
(both direct and indirect losses) according to the Economic Survey of Pakistan 2016-2017
(Khan, Estrada and Yusof 2016; Rana 2018). Much of this militancy and most of the militant
2 networks in the country have historically been concentrated in the Pashtun tribal areas, formerly known as the FATA - Federally Administered Tribal Areas1 (Peterson 2014; Khan
2012a; Mehsud and Khan 2013; Yousaf, Rashid and Gul 2018). Until December 2017, more than 4000 people (out of the total national casualties of more than 60,000) have been killed in former-FATA as a result of militant violence (SATP 2017b, 2019), whereas recent estimates suggest that numbers might be as high as 6000 civilian deaths, especially due to the lack of media access in the region (Pakistan-Today 2018).
The former-FATA region often called Pakistan’s “lawless frontier”, spans a total area of around
27,000 sq. km. and is inhabited by more than 3 million ethnic Pashtun tribes (Johnston and
1 This research was started in April, 2015, when the Pashtun tribal areas were constitutionally known as the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). However, after the 31st Constitutional Amendment Bill passed in the national legislature of Pakistan on May 24, 2018. After the resolution of the 31st Constitutional Amendment Bill, the 25th constitutional amendment was made to the constitution. The President then signed the draft bill of
FATA Interim Governance Act on May, 29, and then approved the 25th Amendment on May 31, paving way for
FATA’s merger with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. After the legislation, the tribal agencies and Frontier
Regions (FRs) have been renamed as Tribal Districts. Hence, the terms “FATA”, “former-FATA”, “tribal areas”,
“Pashtun tribal areas”, “tribal regions” and “Pashtun tribal regions”, whenever used during the course of this research, designates the Pashtun tribal areas and tribal districts formerly known as FATA. Also, the terms
“Pashtun Tribal Areas” or “Tribal Areas” whenever used in this research, denote the former-FATA region.
Additionally, even though FATA’s tribal “Agencies” have been renamed as “Tribal Districts”, the research, for the ease of understanding and analysis, throughout, uses the term “Agencies” when referring to the new “tribal
Districts”. Finally, even though the reforms have been introduced in the region, their immediate impact is yet to be seen, and hence, difficult to evaluate due to the military’s presence and influence in the regions. Therefore the research has a cut-off date of 31st December, 2017.
3
Sarbahi 2016). The Pashtuns2 also referred to as Pakhtun, Pathan, Patan, Pashto, Pukhtoon,
are an Indo-Iranian population living in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan and
north western part of Pakistan (Minahan 2014).
The Pashtun tribal areas have remained the focus of conflict since 1979. This was the year of
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and this invasion was the catalyst for a proliferation of
Jihadist culture in the area (influenced by local Deobandi and foreign Salafist religious
thought). This Jihadist culture further intensified in the region in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the U.S.-led War on Terror, with the presence of local and transnational militant groups in the region since that time (Johnston and Sarbahi 2016; Nawaz 2009a).
It is argued in later chapters that the crumbling of what can be understood as the post-colonial pillars of governance within the region – the Maliks (tribal elders) and Political Agents (state- appointed representatives) – along with the persistence of colonial legacies, in the form of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) administered by the state, within the tribal areas, has resulted in increasing lawlessness, which has also enabled militant groups to operate with increasing impunity in the region (Ahmed 2013a; Siddiqi 2017; Yousaf 2018b). The decline of traditional pillars of governance and persistence of the FCR, coupled with the rising influence of military and religious clerics in the region, often aided by foreign funding, enabling the conditions for a wider presence of militant extremism within the tribal areas during the periods identified above. These conditions, resulting in a proliferation of militant groups, both
2 For the purpose of ease of understanding, this research uses the term “Pashtun” when talking about the
tribes in the Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal areas in the North West.
4
local and transnational, have resulted in Pakistan having to fight a war on terrorism in its own
region, affecting both the tribal areas and the rest of the country.
Successive governments in Pakistan tried countering militancy in the tribal areas since early
2002 by using force, military operations, and airstrikes. However, these efforts have not fully
succeeded in establishing durable peace in the region. Instead, the use of disproportionate
force through the military operations and the “unlawful” CIA-operated US drone strikes,
resulting in collateral damage and forced internal displacement in the tribal areas, not only
invited a major backlash but, in some cases, also turned the tribal people against the state
and military authorities in Pakistan (Qadir 2014; Yousaf 2017b). Furthermore, the army’s
selective use of force only against the anti-Pakistan Taliban, and half-hearted peace
agreements3, also backfired and allowed the militants to further consolidate their ideological position in the tribal areas (Rana 2014; Tajik 2011).
Even though the Pakistani military has claimed that recent military operations in the tribal
areas have been successful in flushing out the militants and helped in reduction of militant
violence and casualties (see below, Table 1), there have nevertheless been major attacks by
militants, in and originating from the tribal areas, especially on education institutions in
Pakistan (Desk 2015; Al-Jazeera 2017b). This has placed a major question mark on the state
policy of using force to reduce militancy in the tribal areas.
3 These peace deals are discussed in detail below in Chapter 7
5
Table i: Militant Violence Fatalities (January 2000 – December 2017)
Source: (SATP 2019)
Furthermore, even though the Pakistani military’s media wing (the Inter Services Public
Relations), has been vigorous in highlighting various “success” stories concerning the military’s struggle against militancy in the tribal regions, the situation on the ground for the people of the tribal areas remains volatile and prone to further violence (Nasruminallah
2018). This once again shows that the conventional means, centred on military force, adopted
by the Pakistani military to quell militancy in the tribal regions, has not met with the “success”
which the Pakistani military would lead many to believe. It is also believed that this lack of
success may also be related to the Pakistani military’s overarching influence over the security
policy, especially in the Pashtun ‘tribal areas’, leaving little room for civilian and democratic
forces to introduce change and reforms in the region. The influence was, in some ways,
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enabled by the persistence of the colonial legacies, especially in the form of FCR, in the
former-FATA region.
Research Problem Statement
As discussed above, the security situation in Pakistan has remained volatile in the post 9/11
period in Afghanistan. The former-FATA region did not only become a sanctuary for transnational and local Pashtun militant groups but has also become a centre for
interventions, military operations, and CIA operated US drone strikes. This situation has also
contributed towards a major displacement of Pashtuns from the tribal areas and forced them
to leave their ancestral and family homes. As most efforts, involving the use of force, to
counter militancy in the tribal areas have achieved mixed results, there is a need to research
resolving of this conflict through unconventional and traditional means in the region. Two
such traditional tools are the Pashtun Jirga and Jirga-based Lashkars. The Jirga is a traditional
Pashtun tribal forum for decision-making involving male tribal elders. The Lashkars refer to
militias periodically formed by Jirgas to either enforce the Jirga’s decisions or for the
protection of local territories.
This research aims to explore the use and effectiveness of Jirga and Jirga-based Lashkars by
discussing their historical and contemporary role in peace and conflict resolution initiatives in
the Pashtun tribal areas. By doing so, this research does not aim to present a case or argue
for the Jirga to be used as an alternative to military operations and other options of force.
Rather, it aims to discuss how this indigenous method of conflict resolution played a role in
conflict resolution, historically and in contemporary times, in the tribal areas and whether it
can become a regular fixture in Pakistan’s conflict resolution and peace policy in future in the
Pashtun tribal areas. Moreover, by discussing three phases of military operations since 2001 7
(in Chapter 7), the research also aims to argue why using force alone, especially in complex terrain such as the former-FATA region, could not achieve lasting and durable peace.
Research Questions
In order to analyse and discuss the solutions for the problem mentioned above, the focus of this research revolves around answering the following question:
How has the Jirga engaged in peace and conflict resolution in the Pashtun tribal
areas of Pakistan?
“Peace and conflict resolution” is a broad term. It encompasses a number of activities of Jirga in dealing with militant insurgency in their region. These include direct responses to insurgents, involving the Jirga convening Lashkars to directly engage with militants. They also include how the state included the tribal elders in state-backed peace deals with various militants. Finally, the activities also include Jirga meetings convened by tribal elders to express their solidarity with the state of Pakistan.
The main research question identified above is both historical and contemporary and is primarily investigated within chapter eight, with a cursory discussion in Chapter seven.
However as Jirga exist within wider complex Pashtun tribal structures, and these tribes, in turn, exist within the tribal region formerly known as FATA, any investigation of the research question above requires a broader investigation of these tribal structures and the tribal regions, as well as their wider place within Pakistan as a whole. This is provided in Chapters three to seven. Chapter three discusses the Pashtun tribal society and segmentation in terms of its history, structure, and traditions. Chapter four looks at the Pashtun Jirga and seeks to contextualize the Jirga by looking at other structures adopted by indigenous tribal societies
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for conflict resolution elsewhere in the world. Chapters five and six looks at the legacy of colonialism in Pakistan and the tribal regions and seek to employ a postcolonial theoretical framework to understand how colonial legacies have impacted the tribal regions. Chapter seven looks at the military interventions by the Pakistani military within the tribal regions in an attempt to quell militancy and eliminate or limit insurgency in the area, as well as the various peace deals negotiated between the Pakistani state (in most cases, the military) and various actors and agents within the tribal areas.
In this respect, Chapters three to seven provide important background discussion to the focus on the role of Jirga in chapter eight. Chapters five to seven, and to some extent Chapter 8, in particular, are centred on specific sub-questions which provide them with their focus and direction. These are as follows:
• How have the traditional structures of Pashtun tribal society and culture within the
tribal regions been impacted upon and, perhaps, altered or destroyed by the Pakistani
state’s administration of the tribal areas in the postcolonial period?
• How has the inheritance of colonial legacies and persistence of the colonial-era
Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) framed and informed the Pakistani military’s actions
in the tribal areas?
• How have these broader factors impacting on Pashtun tribal society, including the
intervention by the Pakistani state and military within the tribal regions, affected the
traditional structure and authority of the Jirga and their capacity to effectively engage
in peace and conflict resolution in the tribal regions?
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Limits of the Research Data
Along with such historical investigation, the research also aims at the contemporary investigation of Jirga within the tribal regions since the year 2002. Yet this leads me to identify a basic restriction upon, and therefore a limitation of, the research. The basic restrictions imposed upon such research is the absence of any means to safely access the tribal areas.
These areas are still unstable, due to “some” presence of militants, and for this reason, it was not possible to directly access these regions for research purposes. For this reason, the information concerning actions of Jirga had to be accessed from primary sources emanating from the tribal areas and much of this information is limited in scope or content. Indeed, there are times when all that is available concerning a single Jirga peacekeeping or conflict resolution effort is a few sentences available in local sources (such as daily newspapers and local news websites). For this reason, the information I was able to collect often allowed only a series of short vignettes on Jirga (and Lashkar) activity at specific moments in time (between
January 2002 and December 2017).
For this reason, it was not possible in engage in detailed case studies based on direct observation or first-hand interviews concerning Jirga activity relating to peace or conflict resolution. However, these questions concerning Jirga activity in relation to peace or conflict resolution are profoundly important ones, given my research focus, requiring investigation and analysis. The result is, that I have had to work within the limits of the information available. That information was collected through targeted search, mostly using online search engines, with a time range from January 2002 to December 2017.
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Structure of Chapter Eight
Chapter eight directly engages with the primary research question, outlined above,
concerning how Jirga have engaged in peace and conflict resolution in the Pashtun tribal areas
of Pakistan. For that reason, I have sought to organise this information, involving details of
specific Jirga (and Jirga-based Lashkar) actions, by employing a series of key investigative questions answered in detail in Chapter 8. These questions are all related to the major research question above. These questions are:
• How did the “tribal” Pashtuns4 react to the growing militancy and violence in the
tribal areas?
• What indigenous methods did the tribes use for peace and conflict resolution in the
tribal areas? and
• What factors inhibited or undermined the success of Jirga and Jirga-based Lashkars
which the “tribal” Pashtuns employed to respond to growing militancy and violence
in the tribal areas?
Research Design Overview
The following provides a brief overview of the research design that this thesis employs. A
more thorough account of the research design is provided in chapter two. The research for
this thesis is qualitative in nature and uses an interpretive paradigm of analysis. The research
uses both primary and secondary sources of data. The research consists primarily of
documentary analysis of primary sources and investigation and evaluation of secondary
4 Due to the negative connotations often associated with the word “tribal”, this research while using the phrase “tribal Pashtuns” intends to signify the Pashtuns living in the tribal areas (FATA).
11 sources. As explained above, primary source data for Pashtun tribes in the tribal region is limited. However, the main primary sources are archives, think tanks working on FATA [mainly
FATA Research Centre (FRC) and Community Motivation and Appraisal Programme (CAMP)], newspapers; including three major English “dailies” of Pakistan (The News, Dawn and The
Express Tribune) and a FATA-focused news website (Tribal News Network). The secondary sources include secondary data such as monographs, the literature on the tribal areas and ethnographies on tribal societies, especially the Pashtun tribal areas. The data from the news sources is collected through a targeted search online using a time range between January
2002 and December 2017.
The research employs postcolonialism as an analytical framework. This is because the social, political and cultural situation in the tribal areas is, even today, shaped by the colonial inheritances that Pakistan acquired from being once part of the British colony of India. In this research, the postcolonial approach provides a critical political science perspective as it directly focuses on the experience of Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal areas as part of both a wider society historically subject to colonialism (Pakistan) but also as an area which the Pakistani state itself perceived as a “Frontier” territory unassimilated to Pakistani society as a whole.
Finally, the research also takes limited inspiration from political anthropology, using segmentation in tribal societies to discuss and understand the “tribal” Pashtun society.
Chapter Outline
The following provides a detailed summary of the content of each chapter within the thesis.
Chapter One: Literature Review
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Chapter one engages in a review of the literature related to the research topic and aims to situate the thesis within this literature by identifying the “gap” in the literature that the thesis seeks to fill. The two broad themes of literature reviewed in this chapter are “Tribal Societies and Conflict Resolution”, and “Pakistan’s Colonial Legacy and Pashtun Tribal Areas”. The first section is divided into four sub-themes and reviews literature on “tribal societies”,
“segmentary lineage in tribal societies”, “conflict resolution and culture”, and
“postcolonialism and indigenous conflict resolution”. Because of the wide-ranging nature of the literature within each of these areas, review of relevant literature on most of the themes and sub-themes is kept concise.
The second section, “Pakistan’s Colonial Legacy and Pashtun Tribal Areas”, reviews the literature on the governance of the Pakistani state within the tribal areas. In particular, it considers that aspect of the literature that seeks to situate this governance within a postcolonial framework of analysis. This section is divided into four sub-themes - namely
“Pakistan’ colonial legacy”, “The Pashtun Jirga”, “Pashtunwali and Jirga”, and “conflict in the
FATA region”. This literature is relevant to the thesis as it focuses on the tribal groups
(Pashtuns) and geographical area (former FATA region) which is the focus of the thesis.
In the final section of this chapter, there is a discussion of the gap in the literature that this thesis seeks to fill. This gap concerns the use of indigenous methods of peace and conflict resolution, centred on Jirga, employed by Pashtun tribes, in their response to the rise of militant insurgency within the tribal regions. It is this area of the literature within which this research is situated and to which it seeks to make a contribution. The thesis, therefore, seeks to add to the literature on indigenous peace and conflict resolution, by focusing specifically on Pashtun tribal society in Pakistan’s former-FATA region.
13
Chapter Two: Research Design
Chapter two aims to outline the research design of this thesis. In its first section, the chapter discusses the methodology employed in this research. The chapter also discusses methods, data sources and data analysis methods used in the thesis. In its second section, the chapter discusses why the theoretical and analytical framework of postcolonialism has been employed in this research. In its final section, the chapter discussions various limitations of this research along with the problems incurred during the course of the research. This chapter is important in the greater scheme of this research as it provides a layout of how the research questions identified in this Introduction section will be answered, along with establishing the theoretical framework for this research.
Chapter Three: Tribal Societies and Pashtuns
Chapter three provides a broad background for this research by discussing Pashtuns, their culture, and the significance of segmentation in Pashtun tribal society. Discussion of these concepts is important for analysis as among Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan and Pakistan, tribal elders have historically played a major role in the maintenance of order and dispute resolution. Where the first section of the chapter provides a brief historical background to the
Pashtuns, the second section of the chapter discusses, in detail, the Pashtun culture known as Pashtunwali. The final section of the chapter discusses how segmentary lineage applies to the Pashtun tribal society of the former-FATA region.
Chapter Four: Indigenous conflict resolution and Jirga
Chapter four aims to build on the discussion in the previous chapters and explains why indigenous and cultural methods of conflict resolution are still playing an important role in
14
indigenous and tribal societies all around the world. In its first section, there is a brief
discussion on the importance of indigenous methods of conflict resolution around the world.
The second section of this chapter then explains a brief introduction to the Pashtun Jirga and
its various types. Later, there is also a brief discussion of Lashkars or the Pashtun tribal
militias, and how they play an important role in the enforcement of Jirga decisions. The final
section of the chapter discusses a brief critique of Jirga and Lashkar and argues why these
tools, even though effective for the Pashtuns in the tribal areas, still carry various loopholes
when it comes to the provision of basic human rights.
Chapter Five: Pakistan’s postcolonial predicament in the Pashtun tribal areas
Chapter five discusses, in detail, the theoretical and analytical approach of postcolonialism
and its application to both the Pakistani state and the “tribal” Pashtuns. This chapter in its
first section discusses the development of postcolonialism as an academic discipline along with its relation to indigenous conflict resolution. In its second section, the chapter various archival negative stereotypes associated with the Pashtuns in colonial literature. In its third section, the chapter discusses Pakistan and what makes Pakistan a postcolonial state. In the same section, the chapter also discusses the colonial legal regime of Frontier Crimes
Regulations (FCR), its persistence until recently, and impact on the Pashtun cultural institution
of Jirga.
Chapter Six: FATA - Colonial Legacies in Pakistan leading to Militancy
Chapter six seeks to analyse the situation of Pashtun tribes within the former-FATA region. In
its first section, the chapter discusses a brief history of the FATA’s accession to Pakistan. In its
second section, the chapter discusses how Pakistan’s persistent use of the colonial-era
15
Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), and the wider legacies of postcolonialism upon the
Pakistani state, has influenced the Pakistani military’s intervention in the former-FATA and
resulted in the state of conflict and instability in the region. This section also discusses how
the former-FATA region is perceived by the Pakistani state as a “periphery”, distinct from
other regions in Pakistan, and in particular, as a has been used by the Pakistani state and the
Pakistani military as a buffer-zone for proxy wars and Jihad against outside enemies, such as
the Soviet Union during its occupation of Afghanistan. In doing so, the chapter discusses the
foundations of extremism in tribal areas and looks at the role of the Pakistani state, especially
the military establishment, in the escalation of militancy in the region. There is also a
discussion on how CIA-operated US drone strikes in FATA, and tacit approval from Pakistan also aggravated the situation in the tribal areas. In its final section, the chapter discusses the formation and operations of several non-state militant groups in the tribal areas.
Chapter Seven: Military operations, Drone Strikes and Peace Deals in the Tribal Areas
Chapter seven focuses on military operations and peace deals within the FATA region in response to militancy. In its first section, the chapter briefly discusses various major military operations in the FATA region along with their effectiveness, or lack thereof. In this section, there is also a discussion of how these operations resulted in mass displacement of “tribal”
Pashtuns and how it affected the socio-political situation in the tribal areas. In its second section, the chapter discusses various peace efforts, in form of peace deals, brokered by the
Pakistani state, largely represented by the military, on the model of Pashtun Jirga. Such peace efforts often involved the Pakistani state and military eliciting the support of tribal elders to broker such deals. The section also analyses whether or not these peace initiatives succeeded in achieving temporary or lasting peace in the region.
16
Chapter Eight: Role of Jirga and towards peace in the tribal areas
The final chapter, chapter eight, focuses on efforts initiated by Pashtun tribal elders
themselves, using the vehicle of Jirga, to engage in peace and conflict resolution in the tribal
areas. This chapter focuses on the efforts of tribal elders (as well as ordinary tribespeople) to
engage in peace and conflict resolution in their local tribal areas from 2002 onwards. Such
efforts constitute a distinct alternative to the peace and conflict resolution methods, centred
on the Pakistani military, discussed in the previous chapter. Section 8.1.1 and 8.1.2 discuss
various peace and conflict resolution initiatives of tribal elders, from 2002 onwards, to
counter militants in their local regions, using Jirga as a basis by which such initiatives are
proposed and agreed to by tribal elders, and Lashkar (militia convened by Jirga and made up
of tribal members) as the instrument by which decisions of Jirga are enforced. Section 8.1.3
focuses on the various obstructions faced by the “tribal” Pashtuns in effectively using these
methods (8.1.3). Such obstructions include the resistance mounted against such tribal
initiatives by the militants who were the focus of such efforts. The chapter also discusses
whether the Jirga, as the primary forum for decision-making by tribal elders, retains its
traditional authority within the tribal regions (section 8.2).
Annex
The thesis also includes an Annex at the end of the research. Even though the content of the annex is important for a broader understanding and history of the Pashtuns, it does not fit into the narrative of the thesis and hence added in the Annex.
17
Chapter 1:
Literature Review
18
1.0. Literature Review
This chapter engages in a review of the literature related to the research topic and aims to
situate the thesis within this literature by identifying the “gap” in the literature that the thesis
seeks to fill. The two broad themes of literature reviewed in this chapter are “Tribal Societies and Conflict Resolution”, and “Pakistan’s Colonial Legacy and Pashtun Tribal Areas”. The first
section is divided into four sub-themes and reviews literature on “tribal societies”,
“segmentary lineage in tribal societies”, “conflict resolution and culture”, and
“postcolonialism and indigenous conflict resolution”. Because of the wide-ranging nature of
the literature within each of these areas, review of relevant literature on most of the themes
and sub-themes is kept concise.
The second section, “Pakistan’s Colonial Legacy and Pashtun Tribal Areas”, reviews the
literature on the governance of the Pakistani state within the tribal areas. In particular, it
considers that aspect of the literature that seeks to situate this governance within a
postcolonial framework of analysis. This section is divided into four sub-themes - namely
“Pakistan’ colonial legacy”, “The Pashtun Jirga”, “Pashtunwali and Jirga”, and “conflict in the
FATA region”. This literature is relevant to the thesis as it focuses on the tribal groups
(Pashtuns) and geographical area (former FATA region) which is the focus of the thesis.
In the final section of this chapter, there is a discussion of the gap in the literature that this
thesis seeks to fill. This gap concerns the use of indigenous methods of peace and conflict
resolution, centred on Jirga, employed by Pashtun tribes, in their response to the rise of
militant insurgency within the tribal regions. It is this area of the literature within which this
research is situated and to which it seeks to make a contribution. Although the discussion
19
below will show that others have written on certain aspects of this topic, the discussion of the
“gap” in the literature will explain precisely what is original in the contribution of this thesis
to this area of analysis. In this way, the thesis seeks to add to the literature on indigenous
peace and conflict resolution, by focusing specifically on Pashtun tribal society in Pakistan’s
former-FATA region.
1.1. Tribal Societies, Culture, and Indigenous Conflict Resolution
1.1.1. Tribal Societies
The scholarship on tribal societies can be traced back to the mid-19th century, with a focus
on kinship, politics, governance and group dynamics (see Morgan 1877; Maine 1861).
However, with the vast scholarship on tribes and tribal societies, the definition and
explanation of such societies have also evolved over time (Ekeh 1990). A translation of
Friedrich Engels’ Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State (1884), describes a
“tribe” as a group of people who share a common language and culture, but do not constitute a historically evolved “nation” (Engels 2010, 224). Wolfgang Kraus (2005, 150), in the context of his study of Muslim tribal societies in the North Africa and Middle-East region, defines
“tribes” as a group or social unit that maintains a specific identity, and associates itself with it, within a wider identity of “ethnicity” or “religion” shared by other tribes. Francis Jennings, in his book The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian
Tribes with English Colonies from Its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744, while using the term “tribe”, defines them as a politically independent entity that is structured by relations based on Kinship (Jennings 1984, 36-37).
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In the second half of the 20th century, debates on the evolution of tribal societies and their
transformation to modern or industrial societies have remained active in the fields of
archaeology, anthropology, sociology, and politics (see Fried 1975; Hinsley 1966; Parkinson
2002; Service 1975). David Ronfeldt (2006, 29) argues that when humans ‘banded together
to constitute primitive societies in Neolithic eras over 10,000 years ago, the first major form
of social organization to arise was the tribe’. Ronfeldt (2006, 8) further argues that analyses
of social evolution revolve around the progression of societies through certain stages that include tribes, to chiefdoms, to states and then to empires, which then go from feudalism to
absolutism, to democracy; and, along the way, from mercantilism to capitalism; and from a
nascent to a full-fledged civil society.
The origins of “tribes” are a matter of some debate within the literature. Sociologists and anthropologists, over time, have agreed that what we today understand as “tribes” began from unions in the past based on families (see, e.g., Jacobsen and Lipman 1956; Kuper 1988;
Hinsley 1966). These initial family-based unions developed into clans and eventually advanced to tribal structures based on the lineage of common kinship (Jacobsen and Lipman 1956;
Hinsley 1966). The common bonds of cohesion and unity among the “primitive” social units were based not only on the “lineages” of common kinship but also on other features such as common language, location, life experience and often religion (Jacobsen and Lipman 1956;
Hinsley 1966; Schapera 1967).
Szuchman (2009) believes that the term “tribe” has suffered a long history of use and abuse in social sciences. Van der Steen (2014) posits that “tribe” might carry different meanings for different people when it comes to discourses on tribes, tribalism, and tribal societies. The word is associated by some with the indigenous people of Africa, located in non-urban areas
21 such as the bush or the desert, whereas others might associate it with Celtic and Germanic tribes of pre-Roman and Roman times (Van der Steen 2014, 1; Ekeh 1990). Lowe et al. (1997), in their paper Talking about ‘Tribe’-Moving from Stereotypes to Analysis, also argue that the term tribe has historically been associated in the West with the primitive societies of Africa.
On discussing the history of disagreement concerning the definition of the term “tribe”,
Fowles (2002), in his chapter From social type to social process: Placing 'tribe' in a historical framework, posits that the term “tribe” went from being used for all non-European societies during the early years of definition during the European colonial era, to meaning a transitional state between hunting bands and complex states. Colson (1986) argues that both “tribe” and
“tribal” are slippery terms which are yet to be precisely defined. Salzman (2015) does not agree on the legitimacy of the term, calling it a colonial creation. Hence, the term tribe, according to Salzman (2015, 354) does not only suffer from its use by Western anthropologists under imperial regimes, but also from its debunking by the postcolonial anthropologists.
Recent debates on tribes and tribal societies have also revolved around the concept of modernity or modernisation (Adebayo, Benjamin and Lundy 2014; Mafage 1971; Cherstich
2014). Criticising the ambiguity surrounding the definition of “tribe” in the scholarship, Archie
Mafeje (1971, 257), in his essay the ideology of ‘tribalism’, argues that anthropologists have used tribalism to define both successes and failures in modernisation, whereas the political scientists, on the other hand, have primarily focused on the failures. On the other hand,
Schultz and Dew (2006), in their work Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias, argue that since the beginning of 1960, tribes and clans as units of analysis have been less often used to describe specific sub-groups, and this has particularly been the case in works on modernization and development within specific societies. On this basis, it might be thought that the concept of
22
“tribe” and “clan” is rendered increasingly outdated due to the impact of modernization on these traditional group identities. On the other hand, Samira Haj (1991), in her essay The problems of Tribalism: The case of nineteenth‐century Iraqi history, provides an anti-thesis for the concept of “tribes” arguing that Iraqi tribes’ involvement in modern trade and economic activities does little in setting them apart from the settled population. Consequently, Haj does not believe modernisation processes have undermined tribal structure in Iraq and so the concept of “tribe”, at least in the Iraqi context of “modernization”, is still relevant.
Peter Ekeh (1990), in his essay Social anthropology and two contrasting uses of tribalism in
Africa, has criticised social anthropology’s abandonment of the use of “tribe” and “tribalism”, which, he argues, has resulted in making the study of kinship irrelevant. Further criticising its contemporary use, Colson (1986, 7) argues that ‘anthropologists unthinkingly accepted the usage of “tribe” as an all-purpose term, but have given the term a further twist by associating it with their own concern for culture’.
In terms of religion’s influence or lack thereof, on tribalism, Salzman (2008) believes that even though Islam’s influence made the Middle East a more inclusive tribal society, yet it could not replace the core principles of tribal organization among the Arabs. Even Khaldun’s concept of
Asabiyyah, or group cohesion, which was more in line with Gellner’s segmentary lineage, needed to have the religious ideological influences, offered by Islam, to promote such solidarity among the tribes of Middle East (Khoury and Kostiner 1990). Hence, Muhammad’s
(Prophet of Islam) message of Islam, according to Ahmed (2013a), provided an opportunity for the pre-Islamic Arab tribes to balance their faith with their tribal values. Thus, Akbar
Ahmed (2013a) coined the term tribal Islam for tribal Muslims practising Islam, which provides a blend of religious as well as tribal/cultural norms.
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1.1.2. Segmentary Lineage and Tribal Societies
Within the field of anthropology, the discussion of “segmentation” among tribes has led to the development of what is known as “segmentary lineage” theory. Smith (1956, 39), in his essay On Segmentary Lineage Systems, defines such segmentary lineage as ‘a group of persons differentiated genealogically from others in terms of unilineal descent’. Segmentary lineage theory advances the proposition that, within specific tribes that lack a centralized source of authority, such as a monarch or a state, it is the genealogical ties between individuals, defined by their common unilineal descent, which will be the primary basis of group identification and loyalty (Tobolka 2003). So for instance, at times of crisis or stress, as the tribe encounters internal or external threats, this theory postulates that individuals will
“segment”, in terms of their primary focus of loyalty and identification, into their respective genealogical groups based on family and wider kinship groups (Tobolka 2003).
Segmentary lineage theory was formally explained in detail by E. Evans Pritchard using the example of Nuer tribes of Southern Sudan. In this functional model, feuding in tribal societies was ‘viewed as [an] "institution" whose sociological function is to maintain the "balanced opposition" of tribal segments and hence preserve social order’ (Caton 1987, 78). Moreover,
Pritchard described this feuding in the following words:
Each segment is itself segmented and there is opposition between its parts. The members of
any segment unite for war against adjacent segments of the same order and unite with these
adjacent segments against larger sections (Evans-Pritchard 1940a, 142).
In this respect, segmentary lineage theory assumes highly mobile and fluctuating lines of loyalty and identification within the tribe depending on whether the threat to the tribe is
24 internal or external to the tribe. Internal threats are likely to lead to the creation of smaller
“segments” within the tribe as kinship and genealogical groups divide and face each other in opposition. On the other hand, external threats allow these smaller “segments” to “unite” against a common enemy, thereby coalescing into a larger “segment”. Evans-Pritchard
(1940b) further explains such “segmentary” tribal systems, especially the Nuer, with the following features:
• The society was mostly egalitarian and had no centralised government.
• The political units, or “segments”, in this society were found on several levels. These
levels included the village (smallest), district (middle) and the tribe (largest).
• The groups in this society were based on a few major lineages. However, once a
lineage tree of these units is drawn, all units descend from a single ancestor (founder
of the tribe).
• This unilineal descent was also a major factor in group cohesion and opposition among
the tribes, hence playing a major role in the political organisation of various units.
• In case of a conflict between different groups, the political organisation was defined
by lineage, where the lower level units align together on the basis of lineage to form
opposing groups backing one party or the other (also known as complementary
opposition).
• All conflicts and disputes within the smaller units were resolved quickly, which
ultimately helped in avoiding fragmentation within the group (Evans-Pritchard 1940b,
272-296).
The foundation of Pritchard’s scholarship on “segmentary lineage” among tribal societies is attributed to French sociologist Emile Durkheim in his work De La Division Du Travail (The
25
Division of labour in society) written in 1893 (Tobolka 2003). On this basis, some of the formative works which influenced segmentary lineage theory included major ethnographies, namely African Political Systems (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard, 1940), The Nuer (Evens-Pritchard,
1940), and The Dynamics of Kinship among the Tallensi (Fortes, 1945) (as cited in Tobolka
2003).
Then in the early 1950s, scholarship on segmentary tribal societies saw David Hart and Earnest
Gellner, two British anthropologists, studying tribes in Morocco, especially the High Atlas
(Tobolka 2003). It was British anthropologist Ernest Gellner who provided the most sophisticated form of the segmentary lineage theory as a means of understanding the pre- modern Arab and Berber tribes of the High Atlas and thus helped in reinvigorating a new debate on the segmentary model and segmentary lineage among tribal societies. According to Gellner (1969, 43-45) the Berber tribes, which were “segmentary” in their tribal society because, given specific causal factors, they sub-divided into smaller groups, which further lead to a subdivision to a family and individual level. Gellner argues that such divisions, or
“segmentation”, allowed for a balance of power both within the tribe and among tribes.
(Gellner 1969, 47). Gellner (1969, 28) argued that segmentation among tribes presented a useful concept compared to that of democracy, as it laid bare the actual functioning and working of Muslim tribal societies.
Yet in addition to “segmentation”, Gellner identified other constitutive factors that were important to the development of tribal lines of loyalty and identification. One of these was religion. Gellner’s (1969, 8) segmentary model suggested that rural Muslim tribes, unlike the urban population, needed a personalized religion based on ‘a tendency to “anthropolarity”, ritual indulgence with the absence of puritanism, the incarnation of the scared, and hierarchy
26
and mediation’. Significant sources of tribal authority that fell outside the genealogical kinship
groups identified by segmentary lineage theory were also religious. For instance, Gellner
argued that regulation between different segmentary groups, within the tribe, or between
groups in different tribes, was often provided by those conceived as “saints”, given their
religious status within the tribe’s religious devotion to Islam, and these individuals were either
closely related to tribal chiefs or tribal chiefs themselves (Gellner 1969).
Gellner’s explanation of segmentation among Muslim tribal societies in Morocco was first
noted and documented by renowned Arab historian Ibn Khaldun (1332- 1446) in his historical
account The Muqqadimah (Ahmed 2013a, 16). Specific activities arising from “segmentation”
was identified through the concept of Asabiyyah, which simply referred to the actions of an
individual in helping his group of association against a threat or a foreign act of aggression
(Halim et al. 2012; Schultz and Dew 2006). This concept refers to the idea of “complementary opposition”, with various tribal units forming an alliance to counter an outside threat, as discussed above. Dresch (1986) provides the following characterization of the tribal outlook towards others arising from of Asabiyyah:
As perhaps in most societies, there is a tendency to hold, without looking too closely at the
facts of the case, that "our" people are in the right as against outsiders-a spirit of tribal
solidarity right or wrong, of the "clannishness," or cohesive drive against others, called
'asabiyyah (Dresch 1986, 312).
However, even with an extensive scholarship, the Segmentary Lineage theory has also been subject to criticism over the years.
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1.1.2.1. Criticism of Segmentary Lineage Theory
The segmentary model in tribal societies has also received criticism over the years. One
concern relates to whether such “segmentation” is actually reflected in empirical fact, within actual alliances and allegiances within tribes (Hammoudi 1980; Geertz 1971). Caton (1987)
also criticises both Gellner and Pritchard’s segmentary model, arguing that neither of them
provides enough data to explain how “Saints” or “tribal chiefs” exercise power in mediating
conflicts between feuding tribes.
One of the strongest critics of Gellner’s segmentary model was American anthropologist
Henry Munson Jr., who, in his publications, dismissed Gellner and David Hart’s segmentary
analysis of the tribes in the High Atlas (Munson 1989, 1993). In his paper titled, On the
irrelevance of the segmentary lineage model in the Moroccan Rif, Munson (1989, 386)
criticises David Hart’s research in Morocco arguing that what ‘Hart depicted as segmentary
lineage was actually a network of factions that cut across genealogical lines’.
Then in 1993, Munson (1993, 277), in his paper titled Rethinking Gellner's Segmentary
Analysis of Morocco's Ait Atta, directly attacks Gellner’s model. After re-reading various
ethnographies and interviewing Gellner and Hart’s research assistant in Morocco, Munson
criticised Gellner’s thesis on empirical grounds, concluding that no one had witnessed such a
segmentary lineage model in the Ait Atta tribes of the High Atlas and called it a model of
“ideology” rather than “actual behaviour”.
However, even with these criticisms, there still remains “some” applicability of segmentary
lineage theory to Muslim tribes, especially those in South Asia.
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1.1.2.2. Applicability of Segmentary Lineage Theory to Muslim Tribes
Even with criticisms, Gellner’s model of segmentation provides an effective tool for
understanding some elements of the conflict in tribal societies, especially the Pashtun tribal
society in Pakistan (Ahmed 2013a). One reason, according to Ahmed (2003, 77), is that
Gellner places Khaldun’s concept of Asabiyyah in context, which allows it to be better used to understand such Muslim tribal societies and the dynamics within them.
These arguments on “Muslim tribal dynamics” and their explanation through a segmentary
model can be found in detail in Idris Khan’s (2010a, 2013) accounts, where the author
provides detailed case studies of Pashtun tribes and their use of Jirga in the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province. Khan shows how “elites” and “religious clerics”, just like Gellner’s
“saints”, play the role of mediators in conflict resolution among tribes, with “clerics” also
playing the role of a common denominator in uniting the tribes in the name of Islam (see Khan
2010a 'Conclusion').
According to Hart (2013, 68), Muslim societies have historically been characterised by
divisions along the lines of segmentation, with tribes having sub-tribe loyalties between
individuals based on clans and sub-clans. In this way, we see that the segmentary lineage
theory is a useful analytical framework to understand Muslim tribal dynamics in the Middle
East. As Piggott (2005, 18) argues, in Arab society, a man’s life is not his own but is of the
hierarchy of institutions, family, patriarchal or agnatic tribal groups, or a nation – all
constituting ascending levels of collective identification, just as segmentary lineage theory
supposes. In this regard, Van der Steen (2009) gives an elaborate description of what
constitutes a Muslim tribal society. According to Van der Steen (2014, 2009), Muslim tribal
societies, especially in the Near East consist of the following features:
29
• The tribal societies are based on a patrilineal system, also called the segmentary lineage
system. This system binds the clans and families through sodalities that cross cut the clan
system. This system is flexible in nature and can be manipulated for social or political
purposes.
• These societies have a sense of loyalty and responsibility towards the group, where all
members are responsible for the honour and wellbeing of society.
• The leaders are selected on the basis of ascribed and achieved qualities, but in most cases,
the leaders are selected on a hereditary basis.
• There is an inter/intra-tribal social interaction which is also encouraged and backed by the
concept of ‘honour’.
• Islam, as a religion, plays a major role in tribal norms, and various aspects of life are
governed under Islamic principles (Van der Steen 2009, 105-106).
Philip Salzman (2015) also supports the idea of segmentary lineage stating that many tribal societies in the Middle East, Central, and South Asia are still characterized by segmentation among the tribes, where such segmentation allows for an egalitarian and decentralized system of power and authority made up of discrete political groups defined by patrilineal descent. This is also evidenced in Pashtuns living in both Afghanistan and tribal areas of
Pakistan5 (Glatzer 2002).
1.1.3. Conflict Resolution and Culture
Conflict is defined as ‘a feeling, a disagreement, a real or perceived incompatibility of
interests, inconsistent worldviews, or a set of behaviours’ (Goncalves 2008, 3). Lewis A. Coser,
5 Further discussion on segmentary lineage in the Pashtun tribal society is discussed below in Chapter 3. 30
a theorist working in the area of social conflict theory, argues that violent actions, or conflicts,
often arise from a matter of dignity, unequal political access and power, or processes of
inequality and exclusion within societies (Wallensteen 2002, 40). Smith (2004), in his essay
Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict, defines armed conflict as a conflict between one or
more organized parties which could stem from competing interests related to power or
territory. Smith (2004) further argues that due to the complexity of the nature of the conflict,
particularly in the years subsequent to 1990, loose terms such as “internal” and “armed
conflict” are often used in the literature to describe conflicts on the intrastate level. In this
regard, Uppsala Conflict Data Project defines armed conflict as ‘a contested incompatibility
that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two
parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths’ (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 618-619). In terms of internal or intra-state conflict, which is a primary focus of this research, Small and Singer
(1982), in their book Resort to arms: international and civil wars, 1816-1980, define internal
or intra-state conflict as a conflict between ‘the government of a state and internal opposition groups without intervention from other states’ (as cited in Gleditsch et al. 2002, 619).
“Conflict resolution” is a relatively new topic within the academic literature and is thus less coherent and developed compared to other academic areas (Wallensteen 2002). The
preliminary developments concerning theories of conflict resolution took place after the First
World War and the failure of the League of Nations. The League of Nations was considered a
primary step in the direction of collective resolution of the conflict on an international level
and its failure, therefore, gave rise to serious questions within the academic literature as to
why it failed. Equally, between 1946-1969, with the formation and increasing role of various
transnational organizations, most importantly the United Nations (Kriesberg 2008), within the
31
realm of conflict resolution, the same concerns came to the fore within the academic
literature, not least how to ensure the success of conflict resolution.
Wallensteen (2002, 8) defines conflict resolution as ‘a situation where the conflicting parties
enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other’s
continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other’. Further,
Schellenberg (1996, 13) describes five major types of conflict resolution approaches. These
are “mediation”, “negotiation”, “coercion”, “arbitration” and “adjudication”. However, while
dealing with any society and employing any of these five approaches to the resolution of
conflict, the specific nature of the conflict and the culture of the society to which these
approaches are being applied remain important variables (Lundy and Adjei 2014).
Bukari (2013) argues that with the emergence of “new wars”, which are internal, “culture-
sensitive” and “non-conversational”, there is an added focus on conflict resolution methods based on “culture” of the local environment. Hence, Kevin Avruch (1998, 5), in his book
Culture and Conflict Resolution, defines “culture” as the derivative of experiences that are
learned or created by individuals or passed on to them socially by their contemporaries or
ancestors. On the other hand, Schwartz (1992, 324) defines “culture” as derivative of
experiences that are created or learned by members of society in a population, which also
includes encodings and interpretations, transmitted from past generations or even formed by
individuals themselves.
Culture becomes particularly important in indigenous contexts given that, in many ways, it is
the maintenance and transmission of traditional culture over generations that assists
indigenous groups in maintaining their identity within wider non-indigenous society.
Therefore, Sen, Danso and Meneses (2014, 257) believe that incorporating non-Western
32
perspectives on culture in current conflict management and conflict resolution strategies
presents a challenge to the Western perspectives and ideas of conflict management.
However, it is argued that very little attention is given by the postcolonial elites to indigenous
culture and indigenous conflict resolution strategies during resolution of conflicts (Avruch
1998; Run 2013).
Indigenous conflict resolution and management strategies have been, and are, common in
various parts of the world. Some examples include the indigenous Andes community in Latin
America (Cordova 2014), or the Dane Zee people of Northern British Columbia, Canada. In
Africa, the Gacaca courts in Rwanda (Schabas 2005) and the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) in South Africa, employing the Ubuntu philosophy (Arthur, Issifu and Marfo
2015), are examples of indigenous conflict management systems. In Asia, the Jirga system used in Afghanistan and northern Pakistan are also examples of the same (Adebayo, Benjamin and Lundy 2014; Sharma 2005).
However, in recent years, indigenous and cultural methods of conflict resolution have been ignored, or come under pressure, mostly due to the negative effects of colonialism in the postcolonial states (Run 2013). It is in this context that postcolonial theory becomes an important framework of analysis in discussing indigenous Pashtun tribes.
1.1.4. Postcolonialism and Indigenous Conflict Resolution
The development of literature in the field of postcolonial theory can be broadly attributed to
initial works by Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, and Stuart Hall, among others (Mullaney 2010).
Fanon, in his book The Wretched of the Earth (2007) and Said, in his book Orientalism (1978b), focused on the culture and politics of colonialism and its negative effects on the colonized
33 nations (Young 2003). Both Said and Fanon analysed and criticised the West’s perceived and portrayed image of the “primitive” East and questioned its resource exploitation (Fanon 2007;
Said 1978b). Both Fanon and Said focused on the power relations that emerge as a result of relationships of colonial domination, and the way in which these relations impact on both the colonizer and the colonized. Both were also interested in the way in which the colonized were either affected by colonization or were depicted and identified in specific ways by the colonizers. Such concerns have become the foundations of the postcolonial theory.
Postcolonialism has been applied to a number of disciplines, including the International
Relations (IR) discipline. “Postcolonialism”, as a framework of analysis, became particularly prominent in the early 1990s, however, the theoretical works influencing the discipline were initiated much earlier (Laffey and Nadarajah 2016). Major influences that lead to development of the Postcolonial theory are said to be the works of Marcus Garvey (1986,
1989), Frantz Fanon (2004), Edward Said (1978a), Gaytari Spivak (2010), Homi Bhabha (1994),
John McLeod (2007), Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin (2002, 2006, 2013) and
Robert Young (2001), among others.
Brigg (2003) posits that post-colonialism, as a field of study, is not (as the term might suggest) what comes after colonialism, but rather focuses on the continuing effects of colonialism in societies that have shed the political rule of their former colonial masters but not the economic, social and cultural legacies of that rule. However, in terms of its definition and scope, Nayar (2010, 1) defines postcolonialism as ‘an academic, intellectual, ideological and ideational scaffolding of the condition of decolonization (the period following political independence for nations and cultures in Africa, Asia and South America)’.
34
Postcolonial states refer to those states which exist in the post-independence period within
former colonial societies. Postcolonial states are often considered to be characterised by a
number of distinctive features. One of the major features of such a state, especially in the
context of South Asian states, is the creation of a strong military-bureaucratic nexus (Kumar
2005; Alavi 1972). This nexus is very much a product of colonialization. In the “west”, the
nation-state was created by an indigenous bourgeoisie, whereas in the colony, such an
indigenous bourgeoisie is often lacking (Kumar 2005, 937). The result is that, due to an absent
indigenous bourgeoisie, the agency of change within the former colony becomes the military
and bureaucratic elites which emerge in the colony during and after the process of
decolonization, resulting in a “centralised” state apparatus.
One possible consequence of such as a “centralised” state apparatus, with a military-
bureaucracy oligarchy, resulting from colonial legacies is that the “peripheries” of these
postcolonial societies are ignored by the powerful “centre” (Yousaf 2018a). Such neglect of
the “peripheries” may create a crisis of recognition of concerning the culture of certain
indigenous groups, belonging to these “peripheries” (Run 2013).
This neglect of the “periphery” by powerful, centralized bureaucratic and military elites within
post-colonial states has also resulted in the neglect of indigenous methods of conflict
resolution by the postcolonial state. This has also at times resulted in the failure of the
postcolonial state to effectively deal with the emergence of local-level “new intrastate
conflicts” in which indigenous groups are directly involved (Run 2013). Such failure is exacerbated by the failure of other means of dealing with such intra-state conflicts. In recent years, with the emergence of new intrastate wars, especially in Africa, there has been a growing critique of the idea of “liberal peace” (Mac Ginty 2008; Bukari 2013).
35
Fernando Cavalcante (2014, 141) argues that peace efforts under “liberal peace” are
‘characterised by the promotion of liberal norms, practices and values, especially those associated with democracy and the market economy’. He then defines “liberal peace” as:
Peacebuilding efforts, when based on the liberal peace tenets, are usually characterised by
programmes, practices and actions implemented from the top-down in areas that are not
necessarily defined as priorities by local populations or that respond to the root causes of
armed conflicts (Cavalcante 2014, 141).
Such “top-down” approaches, in which liberal norms are imposed on indigenous local actors when these norms themselves may have no presence within indigenous culture results in models of “liberal peace” being perceived by such indigenous actors as “coercive” and “an alien expression of hegemony and domination” (Richmond 2006: 300). This is particularly the case when the state imposes such liberal norms in ways that do not engage ‘with local actors and comprehend perspectives, influences, cultures, customs, histories, or political, economic, social systems that exist, or to engage these in interwoven international and local peace projects’ (Richmond 2012, 3).
Hence, Mac Ginty (2008) argues that with such limitations of liberal peace, there is a renewed interest in indigenous methods of peace-making which are more conciliatory and inclusive of local indigenous cultures compared to liberal peace methods. Olonisakin (1997), discussing post-Cold War conflicts in Africa and the failure of liberal peacekeeping solutions, argues that intrastate wars need to be solved through local means and people.
36
1.2. Pakistan’s Colonial Legacy and Pashtun Tribal Areas
1.2.1. Pakistan’s Colonial Legacy
Since its independence in 1947 from the British Raj, Pakistan has experienced a lack of development of its democratic institutions, resulting in the strong military-bureaucratic nexus referred to above, in which such centralized agents take the place of what might otherwise be influential agents of change (such as a local bourgeoisie) within civil society (Alavi 1972).
Pakistani civilian governments and structures, since independence, have mostly been subordinate to this nexus6 (Alavi 1972; Haqqani 2010). In this respect, Pakistan exhibits the traits of a “postcolonial” state (Hussain 2012a; Sōkefeld 2005; Alavi 1972).
Hamza Alavi (1972) argues that the role of the military-bureaucracy nexus, involving a very close connection between the military and the state, has become a common feature in
Pakistan. Because of these features, Pakistan has been described as a “praetorian state”, by
Hussain Haqqani (2010) and Hassan Askari Rizvi (2005b), where the military - with its allies in bureaucracy, landed feudal society, and conservative religious leaders - has consolidated its hold over democratic and political institutions in the country. Such dynamics, according to
Mohammad Asghar Khan (1983), Hasan Askari Rizvi (2005a) and Aqil Shah (2014a), ensured that the military was the ultimate policy-making and policy-enforcing centre in the country.
Upon independence, Pakistan was also faced with the dilemma of the Durand Line, a border marked by the British Raj in 1893, dividing Pashtuns on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border
(Mahmud 2010). This artificial demarcation, a product of the geopolitical legacies of European colonialism, divides Pashtun society between two separation nation-states. Another major
6 Further discussion, in detail, on Pakistan’s postcolonial democracy can be found below in Chapter 5. 37
legacy that Pakistan inherited from the British Raj, after Pakistan’s independence in 1947, was
the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) (1901) – a colonial framework to govern the Pashtun
tribes in the North West of Pakistan (Yousaf 2018b).
In terms of Pakistan’s colonial legacies, various authors, including Willard Berry (1966),
Madiha Tahir (2015), Farooq Yousaf (2018b), and Tayyab Mahmud (2010), have discussed the
Frontier Crimes Regulation (1901), its persistence and its negative effects on the Pashtun
tribal areas. The Pakistani state had, until recently, maintained the colonial administration, in
form of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, to govern the “tribal” Pashtuns (Tahir 2015; Wazir
2007; Yousaf 2018b; Yousaf, Rashid and Gul 2018). The law, which was enacted by the British
under the pretext that the tribes were “lawless” and thus needed to be “tamed”, continued
to govern the region after Pakistan’s independence, until recently, with minimal amendments
(Tahir 2015; Berry 1966).
1.2.2. The Pashtun Jirga and Pashtunwali
A Jirga is a traditional conflict resolution, negotiation and mediation method that has been
practised by Pashtuns for centuries. According to Coburn (2013, 13), Jirga can be defined as
‘gatherings in which the parties to a dispute are represented by members of their patrilineal
kin, who deliberate on the issue’. Willard Berry (1966) argues that even though the colonial
FCR recognized the Jirga system of Pashtuns, it only gave the tribal people a consultative
authority to the state representation in judicial decisions. Furthermore, Wazir (2007) posits
that even though the British apparently included the Jirga system as part of FCR, yet the
Jirga’s consultative role for the Political Agent (PA) (the state-appointed Executive of the
respective tribal Agency (or unit) with judicial authority within a tribal region) meant that the
tribal people commanded little authority over judicial decisions.
38
The importance of the Jirga has been recognised for some time. Various British ethnographies
on Pashtuns suggest the historical importance of the Pashtun Jirga (see Elphinstone 1842;
Enriquez 1921; Caroe 1958; Warburton 1900). Formal studies of importance Pashtun and
Afghanistan’s tribal councils and Jirga structures date back to the 19th century with the
account of Mountstuart Elphinstone. Elphinstone provides an account of Jirga during his mission to the Durrani winter residence in Peshawar (then a part of Afghanistan) in 1809
(Noelle-Karimi 2006; Elphinstone 1842).
Gohar (2014) also refers to the significance of Jirga within traditional Pashtun tribal society, going so far as to claim that an efficient use and incorporation of the Jirga system in Pakistan’s
“peace and conflict resolution” policy could serve as the major difference between success and failure of Pakistan’s security and development policies for the tribal areas of Pakistan.
It has been argued by a number of scholars that one of the major social elements allowing for
the maintenance, integration and reproduction of Pashtun society over time is the Pashtun
culture or the way of life, commonly referred to, by the Pashtuns, as Pashtunwali (Siddique
2014; Hawkins 2009; Gohar 2010). Pashtunwali refers to broad features of Pashtun culture and includes a number of elements of this culture such as Jirga (tribal council of elders), nang
(honour), melmastya (hospitality), badal (reciprocity and/or revenge), tarboorwali (agnatic rivalry), and siyali (competition among extended family) (Siddique 2014; Gohar 2010).
The Jirga is an essential component of Pashtun culture and is headed by the tribal masharan
– the elders (Ahmed 2013a, 20; Yousufzai and Gohar 2005). The Jirga is an indigenous Pashtun
dispute resolution and deliberation mechanism used by the Pashtuns for centuries (Siddique
2014; Yousufzai and Gohar 2005). Moreover, in order to enforce its decisions, the Jirga also
39
sometimes orders the formation of Lashkar, or a tribal militia, which is disbanded soon after
the Jirga decisions are imposed (Yousufzai and Gohar 2005).
The Pashtun tribes have historically shown patterns of segmentary lineage (Glatzer 2002).
Further elaborating on such segmentary alliances, Sir Olaf Caroe (1958), in his book The
Pathans, argues that in all records of previous empires, none of them has been successful in making Waziristan (and tribal areas), or its people, their subject especially because the tribal
Pathans (Pashtuns) had settled their own differences to form alliances against common enemies. Once again, this shows how segmentary lineage allows for fluid shifts in tribal association and identification, depending on internal and external circumstances.
For this reason, the term “jellyfish tribe” was used by Malcolm Yalp to describe the Pashtun tribes in the former FATA region to explain how they could rapidly shift allegiances and overcome differences with each other in order to unite so as to meet external threats and foreign intrusions (Beattie 2011; Yapp 1983). In recent years, such external threats have been various militant groups in the region since 2002.
1.2.3. Conflict in the FATA region
In the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the FATA region has come under
focus by both the U.S. and Pakistani state as it is seen by these state actors as a region in
which militancy and insurgency is prevalent and which is responsible for escalating militancy
and violence, posing dangers not only to Pakistan but also to Afghanistan and the region
(Ahmad 2013a; Nawaz 2009a). This insurgency, which escalated after the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan, made the tribal areas one of the most dangerous places in the world (Nawaz
2009a; Gul 2010). Salaman (2012) argues that the aftermath of 2001’s US war on terror has
40
further worsened the situation in the Pashtun tribal areas and, with emergence of various
Pashtun militant groups, as well as the infiltration of foreign fighters, which has added to an
already present negative image and perception towards the “tribal” Pashtuns propagated in
colonial and contemporary literature. Even though a number of actions, such as Pakistani
military operations, U.S./CIA drone strikes, and peace accords, have been taken to resolve the
fragile situation in the former FATA region, none of these efforts has so far been able to
establish durable peace in the region.
Jones and Fair (2010) critically analyse and discuss the military operations by Pakistan and criticise, in some cases, the army’s approach towards various militant groups, most other works, especially those published in Pakistani academia, have supported the military’s initiatives in the tribal areas. Farhat Taj (2011) and Jones and Fair (2010) blame the military’s ineffective policies and collusion with certain militant groups for failure in achieving peace in the tribal areas. This is a persistent theme in some of the literature and will be discussed in this thesis.
There are also works on the intervention of the U.S. state in Pakistan centred on US drone strikes in the tribal regions. A major theme of these works has remained the questions surrounding the effectiveness of such strikes, and whether or not these strikes have resulted in eliminating terrorism from the tribal areas. Some of these works include those by Williams
(2013, 2010), Yousaf (2017b), Benjamin (2012), Fair, Kaltenthaler and Miller (2016), Fair and
Hamza (2016), and Amnesty-International (2013). Where Williams (2013), Yousaf (2017b) and
Fair and Hamza (2016) focus on the “effectiveness”, or lack thereof, of the drone strikes, along with framing of perception of these strikes in Pakistan, Amnesty-International (2013) and
41
Benjamin (2012) discuss the negative effects of these strikes and how they physically
destroyed the lives of the “tribal” Pashtuns.
However, even with these discussions and literary works on the former-FATA region, there
remains a gap in the literature when it comes to conflict resolution using indigenous methods,
mainly the Jirga.
1.3. Gap in Literature
Since the beginning of the U.S. War on Terror in Afghanistan in October 2001 and its spillover
effects in FATA, a number of works in literature have focused on Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal
areas. These works have primarily focused on themes including the Pakistani army and its
military operations in the former-FATA region, the origin of militant groups in FATA, US drone
strikes in FATA, and escalation of conflict in the tribal areas. There also exist works on the
Pashtun Jirga, however, as will be discussed in the review below, their scope is limited in
nature.
Christine Fair and Peter Chalk’s (2006) Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security
Assistance is one of the first major works, since the U.S. War on Terror in Afghanistan began, to discuss Pakistan’s internal and external security policy. Even though the book makes mention of the militant groups operating in the tribal areas, the book’s focus lies in proposing policy recommendations for the U.S. Bush Administration on how to deal with Pakistan’s military and how to force it to conduct operations against various militant groups in the country.
Shuja Nawaz’s (2009a) report titled FATA--a Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of
Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, written for the
42
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), discusses various dynamics and history
of conflict in the tribal areas, since 2001. On the other hand, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan
by Seth Jones and Christine Fair (2010) is another detailed report, written for the RAND
Corporation, where the authors critically analyse Pakistani military operations until 2010, in
the Pashtun tribal areas. Both these works deal with the conditions of war and violence in the
tribal areas and Pakistani military operations, and hence not focusing on alternative methods
of conflict resolution methods such as the Pashtun Jirga.
In another monograph entitled Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State?,
Christine Fair, Keith Crane, Christopher S. Chivvis, Samir Puri and Michael Spirtas (2010),
discuss and criticise the functioning of the Pakistani army. However, the monograph is again
targeted more towards the U.S. policymakers and the war on terror in Afghanistan rather
than issues central to the former-FATA region or the Pashtun tribes within this area.
In terms of historical accounts of the FATA region, Savage Border: The Story of the North-West
Frontier, written by Jules Stewart (2007), provides a concise history of the Pashtun tribal areas
from the early 19th century to the early 21st century. The book’s focus lies more in creating a
historical narrative of the Pashtun tribal areas, and not on the resolution of conflict. On the
other hand, The Frontier Tribal Belt: Genesis and Purpose Under the Raj by Salman Bangash
(2016) is another historical account of the Pashtun tribal areas between 1849 to 1914, where
the author shows, through historical archives, how the British Raj’s actions in this region were
animated by their concern regarding Russian expansion through Afghanistan. Hence, the
book deals more with the historical, rather than current, narrative of the tribal areas.
A number of Pakistani scholars and journalists have also written important works on the
Pashtun tribal areas. Imtiaz Gul’s (2010) The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan's Lawless
43
Frontier is an important book that discusses, in detail, various dynamics of conflict involving
militant groups in the tribal areas. In the book, the author also criticises the “tribal” Pashtuns
for playing a major in role in the escalation of the conflict by “hosting” various foreign
militants in the region. Therefore, Gul’s book is again focused on the causes of conflict and
not the resolution of conflict and establishing peace in the region.
In another detailed account of militancy in Pakistan entitled The Scorpion's Tail: The Relentless
Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan, Pakistani journalist Zahid Hussain (2010b) provides a historical narrative on the causes of religious extremism and militancy in Pakistan. He further criticises the U.S. war on terror, calling it a war against “Pashtuns” in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. This book, again, focuses more on the reasons for conflict and how Pakistan’s historical policies, coupled with the U.S. drone strikes, aggravated the conflict in the tribal areas.
Even though most of the U.S. literature focuses on US policy and its engagement with
Pakistan in the War on Terror, Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann’s (2012) edited volume
Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics, and Religion gives a detailed
explanation on various militant groups in the tribal areas. The volume also makes an effort to
distinguish between various groups, their loyalties, strategies and tribal affiliations.
Moreover, the book broadly discusses Taliban, Al Qaeda and other militant groups in both
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Similarly, Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Zero written by Rohan Gunaratna and Khuram Iqbal
(2012) uses extensive field research and interviews with government officials and former militants to map the structure and affiliation of various militant groups based in the tribal areas. The book also focuses on how these groups, especially Al Qaeda, have conducted
44 militant activities in other countries, operating from FATA and other parts of the country.
Therefore, the book presents an overview of the militant and terrorist threats in Pakistan in
Pakistan on the whole without discussing conflict resolution strategies in the tribal areas.
Similarly, Akbar Ahmed’s (2013a) The Thistle and the Drone: How America's war on terror became a global war on tribal Islam provides an anthropological analysis of militancy in the tribal areas. The book in its first half focuses on various “tribal Muslim” militant groups and their tribal affiliations in the Muslim world. Then, the book focuses on the former-FATA region and discusses the importance of Pashtun culture in light of his experience as a retired Political
Agent (PA) in FATA. The book provides an understanding and suggests policies for conflict resolution in Muslim tribal societies on the whole without specifically focusing on the
Pashtuns and Jirga.
Hassan Abbas (2014), another Pakistani academic and former civil servant, in his book The
Taliban Revival: Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier, has also made an effort to differentiate various militant groups in the tribal areas. Abba also discusses how
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and India are also involved with various groups in one way or the other. However, the book fails to provide new information or suggestion on how to resolve the conflict in the tribal areas.
Amir Rana, Safar Sial and Abdul Basit’s (2010) Dynamics of Taliban insurgency in FATA, a collection of papers, chapters and factsheets on Taliban activity in the FATA region, is perhaps the most detailed account of conflict and militancy in the Pashtun tribal areas. The book provides a clear distinction between the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, along with mapping their allegiances. Even though the book briefly mentions various peace deals, through the engagement of tribal elders, with the militants and Pakistani army operations against the
45
militants, it falls short in analysing the use of alternate methods for conflict resolution in former-FATA.
In terms of works from authors belonging to the tribal area, Ghulam Qadir Khan (2014), a former bureaucrat and resident of the FATA region, provides a background on the Pashtun culture, peace, and the recent escalation of conflict in his book entitled, Cheegha: The Call from Waziristan, the Last Outpost. The book’s title Cheegha, meaning “a call” or “a scream” in Pashto, is self-explanatory as the author rues the destruction of the tribal culture and peace in the region at the hands of both the militants as well as the Pakistani government. The book,
however, does not seek to discuss complex conflict resolution strategies, nor does it focus in
detail on the use of Jirga as part of such strategies.
One of the key focal points of this thesis is the role of Jirga in conflict resolution within the
former-FATA region. The literary works discussed above did not focus specifically on Jirga or
alternative conflict resolution methods in the former-FATA region. Instead, they focused on
more conventional matters such as the Pakistani state, the Pakistani military, U.S.
intervention and militant groups within the tribal areas. If Pashtun tribes and Jirga were
discussed, it was primarily in terms of the effects of these other actors on the Pashtun society,
rather than the Pashtuns as independent actors in their own right, capable of engaging in
alternative conflict resolution in their region. This thesis does provide such a focus on Pashtun
society and the Jirga, but in order to clearly show the gap which it fills within the existing
literature, we need to consider those sources that have discussed the role of Jirga as an
alternative means of conflict resolution within the tribal areas.
Concerning literature on the indigenous methods of conflict resolution in the tribal areas,
particularly those centred on Jirga, the most relevant literature is that by Ali Gohar (2010)
46
and Yousufzai and Gohar (2005) on the Pashtun Jirga. Gohar (2010) and Yousufzai and Gohar
(2005), discuss the Pashtun Jirga in detail. These analyses rely on the history of Jirga,
discussed the institutional and social role of Jirga within Pashtun society, and also how it plays
an important role in maintaining order in the Pashtun society. Therefore, largely focusing on
a general introduction of the Jirga, and not how the Jirga could, or could have, played a
constructive role in conflict resolution in the tribal areas.
Another report, entitled Understanding Jirga, by Naveed Shinwari (2011), also highlights the
importance of the Jirga in the tribal areas. The report encompasses various aspects, including
the history, legality and legitimacy, of the Pashtun Jirga, along with discussing a public
perception survey of the Jirga in the tribal areas. However, the report, even though briefly
discussing the political situation, avoids going into too much detail on the use of Jirga in the
conflict resolution and long term peace in current circumstances. Nor does it discuss in any
detail the use of Jirga as alternative means of conflict resolution.
Farhat Taj (2011), in her book Taliban and Anti-Taliban, details some initiatives by the “tribal”
Pashtuns in their efforts towards fighting terrorism in the former FATA region. The book
provides various interviews with Pashtun tribesmen concerning their perception of militancy
in the tribal areas. However, the book is predominantly an indictment of Pakistan’s
intelligence agency, ISI, and why, in the view of the author, it is solely responsible for all
conflict in the tribal areas. Hence, the book does not critically discuss the role of Pashtun Jirga
in conflict resolution in the Pashtun tribal areas.
What is evident in the literature review above is that there remains a gap in the literature due to the limited focus on the Pashtun Jirga as a tool for conflict resolution in countering militancy in the former-FATA region. Much of the literature identified above focuses primarily
47 either on the U.S. military or militant groups and the Pakistani state and military and their role in conflict resolution in the former-FATA region rather than Jirga. Those sources that do directly discuss Jirga in this context mainly focuses on the general aspects of the Pashtun Jirga and various instances in which it was employed by the state. Hence, there is a limited discussion on whether the Jirga could have played a more constructive role in conflict resolution in the tribal areas.
Hence, the thesis seeks to contribute to the literature by discussing the role of Jirga in conflict resolution within the region and does so as a means of identifying alternative forms of conflict resolution to those based on US or Pakistani military force. By doing so, the research also aims to analyse and discuss whether the Jirga could have played a long-term role in sustainable peace measures in the tribal areas, and whether it could still be used in future policies.
Further, the thesis seeks to show how Pakistan’s colonial legacy has had a negative impact on culture and security in indigenous societies, and how Jirga, in any conflict resolution process, must struggle with this legacy. The thesis adopts a postcolonial framework of analysis to investigate this impact of Pakistan’s colonial legacy. In this way, the thesis seeks to provide a focus on indigenous conflict resolution in the former FATA region not fully covered by the existing literature above.
1.4. Conclusion
This chapter aimed at reviewing the literature related to the research topic. In its first section, the chapter reviewed various works on tribal societies and segmentary lineage theory as it related to tribal societies. Additionally, the section reviewed the literature focusing on the concept of “culture” and its importance in understanding the nature of specific types of conflict. It also reviewed the literature on indigenous conflict resolution and its status in post- 48
colonial societies. In the second section, the literature on Pakistan and its colonial legacies
were reviewed, as well as how the Pakistani state and military in many cases still operate
within the context and framework of these colonial legacies. In particular, the section
emphasised the role of postcolonial theory in understanding these processes and their impact
on “tribal” Pashtuns.
The chapter then sought to review the primary works that have focused on Pashtun tribal
societies and the Pashtun tribal areas during the period of militant insurgency since 2001. It
sought to identify those analysts who have specifically focused on the tribal areas as well as
the role of Jirga in this period, in particular, their role in peace and conflict resolution. The
chapter then sought to identify how the present thesis aims to fill the gap in the literature by discussing and analysing the role of Pashtun Jirga in alternative conflict resolution methods within Pakistan’s tribal areas. This chapter, therefore, sought to identify how this research filled a gap in the existing literature and therefore provides an original contribution to this literature.
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Chapter 2:
Research Design
50
2.0. Research Design
This chapter seeks to outline the research design of this thesis. In its first section, the chapter
discusses the methodology employed in this research. This includes the data sources and data
analysis methods used in the thesis. In its second section, the chapter discusses why the
theoretical framework of postcolonialism has been employed in this research. In its final
section, the chapter discussions various limitations of this research along with the problems
occurred during the course of the research. This chapter, therefore, provides detail
concerning how the research questions posed in the Introduction chapter will be answered,
and the theoretical framework within which such an investigation will take place.
2.1. Research Methodology
According to Silverman (2005, 109), research methodology refers to the choices made by the
researcher concerning the methods used to gather and analyse data and how that data will
be interpreted. The focus of the research is the use of Jirga as a means of conflict resolution
in the context of militant insurgency in the tribal regions of Pakistan, primarily since the
inauguration of the U.S. led War on Terror in 2001. This research is conducted using an
interpretive research paradigm and is qualitative in nature. According to Gephart (2004, 457), interpretive research ‘uncovers, describes, and theoretically interprets the actual meaning that people use in real settings’. An interpretive research framework assumes that there is no one single “truth” and that any reality needs to be interpreted by recovering and discovering the underlying meaning of activities and events (Mack 2010; Gephart 2004). Also, interpretive research assumes that the external world that the research engages with is “relative” and formed of ‘local intersubjective realities composed from subjective and objective meanings’
51
(Gephart 2004, 456). In epistemological terms, an interpretive paradigm sees the world as experienced by people through their interaction, with the purpose of the research confined to understanding a particular phenomenon and not generalising the findings to a broader population (Tuli 2011, 100). In terms of ontology, an interpretive paradigm allows the researcher to see reality as a human construct, and unlike a positivist paradigm, does not assume that there is an external reality ‘out there’ which is entirely independent of human presence, existence and experience (Tuli 2011, 101).
On this basis, the research analyses various historical and contemporary accounts of militant insurgency within the tribal areas, primarily from 2002 to 2017, and the attempts of both state and military actors, as well as indigenous “tribal” Pashtuns, to engage in various means of conflict resolution within this period. One of the primary means by which “tribal” Pashtuns have sought to respond to the militant insurgency is through the convening of traditional tribal decision-making bodies known as Jirga. It is Jirga that then makes decisions as to the best means for the tribes for conflict resolution. As explained in the Introduction chapter, the information available on the activity of tribal Jirga, in response to this militancy, is fragmented and limited. However in chapter eight the thesis nevertheless seeks, through the use of this limited data, to construct a narrative concerning the response of Jirga to militant insurgents in the tribal regions during this period, and the various means Jirga has employed to engage in conflict resolution during this period. Chapter eight also seeks to consider the prospects for any use of such indigenous methods of conflict resolution in the future.
The research uses both primary and secondary sources of data. The research consists primarily of documentary analysis of primary sources and investigation and evaluation of secondary sources. The main primary sources used in this research are colonial archives on
52
Pashtun tribes, think tank reports on the FATA region [such as those by FATA Research Centre
(FRC) and Community Motivation and Appraisal Programme (CAMP)], newspapers; including
three major English “dailies” of Pakistan (The News, Dawn and The Express Tribune), and a
FATA-focused news website (Tribal News Network). The relevance of using these news
sources is that these dailies have local reporters reporting from the tribal areas. The
secondary sources include secondary data such as monographs, the literature on the tribal
areas and ethnographies on tribal societies, especially the Pashtun tribal areas.
The data for instances of conflict in the former-FATA region is collected primarily from books
and literature on the tribal areas, along with using online sources through a targeted search using online search engines, mainly Google Search and Google Scholar, with a timeline range between January 2002 to December 2017. The targeted search is important because, for the reasons outlined in the Introduction, data on the former-FATA region is limited and scattered,
and so the research has had to collate information from multiple sources in order to secure a
coherent account of events within this region. Additionally, Tribal News Network (an online
news site focusing on FATA) has also been extensively used for data collection of events
involving Jirga and Lashkar. Because the website focuses solely on the former-FATA region, it
reports incidents and instances that are otherwise not reported in the mainstream media.
The data will be organised in chronological order in order to create a concise historical
narrative of relevant events within the tribal areas during the period of analysis.
The collected data is analysed and interpreted using a postcolonial analytical framework (see
2.2 below). Moreover, the research also takes a limited inspiration from political
anthropology and discusses and uses segmentary lineage theory in order to understand the
Pashtun tribal society. The “tribal” Pashtuns, like many African and Middle Eastern tribal
53 societies (see Ahmed 2013a), have historically displayed segmentation, and hence, it becomes important to analyse the Pashtuns through the framework of segmentary lineage. Discussion on segmentary lineage in the Pashtun tribal society can be found below in Chapter 3.
In terms of analysing major military operations since 2001 in the former-FATA region, the research details and analyses ten major operations widely reported in the media, namely, Al
Mizan (Justice), Zalzala (Earthquake), Sirat-e-Mustaqeem (Righteous Path), Sher Dil (Lion
Heart), Rah-e-Nijat (Path of Salvation), Brekhna (Lightening), Koh-e-Sufaid (White Mountain),
Zarb-e-Azb (Sharp strike), Radd ul Fasaad (Rejection of Discontent), and Khyber. The rationale for selecting these operations is that the outcome and consequences of all these operations are reported in the Pakistani media. However, the research also utilises critical scholarly works and stories by foreign news media and non-profit organisations on the negative effects of these operations. Moreover, Chapter 7 below also critically analyses all these operations with regards to various drawbacks, and in some cases effectiveness, of Pakistan’s use of force in its peace and conflict resolution policy in the tribal areas.
In terms of peace accords signed between the military and the militants, the Shakai Peace
Agreement (2004), Sararogha Peace Agreement (2005), and Waziristan (Miranshah) Accord
(2006) are discussed and analysed. Moreover, there is also a mention of other instances of lesser-known peace deals in the tribal areas, which also come under brief discussion.
Discussion of these major and minor peace deals is important because even though such deals, between the state and the militants, show some utility of the Jirga’s role as a mediation body, nevertheless this discussion also explains why the military’s overarching influence in these deals reduced the effectiveness of Jirga in their mediatory role. Furthermore, as discussed in the analysis of these deals in Chapter 7, a critical analysis of these deals also
54
explains various drawback’s in Pakistan’s peace and conflict resolution strategy in the tribal
areas.
. The sources of primary data included in this research include government documents,
reports by non-profit organisations and contemporary newspaper stories; especially from the
FATA Research Centre (FRC) and Tribal News Network (TNN). This use of primary sources of
data will aid in answering the major research questions outlined in the Introduction. The
thesis, as discussed, relies heavily on newspaper stories, especially because these primary
sources of data help overcome, to some extent, the limitation of restricted access to the tribal
areas (see below 2.3). A number of newspaper stories, therefore, published by online sources
such as TNN have been authored by news reporter based in, or around, the former-FATA
region. These stories, in particular, become important for the analysis in Chapters 7 and 8,
especially because accounts of military operations, peace deals, Jirga meetings and Lashkar
activities are not widely cited in the mainstream media of Pakistan.
Major Lashkars, coming under brief discussion, include the South Waziristan Lashkars,
Kurram Lashkars, Bajaur Lashkars, Khyber Lashkars, Orakzai Lashkars, and Peshawar
Lashkars. These instances of Jirga and Lashkar initiatives have been collected using a targeted
search of those instances that have been reported in the news media and/or secondary
literature. Discussion of these Lashkars is also important as they explain how the Jirgas in
these tribal Agencies used this option for peace and conflict resolution in the tribal areas.
Moreover, the formation of these Lashkars also explains how various tribes used indigenous
methods, in some instances with limited state support, to fight militants in their region.
The political circumstances of the former-FATA region, concerning militancy, Pakistani state
and military responses, and the role of Jirga, is fluid and changing. Consequently, in order to
55
provide a chronological limit to the investigation, this thesis will not investigate events that
have occurred after December 31, 2017. Because of the nature of the topic, along with the
changing nature of the political situation in tribal areas this, research proceeds by keeping a
December 31, 2017, cut-off date in perspective. This means that the figures of casualties, peace deals and military operations conducted in FATA are investigated covering a period from January 2002 to December 31, 2017. Moreover, even though the recent constitutional reforms, in May 2018, have paved way for FATA’s merger with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the fact that these reforms fall outside of the time limits referred to above, only a cursory and limited discussion of the initial and possible future impact of these reforms is possible.
2.2. Postcolonialism as an analytical framework
The theoretical and analytical lens employed in this research revolves around postcolonialism,
and this framework is used to analyse data and inform the response to research questions.
Since its independence from the British in 1947, Pakistan has inherited a number of major
colonial legacies. One of these is the Durand Line, demarcated by the British Raj in 1893, which is the border that divides Afghanistan and Pakistan, leaving Pashtuns on both sides of the border (Mahmud 2010). Along with the Durand Line, Pakistan has also inherited the Frontier
Crimes Regulation (1901) (FCR), a set of colonial laws that were used by the British to govern the Pashtun tribes in the tribal areas (Tahir 2015).
It will be argued that the influence of this colonial legacy also had an effect on the attitudes
of the Pakistani state and military to the “tribal” Pashtuns, not least in the persistence of
colonial assumptions concerning the Pashtuns and their culture. Within the colonial period,
“tribal” Pashtuns were subject to various negative colonial representations, advanced by the 56
British, mainly resulting from the involvement of Pashtuns in insurgencies against British military expeditions in the tribal regions (Beattie 2011, 2013).
The Pakistani ruling elite, from the time of independence in 1947, inherited some of these attitudes, perceiving the tribal regions, as the British had done, as a semi-lawless frontier that required intervention and pacification (Khan 2006). In part as a result of these assumptions towards Pashtuns, Pakistani state leaders, after Pakistan’s independence in 1947, decided to maintain the legal framework that the British had used to govern the tribal regions – the
Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). The willingness of the Pakistani state to maintain the
British rule of governance within the tribal regions, rather than seeking to integrate those regions into the mainstream framework of law and order governing the rest of the newly independent Pakistani society, shows the extent to which the new Pakistani ruling authorities endorsed the British attitudes towards the tribal region as a semi-lawless frontier requiring intervention and pacification.
The persistence of these colonial legacies, therefore, makes postcolonialism a meaningful frame of reference in which to interpret the actions of the Pakistani state and military in relation to the Pashtun tribes in the former-FATA region. This is because the social, political and cultural situation in the tribal areas is, even today, shaped by the colonial legacy that the
Pakistani state inherited from the British Raj. Indeed, as a former territory of the British Raj, much of the history of Pakistan itself, since it gained independence in 1947, can be understood in these postcolonial terms (see Alavi 1972; Ahmed 2013b). Moreover, postcolonialism also helps in explaining how the Pakistani military, based on the British model, gained influence – in alliance with the bureaucracy and religious right – over time at the cost of lack of political and democratic progress. Due to this lack of progress, and with on
57
and off military rules in the country, the military, over the years, has gained unassailable
influence in political, economic and security affairs of Pakistan. Due to these influence, even
when the civilian governments come to power after elections, the elected Prime Ministers
have to remain on the “same page” with the military in order to sustain their government.
2.3. Research Limitations and Problems Occurred
One of the primary limitations of this study is the lack of access to the tribal areas of Pakistan
for data collection. The primary reason for this lack of access is the absence of security in
these regions and therefore the personal dangers involved for those outside the region in
travelling there. As explained in the Introduction, this has limited the availability of
information concerning the activity of “tribal” Pashtuns, and particularly their use of Jirga, in the tribal regions, as a means of responding to a militant insurgency within these areas. As
explained in the Introduction, this limitation was somewhat overcome using works from
journalists and local news networks from the former-FATA region along with primary research
conducted on the tribal areas by various think tanks. Nevertheless, the topic is one in which
sources are not abundant and therefore in which much information must be pieced together
from a number of different sources.
Another limitation of the study is that even though the conflict in Pakistan in terms of
militancy and terrorism is multi-faceted, involving several actors and stakeholders, and
transcending the Pakistani-Afghan border, the focus and scope of this research is limited to a
brief discussion of the conflict, actors and stakeholders in the Pashtun tribal region of
58
Pakistan. Also, the research focuses only on the Pashtun people and the Pashtun based
militant groups in the tribal areas, and thus only a passing reference is provided to the
transnational militant factions and their various “splinters” operating in former-FATA.
As the former FATA region, like most of Pakistan, is a male-dominated society, there is very
little inclusion of women within relationships of power. The research, while acknowledging
the gender inequality of the Jirga system and wider Pashtun culture, must engage in its
research within the paradigms of contemporary Pashtun society. These paradigms are ones
where men exercise the most dominant relationships of power and where men, rather than
women, participate in the exercise of that power. As such, the thesis has only very limited
emphasis on the issues of gender inequality that afflict Pashtun culture. I believe that to
properly address the issue of gender inequality a separate research project would be
required.
Finally, due to the time constraints, the research does not discuss the possible impact of
constitutional reforms and the merger of the FATA region with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
province that occurred in 2018. The reason why this is not discussed is that these
developments, albeit major, fall outside the scope and timeline of this research. Moreover,
both short and long term impacts of these developments are yet to be determined. Hence,
the only points at which these developments are discussed is, at a very cursory level.
2.4. Conclusion
This chapter provided an outline of the overall research design of this dissertation and
provided a framework for how the research is to be conducted. In its first section, the chapter discussed the methodology employed in this research. This research is conducted using an
59
interpretive research paradigm and is qualitative in nature. The data used for this research is
both primary and secondary, with the primary data including newspaper stories, newspaper
op-eds and editorials, policy reports and research reports on the tribal areas. The secondary
data includes wider literature and scholarly works on the tribal areas.
In its second section, the chapter justifies the use of a postcolonial theoretical perspective for
this research. It was argued that such a perspective was justified because Pakistan was once part of a former colony of Britain, and the actions of the Pakistani state and military, in their
engagement with and policies towards the “tribal” Pashtuns have been influenced by the
colonial legacies which Pakistan inherited from the British. The methodology along with the
theoretical framework helps in answering the primary research question posed in the
Introduction above. In its final section, the chapter discussed various limitations of this
research along with the problems incurred during the course of the research.
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Chapter 3:
Pashtuns: A Historical
Background
61
3.0. Pashtuns: A Historical Background
This chapter initiates the research for this thesis by discussing Pashtuns, their culture, and
evidence of segmentation in Pashtun “tribal” society. The first section of the chapter provides a brief history of the Pashtuns in general along with the Pashtuns in the tribal areas of
Pakistan. The second section then discusses the Pashtun cultural code of Pashtunwali and how various tenets of this culture play an important role in maintaining order in the Pashtun society. In the final section, the chapter discusses some evidence, and importance, of segmentation in the Pashtun tribal society using historical and contemporary accounts. This anthropological approach, centred on segmentation, is important as it will be connected with the concepts and operation of indigenous methods of conflict resolution (especially, the
Pashtun Jirga).
3.1. A Short Introduction to Pashtuns
Pashtuns are an ethnic group residing in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and are also known
by exonyms such as Afghan, Pathan, Pakhtun and Pukhtoon (Ahmed 2013a, 13-14). There is
little consensus on the past or ancient history of Pashtuns, yet the first authentic account of
Pashtuns could be found in Al-Biruni’s Tarikh-al-Hind, who resided in South Asia from 1016 to
1048 (as cited in ul Haq, Khan and Nuri 2005). He defines Pashtuns as tribes who were
“rebellious” and resided in frontiers of ‘India towards the west’ (as cited in ul Haq, Khan and
Nuri 2005, 1).
According to unofficial sources, the total number of Pashtun population in both countries
ranges between 40 million and 45 million, with exact numbers hard to gauge (Siddique 2014;
Khattak and Bezhan 2018). In Pakistan’s North West and Balochistan province, the Pashtuns
62
make up the second largest ethnic group within Pakistan, whereas the largest concentration
of Pashtun people, over three million, is based in Pakistan’s largest city of Karachi (Bartlotti
2000).
Pashtuns consider “Qais Abdul Rashid” as their common ancestor, and a number of
genealogies of Pashtuns have been structured around him (Siddique 2014; Caroe 1960). It is
said that by 1000 A.D., most of the regions inhabited by Pashtuns had become Muslim and accepted Islam as their religion of practice. It is also said that Qais had three blood-sons,
Sarban, Bhittan, and Ghurghust, and one adopted son, Karlan (Caroe 1960). The mother tongue of most Pashtuns is Pashto, an Indo-European language. A majority of Pashtuns are from the Sunni sect of Islam whereas some tribes, such as Turi, Bangash, and Orakzai, also follow the Shia sect of Islam (Siddique 2014; Yousaf, Rashid and Gul 2018).
In terms of the contemporary history of Pashtuns, the Afghan state was founded by the
Durrani King, Ahmed Shah Abdali (Abdalis) in 1747 (Caroe 1960; Bartlotti 2000). Before the
formation of this state, Pashtuns living in the Afghan areas were either part of the Mughal
Empire or the Persian Empire. Caroe (1960, 920-922) argues that because of this state
formation, coming on the back of two centuries of turmoil, there arose anti-Pashtun
sentiments among the tribes located in Western parts of Afghanistan (who leaned towards
Persia), whereas the Eastern tribes (now a part of Pakistan) developed a bias towards New
Delhi (Indian Sub-continent). This tension also led to the Western tribes using the Persian
denomination of “Afghan” to identify their people, whereas the Eastern tribes used “Pathan”,
an Indo-colonial term for Pathans or Pashtuns (Caroe 1960, 922). Also, there were other tribes
in the North and West of Afghanistan including Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, Aimaq and Hazaras, all
63 of whom had come from what was historically a part of Persia, and now are part of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (Barfield 2010, 18).
Before the Abdalis, Afghanistan, in the 13th century, was controlled by the Mongol empires, and in the 14th century, King Timur (Tamerlane) established the Timurid dynasty (1370-1506)
(Runion 2007, xvi). Then, for the next 200 years, the Safavid Dynasty, following Shiite Islam, ruled over most parts of Afghanistan. Moreover, between 1506 and 1707, various parts of
Afghanistan are shared between the Mughal and Safavid empires (Runion 2007, xvi). Then in
1709, the Sunni Ghilzai (Ghilji) Pashtun tribe revolts against the Safavids (following Shiite
Islam) and results in the Ghilzai (Ghilji) tribe establishing an independent kingdom of
Kandahar in 1709 after leading a successfully rising against Gorgin Khan, the Persian governor of Kandahar (Wahab and Youngerman 2007, 68). This was followed by the Abdalis gaining control and establishing an independent kingdom Herat in 1715 (Kraml 2012).
In 1722, after Mirwais’s death, his son, Mahmud Ghilzai took control of most parts of
Afghanistan, and held his reign for seven years, before he was assassinated and Nadir Shah restored the Safavid Empire in parts that were lost mainly to Afghans. In 1747, Nadir Shah was assassinated and one of his generals, Ahmed Shah Abdali, took control over the Eastern parts of Afghanistan. It was after a highly influential Jirga consisting of the most important
Barakzai tribes that Ahmed Shah Abdali was unanimously named the King of Afghanistan in
1747 (Wahab and Youngerman 2007, 69).
Ahmed Shah, previously known as Ahmed Khan, did not seek the position, yet, the Jirga, after a deadlock, decided that he was the Dur-e-Durran (“pearl of pearls”) among all the candidates, and hence the tribe-name Durranis was used for the Abdalis afterwards (Barfield
2010, 98). Ahmed Shah’s election was seen by many as a surprise as he belonged to a less
64 powerful Sadozai branch of the Popalzai tribe. But because of his connections and support expanding beyond Pashtuns, he was the only choice who could help create a Pashtun heartland and expand Pashtun influence in the country, along with recovering the control over Kandahar from Ghiljis (Barfield 2010; Kraml 2012).
Barfield (2010) argues that even though Ahmed Shah rose to power within a Pashtun tribal culture defined by segmentary allegiances and an egalitarian structure, his model of governance was more aristocratic and systematic in nature, as he sought to ensure that any transfer of power was confined to his own family. One benefit of Ahmed Shah’s Pashtun background was that many Pashtun tribes were granted certain privileges and tax exemptions, along with a right to self-government (Kraml 2012).
Then in 1761, Ahmed Shah led a strong army against the Marathas, who had gained power by defeating the Mughal kings in India (Cooper 1989). This allowed him to take control of New
Delhi and Northern India. There were various power struggles within the Afghan kingdom from the time of Ahmad Shah’s coronation as King in 1747 and the first Anglo-Afghan War in
1839-1842. Yet the Pashtun tribes kept themselves out of these power struggle on the condition that whoever came to power respected their traditions and their place within
Afghan society (Barfield 2004).
The situation changed in Afghanistan after the second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880) when the new king, Abdur Rehman, allegedly a British “puppet”, abolished all forms of decentralized governments and tried establishing his autocratic rule with help and support from Britain (Kraml 2012). It was during the Anglo-Afghan wars that the British Raj consolidated its control and hold over New Delhi and was facing trouble taming the Pashtun tribes on its Western border in Afghanistan. As a means of ensuring greater control over these
65 tribes, Sir Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary to the British government in India, reached a deal with King Abdur Rehman, in 1893, to create an administrative border, called the Durand
Line, dividing Pashtuns on both sides of the border between British India and Afghanistan, in return for rich subsidies for the King from the British government (Kraml 2012; Barfield 2010).
This agreement, as Caroe (1958) argues, was, in many ways, a coerced deal forced upon the
Afghan King by the British government. The British government’s decision to create the
Durand Line was in accordance with a “forward moving” policy it adopted in British India, creating railway lines and roads reaching as far as Balochistan (then part of Afghanistan).
Further discussion of this colonial creation of Pashtun tribal areas and separation of Pashtuns on both sides can be found below in Annex 1.
Maps 1 and 2 below show an illustration of pre and post-Durand Line geographies of
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and how the arbitrary border changed the regional map. These maps also show how territories of Afghanistan later became a part of then India, and now
Pakistan, after the demarcation.
66
Map 3.1: Afghanistan pre-Durand Line showing the areas that were a part of Afghanistan
before the Durand Line demarcation
Source: (Afghanland 2000)
67
Map 3.2: Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan and what territories became
part of Pakistan after partition in 1947
Source: (Morris 2017)
The Durand Line was controversial. Even though the Line was a product of an agreement between the British Government and the Afghan monarchy, subsequent Afghan governments never accepted this division and this tension led to the third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919, which finally forced the Afghan side to cease its explicit demands for return of the lost territory that it suffered as a result of the Durand Line.
During the process of Indian partition and independence from the British Raj in 1947, Pakistan sought control of the Pashtun tribal areas. It utilised the international law res transit cum sua onera (treaties of extinct states concerning boundary lines), in which all rights and duties
68
arising from past treaties pass on to the successor states (Malik 2016a, 81). On this basis, the
Pashtun tribal areas – later renamed the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) – were
absorbed by the Pakistani state (As seen in Maps 1 and 2 above). However Pashtun tribes
continued to exist and survive on both sides of the Pakistani and Afghan border.
For the purpose of clarity, the Pashtuns discussed in this research are concentrated in the
former-FATA region in the North West of Pakistan. The region until recently was a semi-
autonomous region governed by the 1901 Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR). The region covers
a total area of 27,000 sq. km. and also shares a 600km long border with Afghanistan (Siddique
2014). An overwhelming majority of the tribal areas are of Pashtun ethnicity where major
tribes include the Shinwaris, Afridis, Mehsuds, Wazirs, Jajis, Orazkais, Daurs (or Dawar), Turis,
Safis and Mohmands (Siddique 2014; Yousaf, Rashid and Gul 2018). The region was divided
into seven administrative units called the “Agencies” which included Bajaur, Orakzai,
Mohmand, Khyber, North and South Waziristan and Kurram. The region also consisted of six
settled areas called Frontier Regions (FR) including Bannu, Kohat, FR Peshawar (not to be
confused with Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province), Dera Ismail Khan,
Lakki Marwat and Tank (Siddique 2014; Yousaf, Rashid and Gul 2018).
Because militancy mainly remained concentrated in the tribal “Agencies”, and not the FRs, since 2001, it is also important to briefly geographic profiles of these “Agencies”. This brief analysis will aid in an in-depth understanding of various militant groups, violence and peace and conflict resolution efforts discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Even though these “Agencies” have been renamed as “tribal districts” after the May 2018 constitutional reforms, this section
69
uses the pre-merger nomenclature of “Agencies” to designate the administrative units in the
former-FATA region7.
Mohmand Agency
The Mohmand agency covers a total area of 2,296 sq. km., and borders Bajaur “Agency” in
the north, Malakand region in the east, Peshawar in the south-east and Afghanistan in the
west (FATA-Secretariat 2019). In terms of terrain, the “Agency” is composed of rugged
mountains and barren slopes. Established in 1951, the “Agency” derived its name from the
Mohmand tribes that reside in the area, with a population of around 350,000 (FATA-
Secretariat 2019). These tribes had historically given trouble to the British forces and
mounted strong challenges against most invasions (Abbas 2006). The “Agency” is also known to have strong religious influences and conservative values, with clerics historically enjoying respect among tribes (Abbas 2006).
Khyber Agency
The Khyber “Agency” covers a total area of 2,576 sq. km. with a population of over 500,000
(FATA-Secretariat 2019). The “Agency” takes its name from the historic Khyber Pass that connects both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The region is inhabited by Afridi and Shinwari tribes
(Yousaf, Rashid and Gul 2018). The agency has the all-important border with Afghanistan in the east, whereas it also borders Orakzai Agency in the south, Peshawar in the east and
Mohmand “Agency” in the north (FATA-Secretariat 2019). Due to its proximity with
Afghanistan, the “Agency” has not only witnessed the influx of militants from Afghanistan but has also remained a hub of drug trade and goods smuggling from and into Afghanistan (Malik
7 These profiles have been reproduced from government of Pakistan’s FATA Secretariat Website and profiles written by Hassan Abbas (2006). 70
and Sarfaraz 2011). Since 2001, the region became a center of conflict and militancy, not only
because of local militant groups (see below Chapter 6), but also because of spillover effects
of sectarian conflict - between Shia and Sunni militants - in the nearby Kurram Agency.
Afridis are portrayed as “courageous, rebellious and treacherous” in colonial and
contemporary literature (see above 5.2). In terms of religious affiliations, a majority of the
tribes in the “Agency” follows “Barelvi” sect of Islam, which is less conservative that then
Deobandi sect (Abbas 2006).
Kurram Agency
Kurram has remained one of the most important tribal “Agencies” when it comes to peace and conflict in the region, especially since the Afghan Jihad in 1979. Covering a total area of
3380 sq. km., the “Agency” borders Afghanistan in west and north, Khyber and Orakzai
“Agencies” in the east, Hangu District in the southeast, and North Waziristan “Agency” in the
south (FATA-Secretariat 2019). Inhabited by over 500,000 Pashtuns, the “Agency” is home to
Turi and Bangash tribes (Yousaf, Rashid and Gul 2018; Reliefweb 2015). The “Agency” holds
regional importance especially because of its 42 percent Shia population, making it vulnerable
to sectarian and proxy conflict (Yousaf, Rashid and Gul 2018; Reliefweb 2015). Because of this
sectarian makeup, the Sunni-Taliban have faced strong resistance from the Shia tribes,
especially since 2001. This resistance has, therefore, brought Sunni militants, both from
Afghanistan as well as other parts of former-FATA, to fight against the Shia tribes (see below
6.3.2.1).
Bajaur Agency
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Bajaur “Agency” is the smallest of all administrative units in the former-FATA region. The region is mostly composed of hilly terrain which makes most of its parts inaccessible. The
“Agency” has a total population of around 600,000 and borders Afghanistan’s Kunar province
(FATA-Secretariat 2019). Interestingly, Kunar has remained a major center of militancy, currently containing both the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. The major tribes in Bajaur include
Utmankhel and Tarakni tribes (Yousaf, Rashid and Gul 2018). The “Agency” was officially made part of FATA in 1973, before which it mostly remained a remote and inaccessible semi- autonomous territory coming under the jurisdiction of the Political Agent of the Malakand region (FATA-Secretariat 2019).
Orakzai Agency
With a total population of around 240,000, the Orakzai “Agency” derives its name from the
Orakzai tribe based in the region (FATA-Secretariat 2019). It is the only “Agency” of former-
FATA that does not share a border with Afghanistan, however, borders FR Kohat in the east,
Kohat district in the south and Kurram “Agency” in the west (Abbas 2006; FATA-Secretariat
2019). The total area covered by Orakzai is around 1538 sq. km. and comprises of hilly fertile valleys (FATA-Secretariat 2019). Due to its proximity with Kurram, the 8 percent Shia population was under constant threat of militant attacks, between 2008 and 2010, from Sunni militants who had moved into Orakzai from other tribal “Agencies” after various military operations (IRIN 2010). During these years, the “Agency” also had a significant presence of the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), many of whose fighters had fled from South Waziristan after military operations (Jan 2010a). It was because of this influx of militants that the
“Agency”, even having a higher literacy ratio compared to other “Agencies”, witnessed a ban of non-profit organisations and criminalised passion of a television (Abbas 2006).
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North Waziristan Agency
In terms of the total area covered, North Waziristan is the second largest “Agency” in the
former-FATA region. The region has remained a nuisance for the British Empire when in 1930,
it was argued that more troops were based in North Waziristan alone compared to that rest
of the Indian sub-continent (Warren 1997). Two major tribes that inhabit North Waziristan
are Wazirs and Dawars, or Daur (Yousaf, Rashid and Gul 2018). The “Agency” is inhabited by
nearly 400,000 Pashtuns and covers a total area of 4707 sq. km (FATA-Secretariat 2019). In terms of borders, the “Agency” borders Kurram Agency and Kohat in the north, Kohat and
Bannu in the east, Afghanistan in the west and South Waziristan “Agency” in the South (FATA-
Secretariat 2019). Since 2001, North Waziristan, along with South Waziristan, has remained
the target of militant influx, military operations and U.S. drone strikes (Yousaf 2017b).
South Waziristan Agency
South Waziristan is the largest “Agency” of the former-FATA region with a total population of
over 400,000 (FATA-Secretariat 2019). Similar to North Waziristan, it is also inhabited by
Mehsud and Wazir tribes (Abbas 2006; Yousaf, Rashid and Gul 2018). With a total area of
6620 sq. km., South Waziristan borders Bannu and Lakki Marwat districts in the north-east,
D. I. Khan district in the east, Zhob district of Balochistan province in the south and North
Waziristan “Agency” in the north (FATA-Secretariat 2019). In terms of terrain, South
Waziristan mostly consists of barren hills and small valleys. Since 2001, and due to its terrain
and proximity, South Waziristan attracted militant influx from Afghanistan, especially the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an Al Qaeda affiliate. Moreover, Nek Muhammad
Wazir, a Taliban leader and Afghan Jihad veteran killed in the first U.S. drone strike on
Pakistani soil, along belonged to the South Waziristan “Agency” (Abbas 2006).
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3.2. Pashtunwali – The Way of the Pashtuns
Pashtunwali (literally translated as the “way of the Pashtuns”) is a set of cultural values and
tenets of Pashtun society that plays a major role in maintaining social order in this society
(see Kakar 2004b; Spain 1972). Historically, the academic accounts of Pashtunwali go as back as 1815 when Elphinstone (1842, 262), spelling it as “Pooshtoonwullee”, mentions the cultural code calling it the customary law of the Pashtun people.
Yousufzai and Gohar (2005) posit that Pashtunwali is a combination of conventions, traditions and a code of honour that govern the social system of Pashtuns. Pashtunwali includes tenets such as Jirga (tribal councils), nang (honor), melmastya (hospitality), which is complemented by an assembly room (hujra) to discuss everyday affairs and shelter travellers or guests, badal
(reciprocity, sometimes also misinterpreted as revenge), tarboorwali (agnatic rivalry), and
siyali (competition among extended family). For Pashtun tribes organized in the tribal areas,
Pashtunwali, particularly its concept of “honour”, and tribal lineage and kinship ties, are important traditional characteristics that define the way of life and dominant values of these
tribes as much as the formal religious code of Islam (Ahmed 2013a, 22).
Yousufzai and Gohar (2005, 22) identify the code of Pashtunwali in the context of a discussion
of Jirga:
The context of Jirga is based on a shared understanding of history, values, traditions, culture,
local environment, and above all the Pushto language. These local practices are more
popularly known as “Pukhtoonwali” (Pashtunwali), the code of Pukhtoon (Pashtun) life
(Yousufzai and Gohar 2005, 22).
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Using various tenets of Pashtunwali, Yousufzai and Gohar (2005, 30) provide an interesting
explanation of the word Pukhtoon (root of Pashtun) stating that the word has been
abbreviated from a set of words namely ’ “P” for Patt or Family Honour, “Kh” for Khaigara
which means Compassion, “T” Toora or Triumph, “W” for Wafa which means loyalty and “N”
for Nang or Pride’.
A major fact that is rarely acknowledged by policymakers when dealing with Pashtun tribes is
the importance of Pashtunwali as the sole customary code for resolution of conflicts and
personal grievances in remote Pashtun areas of Afghanistan (Drumbl 2007, 192).
Consequently, a focus on Pashtunwali and the various values it seeks to advance is necessary if we are to understand traditional indigenous dispute resolution and conflict management mechanisms of Pashtun tribes, such as the Jirga.
The following are a brief description of some of the major tenets of Pashtunwali:
3.2.1. Aitbar
Aitbar in its literal translation means “trust”, which is an implicit understanding among the
Pashtuns that every dealing, transaction, and decision, in every walk of life should be based
on trust of each party (Gohar 2010). Pashtun society prides itself on trust and thus Aitbar
holds an important place among the Pashtun people. Aitbar is a cornerstone of Pashtun
traditions and is based on verbal guarantees of trust.
3.2.2. Badal
This is one of the most important sets of customs in Pashtunwali which is concerned with
reciprocity, revenge and retribution (Shinwari 2010). Wylly (1912, 6) observed that for
Pashtun people, revenge and retaliation were their strongest and most important obligations. 75
Gohar (2010) believes that self-respect and sensitivity to insult is an inbuilt trait of all the
Pashtuns, even those who belong to the lowest of income level classes, and thus any insult towards them could provoke them to seek revenge. Badal also implies another meaning of
Badal which stands for return, exchange or a penalty which an offender has to pay to the victim or his or her family for the crime he or she might have committed (Atayee 1979;
Yousufzai and Gohar 2005, 78).
Yousufzai and Gohar (2005) posit that Badal can both be positive and negative. One positive of Badal is it requires a tribesperson not to harm someone if they have helped them in the past (Qadeer 2014). This positive aspect is also observed once both the parties involved have had an equal score of kills in light of revenge, which triggers the need for arranging a council of elders, Jirga, to establish peace between both the parties and settle the blood feud
(Yousufzai and Gohar 2005, 36).
This custom is in many ways responsible for propagating the war-like mindset and culture of the Pashtun people. It is also regarded as one of the major factors that encouraged Afghan
Pashtuns to take up arms against the Soviets during the Soviet-Afghan war in 1980’s so that they could take revenge for the collateral damages caused by the Soviet Army (Hussain 2008).
3.2.3. Badragga
Badragga, or badraga, is a norm referring to “safe conduct”. Badragga is the set of values that ensures security and protection of all the participants of the Jirga during the Jirga proceedings (Yousufzai and Gohar 2005). The Badragga is also used to provide a tribal escort to protect visitors or guests of tribes, and if the escort is violated or hurt in any way, a tribal
76 feud could follow (Poulton 2003). Badragga is also the term that is used to describe an armed escort that protects a fugitive who is being pursued by his enemies (Gohar 2010).
3.2.4. Balandra
Balandra (also known as Ashar) is derived from Balana (meaning “invitation”). It is a set of norms relevant to collective work or action and describes a form of social work conducted by the “tribal” Pashtuns (Atayee 1979; Gohar 2010). Balandra is an obligation on all members of the tribe to perform collective tasks for the community, such as digging a canal or helping someone in need (Widmark 2010). Under Balandra, the Pashtun tribes also help a member of the tribe with tasks he might not have the resources to complete on their own (Khan
2010b).
3.2.5. Baramta and Bota
Both Baramta and Bota refer to a security deposit which is kept from a party who is obliged to pay a fine or penalty (Khan 2010b; Barfield 2003). In the case of Bota the security is in the form of seizure of land, whereas in the case of Baramta, hostages might also be taken as collateral or security (Khan 2010b). This custom has been used not only by the Pashtuns, but also by the British, during the Raj, and the post-independence Pakistani government, when dealing with the Pashtuns. (Yousufzai and Gohar 2005). During the British Raj, the British Army used this tactic, by seizing lands, possessions, and businesses of the “tribal” Pashtuns to force them to agree to demands laid out by the British Army (Yousufzai and Gohar 2005). On the other hand, in the post-independence period, the Political Agent in the tribal agencies, appointed by the Pakistani government, may also confiscate and seize properties of tribal people accused under the law. Conversely, there have been cases of Pashtun tribes, in conflict
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with the Pakistani state, utilising this custom to justify the kidnapping of government officials
so that they could more forcefully put forward their demands to the state (Yousufzai and
Gohar 2005).
3.2.6. Chigha (Cheegha)
Chigha in literal terms means “to shout” (Daur 2014). It is generally a call for help in case of
danger or adversity. During a Chigha, everyone who hears this cry for help runs to their house
and collects their arms and weapons, and then assembles in the spot where the Chigha,
signified by a drumbeat, was initiated (Atayee 1979). The term can also mean a posse formed
to pursue bandits or thieves (Khan 2010b). A Chigha is in some ways a peace and security
mechanism because it is used in times of an emergency or for the pursuit of a party (Gohar
2010).
3.2.7. Gundi
Gundi is derived from the word Gund, which means simply a party, a collection of people, a
group or a faction (Shahmahmood 2009; Christensen 1981). In terms of Pashtunwali, Gundi
means tribal or personal rivalry, between clans, families, or even entire tribes (Shahmahmood
2009). In this custom, warring or conflicting parties reach out to other tribes and clans that
are enemies with their enemies, in an effort to form a larger alliance against their enemies.
Hence, Gundi is one means by which segmentation occurs within and between tribes, as
loyalties and allegiances shift in response to Gundi. It is also the means by which a balance of power is sought, either internally, between families and clans within a tribe, or externally, between tribes (Khan and Syed 2017, 506).
3.2.8. Hamsaya
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Hamsaya in Pashto means a neighbour, whereas its literal meaning stands for one “who shares the same shadow” (Lee 2011, 129). Neighbours hold a special place in the Pashtun culture and thus constitute an important part of Pashtunwali. This custom means that a neighbour would be protected at all costs if they seek refuge with a tribe or a tribal family
(Shahmahmood 2009). If a Pashtun is unable to protect his family and his life living with his tribe, they have to migrate to another tribe and seek refuge and protection, where he lives as a Hamsaya. The Hamsaya enters the service of the protector and an attack on the guest
(“Hamsaya”) is considered an attack on the protector (Shahmahmood 2009; Khan 2010b).
3.2.9. Hujrah (or Hujra)
Hujra is a community hub for Pashtuns, constituting a common sitting and gathering place for Pashtuns, located in almost every Pashtun street and normally owned by a well off
Pashtun elder (Khan) (Yousufzai and Gohar 2005, 31). Hujra not only serves as a common community space for discussions on social and political issues but is also used as a conflict resolution space, where proceedings of Jirga are mostly organized, especially in urban
Pashtun areas (Abbas 2014: 19). Gohar (2010) gives an elaborate explanation of a Hujra as:
a communal setting for entertainment, a community center for children to play, a decision-
making conflict resolution center, a place to offer people workshops in various skills, a place
for ceremonies and celebrations in the event of deaths, marriages, festivals, and a communal
"hotel" and guest hall with a big compound for males in the community or village (Gohar 2010,
27).
A significant drawback of Hujra is that, like many elements of Pashtunwali, it is a male- dominated institution, where little participation of female Pashtuns is encouraged.
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3.2.10. Jirga (Jirgah, Jarga)
Jirga - a council of elders used for conflict resolution and mediation - is by far the most important tenet of Pashtunwali, and also a focus of this research. The Jirga is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
3.2.11. Lashkar
Lashkar is an Arabic word, also commonly used in Pashto, which means a group of soldiers or an army (Yousufzai and Gohar 2005; Atayee 1979). A Lashkar is, therefore, a group of Pashtun
tribesmen8 that enforces a Jirga decision. Further discussion of Lashkar can be found below in Chapter 4.
3.2.12. Lokhay Warkawal
The term Lokhay Warkawal means “giving pots”, where “lokhay” means a pot, and
“warkawal” means to give. “Lokhay”, in this context, is used a synonym for “security” or
“protection”, whereby the party in danger gives a gift or a sacrifice to a strong tribal leader in
return for protection (Khan 2010b). On some occasions, a Pasa (or a sheep) is sacrificed and
presented as an offering after which the person seeking protection is taken into the tribe
(Atayee 1979). This custom is most common among the Afridi tribes of Khyber agency and
Orkazai tribes of Tirah (Gohar 2010).
3.2.13. Melmastya
8 I am using a gendered term here because at the time of writing, all of the participants in the Pashtun Jirgas
and Lashkars in the former-FATA region were men. I am not implying that this should be the case in the future.
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Melmaysta in simple terms means “hospitality”, and is one of the important tenets of
Pashtunwali and forms the core of Pashtun culture (Kakar 2004b). In Pashtun culture, the obligation of hospitality towards a guest, irrespective of their background, is considered sacred and the host considers it their eternal duty to protect the guest. In case of an attack on the guest, the host responds or reciprocates in a manner as if they were directly attacked by the perpetrators (Atayee 1979). It was the concept of hospitality among Pashtuns that allowed Osama bin Laden to seek refuge in Afghanistan. It is also the concept that was used by members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban to seek refuge among the Pashtun tribes in both
Afghanistan and the former-FATA region (Mayville 2011, 2).
A variation of Melmastya is called “panah warkawal” (giving refuge), which, Hussain (2010a) argues, resulted in many “tribal” Pashtuns giving refuge to the Taliban, who belonged to their
tribes, in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.
3.2.14. Nagha and Tarr
Nagha is a fine or the amount of fine that the tribal Jirga imposes on an offender (Gohar
2010). This fine is imposed according to predetermined amounts or precedents which are
determined through Narkh (discussed below) (Atayee 1979). This tribal fine is also, in some
cases, imposed or determined on the spot by the Jirga for the satisfaction of the victim (Alley
2012). Nagha is often bracketed with Tarr, which is a ban on a certain activity which is decided
after a mutual consensus of two parties such as not grazing on certain lands where seeds are
sown for irrigation (Gohar 2010). Anyone violating a Tarr pays a Nagha in return.
3.2.15. Nanawatay (Nanawate)
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Nanawatay generally refers to the forgiveness or pardoning of the enemy (Khan 2010b).
Nanawatay is the process where an offender sends someone respectable from their side of the tribe or clan to the victim’s family to beg for pardon and forgiveness. Yousufzai and Gohar
(2005, 32) argue that the process of Nanawatay involves humility, sorrow and apology from the offender who asks for asylum, at least temporarily, so as to create a peaceful environment for further dialogue. The process involves speen-geeri (white bearded / elders) who are tribal elders and are respected in the society (Atayee 1979).
This is also one of the positive aspects of Pashtunwali which can lead to reconciliation and peace in generations-old rivalries. In some instances, Nanawatay might also be defined as a voluntary public apology by the offender, especially in minor cases (Yousufzai and Gohar
2005). Nanawatay can also be used as a source of admitting defeat when the defeated party goes to the other party’s house and asks for shelter and forgiveness (Matthews and Khosa
2014).
3.2.16. Nang
Nang stands for “honour” in the Pashto language, which means the honour of not only the person concerned but also his or her family. According to Khattak, Mohammad and Lee (2009)
Nang is the basic value of Pashtunwali and also a prime feature of the Pashtun personality.
Nang is also sometimes bracketed with Namus which means protecting your wealth and family. In order to live in Pashtun society and be a proud member of the community, one should be able to protect both Nang and Namus (Shahmahmood 2009). People living in closely knit “tribal” Pashtun societies have to ensure they maintain their Nang and Namus, and if they lose it, they need to leave the family and only return once they regain their honour.
Yousufzai and Gohar (2005, 42) posit that when a Pashtun’s honour is threatened, they are
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forced to take up arms, as a right given to them at birth, to protect their honour. Thus, Nang
gives a Pashtun the right not only to protect his rights but also the rights of his tribe (Khan
2015b). Nang or Honour is also used for the “protection” of women in the Pashtun society
(Yousufzai and Gohar 2005).
3.2.17. Narkh
Narkh, meaning “penalty rate”, is a tribal customary law which sets penalties and standards
for all sorts of offences in a tribal community (Atayee 1979). Narkh are also the codified customary laws of Pashtuns that are supposed to be implemented by a tribal Jirga (Siddique
2014). Each tribal community sets its own Narkh; in most cases, however, this Narkh is mostly similar in nature. Any member of the tribal community who refuses to abide by the Narkh is not allowed to remain a member of that tribal community. The Narkh might also be regarded as a tribal rule or a precedent under which a Jirga recommends punishment for the offender
(Yousufzai and Gohar 2005).
3.2.18. Saz
Saz means reconciliation or blood money to be paid according to Pashtun traditions. Saz is
also the customary practice of Pashtuns where compensation is given in return for bloodshed,
murder or a grave offence in order to end a blood-feud and achieve peace between the
conflicting parties (Richard 2014). The term is mostly used among the Afridi tribes who use
Saz as cash payments paid by the murderer to the victim’s family (Atayee 1979). Saz is thus the compensation paid by the perpetrator for wrongful death or murder (Khan 2010b). Saz is
offered by the representatives of the murderer to the surviving members of the victim’s
family (Khan 2010b). In some cases, the Saz is also replaced by Swara (giving a female member
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of the murderer’s family to the victim’s family in marriage) in order to make peace and end
blood-feuds. Hence, Swara has come under constant criticism for being a “primitive” custom
which violates basic human and gender rights (Naseer 2018).
3.2.19. Tarboor (Tarbur)
Tarboor is someone who has a common share in inheritance such as a cousin. A Tarboor can
be a clan member, distant relative or a cousin (Atayee 1979). The concept of infighting among
the Tarboors is common in the Pashtun society, but in case of an external attack from another
tribe, or an outsider, a Tarboor is obliged to help their fellow Tarboor. In this way, we see
segmentation again in evidence within the tribe as loyalties and allegiances shift in relation
to changing circumstances.
Tarboorwali (rivalry among cousins) is a common feature of Pashtun societies (Ahmed 2013a,
53). It is said that in 1973 the Afghan Durrani King was removed by his cousin Daoud Khan in
a coup, and this was justified in terms of the norms of Tarboorwali (Ahmed 2013a, 201).
3.2.20. Tiga (Teega, Tigah, Tizha)
Tiga in the Pashto language means simply a ‘stone’ (Atayee 1979). But in terms of
Pashtunwali, the tribal custom of Tiga is a formal truce between two conflicting parties where
a stone is placed between the parties to signify and symbolize a temporary truce until the
conflict is resolved (Ahmed 2013a, 65). The custom of Tiga is used when a large number of tribal elders gather to form a Jirga and initiate a truce between two conflicting parties in emergency situations. The first step taken in this regard is to initiate a ceasefire, which according to local practices and language is called Tiga or Kanray (stone) (Taizi 2007). The main purpose of the Tiga is to ensure a temporary true or ceasefire until the tribal elders can
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resolve the conflict through a Jirga (Wazir 2010). Again, this is a positive element of
Pashtunwali, making possible one of the steps necessary in the process of conflict resolution.
3.2.21. Tor
Tor, meaning “Black”, is a tribal custom of Pashtunwali that relates to respect and honour of females in the Pashtun community. Tor is a gender protection custom that forbids a male from touching a female to whom he is not married (Khan 2010b). Where Nang is mostly used in the context of protecting the male honour, Tor is used in the context of protection of the female honour (Ginsburg 2011).
3.2.1. Problems with Pashtunwali
The aforementioned discussion on various tenets of Pashtunwali reflects both the positive
and negative sides of the Pashtun culture. Criticism of Pashtunwali reached a global level after
the September 11 attacks and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. This is because, as explained
above, it was the element of “hospitality” in Pashtunwali that enabled Osama bin Laden to
seek refuge in Afghanistan, among the Taliban. Indeed, the refusal of the Taliban to hand over
bin Laden to U.S. custody, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, was informed by the
custom of melmastya (hospitality), in which the Taliban perceived bin Laden as their “guest”
and so deserving of their protection (Yousufzai and Gohar 2005, 34). However, history also
suggests that the Taliban leader Mullah Omar was finally willing to hand over Osama in 1998,
however, changed his mind after the US launched cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan after
Nairobi bombings by Al Qaeda in August that year (Whitaker 2001).
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It was the same set of norms that allowed many of the Taliban, members of Al Qaeda, and
other militant insurgents to seek refuge with the Pashtun tribes in the wake of the U.S.
invasion of Afghanistan (Kerr 2011: Gul 2012).
Rashid (2001, 112) identifies Pashtunwali as a significant influence on the Taliban regime. He
points out that the Taliban are primarily Pashtun in the origin and background. He further
argues that the norms of Pashtunwali influenced the Taliban’s conception of law and
punishment that they sought to implement within their regime (Rashid 2001).
Moreover, Pashtunwali has also been criticised for a number of other reasons. First and foremost, being a male-dominated society, the “tribal” Pashtun culture forbids women from taking part in any Jirga or decision-making process, resulting in the marginalisation of women in the society (Kakar 2004a). This means that the male section of the society enjoys more rights compared to women(Ginsburg 2011, 96). It is because of these rights that due to the custom of Swara (or exchange), women are often “given” in exchange to settle long term disputes (Qadeer 2014, 1232; Naseer 2016). In many cases, underage girls are also forcibly married under Swara (Naseer 2018). Finally, because of these customs, many Jirga decisions have often resulted in honour killing or strict punishment of women for allegedly ‘violating the honour and culture’ of the tribal society (Ali 2018a). This practice also followed in other rural parts of Pakistan, results in the killing of women on suspicion of adultery or other illicit relations with men (Qadeer 2014). Pashtunwali, therefore, underwrites and provides justification for the unequal position of women within Pashtun society and culture.
Another negative custom in Pashtunwali is Badal (revenge), which results in blood-feuds and bloodshed which can be ongoing for decades (Mehsud 2017). Under this custom, in some cases of murder, when the victim’s family is unable to trace the perpetrator, they aim to kill
86 the perpetrator’s male relatives (Qadeer 2014). An empirical study on the tribal areas found that over 64% of the respondents believed that employment of Badal in the Pashtun tribal society was important for justice and social order (Khayyam, Ullah and Shah 2018, 180). It is argued that it was Badal that aided in Taliban’s recruitment efforts in Afghanistan, using images and propaganda of US/NATO military operations and the collateral damage resulting from these operations as reasons for local males to actively resist (Afsar, Samples and Wood
2008). Moreover, in Pakistan, the Taliban have also used collateral damage resulting from the
Pakistani military operations and US drone strikes in order to recruit those who wanted to take Badal (revenge) for the loss of their family members or relatives as a result of such operations (Abbas and Qazi 2013).
Consequently, Pashtunwali has an immense influence within the Pashtun tribal society, providing the norms by which this traditional society regulates relations among its own members. But from the perspective of conflict resolution, it contains both positive and negative elements, with some elements of Pashtunwali serving to exacerbate existing or potential conflicts, and other elements providing the means for their possible resolution.
Further, we have seen that some elements of Pashtunwali, particularly its use in the unequal treatment of women in Pashtun culture and society, is at odds with the basic tenets of the modern Western world and the universal rights discourse prevalent within bodies such as the
United Nations (Ginsburg 2011).
Ginsburg (2011, 90), however, argues that generalisations on negative aspects of Pashtunwali hinder a rational explanation and discussion of the Pashtun tribes and their culture which leads to them being perceived as “primitive rural population”. However, such an explanation, he argues, does not help in explaining the problems faced by these tribes, especially in
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Afghanistan where there is no effective state government and the citizens, therefore, have to
find alternative ways for resolving disputes (Ginsburg 2011, 90).
However, the norms and values of Pashtunwali have nonetheless influenced outside
perceptions of Pashtuns and their tribal societies. In some cases, it has enabled the
persistence of over-simplified generalisations concerning “tribal” Pashtuns, especially in the
colonial and post-colonial literature (see below, Chapter 5).
3.3. Pashtuns and Segmentary Lineage
Akbar S. Ahmed, renowned anthropologist and a former Political Agent (PA) in the Pashtun
tribal areas, argues that the Pashtun tribal society is characterised by four elements. The first
element is the unilineal descent from a common ancestor (Ahmed 1980: 82). We saw in the
previous chapter that such unilateral descent is an important element in the process of
segmentation of the tribal groups, allowing different families, groups or clans within the
tribes, and between tribes, to shift loyalties and allegiances in response to different
circumstances.
Ahmed identifies such segmentation (and the segmentary lineage which makes it possible) as
the second element characteristic of Pashtun tribal society (Ahmed 1980, 82). The third
element is defined by “monadism”. This refers to the reciprocity of identity within the tribe
in which the smaller group within the tribe is reflective of the wider tribe, while the wider
tribe is very much identified as the smaller group with large (Ahmed 1980). A fourth element
is an acephalous form of political organization, in which there is no single leader or head of the tribe, but rather where tribal authority is more diffusely dispersed throughout the tribe
(Ahmed 1980, 82).
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It has been argued the second element of Pashtun tribal culture, identified by Ahmed above
(segmentary lineage) is less evident among urban Pashtuns compared to rural or “tribal”
Pashtuns (Ahmed 2013a, 26-27). However the focus of this research is on the tribal regions of
the former-FATA, and in this area, there is a predominance of rural Pashtuns. For this reason, we shall see that the kinship ties that arise within these tribes, make segmentation an often evident feature of tribal relations. This segmentation, therefore, also holds importance in
analysing the conflict in the former-FATA region, particularly as some members of the militant groups are of Pashtun background and so have kinship ties to the local tribespeople.
Segmentation is therefore also important in the analysis of the various efforts of peace
initiatives (discussed in chapters 7 and 8) that the tribes have been involved in.
The differentiation between tribal and urban Pashtun has been discussed by Ahmed (2011a,
1980) who distinguishes tribal and urban Pashtuns by referring to Nang (honour) and Qalang
(tax paying) Pashtun societies. The Nang societies are situated in mountains, and so are
Pashtun tribal societies occupying rural regions. The Qalang societies occupy urban space, living in towns or cities. They are perceived to compromise somewhat on “honour”, as a
governing code of conduct, in order to integrate into urban areas in which non-Pashtuns also
live (Ahmed 2011a, 117-118).
The Qalang tribes have historically been the Yousafzai tribes, who in times of the Mughal and
British empires allied themselves to the ruling class, and thus gained prominence in
government and military structures (Ahmed 2013a, 57). On the other hand, the Wazir and
Mehsud tribes of Khyber and Waziristan were Nang Pashtuns who have historically shown
unity against any invasion, and such unity was a primary reason why the Mughal empires and
Imperial armies avoided any military adventures in Waziristan (Ahmed 2013a, 58).
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Bartlotti (2000, 57) argues that even after the arbitrary division of Pashtuns as a result of the
Durand Line during the time of British rule in the Indian subcontinent, the Pashtuns retained their sense of association based on ties of kinship, religion, history and language, transcending such arbitrary divisions. The association based on kinship, centred on segmentary lineage, has remained an evident feature of the Pashtuns, especially those based in tribal areas of
Afghanistan and Pakistan (Ahmed 2013a, 3; Sneath 2007, 54).
Aman (2013) has identified segmentation among the Pashtuns, based on kinship and descent from a common ancestor, and perceives this as a major organizing factor, allowing alliances within and between tribes to shift in respond to changing circumstances. In this way, Aman
(2013, 185) identifies how segmentation not only divides “tribal” Pashtuns into rival alliances when confronted by factors that place them at odds but also allows them to unite together in response to a common external threat.
Tainter and MacGregor (2011) also identify segmentary lineage as a common feature of
Pashtun tribes. As with Aman, they perceive the “segments” of Pashtun tribes as linked together on the basis of kinship and shared culture (Tainter and MacGregor 2011, 2). Also like
Aman, Tainter and MacGregor (2011, 3) point out that this segmentary nature of the tribal structure allows for shifting and flexible allegiances in response to changing circumstances.
They also point out that this shifting and flexible quality of allegiance within Pashtun tribes gives rise to a “situational” type of leadership. This is a leadership that (like the temporary allegiances) arise in response to a specific circumstance or threat, and subsides once that threat or circumstance is dealt with (Tainter and MacGregor 2011, 2). However, a leader in
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this segmented “tribal” Pashtun society has to keep proving their leadership abilities or else
they lose the right to lead the tribe (Aman 2013)9.
The segmentation among “tribal” Pashtuns arises in the context of specific segments that are
“tree-like” in their relationship to each other, and which (in terms of the kinship ties) are
based on male descent (Army 2009; Siddique 2014). The “tree-like” quality arises from the
fact that smaller lineages branch out but from a wider common source, but, at the same time,
can unite together (as a result of that common source) when necessary (Johnson and Mason
2008b, 51). In case of Pashtuns, the smaller lineages (‘zais’ or ‘khels’) all derive from a
common source, this being the clans, but when necessary can join together to form larger
tribes and tribal confederations (Johnson and Mason 2008b, 51). But these smaller lineages
(‘khels’) are also capable of further segmentation. The khels are divided into khols (or kahols)
– smaller segments – which are then divided into nuclear families called koranay (household)
(Johnson and Mason 2008b).
This process of segmentation allows for a decentralized power structure both within and
between tribes (Glatzer 2002). This decentralized power structure allows for the flexibility in
leadership, referred to above, in which leadership can arise on a “situational” basis, in
response to shifting circumstances. Yet we have also seen that tribal society is managed, in
the context of this decentralized power structure, in terms of binding norms and customs,
centred on Pashtunwali, that seek to regulate individual and group behaviour. We saw that
this same code of conduct often leads to disruptive behaviour, when “honour” is perceived
to be violated, resulting in feuds and other forms of conflict. Despite such potential for
9 Further discussion on Pashtun tribal leadership, especially in the context of the Pashtun Jirga, can be found below in Chapter 4. 91
division, Pashtuns also hold their group loyalty, based on kinship and other ties, in high regard,
and this allows for a significant level of social cohesion and unity both within and between
tribes (Glatzer 2002). Barfield (2010, 18) posits that among the tribes, the peoples’ loyalty is
towards their kin, tribe, the village as well as their ethnic group, which they call as qawm
(translated as “a nation”).
Frederick Barth, a notable academic who worked on segmentation in Pashtun societies,
conducted fieldwork in Pakistan’s Pashtun region of Swat Valley. He gives the following
explanation regarding rivalry and alliances among the Pashtun based on segmentation:
Alliances are sought with small, distant collateral groups against one's close collaterals, while the latter
reciprocate by allying themselves with the rivals of one's allies. Such alliances involve mutual support
against the respective rivals of the partners, both in the debates of the councils and in the case of
warfare (Barth 1959, 12).
Yet as well as being a source of expansion, we have seen that segmentary lineage is also an
important source of defence in relation to external threats. Historical patterns of such
dynamics due to segmentary attributes of a Pashtun tribal society can also be found during
the British rule over the Indian subcontinent (Beattie 2011, 2013). Indeed the difficulty which the British, and later the Soviets and the Pakistani army, have had in subduing the Pashtuns in the tribal regions on either the Pakistani or Afghan side of the border have been explained in terms of the flexibility of the tribes in shifting allegiances based on segmentary lineage
(Johnson and Mason 2008; Akram Lodhi 2016).
Hugh Beattie (2013), using various historical accounts, has explained the evidence and importance of segmentation of “tribal” Pashtuns during their engagement with the British
Raj, where various tribal alliances were formed against the Raj. Edwards (1998) argues that
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during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (from 1979-1989) the tribal Lashkars that were
formed to fight against the Soviets were made up of multiple kinship groups and had
therefore formed through processes of segmentary lineage, binding different clans in the
tribal groups together.
In the case of the Pakistani army, some members of the Pashtun tribes engaged in segmentary
alliances in response to specific military actions directed against the tribes. Two militant
leaders Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir formed an alliance, known as the Waziri alliance,
to protect the interests of the Wazir tribe in North and South Waziristan (Clarke 2011, 148).
Because the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group in the region, was Mehsud-led
and dominated, based and founded in South Waziristan, it was also important for the group
to maintain good ties with the likes of Maulvi Nazir and Gul Bahadur against a “common
enemy” either in form of the Pakistani army or the U.S. in Afghanistan (Siddique 2011). In this respect, we see segmentary alliances linking local tribes and militant groups in the region due to common kinship ties. This is so despite the fact that the Wazirs and Mehsuds have historically remained rivals.
Ahmed (2013a), who served as a Political Agent in FATA, describes the exercise of segmentary lineage in Waziristan through the following recollection of his experience:
Nikkat (meaning ancestry) was the central principle by which Wazir and Mahsud tribes
organized themselves and adjudicated contentious matters. It was codified in the time of the
first Afghan king, Ahmad Shah Abdali, in the mid-eighteenth century on the basis of their
relative populations and set forth in a formal agreement between the tribes. Henceforth the
agreement established the basis for all dealings, privileges, responsibilities, and distribution
of lands between the tribes, clans, and subclans. As a political agent, I was frequently
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confronted with the mathematical reality of nikkat in tribal society. The PA’s place of
residence, for example, was based on nikkat: he spent eight months of the year among the
Mahsud in Tank and four in Wana in Wazir territory. The PA’s personal escort, or badragga,
especially when on tour, consisted of thirty tribesmen drawn from clans and subclans
according to nikkat. The PA’s personal bodyguard unit, which protected him round the clock,
consisted of five Mahsud and one Wazir. Any suggestions about reducing the number or
utilizing the bodyguard in a more practical or useful way were met by a storm of protest. It
would upset the delicate balance of nikkat, tribesmen would argue. Violation of traditional
understanding of nikkat frequently led to feuds (Ahmed 2013a, 50).
In terms of the formation of alliances, the tribal elders have historically played an influential role in this regard. This influential role of tribal elders in forming alliances or creating divisions within and between tribal societies is evident in the crucial role of Jirga within Pashtun tribal societies. The Jirga can often act as mediators, regulating these alliances and divisions
(Akram‐Lodhi 2016). Therefore, Jirga among Pashtuns holds importance for the maintenance of order in the society. Finally, in Pashtun tribal areas, the tribal elders derive their “lineage based” authority vested through the Jirga system (Yousufzai and Gohar 2005; Ahmed 2013a,
49). Ahmed (2013a) provides the following explanation of this authority:
The pillar formed by the elders represents lineage-based authority vested in the Jirga (council
of elders) and expressed through Pukhtunwali (the tribe’s code). The elders derive authority
from their position in the segmentary lineage system with its genealogical charter, and that
authority is understood in terms of the charter or nikkat—which literally means grandfather
or ancestor. Nikkat confers certain privileges and status while defining responsibilities (Ahmed
2013a, 49).
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The influence of tribal elders is evident in recent incidents of conflict in the former-FATA region. One example is the Kurram Agency (discussed below in Chapter 8), wherein tribal elders from two different sects and ideologies (Shias and Sunnis), united against the Tehrik e
Taliban (TTP) and convened Jirga meetings to show their resolve against the militant groups.
Additionally, attacks by militants on tribal elders (also discussed below in Chapter 8) is evidence that the militants recognized these elders as an important source of authority in the tribal regions, able to mobilize local support against them, often across tribal lines. In this regard, Ali Wazir, an activist and current member of the Parliament who lost most of his family members to militant attacks in South Waziristan, points to the desire of the militants to remove important sources of local influence, like tribal elders, able to mobilize support against them:
Their (militants) aim is to eliminate everyone who can ask why this [insurgency] is happening [in FATA]
or can prevent people from making mischief in their homeland. All this is ultimately aimed to remodel
the tribal society so they will not resist an aggressor collectively and won't be able to defend their
homeland (Shah 2014c para 13).
This evidence, though limited, suggests that the concept of segmentation still plays a significant role in Pashtun tribal society. This segmentation, as discussed above, has also created complications for the state of Pakistan in its attempt to regulate and control the tribal areas. However, this segmentary association, based on kinship, has also played a positive role, with the Pashtun tribes uniting against various militant groups and protecting their region.
3.4. Conclusion
This chapter has discussed various aspects of Pashtuns as an ethnic group and as a tribal culture in the former-FATA region. In terms of its relevance to the overall scheme of this
95 research, the discussion helped in understanding the political and tribal dynamics of Pashtun tribal society, centred on segmentary lineages, along with the cultural codes of Pashtunwali.
We saw that both of these factors had both positive and negative effects in terms of the sources of division and unity within Pashtun tribal society. The chapter first discussed a brief history of Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s North West region, along with explaining various dynamics of this ethnic group. Section 3.2 explained various tenets of Pashtun culture and explained why these tenets were important for maintaining law and order in the Pashtun tribal society. The chapter further explained, in section 3.3, how segmentary lineage played an important role in the Pashtun tribal society and confirmed that segmentation, in some form, held importance in Pashtun society as a means for Pashtuns to quickly and effectively respond to what they perceive as internal and external threats. We also saw how this capacity has been, at times, militarily effective against those who would seek to military impinge on
Pashtun tribal society, such as the British Raj, the Soviets, the Pakistani army, and militant groups. The forthcoming chapters will discuss how this segmentation among the Pashtun tribes was related to indigenous conflict resolution method of Jirga and how Pakistan’s colonial legacies negatively impacted the Jirga in the former-FATA region.
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Chapter 4:
Indigenous Conflict
Resolution and Pashtun
Jirga
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4.0. Indigenous Conflict Resolution and Pashtun Jirga
This chapter aims to build on the discussion in the previous chapters and explains why indigenous and cultural methods of conflict resolution are still playing an important role in tribal societies. In the first section, there is a brief discussion on the importance of indigenous conflict resolution methods around the world. The second section of this chapter then explains the Pashtun conflict resolution method of Jirga along with engaging in a brief
historical overview of the importance of Jirga within Pashtun tribal societies. In its third
section, the chapter discusses the Jirga’s use of Lashkars and how these tribal militias are
used for enforcement of Jirga decisions. Finally, the chapter discusses a brief critique of both
Jirga and Lashkar, and a discussion of why both these methods, even though useful, still have
their drawbacks. Given that later chapters focus on Jirga as an indigenous means of conflict
resolution within Pashtun tribal societies, this chapter provides background to this later
discussion by focusing on Jirga themselves and their role within the Pashtun culture.
4.1. Indigenous Conflict Resolution around the World
In many parts of the world, traditional or indigenous methods of conflict resolution are either
still in place or have been incorporated in state legislation to maintain peace and harmony
among local groups. Even today, many tribal societies rely upon local, or indigenous, means
of conflict resolution based on their cultural and/or religious norms to solve their everyday
conflicts (see, e.g. Adebayo et al. 2014; Zartman 1999; Brigg and Bleiker 2011). Furthermore,
some have argued that indigenous decision-making practices also help the indigenous
cultures to sustain themselves over time, by allowing their traditional practices to continue
(Ney et al. 2014). In order to contextualize our specific discussion of Jirga later in the chapter,
98 it is important to briefly discuss various indigenous practices of conflict resolution around the world. However it is also important to note that some of these indigenous practices have often had to sustain themselves in the face of colonial settler society and practices that have not always acted in ways that support indigenous culture and have often acted in ways that inhibit the capacity of such cultures to sustain themselves (Brigg and Bleiker 2011).
In Central and South America, fifteen out of twenty countries have either recognition or provisions of the local customary law and culture (Cuskelly 2010). In terms of indigenous groups, the Andean communities are the ones having a strong emphasis on indigenous conflict resolution structures (Cordova 2014; Mainwaring 2006). In North America, the Dane-
Zaa and other First Nations peoples of Canada and Indian (Native American) communities in the United States have also had a long history of indigenous conflict resolution methods centred on tribal culture (Ney et al. 2014; Dickson 2014; Jones 2000).
In the African continent, even with the advent of modernisation and introduction of western models of democracy, tradition and custom are still intact in many countries (Zartman 1999;
Benjamin and Lundy 2014). Major examples include the institution of Chieftaincy in Ghana, the application of Ubuntu philosophy in South Africa for truth and reconciliation, traditional conflict resolution techniques applied by the Buem people of Ghana-Togo border, use of indigenous conflict management strategies by the Igbo community in Eastern Nigeria, Gacaca courts in used in Rwanda for truth and reconciliation after the 1994 genocide, and Anyuaa community in Ethiopia and South Sudan using a variety of cultural conflict resolution methods
(Issifu 2015; Masina 1999; Fred-Mensah 1999; Tafese 2016; Schabas 2005).
Among the Muslim states in the Middle East, because a number of Arab states are monarchies and tribal in nature, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms also exist and function in some
99 of these countries mainly Saudi Arabia and Morocco. Also because these countries are predominantly Islamic, religious mediation and arbitration mechanisms are also used in personal and interpersonal cases (Özçelik 2007; Johnstone 2015). The three basic
Islamic/Middle Eastern conflict resolution techniques used even today are peace- making/conciliation (sulha/sulh), the mediation (wisata/wassata), and arbitration (tahkim)
(Özçelik 2007; Johnstone 2015). These mechanisms and customs are evident in Jordan, with a diverse legal system, while also being observed in smaller, local and interpersonal conflicts in Saudi Arabia and Morocco (Abboud 2014; Johnstone 2015; Maisel 2009).
In the Asian continent, the Muslim-dominated Mindanao region of the Philippines has two common forms of alternative dispute resolution known as Taritib-and-Igma (customary law) and Sharia (Islamic law) (Pigkaulan 2013). On the other hand, the concept of Nahe Biti (laying out a mat), is a form of indigenous dispute resolution practised in East Timor (Mac Ginty 2008;
Carroll-Bell 2012).
More importantly, in Afghanistan, among “tribal” Pashtun communities, the tribal elders lead
Jirga proceedings for the resolution of inter and intra-tribal disputes (Wardak 2003). The importance of Jirga for Pashtuns in Afghanistan was witnessed when the United Nations, after the toppling of the Taliban regime after the U.S.-led NATO invasion in Afghanistan in 2001, had to secure the services of a national Loya Jirga (Grand Jirga) to nominate the interim president and government for the country (Kriesberg 2007). The Loya Jirga has historically proven to be an effective tool for consensus among the tribal chiefs from various ethnicities.
Roger Mac Ginty (2008) argues that in times of adversity during the U.S. invasion, the Loya
Jirga (grand Jirga of tribal elders), played a role in an emergency situation in a society lacking legitimate legal forums.
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Afghanistan has failed to achieve long-lasting peace even after efforts by the NATO forces and
Western governments, rendering rural pockets of the country either lawless or having
minimal state presence (Basit 2016). Saleh (2013, 54) argues that in such pockets and regions,
along with other major parts of the country, the local Afghans still trust their indigenous and
cultural structures such as Jirga for dispensation of justice and resolution of conflicts, rather
than the national police, whom they perceive as a force “installed by the U.S. government”.
Such is the importance of Jirga in Afghanistan that a monograph by Maj. John M. Auten III
advocates the use of such Jirgas and inclusion of “tribal” Pashtuns in governance processes if
the U.S. Army aims to succeed in peace and conflict resolution in Afghanistan (Auten 2012).
4.2. The Pashtun Jirga
4.2.1. A Brief Introduction to Pashtun Jirga
The Pashtun Jirga is an indigenous means of conflict resolution that has been used for centuries among Pashtun tribespeople to negotiate and mediate conflict both within and
between tribes. According to Coburn (2013, 13), a ‘Jirga is a Pashto word, deriving from the
Turkic word for circle, and typically denotes gatherings in which the parties to a dispute are
represented by members of their patrilineal kin, who deliberate on the issue’.
Even though writers of Pashtun history remain adamant that the institution of Jirga is one of
the oldest and most dominant component structures of the Pashtun way of life, its written
history is still scarce (Yousufzai and Gohar 2005). The Jirga is an essential component of the
Pashtunwali (see above, 3.2.2). This is because the Jirga is the primary conflict resolution tool
among the “tribal” Pashtuns, especially in the rural Pashtun areas of both Pakistan and
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Afghanistan, and therefore plays a role towards harmony and coordination among and
between the tribes (Ginsburg 2011, 97).
A Jirga is made functional and operational by the participation of local elders and leaders from tribes. Elders in Pashtun tribal society include Maliks, the tribal elders, and Khans, the heads of clans (Yousufzai and Gohar 2005). The authority among tribes is with neither of them, but a collection of Maliks, making a Jirga or a tribal council, exercises and enjoys the influence and authority (Yousufzai and Gohar 2005). The proceedings of a tribal Jirga are carried out by
Maliks, whereas the Khan presides over the Jirga, holding a ceremonial position and acting as a focal point of communication between the tribes, with this hierarchy still maintained over centuries (Wylly 1912; Yousufzai and Gohar 2005).
The tribal elders, known as speen geeri (white bearded/elders) and masharan (elders), are responsible for making decisions after reaching consensus, whereas other members taking part in the Jirga serve as jurists having “recommendatory” roles (Yousufzai and Gohar 2005).
Before a Jirga meeting is convened, in some cases, a bond is generally collected, in form of
cash, guns, or even a person, to ensure that the Jirga’s decision would be enforced afterwards
(Ginsburg 2011, 98). The proceedings of Jirga vary in time and duration depending on the
nature of the dispute, often lasting two days on average and in serious matters further
deliberations could also be made (Taizi 2007).
Whenever a conflict or the need for consultation on issues of importance arises, the tribal elders gather in a circle, with no obvious hierarchy or leader, and aim to reach a consensus over the issue under discussion. Once the Jirga reaches its decision after all possible
deliberations, there are two scenarios that might be faced in terms of a consensus or
implementation of a decision.
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These scenarios are Haq (one’s right) and Waak (authority). Haq means that either of the conflicting parties has the right to challenge the final decision of the Jirga, either by voicing their reservations on the decision of quoting previous precedents on similar matters (Yousaf and Poncian 2018, 6). Waak means that elders from the conflicting parties give the final authority to the Jirga members to reach a decision, which makes the decision mutually binding on both the parties (Yousaf and Poncian 2018, 6; Khayyam 2016, 148).
One of the major reasons for Jirga being a popular choice of justice administration among the
Pashtuns is its ability to deliver speedy justice, and ensure compensation for the victims
(Gohar 2014). Within the Pashtun culture, there is an effort to reintegrate the offenders once they serve their punishment (Gohar 2014). Such an emphasis on re-integration makes sense given that tribal societies are remote from mainstream Pakistani society, and so those
Pashtun tribespeople subject to punishment from Jirga decisions are still likely to live the rest of their lives in Pashtun tribal society.
It is said that the Jirga regulates the Pashtun way of life, discussing issues ranging from local conflicts to matters pertaining to regional conflicts (Oberson 2002, 42). The earliest academic references to the Pashtun Jirga can be found in Mountsuart Elphinstone’s account of
Afghanistan, published in 1842, where he occasionally acknowledges the presence of Qazis, judges in the Islamic community, as well as the Jirga, to decide on crimes in Afghanistan
(Elphinstone 1842). Arnold Keppel (1911) also made reference to Jirga in his account of
Pashtun tribal societies. He writes:
A mass meeting of the elders (of the whole of the Afridi tribe, for instance), would correspond
very much to the old `Shiremote' of the Saxon heptarchy; and, indeed, there is more in the
simile than one would expect at first glance, for the democratic spirit that is so characteristic
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a feature in the gradual growth of English customs finds its counterpart in the spirit of liberty
and right of free action that is one of the most cherished prerogatives of the Pathan (Pashtun)
tribesmen, be he ever so humble (as cited in Yousufzai and Gohar 2005, 17).
The Jirga’s importance can be witnessed in historical accounts of Pashtun empires in
Afghanistan where even in the early 18th century, the affairs of the Abdali Empire were looked
after by a family of elders, known as the Jirga (Elphinstone 1842). When the Ghazali Empire was overthrown and taken over by Abdalis in 1747, a Loya Jirga, after nine days of deliberations, announced Ahmad Shah Abdali as Afghanistan’s new king (Rashid 2001, 10). It is also said that the Afghan rulers in India in the 15th century and afterwards used to maintain a Jirga, or a council of elders, to advise the kings at the time on important matters (Taizi 2007).
Sir Olaf Caroe, renowned British administrator and writer, in his book The Pathans, noted that
in his experience as administrator observing the Pashtuns in North and in Balochistan, the best means to achieve outcomes among the tribes was to let them decide on matters through tribal elders (or Jirga) (Caroe 1958).
4.2.2. Levels of Jirga
In terms of its levels of authority, scope or legitimacy, a Jirga has four major forms or practices
in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. These include,
1) Loya (grand) Jirga: An inter-tribal Grand Jirga convened, mostly in Afghanistan, to discuss
matters of national priority (Wardak 2003; Yousufzai and Gohar 2005, 50).
2) Qaumi (nation) /Olasi (peoples) Jirga: A local/village Jirga of tribal elders comprising of
each elder from a family, and is held after initial consultations by a few elders in the village
(Yousufzai and Gohar 2005, 47).
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3) Sarkari (state) /FCR Jirga: A Jirga sponsored by the state and convened by the Political
Agent to resolve criminal offences in the tribal areas (Yousufzai and Gohar 2005).
4) Shakhsi (person) or third party Jirga: A local Jirga convened to resolve conflicts between
individuals and families (Shinwari 2011; Yousufzai and Gohar 2005, 48).
A Loya Jirga is a grand gathering of Pashtun tribal elders from various regions to discuss issues of regional concern. In Afghanistan, the Loya Jirga enjoys both legality and legitimacy, where various local, national and tribal leaders gather to discuss and resolve issues of national interest and security (Wardak 2003). The Loya Jirga has been historically used in Afghanistan to bring together leaders from various ethnic, religious, and tribal groups to decide on broad matters of common interest or dispute, such approving a constitution, choosing a new King, or declaring a war (Bezhan 2013). In the modern times, even though Afghanistan regards the
Loya Jirga as the “highest representative body” of the Afghan people for discussion of various issues, its decisions are not legally binding on the governments in power (Bezhan 2013).
In Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal areas, a Loya Jirga is practised when elders from one tribal
Agency10 gather to discusses inter or intratribal issues, or elders from different tribes and
tribal areas gather to raise a common issue, faced by the whole region (Yousufzai and Gohar
2005, 51) A Loya Jirga’s membership is determined by the overall authority and respect a tribal elder enjoys within their respective tribe. It is argued that selection of members of the
Loya Jirga is a sensitive matter, as any nominated members who do not enjoy full support
from their tribe could affect the overall legitimacy of the Loya Jirga (Yousufzai and Gohar
2005, 50). In Afghanistan, there is no fixed number of the membership of this Jirga, however,
10 After the May 24, 2018, constitutional reforms and merger of FATA with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the tribal “Agencies” have been renamed as tribal “districts”. 105
the members are nominated by the convening authority, which is primarily the government
of the time (Bezhan 2013). In Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal areas, respected tribal areas from each
Agency, or within the Agency, convene a Loya Jirga, with members nominated through smaller level Jirga on a local/community level (Yousufzai and Gohar 2005, 98).
The Qaumi or Olasi, often spelt as Ulasi, Jirga is generally held at a local or a village level where local elders gather to solve criminal offences and minor disputes and make sure the conflicting parties are in agreement over the Jirga’s decision (Shinwari 2011). The Jirga is convened by tribal elders in a village or localities, and discusses issues ranging from ‘collective property, rights and distribution of irrigation water, or common concerns, like the selection of a site for a school to issues of national or community interests’ (Yousufzai and Gohar 2005,
47). Through the Olasi Jirga, the tribes might often reach out to the government to introduce and implement various development programmes for the tribal areas (Yousaf, Rashid and Gul
2018, 30). This form of Jirga is also the most common form of Jirga practised among the
Pashtun communities.
The Sarkari Jirga, until recently in former-FATA, came under the Pakistani state supervision
and was first mandated under the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) 1887, and then in its final
version in 1901, under the British Raj (Yousaf, Rashid and Gul 2018; Hopkins 2015, 375). This
Jirga was only convened in response to specific conflicts and was initiated in former-FATA by the Political Agent (PA), representing the Provincial Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Shinwari 2011). The Jirga only went ahead if both the disputing parties gave their consent (Shinwari 2011).
This Jirga first came into being in the FCR during the British Raj. The Raj signed an agreement with the Pashtun tribes allowing the Deputy Commissioner (DC), an official appointed by the
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Raj who had authority over respective tribal agencies, to form or re-form the Jirga in response
to specific circumstances requiring dispute resolution within and between the Pashtun tribes
(Akins 2017). The DC was a position instituted by the British Raj to ensure governance over the tribal regions, and during the British Raj, the DC held the final decision-making authority
within the tribal regions (Hopkins 2015).
In allowing the DC to convene the Jirga to resolve specific disputes within the tribal regions,
the Raj clearly recognized the Jirga as an important conflict resolution mechanism among the
Pashtuns (Akins 2017; Hopkins 2015). When Pakistan achieved independence, the role of the
DC was taken over by the PA, which was now a position instituted by the Pakistani state to
ensure governance in the tribal regions (Shinwari 2011; Yousufzai and Gohar 2005, 46). As
well as having the capacity to convene Sarkari Jirga, just like the DC before him, the PA also
has at his disposal the assistance of the Pakistani security forces, mainly khassadars
(paramilitary forces recruited from various tribes) (Ghani 2010).
A Shakhsi Jirga is a “third party Jirga”, where in case of lack of agreement between two tribes,
a “third party”, selected by elders from both parties, mediates the resolution of the conflict
at hand. For successful formation and functioning of the Shakhsi Jirga, it is important for both
the conflicting parties to agree to this resort to a third party resolution process (Ahmed and
Yousaf 2018; Röder and Shinwari 2015). Just like the Olasi Jirga, a Shakhsi Jirga is also formed by the tribes on their own and derives its legitimacy directly from the people (Yousaf, Rashid and Gul 2018).
The decisions and verdicts of the Shakhsi and Olasi Jirga are varied, depending on the circumstances of the dispute being resolved. However if the verdict requires martial enforcement, then either the Shakhsi and Olasi Jirga might also order that a Lashkar
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(voluntary militia) be raised among the local tribesmen subject to the Jirga’s jurisdiction, in order to enforce the decision, and which disbands once the decision is implemented (for further discussion on Lashkars see below 4.3.).
Two major distinguishing factors between Afghan and Pakistani Jirgas are Afghanistan’s inclusion of women in the Jirga process, along with the legal status the institution holds at the state level. One of the major reasons for these distinctions is the Pakistani state’s approach towards the tribal areas and its persistence until recently of the colonial-era FCR to govern the region (Shinwari 2013; Ahmed and Yousaf 2018). The Sarkari Jirga, was, as explained above, complicit with the governance processes that the Pakistani state has sought to institute in the tribal areas. For this reason, it had lost the support of local tribespeople.
4.2.3. Jirga’s Historical Role in Tribal Areas and Afghanistan
In contrast to the “martial” and “militant” characteristics that many outside observers have identified in “tribal” Pashtuns, “peace” still remains a major component of the Pashtunwali.
This peace has been primarily propagated and achieved through the institution of Jirga. Sligo
(2012) and Beattie (2011) argue that much of the success that the British achieved in the
Frontier tribal areas was not through the use of force, but using elements of soft power. This soft power required negotiations with tribes, and Jirga was an important element of such negotiations as they were the one means whereby tribes could create a central body that could speak on their behalf. Williams (2015, 17) further argues that whenever the British failed to implement their policies by relying on specific individuals with alleged influence in the tribal areas, they would often resort to negotiation with Maliks or Jirgas.
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William Merk, Commissioner of Derajat during the British Raj, noted that it ‘was never a mistake to listen to what men have to say in a Jirga’ (as cited in Beattie 2011, 575). Moreover,
E.E. Oliver (1890), also writing at the time of the British Raj, described Pashtuns and their connection with the Jirga in the following words: ‘the Pathan (read Pashtun) is essentially a radical, every man as good as his neighbour and better, and will obey no one with the Jirga – or democratic council’ (Oliver 1890, 24). He further connects the Jirga, Pashtuns and their segmentary attributes in the following words:
Each Pathan clan is a separate democracy, but a democracy in which the interest of the
individual comes first, the welfare of those neighbours who compose his sept or his Khail,
second; and save in the presence of a common danger, or some question where combination
is absolutely necessary, the general community runs a bad third (Oliver 1890, 252).
R.I. Bruce (1900, 110), in light of his administrative experience, as a functionary within the
British Raj with the tribes in Balochistan and the Frontier region, argued that both the Pashtun
and Baloch tribal Jirgas could not be overlooked by the British administration as they were an
integral part of the tribal society. His experience dealing with the troubling Mehsud tribes also
involved periodically holding Jirgas for resolution of major and minor tribal problems (see
Bruce 1900).
Colonel Sir Robert Warburton, an Anglo-Indian soldier whose mother was an Afghan, wrote
an ethnographic account under the title of Eighteen Years in Khyber, narrating his experience
with the Pashtun tribes in the Khyber region (Warburton 1900). Warburton, while talking
about the British interaction with the Pashtun tribes on the border, also explains how the
British Raj engaged Maliks (tribal elders) from each tribe s middlemen to negotiate with the
respective tribes on various matters (Warburton 1900, 35-36). Warburton was not only a
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proponent of the Pashtun tribes’ self-rule but also engaged with various Jirgas over the years.
In one such incident, when the British army invaded the Afridi tribes in 1897, a tribal Jirga met
Warburton - who was also well regarded by the tribes - to complain about the bombardment and their losses. While narrating the incident, Warburton writes:
When I told the old men of the Afridis in reply to their cry, that it was out of my power to help
them, the Jirga replied: "Never mind, Sahib, whatever happens, we are earnestly praying that
you should not be injured in this campaign”.
C.M. Enriquez (1921), in his account of the Frontier region during his time in the Indian Army, also mentions that many conflicts among the tribes were solved through Jirgas of tribal elders.
Enriquez (1921), without mentioning the year, notes that once the whole Adam Khel tribe in
Khyber ended a long term feud by calling upon a tribal Jirga, which established peace for 12
months. The truce was, however, momentarily disturbed when a man shot his enemy.
However, soon after the murder, a Jirga of 600 tribal elders was convened, which refused to
do business for one week and asked the offender to feed the whole tribe during that week.
Moreover, the Jirga also burnt the house and property of the offender but also fined him
2000 Rupees, half of which was given to the victim’s family and half distributed among the
Jirga members (Enriquez 1921, 69). Enriquez, therefore, notes that the Pashtuns always
strived for “peace and order” through tribal Jirgas, however, such efforts were often negated
because of blood feuds running within and between tribes (Enriquez 1921, 69-70).
In other instances, when Sir Robert Sandeman - Chief Commissioner of Balochistan province
(1877-1892) - promoted a system of rule within the British Raj known as “The Sandeman
System” - which called for “occupation with cooperation” - he also engaged with tribal Jirgas at that time. The “cooperation” part in his “occupation with cooperation” policy involved
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regular negotiations, through Jirgas, with the tribal elders and included a payment system for
tribal elders for their services (Caroe 1958, 375-376). The system was a success in Balochistan province, yet faced difficulties in frontier tribal areas due to strong resistance from the tribes in those regions (Sammon 2008, 27). Sandeman arranged a grand Jirga in Waziristan in 1890, where Richard Isaac Bruce - his pupil and also Political Agent - was also present. The Gomal
tribes in Waziristan were hoping to get the results Sandeman achieved in Balochistan with
the Quetta tribes, yet the Jirga proved to be of little effect as raids and attacks continued on
police and army check posts (Caroe 1958, 376). The British administration, Caroe (1958)
argues, was inclined to implement The Sandeman System in the Frontier tribal belt. A key
tenet of the Sandeman System stated:
if you want to get anything done in dealings with tribes, work through the tribal organization;
let the tribal leaders produce the goods in their own way. In other words, it was the principle
of indirect rule (Caroe 1958, 398).
In 1892, Richard Bruce managed to convince Mehsud tribes, through a Jirga, to surrender five
tribesmen who killed a British Public Works Department officer in the areas (Sammon 2008,
29). Then, in November 1900, when the Mehsud tribe attacked a police check post in
Waziristan, Willam Merk, superintendent of Derejat, called upon a Jirga of tribal elders to
resolve the matter of ongoing raids and impose a fine on the attacking tribe (Tripodi 2011,
99). Then in 1902, after a series of military operations against the Mehsuds, the Mehsud tribes
sent a Jirga delegation to tell the British that the tribes had accepted terms of surrender and submission from the British Raj (Howell 1979).
An account of operations in the Mehsud and Wazir areas in the tribal regions, presented to the House of Commons and entitled East India (north-west Frontier) Mahsud-Waziri
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Operations in 1902, also provides a detailed account of Jirga negotiations with tribes. This account also mentions how tribal councils and Maliks were approached time and again for resolution of conflicts, as well as to assist with law and order processes such as the apprehension of suspects (see Commons 1902).
It was widely understood by the British administrators in the tribal areas that even though
Jirgas were a tiresome, arduous and time-consuming process – and sometimes unlikely to provide a consensus – there was no other alternative to deal with the tribes that involved the use of a negotiation mechanism that, because of its central to tribal culture, had legitimacy among the tribes themselves (Beattie 2011, 576). Jirgas, therefore, remained an important mechanism by which the British Raj sought to negotiate with the Pashtun tribes and an important means by which the British sought to maintain their governance within the area.
Spain (1961) believes that the Pashtun tribes on both sides of the Durand Line have always had limited loyalty and given limited formal recognition to the sovereign state authorities on either side of the border, and therefore the region has always remained susceptible to conflict. The attempt by sovereign authorities on each side of the border to quell such conflict through the use of force has often not met with success, and certainly not sustained success over a long period. Consequently, such authorities engaged in negotiation with the tribes and
Jirga was an important means by which these negotiations could take place and an alternative to the use of force found. In this respect, Jirga has a long history in the tribal areas and have been a central element in negotiation between tribes and various state authorities that have sought to impose their rule in the tribal areas. Chapters seven and eight will focus on how this institution has played its role in peace and conflict resolution in the former-FATA region since
2002.
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4.3. Lashkar
Lashkars are an integral part of Pashtunwali and a by-product of the Jirga. The word Lashkar can roughly be translated as “troops”, though western writers have often referred to it as a
“raiding party” or a “militia” (Taj 2011, 35). A Lashkar can also be defined as a Pashtun
“community-based customary policing structure” (Schmeidl and Karokhail 2009, 320). A
Lashkar involves the temporary formation of a militia and is comprised of able-bodied
Pashtun adult men. It is sanctioned by the Jirga to either enforce the Jirga’s decisions or
protect their territory (Siddique 2014; Yousufzai and Gohar 2005). Moreover, a Lashkar can
also be organised in exceptional circumstances by a community Cheegha (or “call”) to defend
against a “common enemy” (Tariq 2008, 2). In Afghanistan, these Lashkars also play the role
of private local police in remote areas (Tariq 2008).
Lashkar, like the Jirga, is also considered to be an important tenet of Pashtunwali (Oberson
2002, 42; Chaudhry and Wazir 2012). In this regard, Tariq (2008, 2) argues that maintaining
an indigenous security force (Lashkars) has helped Pashtun tribes, especially in Afghanistan,
preserve their tribal communities and customs (Pashtunwali). Moreover, volunteer Lashkars
in the remote Pashtun tribal, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s former-FATA region, have
historically played in role towards defending their villages and communities in the absence of
state security (Taj 2011, 35; Tariq 2008). However, Lashkars also reflect the male-dominated
tenets and patriarchal assumptions of Pashtun tribal society. For instance, it is said that no
tribal “man”, in good health, is absolved of Lashkar duties once a tribal army is formed for
fights or defence (Atayee 1979).
Once a call for forming Lashkars in a tribe goes out, any tribal man refusing to join the Lashkar
is punished according to Narkh (see 3.2.2.17), either in the form of his house being burnt 113 down, or him being expelled from the tribe. A Lashkar is headed by a sub commander known as the Mir, who is directly answerable to the tribal Jirga. Once the Jirga believes that the
Lashkar has fulfilled its aims, it is dispersed under the orders of the Jirga (Taj 2011, 35).
Historically, the importance of Lashkars can be observed through various accounts in both
Pakistan and Afghanistan. In one such instance, when the British Army attacked Wana, South
Waziristan, in 1894/95, it was pushed back by a Lashkar of 2000 Mehsud fighters (Ullah and
Ahmad 2017). Another instance of the role of Lashkar involves Afghanistan’s King Nadir Shah and his reclaiming of the Afghan throne in 1929. When Shah was overthrown by Tajik guerrilla
Habibullah Kalakani, he organized a Lashkar from Loya Paktia (Afghanistan) and Waziristan tribes. Shah successfully reclaimed his throne using these tribal Lashkars (Siddique 2014).
Even during Afghanistan’s most peaceful periods from 1929 to 1978, such peace was dependent on a synergy between state and community, and this synergy required tribal policing, to maintain order in local tribal areas, and this was provided by Lashkars (Jones
2010).
The Pakistani state, soon after independence in 1947, also encouraged the “tribal” Pashtuns to form Lashkars as a de-facto army to protect the Pakistani- Afghan border, as a replacement for the military, along with sending these Lashkars to fight on the state’s behalf in the battle of Kashmir (1947-1948), when Maharaja Hari Singh declared Kashmir’s accession to India
(Siddique 2014; Haqqani 2003).
The Pashtun tribal communities, largely in the absence of a modern justice system, still adhere to their cultural institutions. Hence, tribal Lashkars have played a substantial role in maintaining peace in the tribal areas. Indeed, the use of Lashkars has also been effective most recently in assisting the Pakistani state to respond to the presence of militants in the tribal
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areas. The Pakistani state has sometimes moved to empower tribal Lashkars, so as to develop a strong line of defence against Taliban infiltration and control in the region (Taj 2011, 172).
An example of this was between 2006 and 2010 when, as militant incidents and fatalities in
the tribal areas were on the rise, an initiative by the military and the government resulted in
formation of Lashkars through Jirga consultations, as a means of militarily responding to
militants using local tribal forces and local tribal methods (Perlez and Shah 2008).
4.4 Critique of Jirga and Lashkar
Even though Jirga and Lashkars have played a significant role in maintaining order in the
Pashtun society, they have also come under criticism for various reasons. The Pashtun Jirga in the tribal areas has been criticised for its male-oriented structure with little or no representation or inclusion of women, as the formation of a Jirga only includes adult males and tribal elders (Manganaro and Poland 2012). Such a pre-dominantly male structure of the
Jirga has also resulted in Jirga decisions imposed on women without their input or consent
(Wardak 2003; Wimpelmann 2013). This is particularly problematic when Jirga have delivered decisions in which women are to be killed for the sake of tribal “honour” because the Jirga thought that they had violated the tribe’s honour in some way (Braithwaite and Gohar 2014a).
There have also been cases of such Lashkars, in Afghanistan, handing over women, on orders
of the Jirga, to the victim’s family as compensation for murder (Tariq 2008). This is because
in many Jirga decisions, the women, under the custom of Swara or exchange, are given as
property to the aggrieved party to settle long term disputes (Naseer 2018). In some cases,
under-age girls are also given as Swara by Jirga members and forcefully married to a member
of the aggrieved party (Naseer 2018).
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These negatives of both Jirga and Lashkar not only present social and legal dilemmas for the
Pashtun culture, but also amount to the violation of the sort of basic human rights identified by the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in particular, gender rights. It is because of the non-inclusion of women in the Jirga process, and therefore their absence of influence within it, that these rights violations fall heavily on women, as well as on children, who are also not represented within Jirga (Naseer 2018).
In Afghanistan, there has been some change with regards to women’s representation and consultation with the formation of female Jirgas and in some parts of Afghanistan
(Braithwaite and Gohar 2014a, 539). Also, various women-oriented Jirgas have been formed in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan on an experimental basis. However, they have received little state, public or financial support (Zakaria 2016).
In some cases in the former FATA region, the tribal Lashkars have also been accused of misusing their authority and influence, gained after defeating the militants against which they were directed by Jirga and utilising their new-found authority against the local population
(Mohmand 2015a). It is also feared that Lashkars, convened to defeat the Taliban, might remain in existence and be used in inter-tribal conflicts, thereby sowing the seeds of prolonged conflicts by escalating tribal feuds (Khan 2008b).
4.5. Conclusion
This chapter aimed at providing a thorough insight into the use of Jirga in the tribal regions.
The beginning of the chapter sought to contextualize that use by looking at various tools of indigenous conflict resolution around the world. The chapter, in its second section, gave a detailed insight into Jirga and explained through historical instances why this indigenous tool
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has played an important role in the Pashtun tribal regions of both Pakistan and Afghanistan
in resolving inter-tribe and intra-tribe conflict. It also explained how Jirga was also an important means of communication and negotiation between dominant state authorities in these regions, and the Pashtun tribes. Then, the discussion of Lashkars explained how this method of enforcing some Jirga decisions is an important tool for peace enforcement and conflict resolution in Pashtun tribal society. However, a brief critical analysis of both Jirga and
Lashkar suggests that even with their effectiveness, both cultural tools had their drawbacks.
In the next chapter, the thesis will discuss how Pakistan’s ‘postcolonial’ state and colonial legacies in the tribal areas further dented the traditional Pashtun ‘tribal society’ and the indigenous conflict resolution methods.
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Chapter 5:
Pakistan’s Postcolonial
Predicament in the
Pashtun Tribal Areas
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5.0. Pakistan’s Postcolonial Predicament in the Pashtun Tribal Areas
Following from background discussion on tribal societies and indigenous methods of conflict
resolution in relation to “tribal” Pashtuns in the previous chapters, this chapter now discusses, in detail, the theoretical and analytical approach of postcolonialism and its application to both the Pakistani state, particularly the military establishment, and the “tribal” Pashtuns.
Postcolonialism is a relatively new academic discipline and theoretical approach that engages
in the analysis of the effects of colonialism in a postcolonial world on both colonized and
colonisers and often searches for these effects within contemporary “texts” and practices in
a wide variety of forms.
In its first section, the chapter discusses background on postcolonialism and its connection to
indigenous conflict resolution in post-colonial states. In its second section, the chapter
discusses various colonial ethnographies and other sources of colonial and more recent
literature to discuss how “colonial stereotypes” concerning “tribal” Pashtuns were developed
by British authors in the colonial era and how these still persist in many contemporary
accounts of the “tribal” Pashtuns today. In its final section, the chapter discusses how the
practices of the Pakistani state, in relation to “tribal” Pashtuns, are still informed by some of
these colonial legacies which the Pakistani state has inherited from the British Raj, even after
more than seventy years of its independence.
5.1. A Brief Introduction to Postcolonialism
5.1.1. What is Postcolonialism?
Postcolonialism is both an academic discipline and a theoretical approach that focuses on the legacies and effects of colonialism in a post-colonial world, and therefore includes a focus on
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former colonial states and societies in the period after their formal acquisition of
independence and deals with the negative effects of colonialism in colonized states during
and post-independence (see, e.g, Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin 2013, 163; Young 2001). As a disciplinary field and interdisciplinary method, postcolonialism studies the (negative) effects of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism in the twentieth and twenty-first century, and
its impacts on the states and societies that were once colonizers and those who were once
colonized (Botella-Ordinas 2013; Jani 2014). Thus, before applying postcolonialism to the
subject matter of this thesis, it is important to discuss colonialism as a concept and practice.
Robert Young (2001, 15) argues that the foundations of postcolonial critique and its
theoretical formations can be traced back to resistance to imperialism and colonialism.
However, imperialism and colonialism, although often related in a causal fashion, are distinct.
Imperialism refers to the exercise of power, acquisition, and control by one entity over
another, particularly when such entities are states and territories. Colonialism, by contrast,
refers to what often occurs in the wake of imperialism- a systematic process of occupation
and exploitation of the colonized territory by the imperial power that has colonized it.
Margaret Kohn and Kavita Reddy distinguish the concepts of “imperialism” and “colonialism”
in the following way:
Colonialism is a practice of domination, which involves the subjugation of one people to
another. One of the difficulties in defining colonialism is that it is hard to distinguish it from
imperialism. Frequently the two concepts are treated as synonyms. Like colonialism,
imperialism also involves political and economic control over a dependent territory. The
etymology of the two terms, however, provides some clues about how they differ. The term
colony comes from the Latin word colonus, meaning farmer. This root reminds us that the
practice of colonialism usually involved the transfer of population to a new territory, where 120
the arrivals lived as permanent settlers while maintaining political allegiance to their country
of origin. Imperialism, on the other hand, comes from the Latin term Imperium, meaning to
command. Thus, the term imperialism draws attention to the way that one country exercises
power over another, whether through settlement, sovereignty, or indirect mechanisms of
control (Kohn and Reddy 2017).
Young (2001, 16) suggests imperialism signifies a process whereby there is an exercise of power, acquisition and control of a territory from the “centre” in relation to a “periphery”,
where the “centre” is the imperial power and the “periphery” is the territory acquired or
controlled. In contrast, Kohn (2014) defines colonialism as a European project of domination
and settlement of specific territories, where the settler population still retains a primary
loyalty to the imperial power rather than the subject indigenous population. She points out
this process of colonialism emanated from European powers from the 16th to 20th centuries, ending, in many cases, with the liberation movements within the colonial world in the 1960s
(Kohn 2014).
“Postcolonialism”, on the other hand, is distinct from “colonialism”, in that it focuses upon and analyses the legacies and effects of colonialism in the post-colonial world. These legacies impact on the descendants of both the indigenous populations subject to colonisation and the descendants of the settler population within the colonized territory, as well as on the descendants of those situated within the imperial power. Postcolonialism focuses not only on negative or debilitating effects of colonisation but also processes of resistance and reaction to the exercise of colonial power or its legacies. (Laffey and Nadarajah 2016; Butt 2013). As
Young puts it, postcolonialism “focuses on forces of oppression and coercive domination that
121 operate in the contemporary world: the politics of anti-colonialism and neo-colonialism, race, gender, nationalism, class and ethnicities define its terrain” (Young 2001, 11).
As Young’s statement makes clear, postcolonialism, as a framework for analysis, is concerned with multiple effects of colonialism, along with a number of dimensions, manifested in a wide variety of ways. Mbembe (1992, 3) makes the same point, declaring that the idea of a ‘post- colony’ ‘identifies a given historical trajectory….a specific system of signs, [and] a particular way of fabricating simulacra or re-forming stereotypes’. Consequently, even though colonies achieved independence from the colonisers, postcolonialism assumes that the relationships of power between imperial “centre” and colonial “periphery” still operates in a wide variety of ways, though such relationships are no longer the direct forms of ownership and control that defined imperial power in the colonial era (Young 2003, 3). In this respect, despite
“independence”, relationships of “dependency” are still capable of existing between former imperial powers and their former colonies, through resistances to such relationships also arise.
Postcolonialism, even with criticisms (discussed below in 5.1.5), is still widely used as a theoretical and analytical framework for discussing problems in formerly-colonised states in
Africa and Asia. Bassil (2013), in his book The Post-Colonial State and Civil War in Sudan, uses a postcolonial critique to discuss civil war and power struggles in Sudan. Between
Development and Destruction: An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States, a collection of essays edited by Rupesinghe, Sciarone and van de Goor (2016), discusses causes of conflict in various post-colonial states from Africa, Europe and Asia. Boehmer and
Morton (2015), in their collection of essays titled Terror and the Postcolonial: A Concise
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Companion, have a comparative study on terrorism and its linkage to postcolonialism. The study creates a linkage of terrorism with globalisation as well as postcolonialism, by discussing various historical case studies and theorizing how postcolonial studies, colonial history and terrorism are related (see Boehmer and Morton 2015).
5.1.2. Postcolonialism and Alterity
“Alterity” or “otherness” is a major recurring theme in postcolonial studies. Both alterity and
otherness have been used as interchangeable terms in postcolonial theory to describe how
“marginal” or “outsider” groups are ascribed identities which are defined (often negatively)
by their differences from dominant groups (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin 2013, 12). Said
(1978a), in Orientalism, talks about the assumptions that Western writers had while writing
about the “Orient”, concerning the very different characteristics and identities they attributed
to the inhabitants of these realms relative to themselves and other Europeans. In this way,
Said shows how Western writers perceived those inhabiting “Oriental” societies and cultures
as “other” to Europeans, characterized primarily by their “alterity” or difference to Europeans
(Said 1978a).
However, outsider groups have often themselves embraced such ascriptions, using them as a
term of self-identification. For instance, the term was used by African anti-colonial theorist,
Frantz Fanon (2004, 1986), who identified himself, or members of other marginal groups,
relative to dominant imperial identities, as the “other”. Fanon (1986, 17), while describing the
detrimental effects of colonialism on the “black” man and the subsequent creation of
otherness, argues, ‘The black man has two dimensions, one when he interacts with a white
man, and one when interacting with his fellow’ and this division according to him is a direct
result of colonialism.
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This argument by Fanon points towards how the construction of the “otherness” of
marginalised or colonised groups, where their identity is defined primarily by their
“difference” from and often a perceived “inferiority” to Europeans and is embedded in them by colonial discourses of superiority emanating from the West, has a profound effect on the psychology and self-perceptions of colonized people (Fanon 1986, 18).
5.1.3. Postcolonialism and Indigenous Conflict Resolution
The exercise of imperial power and the colonial occupation that often follows from this have
negatively affected indigenous societies and cultures (Brigg and Walker 2016). Ashcroft,
Griffiths and Tiffin (1989, 2), in their first edition of The Empire Writes Back, base the
definition of postcolonialism on culture, arguing that “post-colonial” refers to ‘all the cultures
affected by imperial processes from [the] moment of colonisation to present day’. Richmond,
Pogodda and Ramovic (2016) argue that recent developments in “IR” and “Peace and Conflict
Studies” are influenced by postcolonialism and its identification of Western-centric discourses
arising from positions of dominant imperial power. It is also argued that such approaches are
challenging the “North-dominated” approaches to peace and conflict studies that were
developed in a period of decolonization after the Second World War (Richmond, Pogodda and
Ramovic 2016). These methods, emerging at the end of direct colonialism and giving rise to
liberal institutionalism, are being challenged by the emergence of various perspectives that
emphasise the role of non-state actors in peace and conflict studies (Richmond, Pogodda and
Ramovic 2016; Chandler 2016). These dominant approaches have been criticised by Chandler
as over-emphasising the role of the state as distinct from non-state actors in peace and
conflict studies:
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This universalist, mechanistic and reductionist approach to international peace interventions
assumed that international intervention was the prerogative of leading Western states, that
the subjects of intervention were non-Western states, and that Western international
specialists had the knowledge, technology and agency necessary to fix the problems (Chandler
2016, 36).
William Zartman (1999, 1) argues that indigenous and traditional societies, in Africa and elsewhere, are known to hold centuries-old practices of peace-making laid on foundations of centuries of custom, before the disruption of colonization. However, Brendan Tobin (2014) believes that indigenous peoples’ legal regimes have faced centuries of disdain and even negation during colonial regimes. However, even with the resurgence of indigenous societies and conflict resolution methods in some recent years, Brigg and Walker (2016, 263-264) argue that the legacy of colonial discourses and assumptions, and their internalization by political science and IR disciplines, has meant that these disciplines have yet to seriously engage with non-Western indigenous forms of conflict resolution.
Peter Run (2013) also believes that colonial thinking and approaches have inhibited cultural or indigenous ways of conflict resolution that have proven effective over the years, forcing their replacement by Western-centric methods. Where in pre-colonial times conflicts were often monitored and resolved, in indigenous societies, through a council of elders, these conflicts are now monitored by foreign peacekeeping operations and subject to lengthy legal processes (Ajayi and Buhari 2014). Brock-Utne (2001) and Wilson-Fall (1999) suggest that power held by elites along with foreign values replace indigenous customs, and prove to be a source of discord and discontent within a number of African societies.
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Peter Run (2013) further argues that even after research suggesting that traditional conflict
resolution methods have provided positive results in Africa, the continent’s leaders, with their
colonial inhibitions, are reluctant in applying these methods. In this regard, Ali Gohar (2014) further argues that the lack of understanding among international peacemakers regarding indigenous social institutions as well as overlooking of indigenous methods of conflict resolution and peacebuilding have contributed to the failure in achieving lasting peace in countries like Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Ajayi and Buhari (2014) further believe that colonialism in Africa adulterated and wiped out most of the local and indigenous African conflict resolution methods. Mengesha, Yesuf and
Gebre (2015) and Berhane (2014, 22) are also of a similar view that African society had devised its own mechanisms of governance and peace since time immemorial, which were then “poisoned” and dismantled by the colonisers. Achankeng (2013) points to the consequence of the removal or marginalization of such indigenous methods of conflict resolution, and their replacement by Western methods, arguing that the colonial approach to governance in postcolonial states involving the use of force for resolution of conflicts, is further aggravating violence in the African continent.
Farooq Yousaf and Japhace Poncian (2018) argue that tribal societies and indigenous methods such as the Pashtun Jirga in post-colonial states have suffered due to the persistence of colonial legacies. Where Jirga was used as a mechanism to police, monitor and regulate the
Pashtun way of life, it was made dysfunctional soon after the introduction of the Frontier
Crime Regulations (FCR) by the British Raj to “manage” the Pashtun tribes – with the FCR persisted with by Pakistan after independence in 1947 (Banerjee 2000, 33; Omrani 2009).
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5.1.4. Critique on Postcolonial Theory / Postcolonialism
Postcolonialism, as an area of scholarship and an analytical framework, has also come under
criticism since its inception. Ella Shohat (1992, 105) argues that the term “postcolonial” is
fraught with ambiguities, assuming that colonialism is “now a matter of the past, undermining
colonialism's economic, political, and cultural deformative traces in the present”. Shohat
further argues that postcolonialism fails to take into account the “neo-colonisation” of
countries like Egypt where formal independence, in 1923, did not guarantee the end of First
World Domination (Shohat 1992, 104). Graham Huggan (1997) addresses such criticism by arguing that postcolonialism does not imply that colonialism is over, rather it confronts the neo-colonialism of the present times. In this regard he argues:
Postcolonial studies investigates this history of exploitation; it also acknowledges that many
of the current discussions surrounding the status of literature - the seemingly interminable
quarrels, for example, over the canon- distract from, rather than address, the marginalization
of non-western cultural products, many of which draw upon indigenous aesthetic traditions,
or emanate from a variety of oral performative sources (Huggan 1997, 23).
In more recent criticism of postcolonialism, neoconservative Stanley Kurtz, speaking at a hearing at the United States House of Representatives, blamed the 9/11 attacks on Said’s postcolonial theory, stating that “area studies after Orientalism wrested knowledge from the service of power” and therefore left the U.S. policymakers in the dark about Islam and the
Middle East (Agnani et al. 2007, 634). Moreover, Kurtz also ‘portrayed postcolonial studies as
“extremist” and “anti-American” apologia for terrorists’ (Agnani et al. 2007, 634). In one of
his opinion pieces for the Weekly Standard in 2001, Kurtz writes: “like the terrorists
themselves, the post-colonial theorists have long found comfort and solidarity in blaming
127 both American power and a fast-fading band of traditionalist scholars for the complex ills of the Muslim world” (Kurtz 2001).
Challenging such criticisms on Said and his work, Spencer argues that Orientalism allows us to perceive how images, assumptions and stereotypes developed in the West concerning non-
Europeans, and the European attitudes arising from these, can justify the sort of imperial practices that continue to be perpetrated by the West in these regions:
Orientalism should be read today as a potent corrective to the prejudices as well as to the
ideological complacency that made possible the abominations perpetrated at Abu Ghraib as
well as the depredations visited on Iraq, and that permit the violence meted out unremittingly
to the Palestinians (Spencer 2013, 170).
Jennifer Wenzel believes also believes that such critiques and assumptions of failure of postcolonial studies are ‘too simple…. and if the era of postcolonial studies is over, it ends just when the need for historically informed critiques of imperialism could not be more urgent’
(Agnani et al. 2007, 643). Thus, newer states of Africa and South Asia, having gained independence in the twentieth century, are still witnessing and experiencing colonial legacies in state policies and narratives.
In this context, Pakistan’s persistence with a colonial legal framework to administer the
“tribal” Pashtuns in the former-FATA presents an effective case-study for critical analysis of the negative effects of colonial legacies in the post-colonial states. Moreover, it will be argued that the Pakistani state’s treatment of the “tribal” Pashtuns and the narratives adopted by the state towards them have their roots in similar narratives developed and advanced by the
British colonists during the Raj, when they too had to engage with “tribal” Pashtuns as a means of maintaining British governance in the tribal areas. In this way, we see how the 128 legacies of colonisation, and the imperial narratives arising from it, still have a significant legacy in post-colonial states like Pakistan.
5.2. “Tribal” Pashtuns, Colonial Literature and their Representation
Various representations of Pashtuns and their culture, developed by European writers during colonial times, have persisted due to limited recent literature challenging these representations (Berry 1966; Hanifi 2016). These representations amount to generalisations and are common themes found in the writings of most colonial writers concerning Pashtuns and their tribal culture (see Elphinstone 1842; Warburton 1900; Wylly 1912; Caroe 1958).
These generalisations in the colonial readings have categorised Pashtuns as “savage”,
“vengeful” or “fearless warrior-like” people who do not like to be ruled by external powers.
These generalisations are evident in much of the notable colonial writings on Pashtuns discussed below.
Robert Warburton (1900) quotes Lord Lytton, the Viceroy and Governor-General to the
Secretary of State for India and held office from 1876 – 1880, on the Raj’s relations with
Pashtun tribes in the North West Frontier, in which Lytton utilises the description of Pashtun as “semi-savage”:
I believe that our North-Western Frontier presents at this moment a spectacle unique in the
world; at least I know of no other spot where, after twenty-five years of peaceful occupation,
a great civilised Power has obtained so little influence over its semi-savage neighbours
(Warburton 1900, 7-8).
Moreover, Warburton (1900), throughout his book on his time in the North West Frontier, also describes the tribes on the border as “savages”. He narrates how ‘ in nearly every case
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the savage of the independent hills was clever enough to interrupt our work by his inter-tribal
quarrel, so as to force us to interfere between them’ (Warburton 1900, 205). In another
account of the Pashtun tribes, Harold Carmichael Wylly (1912) quotes Sir R. Temple, Secretary
to the Chief Commissioner of Punjab, in 1855, saying:
Now these tribes are savages—noble savages perhaps—and not without some tincture of
virtue and generosity, but still absolutely barbarians nevertheless...They are a sensual race.
They are very avaricious; for gold, they will do almost anything, except betray a guest. They
are thievish and predatory to the last degree. The Pathan mother offers prayers that her son
may be a successful robber (Wylly 1912, 5-6).
Edward Oliver (1890, 183) in his account of the Pashtun tribes on the border, describes the
Afridi tribes as ‘the most lawless and savage of Pathans’. For Woosnam Mills (1897, 8), the
tribes living on the Khyber-Kabul route were the ‘most savage and warlike of the frontier
tribesmen’. Moreover, from the accounts of British colonial ethnographies written on the
North West Frontier, their portrayal of Pashtuns is somewhat similar and mostly based on their experience with the Pashtuns in times of war (Leonard 2016).
This repeated reference to the adjective of “savage”, by British colonizers, to define Pashtuns,
shows how the use of this term, in a colonial context in which imperial power is being
exercised in relation to Pashtuns, emphasises the “otherness” of the Pashtuns, and their
“alterity” in relation to the British colonizers. The British colonizers do not consider
themselves “savage”, and so to identify the Pashtuns as “savage” is to demarcate the
difference of the Pashtuns, and therefore identify their “otherness” and “alterity”, in relation
to themselves. The result is that Pashtuns are defined, by the British, primarily in terms of
their “difference”, in relation to the British, where this difference is defined, and demarcated,
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by the British themselves. Here we see how the narrative of “savageness” reflects an
inequality of power, between the British and the Pashtuns, and enables the British, in defining
the Pashtuns in terms of their “otherness”, to justify acts of imperial power over them, in an
attempt to control or overcome their “savageness”. It is precisely the analysis of such
narratives which is the focal point of postcolonial accounts such as Said’s, and we can see the
processes that Said identifies as occurring in British colonial accounts of Pashtuns.
British colonizers also identified what they perceived as other persistent traits with the
Pashtuns. Two of these traits were identified by the Pashtuns as positive traits within their
ethic of Pashtunwali – “hospitality” (melmastya) and “courage” (Wylly 1912). Yet these same narratives often contradict these qualities by referring to Pashtuns as “treacherous” and
“untrustworthy” (Wylly 1912, 7).
Colin Metcalfe Enriquez (1921, 94) states that one of the officers in the British Army, in his military role as an officer to colonial troops, declined to use the word “trustworthy” on any
Afridi sepoy’s discharge certificate. Other British colonial writers, such as Warburton (1900,
342), perpetuated this idea of Pashtuns as “untrustworthy”, describing the Afridi, a tribal group among the Pashtuns, as ‘brought up as kids to distrust all mankind’. He quotes
Lieutenant colonel Frederick Mackeson, who identified the Afridi themselves as unable to be
“trusted”:
The Afridis are a most avaricious race, desperately fond of money. Their fidelity is measured
by the length of the purse of the seducer, and they transfer their obedience and support from
one party to another of their own clansmen, according to the comparative liberality of the
donation (Warburton 1900, 342).
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Even in contemporary times, Bashir and Crews (2012, 4) note that most research conducted by the U.S. military strategists on Afghanistan, in preparation for the 2003 invasion, focused on the colonial literature that homogenized the Afghan society and considered them all as
“wild tribes”. Hence, these strategists committed a similar mistake of understanding the
Pashtun tribes through generalised narratives (see, e.g., Williams 2015).
Similarly, others have interpreted the contemporary actions of Pashtun tribes, in the wake of the U.S.-led War on Terror, in terms of these same dominant colonial narratives. Such a discourse is present in the following passage from David J. Kilcullen’s The Accidental Guerrilla
(2009a). Describing the contemporary actions of Pashtun tribes in the FATA region, Kilcullen draws directly on Winston Churchill’s11 narrative to ascribe the similar “warlike” characteristics to contemporary Pashtuns:
All the elements of Churchill’s account (on tribal Pashtuns) will immediately be familiar to
anyone who has served in Afghanistan or Pakistan in the “war on terrorism”. Honor-driven
(nang) behavior, tribal solidarity, cultural institutions of revenge, generalized reciprocity and
balanced opposition, immense value placed on weapons, the Jirga pleading an inability to
account for the actions of its young men or to control its tribal allies, cross-border raiding,
religious justification being advanced for tribal militancy, rival tribes coalescing in a temporary
alliance against external intrusion and a harsh and alienating government response—all these
elements of “frontier tradition” are well in evidence in Pakistan’s Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) today (Kilcullen 2009a, 3).
11 Winston Churchill, in 1898, once wrote that the Pashtun tribes were ‘always at war, except at the time of harvest or self-preservation’ Cooley, J.K. 2002. Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism. Pluto Press.. 132
Yet not all colonial narratives of Pashtuns went unchallenged within the European literature.
Far from constituting a homogenous bloc, the colonial descriptions of Pashtuns were in some
cases at odds. Colin Metcalfe Enriquez challenged the dominant colonial narratives concerning Pashtuns as follows:
The character of the unfortunate Pathan has been torn to bits by the writers of half century,
who have lavishly applied to him the adjectives treacherous, blood-thirsty and cruel until it
has become fashionable to ·regard the Pathan as the ·worst kind of savage (Enriquez 1921,
94).
Yet colonial discourses of inferiority are sometimes present even in cases where Europeans
sought to defend Pashtuns from colonial stereotypes. Enriquez (1921, 94) tries to diminish
the sense of “otherness” that European colonial writers ascribed to the Pashtuns by
identifying their similarity with habits of Anglo Saxon tribes. In so doing he states that
Pashtuns might be conceived as living in the “tenth” century (Enriquez 1921, 94). However,
in doing so, Enriquez is ascribing to Pashtuns an identity as “primitive”, thereby again
demarcating their difference, alterity, and “otherness” from European colonizers even when
seeking, in part, to overcome it.
5.3. Pakistan – a Postcolonial state?
5.3.1. Pakistan’s Postcolonial Dilemma
A “postcolonial” state is a state occupying a territory that was once a colony but has now
achieved formal independence after the Second World War and is self-governing (Rai 2018).
Postcolonial states are widely perceived to be subject to relationships of power and
dependency that may not characterize non-postcolonial states, where such relationships arise
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from the former colonial ties, and their consequences and effects that once bound such
territories to European empires. In South Asia, Guha defines the legacies of colonialism upon
such postcolonial states as follows:
We [….] suggest that the colonial state in South Asia was very unlike and indeed fundamentally
different from the metropolitan bourgeois state which had sired it. The difference consisted
in the fact that the metropolitan state was hegemonic in character with its claim to dominance
based on a power relation in which the moment of persuasion outweighed that of coercion,
whereas the colonial state was non-hegemonic with persuasion outweighed by coercion in its
structure of dominance (Guha 1997, xii).
Postcolonial states in the South Asian region, according to Guha, are characterized by specific
characteristics as a result of this colonial legacy of inequality, centred on a hegemonic imperial
power and its non-hegemonic colony. Such characteristics of postcolonial states, arising from the consequences of the unequal relationships of colonialism, can be considered characteristic of the Pakistani state, in the years from its achievement of independence in
1947, which was highlighted by the emergence of a military-bureaucracy oligarchy, later joined by the religious right wing (Waheed 2017).
These characteristics, along with theoretical foundations of Postcolonialism in Pakistan are discussed below:
5.3.1.1. Pakistan and Postcolonialism
The idea of Pakistan being a “Postcolonial” state has been discussed by a number of authors
such as Ishtiaq Ahmed (2013b), Hussain Haqqani (2010), Sadia Toor (2014) Hasan Askari Rizvi
(2005b, 1988, 2000), Ayesha Jalal (1995, 1991), Aswini Ray (1989), T. V. Paul (2015), Stephen
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Cohen (2004) and Iftikhar Malik (2016b, 1996). However, it was Hamza Alavi – a Pakistani
political scientist from the Marxist school of thought – who first discussed postcolonialism in
the context of Pakistan and Bangladesh (Alavi 1972). It was Alavi’s work that helped
academics and students at that time in the country to understand and apply the idea of
postcolonialism (Shaheed 2013). His works contributed towards the understanding of
“overdevelopment” of major institutions of the state – mainly military and bureaucracy – that
work for the interests of the centre (or metropolitan) and not the interest of the peripheries
(Shaheed 2013; Siddiqa 2007, 67).
Furthermore, Pakistan’s postcolonial state, even after independence and end to the foreign imperialist bourgeoisie, the indirect control still remains (Alavi 1972). Alavi’s thesis on postcoloniality in Pakistan was further developed by Ayesha Siddiqa (2007) and Ishtiaq
Ahmed (2013b) in their books specifically focusing on the Pakistani army. Siddiqa’s arguments are based on the military’s business and economic activities – or milbus – and how it created an economic empire in the country, allowing it to remain unaccountable for the capital it amasses and uses to control the political activities, similar to countries like Egypt (see Siddiqa
2007). Additionally, due to the unstructured nature of the relationship between the state and society, the military - along with the religious forces, businessmen and influential politicians - shapes the state according to its vested interests (Siddiqa 2007, 16). On the other hand,
Ahmed, argues that in Pakistan’s case, the military has gained enough influence over the
national discourse to promote itself not only as the sole protector but also the most
competent institution to lead the country (Ahmed, 2013b, pp. 23-24).
It is also argued that the roots of the religious groups’ political activism could be traced back
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founder, and his speeches during the independence
135 movement, where he loosely used terms “Islam” and “Muslim State” to segregate the Muslim population (Shaikh 2009, p. 2). Such a political discourse ultimately resulted in the confusion surrounding meaning and interpretation of Islam for the new state of Pakistan, which also became one of the major challenges towards the development of the country as a nation- state (Shaikh 2009, 2; Jalal 1991, 279; Devji 2013, 10). This was also one of the reasons why
Jinnah was criticised as he was known to be secular, although, with other leaders of the All
India Muslim League, he still used religion to get political mileage that ultimately played a major part in shaping the future constitutions of Pakistan (Jalal 1991; Waheed 2017).
Jinnah, while speaking at the first constituent assembly of Pakistan on 11 August, 1947, famously said that ‘You may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that has nothing to do with the business of the State’, but there was a radical departure from this in his later speeches which advocated for a state based on Islamic values and principles (Jalal 1991, 279).
Such a departure by Jinnah allowed religious parties, who were initially against Pakistan’s creation, with enough impetus to play a major role in Pakistani politics in years to come (Malik
1996, 47; Jalal 1991). This also made Jinnah realise his mistake, who had previously used Islam to justify the ‘two nation theory’, however, it was now difficult the contain the problems of religiosity that had evolved out of his pro-Islam discourse (Shaikh 2009, 82).
Alavi (1991) and Malik (1996, 3) believe that Pakistan’s postcolonial problems started when the country’s “state matured before the nation”. Such a situation in Pakistan developed mainly because of restrictive colonial legacies, which further resulted in the creation of a
‘Janowitzian military-bureaucracy alliance vested in the status-quo ante’ (Shah 2014b, 255).
These circumstances in Pakistan’s initial years after independence led to the formation of an elite and powerful class, in collusion with the landed-feudal, the indigenous bourgeoisie, and
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the metropolitan bourgeoisie (Alavi 1972). To this, there was late addition of the religious- right, who found common ground with the Pakistani military establishment and therefore worked towards their own vested interests at cost of the erosion of democratic norms in the country (Siddiqa 2007, 75; see Alavi 1972; Toor 2014). This elite – headed by the military – later found political Islam as a source to drive the ideology of the state (Ahmed 2013c). Hence,
It was during General Zia’s military rule (1978-1988) that the religious-right came to prominence in Pakistan’s social and political sphere (Shaikh 2009, p. 101). Such became the influence of the religious right wing in Pakistan’s state apparatus and politics that even progressive political leaders, such as Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and strong military dictators, like
General Zia, pandered to religious groups in the country, especially by declaring the
Ahmaddiya community as “Non-Muslims” and introducing strict Blasphemy laws (Nelson
2011, 127-128). Moreover, this “ideological commitment” towards Islam and its use by the military, especially during the 1969-1971 military rule by General Yahya, keeping secular
Bengali leaders away from power, resulted in the breaking of East (now Bangladesh) and West
Pakistan (Haqqani 2010).
Rather than learning from this disintegration, Haqqani (2010, 8) argues, the military formed an alliance with the “mosque”, or religious groups, to supposedly “unite” disparate ethnic groups in the country on “ideological” basis. This has further resulted in radical and violent manifestations of Islamist ideology, today, threatening Pakistan’s stability (Haqqani 2010, 8).
This use of Islamism further escalated during General Zia’s military rule, where he co-opted
with religious groups not only to validate his rule and consolidate his power but also target
and punish secular political leaders and dissidents in the country (Shah 2011, 71).
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5.3.1.2. Military’s rise and lack of democratic progress
Pakistan’s postcolonial characteristics are also marked by lack of democratic and institutional progress, along with how it has treated its peripheries, especially the “tribal” Pashtuns. For
Akhtar and Ahmad, such lack of progress, especially in a state like Pakistan, can be summarised as:
Their military-bureaucratic character; their extensive role within the economy as
‘entrepreneur’ and ‘landlord’, and the tendency to generate rents through resources such as
oil or strategic concessions to external powers (e.g. allowing foreign military bases) rather
than raising taxes – thereby further reducing the relevance of ‘legitimacy’ to statehood
(Akhtar and Ahmad 2015, 99).
Further elaborating on these characteristics and Pakistan’s erosion of democracy and
inheritance of colonial administrative structures, Sundar and Sundar (2014, 6, 17-18) argue
that the nature of sovereignty in Postcolonial states, such as Pakistan, has gradually changed
since independence.
Due to these predicaments, Pakistan has historically remained a state with a strong military
and a weak democracy (Hussain 2012a). Additionally, unlike other former colonies, Pakistan’s
military does not have a fixed or settled role in the country. This dynamism or lack of
establishing a role for the military has also resulted in pursuing of interventionist policies by
the military, also resulting in a constant civil-military tussle in the country (Cohen 2004, 158).
This tussle has resulted in four military rules; namely General Ayub 1958-1969, General Yahya
1970-1971, General Zia 1977-1988 and General Musharraf 1999-2008 (Cohen 2004, 7; Lyon
2008). These military regimes were “justified” under the necessity of protecting the country
138 from “corrupt politicians” and that the military was the only clean institution and protector of the country (Cohen 2004; Shah 2011).
Aqil Shah (2014b), Hassan Askari Rizvi (2005a), and Hussain Haqqani (2010), also discuss the security and praetorian orientation of the military in their works. Shah (2014b, 4) believes that the perceived security threat from India has provided a justification for the military to consolidate its influence at the cost of democracy. Haqqani (2010) and Rizvi (2005a) describe
Pakistan as a “praetorian state” especially because the military – in alliance with the bureaucracy and the religious-right – has consolidated enough power to maintain influence over political and democratic institutions in the country. It was this “perceived security threat” that resulted in the Pakistani military fighting and, on most occasions, instigating four major wars with India (in 1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999) (Fair 2011).
Moreover, the military has also perceived politician as “distrustful and corrupt”, and therefore “self-assuming” the role of the only institution in the country standing between stability and anarchy (Shah 2011). This praetorian syndrome of Pakistan is largely attributed to the disconnect and fragmentation between the state and civil society, as the former is focused on further self-interest (Siddiqa 2007, p. 67). However, Waheed (2017, 283) argues that various existential threats to Pakistan, particularly emanating from Afghanistan and
India, coupled with the “ineffectiveness” of political parties to govern, further enabled the military remained “concerned with protecting the country” along with strengthening itself as an institution.
Starting from the first military rule imposed by General Ayub 1958, the military, until today, enjoys substantial influence in political affairs of Pakistan (Khalil and Ahmed 2017). However, in terms of military’s consolidation of power in Pakistan’s security and foreign policy affairs,
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it is argued that it was after General Zia’s eleven year rule that did not only make the military
the focus of power but also made the “Army Chief” an important element for the “country’s
stability” (Haqqani 2010, 231-232). Moreover, it is also argued that since 1988, any “smooth”
functioning of a civilian government has depended on good ties between the Army Chief and
the country’s Prime Minister (Haqqani 2010, 231-232). Aqil Shah (2011) summarises this
situation in the following words:
But running through both the domestic and foreign dimensions of Pakistan’s past, present,
and future is one connecting factor: an out-of-(civilian)-control army. Civil-military relations
are not just one of many “structural problems” faced by Pakistan. In fact, civil-military
relations are central to and inseparable from centre-province relations, ethno-regional
conflict, internal political stability, Islamist influence in the polity, the prospects of warfare
with India, nuclear security and proliferation, and regional and global terrorism.
Therefore, even between 1988 and 1999, four democratic governments, with two terms each
by Nawaz Sharif (of Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz - PML N) and Benazir Bhutto (daughter of
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and leader of Pakistan People’s Party - PPP), could not complete their terms due to military’s interference (Nelson 2011, 127-131). Even though the military intervened in some way during these terms, the democratic progress was also stunted due to short-sighted political approach by both major political parties and their on and off alliances with the
military establishment (Nelson 2011, 127-131).
One infamous case, in this regard, which proves the military’s active interference in democratic governments is now known as the “Asghar Khan Case”. During 1995-1996, late
(retired) Air Marshal Asghar Khan sent a letter to the Supreme Court of Pakistan asking the
Chief Justice to inquire about a “political cell” in the ISI. The letter was later converted into a
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petition, with hearings on the case still in progress. During the course of hearings, retired
military intelligence officers, especially Lt. General (retired) Asad Durrani, admitted to the
presence of such a cell and using money to back Nawaz Sharif, by forming the Islami Jamohuri
Ittihad (IJI) – or Islamic Democratic Alliance, and overthrowing Benazir Bhutto’s government in 1990 (Abbas 2018). A former chief of the ISI, Lt. General Hameed Gul, argued that the military decided to overthrow Benzair fearing she would be vindictive against the generals who were responsible for her father’s assassination (Abbas 2018). Hence, the military was
also aided by the vested interests of politicians who often sided with the military, along with
the religious parties, to consolidate its power.
Finally, especially because of both the anti-Soviet Afghan Jihad (1979-1989) and the U.S. war
on terror (2001-present), the U.S. governments have found convenient allies, to further their
regional agenda, in the Pakistani military and therefore have also supported military dictators
in Pakistan (Haqqani 2010; Haqqani 2004). This support by the U.S. for military dictators,
especially for General Pervez Musharraf, is discussed in Chapter 6 below.
Hence, these local and global factors have ensured that the Pakistani military remains a major
stakeholder in Pakistan’s governance, security and economy. More recently, even though
General Musharraf, who ruled from 1999 to 2008, resigned nearly ten years ago and his
departure followed by two democratic transitions, the military is still considered the strongest
institution in the country (Tankel 2018). This is because not only has the military, over the
years, succeed in increasing its budget and spending - in face of worsening economic
conditions of Pakistan – but it has also been accused of interfering in 2018’s General Elections
in Pakistan, along with supporting and mainstreaming banned religious groups (such as Hafiz
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Saeed’s Jamaat ud Dawa) and censuring the mainstream media12 (Fair 2018; Tharoor 2018;
Yousaf 2018c; Shah 2019).
Pakistan’s inheritance of a strong military and bureaucracy and their nexus has also played a major role in shaping this security policy. Not only has the military remained at the forefront of influencing the foreign policy since the 1950s, but its “working” relationship with the U.S. military has also undermined the civilian Pak-US ties (Nawaz 2010). In all of this, Pakistan’s spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) – formed in 1948 by a British officer Major
General R. Cawthome for the purpose of coordinating intelligence efforts between armed forces – has played a major role in the anti-Soviet Afghan Jihad and more recently, alleged support for the anti-US Haqqani Faction of the Taliban in Pakistan and its tribal areas
(Gartenstein-Ross 2010, 30). It was the ISI which, with the help of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, helped train Mujahedeen in the tribal areas for the anti-Soviet Jihad in Afghanistan (Siddique
2011).
5.3.1.3. Pakistan and Pashtun Periphery
The situation in the Pashtun tribal areas, or FATA, and Pakistan’s postcolonial predicament
can also be explained by Arif Dirlik’s (1998) position on indigeneity and native societies.
According to him, native societies have been victims of disorganization under colonial rule
and later reorganised due to the political and cultural prerogatives of colonialism, which has
further led to political and social disintegration of such societies (Dirlik 1998, 238).
12 Due to the nature and scope of this research, this discussion on the 2018 and onwards is kept to a bare minimum. 142
This has happened with the Pashtun tribal areas, in FATA, which were absorbed during the
Durand Line partition in 1893 and also governed under the FCR under the colonial era because their location served as a ‘buffer zone for the British against the Russians’ (Sundar and Sundar
2014; Gazdar, Kureshi and Sayeed 2014). This “buffer zone” was similarly used again by the
Pakistani state in between 1979 and 1989 during the anti-Soviet Afghan Jihad for training the
Mujahedeen against the Soviet Union.
The Pakistani state, during anti-Soviet Afghan Jihad (1979-1989), applied the British policy towards the “tribal” Pashtuns in letter and spirit. The image of a “noble savage” of Pashtuns was maintained, who were used to fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, with the U.S. and Saudi help, in the name of Jihad (Khan 2018c). It was due to this policy of Pakistan, coupled with the backlash of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 that the situation has further worsened in the tribal areas (Salaman 2012).
Moreover, this situation has also added to an already present negative image and perception towards the Pashtuns. Kadayifci-Orellana (2015, 434) argues that one of the major failures of
War on Terror in Afghanistan is attributed to the orientalist discourses that alienated the
Pashtun majority, which was painted as “primitive”, unknowing of its rights, and needing an international intervention. As discussed above in 5.2, it was such a generalised and negative representation of “tribal” Pashtuns that led to the implementation of the Frontier Crimes
Regulations (1901) (FCR) under the colonial era, and then its persistence in postcolonial
Pakistan. The primary purpose of the FCR was to keep the Pashtun tribes under strict control, further leading to abrogation of their rights and isolation from the mainstream (Yousaf
2017a). Moreover, this deprivation of Pashtuns in the tribal areas, Sawhney (2011) argues,
143 led to a further sense of deprivation among the tribal youth, who became easy targets of recruitment by the Taliban.
The colonial representation of “tribal” Pashtuns, especially those from Waziristan, persists even today, with the Pashtuns of Waziristan generalised as militants and perpetrators, and not the victims (Taj 2017, 160; 2011). Farhat Taj’s two volumes, titled Taliban and Anti-Taliban
(2011) and The Real Pashtun Question (2017), provide a critical discourse analysis on how the
International media along with the Pakistan media (controlled by the military’s narrative), persisted with promoting a violent image of Pashtuns from the tribal areas, even though they were the main victims of the Taliban violence.
As discussed in 5.3.1.2 above, the lack of democratic progress leading to the military’s control of security policy, especially after 1998, gave the military an unquestioned control over the
Pashtun tribal areas. This control also raised questions over whether the Pakistani military was serious in completely eliminating militancy from the region. In this regard, pointing towards the rising militancy in FATA, post-2001, Sial (2010, 143) argues that lack of action by the Pakistani army against the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda between 2002 and 2004 helped both the groups establish their de-facto authority in FATA’s South Waziristan agency. Rana
(2010a, 215) also believes that the Pakistan army’s approach of supporting the Pakistani
Taliban groups, such as Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, in order to divide the local
Taliban, was based on a precarious rationale and therefore negatively affected its counter- insurgency in FATA. Further elaborating on this policy, Johnson and Mason (2008b) also believe that the Pashtun borderlands in Afghanistan and Pakistan have become militant safe havens due to the role played by the Pakistani military. This role and its rationale have been recently explained by former retired military and intelligence officers.
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Lt. Gen. Retd. Abdul Qadir Baloch, minister for states and frontier regions, in 2015, while addressing a delegation from the Mehsud tribes, admitted to the military’s misuse of the tribal areas for its “strategic depth”, which ultimately escalated militancy in the tribal areas.
Baloch said,
Then South and North Waziristan within Pakistani territory were chosen to [support the latest
phase of the war in Afghanistan]. From that time [in 2001] till today these two agencies (tribal
districts) and other agencies in FATA have suffered terribly (Siddique 2018 para 11).
This statement clearly indicated that the military establishment played a major role in the deprivation of the “tribal” Pashtuns along with the rise in terrorism and conflict in the region.
Farhat Taj (2017, 26) also believes that the violence in FATA continued so that the military establishment could continue with its policy of “strategic depth”, and hence create a safe- haven for militant groups, especially the Afghan Taliban. Additionally, the Pashtun culture was itself becoming eroded under the persistence of the colonial-era FCR. The forthcoming discussion explains how the persistence of a colonial-era FCR negatively affected the socio- political situation in the Pashtun tribal areas of Pakistan.
5.3.2. The Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), FATA and Pashtun Jirga
Pakistan was one of the few countries that even after its independence from British colonial rule in 1947, retained certain colonial practices and models of administration. This retention of colonial and practices is one reason why the framework of postcolonialism is a meaningful context to understand the actions of the Pakistani state in those instances where these colonial practices are applied. This is particularly the case in relation to Pakistani state and
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military practices regarding “tribal” Pashtuns (Mullaney 2010, 5). Such a relation and policy is
discussed and explained below in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
Perhaps the most obvious example of colonial practices, retained by the Pakistani state, which
impacted on the Pashtuns, was the Pakistani state’s decision to retain the Frontier Crimes
Regulation (FCR), which was the legal framework established by the British Raj to govern the
tribal areas, and which was not abolished until May 2018 (Tahir, 2015). The use of the FCR as the system of legal governance in the tribal areas (former FATA) effectively relegated the tribal areas to a peripheral or “frontier” status, relative to the rest of Pakistan, since the presence of the FCR meant that, unlike the rest of Pakistan, the tribal areas were not subject to the normal rule of law in Pakistan, and in particular were not subject to the laws of the
Pakistani Constitution.
The FCR was a colonial-era framework of special rules and exceptions from the normal rule of law that was initially enacted by the British Raj in the tribal areas in the Indian-subcontinent
to subdue the tribes on the frontier (Wazir 2007). With its persistence in Pakistan, this meant
that Article 8 of the Pakistan Constitution, which declares that “[l]aws inconsistent with or in
derogation of fundamental rights” within Pakistan are “void”, are not applicable to the tribal
areas to which the FCR applies (Pakistan 2018).
Efforts by the British Raj to implement the FCR in the tribal areas began 1872, creating a legal
exception for “tribal” Pashtuns. The British had annexed the six tribal districts in 1848 and
had begun to treat these areas in legally exceptional ways when the British-appointed
magistrates were given the authority to withdraw cases of blood feud arising between
Pashtuns from the formal judicial process and recommend them to tribal Jirga (Caroe 1958,
353; Kolsky 2015). This legal exception, along with a number of other rules and laws
146 specifically established for the tribal areas, was also enacted, such as the Criminal Code of
Procedure 1861, the Indian Penal Code 1862, and the Criminal Tribes Act 1871 (Ullah 2013).
In their initial form, these laws were known as the Punjab Frontier Crimes Regulations. But with the creation of the North West Frontier Province in 1901, the name was changed to
Frontier Crimes Regulations.
The British amended these regulations, in 1873, 1886, and 1887, in response to practical issues arising from the implementation and application of these laws in the tribal areas
(Hopkins 2015; HRCP 2005). These regulations were formally reconstituted in their final form as the FCR in 1901, after which virtually no amendments were made until the creation of an independent Pakistani state in 1947.
Most of the amendments made in the FCR altered the legal framework from one in which the individual was the primary legal agent, subject to the obligations and responsibilities imposed by the FCR, to one where the primary legal agent were collective units such as the family or tribe (Nichols 2013, 44; Ullah 2015). The primary aim of the British Raj, with these amendments, was to make the FCR a more effective means for imposing law and order within the tribal regions (Hopkins 2015). By shifting legal responsibility to the family or tribe, this
“supposedly” allowed for the more effective policing of individuals within these regions, since, under the FCR, their personal actions now had direct implications for their larger relationships in their tribal community. For instance, any breach of the FCR committed by any member of the tribe resulted in the collective punishment of the whole tribe (Tameez
2014; Hopkins 2015).
The FCR was a significant means for the imposition of British authority in the tribal areas. For instance, although there were provisions in the FCR which recognized the indigenous role of
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Pashtun Jirga as a means of local governance for the tribes, the FCR relegated all final decision making authority to the Deputy Commissioner (DC) of the tribal areas, appointed by the
British Raj (Hopkins 2015).
The Deputy Commissioner had significant executive and judicial powers under the terms of the FCR. These included DC’s powers to intervene directly in the tribal society in order to control violence emanating from blood feuds (Hopkins 2015, 375). Moreover, the 1887 and the final 1901 revisions in the FCR gave further powers to the DC “allowing for whipping and transportation, in addition to imposing fines” (Hopkins 2015, 375). Indeed, it has been argued that the Deputy Commissioner played the role of “judge, jury and executioner” in the areas wherein the FCR was applied because the FCR excluded judiciary from tribal eras leaving only the DC (Hopkins 2015). In particular, the FCR allowed the Political Agent (PA) (replacing the designation of DC after 1947) to suspend formal judicial processes and keep “tribal” Pashtuns, subject to the FCR, in custody for three years without trial (HRCP 2005, 57).
In order to increase the control of the British Raj over the Pashtun tribes, Lord Curzon, the
British appointed Viceroy of India, decided, in 1901, to split the Punjab province into two halves, with one half named as the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and the other half remained Punjab (Ahmed 2013a, pp. 59-60). The Pashtun tribal areas – consisting of five tribal
Agencies namely Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan, South Waziristan and Malakand – fell within the NWFP (Ahmed 2013a, pp. 59-60). The FCR applied to the North West Frontier
Province, along with Balochistan (Hopkins 2015, 376). The Punjab province, like other provinces and territories, was supervised by the British Parliament Acts, with the British
Parliament passing a total of 196 Acts - between 1858-1947 - to handle matters in the Indian subcontinent (Parliament 2017b).
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When Pakistan achieved its independence on 14th August 1947, the FCR was maintained by
the Pakistani state as the means to govern the tribal areas. The reason for this was
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founder, was facing challenges on the border, especially a conflict on Kashmir with India, and therefore wanted to act swiftly on the region (Ahmed
2013a, 63). Hence, he not only reversed the British policy of maintaining a military presence in the tribal areas but also entrusted the tribes to deal with border and security challenges on their own (Akins 2017, 8).
It is also argued that another reason for the Pakistani state’s willingness to maintain the FCR, after Jinnah’s death in 1948, was because it too shared some of the assumptions of the British
Raj concerning the “tribal” Pashtuns (Yousaf 2018a). We have also seen that these
assumptions were articulated and advanced by the British Raj in regard to the Pashtun tribes.
In this respect, we see direct evidence of the legacy of colonialism upon the post-
independence actions of the Pakistani state.
In the wake of the 1956 Constitution, the Pakistani state abolished the use of the FCR in the
North West Frontier Province (Wazir, 2007). In the 1973 Constitution, it abolished it in
Balochistan (Wazir 2007). However, the tribal areas, or FATA, were the only region where the
state decided to persist with the FCR. Moreover, the title of the Deputy Commissioner (DC) was changed to the Political Agent (PA). However, the functions and powers of the PA remained similar to that of the DC (HRCP 2005; Ullah 2016). The PA, therefore, continued to play the role of a “judge, jury and executioner” in the FATA region (Ullah 2016; HRCP 2005).
This persistence of FCR also meant that no legislation passed in the national legislature (the
National Assembly and Senate) was applicable in FATA (Tameez 2014). Even though the FATA region elected its representatives to the National Assembly, these members were still not
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able to legislate for FATA as, under the FCR, the area fell within the jurisdiction of the
President of Pakistan and Provincial Governor of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Orakzi
2009).
The locals in the tribal areas argue that the lack of effective governance and persistence of
the FCR has also contributed towards the escalation of conflict and militancy in the region
(Khan 2014b). A study conducted in 2009, in the FATA region, found that one in five people in
the tribal areas believed that “flawed” governance systems in FATA, in form of the FCR, have
contributed towards growing militancy in the region (Rana 2017b, 39). Moreover, it was this
vacuum and lack of “democratic and political representation” that also allowed military
dictators to implement “security” policies without taking the people’s will into consideration.
Finally, the persistence of the FCR has also negatively affected the Pashtun Jirga.
5.3.2.1. Constitutional Status and Demographics of FATA (1947-2018)
FATA’s constitutional “special” status remained one of the major dilemmas for Pakistan until
the FCR was repealed in May 2018. Article 246 (c) of the constitution, before FATA merger, named the following regions as part of FATA, or the tribal areas:
246: Tribal Areas. (c) Federally Administered Tribal Areas includes
(i) Tribal Areas adjoining Peshawar district; (ii) Tribal Areas adjoining Kohat district; (iii) Tribal
Areas adjoining Bannu district; (iiia) Tribal Areas adjoining Lakki Marwat District; (iv) Tribal
Areas adjoining Dera Ismail Khan district; (iva) Tribal Areas adjoining Tank District; (v) Bajaur
Agency; (va) Orakzai Agency; (vi) Mohmand Agency; (vii) Khyber Agency; (viii) Kurram Agency;
(ix) North Waziristan Agency, and (x) South Waziristan Agency (Pakistan 2004, 109).
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On the other hand, Article 247 of the constitution elaborated the Administration of Tribal
Areas where the President was the executive for the FATA region, with the provincial
governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa reporting to the President (Pakistan 2004; Naseer 2015).
Two major provisions in the constitution that deprived the former-FATA of enjoying a full
constitutional status included the authority vested in the President to make laws and pass
Orders, something the National Constitution forbade him from doing elsewhere, and the
inapplicability of the country’s judicial system in the tribal areas (Naseer 2015). The legal
provision also went against Article 25 of the constitution that calls for equality for rights for
all citizens of Pakistan (Pakistan 2004, 11).
Even if FATA’s integration goes ahead as planned, it is believed that the implementation of this process, in its true sense, because of the military’s vested interests in the region, will take
many years (see Khattak 2017b; Yousaf, Rashid and Gul 2018). It is also argued that because
of the conservative nature of the tribal society towards change and ‘foreign interventions’,
the process of the merger would remain complicated in practice (Editorial 2017). Finally, a
“de-facto FCR”, maintaining the military’s influence in the region, might still remain in place as long as the Afghan war continues and the Pashtun tribal belt remains susceptible to violence and militancy, which would result in the consistent presence of the military in the region.
The population over the years has increased, and whereas the last census of 1988 claims that the former-FATA region is home to 3.18 million people (FATA-Secretariat 2017), recent
unofficial estimates from 2011 suggest that the population stands at around 4 million (Dil
2016; Röder and Shinwari 2015). There was also a growth rate of a population of 2.19%
between 1981 and 1998. In terms of culture and customs, tribes in the former-FATA region
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are known to solve their everyday matters through collective efforts, using Jirga and Hujra (a
guest house used as a meeting place) (Yousufzai and Gohar 2005). These matters include inter
and intra-tribal conflicts, construction of infrastructure, harvesting of crops, managing water
channels, and cutting of wood.
One of the controversial mechanisms of the Maliki system is state-appointed or selected tribal elders receiving a monthly allowance from the Political Agent (PA)13, allegedly for running
their hospitality expenses (Yousaf, Rashid and Gul 2018). This rent-seeking In terms of
constitutional reach, even though the former-FATA was a part of Pakistan, however, under
Article 1 of the constitution of Pakistan, it came under the direct executive authority of the
President, and not the Prime Minister, under the Articles 51, 59 and 247 of the constitution
(Begum 2015). The FATA was also represented by its representatives in the National Assembly
and Senate, however, because of the FCR, laws passed in the Parliament did not apply to the
region (Ahmed 2016). In terms of administration of tribal Agencies, the FCR made the PA an
administrative head in the respective tribal Agencies and was answerable to the provincial
governor (of KP Province), who was, in turn, answerable to the President of the country
(Begum 2015).
In terms of political administration under the civilian governments, the region came under
the overall supervision of the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (FATA-Secretariat 2017).
Within this framework, each tribal Agency was run and administered by a PA, who was
assisted by Assistant Political Agents (APA) and Tehsildars (heads of administrative areas),
deputy-Tehsildars, along with security forces including local police, levies, and scouts (Khan
13 The role of the PA, after the FATA reforms on May 24, 2018, has now been change to Deputy Commissioner (DC). 152
2016d). The PA was also responsible for line departments and service provision affairs in their
respective agencies.
On the other hand, the Frontier Regions were administered separately by District
Coordination Officers (DCOs) who enjoyed similar powers as that of the PA. Moreover, the
PA, for ease of administration, had informally divided the tribal areas into three zones, namely
administered areas, protected areas and inaccessible areas (Ali 1999; Röder and Shinwari
2015). The administered areas were governed directly by the PA under the FCR, whereas the
protected and inaccessible areas were governed indirectly with tribes using Jirgas as means
of justice delivery and conflict resolution (Ali 1999, 185; Röder and Shinwari 2015, 25).
Because of the lack of a judicial system in FATA, until recently, Jirgas were used for conflict resolution, under the FCR, supervised by the PA. Moreover, all criminal and civil cases were resolved under the FCR by a Jirga supervised by the PA, with the Jirga only holding an advisory role (HRCP 2005; Khan and Khan 2012). Therefore, it is believed that the Jirga, due to the powers residing with the state officers, had merely become a political tool in the hands of PAs and DCOs (Khan and Khan 2012). Because of these power resting with the state-appointed bureaucrats, residents of FATA had gradually lost their faith and trust in the FCR Jirga because this mechanism gave them little authority or influence over the due process (Shinwari 2013).
Because the state, through its PA, was always a major stakeholder in the overall process, it exerted its pressure and influence over the Jirga members to give recommendations laden with bias or self-interest (Shinwari 2013).
Due to this ambiguity in conflict resolution mechanisms and justice delivery, or lack thereof, the Pashtun tribal areas have remained subject to a governance vacuum over the years. This
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vacuum, coupled with state policies, has historically provided enough space to militant groups to consolidate their hold in the region, which is discussed in the forthcoming section.
5.3.2.2. The FCR and Pashtun Jirga
The FCR, among other negative effects, has also displaced the centuries’ old tradition of Jirga as the ultimate decision making authority in the tribal areas (Hopkins 2015). With the appointment of the DC, responsible, under the FCR, for administering the tribal areas on behalf of the Raj, the Jirga became subservient to a nominated and appointed representative of the Raj (Wazir 2007). Because of the FCR, the state judiciary did not have jurisdiction in
FATA, leaving the PA and his consultative Jirgas as the only legal framework available for the people of FATA (Ullah 2013).
These consultative Jirgas have also been severely criticised for their bias and lack of authority under the PA. Because the PA enjoyed executive powers under the FCR, including the nomination of FCR-Jirga members, the membership of Jirga were often seen as being sympathetic to the PA, with the result that the decisions of the FCR-Jirgas were often criticised by locals as being politically biased (Shinwari 2011). This bias could take a number of forms.
In some cases, decisions were criticised as being too closely aligned with the interests or agenda of the PA, and the Pakistani state whom the PA represents within the tribal regions
(Mahsud 2017).
In other cases, bias arose from the tribal lineages within which Jirga exist, with some individuals with closer relationships to Jirga members receiving more sympathetic outcomes in terms of Jirga decisions than others (Wazir 2007). In order to avoid the bias arising from
PA-nominated FCR Jirga, the “tribal” Pashtuns sometimes preferred Olasi (peoples) Jirgas to
resolve matters related to small or domestic issues between or within the tribes (Gul 2010,
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pp. 46-47). This is because membership of Olasi Jirgas was not nominated by the PA. Rather elders of each household take part in this Jirga, which, therefore, makes it less susceptible to
corruption and bias (Yousufzai and Gohar 2005, 47).
Yousufzai and Gohar (2005, 84) argue that FCR is one of the major external factors that
contributed to the erosion of the Pashtun Jirga. This is because it took decision making
authority in the tribal regions away from the tribal elders and gave it to the DC and (after
Pakistani independence) the PA. One of the means by which this was done was the capacity,
given to the PA, to nominate certain types of Jirga, thereby providing the PA with a capacity
to influence decisions and so undermine Jirga credibility (from the perspective of the
tribespeople) due to perceived elements of bias.
Other means by which local authority has been removed from tribal elders and the
independence of Jirga undermined involve actual cases of threats, bribes or pressure being
imposed on Jirga by the PA in order to achieve a specific outcome from the Jirga decision-
making process (Taj 2017, 181). These complications were also expressed by former members
of the PA-nominated Jirga who said that ‘ever since our Jirgas have become government-
sanctioned, the going rate (bribe amount) for each Malik is known to everyone’ (Khan 2018b).
Tribal elders themselves have identified the FCR, and the significant authority it accords to
the PA, as one reason the Jirga is losing its traditional worth and effectiveness within the tribal
regions (Khan 2018b). It was due to these reasons that James W. Spain, a US Diplomat having
served in Pakistan, argued that the Jirga under the FCR was ‘far-cry from’ its natural form,
and its role was merely reduced to being a ‘recommendatory body’ (Spain 1963, 145-146).
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5.3.2.3. Amendments in the FCR since 1947
Since Pakistan’s independence, the process of amending and replacing the FCR has remained
slow and full of complications. The first proper and notable amendment to the FCR came in
1996 when the adult franchise was introduced in the tribal areas, allowing for the first
members of the National Assembly elected for the 1997 general elections (Ullah and Hayat
2018). Then in 2005, the Governor of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (then known as the
NWFP) constituted an FCR reforms committee to discuss further amendments to the FCR
(Ullah and Hayat 2018). The committee concluded that majority of the “tribal” Pashtuns wanted major changes to the FCR, however, because of the rise of militancy in the tribal areas,
repealing the FCR was a lesser priority for the Musharraf regime at that time (Qazi, Qazi and
Bashir 2018). These recommendations were not implemented with no major amendments
taking place in the FCR until 2009.
Then in 2009, a Cabinet Reforms Committee was formed by the Federal government to
develop modifications to the FCR (Qazi, Qazi and Bashir 2018). As a result of deliberations,
the FATA Regulation 2009 was introduced, which made minor, but important, changes to the
FCR. One of these changes required the local administration to present any arrested person
before the Assistant Political Agent (APA) within 24 hours of arrest (Ullah 2015).
In 2011, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) government introduced the Political Parties Order
(PPO) 2002, as a resulted of the Frontier Crimes (Amendment) Regulation [FC(A)R] 2011,
allowing political parties to conduct political activities and campaigning in FATA (Rahmanullah
2012). The FC(A)R 2011 also relaxed various clauses of collective punishment and arrests of
underage women and children (Ullah 2015). However, during the same year, on June 23, the
PPP government passed another draconian legislation by the title of “Actions (in Aid of Civil
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Power) Regulation, 2011”, which gave the military “ex post facto” legal protection for
unlawful actions committed in FATA during military operations since 2008 (Qazi, Qazi and
Bashir 2018). Hence, any prior minimal amendments in the FCR became inconsequential.
After 2011, the reforms process for the abolition of the FCR and integration of FATA in the
mainstream started in the Nawaz Sharif-led Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N)
government in 2015. In November 2015 a six-member reform committee was formed by the
then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to mainstreaming FATA (Aziz 2017). The committee held
yearlong consultations with the tribal elders and locals and provided recommendations to the
PM. The most of important recommendation of all was the merger of FATA with the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, and abolishing the FCR that would lead to the integration of the
region in the country’s mainstream (Nation 2017).
After the initial recommendations, some allies of Nawaz Sharif initially opposed the merger
calling for a referendum in the FATA region and allowing the “tribal” Pashtuns decide on their
future (Dawn 2017c; Aziz 2017). However, after various delays, the national legislature and
the President of Pakistan finally signed the constitutional amendments in the final week of
May 2018 with the 31st Constitutional Amendment Bill, to pave way for FATA’s merger with
the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Yousaf, Rashid and Gul 2018).
The 31st Constitutional Amendment Bill was passed in the national legislature of Pakistan on
May 24, 2018. After the resolution of the 31st Constitutional Amendment Bill, the 25th
constitutional amendment was made to the constitution (Yousaf, Rashid and Gul 2018). The
President then signed the draft bill of FATA Interim Governance Act on May, 29, and then
approved the 25th Amendment on May 31, paving way for FATA’s merger with the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province (Zeb and Ahmed 2019). After the legislation, the tribal agencies and
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Frontier Regions (FRs) have been renamed as Tribal Districts. Even though the region has been
merged with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, socio-political and legal challenges still
remain for the state (Yousaf 2019).
5.4. Conclusion
The chapter focused on how the theoretical framework of postcolonialism helped in the effective treatment of a case study such as Pakistan. In its first section, while discussing a brief historical background of the postcolonial theory, the chapter explained why postcolonialism
serves as an ideal analytical framework for discussing Pakistan’s treatment of its Pashtun
periphery. In its second section, the chapter discussed various colonial ethnographies and
other sources of colonial and more recent literature to consider how “colonial stereotypes”
concerning “tribal” Pashtuns were developed by British authors in the colonial era and how
these still persist in many contemporary accounts of Pashtuns today. In its final section, the
chapter discussed how the practices of the Pakistani state, in relation to “tribal” Pashtuns, is
still informed by some of these colonial legacies which the Pakistani state has inherited from
the British Raj, even after seventy years of its independence.
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Chapter 6:
FATA – Colonial Legacies
Leading to Militancy
159
6.0. FATA - Colonial Legacies leading to Militancy
Building upon the discussion of postcolonialism in the previous chapter, this chapter seeks to
use the framework of postcolonialism to analyse the situation of Pashtun tribes within the former-FATA region. In its first section, the chapter discusses a brief history of the FATA’s accession to Pakistan. In its second section, the chapter discusses how the Pakistani state’s persistent use of the colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), and the wider legacies of postcolonialism upon the Pakistani state has influenced the Pakistani military’s intervention in the former-FATA and resulted in the state of conflict and instability in the region. This section also discusses how the former-FATA region is perceived by the Pakistani state as a
“periphery”, distinct from other regions in Pakistan, and in particular, as a has been used by
the Pakistani state and the Pakistani military as a buffer-zone for proxy wars and Jihad against
outside enemies, such as the Soviet Union during its occupation of Afghanistan. In doing so,
the chapter discusses the foundations of extremism in tribal areas and looks at the role of the
Pakistani state, especially the military establishment, in the escalation of militancy in the
region. There is also a discussion on how CIA-operated US drone strikes in FATA, and tacit
approval from Pakistan also aggravated the situation in the tribal areas. In its final section,
the chapter discusses the formation and operations of several non-state militant groups in
the tribal areas, and how a proliferation of these groups further added to instability in the
region. This section only mentions and discusses FATA-based militant groups who have
operated in the region since 2002.
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6.1 FATA’s Accession to Pakistan
After Pakistan’s independence, the urban settled Pashtun areas were incorporated into the
North West Frontier Province (NWFP), now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, and Balochistan
(consisting of both Baloch and Pashtun ethnic groups). The Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA), consisted mainly of “tribal” Pashtuns14.
The NWFP was annexed, by the Pakistani state, from what was, prior to independence, once
part of British administered Punjab province. Before Pakistan’s partition, the government in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, was dominated by the Indian National Congress, and by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his Khudai
Khidmatgar (Servants of God) movement (Spain 1961). On the cusp of partition, it was decided that a referendum would be arranged in NWFP to decide whether the Pashtuns wanted to join India or Pakistan. Ghaffar Khan, fearing loss of popular support at the hands of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, boycotted the referendum where nearly 51% of the registered voters voted in the referendum and more than 99% opted to join Pakistan (Spain 1961, 172).
Moreover, there were also a number of negotiations taking place to decide the future of
Pashtun tribal areas. Such negotiations had to take place because, after the enactment of
Indian Independence Act in 1947 leading to the partition of the Indian subcontinent, all
agreements of the Pashtun tribes with the British administration lapsed and thus Pakistan had
to renegotiate agreements with the tribes on Frontier (Sammon 2008). Hence, after a series
of various agreements, through Jirga, the tribal areas joined the newly formed state of
14 A brief history of the Pashtun tribal areas, later known as FATA after Pakistan’s independence, is discussed in
Annex 1.
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Pakistan. The Afridi and Wazir tribes, in a meeting with British Viceroy Lord Mountbatten in
1947, had already sounded their reservations on joining a Hindu-dominated state, thus their
accession with Pakistan was considered a natural course of action (Sammon 2008, 39).
The annexation of Balochistan and tribal areas created more difficulties because the
populations of each were primarily rural and tribal in nature. This annexation also required
months of Jirga negotiations between state officials and local tribal leaders (Ahmed 2011b;
Shah 2012). Pakistan’s incorporation of NWFP and the Pashtun tribal areas in its territory also
became a source of contention because of the Durand Line. When Pakistan’s question of
recognition came up in the United Nations, Afghanistan was the only opposing vote, citing
the controversial nature of the Durand Line (Clements 2003, 11). Moreover, in the initial years
of Pakistan’s independence, Pashtun nationalist movements, vying for an Independent
Pashtunistan (Pashtun state), did not take well the fact that the Pashtun areas became part
of Pakistan, a sentiment that was used and exploited by successive Afghan government to
fuel the movement for Pashtunistan, an independent Pashtun land15 (Malik 2016a).
Between 1948 and 1978, the tribal areas presented two major challenges; 1) insurgencies and
2) support for Pashtunistan, an independent Pashtun state separated from Afghanistan.
This situation was more or less “controlled” through suppression and bombing of nationalist
and pro Pashtunistan leaders (Schofield 2011). Additionally, an approach, similar to the colonial era, was also used in FATA when the Pakistani state used bribery, patrolling, retaliatory raids, and bombing to keep a check on the fragile tribal areas (Schofield 2011, 41).
Hence, even though the British left the Indian subcontinent in 1947, they also left behind a
15 Further discussion on this discord among nationalist Pashtuns can be found below in 6.2.
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number of problems on the “Pathan (Pashtun) Borderlands” (Spain 1961, 171). In these
“borderlands”, the Pakistani state faced similar issues to that of the British Raj, albeit limited,
from the tribal areas when the Mirzali Khan, famously known as the “Faqir of Ipi” and a
Pashtun nationalist leader, demanded an independent Pashtun state soon after Pakistan’s
independence in 1947 (Tahir 2015). The Pakistani state, following the British colonial pattern,
bombed Faqir’s Lashkar with little or no efforts to negotiate the issue (Tahir 2015). Hence,
initial policies towards the Pashtun tribal belt indicated that the new Pakistani state was
willing to persist with a colonial-era approach of force towards the “tribal” Pashtuns.
Moreover, the Pakistani state also decided to persist with the FCR to “manage” the Pashtun
tribes in the FATA region. The Maliki system, where Maliks were paid allowances to remain
loyal towards the British before partition (Warren 1997), was also maintained to get state support of tribal elders.
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founder, took an early initiative on the tribal areas when after consultations, he ordered to withdraw all troops from Waziristan and the tribal areas, in order to build trust with the tribes (Ahmed 2013a, 62-63). Jinnah, while addressing a grand
Jirga in Waziristan in 1948, acknowledging the historical status of tribal areas, made the following statement:
Keeping in view your loyalty, help, assurances and declarations we ordered, as you know, the
withdrawal of troops from Waziristan as concrete and definite gesture on our part ... Pakistan
has no desire to unduly interfere with your internal freedom. On the contrary; Pakistan wants
to help you and make you, as far as it lies in our power, self-reliant and self-sufficient and help
in your educational, social and economic uplift. We want to put you on your legs as self-
respecting citizens who have the opportunities of fully developing and producing what is best
in you and your land (Tameez 2015, 454). 163
However, Pakistan replaced each British-era Deputy Commissioner with a Political Agent (PA)
of its own, to look after the affairs of each tribal agency (Naseer 2015). The PA was also
provided with unlimited administrative powers and enormous resources to ensure local tribal
support (Naseer 2015). Just like the British era, the system of tribal Maliks, who played a
major intermediary role between the individual tribes and the government through the PA,
was also maintained. These Maliks were also responsible to convince their tribes of any
policies or plans that the government wished to implement in the tribal areas. This special
administrative status for FATA finally crystallised in its current form in the constitution of
1973, which changed tribal areas status from ‘Special Areas’ to Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (Ali 2009). Before the 1973 constitution, FATA was known as CATA, or the Centrally
Administered Tribal Areas (Rahman, Mohmand and Wazir 2013).
6.2. Militancy and violence in Pakistan’s Pashtun Tribal Areas16
6.2.1. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations (1947 -1979)
Among some of the most important conditions of either peace or instability in the tribal
regions of the former-FATA is the relationship between Pakistan and its neighbour,
Afghanistan. This is because the tribal regions straddle both countries and are divided,
between these countries, by the Durand Line – a colonial legacy of the British. From the time of Pakistani independence, in 1947, to the end of the 1960s, Pakistan and Afghanistan
16 Due to the nature of the research topic, this section, without going in a detailed history of conflict in the tribal
areas, gives a brief historical overview of conflict starting from the Afghan Jihad against the Soviet Union in 1979.
Moreover, the section then deals with the role of the state, especially the military establishment, in the
escalation of conflict in the tribal areas.
164 maintained a “complex” relationship. Moreover, there still remained the issue of
Pashtunistan as Afghanistan opposed to Pakistan’s admission in the United Nations in 1947, arguing that any recognition of Pakistan’s border was conditional to resolving the issues of the Durand Line and Pashtunistan (Rubin and Siddique 2006). Moreover, both the Soviet
Union and India “politically” supported Afghanistan’s demands, where the Soviet Union wanted Afghanistan by its side and India wanted Pakistan to remain engaged on its Western border with Afghanistan (Rubin and Siddique 2006).
By the 1970s, however, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan had altered significantly.
One of the primary reasons for Afghanistan’s refusal was Durand Line’s temporary nature as it was demarcated initially for 100 years by the British Raj (Omrani 2009). Moreover, both the countries accused each other political interference through supporting and sheltering rebel and insurgent groups. Where Afghan President Daoud Khan, who came to power after overthrowing Zahir Shah in 1973, accused Pakistan of supporting Afghan Islamist insurgents,
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s government, on the other hand, accused Afghanistan of inciting violence in Pakistan’s NWFP (now KP) and Balochistan provinces – both bordering
Afghanistan (Wirsing 1991). Even though Bhutto was initially receptive to President Daoud and made friendly overtures, Daoud was “influenced” by Pashtun nationalist members of his own Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which resulted in him supporting the
Pashtunistan movements in Pakistan (Siddiqi 2008). Moreover, much of Pakistan’s “proxy war” policy, through the support of Afghan Islamists, in the 1970s was informed by the perception that Pashtun nationalist sentiment was used and exploited by successive Afghan governments to fuel the movement for Pashtunistan, therefore posing a threat to Pakistan’s stability (Malik 2016a)
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The Pashtunistan movement had its origins in the initial years of Pakistan’s independence.
The Durand line divided Pashtuns between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pashtun nationalist movements hoped to unite tribes on both sides of the line and create an Independent
Pashtunistan (Pashtun state) (Rubin and Siddique 2006). They were therefore hostile to the
creation of the new state of Pakistan, in 1947, which incorporated the Pashtuns on the
Pakistan side of the Durand line into the new Pakistani state (Malik 2016a).
After independence, Pashtun nationalist political parties started supporting the cause of
greater ‘Pashtunistan’ - a separate state for Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line (Rubin
2002). As explained above, this cause was also actively supported by various Afghan
governments, and this produced hostility among Pakistan’s ruling authorities, who perceived
such support as promoting ethnic divisions in Pakistan.
For our purposes, what is significant is how the Durand Line, Pashtunistan, and the tensions
arising between Pakistan and Afghanistan as a result of these factors, are all a legacy of
colonialism. The Durand Line was a demarcation line imposed by the British. As explained
above, it was only meant to be temporary. And yet it is this line which has, in part, been one
of the factors fuelling the politics of Pashtunistan, as well as tensions between Afghanistan
and Pakistan concerning their border disputes.
During the Bhutto government (1972-1977), a heavy-handed approach was used against
Pashtun nationalists in NWFP, FATA, and Balochistan (Rubin and Siddique 2006, 8). Moreover,
in order to extend the Pakistani authority in the tribal area, Bhutto did not only introduce
“some” development programmes for the tribal areas but also strengthened the “colonial
system” of FCR in the 1973 constitution (Rubin and Siddique 2006). Moreover, in his tit for tat
policy against Afghan support for Baloch rebels, Bhutto government sheltered and armed
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Islamists and rebel leaders, namely Ahmad Shah Massoud, Burhanuddin Rabbani and
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, which in turn, put pressure on the government in Kabul (Siddiqi 2008).
6.2.2. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations (1979-1989)
Despite the tensions - identified above - that arose between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the
1970s, relations between the two countries somewhat began to improve in the late 1970s.
This was because both the countries, through active official engagement, had agreed that
proxy wars were neither doing good to the countries nor the region on the whole and
therefore an agreement on the Durand Line was of utmost importance for greater stability of
both the countries (Siddiqi 2008). These improved relations between Pakistan and
Afghanistan continued even after the overthrow of Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Bhutto
by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, commonly known as General Zia, in 1977, although
momentarily.
A dramatic change in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations occurred in April 1978 when the People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) engaged in a communist coup, taking power from
and killing the Afghan President, Mohammad Daoud Khan (Wirsing 1991). General Zia sought
to establish good relations with the new Afghan communist regime but was not successful
(Siddiqi 2008). He then shifted his position, in relation to the new Afghan regime, and began
to support the guerrilla camps in tribal areas that had arisen as a base for the armed
Mujahedeen resistance against the PDPA (Wirsing 1991, 33).
The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan radically shifted once again when, in
December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The Soviet authorities justified the invasion on the grounds of the Brezhnev Doctrine (Reisman 1988). The Brezhnev doctrine was
167 first articulated by the Soviet Union in 1968 to justify the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in that year (Reisman 1988). The doctrine declared that the Soviet Union was entitled to intervene in the affairs of other Communist countries in order to strengthen and maintain communism within those countries. It was the opposition to the new Afghan communist regime and in particular the armed attacks on that regime by Mujahedeen groups, which provided the pretext for the Soviet Union to apply the Brezhnev Doctrine to Afghanistan and justify the invasion (Cogan 1993).
The Mujahedeen who had organized, initially, to engage in armed resistance to the Afghan communist regime, now also directed that resistance to the Soviet Union’s forces in
Afghanistan. These Mujahedeen were supported not only by the Pakistani government of
General Zia but also ultimately by the Saudi and United States governments. Pakistan had already formed an informal alliance with the U.S., between 1959 and 1970, against the Soviet
Union by providing a military base in Peshawar to the CIA, which was used for radio transmission interception from the Soviet Union (Khan 2018d). Money, arms and training were provided to the Mujahedeen by the Pakistani, Saudi and American governments, along with the Pakistani military, and the clandestine security forces of both Pakistan and the United
States. It was the Mujahedeen who therefore were the primary agents engaged in a proxy war with the Soviet Union, in Afghanistan, from 1979 to 1989, backed by Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia and the United States.
The military establishment’s historical role in causing conflict and violence in the Pashtun tribal areas was also evident during this time, especially between 1981 and 1983, when
General Zia, through forced displacements and settling of Afghan Sunni refugees, tried converting the Shia majority of Kurram Agency into a minority (Taj 2017, 16). This was because
168 the Shias of Kurram were strongly opposed to the Afghan Jihad, especially because it was funded by Sunni Saudi Arabia. These demographic manipulations by the military and the intelligence agencies also saw the first major Shia-Sunni incidents of violence exacerbated by
Sunni Afghan refugees (Taj 2017, 16). This division in the tribal society and limited checks by the security forces during that conflict also laid foundations for further sectarian conflicts in the coming years.
It was, therefore, these significant changes in the region that impacted profoundly on the tribal regions in the former-FATA in the period 1979 to 1989 and beyond. The fact that the former-FATA bordered Afghanistan, and was relatively inaccessible and inhospitable terrain, rendered it a favourable location for the establishment of training camps for Mujahedeen fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. General Zia condoned these developments, and Saudi and
American funding, and Pakistani and American training of the Mujahedeen groups made the
“Jihad” against the Soviet Union and the presence of communism within Afghanistan, a military reality.
Yet these significant developments within the former-FATA also had a profound impact on traditional Pashtun tribal society. The immense influx of Mujahedeen fighters placed strains on traditional tribal structures and the traditional authority relations that these sought to uphold. One reason was that agents other than the tribal elders were now exercising influence in the area, backed by money and military resources.
Another profound impact on the tribal areas was the increasing influence of strains of radical
Islam. The Saudi authorities seeking to galvanize the Mujahedeen against the Soviets sought to instil this Wahhabi variant of Islam in the Mujahedeen, but also more widely in Pakistan, funding religious schools or seminaries to teach the young in this radical interpretation of
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Islam. Indeed, the Pakistan Army, under General Zia, and its intelligence agency – the ISI – helped facilitate these seminaries – known as madrassas - in FATA, with the funding once again coming from Saudi Arabia (Weinbaum and Harder 2008).
General Zia, and the Pakistani authorities, assisted this proliferation of radical Islam within the tribal areas because they believed that it would counter or displace the threat of Pashtun nationalism, centred on the separatist demand for a “Greater Pashtunistan”, which the
Pakistani authorities believed was being supported by Afghanistan (Zahab 2016, 123). Such nationalist aspirations were not a central part of the religious and political perspective inculcated by those advocating a radical interpretation of Islam within the tribal regions.
The result was that this proliferation of this type of Islam led, in the view of some, to the
“radicalisation” of a whole generation of Pashtuns within the tribal regions (Zahab 2016).
Further, this new religious dynamic within the tribal regions also undermined traditional tribal authority structures, with traditional sources of tribal authority, such as the Maliks, being displaced by local Mullahs (clerics) who, backed by Saudi money and the Pakistani intelligence agency (ISI), enabled a Jihadist narrative for war in Afghanistan to be spread throughout the tribal regions, galvanizing the Mujahedeen (Zahab 2016). The eleven year period in which
General Zia presided over such developments introduced a culture of “guns” into the tribal regions (Ali 2009).
6.2.3. Osama Bin Laden and the Mujahedeen
It was during this period, from 1979 to 1989, when the Pakistani, Saudi and United States authorities were funding and training Mujahedeen groups in the tribal regions to engage in an insurgency against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, that Osama bin Laden first came to
170 prominence. Bin Laden was influential in setting up training camps and establishing financial networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s FATA for the Afghan Jihad (Rana 2010b). Bin Laden himself was a Saudi, a younger son in a wealthy Saudi family. He used his Saudi networks to establish funding for the Jihadi groups of Mujahedeen to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan.
Bin Laden was joined in this work by Abdullah Yusuf Azzam (Rana 2010b). Azzam was a
Palestinian Sunni Islamic scholar teaching at the Islamic International University in Islamabad
(Rana 2010b). He used his networks and sermons in different countries, coupled with literature published in Peshawar, to spread his message of Jihad against the Soviets (Rana
2010b, 15). Azzam was also regarded as one of the major influences on Osama bin Laden during their working relationship seeking to establish the Afghan Jihad (Wells 2016, 43).
Osama and Azzam’s mission was also supported by Jalaluddin Haqqani – an influential Afghan cleric (Rana 2010b).
Besides these individuals, the former-FATA region, after 1979, witnessed the presence of numerous Islamic charity organizations, some of whom had connections to Jihad operations directed at the Soviets in Afghanistan (Rana 2010b). Due to the efforts from Islamic charities working in FATA, the area of Waziristan became a second home to a number of Arab
Mujahedeen, training and fighting in Afghanistan, who had nurtured some ties and relationships with local tribes (Rana 2010b). By 1980, the South Waziristan Agency was concentrated with Pakistani and foreign military and intelligence trainers, not only training tribal youth but also providing arms and supplies to Jihadi groups (Bronson 2008, 170). In this way, the tribal areas provided, in many cases, a “hospitable location” for the Mujahedeen, because many of the local tribespeople perceived the Mujahedeen as “Holy Warriors” fighting for Islam (Rana 2010b).
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Such was the impact of Arab-funded Islamic charities that by the year 2000, there were still
up to thirty-five Islamic foreign-funded charities working in Pakistan (Rana 2010b, 25). It was these charities that, along with the funding of religious schools, provided one of the primary means for Saudi authorities to spread its brand of Wahhabi Islam in both Afghanistan and
Pakistan (Tomsen 2013, 310).
Moreover, during this spread of Wahhabism, the social strata and structures of the Pashtun tribal society were also changing and mutating. The FCR Jirgas of FATA convened under the
auspices of the Political Agent (PA), were now being attended by radical religious leaders
(“Mullahs”) under the guardianship of the PA (Taj 2011). This move by the PA to incorporate
religious leaders, in addition to tribal elders, within the Jirgas, reflected the strategy of the
Pakistani military establishment to encourage religious radicalism in the tribal areas. The
Pakistani state recognized that religious radicalism galvanized Mujahedeen behind the idea
of Jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and so raised morale among the militants (Siddiqi
2008).
6.2.4. Militancy in FATA post-Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (1989-2001)
The Soviets began withdrawing troops from Afghanistan in May 1988 and completed their
withdrawal by February 1989 (Reuveny and Prakash 1999). The Soviet presence in
Afghanistan had enabled the communist regime in Afghanistan, led by the People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), to maintain and retain power in the region in the
face of the insurgency led by numerous rebel groups, including the Jihadi forces operating
from the FATA region (Rubin 1989). However, the Soviet withdrawal led to a power vacuum in which the PDPA government was unable to hold on to power and the capital of Kabul fell to rebel forces three weeks after the Soviets left.
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The post-PDPA situation in Afghanistan was chaotic with different rebel groups eventually fighting against each other for control over territory, resources and the Afghan government.
Kabul itself became a warzone (Ahmed 2013a). The situation was not helped by the fact that different rebel factions were often led by different ethnic groups - Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks. Out of this chaos eventually emerged the Taliban, a large group of former
Mujahedeen, who took control of Kabul and the Afghan government in 1996, continuing a civil war against other rebel groups, loosely united in what was known as the “Northern
Alliance”, thereafter (Ahmed 2013a, 202). The Taliban and previously other Islamists, such as
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, were also actively supported by Pakistan’s ISI and top military leadership, who were of the view that with “Islamists” being in power in Kabul would neutralise the threat of Pashtunistan (Schetter 2017). Moreover, the military’s top leadership was also of the view that Pakistan deserved to have an “Islamist government” in Kabul that was answerable to them as a “reward” for Pakistan’s decade-long fight in the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets (Haqqani 2010, 189).
Therefore, many Mujahedeen from the Pakistani side, who had returned to FATA, as they had no cause to fight for in Afghanistan, were encouraged by Pakistan to go back to Afghanistan to join the Taliban ranks and fight against the Northern Alliance after 1994 (Zahab 2016, 124).
This period also had further negative impacts on the social and cultural fabric of the Pashtun tribal areas in Pakistan. According to Raza Wazir, a young writer from Waziristan,
Our troubles began after the Taliban, led by Mullah Muhammad Omar, took over Kabul in
1996. Waziristan became the gateway for thousands of madrasa students who travelled to
Afghanistan to join the Taliban. Many young men from madrasas in our area signed up. When
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they returned home, they set out to replicate the oppressive, puritanical ways of the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan (Wazir 2018).
In terms of security, between 1989 and 2001, the FATA region witnessed a “relative calm”, with most Pakistani militant groups focusing their attention towards Indian Kashmir, especially after 1996 (Tankel 2016). With Taliban in power in Afghanistan after 1996,
Pakistan’s “Mujahedeen” or militant groups, fighting in Kashmir against the Indian forces used
Afghanistan for their training bases and fought alongside the Taliban against the Northern
Alliance (Tankel 2016). By establishing “Kashmir Jihad” militant bases in Taliban-led
Afghanistan, the Pakistani military establishment aimed to avoid sanctions from the U.S. for being a “state sponsor of terrorism” (Tariq, Malik and Afridi 2018, 104). These Pakistani militant groups fighting in Kashmir, namely Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen (HuM) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), were “Punjabi” dominated in ethnicity and were also supported by the Pakistani military (Tankel 2016).
However, social and security dynamics for the FATA region took a major turn after the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. in 2001, which resulted in the U.S. Invasion of Afghanistan and forcing many militants to take shelter in the FATA region.
6.2.5. Militancy in FATA Region (2001-present)
It was the events of September 11, 2001, involving a two-plane attack on the Twin Towers in
New York City, and the Bush Administration’s War on Terror which followed, which, like the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, constituted a profound shift in the dynamics of militancy in the former-FATA region. The Bush Administration identified the Al Qaeda network, led by Osama Bin Laden, as responsible for the September 11 attacks, and
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demanded that the Taliban government of Afghanistan, hosting Bin Laden, hand him over to
U.S. authorities (Ahmed 2013a, 22). When the Taliban regime refused, the U.S. invaded and removed the Taliban from power. The U.S. occupied the region and eventually arranged for a transition of formal government authority to Hamid Karzai, though the U.S. and its allies maintained a strong military presence in the country for nearly 18 years (Runion 2007). This presence continues to this day, though not at the levels witnessed in the years immediately following the 2001 invasion. This is because the U.S. and its allies have continued to confront resistance from Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, and more recently the Islamic State (IS), throughout its occupation of Afghanistan, from 2001 to the present.
Pakistan’s entering in an alliance on the War on Terror with the U.S., just like the anti-Soviet
Jihad, coincided with a military dictator in power in Pakistan. Interestingly, where General Zia used his “pro-Islamic” credentials and support from religious groups as a strength to form an alliance with the U.S., General Musharraf, on the other hand, used “Islamism” as a “scare tactic” to get US support for his military regime after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001
(Shah 2002). Musharraf assured the U.S. that he would keep the “mullahs” away from power, and therefore argued that to keep a nuclear-armed Pakistan “stable”, he needed USA’s unconditional support (Shah 2002, 70). However, Musharraf later also justified his decision of siding with the U.S. arguing that if he had refused to accept US demands in 2001 – in form of withdrawing support for the Taliban and providing access to Pakistan’s defence and security facilities – the U.S. would have formed an alliance with Pakistan’s arch-rival India (Tankel
2018).
This argument also explained the military’s “Praetorian Syndrome”, previously discussed in
Chapter 5 above, where the military establishment sees India as the only major threat to
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Pakistan’s security and therefore this perception also informs much of its security policies.
Hence, this “ideological shift” against the Taliban within the Pakistani army’s top leadership,
and forming an alliance with the U.S., was not because of a change in the military’s mindset
or approach, but because of Musharraf’s need to get USA’s support for his regime along with
the perceived threat from India.
However, even though Musharraf entered an alliance with the U.S., the Pakistani military, under Musharraf, since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan has also been accused of playing a
“double game”. This is because Musharraf is said to have provided active support and refuge to Taliban and Haqqani Network fighters, who were waging an insurgency against the coalition forces in Afghanistan (Tankel 2016, 53). Therefore, it is argued that Musharraf, during this time, was taking the U.S. “for a ride” by both pretending to be on the U.S. side and tacitly supporting the Taliban as well (Rashid 2007).
Musharraf and the Pakistani military’s support for these groups, as discussed above, was also
stemmed from the growing influence of India in Afghanistan. This is because Pakistan has
accused India using the Afghan territory for militant attacks in Pakistan (Khan 2015d). The
view among the Pakistani military establishment is that a pro-India government in Kabul
would result in the Pakistani military engaged on both the Western (Afghanistan) and Eastern
(Indian) border, whereas a pro-Pakistan regime (such as Taliban) would take the energy and
focus away from the western border (Johnson and Mason 2008a). Such a threat perception
has, therefore, informed much of Pakistani military’s policy of tacitly supporting anti-US
militants in the tribal areas. This support has also resulted in complications towards peace
and conflict resolution in the former-FATA region, which will be discussed below in Chapters
7 and 8.
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Secondly, financial motivations, in the form of the U.S. aid for the Pakistani military, also played a major part in Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. in the war on terror (Jadoon 2017).
Musharraf, after forming an alliance with the U.S., succeeded in not only getting $600 million emergency cash transfer from the U.S. in 2001 but also received a $3 Billion aid package from
President George W Bush during their meeting Camp David in 2003 (Sales 2003). Moreover, between 2002 and 2012, out of the total $15.8 billion of US aid for Pakistan, around two- thirds of it was appropriated for security assistance (Epstein and Kronstadt 2013, 10).
Additionally, out of the total $33.4 Billion received by Pakistan between 2002 and 2018, the year when the aid was suspended by US President Trump, a total of $14.5 Billion went to the
Pakistani military alone (Hussain and Takar 2018). The U.S. government accused the Pakistani military of not using the funding “effectively” by sheltering the Haqqani network in the tribal areas. Moreover, the Pakistani officials also failed to account as to how and where the U.S. aid was spent (Hussain and Takar 2018).
However, with regards to militancy, due to this U.S. aid and alliance, “anti-Pakistan” militant groups, based in the former-FATA region, started attacking Pakistani civilian and military installations, citing Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S., along with accusing Pakistan of working on the “Western (US) agenda” (Brumfield 2014).
It is further argued that even though the aforementioned factors played a major role in an escalation of militancy in the region, locals in the tribal areas also argued that lack of effective governance and persistence of the colonial-era FCR also contributed towards militancy in the region (Rana 2017b; Khan 2014b). A study conducted in 2009, in the FATA region, found that one in five people in the tribal areas believed that “flawed” governance systems in FATA, in form of the FCR, have contributed towards growing militancy in the region (Rana 2017b, 39).
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Because of this vacuum, various militant groups also found an opportunity to not only provide financial incentives to some tribesmen and also hired the unemployed youth into their cadres, but their perceived “Holy Warrior” status also allowed some militants to establish local “tribal bonds” (Sial 2010; Stenersen 2011). The Arab militants from Al Qaeda, especially, during their initial influx into the tribal areas used their financial resources to court both the local militants as well as common tribespeople (Gul 2010). Imtiaz Gul, during his visit to Wana, South
Waziristan, in April 2004, met one such tribal elder who was allegedly hosting foreign militants
(Gul 2010). According to Gul, the tribal elder, even though refusing to admit that he was hosting any foreigners, was also upset that his region was hosting Uzbeks and not the Arabs.
This was because, he said, ‘Uzbeks are short of funds but Arabs have plenty of money and they are generous too’ (Gul 2010, 26). These local bonds initially created by the militants in the tribal areas also led to complications towards peace and conflict resolution strategies, especially peace deals, which are discussed below in Chapter 7.
These developments also resulted in the decline of the authority of the tribal elders, or Maliks, who were now replaced by hard-line local and transnational Islamists. In the colonial era, the
‘status-quo’ in the tribal areas involved the governments using their appointed Political
Agents (then Deputy Commissioners) to interact with the Maliks for political and developmental concerns for respective ‘tribal’ administrative units. Persisting with this colonial pattern, the governments in Pakistan did not only prefer dealing with the Maliks but also paid them a “monthly allowance” to keep them on their side (Yousaf, Rashid and Gul
2018). It was due to this “rent-seeking” behaviour that the locals viewed these Maliks as corrupt (Farooq, Mirahmedi and Ziad 2009). However, the beginning of the Afghan Jihad
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(1979-1989) in Afghanistan played a major role in the erosion of the ‘status quo’ and the
Maliks’ authority.
Akbar S. Ahmed argues that three pillars that kept the Pashtun tribal society intact were the
Political Agent, the Maliks and the Mullah (Ahmed 2013a, 49-51). The Mullahs were clerics based either in the local mosque or madrassah (religious school). Historically, when it came to sensitive issues such as education and war, the Maliks exercised their tribal leadership authority to challenge the clerics, in case the latter were against education or called for war
(Ahmed 2013a, 49-51). However, the Maliks’ ability to challenge the clerics changed with the
Afghan Jihad and Pakistan’s role in it between 1979 and 1989. The Pakistan state did not only finance these clerics to train the Mujahedeen but also armed them to fight in Afghanistan
(Ahmed 2013a, 66).
It was due to this arming and financing that the erosion of the Maliks’ authority had started declining after the conclusion of Afghan Jihad in 1989, where the mullahs, or clerics, had started gaining influence in the ‘tribal’ region (Ahmed 2013a, 66). Moreover, with the influx of militants and rise of ultra-right clerics, post-2001, and with the Pakistani military launching major offensives in 2004, the Maliks, after losing their influence, were actively replaced by religious leaders (Nawaz 2009a). It was because of this erosion of the Maliks’ influence in the tribal areas that also resulted in their failure of enforcing various peace deals signed between the militants and the military, discussed in detail below in Chapter 7.
(Farooq, Mirahmedi and Ziad 2009; Ahmed 2013a; Nawaz 2009a)However, it was not only these “local” factors that contributed towards militancy in the tribal areas. One by-product of
Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. was the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) Drone Strikes, which followed the militants into Pakistan’s tribal areas, with the first strike taking place in 2004.
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Therefore, it is also important to briefly discuss the role of these strikes in escalation - or
reduction - of militancy in the former FATA region.
6.2.6. US Drone Strikes in FATA
Since the first drone strike in 2004 on Pakistani territory, drones have remained a major
security challenge for Pakistan, raising issues of legality and Pakistan’s sovereignty (see, e.g.,
Ahmad 2013b; Yousaf and Ullah 2014; OHCHR 2013) and have been likened to British colonial attacks against the “tribal” Pashtuns (Tahir 2015).
The first US drone strike in FATA was linked to Pakistan’s first high profile peace deal
(discussed below in Chapter 7) with militant leader Nek Wazir in 2004. In March 2004, the
Pakistani army acted on suspicion of the presence of Al Qaeda leaders in FATA and launched
an operation in South Waziristan. However, after incurring heavy losses, the army signed
decided to sign a peace deal with Nek Muhammad Wazir – an Afghan Jihad fighter and local
tribal leader – in April 2004 (Khattak 2012). Seeing this as a deal with a “wanted terrorist”,
the CIA, through a Predator drone strike, targeted and killed Wazir after learning of his
interview with a foreign news outlet (Rohde and khan 2004). However, initially, the Pakistani
Army denied any US involvement in the killing of Wazir, claiming that he was killed by the
military for his attacks on the armed forces. These claims were contradicted by local witnesses
who claimed that Wazir had been taken out by a Predator strike (Rohde and khan 2004;
Mazzetti 2013).
Since Wazir’s killing, the CIA has conducted over 400 drone strikes in former-FATA killing more
than 70 influential Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders, with a majority of these strikes taking place
in North Waziristan, where both the Pakistani Taliban and the Haqqani network are based
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(New-America 2018; Bergen 2012). Moreover, the number of strikes during Obama’s
administration saw a sharp rise from 51 (during the Bush administration) to 373, witnessing
a 630% rise (Khan 2016e).
Tahir (2015) believes that these strikes in FATA, and portrayal of the region in the U.S. media as a “wild west”, has brought back the colonial past where a similar discourse was used to justify British army attacks in the tribal areas. Also, the U.S., by targeting the tribal areas, is also persisted with the colonial “sorting” of Pashtuns into “tribal/lawless” and
“urban/settled” Pashtuns (Tahir 2015, 7). Nicholas and Agius (2017, 122) also argue that most target sites of US drone strikes, including the tribal areas, are regions with colonial inheritance and therefore regarded as “unruly and barbaric”. Therefore, such strikes have also rewritten a new order of “colonial control from the skies” (Nicholas and Agius 2017, 122).
Media reports and Pakistan’s former President Musharraf’s admission of consenting to these strikes, and assuring the CIA of maintaining their secrecy, has also provided enough evidence of Pakistan’s collusion with the U.S. on these strikes (Boone and Beaumont 2013; Farooq
2017a; Tahir 2015). This apparent collusion with the U.S., again, explains the Pakistani military’s negative treatment of both the tribal areas as well as the “tribal” Pashtuns, allowing a foreign state to violate its sovereign space.
Even though the U.S. has argued that most of the target killed in these strikes were militants, there were no means to confirm the targets’ identity due to the secrecy of these operations.
Shahzad Akbar, a Pakistani lawyer representing drone victims, contradicts these figures compiled by drone databases as he believes most of the unknown victims of these strikes are civilians, wrongly labelled as “militants” (Benjamin 2012, 104).
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Even though surveys conducted with the people of FATA suggest that drones might not be on
top of the list when it comes to major issues (Shinwari 2012b; Shah 2016), Siddiqui (2013)
believes that much of the drone narrative was controlled by the Taliban in FATA when the
conflict was at its peak, making it difficult to gauge the real perception of drones. However,
opinions within the tribal areas are also polarised with some believing these strikes were
effective, whereas others thought that they only killed innocent civilians (Yousaf 2013, 2017b;
Gusterson 2019).
A psychiatrist from Peshawar has also gone on record arguing that his patients from the tribal
areas suffered perpetual fear and anxiety from drone strikes (Yousaf and Ullah 2014, 121). In
a similar context, Malik Ghulam, a tribal elder from North Waziristan, says that his children
cannot sleep at when they hear any buzzing sound that resembles that of a US drone (Farooq
2017a). On this fear and insecurity and criticising the U.S. Drone strikes, Agius (2017) argues:
For the liberal state, drones provide a sense of ontological security and cohere with liberal
values because they are deemed precise and ethical weapons that avoid collateral damage
and protect military personnel, without the costs of occupation. Yet drone strikes create deep
insecurity within postcolonial borderspaces, impacting communities already subject to
multiple forms and legacies of power and control (Agius 2017, 370).
Even though there have been conflicting arguments on drone casualties and civilian deaths,
Former U.S. President Obama, in a 2013 speech, admitted that the strikes had killed innocent
civilians, by saying ‘It is a hard fact that U.S. strikes have resulted in civilian casualties… these
deaths will haunt us’ (Gerges 2013). Statistics also show that it takes on average ‘three’ strikes
for every ‘one’ targeted militant, hence killing more innocent people than targeted militants
(Ackerman 2014). Zenko (2016) also criticises this approach of the U.S., understating the
182 casualty numbers, where targets who were unknown were designated as either “other militants” or “foreign fighters.”
On the other hand, even though Johnston and Sarbahi (2016) find little evidence of drones leading to easier militant recruitment, there have been instances where civilian deaths have resulted in the radicalisation of individuals. Pine (2016, i), in his study, confirms that drone strikes have resulted in easier recruitment for the TTP.
One example of such recruitment was of Faisal Shahzad who was arrested for the Times
Square Bombing in 2010. Shahzad claimed to have been motivated to commit the bombing because of the loss of lives of civilians in US Drone strikes (Adams and Nasir 2010). Anonymous militant recruiters have also made similar claims arguing that widespread drone coverage and loss of lives in such strikes makes it easier for militant organizations to recruit young fighters
(Adams and Nasir 2010). In this regard, Begum Jan, an educationalist from South Waziristan, in an interview, said that drone strikes were not only ineffective as a counter-terrorism tool for the tribal areas but have also resulted in easier recruitment for the militant groups as a result (Braithwaite and D’costa 2018).
In conclusion, Aslam (2014) and Benjamin (2012) argue, the U.S. drone policy and claims of success are flawed in a way that civilians have died and militant groups have easily relocated to other tribal and settled areas to avoid drone strikes. Moreover, even though the number of strikes has drastically declined in recent years, the fact that drones have resulted in the killing of innocent civilians (TBIJ 2017) and negatively affected the way of life of people living in FATA (Friedersdorf 2012) make them a major challenge for Pakistan in its peace and conflict resolution efforts in the tribal areas.
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6.3. Militant Groups in FATA
While discussing the situation of conflict in the Pashtun tribal areas, it is also important to
discuss various militant groups that have operated in the tribal areas since 2001. It is because
dynamics and operations of these groups explain the seriousness of both the conflict as well as the Pakistani army’s strategies to these counter these groups (discussed below in Chapter
7) in the tribal areas. Moreover, due to the nature and scope of this research, this section only deals with the groups that have, or had, operated in the former-FATA region after 2001, and
therefore excluding ethnic and sectarian groups from other regions and provinces in the
country.
The two major categories of these militant groups in the former-FATA region include the 1-
transnational groups and 2- the Pakistani Taliban. Further sub-groups in these two broad
groups are discussed below.
6.3.1. Transnational Groups
6.3.1.1. Haqqani Network
The Afghan Taliban are allegedly represented by two groups in Pakistan; namely the Taliban
Quetta Shura, under the leadership of now-deceased Mullah Omar, and the Haqqani
Network. Where Pakistan has categorically denied the presence of the Taliban Shura in
Quetta, the presence of Haqqani Network in the tribal areas has remained a reality (Shah
2017). The network – designated as a terrorist group in 2012 by the U.S. – also remains a major threat to the U.S./NATO and Afghan forces, as it has been regularly involved in various cross border attacks since 2001 (Stewart and Quinn 2012).
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Founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani – a Pashtun tribesman from Afghanistan – in the early 1970s
against President Daoud of Afghanistan, the group soon became involved in the Jihadist
movement against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan receiving support from Pakistan, the U.S.
and Saudi Arabia (Stanford-University 2017b). It was Jalaluddin Haqqani who established the
famous Manma ul Ulum Madrassa and mosque complex in North Waziristan during the
Afghan Jihad in 1980, which was actively used to train Jihadists for Afghanistan (Dressler
2010).
Soon after the U.S.-coalition invasion and overthrowing of the regime, Jalaluddin Haqqani and
his Haqqani network moved to North Waziristan Agency and established their headquarters
in the tribal agency (Steinberg 2008). The network, in alliance with the local militants and Al
Qaeda, ran Jihadist training camps and orchestrated various attacks on the U.S. and Afghan
forces in Afghanistan. Because of them providing financial incentives to some local tribes, the
network also initially found support in Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal areas (Peters 2012).
As of present situation, both the U.S. and Afghan governments still claim that the network
has operational bases in Pakistan, especially in the tribal areas, whereas Pakistan claims that
the group has been driven out of the country and has no presence in Pakistan (Iqbal 2017a).
Even though an Afghan-based group, the Haqqani network’s some foreign soldiers also
include Pakistanis, especially from the tribal areas including Wazirs, Dawars, and Mehsuds
(Dressler 2010, 14), indicating a local tribal nexus.
In terms of its current status, it is still unclear whether the group gets indirect support from
Pakistan’s military establishment. Afghan media sources in October 2017, reported that after increasing US pressure on Pakistan to act against the group, relations between the Pakistani military establishment and the Haqqani network have started to strain (Siddique 2017).
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On the other hand, US President Trump’s administration, in 2017, handed over a list of 20
militant groups involved in domestic and regional terrorism operating from Pakistan, with the
Haqqani network on top, asking Islamabad to act against the groups (Iqbal 2017b). Pakistan,
though, categorically denied these claims. Pakistan’s denial has been weakened by
statements coming from former military and intelligence officials. For example Lt. Gen. (Retd.)
Asad Durrani – former chief of Pakistan’s intelligence agency – in a recent interview argued that if the (Afghan) Taliban were not against Pakistan, they should not be asked to leave the
FATA region, therefore raising question marks over the army’s operations in FATA (RT 2017).
6.3.1.2. Al Qaeda and its affiliates
Similar to the Haqqani network and other groups, the Al Qaeda also moved to Pakistan’s
ungoverned tribal areas after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 (Gunaratna and Nielsen
2008). Even though such an influx of militants was expected after the U.S. invasion, no prior
controls were put in place on the Afghanistan border, thus making it easy for Al Qaeda and
its top leadership to flee into former-FATA and establish a base (Katawazai 2016). It is also believed that at some point, Al Qaeda’s founder Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman Al
Zawahiri, were based in Pakistan’s tribal areas for a short time, highlighting the importance of the region for the group (Nawaz 2009a).
Al Qaeda’s presence in former-FATA, after the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, was initially limited to Bajaur, Mohmand, North and South Waziristan Agencies (Shahzad
2011). In its initial years, the group mostly flourished due to its close connections with local and other transnational militant groups such as the Haqqani Network, Tehrik e Taliban
Pakistan (TTP), and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
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The Al Qaeda, according to both US intelligence and Pakistani military sources, has lost its major relevance in the region, especially in the tribal areas, with the killing and capture of its prominent leaders such as Osama bin Laden, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Mohammad Atef, and Ilyas Kashmiri (McNally and Weinbaum 2016, 1). However, it is also claimed that the organization is regrouping with renewed contacts and coordination with the Taliban in
Afghanistan and Pakistan (McNally and Weinbaum 2016). Even though the Pakistani military’s media wing recently announced that the area has been cleared of any Al Qaeda presence, it is argued that the group still has “some” traces in the tribal areas (Saifullah, Sayed and Shams
2017).
6.3.1.3. ISIS/IS/Da’esh
Initially described as a non-entity in Pakistan, ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), also known as IS (Islamic State) or Da’esh, has conducted some attacks in Pakistan. First signs of ISIS in
Pakistan were observed in September 2014, when ISIS literature was distributed in parts of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and tribal areas (Dawn 2014). However, the government and the
Pakistan Army had always maintained that the group had no organised presence in the country (Pakistan-Today 2017). The group, however, has not only been involved in militant attacks but also in recruiting activities in refugee camps (Khan 2016a). In a major attack On
17 February 2017, the group attacked a Sufi shrine in the Sindh province, killing 90 people, with the attack being the highest profile attack carried out by the group (Al-Jazeera 2017a).
The group is active in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, presenting a new security threat to both countries. The group has still faced issues in establishing itself as a major terror group in the tribal areas due to its internationalist appeal and weak local support base (Hastings and Naz
2017). However, some educated youth have remained susceptible to the lure of the group as
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in April, the Pakistani army arrested a medicine student from Punjab who had joined ISIS and
was planning to detonate herself at a crowded church (Bhojani 2017).
Hastings and Naz (2017) however argue that with on and off activities and attacks in Pakistan, the group is still finding it hard to establish itself in terms of the organization due to an already
concentrated militant ecosystem in the region. However, even with these limitations, the
Pakistani military – after denying the group’s presence in FATA for years – launched a major
operation (Khyber 4) against ISIS in the Khyber Agency.
6.3.2. Pakistani Taliban
6.3.2.1. TTP
The Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is an alliance of various factions and is regarded as the
most deadly militant group in the country. Formed in December 2007, in South Waziristan,
by Baitullah Mehsud, the group aimed at unifying groups that were opposed to Pakistan’s role
in the War on Terror in Afghanistan (Stanford-University 2017c). After initial military
operations and drone strikes in former-FATA, the Pakistani Taliban decided to form an alliance
against both the state of Pakistan and the U.S.
Therefore, On December 14, 2007, some 40 senior leaders of the local militant groups,
headed by Baitullah Mehsud, gathered to announce the formation of the Tehrik e Taliban
Pakistan (TTP). Where Baitullah was selected as the head of the alliance, Hafiz Gul Bahadur
was made regional commander of North Waziristan, Maulvi Faqir the head of Bajaur, and
Maulvi Fazlullah the head of Swat chapter (Ghufran 2009). The group’s manifesto included
expelling the Pakistani forces from the tribal areas, along with imposing a strict interpretation
of the Sharia Law in the region and also the rest of the country (GCTC-Analyst 2017).
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By some estimates, the group had a fighting base of roughly 12000-35000 recruits in 2017
(GCTC-Analyst 2017). Recruitment of the group is mainly from the Mehsud tribe, but it has
also attracted members from the rival Wazir tribe. It is interesting because both Mehsuds and
Wazirs have historically remained rival tribes (Ahmed 2013a).
In terms of the group’s allegiance, soon after its formation, the group’s founder Baitullah
Mehsud pledged allegiance to the Afghan Taliban and its emir Mullah Omar (Zaidi 2008b).
Hence, the group has cooperated over the years with the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network to maintain control of tribal areas of Pakistan (Stanford-University 2017c). Moreover, the group was also influential in providing safe havens to various transnational groups and fighters, mainly Al Qaeda.
Baitullah Mehsud was ultimately killed by a US drone strike in August 2009 and was succeeded by Hakeemullah Mehsud (Yousaf 2017b). Hakimullah was regarded as one of the most deadly militant heads in Pakistan orchestrating a number of suicide attacks that resulted in scores of civilian deaths (Hussain 2012b). Before assuming the leadership of TTP, Hakeemullah was leading a group of Sunni militants fighting against Shias in Kurram agency (GCTC-Analyst
2017). Soon after taking over the TTP, his activities spread all over the tribal areas, especially the Orakzai Agency. Hakeemullah’s reign as the TTP’s head saw one of the deadliest times in terms of terror attacks and casualties, with more than 11,000 people losing their lives between 2010 and 2012 (SATP 2017b, a).
In the second half of 2013, it was reported that Hakeemullah was willing to engage in peace talks with the Pakistani authorities but a US drone targeted and killed him in November that year (Yousaf 2017b). Interestingly, even though regarded as Pakistan’s enemy number one,
Pakistan protested Hakeemullah’s death in the drone strike (Edwards 2013). Soon after
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Hakeemullah’s death, there was a momentary crisis over the leadership of the TTP, as historically a Mehsud tribesman had held the position. However, there was a change in trend when a non-Mehsud, in the form of Maulana Fazlullah, was chosen as the new head of the group.
Known as the “Radio Mullah” for running an underground radio station for preaching his ultra- right brand of Islam, Fazlullah was not only opposed to democratic forms of government but also openly opposed education for girls and polio vaccinations, and was therefore responsible for destroying more than 200 schools in the valley (Qazi 2015). It was Fazlullah’s men who attacked the now Nobel Peace Prize winner Malala Yousafzai in 2012 (Qazi 2015).
In 2009, after a successful military operation by the Pakistani army, Fazlullah and his men left the valley and moved to Afghanistan’s Nuristan province. A week after Hakeemullah’s death, the Pakistani Taliban chose Fazlullah as their new emir (Roggio 2013). Based in, and operating from, Afghanistan, Fazlullah was successful in maintaining control over the TTP, orchestrating on and off attacks. However, in June 2018, Fazlullah was killed in a U.S. drone strike in
Afghanistan’s province of Kunar (Branigin and Salahuddin 2018).
6.3.2.2. Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group
The Nazir group was formed by Maulvi Nazir, an influential Taliban commander, having ties
with the TTP, Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. Belonging to the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe, Nazir
was a dual national of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, primarily based in South Waziristan and
was the second most influential leader in the tribal areas after Baitullah Mehsud (Harnisch
2009). Nazir was born in the Bermal region of Afghanistan, five and a half miles from the
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Pakistani border, which is why he never regarded the Durand Line as an official border
(Harnisch 2009).
After receiving his formal religious education at a Madrassa in South Waziristan, Nazir went
to Afghanistan around 1995, fighting alongside Mullah Omar’s Taliban (Harnisch 2009). Nazir
moved to South Waziristan after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, forcing him to take up arms against the Pakistani army. In 2004, he was captured and later released by the military after a peace deal was signed between the army and Nek Muhammad Wazir – a local and influential Taliban commander (Zia-ur-Rehman 2013). In terms of his allegiance, Nazir
was regarded as an anti-US and pro-Pakistan militant, who had committed to not attack the
Pakistani military (Zia-ur-Rehman 2013).
The Pakistani army allegedly “supported” Nazir mainly due to his anti-Uzbek militant stance and therefore helped him in flushing Central Asian militants out of the Wazir areas of South
Waziristan (Mehsud and Khan 2014). Therefore, Nazir along with Hafiz Gul Bahadur (discussed below) was regarded as the “Good Taliban”, unlike the TTP who were the “Bad Taliban”
(Mehsud and Khan 2014; Syed 2009).
It was also claimed by the Afghan intelligence agencies that Nazir used to train “Jihadists” in
FATA, in “an understanding with Pakistan’s ISI, sending them to Afghanistan” (CBS 2013).
Hence, due to this alleged affiliation with the Pakistani army, Nazir was often at odds with the
TTP and therefore came under attack from TTP commanders in late November 2012, leaving him injured (Webb 2013). Nazir was also once asked by the Pakistani army, in 2009, to “get on board” and fight against Baitullah Mehsud and the TTP, though Nazir, along with Hafiz Gul
Bahadur, only agreed to provide logistic support to the Pakistani army (Shah 2009b).
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On January 3, Nazir was killed when his house in South Waziristan was targeted by a US drone
strike, killing him and his deputy, Ratta Khan (Webb 2013). Since his death, his group, even
though keeping a low profile, has been active in South Waziristan and harassing pro-peace
activists, with little military action against them (Khattak 2017a; Khan 2018e).
Another group, coming under the auspices of “Good Taliban” is the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group,
formed by Taliban commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur (Mehsud and Khan 2014). Born in North
Waziristan, Bahadur is another Taliban commander who took his primary Islamic education
at a Deobandi madrassa in North Waziristan, after which he actively engaged in the Afghan
civil war between 1992 and 1996, and later becoming part of the Taliban regime (Szrom 2009).
In the post-2001 scenario, he rose to prominence when he directed his fight towards Pakistan
in 2005, during a military operation in North Waziristan (Sulaiman 2009). In June 2006,
Bahadur and the North Waziristan Taliban reached a peace deal with the Pakistani Army,
mediated by a tribal Jirga, agreeing not to attack the Pakistani forces (Sulaiman 2009). Hailing
from the Uthmanzai Wazir tribe of North Waziristan, Bahadur had always enjoyed some local tribal support in the agency, especially from the Wazirs, and therefore made it easy for him to establish his presence in the region (Sulaiman 2008).
Due to these links, Bahadur often served as a chief negotiator when it comes to peace talks
and ceasefires between rival Taliban groups and the Pakistani military (Szrom 2009). Even
though later becoming a part of the TTP alliance under Baitullah Mehsud in 2007, Bahadur mostly refrained from attacking the Pakistani forces due to his understanding and peace deals with the Pakistani army (Gul 2010). Therefore, just like the Maulvi Nazir group, the Gul
Bahadur group also focused mainly on Jihad in Afghanistan (in alliance with the Haqqani network), and not inside Pakistan; a position that played a major role in distancing him from
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the TTP (Siddique 2011; Mehsud and Khan 2014). Finally, even though the recent
whereabouts of Bahadur are unknown, reports of internal rifts in his group emerged in 2014,
when 8 out of 10 members of his Shura (council) went to Afghanistan to fight alongside the
Taliban (Mehsud and Khan 2014, 6).
6.3.2.3. Lashkar e Islam
Lashkar e Islam (Army of Islam) is a local militant group founded in former-FATA’s Khyber
Agency. The group was formed by a fundamentalist local cleric named Mufti Munir Shakir, in partnership with Haji Namdar, both from the Sunni Deobandi school of thought (Chandran
2006). The group was formed after Shakir’s supporters clashed with various militant groups, which forced Shakir to mobilise his supporters under the banner of Lashkar e Islam (Zaidi
2008a). The purpose of formation of this group was also to counter a rival Barelvi sect group,
Ansar ul Islam, led by Pir Saif ur Rehman (Rana 2017a). In his region, Shakir was also known
for spreading sectarian hatred and was forced out of the Kurram Agency by tribal elders for
his hate speech against sects other than his Deobandi sect (Zaidi 2008a). Shakir’s creation of
Lashkar e Islam was significant because the group was based in the Khyber Agency, hosting
the Khyber Pass, which was used for NATO supplies into Afghanistan and along with the
Afghanistan-Pakistan transit trade.
Soon after its creation, the group enforced a radical form of a parallel government in the tribal
Agency, forcing the locals to adhere to their brand of Sharia law. Where Shakir set up Sharia
courts, his militiamen were acting as “police” in the region (Zaidi 2008a). However, it was in
2007 after the group’s actions of shutting down schools and attacking military and NATO
consignments in Khyber that the Pakistani military decided to crack down on the group. The
crackdown resulted in the arrest of Shakir, soon after which his student and apprentice
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Mangal Bagh took over the control of the group (Zaidi 2008a). Bagh also continued on the pattern of his predecessor and established Sharia Courts and Militia Patrols. One of the major decisions that his courts took was sentencing two men and a woman to death on charges of adultery (Zaidi 2008a).
By 2008, Bagh was successful in establishing a parallel government structure in Khyber agency, with the Pakistani army or the PA having little control in the agency (Stanford-
University 2017a). What made Bagh interesting in terms of the local Taliban dynamics was, what some locals believed to be, the alleged “support” for him within some ranks of the
Pakistan army due to his anti-TTP stance (Zaidi 2008a, 7).
Even though the military claimed that Bagh was killed in subsequent military operations,
Lashkar e Islam refuted these claims stating that Bagh was alive and based in Tirah Valley in
Khyber (Stanford-University 2017a). In order to finally eliminate the group in Khyber,
Operations Khyber 1 and Khyber 2 were launched, with support from the Pakistan Air Force, forcing the group’s leadership to flee Khyber and move to Afghanistan. It was reported that
Bagh was killed in a US drone strike in Afghanistan in 2014, however, the reports could not be confirmed (Rana 2017a).
6.4. Conclusion
This chapter aimed at summarising the complexity of the current situation in the tribal areas, using both historical and contemporary accounts. In its first section, the chapter argued the complications in the Pashtun tribal areas were mainly as a result of the colonial legacies that
Pakistan inherited, which also played a role during the tribal belt’s accession to Pakistan. In its second section, the chapter created a brief narrative of conflict and instability in the tribal
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areas and how Pakistan’s postcolonial dynamics, including a strong military establishment,
played a role in making the former-FATA region a centre of conflict and Jihad. Moreover, there
was also a brief discussion of how the U.S. drones, in some way, also negatively affected the
situation of conflict in the tribal areas. In its final section, there was a brief discussion on
various militant groups that were formed in the region, with some groups still operating,
raising questions over peace and stability in the region. In discussing these three themes –
FATA, Militancy, and Militant Groups – the chapter aimed at connecting how with the persistence of a postcolonial administrative framework and narrative towards the “tribal”
Pashtuns played role in a governance vacuum and escalation of militancy.
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Chapter 7:
Military Operations and
Peace Deals in FATA
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7.0. Military Operations and Peace Deals in the Tribal Areas
The previous chapter discussed the rise of militancy in the former-FATA region. It looked at
specific periods in which such militancy arose, distinguishing in particular between the
prevalence of “jihadi” activity, among such groups, during the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan (1979-1989) and the same resort to the idea of “jihad” in the years following the
American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. This chapter focuses on military operations and
peace deals within the FATA region in response to such militancy. Such military operations have been launched by the Pakistani state and military. There have also been a long history of drone strikes, within the area, launched by the United States government, but as this thesis is primarily focused on the engagement of the Pakistani state and military with the Pashtun tribes within the tribal areas, drone strikes, and their impact, were briefly discussed in 6.2.6 above.
In its first section, the chapter briefly discusses various major military operations in the FATA region along with their effectiveness, or lack thereof. In this section, there is also a discussion of how these operations resulted in mass displacement of “tribal” Pashtuns and how it affected the socio-political situation in the tribal areas. In its second section, the chapter discusses various peace efforts, in form of peace deals, brokered by the Pakistani state, largely represented by the military, on the model of Pashtun Jirga. Such peace efforts often involved the Pakistani state and military eliciting the support of tribal elders to broker such deals. The section also analyses whether or not these peace initiatives succeeded in achieving temporary or lasting peace in the region. Using postcolonialism as an analytical lens, this chapter connects Pakistan’s lack of democratic progress leading to military’s influence and the colonial legacy of FCR in the former-FATA region to argue why the Pakistani military had a
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near-monopoly over peace and conflict resolution in the region. It was due to this near-
monopoly and lack of input from civilian government and the local population that ultimately
became a major ensuring long-term peace in the region.
7.1. Pakistani Military Operations in FATA (2002-2017)
Soon after the Taliban regime was overthrown in Afghanistan in December 2001, supporters
of both the Taliban regime and also members of Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda started moving
into Pakistan’s tribal areas in search for safe havens (Nawaz 2009a). This was in response to
the U.S. led military operations in Afghanistan, which, in key battles such as Tora Bora,
resulted in militants either escaping to mountainous or rural regions of Afghanistan or
entering the tribal regions and crossing the border into Pakistan (Gul 2010).
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, U.S. President, George W. Bush, had famously declared to other nation-states around the world, that if they were not “with” the Bush
Administration then they were “with” the terrorists (Goldenberg 2006). This placed immense pressure on other nation-states to declare their allegiances with respect to the U.S. led War on Terror. The Pakistani government of General Pervez Musharraf had formally committed itself to the Bush Administration in the wake of the September 11 attacks, agreeing to be part of the U.S. led War on Terror. Consequently, the Bush Administration expected the Pakistani government to respond to this renewed presence of militants within its borders.
The initial response of the Pakistani government to the influx of militants was not to engage in a military expedition in the tribal areas due to an “agreement” with the tribes in 1947 after
Pakistan’s independence that the tribal areas would not have any military deployment from the state. However, after increased pressure from the Bush Administration and the militant
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attacks on the Pakistani army, the military engaged in more proactive measures in response
to the presence of militants in the tribal areas and launched a number of major and minor
military operations.
7.1.1. Military Actions
One of the first military “major” actions in expanded efforts by the Pakistani state and military to engage with militants in the tribal regions was to “deploy” military forces in the Khyber
Agency, North Waziristan Agency and Mohmand Agency in July 2003 (Kilcullen 2009b, 238).
The purpose of this deployment was to stop the influx of Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters from
Afghanistan along with apprehending foreign fighters in the region. These deployments came
after the U.S. pressures on the Musharraf regime, as there was an increase in cross border attacks on the coalition forces in Afghanistan from FATA (Yusufzai 2004).
The decision of the Pakistani state and military to deploy military forces in the tribal regions was unprecedented. This was the first time in Pakistan’s history where security forces had been formally “deployed” in the tribal areas. Initially, such actions by the Pakistani state and military elicited a strong reaction from tribal elders (Hasnat 2011, 155). This was because the tribal elders argued that during the time of independence, they were promised there would be formal military deployment in the FATA region. Moreover, initial deployment of the
Frontier Corps (FC) – a “peacetime” paramilitary force of the Pakistan army – also provided some complications as the local personnel of the FC were not only untrained to fight this asymmetric war but were also unwilling to fight their “tribespeople” (Nawaz 2009b).
In order to placate tribal elders, who were hostile to the intrusion of the Pakistani military into the tribal areas, the Pakistani state negotiated with the tribes to ensure their agreement
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to the presence of these forces (Yusufzai 2004). Part of the agreement brokered with the tribes included the promise of increased state funding for the tribal regions and specific development and infrastructure projects to be provided by the state for the region (Yusufzai
2004). However although military operations within the tribal regions have intensified with
each passing year, most of this increased state funding and infrastructure projects have not
been delivered (Epstein and Kronstadt 2013).
The first military operation launched in the tribal areas was on June 22, 2002, near Azam
Warsak, South Waziristan, when Al Qaeda hideouts were attacked by the Pakistani military
(Haider 2014). As a result of this operation, 11 Uzbek and Chechen militants along with six
army soldiers were killed (Haider 2014). Some believe that efforts by the military were
hindered because of sympathy among some of the local tribespeople for the militants (Haider
2014). The tribespeople referred to such militants as “Mujahedeen”. However, the militants
after 2001 had a very different role in the tribal regions. Far from using the tribal regions as a
base for actions in Afghanistan against the (now departed) Soviets, they were using them as
a base for actions against the newly occupying Americans, and later for actions against
Pakistan.
Further, the support of some of the tribespeople for the militants also reflected the
tribespeople’s perception of inconsistency on the part of the Pakistani state and military (Gul
2010). The tribespeople recognized that during the era of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan,
the Pakistani state and military had been openly supportive of the militants in the tribal
regions. Now they were launching military operations against them. It is for this reason that
they might have perceived the Pakistani military’s actions against the militants in the tribal
regions after 2001 as an “inconsistent” or “contradictory” policy relative to their support for
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them during the era of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979-1989. Tom Hussain
summarizes this “inconsistency and “confusion”, in relation to how Pakistan characterised
Pashtuns during the 1979 Jihad and 2001 US War on Terror, says that ‘within a single lifetime,
the tribesmen of FATA have been portrayed first as brave warriors resisting the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan and subsequently as minions of al-Qaeda’ (Hussain 2016b).
Due to such “inconsistencies” and “sporadic” military policies (Khalid and Roy 2016), initially
resulting in failure towards peace and conflict resolution, the following “major” operations were either carried out or still in progress, in the former-FATA region:
7.1.1.1. Operation Al Mizan (Justice)
Started in 2002 and ending in 2006, the operation, under President General Musharraf, saw
the deployment of around 80,000 soldiers in the FATA region (Fair and Jones 2009). In late
2003, the military, using the FCR’s collective punishment clause, arrested influential Wazir
elders in South Waziristan and imposed various embargoes (Meyerle 2012, 20). The pressure
from the military forced the tribes to form Lashkars against the Taliban and Al Qaeda and
provide some results, however, the military did not fully back the tribes and instead pursued
its own course of action with further military operations and half-baked peace deals (Fair and
Jones 2009, 168-169).
7.1.1.2. Operation Zalzala (Earthquake)
This operation was launched in South Waziristan Agency in January 2008 against Baitullah
Mehsud and his supporters (Khan 2009). The operation came after Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan
(TTP), under Baitullah Mehsud, captured the Sararogha Fort in South Waziristan, killing a
number of security forces personnel. Interestingly, the aim of the operation was not to target
201 those militants who were involved in Indian-Kashmir or Afghanistan, but only the TTP and
Baitullah Mehsud (Khan 2012b, 133). Around 200,000 locals were estimated to have been displaced, though it cleared most of South Waziristan and security forces destroyed over
4,000 houses (Fair and Jones 2009). In May 2008, the military had cleared South Waziristan of TTP, claimed victory, and averted attacks for the “short term” only as militancy continued in the region and other parts later (Fair and Jones 2009).
7.1.1.3. Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem (Righteous Path)
This operation was started in June 2008 to tackle the Lashkar e Islam (LeI) from the Bara region in Khyber Agency (Hussain 2011c). The operation also included a number of sub- operations codenamed Daraghlam (Here I come), Biya Daraghlam (Here I come again) and
Khawakh Ba desham (I’ll teach you a lesson). Even with claims by the military of pushing the
LeI to the Tirah Valley, the region remained insecure along with negatively impacting the local businesses (Hussain, 2011). Due to Khyber Agency’s proximity with Orakzai and Kurram, along with it sharing a border with Afghanistan, it became easier for the militants to flee the Khyber momentarily after all these operations (Hussain 2014).
7.1.1.4. Operation Sher Dil (Lion Heart)
In 2008, the military moved its operations to the Mohmand and Bajaur Agency launching
Operation Sher Dil in September, aimed at targeting all militant groups present in the region.
The operation formally started when local militants attacked a military convoy in the Loe Sam area of Bajaur Agency (Fair and Jones 2009, 175). The operation was also intended to reclaim the Bajaur Agency from Taliban and Al Qaeda militants, initially targeting the border crossing in the town of Loe Sam, but later the scope of the operation was expanded to the whole
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Agency. Even though the military called the operation a success, killing over 1000 militants
and losing over 60 soldiers, on and off militant attacks were still originating from the area
(Fair and Jones 2009).
7.1.1.5. Operation Rah-e-Nijat (Path of Salvation)
On October 17, 2009, the Pakistan army - coming under pressure from the U.S. as well as because of growing domestic insecurity - launched a major operation in South Waziristan against the then TTP, deploying over 30,000 troops (Khattak 2011; BBC 2009). Due to the intensity of the operation, most of the militants moved to Orakzai Agency, the former base of
Hakimullah Mehsud, and therefore, the military announced the operation was a success by the end of the year, marking an end to the first phase of the operation (Jan 2010b). Even though the army was successful in reinstating somewhat the writ of the state in South
Waziristan, militancy, as a consequence, escalated in other tribal agencies (Jan 2010b).
7.1.1.6. Operation Brekhna (Lightning)
In late 2009, the Pakistani military had been engaged in a campaign to clear criminals and
militants from the Mohmand Agency (Abbasi 2014). The operation came as a result of militant
groups taking over the administration of the Agency, enforcing Sharia along with a ban on
shaving beards and music (Khan 2012a). In September that year, the military claimed to have
cleared 80 per cent of the Agency of militants, however low-intensity conflict still continued
onwards (Ali 2010b).
7.1.1.7. Operation Koh-e-Sufaid (White Mountain)
The operation, launched roughly between July 2 and 4, 2011 was intended to target the TTP
militants in the Kurram Agency (Khalid and Roy 2016; Express-Tribune 2011b). Kurram
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Agency’s importance was related to the fact that not only is it based between North
Waziristan and Khyber, but also provided the shortest route between Pakistan and
Afghanistan’s capital Kabul (Jan and Worby 2011). The military’s operation contingent
consisted of 4000 soldiers, heavy artillery and air support (Jan and Worby 2011). On August
11, 2011, the then chief of the Army General Ashfaq Kayani visited the Kurram Agency to mark
the end of the operation, which the army claimed was successful in rooting out terrorism from
the Agency (Express-Tribune 2011a). However, low-intensity sectarian and militant violence
still continued in the region.
7.1.1.8. Operation Zarb-e-Azb (Sharp strike)
Marked as the most important military operation against militancy in Pakistan, Operation
Zarb-e-Azb was supposed to begin in 2012 but lack of public support held the military back
from launching it in North Waziristan and other parts of FATA (Zahid 2015). The operation
was finally started after the TTP attacked Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, on June 8,
2014, killing 36 and injuring 18 (Zulfqar 2017, 124). It was this operation whose reaction from
the militants resulted in the infamous “Peshawar Army Public School Massacre”, on
December 16 2014, killing over 140 children and staff at the school (Khan, Ali and Gabol 2016).
The operation resulted in a significant decrease in militancy and overall incidents of militancy-
related deaths. Hence, Pakistan improved its ranking from 4th, in 2015, to 5th, in 2017, on the
Global Terrorism Index (GTI) (IEP 2017b). The GTI report also acknowledged that the reduction in terror-related incidents in the country was partly due to the success of Zarb e
Azb (IEP 2017a).
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7.1.1.9. Operation Khyber 1, 2, 3 and 4 (2014-present)
In order to curb militancy and secure transit trade route between Afghanistan and Pakistan, a series of operations codenamed Khyber 1, 2, 3 and 4, were launched in the Khyber Agency.
Khyber 1 started in October 2014 and went on for over a month with the military claiming that nine militants were killed in the first phase (Sherazi 2014). As per reports, the operation was concluded in February 2015, with the announcement of Khyber 2. During this operation, which concluded in on June 15 2015, the military claimed to have cleared the area of TTP and
LeI, but in the process also lost 50 soldiers (Khan 2015c). Due to the unachieved objectives from previous two operations, the Pakistan army launched operation Khyber 3 on August 16,
2016, with the help of Pakistan Air force fighter jets, bombarding militant hideouts (Agencies
2016). As per military sources, key mountainous passes were secured in Rajgal valley with as many as 40 militants killed in the operation (Correspondent 2016). The operation officially concluded when operation Khyber 4 was started in the Agency on July 15, 2017, as part of operation Radd ul Fasad, to again rid the Khyber Agency of terror groups such as ISIS, especially in Rajgal valley (Dawn 2017a).
7.1.1.10. Operation Radd ul Fasaad (Rejection of Discontent) (2017-present)
Operation Radd ul Fasaad is an ongoing operation that was announced on 22 February 2017,
soon after the conclusion of Operation Zarb-e-Azb’s (Rehman 2017a). The operation was not
only limited to the tribal areas, but its scope was expanded to the whole country, with a focus
on de-weaponisation and explosive control (Dawn 2017b). The operation was intended to
eliminate all remaining militant threats present in the country. The operation was a started
on the back of a fresh wave of militant attacks in February, where militants targeted all four
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provinces – Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and Punjab province – and the Pashtun
tribal areas (Dawn 2017b).
7.1.2. Pakistani Military Strategy in FATA (2002-Present)
The formal or “explicit” strategic policy of the Pakistani state and military, in regard to the presence of militants within the former-FATA region, remained largely constant throughout
the 2002-2017 period. As explained above, this policy, at the formal or official level, was one
of ridding the region of “all” militants or at least hindering the operations of militant groups, preventing them from attacking targets in Pakistan or Afghanistan.
However, during the 2002-2017 period, there have been significant shifts in the tactical
policies of the Pakistani army in achieving these objectives. Initially, Pakistani army operations
against militants in the former-FATA region were supposed to be “target specific”. Specific
militant groups were identified in specific regions and the army would then deploy forces in
those regions with the intent of eliminating the militants (as discussed above in 7.1.1.). The
military’s shifts in strategic and tactical policies can be divided into three periods; 2002-2007,
2008-2014, and 2014-present.
In the initial phase of the Pakistani military’s operations the FATA region (2002-2007), the
focus of these operations primarily relied on capturing “foreign militants”, and therefore the
threat of domestic insurgents and was not taken “seriously” (Rana 2017a, 38). During this
time, there was also a focus on with engaging with the local tribal elders through peace deals
for the apprehension of foreign Al Qaeda militants (see 7.2 below). During this time, the
military was also accused of “inflating” the number of killed and the apprehended foreign
militants, which was done to prove the “success of its operations” (ICG 2006, 16). The
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military’s strategic policy failure was evident with the fact not only did militant violence and
fatalities rise after 2007 (SATP 2019), but the year 2007 also saw the formation of TTP – the
deadliest militant group in the country’s history (SATP 2017a).
The second phase, 2008-2014, saw a dramatic increase in the deployment of military
personnel in the tribal areas, especially because of the rising number of attacks both from the
TTP and Al Qaeda militants in FATA and rest of Pakistan. The main objective of military
operations during this period was to clear the FATA region from “all militants”. However, Rana
(2017a, 41) argues that even though the military had proactively engaged in the military
operations during this period and vowed to eliminate militants, there was still relative
“confusion” in the military’s policy as it was differentiating between “good” and “bad” Taliban
(see above 6.3.2.2), along with not targeting the Haqqani Network. However, a combination of various factors, including the relative success of various operations and death of TTP Chief
Hakeemullah Mehsud in a US drone strike in 2013, saw a marginal decline in militant violence and causalities in the country (SATP 2019; Rana 2017a).
The third and final major shift came in 2014 in the backdrop of failed peace efforts by the PML
N government in 2013, constant attacks from the TTP in mainland Pakistan and FATA and a major attack on an airport in the city of Karachi in July 2014 (see below 7.2.4.). These developments resulted not only in the initiation of operation Zarb e Azb, but it was the first time that the political, civil and military leadership agreed unanimously on the National Action
Plan (NAP), announced by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif late in December 2014 - after the 16
December 2014, Army Public School attack - to fight “all” militant groups in the country (Rana
2017a, 43; Salahuddin 2016). This shift also saw both the civil-military leadership, having
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differences on the security policy otherwise, on the same page in their resolve to fight
militancy in both FATA and the rest of Pakistan (Yousaf 2014).
Another feature of the Pakistani military’s operations in the tribal regions is that the scope of
operations expanded over time. Where the military initially entered former-FATA in 2002 and
2004, with the intention of clearing only a few hundred foreign militants (Khan 2012a, 105),
today most of the tribal region has Pakistani army presence. The reason for this expansion of
army operations throughout the former-FATA region is that in many cases these operations
did not achieve their desired objectives due to the porous nature of the Afghan border and
constant influx and/or movement of militants on the border (Khalid and Roy 2016). Moreover,
Pakistan was also accused of “sheltering” the Haqqani militant network which further
complicated the peace and conflict resolution efforts in the region (Siddique 2017).
The above provides a broad overview of Pakistani military operations in the tribal areas and the strategic objectives and tactical measures that informed these activities, from 2002 to
2017. The following section discusses whether or not these operations succeeded in eliminating militants and establishing peace in the Pashtun tribal areas of Pakistan.
7.1.3. Effectiveness of Military Operations
The brief description above of the Pakistani military operations directed against militants in
the former-FATA region suggests that even though the military managed to achieve a large
number of their strategic objectives, other key objectives were not achieved. As discussed
above, the army’s main strategic objective, in relation to militants in the tribal regions, was
to rid the region of militants or, at least, hinder their operations sufficiently to ensure that
they could not successfully attack targets in Pakistan.
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Since 2014, Pakistan has witnessed a decline in militant violence in former-FATA and Pakistan,
with the year 2017 recording the lowest militant violence fatalities since 2006 (SATP 2019).
However, major militant attacks have still originated from the tribal areas in recent months,
suggesting that the situation in the region is still far from ideal.
But what might be considered the overall success of the Pakistani military in achieving its main
strategic objective, first formulated in 2002, of ridding the tribal regions of the presence of
militants, or at least hindering their capacities sufficiently that they are unable to launch
effective attacks on targets in Pakistan or Afghanistan? Has the military been successful in
achieving this objective?
A statistical study on the military operations in the tribal areas found little impact of Pakistan’s
military operations on the reduction of violence and militant attacks during the period of
1972-2015 (Rehman, Nasir and Shahbaz 2017). The study argued that military operations, without proper counterintelligence efforts, at most, resulted, not in the elimination or incapacitation of militants but rather in their relocation to other areas (Rehman, Nasir and
Shahbaz 2017).
However, there have been studies in Pakistan that found some positives coming out of the military operations in the tribal regions during the period 2002 to 2017. Rehman (2017b), in his empirical study on military operations in the former-FATA region, concludes that military operations between 2001 and 2011 did have a positive impact in terms of reducing violence in FATA and the country. In his estimate, military operations reduced on average five attacks by militants per month in districts treated under the study (Rehman 2017b, 12). Moreover,
Javaid (2015b), in her study on Operation Zarb e Azb, found that the military operations
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starting in 2015 in the tribal areas were successful to the extent that the military took back
territorial control from militant groups in North and South Waziristan.
We see therefore that the Pakistani military has had mixed success from 2002 to 2017 in
achieving its strategic objective of ridding the tribal regions of militants or at least hindering
their capacities sufficiently that they are unable to engage in effective attacks of targets in
Afghanistan or Pakistan. In the first instance, it is certainly true that the Pakistani military has
failed to rid the tribal region of militants. Studies indicate that from the period 2002 to end of
2017, the presence of both Pashtun and foreign-born militants within the tribal areas, from a
wide variety of groups and factions, has decreased, but have certainly not been eliminated.
Concerning the other element of the Pakistani state and military’s strategic objective – the
incapacitation of militant groups in the tribal regions, undermining their capacity to
effectively attack their targets in Afghanistan or Pakistan – the results have been more mixed.
We saw above that some studies identified a decrease (but certainly not elimination) of militant attacks, emanating from the tribal regions, in specific periods, and also some retaking of territory by the military from militant groups. But there has certainly by no means been an elimination of attacks, and the reduction of attacks could conceivably be due to other causes impacting on militant groups other than the military’s operations. It is therefore difficult to always draw a clear causal link between military action and reduction of militant attacks, making an assessment of the relative success of the military’s actions even more difficult.
7.1.3.1. Factors Affecting the Ability of the Military to Achieve its Strategic Objectives
The reasons why the Pakistani state and military’s strategic objectives in relation to militants
in the tribal regions have not been fully achieved are complex. The following seeks to discuss
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these reasons, identifying factors that have undermined the capacity of the Pakistani military
to achieve such objectives.
One key reason for the Pakistani army’s inability, over the 2002-2017 period, to achieve its
strategic objective in relation to militants within the tribal regions has been discussed above.
This concerns the unwillingness of the Pakistani army to consistently abide by its policy of the
3Ds. We saw that this policy involved a tactic of “dialogue” and “development”, in addition to
“deterrence”. Yet it was explained above that many of the promises of increased funding and
infrastructure projects, provided by the state and military to the Pashtun tribes, in return for
their support in combating militants in their local area, has not been forthcoming. Further,
we also saw above that the “dialogue” with the Pashtun tribes, as part of the military’s effort
against militants, at times degenerated into a punitive policy against the tribes, the army
destroying or confiscating property of tribespeople in those situations where the military did
not believe that tribal support had been forthcoming (see below 7.2).
Another reason for the army’s failure to achieve its strategic objectives concerns the lack of
precision in army attacks on militants and the collateral damage inflicted on tribespeople that
follows from this. For example, in 2013, responding to an attack from the Taliban on its base
in Darpa Khel village in North Waziristan, the army fired mortar shells in the general direction
of the attack, killing two 18-year-old twin sisters living in the area (Amnesty-International
2013, 15). This aroused the anger of the members of the girls’ tribe, and so diminished their
support for the military’s presence in their area.
In June 2013, in another incident soon after, the military was targeted with an IED (Improvised
Explosive Device) delivered by local Taliban in North Waziristan. In response, the military used
the Political Agent to order local villagers, from Tappi Village, to vacate their homes within six
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hours (Amnesty-International 2013, 16). Soon after the deadline for evacuation expired, the
military started firing mortar shells towards the village causing damage to private properties.
The state and the military refused to compensate the locals for this damage (Amnesty-
International 2013, 16). Once again, this aroused the anger of local villagers and diminished their support for the military’s presence within their area.
In terms of civilian deaths resulting from the military operations, the Bureau of Investigative
Journalism has reported that between December 2013 and June 2014, the Pakistan army operations and air force airstrikes within the tribal regions could have killed as many as 112
“non-militants” (Mole 2014). In one such incident, in December 2013, the Pakistan army attacked the Mir Ali region of North Waziristan Agency, claiming to have killed “40 insurgents”. However, local sources revealed that as many as 25 of those killed were hotel guests and civilians (Wazir 2013).17
There have been times when the actions of the Pakistani military in relation to Pashtun villagers have much more directly resembled the actions of the British Raj under the collective punishment clauses of the FCR. In 2004, when the military was conducting an operation against the possible presence of militants in South Waziristan, it punished an entire Pashtun
tribe, located in the area, for failing to assist in the apprehension of militants in their local
area (Foster and Ali 2004). The punishment involved the military’s imposition of an economic
embargo on the tribe, preventing them from selling their cash crop of fruit and nuts to others
17 The numbers could be higher than this because there was limited access to the tribal areas when the military
operations were at their peak. Moreover, any access was only possible through the military’s approval, resulting
in what could be an underestimation of casualty figures.
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outside their tribal region (Dawn 2004). This embargo was imposed during the peak season
of the fruits and nut harvest, which, being one of the main cash crops in South Waziristan, negatively affected the livelihoods of the local tribespeople (Dawn 2004).
Indeed, the Pakistani state has engaged in similar collective retaliation against tribes even in instances where it is not the tribes who are the cause of the offence. In 2012, when Hafiz Gul
Bahadur, a leader of the Pakistani Taliban, banned the anti-polio drive in the Agency, the
Political Agent retaliated against the whole North Waziristan Agency by refusing to issue
passports, ID cards and domicile certificates to the locals from the tribal Agency (Tahir 2015,
3). In November 2016, soon after a military officer was attacked and killed, a two-storey commercial building, owned by a local lawyer, was razed after a raid on a weapons shop allegedly owned by an Afghan national (Yousaf 2016). The locals felt the action, under the collective responsibility clause of the FCR, was unnecessary not only because the accused was apprehended, but the razed Al Muhib market was a common social gathering spot for the locals owned by a respected member of the society (Yousaf 2016).
Needless to say, such actions of collective punishment are deeply unpopular with the local tribespeople (Yousaf 2016). Further, although such punishments were often inflicted for perceived failure, on the part of tribespeople, to adequately assist the military in their actions against militants, the unpopularity of such actions, and the consequent loss of support among the tribespeople for the military, may make such non-cooperation even more likely in future.
In addition to such collective punishment, at times the Pakistani military has targeted specific
tribespeople within the tribal regions, for failure to assist in actions against militants, or
suspicion of support of militants, negatively impacting on the lives and livelihood of these
people. In one such incident in 2015, Taj (2017, 135) writes that one of her good students at
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the Kohat University Science and Technology, from the Orakzai Agency, was abducted by the
military on suspicion of ties with the Taliban. The student’s family has subsequently been given no information about his whereabouts. In some cases, those allegedly arrested by the military have been denied the ordinary process of law, instead, ending up dead, with their bodies dumped near their homes (Tameez 2015, 469).
Such actions have elicited anger and outrage on the part of those Pashtun tribes whose members have been adversely affected by the military in such ways (Amnesty-International
2010). A 2010 report by Amnesty International, which criticised such alleged illegal abductions
by the military, claims that many Pashtun tribal locals are equally afraid of the Pakistani
military and the militants (Amnesty-International 2010, 49). Needless to say, such outcomes
further weaken the support which exists among Pashtun tribes for the military’s presence
within the tribal regions, and makes their cooperation with the military, assisting it to achieve
its strategic objectives less likely.
Another factor that has affected the ability of the Pakistani military to achieve its strategic
objectives concerns its local relations with “tribal” Pashtuns themselves. We saw in a
preceding chapter that Pashtuns were seen, in colonial times, as a “frontier” people, less
“civilized” and less “loyal” than others under the jurisdiction of the British Raj. We shall see
further below how such a discourse has also resulted in a specific “agreement”, developed by
the Pakistani state for the signature of Pashtun tribes, to ensure such “loyalty”. However, such
a discourse has also affected the way that many in the Pakistani military engage with Pashtuns
in the tribal regions on a daily basis.
For instance, “tribal” Pashtuns, moving in and out of North Waziristan, have had to dismount
from their vehicles and go through multiple army checkpoints, even though the army claims
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the area has been “cleared” of militants (Farooq 2017a). Those passing through these
checkpoints are frisked and also asked for their identity cards (Wazir and Siddique 2017). For many Pashtuns, such actions are perceived as a reflection, by the army, on their loyalty, and so this is likely to alienate them from the military (Khattak 2017c; Khan 2018e). Such alienation, once again, affects the willingness of local Pashtuns to cooperate with the military, which is once more a factor which would adversely affect the military’s ability to achieve its strategic objectives.
As a reaction to such treatment, a recent Pashtun youth movement, known as the Pashtun
Tahafuz (Protection) Movement (PTM), has gained pace after the extrajudicial murder of a
“tribal” Pashtun named Naqeeb Mehsud in Karachi (Siddique 2018). The PTM, in one of its major demands, is also asking that for the military to be held accountable for “enforced disappearances” of “tribal” Pashtuns since 200218 (Siddique 2018).
Some Pakistani military operations within the tribal regions were not undertaken at the
initiative of the Pakistani army but on the pressure of the United States (Khan 2018). In such
instances, it is difficult to determine if the Pakistani military was wholeheartedly engaged in
the operation unless it accorded with the army’s own strategic objectives. In some cases, a
less than wholehearted effort might explain the mixed results of some Pakistani military
operations, with its negative impact on strategic objectives.
18 The PTM is a relatively recent movement, started in 2018, which falls outside the scope of this research.
However, a brief discussion of the PTM also helps the overall narrative of this thesis. Hence, only a cursory is discussion is provided on the movement to keep the research current.
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In cases where the Pakistani military fails to achieve its strategic objectives, the result can be a significant shift in power within the tribal regions. Some militant groups have been particularly proactive in seeking to attain influence over local Pashtun tribes, through specific methods of coercion, in some cases specifically targeting tribal leaders and eliminating such leadership (SATP 2004). If militant groups within a local area seek to place coercion on local
Pashtun tribes, for the sake of specific objectives, then the local tribes are likely to look to the
Pakistani military for protection if they are unable, through their own resources, to relieve themselves of such coercion. However, if the Pakistani state, and the military, proves itself unable to rid the local region of such militants, or neutralize their capacity to coerce the local tribes, then the local tribes will have little option but to accede to the pressure placed on them by militants. This loss of influence and control will further undermine the capacity of the Pakistani military to achieve its strategic objectives within the tribal region.
Additionally, in chapter 6 above, it was discussed how the Pakistani military engaged in tacit support for specific militant groups within the tribal regions. The result is an uneven response from the Pakistani military to militant groups within the tribal regions, with the Pakistani military openly targeting some groups but allowing other groups to operate with little interference. If there is one primary factor that has undermined the capacity of the Pakistani state and military to achieve its strategic objective of ridding the tribal regions of militant groups, or at least incapacitating such groups sufficiently to undermine their capacity to effectively attack targets in Afghanistan or Pakistan, it is this uneven response to militancy in the tribal regions based on the Pakistani military’s selective response to militant groups.
The Pakistani army’s lack of action against the Haqqani Network and the “Good Taliban” has invited criticism from both the U.S. and Afghan governments (Zahid 2017; Siddique 2017).
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This criticism also holds weight as most of the prominent Taliban and Haqqani militant leaders in Pakistan have been eliminated in US drone strikes and not in the Pakistani army operations
(New-America 2018). Moreover, even though the Pakistani military has constantly distinguished between the TTP and the Afghan Taliban (the Haqqani Network) in FATA,
Khattak (2017b) believes that both groups are different sides of the same coin, especially as the TTP has already pledged allegiance to the Afghan Taliban, with both groups coordinating in Afghanistan and FATA.
It is also argued that the selective operation against these militant groups was informed by the political and security situation in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military believes that a strong and stable Afghan government, which tilts towards India, could cause problems on the
Western border (Felbab-Brown 2018; Siddiqa 2011). Hence, the growing military imbalance between India and Pakistan seems to have “compelled” the Pakistani military to support
“proxy tools” in Afghanistan (Siddiqa 2011, 154). Moreover, it is also believed - among the senior ranks of the military – the Taliban will always maintain “some” control over
Afghanistan’s political and security landscape, and therefore Pakistan does not want to alienate it (Felbab-Brown 2018).
Pashtuns in the tribal areas have recognized these selective activities of the Pakistani army, attacking some militant groups but giving tacit support to others. An excerpt from the
“Peshawar Declaration” (a declaration issued after a two day grand tribal Jirga in 2009 in
Peshawar) linked these selective activities to the failure of the Pakistani army to achieve its strategic objectives, in relation to militants, within the tribal areas:
All the participants agreed that the failure of military operations and the ongoing terrorism
which is spreading its tentacles very fast are not because of the inability of the Pakistani army,
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but rather it is a deliberate attempt on the part of our establishment to secure its military
assets at any cost (Taj 2011, 204).
We have discussed above a series of factors that have affected the capacity of the Pakistani
military to achieve its strategic objective of ridding the tribal areas of militants or removing
the capacity of militants to engage in attacks on targets in Pakistan or Afghanistan. These
factors have included specific conditions and outcomes relating to the tactics adopted by the
military in its operations in the tribal regions and has also extended to the investigation of
other factors, such as the alleged selectivity of the Pakistani military in relation to militant
groups in the region.
Because of this range of factors impacting on the capacity of the Pakistani military to achieve
its strategic objectives in the tribal areas, the military has fallen short of achieving these
objectives. The result is that far from eliminating militant groups from the tribal areas, and
neutralizing their capacity to engage in attacks on targets within Pakistan or Afghanistan, we
have seen above that evidence suggests that the operations of the Pakistani military have, in
many cases, simply shifted the location of militants, “clearing” them from one region only to
have them re-emerge in another (Khattak 2017a). Indeed, there is evidence of some militant
groups returning to a reputedly “cleared” region after military operations were “concluded”
(Khattak 2017a). A relatively recent incident that provides evidence of such claims concerned an IED attack on December 1, 2017, targeting Peace Committee (Lashkar) members in South
Waziristan Agency, which killed at least five people (Akbar 2017).
Indeed, the Pakistani military itself has provided tacit evidence of the failure of such
“clearance” operations. This is evident in the fact that in the North Waziristan Agency, a military-imposed Sunday curfew remains in place even after the military claims the area has
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been “cleared” of militants (Khattak 2017a). These curfews were put in place because of
constantly emerging reports, especially from Mohmand, Bajaur and Waziristan Agencies, of
continued skirmishes between militants and the military (Khattak 2017b).
In all these respects, therefore, we see evidence that the Pakistani military has fallen short of
achieving its strategic objectives in relation to militants within the tribal regions. The reasons
for this have been identified in terms of a number of factors discussed above. The following
section discusses some of the impact of military operations in Pashtun tribes in the tribal
regions in terms of the “displacement” it has imposed on some “tribal” Pashtuns.
7.1.3.2. Internal Displacement of Pashtun tribes
Since 2002, the Pakistani military operations and rise in militant violence in former-FATA have resulted in the internal displacement of “tribal” Pashtuns. In 2014, there were as many as one million people from the tribal areas who were forced to leave their homes and live in refugee camps in neighbouring Agencies (Javaid 2015a). By mid-2015, almost 1.8 million people had been forced to leave FATA, mostly from North and South Waziristan (Lieven 2017, 176). Even though the civilian government and military have started sending the displaced families back to their homes in the tribal areas, as of October 31, 2017, more than 32,000 registered families from the tribal areas were still displaced and living in IDP (Internally Displaced
Persons) camps in surrounding areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. A majority of these families originated from North Waziristan, which was subject to Pakistani army military operations (UNHCR 2017).
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Table 7.1.: Internally Displaced Families from FATA as of October 2017
Source: (UNHCR 2017)
Even though the government had intended to send all IDPs back to FATA by March 2018
(Jawad 2017), ongoing operations and damage repairs in the region still suggest that it might take longer than that in reality. As a reaction to this situation, in November 2017, tribal elders from South Waziristan, based in an IDP camp in Bannu district of KP, demanded their early repatriation due to lack of basic facilities in the IDP camps (Admin 2017b).
Also, even though recent reports suggest that a majority of the IDPs from FATA have been repatriated, there is still a significant number in camps who have been asked to stay because the military has not yet cleared their areas of militants (Admin 2017b). A letter sent by a resident of Kurram Agency to a daily newspaper on December 5, 2017, suggested that IDPs resulting from military operations in Kurram Agency in 2007/2008 have still not been able to properly return to their homes due to lack of basic amenities and lack of government support
(Amin 2017). Adding to this, there is the difficulty of life for traditional “tribal” Pashtuns in the
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IDP camps. Traditional tribal structures and rules of interaction are undermined by such
displacement, which means, for instance, that female “tribal” Pashtuns often have difficulty in the camps because of the difficulties in communicating with males (for basic necessities like food, clothing and shelter) due to absence of traditional tribal arrangements facilitating such communication (Mohsin 2013, 99).
Such displacement has been blamed, in part, on the military’s mode of operations when engaging with militants in the tribal regions. The military has been constantly criticised for not
giving enough time to the “tribal” Pashtuns to evacuate their region before the start of a major operation. Others have criticised other aspects of the military’s operations. Hussain
(2016a) criticised the approach by the Pakistani military where everyone located in the tribal
Agencies of intended operations is asked to leave, and those who refuse to leave are often considered suspicious and sympathetic to militants (Hussain, 2016, p. 61).
In addition to these specific problems arising from army operations, there are other factors exacerbated the displaced person problem. For instance, there has been a lack of coordination between the army and the civilian governments resulting in lack of efforts for accommodation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from the tribal areas, with many having to walk almost 40 km from their homes to IDP camps at short notice from the military when the military begin operations in their area (IPS-Task-Force 2015).
Displacement does not simply refer to a transfer of “tribal” Pashtuns from their local villages to displaced person camps. Because of fear of the militants and resentment towards the
Pakistani military, an unknown number of tribes from the tribal areas have also taken refuge in neighbouring Afghanistan as well (Hussain, 2016, p. 61).
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The Pakistani army has also been criticised for the way it has managed the repatriation of the
“tribal” Pashtuns. In one instance, when displaced persons from the North Waziristan Agency
were about to be repatriated in 2015, they were asked to sign a document called “Social
Contract/Agreement North Waziristan 2015” (Ali 2015; Wazir 2015c). The agreement -
formulated after a series of Jirga consultations between the Political Agent’s office of North
Waziristan Agency and tribal elders of the agency - was aimed at ensuring peace in North
Waziristan. However, the document put the onus on the displaced tribes to prove their loyalty
towards the Pakistani state (Dawar 2015). According to the agreement, the tribes were asked to “reaffirm their allegiance to the constitution” of the country (Ali 2015). However, critics noted that, at the time in 2015, the Constitution was not even in place in the tribal areas because the Frontier Crimes Regulations had suspended its application in the tribal regions
(Ali 2015). The agreement also placed the onus on the tribes to engage proactively to prevent
militancy in their local areas. Mohsin Dawar (2015) – a prominent activist and current
Member of the National Assembly from the tribal areas – declared that the Agreement included the following:
Clause 1 of part 2 makes the tribes bound for maintaining every kind of peace and order in
their areas.
Clause 4 of part 2 says that there will be a ban on the formation of militant wings and the
tribes themselves will stop all such types of activities.
Clause 5 of the same part says that every tribe or subtribe will form their own Salweshti (a
Lashkar of about 40 men) which will be responsible for eradicating militancy and maintaining
law and order in the area.
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Clause 6 says that a list of all those who were involved in militancy will be issued by the political
administration and the Qoum or tribes will be responsible for handing over all of these people
to the political administration.
Clause 13 says that that the local tribes will be bound to provide security to the state
authorities and to facilitate their functioning.
Clause 17 says that the law enforcing authorities can establish a checkpoint in any area if
required and the tribes would have no right to object to it.
Clause 18 of the Oath section asks the tribes to give up the ownership of all the mines that
will be found in their territory, which is also in violation of the FCR (Dawar 2015para 4).
These conditions clearly suggest that the state of Pakistan was putting a major responsibility on tribes for countering militancy, without acknowledging that the tribes in North Waziristan had not only been displaced in military operations but were also disarmed by the military (Ali
2015). Additionally, these conditions were putting the tribes at risk of not only being exposed to hostility from militants but susceptible to further attacks from the militants (Wazir 2015b).
They were particularly placed in danger by the requirement, within the agreement, that the
“tribal” Pashtuns protect state properties (as a priority) in their respective areas (Wazir
2015b).
These conditions invited strong resentment from the tribal elders and Jirga members (Ali
2015). Moreover, the tribespeople pointed to the contradiction in the agreement whereby they were required to form Lashkars to combat the militants but at the same time, the
Pakistani state was disarming the same tribes (Ali 2015). Finally, a tribal elder from Khyber
Agency pointed to the inequity of the agreement, where the Pakistani army was asking for the tribes to assist in the engagement with militants, where the tribes themselves were, in 223
many cases, “on the run” from the militants because of insufficient army protection for the
tribes (Dawn 2015a). Further, there have been suggestions that this agreement has not been entered into by tribespeople with their free and independent consent (Ali 2015). Instead, there have been suggestions that the Political Agent, under the influence of the army, had placed some coercion on tribes to enter this agreement (Ali 2015; Dawar 2015).
The idea that specific “agreements” need to be reached between the Pakistani state and
Pashtun “tribes” perpetuates the longstanding discourse that the Pashtuns, as a “frontier” people, are less integrated into mainstream Pakistani society, and their loyalty to the
Pakistani state and its objectives sufficiently suspect as to require formal agreement. This can also be observed from some comments posted under a story reporting the “Social Agreement of 2015” in Dawn News, a famous English daily of Pakistan. One of the readers, in their comments, wrote, ‘So what's wrong in signing this undertaking? The unwillingness to do so is indicative of the fact that the tribal people do not feel loyal towards Pakistan even now’ (Ali
2015).
Such a discourse towards the “tribal” Pashtuns has therefore reinforced the status of
Pashtuns as “other” in relation to more mainstream Pakistanis. We saw in a previous chapter
how this discourse of Pashtun as “other”, underwritten by influential accounts of them as
unruly, “savage”, or lacking in loyalty, was a key feature of the colonial era. Its persistence in
post-independence Pakistan shows how these colonial legacies have now taken on a
postcolonial identity, affecting the way in which Pashtuns are often perceived, and ultimately
often treated, by dominant forces such as the Pakistani state or military, but also by others in
mainstream Pakistani society.
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For instance, we saw above that Pashtuns, unlike other elements within Pakistani society, were seen to be in need of a formal “agreement” as a means to ensure their loyalty to the
Pakistani state against the militants. However, Pashtuns who, due to displacement, have had to be accommodated outside the tribal areas, have also been the targets of hostility or unequal treatment by non-Pashtun members of Pakistani society. One example of this is in
February 2017, Pashtun businessmen - who had moved to Lahore in the Punjab province - complained that they were asked by Lahore’s local police to submit their “National Identity
Card copies, photos, as well as business details to the nearest police station or else, face legal action” (Yousaf 2017c). This was done in reaction to a spate of militant attacks in the country that resulted in a crackdown against “Afghans” and “Afghan refugees” (Yousaf 2017c). Raza
Wazir, a young student from FATA, studying in Lahore tells his experience of being profiled by local police in the following words:
But my Pashtun ethnic origin, my being from Waziristan, would turn me into a target for racial
profiling. The prejudice and suspicion against ethnic Pashtuns like me intensified after the
tribal areas became the base for the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, whose bombing campaign killed
hundreds in Pakistan’s cities. One night several policemen barged into my dorm room, which
I shared with three other students, ethnic Punjabis. After the policemen looked at our identity
cards, they took me aside and rifled through my books and my belongings for incriminating
evidence (Wazir 2018).
The widespread experience by Pashtuns of such unequal treatment in regions outside the tribal areas had led many to agitate for quick repatriation to the tribal areas (Amin 2017).
However, with a large number of families still unable to return to their tribal agencies, resentment towards the state and the military has grown, providing easy targets for the militant organizations for recruitment (Hameed 2015).
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7.2. Major peace deals in FATA since 2001
Military options were not the only recourse of the Pakistani military and state when it came
to conflict resolution and peace enforcement in the tribal areas. At times, when military
operations failed to achieve their objectives, the Pakistani state and military sought to engage
in negotiation with militant groups (Khayyam 2016). The objective of these negotiations were
“peace deals” agreed to between the Pakistani state and military and the militant groups
(Tajik 2011). In terms of the strategic objectives of the Pakistani military and the state, discussed above, such “peace deals” might not rid the tribal areas of militant groups.
According to some accounts, around 30 “peace deals” have been signed between the state
(particularly the army) and the militants between the years 2002 and 2013 (Braithwaite and
D’costa 2018, 315). The primary parties to these peace deals were the Pakistani army and the militants. However tribal elders also, at times, had a “limited” role within these deals. This role was mainly limited to brokering or mediating these deals between the military and militants. The role that Jirga played in the negotiation or ongoing guarantee of these deals was bringing both the militants and the state (mainly military) representatives on the negotiating table. However, even though they were asked by the military, and sometimes the civilian governments, to play these roles, there were no measures to ensure their security as these elders were often targeted and killed by militants (Taj 2011) (for further discussion on these attacks, see below Chapter 8).
Yet although the tribal elders did have a role within these peace deals, and were also often a party to them undertaking specific obligations under the deals, it was the Pakistani military and the militants who were the primary parties in the deals. This was due, not least, to the fact that it was these two parties who possessed the military resources to continue the armed 226
conflict, and it was the purpose of these peace deals to curb that conflict. Hence although the
tribal elders were often involved in “brokering” specific deals, or in some cases taking on
responsibility for ensuring that militants upheld their obligations under “deals”, the ultimate
bargaining power in the negotiation of the deals lay with the Pakistani military and the
militants. In many cases, therefore, although the tribal elders had an official role within the deals, the effective authority of tribal elders in the determining of these deals, and their enforcement, was excluded. This was opined by a local Pashtun, interviewed by Braithwaite and D’costa (2018), who said,
the tribesmen were left out of the peace agreements. They were between militants and the
military. Local administrators were not even involved. So there was no backing of the people
of the area (Braithwaite and D’costa 2018, 315).
Although the Pakistani military is subject to the constitutional control of the Pakistani
government, these peace deals were made very much at the initiative of the military (Shah
2014e). This is because they were often an option chosen by the military when military
options to remove militants from the tribal areas had not been as effective as intended, and
often such deals were “imposed” on the tribal elders by the military (Taj 2011, 36). It was,
therefore, the Pakistani military, rather than the government, who determined the conditions
offered to militants within the deals, and the obligations to be upheld by respective parties
(Tajik 2011).
Due to reasons of space, only the most prominent peace deals are discussed in this section.
Further, it is only possible to discuss those peace deals whose content is in the public domain
and therefore accessible to researchers.
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7.3.1. The Shakai Peace Agreement (2004)
The Shakai Peace Agreement was one of the first major high profile peace deals signed
between the militants and the Pakistani army. The deal was negotiated and signed as an
alternative to military action, and was an option pursued by the Pakistani military after the
failure of a major military operation in South Waziristan.
After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and the fall of the Afghan Taliban regime, South
Waziristan had become a hub of local, Afghan and Arab militants (Topich 2018, 85). Some of
these were Taliban but others had allegiance to Al Qaeda. Also present in the region was the
Taliban’s Pakistani commander, Nek Muhammad Wazir (Mahsud 2013, 166). Wazir not only
started mobilising local fighters for “Jihad” against the Americans and allied forces in
Afghanistan but also provided refuge to Afghan Taliban and foreign militants in the region
(Mahsud 2013, 167).
In order to apprehend and eliminate these militants, the military was forced to launch an operation in South Waziristan in March 2004 (Khattak 2012). The operation was intended to
eliminate Al Qaeda from the tribal areas and also force the local Taliban to hand over or expel foreign fighters in the region (Khayyam 2016). Initially, the Pakistani army underestimated the potential of militants and thought the operation would finish soon (Shahzad 2011, 12).
However, after incurring heavy losses, the military was soon backtracking from its claims of
“success” in the operation including a statement that they had killed a top Al Qaeda operative in South Waziristan (Khayyam 2016). The operation also resulted in the deaths of more than forty military personnel which, coupled with local anger and frustration, forced the army to initiate the process for a peace deal with Nek Muhammad and the Taliban in April 2004 (ICG
2006).
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According to documents of the peace deal, the signatories to the Shakai Agreement included
Nek Muhammad (Taliban leader), Maulana Abdul Malik and Muhammad Mirajuddin
(Parliamentarians), Maulana Akhtar Gul (a local pro-Taliban cleric), Muhammad Abbas
(militant), Haji Sharif (militant), Baitullah Mehsud (militant), Noor Islam (militant),
Muhammad Alam aka Abdullah Mehsud (militant) and Muhammad Javed (militant) (Shahzad
2011, 13). The deal was signed by the Pakistani military on behalf of the Pakistani state.
The agreement included the following clauses:
• The state would release all prisoners associated with the Taliban.
• The people killed or injured during the military operations by the Pakistani military
would be properly compensated.
• There would be no action against Nek Muhammad Wazir and his associates.
• The local Taliban were required to lay down their arms.
• The local tribal elders were required to register any foreigners residing in the local
territory.
• All Taliban “Mujahedeen” would be allowed to live in Waziristan.
• The local Taliban would not attack any government installations or Pakistan army
convoys.
• The local Taliban would not cross the border and not take any part in the Afghan war
(Shahzad 2011, 14).
The military was subject to criticism by the international community for engaging in this peace deal and virtually surrendering to the Taliban (Shahzad 2011, 12). The very fact that negotiations were entered into and concessions made by the military to the Taliban was
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perceived by some as a process of appeasement (Shahzad 2011, 12; Tajik 2011). Indeed, some
within the Taliban perceived the “peace deal” as a victory, making triumphant speeches at
the signing ceremony (Naseemullah 2014, 517). The compensation allocated for Wazir and
his aides, in line with one of the clauses of the peace deal above, was used to repay the debt by the Taliban owed to the Arabs from Al Qaeda (PBS 2006).
This deal was authorized and overseen by the military, with little input from local Pashtun tribespeople or regard for their opinion. Initially, it was assumed that the local tribal elders were the “guarantors” for the deal, but the senior military officers oversaw the deal and therefore played a major role in legitimising the demands and position of Nek Muhammad and other militants (Naseemullah 2014, 517).
There were also different opinions on the clause of registration of foreign militants, with the
Pakistani army insisting that Wazir register militants and Wazir and the local Taliban insisting that no such clause was present in the deal (Mahsud 2013; Shahzad 2011). Soon after the deal, Nek Muhammad Wazir also refused to hand over any foreign militants to the Pakistani army, therefore laying a foundation for the deal to fail (Khattak 2012). It was also soon after the deal that Wazir was killed in a drone strike in June 2004.
Some critics argued that one of the biggest negatives coming out of the deal was the pro-
Taliban militants being given an equal party status under the agreement, which implied that they had more rights or privileges compared to the local tribes (Shahzad 2011). The deal was also seen by the local tribes as a surrender of the army against the militants, therefore giving the latter more legitimacy and influence in the region (Jones and Fair 2010, 52). However,
Khayyam (2016) argues that both the Pakistani Army as well as the local tribal elders failed to stand by their promises of the deal. This is because, with the rising influence of the Taliban,
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the local elders’ influence and authority had gradually reduced, therefore making them less
influential in the tribal society (Naseemullah 2014). The military failed to uphold the deal
because not only was Nek Muhammad killed later in a US drone, falsely claimed as a Pakistani
army strike, but the Pakistani military also launched a major operation in South Waziristan
(Mazzetti 2013). Hence, due to both his Wazir’s death and subsequent operations launched
by the Pakistani military in the region against Al Qaeda, the deal could not survive.
7.3.2. Sararogha Peace Agreement (2005)
When the Pakistan army anticipated a higher frequency of attacks from the Pakistani Taliban, a Jirga was initiated by the military through tribal elders to mediate a peace deal, which was signed in early February 2005 between Baitullah Mehsud, the Taliban commander, Malik
Inayatullah Khan (local elder), Malik Qayum Sher (local elder), Malik Sher Bahadar
Shamankhel (local elder) and Lt. General Safdar of the Pakistan Army (Shahzad 2011, 16-17).
The deal was signed at the Sararogha Fort in South Waziristan on February 22, 2005, with the intention of achieving a ceasefire between the military and the local Taliban and establishing peace in the region (Rana, Sial and Basit 2010).
The peace deal was arranged through the mediation of a local Jirga that included tribal elders from the Agency (Rana, Sial and Basit 2010). Mehsud and his group were given full amnesty for their previous actions in the deal, in return for Mehsud assuring the military and government that his local Taliban forces would not cooperate with foreign militants (Rana,
Sial and Basit 2010, 233). The military, for their part, refrained from asking Mehsud to stop cross border attacks in Afghanistan. In doing so, the military showed that, for the sake of reaching a negotiated agreement with local Taliban, they were willing to make a normative distinction between Taliban attacks in Pakistan and Taliban attacks in Afghanistan. Afghan
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attacks were likely to target Americans and their allies. Attacks in Pakistan, by contrast, would
target Pakistanis. The military showed that they were willing to engage selectively with the
Taliban in the tribal areas, only seeking to stop them from attacking targets in Pakistan.
The six major clauses of this pact imposed the following obligations on the respective parties:
• Mehsud and his group were not to harbour or support any foreign militants.
• The group would not attack any government forces, nor would they hinder any
development activities engaged in by the Pakistani military, state or local
tribespeople.
• The government would not take any action against Mehsud or his group for their past
activities, however, any actions in future would be dealt with under the Frontier
Crimes Regulations (FCR).
The government and Mehsud pledged that:
• If any culprit or militant, other than the Mehsud group, is found in the Mehsud area,
he would be handed over to the government and dealt with under the FCR.
• Issues not covered in the agreement would be resolved through consultations
between the political administration in FATA and the Mehsud tribe.
• The Political administration will be entitled to take action against any individual or a
group if the above clauses are violated (Shahzad 2011, 17).
After the deal, Baitullah Mehsud, who was called a “soldier of peace” by General Safdar for
signing the agreement, became one of Pakistan’s most wanted militants due to his
orchestrating of a number of militant attacks (Yusufzai 2008a). The agreement was also
considered by some to be a retreat and defeat for the Pakistan army, as the militants were
232 promised compensation for the houses razed during the military operations, and were also not asked to hand over foreign militants (Khattak 2012).
Just as in the case of Nek Muhammad, the recognition of Mehsud by the Pakistani army gave him status and legitimacy within the local area, with the result that he was perceived by his own followers and many Pashtun tribal members as a “strongman” of South Waziristan
(Khattak 2012). This reduced the relative importance or influence of the local tribal elders as a source of the local authority within the region (Khattak 2012). The deal also saw Mehsud consolidate his power because “high level” military officials offering the militants a deal was seen as a “victory” and therefore undermined the writ of the state (The-News 2014). This, in turn, gave him enough confidence to launch the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) within his local region in December of the same year (Khattak 2012). This group was to become the deadliest militant group in the country’s history (SATP 2017a).
Just like Nek Muhammad, Mehsud was regarded by his followers as a “hero” after signing the deal in 2005, with his group claiming “victory” over the Pakistani army. This apparent victory and compensation paid to the local militants for the houses destroyed added to Mehsud’s financial resources and this money was used for further hiring of young militants (Shahzad
2011). It was during this time, and with these new-found resources, that Baitullah Mehsud expanded his operations beyond his local region and laid foundations for terror in the tribal areas, forcing many tribespeople to flee their homes (Shahzad 2011). We see therefore how the peace deal, far from ensuring the peace intended, actually provided the opportunities for
Mehsud to expand his operations and undermine peace in the wider region within the tribal areas.
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The peace deal also failed in a wider sense in that neither party agreed to the clauses that
ensured a cease-fire. On the contrary, Mehsud’s Taliban continued their attacks against the
military, and the military, in response, continued to assert its presence and operations in the
local area (Khayyam 2016, 151). However, there were efforts in the coming years by the state,
military and tribal elders to negotiate a ceasefire after periodic violations of the peace deal.
In August 2007, a tribal Jirga met Baitullah Mehsud to enforce a ceasefire after his group had
announced that the Sararogha peace deal was called off (Dawn 2007). However, even after
these efforts, the deal was unilaterally scrapped by Mehsud later that month (Dawn 2007).
7.3.3. Waziristan (Miranshah) Accord (2006)
On September 5, 2006, the government, along with the military, Political Agent and tribal
elders from Uthmanzai Wazir tribe signed another peace deal in North Waziristan with the
Taliban commanders Gul Bahadur and Sadiq, both of whom sent their representatives to sign the deal. The purpose of the peace deal was to halt militant activities in the region (Gul 2006;
Bokhari 2006). The Jirga negotiations were convened by Political Agent of the North
Waziristan, whereas tribal elders from the tribal Agency mediated the agreement between the state and militants (Gul 2006). Major General Azhar Ali Shah, who was representing the army, did not only oversee the process but also “embraced” the militants after the deal was signed (Gul 2006).
The deal had sixteen major clauses and four sub-clauses, along with the following
undertakings:
The local Taliban, Uthmanzai Wazirs, and the tribal elders undertook that:
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• There would be no attacks on government and law enforcement agencies from the
tribes and local Taliban
• The Taliban would not establish any parallel administration in Waziristan, and if it did,
the tribes would be dealt with under the FCR provisions
• The local Taliban and tribesmen would not engage in military activities in neighbouring
Afghanistan
• No militant activities would be conducted in other tribal agencies adjoining North
Waziristan
• All foreign fighters would peacefully leave FATA.
• All government properties and possessions confiscated by the Taliban during the
operations would be returned.
The government undertook that:
• All previously arrested militants would be released and no existing militants would be
arrested on previous charges
• All political benefits would be released for the North Waziristan tribes
• All weapons and vehicles seized by the government would be returned
• All land and air operations would be halted by the government
• All collateral damage suffered by the tribal Agency would be compensated by the
government
• All newly established checkpoints established by the military would be removed, with
paramilitary personnel transferred to older checkpoints and posts
• Even though there would be no restriction on tribesmen carrying arms according to
the local custom, there would still be restrictions on carrying heavy arms
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• The agreement would be implemented soon after the military vacates all its newly
established check-posts.
The miscellaneous clauses stated that:
• A ten-member committee comprised of religious scholars, tribal elders, and political
administration would be formed that would oversee the 1) establishment of links
between the government and the Uthmanzai tribes, and 2) implementation of the
agreement in its true spirit.
• If any group or individual (both local and foreign) is found in violation of the
agreement, strict action would be taken against them (Shahzad 2011, 36-37).
As with previous deals discussed above, this deal did not last long. The local Taliban failed to
maintain their commitments under the deal. Militant groups not only violated the agreement
time and again but also killed tribal elders who opposed the militants (Roggio 2008). By failing
to curb the militants, the deal revealed to many the comparative strength of the militants in
the local areas, relative to the Pakistani army, thereby once more adding to their authority
and diminishing the authority of local tribal elders in the region.
Because the accord was mainly negotiated with the Taliban, it was the militants, and not the
tribes, who received preferential treatment over time (Bokhari 2006). Moreover, the militant
groups not only violated the agreement time and again but also killed tribal elders who
opposed the militants (Roggio 2008). Hence, the deal ultimately went in favour of the militants, and not the military or the local tribes and consequently further undermined the position of the local tribes and tribal elders.
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7.3.4. Other Peace Deals, Understandings and Efforts
There were also other minor efforts made by the military and the tribes to initiate peace
processes in the FATA region. Once again, these attempts arose from the failure of the military
to achieve their ends by conventional military means.
On June 27, 2002, in South Waziristan, two Pakistani military officers, Shaukat Hayat and
Saeed Khan, met tribal elders in a Jirga and assured them that the tribes would be allowed to
deal with the foreign militants, especially Al Qaeda, on their own before launching a military
operation (Shahzad 2011, 5). It was also agreed upon by both the military representatives
and tribal elders that properties of accomplices of militants would be destroyed if they were
found guilty (Rana, Sial and Basit 2010, 232). The deal was violated periodically by the
Pakistani army within the tribal regions. This violation took the form of military operations,
especially on October 2, 2003, when the army airlifted around 2500 military Commandos to
launch a major offensive against Al Qaeda without forewarning the tribes. Even though the tribal elders took serious exception to this, they did not show a strong reaction to this action
(Shahzad 2011, 5). Hence, the deal could never substantiate because the military, even though put the responsibility to take action against the Al Qaeda and other foreign militants,
also persisted with its own line of action.
In June 2008, a peace deal was concluded in Khyber Agency with militants, mainly Lashkar-i-
Islam (LI) and its head Mangal Bagh (Khattak 2012). Militants agreed not to set up a parallel
administration within their local region in the tribal areas, along with agreeing not to harbour
any foreign militants (Khattak 2012). The deal did not survive long and eventually, a Pakistani
military operation, Sirat-i-Mustaqeem , was carried out, with the military staying in Khyber
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Agency and the LI constantly attacking the military checkpoints. Even though the military
cleared the area of Bagh and militants, there were still skirmishes and attacks for a few years.
In March 2012, an anonymous Jirga of tribal elders met Mangal Bagh again at an undisclosed location to convince him to surrender unconditionally (Shinwari 2012a). The members also asked Bagh to open a channel of communication with the government for possible peace talks so that insurgency and conflict could be halted. However, Bagh refused to surrender until the military stopped its operations in the Khyber Agency against his group. There were doubts and suspicions surrounding the Jirga as well because even though the tribal elders, in the
Jirga, said that they had the government’s support during negotiations, the Assistant Political
Agent of Khyber Agency later denied such reports (Shinwari 2012a).
Then in February and March 2009, successive efforts were made to establish peace in the
Bajaur Agency. On February 23, 2009, negotiations took place between the government, local
Taliban militants and tribal elders, where both the military and militants agreed on a ceasefire,
along with the government agreeing to compensate the militants and the tribes for loss of
lives and property during previous military operations in the area (Rana, Sial and Basit 2010,
234-235). A peace deal was finally reached between the Mamond tribes of Bajaur, the
militants and the political administration between March 9 and March 11, 2009 (Shah 2009a).
It was agreed that all the militant organizations in the Agency would be abolished and that all
fighters would surrender themselves either to the local tribes or the political administration.
In the case of the militants surrendering to the tribes, the tribal elders were required to
submit a good behaviour bond for the militants. It was also agreed upon that there would be
no attacks from either side, either the military or the militants, with the tribes also assuring
to stop cross border movement of militants (Rana, Sial and Basit 2010, 234). The deal did not
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last long because of violations of the deal by militants and therefore resulted in another major
military operation in the Agency.
In a final effort to arrive at a broad “peace deal” with militants in the tribal areas, Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif formed a four-member committee (called “Peace Jirga”) in January
2014 to initiate peace talks with the TTP in the tribal areas (Abrar 2014). The final committee included Habibullah Khan Khattak, secretary for port and shipping, along with FATA’s
Additional Secretary Arbab Arif, Prime Minister Secretariat’s Additional Secretary Fawad
Hasan Fawad and former ambassador, Rustam Shah Mohmand, who himself hailed from the tribal areas (Abrar 2014). The process did not come to fruition, and the talks were suspended when the TTP, in February 2014, executed 23 soldiers of the Frontier Corps (FC) in the tribal areas (Crilly 2014). Any prospects of the peace talks finally ended when the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan militants, supported by the TTP, attacked a major airport in Karachi in June
2014, killing 28 people (Shah 2014d). This attack led to the initiation, by the Pakistani military, of operation Zarb e Azb in North Waziristan, which later expanded to the rest of FATA.
Since the initiation of operation Zarb e Azb in 2014, “peace deals” between the Pakistani state, military and militants have remained limited. However, Jirgas and Lashkars in the tribal areas (discussed below Chapter 8) have been used by tribes to try to counter militant intrusions on a local level.
7.3.5. Failure of Peace Efforts
As discussed above, even though the military, on a number of occasions, signed “peace deals”
with militants, often using tribal elders to broker these deals, all these efforts more or less failed in terms of curbing militancy in the region. One can argue that brief periods of the
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ceasefire, resulting from these deals, did, however, help in avoiding human loss in military
operations against militants or militant attacks in the region; albeit for brief periods of time.
A number of reasons, though, can be attributed to the failure of these efforts towards peace
and conflict resolution in the tribal areas.
One of the primary reasons for the failure of these deals was the militants succeeding in
getting many of their demands accepted by the military. This gave the militants greater status
and legitimacy within the tribal areas. In many cases, the resources they received through the
deals, in the form of “compensation” paid for by the Pakistani state for damage caused by the
military, gave them enough resources to then subsequently ignore their obligations under the
deals and continue their activities (Khattak 2012). It also gave them the resources to mobilise
more effectively against those in the local regions, such as specific tribal elders, who were
opposed to their presence, thereby further entrenching their presence in the region (Khattak
2012; Acharya, Bukhari and Sulaiman 2009).
Additionally, Khan (2016b) argues that most of the peace deals made by the military were made from a “position of weakness”, often occurring as an alternative to military action
against the militants when that military action had proved ineffective. It is from this “position
of weakness” that the deals appeared as efforts to “appease” the militants, not least by giving
them “equal party status” in the negotiation of the deals. Khattak (2012) also supports this
argument, declaring that recognition of the status of Taliban commander Nek Muhammad
Wazir, who was not a popular commander until 2004, during the Shakai agreement, not only
made him more popular, but also reduced the importance of the local tribal elders in the tribal
areas who might have been a source of opposition to him (Khattak 2012).
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Also, because the military was often the primary agent initiating the deals and determining their content, not the civilian government, most aspects of these deals were concerned with the military objectives and concerns (such as obligations placed on the militants not to attack military installations and forces). This took the focus away from the objectives and concerns of common tribespeople in the region (Tajik 2011). Further, we saw that in some cases, although the deals obligated the militants not to engage in attacks against objectives of concern to the Pakistani military, the deals left them free to engage in other attacks, such as those undertaken in Afghanistan. Finally, we saw that the increased authority and legitimacy that these deals accorded to militants, as equal negotiating parties with the military, as well as the material benefits flowing to the militants as a result of some of these deals, further entrenched their position within the tribal areas, often at the expense of traditional sources of authority in the area such as that held by tribal elders.
The result is that some militants actually moved to eliminate those tribal elders who were still opposed to their presence in the region, thereby further undermining traditional sources of tribal authority (see below, Chapter 8). Moreover, even though the tribal elders and tribespeople had lost authority and influence with the rise of militants, nevertheless we saw above that in many cases local tribes undertook specific obligations within some of these deals, being held responsible for the delivery of specific outcomes promised under the deals.
Rahimullah Yusufzai, a journalist from Peshawar, also argues that the army, coming under pressure from the U.S. for peace in the tribal areas, was also another reason for the failure of
Jirga based initiatives. In that context, he argues,
The government has to think of other options keeping in view the national interest. Bowing
to US pressure would reinforce the general impression among the fiercely independent
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Pashtun tribes inhabiting Waziristan and other tribal areas that the military operations are
being carried at the behest of America. That perception needs to be corrected but it can only
happen if traditional methods such as Jirgas are employed to resolve the conflict (as cited in
Sadiq and Naeem 2016, 86).
The weakening of the authority of the tribal elders also had an influence on the peace deals
themselves. We saw above that one of the primary reasons for the ineffectiveness of the
peace deals was that the military engaged in them from a position of weakness rather than
strength, as an alternative to military operations against the militants that had failed to
achieve their objectives. However, the weakening of the authority of tribal elders also
contributed to such ineffectiveness since the tribal elders often did not have the weight to
impose their authority - in any “brokering” role they might have played with the militants - to
ensure that the militants upheld their obligations in the deals made (Naseemullah 2014).
Instead, we saw that one of the results of some of these deals, in further entrenching the
position of some militant groups within the tribal regions, were reprisal attacks against some
tribal elders who continued to maintain opposition to the militants. The result of the peace
deals was, therefore, further marginalization of traditional tribal authority within the tribal
regions.
Indeed, this weakness of tribal elders was apparent even in the context of many of the major
deals themselves. Often, we saw, tribal elders were held responsible by the Pakistani military
for ensuring that militants maintained their obligations under the deals. But the tribal elders and the Jirga of which they were a part were not provided with enough backing or support of the military to fulfil these obligations.
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This exclusion of the locals could also be attributed as one of the reasons for the failure of major peace deals signed by the Pakistani army. This pattern was also witnessed during
Operation Sherdil in Bajaur, when even though the military had eliminated most of the terror groups in Bajaur, it still went ahead and signed a peace deal with some militant groups in
March 2009 (Siddique 2014). This gave the local Taliban the time to not only reconsolidate their position but also attack members of the pro-government tribal Lashkars.
If looked at in conjunction with the outcome of military operations, it becomes clear that following a colonial pattern, the Pakistani army gave little regard to the “tribal” Pashtuns while conducting its peace and conflict resolution policies in the tribal areas. Because the tribal elders were consulted in a limited capacity and were often punished for the crimes of the militants, under the FCR, it was obvious that both the military operations as well as the peace deals supervised by the army would reap mixed or negative results.
7.3. Conclusion
This chapter focused on Pakistani military operations in the tribal region, their relative success or failure, and the consequences of such operations, including the displacement of Pashtun tribes. It also discussed the more prominent peace deals that the Pakistani army negotiating with the militants, often employing tribal elders as a party to these deals. The chapter argued why, after various military operations since 2004, the military solution to the conflict in the tribal areas has done little in countering militancy and achieving conflict resolution in the region.
One key feature that emerged from the discussion of peace deals was how the deals themselves often marginalized the authority of tribal elders and the Jirga in which their
243 authority was exercised, within their own local regions. This occurred in two ways. Firstly, we saw that the primary agents in the peace deals were the Pakistani military and the militants.
This primary agency arose from the fact that it was these two parties who were responsible for the military conflict in the local tribal areas and it was, therefore, these two parties who possessed the resources to cease this conflict. The deals, therefore, focused primarily on the respective demands and the obligations undertaken by each. We saw that the tribal elders often had a role in initially “brokering” the deals, and also at times undertook obligations, within the deals, including the registering, with the military, of foreign militants in their local areas and also, at times, undertaking obligations within the deals to ensure that the militants upheld their obligations under the deals. But we also saw that the deals themselves often had the effect of marginalizing the authority of tribal elders, and the Jirga of which they were a part, thereby diminishing their capacity to achieve these outcomes.
This marginalisation occurred as a result of the legitimacy accorded to the militants under the deals, as equal bargaining agents or parties with the Pakistani military, and the enhanced authority and status this accorded them in the local region. In this way, the traditional tribal authority structure within the local region, centred on the authority of tribal elders and the
Jirga in which they exercised their authority, was further undermined, and the presence, status and authority of the militants enhanced.
The forthcoming chapter will now discuss Jirga and Jirga-based Lashkar initiatives by the
“tribal” Pashtuns, to engage in their own conflict resolution within their local regions.
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Chapter 8:
Role of Jirga towards
Peace and Conflict
Resolution in the Tribal
Areas
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8.0. Role of Jirga towards Peace and Conflict Resolution in the Tribal Areas
The previous chapter discussed various efforts by the Pakistani military to engage in peace and conflict resolution in the tribal areas. This involved direct military action targeting militant groups and various “peace deals” negotiated between the Pakistani military and the militants, often with Pashtun tribal elders as both “brokers” and parties to these “deals”. This chapter focuses on efforts initiated by Pashtun tribal elders themselves, using the vehicle of Jirga, to engage in peace and conflict resolution in the tribal areas. The previous chapter pointed out that in those situations in which militants have exercised enhanced authority and influence in the local tribal regions, this has often been at the expense of traditional tribal authority structures in these regions, centred on tribal elders.
This chapter focuses on the efforts of tribespeople to engage in peace and conflict resolution in their local tribal areas from 2002 onwards. Such efforts constitute a distinct alternative to the peace and conflict resolution methods, centred on the Pakistani military, discussed in the previous chapter. Section 8.1.1 and 8.1.2 discuss various peace and conflict resolution initiatives of tribal elders, from 2002 onwards, to counter militants in their local regions, using
Jirga as a basis by which such initiatives are proposed and agreed to by tribal elders, and
Lashkar (militia convened by Jirga and made up of tribal members) as the instrument by which decisions of Jirga are enforced. Section 8.1.3 focuses on the various obstructions faced by the
“tribal” Pashtuns in effectively using these methods.
The chapter also discusses whether the Jirga, as the primary forum for decision-making by tribal elders, retains its traditional authority within the tribal regions (section 8.2). We saw in the previous chapter that the traditional authority of tribal elders was at times displaced by the rise of influence among militant groups within the local tribal regions. This chapter
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considers whether these broader developments have undermined the respect and
recognition traditionally accorded to Jirga, within the tribal regions, and whether this has
undermined the effectiveness peace and conflict resolution initiatives initiated by tribal
elders, through the forum of Jirga.
8.1. Jirga’s Engagement in Conflict Resolution in the Tribal Areas
This section discusses the role that the tribal Jirga, and Lashkars formed by Jirgas, have played since 2002 in peace and conflict resolution in the tribal areas. Section 8.1.1 provides
“symbolic” instances of various Jirga meetings where the tribal elders and tribal society expressed their opposition towards militancy in the region. Even though the section mentions
“symbolic” Jirga meetings, there is also discussion on the Kurram Agency case, where the
Jirga played a major role in the resolution of sectarian-cum-militant conflict. Section 8.1.2 discusses more concrete and substantial instances of Jirga, where Lashkars were formed to fight militants in the tribal areas. In this section, cases of Lashkar formation are divided in terms of various tribal “Agencies”. Finally, section 8.1.3 of this section discusses various reasons and factors that limited the performance of Pashtun Jirga towards peace and conflict resolution in the tribal areas.
8.1.1. Jirga and Conflict Resolution in the Tribal Areas
When one looks at the situation of conflict and militancy since 2002 in the former-FATA
region, the tribal elders from all Agencies have shown their willingness to play a role, through
Jirga, for peace and conflict resolution in the region. However, as seen above in Chapter 7, even during most of the peace deals and pacts that the military signed with the militants, these elders and Jirgas were only given a “symbolic” role, whereas the real negotiations used
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to take place between the military and the militants (Khayyam 2016, 152). However, even
with this limited and “symbolic” role, many tribal Jirgas arranged by tribal elders, have, time
and again, expressed their desire for peace and disapproval of militancy in the region (as seen from the examples discussed below).
Another dimension of these Jirgas was their use by tribal leaders to show support for the
Pakistani military and the state on the whole. Because of the scepticism surrounding the
“loyalty” of the “tribal” Pashtuns in Pakistan’s mainstream media (see Yousaf 2017c), some
Jirga meetings were held by the tribes to reinforce their “loyalty” towards Pakistan (Khayyam
2016). This was because tribal elders, through these Jirgas, wanted to dispel the notion that
they were “supporting” the militants in any way as the media had reported (Khattak 2017c).
At times, such Jirga have lacked success, not due to external factors, but due to internal factors persisting within the tribes themselves. One such internal factor that has undermined the success of Jirga concerns the perception of many local tribespeople, discussed in a
previous chapter, that the militants are “holy warriors” leading a “Jihad” in Afghanistan
against the invading American forces (Rana and Gunaratna 2008). Such a view of local
militants, we saw, was also present at the time of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The
Pakistani state has often accused Pashtun tribespeople of lacking loyalty to the Pakistani state
in its official opposition to militants, and therefore not assisting in prosecuting the fight
against militants wholeheartedly (Rana and Gunaratna 2008).
Indeed, this sympathetic attitude of some Pashtun tribespeople towards the militants was
underwritten by Pashtunwali, in which the militants were perceived as “guests” in the local
region, with the result that some tribespeople were reluctant to assist in handing the militants
over to the custody of Pakistani state or military authorities (Hilali 2010). However, soon after
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witnessing the damage the militants started inflicting on their region, tribal elders from
various regions convened Jirga meetings to condemn militant groups and their activities in
the region.
8.1.1.1. Jirga in Khyber Agency
In October 2007, a Jirga of the Zakakhel tribes in Landikotal vowed to stop any influx of local or foreign militants in the Khyber agency (Shinwari 2007). The Jirga was convened after hundreds of militants from the Lashkar e Islam (LI) militant group entered the Khyber Agency and started disturbing the law and order situation (Shinwari 2007). As a result, the Jirga of
tribal elders from the Khyber Agency gathered at the house of the then member of
Parliament, Ayub Afridi, vowing to ensure law and order in the Landi Kotal district of the
Khyber Agency (Shinwari 2007). The members of the Jirga also set up a delegation to meet
Mangal Bagh, head of the Lashkar e Islam, and ask him to leave the area. However, Bagh
refused to leave the agency and started created problems for the local law and order
situation.
After Bagh took 15 Christians from Peshawar hostage, the military launched Operation Sirat
e Mustaqeem to apprehend Bagh. However, the locals accused the military of “forewarning”
Bagh, who succeed in fleeing to the Tirah district of the Agency (Zaidi 2008a). This is because
even after a number of operations in the Agency, the military was unable to eliminate the
threat of Mangal Bagh and Lashkar e Islam, and therefore the locals starting calling the group
as the “army’s proxy” (Ali 2018b). The local anger towards the military had also stemmed
from an infamous PAF air force strike that “missed” its target and instead killed over 60
tribespeople of the Kukikhel tribes in April 2010 in Khyber Agency (Ali 2018b).
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8.1.1.2. Peshawar Declaration
In December 2009, representatives from various tribes of former-FATA, political parties and civil society issued a declaration – known as the Peshawar Declaration – in a grand tribal Jirga meeting in Peshawar (Taj 2011, 197). The declaration was formally issued in February 2011
(Taj 2011, 197). In this declaration, not only did the Jirga condemn terrorism and militancy but also sought to dispel the widespread assumption concerning Pashtuns and their link to terrorism (Taj 2011, 197).
Not only did the Peshawar Declaration seek to condemn terrorism. It also criticised elements of the Pakistani population who supported terrorism. Further, it made wider claims concerning Afghanistan, insisting that not only militants but the Pakistani state should recognize its independence, thereby implying that the Pakistani state was engaging in operations to undermine peace in Afghanistan, despite the formal alliance of the Pakistani state with the United States:
This conference also demands in the strongest possible words that Pakistan must have to
stop her policy of interference in Afghanistan and accept Afghanistan as a sovereign
independent state in the region. The conference believes that this is in the interests of
millions of people of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
There are several political parties and groups in Pakistan which do not oppose terrorism
unequivocally but are directly or indirectly involved to support terrorists in Pakistan and
the region. This conference declares such pro-terrorist parties are the enemies of the
Pashtun nation and humanity at large.
The conference demands that targeted and immediate operation against all centers and
networks of terrorism should be initiated and the blunders of the past should not be
repeated.
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This conference also demands the elimination of all foreign, non-local and local terrorists
in FATA (Federally Administrative Tribal Area). Damages should be compensated. A
comprehensive developmental package should be commenced according to the wishes
and aspirations of the people of FATA (Abbas 2009 para 4-7).
This strongly worded declaration not only suggested that “tribal” Pashtuns wanted the elimination of the operation of militant groups within the tribal regions, but it also insisted on an end to what the tribal elders at the grand Jirga perceived as the Pakistani state and military’s discriminatory policies towards Pashtuns in the tribal areas. Some of the participants in this Jirga were later harassed, and some arrested, by the military’s intelligence agencies (Taj 2011, 197).
8.1.1.3. Jirga in North Waziristan
In another instance, on September 19, 2012, a Jirga in Miranshah, North Waziristan, decided to demolish 52 suspected hideouts of militants and militant supporters (Wazir 2012). This decision was taken by the tribal elders after a military vehicle was attacked, injuring three people (Wazir 2012). A local tribal elder, after the demolition, argued that the tribes were ready to extend all kinds of support to the state to ensure peace in the area (Wazir 2012). It was reported that one of the reasons for the tribes to act was the “territorial responsibility” clause under the FCR. Under this clause, the tribes were held responsible by the military to expel and fight militants in their region (Wazir 2012).
On June 7, 2014, a 65-member tribal Jirga from North Waziristan met the Corps Commander of Peshawar to discuss the security situation in the tribal areas (Express-Tribune 2014). During the meeting, the tribal elders asked the military to cease military operations in their Agency as they were negatively affecting the socio-political situation in North Waziristan. The Jirga
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also assured the military that it would play its part in ensuring peace in the region (Irfan and
Ali 2014).
The Jirga’s meeting was important because during that time, a Taliban-nominated committee, headed by Maulana Sami ul Haq, was also negotiating peace with the government in North
Waziristan (Express-Tribune 2014). Hence, the Jirga assured the military of playing its part in ensuring peace in the region. However, a day after, the TTP attacked Karachi International
Airport, on June 8, 2014, which resulted in the launching of Operation Zarb e Azb, and hence all peace talks and efforts were abandoned.
These developments suggested the willingness of the tribal elders to mediate peace, through
Jirga. However, it also shows how in doing so there were other developments that occurred at the same time, involving the military and the militants with their own agendas. In some cases, we have seen above, this curtailed Jirga actions to ensure peace and conflict
resolutions in the region, or rendered such actions less effective than what they otherwise
might have been.
Soon after the initiation of operation Zarb e Azb by the Pakistani army in 2015, which focused on North Waziristan, militant groups moved from North Waziristan into South Waziristan. The
Political Administration decided to engage the Pashtun tribes in the local area to deal with the militants. Hence, a grand Jirga in South Waziristan was convened by the Political Agent
(PA) with the tribes. The Jirga was asked by the PA to expel all “non-local” militants from the region (Dawn 2015c). The Jirga agreed to do so and further warned the militants that if they failed to leave, the tribes would take action against them (Dawn 2015c). The Jirga also warned that houses of militant facilitators would also be destroyed if anyone was found guilty of helping the foreign militant groups (Dawn 2015c).
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However, the Pakistani army’s selective policy towards militants, discussed in a preceding chapter, was also evident here in the actions of the Political Administration. The request from the Political Administration to the Jirga was to expel from the region only “non-local” militants. This suggested a tacit policy of tolerance for local militants (Dawn 2015c). Again, the duality of the military’s policy towards militancy was exposed as the order from the political administration was to expel only “non-local” militants, suggesting tacit support for local militants fighting in Afghanistan
8.1.1.4. Bajaur, Mohmand and Khyber Jirgas
On 25 January 2015, tribal elders and members of “Peace Committees”, or Lashkars, from the
Bajaur Agency met the Political Administration and representatives of the military to assure their support for all actions against militant groups in their region (Dawn 2015b). Tribal elders from Khar, Mamond and Mandal tribes also vowed to fight remaining the “miscreant” elements in the tribal Agency alongside the security forces (Khan 2015a).
During the same month in Mohmand Agency, the Haleemzai tribal elders met the Political
Administration and assured them of their full support against any militant action from the state (Dawn 2015b). The tribal elders were of the view that they would fight the militants on their own if needed, as the militants had not only deprived their children of education but had also destroyed the tribal society.
Similarly, on the same day, elders in the Landi Kotal area of Khyber Agency assured the government that they would extend their full support to the state for curbing militancy in the tribal areas (Dawn 2015b). The tribes had previously, in May 2014, also assured the military and the Political Administration of supporting the state with all anti-militant operations and initiatives (Afridi 2014).
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8.1.1.5. The Kurram Case
The Kurram Agency of former-FATA has remained a hotbed of sectarian violence and terrorism for many years (Rafiq 2014, 4). In the Kurram Agency, the ratio of Shias is higher than Pakistan’s overall ratio of Shias and has, therefore, remained a centre of sectarian rifts
(Rafiq 2014, 4). The tribal Agency is also only 100 kilometres from the Afghan capital Kabul and hence located at a strategic vantage point (Taj 2017). This strategic location has also contributed towards growing sectarian militancy and conflict since 2002. Before 2002, because of the Jirga meetings between elders of “Shia” and “Sunni” tribes, conflict between these two warring tribes was very much controlled over the years. However, the situation worsened after the influx of Sunni militants in the Agency, especially in 2007, when the TTP and Haqqani network moved to Kurram Agency as a result of military operations in other parts of FATA. Where before 2007, the sectarian conflict was limited to minor clashes, after 2007 and the Sunni militant influx, the conflict transformed into a full-scale Shia-Sunni war.
In 2007, the conflict in the region escalated after the influx of Afghan Sunni militants, allying with the local Sunni militants and attacking the local Turi Shia population. This alliance resulted in the deaths of around 3000 people between 2007 and 2011 (Hussain 2011d).
Moreover, the Pakistani army was also been accused of turning a blind eye to this Sunni militant alliance against the Turi Shias of Kurram, as it had not acted against a number of anti-
Shia attacks by the Sunni militants, and hence questions had been raised on the army’s lack of action on the matter (Taj 2017; Rafiq 2014). One of the possible reasons for the army’s lack of action was that it was accused of “relocating” and protecting the Haqqani Network as the number of US drone strikes had increased in North and South Waziristan where the Haqqani militants were based (Rafiq 2014, 67). Haqqani network’s relocation to Kurram along with the
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presence of TTP escalated not only the sectarian conflict but also attacks on Shias (Rafiq 2014,
63-64).
These attacks on the local Shia population led the Shia population to organise in self-defence.
A Shia militant group, known as the Medhi Militia, was formed for the purpose of countering
Sunni militants and enjoyed local support among the local Shia tribes (Zia-ur-Rehman 2012).
Hence, because of the formation of the Mehdi Militia, clashes between the group and Sunni groups (such as the TTP and Haqqani network) also escalated because the Taliban were of the view the Mehdi Militia was being supported by Iran (Zia-ur-Rehman 2012).
Historically, conflicts in Kurram were resolved through Jirgas, and where Jirgas failed to settle disputes, Lashkars were formed by Jirgas to settle disputes by force (IDMC 2011). Therefore, when the Sunni-Shia conflict escalated, a grand tribal Jirga was convened in 2008, involving all stakeholders, to reach a negotiated settlement of the issue. The first agreement was signed between Shia and Sunni tribal elders in 2008, known as the Murree Accord. It was agreed that the situation would be restored to a pre-2007 “peaceful” situation. Also, land and properties captured during the conflict would be returned to their rightful owners (Siddique 2014, 103;
Hussain 2011a). This agreement was welcomed by both parties, yet constant violations by the local Sunni Taliban militants ensured that the agreement was not enforced in its true spirit, thus failing to resolve the conflict (Hussain 2011b). Therefore the situation in the region remained volatile.
Then in 2009, after the clashes intensified, the locals were of the opinion that it was only the militant groups that were against any truce, as local members of both Sunni and Shia sects in the tribal Agency wanted peace (Laskar 2009). However, no substantial efforts were made by
255 the tribal elders due to the volatile security situation. The result was that the situation in the
Agency continued to remain volatile.
Then in early 2011, elders from both the sects finally decided to convene another grand Jirga.
There was a definite effort on all sides among the tribal elders to end what was widely seen as a “useless” conflict that had taken thousands of innocent lives (Siddique 2014, 103; Butt
2011). The Jirga decided that the means to end this conflict was a formal truce between both the tribes. Unlike the previous grand Jirga which sought to end the conflict, this one had greater success because it involved two years of negotiations and involved around 225 tribal elders from the tribal belt. Notable members of the Jirga included former law-makers namely
Sajid Toori, Munir Orakza and Malik Waris Khan (Butt 2011).
What the situation in the Kurram Agency shows is that local tribal elders have managed, through Jirga, to engage in their own actions against militants to bring a greater level of peace to the Agency. It has been suggested that these Jirga were not given adequate support by the
Pakistani state and military. The evidence for this is various attacks on tribal elders who fought alongside with military in its operations against the militant groups were given little protection and therefore came under regular attacks from various militant groups (as discussed below in 8.1.3).
However, despite this lack of support, the Jirgas, and the peace Lashkars it convened, did manage to meet with some success and curb the violence in the agency committed by militants. Because of such indigenous efforts, coupled with military action, the present situation in Kurram has drastically improved as any issues of conflict or attacks on either sect are dealt with by the tribal Jirgas. (Irfan-U-Din et al. 2017).
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The result is that Jirga has continued to be convened in the Kurram Agency, in response to attacks by militants, and have enjoyed continued success. This was witnessed in April 2017, when a Jirga including both Shia and Sunni tribal elders was convened after a van was destroyed by a landmine, planted by the TTP, killing 15 people (Firdous 2017; Admin 2017a).
The Jirga decided that the attack would not affect the inter-sect harmony in the tribal agency and all efforts were to be made to continue the fight against militant elements in the agency.
Civil society organisations and research centres working on the Kurram Agency have also been an important influence in enabling successive Jirga to be convened in response to militant attacks. This is because they have been able to work towards bringing Shia and Sunni tribal elders sufficiently together. According to a report published by Community Motivation and
Appraisal Programme (CAMP), local civil society organisations (CSO) have played a major role in bringing together the two major sectarian groups (Gordon 2013). A local CSO states:
We have played an active role in peace and conflict resolution in our area. [We] arranged
several Jirgas in the last four years in Kurram Agency to solve the conflict between Shia and
Sunnis. We brought both the sectarian rivals to the table to solve different problems. Due to
our efforts and continuous contributions, we were able to open the road for both the rivals
which had remained closed in the last four years. Schools were blown up in various parts of
our agency. We stood together and safeguarded the schools and today all our schools are safe
(Gordon 2013, 17).
The discussion of various tribal Jirga in the Kurram Agency above suggests that tribal elders played a constructive role towards peace and conflict resolution in the tribal areas. Other changes also occurred as a result of these developments in the Kurram Agency. We saw in a previous chapter that much local Pashtun tribespeople did not share the Pakistani state and
257 military’s perception of militant groups, seeing them as Mujahedeen (“Holy Warriors”) in a
“Jihad” (“Holy War”) against the infidel occupants of Afghanistan. We saw that this perception did not change despite the fact that the “infidel occupants” switched from Soviets to
Americans and their allies. However as a result of the repeated violent actions of militants in the Kurram Agency, and the actions of local tribespeople, through Jirga and Lashkar, in combating this, local perceptions of militants have changed once they saw the damage these militants were inflicting on the tribal areas.
8.1.2. Lashkars engaged in fighting militants
The institution of Jirga, as discussed in previous chapters and below in 8.1.3, has come under immense pressure by the rise of militancy in the tribal areas (Taj 2011, 3-4). The result has been that tribal elders have had to confront the need to restore peace in their regions. We saw above that, in the case of the Kurram Agency and elsewhere, tribal elders have managed to curb militant activity through the convening of Jirga. However, more substantial and concrete action has also been taken, in various instances, with the Jirgas forming Lashkars against militants.
Lashkars have been more successful in curbing the actions of militants in local regions when they have been supported by the Pakistani army. Some of the support that the Pakistani army has provided the Lashkar, in their actions against militants, was through arms and ammunition (Mohmand 2015b). In recent years, as the Pakistani army occasionally moved to empower the tribal Lashkars, there has been “some” decline in terror-related activities, where tribal Lashkars, supported by the military, developed a strong line of defence against militant infiltration (Taj 2011, 172).
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The following instances of Lashkar formation and their activities, in different tribal Agencies,
suggest that the Jirga-based Lashkars, even with their “mixed” results, can help Pakistan in
formulating a comprehensive future peace and conflict resolution strategy in the tribal areas
and on the volatile Afghan border.
8.1.2.1. South Waziristan Lashkars
The Jirgas in the South Waziristan Agency have formed various Lashkars to deal with the presence of militant groups in the area. In 2008, when nine members of the “Peace
Committee” were attacked, allegedly by Al Qaeda and their supporters in South Waziristan, the Jirga decided to form a Lashkar to avenge the killings and counter the militants in the region (McGregor 2008). However, the Jirga was led by militant Maulvi Nazir, of the infamous
“Nazir Group” (McGregor 2008). The Pakistani military was aware of the Jirga led by Nazir to proceed, and the Lashkar it formed to engage with the Al Qaeda militants (McGregor 2008).
This again showed how the Pakistani military has engaged in selective engagement with militants in the former-FATA region. It is willing to make a distinction between those militant groups who are “foreign” and “domestic”, and those who engage in attacks within Pakistan and those who are only willing to engage in attacks within Afghanistan.
Yet alliances are fluid in the tribal regions. So while Nazir mobilized against foreign militants in 2008, avenging the deaths of the members of the “Peace Committee”, in March 2016, tribesmen from South Waziristan, after a Jirga meeting, used its Lashkar to demolish seven houses of Ghulam Khan, and his relatives, for supporting the TTP and the Nazir group (Dawn
2016a). The tribe took this action after a 120-member Jirga found, through investigation, that
Ghulam Khan had violated the tribes’ accord with the state and facilitated both these groups
(Dawn 2016a).
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We see, therefore, the complexity of the situation in the tribal regions. While the Pakistani army was, at a de facto level, willing to tolerate the actions “good Taliban” such as Nazir in
2008, it was only going after the anti-Pakistan militants such as the TTP and Al Qaeda.
8.1.2.2. North Waziristan Lashkars
As North Waziristan, since the beginning of the conflict in the tribal areas, remained the centre of that conflict and a stronghold of both the TTP and the Haqqani Network, indigenous efforts by the tribes to respond to militancy had not, in initial years, been very successful.
However, Haji Shah Mehmood, a tribal elder from North Waziristan, says that in the middle of 2008, the tribes in North Waziristan finally decided to take collective action against the militant groups in the Agency (Mehsud and Khan 2013). Hence, a Jirga was convened consisting of tribal elders, tribesmen and the Political Agent of North Waziristan, to discuss the formation of an anti-Taliban Lashkar. However, the Jirga meeting was attacked by the militants, killing several tribesmen, and forcing the tribal elders to abandon the idea of the
Lashkar (Mehsud and Khan 2013). Mehsud and Khan (2013) point out that another factor that would have inhibited the effective formation of the Lashkar - had it gone ahead - was a number of major Pakistani military operations in the Agency which had resulted in mass displacement of locals.
In July 2007, the Pakistani military engaged in a retaliatory attack on the Eidak Village, in Mir
Ali (The-News 2007). The reason for the retaliatory attack is that the military believed that the attack originated among militants located in the village (The-News 2007). The tribal elders in the Eidak village, therefore, held a Jirga and decided to form a 700-strong tribal Lashkar to fight and expel any militants in their village so as to avoid any further retaliatory attacks (The-
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News 2007). The Lashkar ensured that the village was not used as a militant sanctuary for
carrying out attacks against the military, and did so until 2014.
What changed in June 2014 was that a major military offensive was launched in South
Waziristan. The tribes were caught in the crossfire as they refused to leave their village,
arguing that their Lashkars had successfully kept the militants away from the village (Javaid
2014). However, the military soon forced the tribe to stay in temporary IDP camps based in
Pir Kali, a barren plain outside Bannu. This relocation also invited resentment from the tribe,
who claimed that they were being unfairly treated even after keeping the militants away from
their village (Javaid 2014). Therefore, even though the Lashkar efforts were successful,
according to the tribe, the military still deemed it necessary to conduct a full-scale military
operation, forcing the tribes to evacuate. This shows how independent efforts by the tribal
people to deal with militants in their local areas can sometimes be overtaken by larger efforts
by the Pakistani military.
8.1.2.3. Kurram Agency Lashkars
As discussed above in 8.1.1, the Kurram Agency has witnessed years of sectarian conflict and
militant influx. In the resolution of this conflict, both the Jirga and its mandated Lashkars from both the Shia and Sunni tribes have played a major role in restoring peace and order in the region. However, as with many of the Lashkars, limited information exists, mainly due to lack of access to media sources in the region.
Farhat Taj (2011), having interviewed tribal elders from the Kurram Agency, argues that Shia
Turi and Bangash tribes engaged in intense battles with the TTP in the region, providing a stiff resistance to the presence of militants in the region. It was because of this resistance that the militants besieged the Upper Kurram region (2007-2011), where majority Shias were based,
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in order to force them to surrender. According to Taj, another reason for this siege was the
Shia tribes’ lack of willingness to allow militants, especially the Haqqani network, to enter
Afghanistan, through Kurram, to fight the U.S., Afghan and NATO forces (Taj 2011, 50).
Moreover, the Sunni Musozai Lashkar, rarely mentioned in the news media, also formed
Lashkars in the agency against the militants. However, the tribe incurred major human losses
and failed to defeat the militant groups in the region (Taj 2011).
After a major Pakistani military operation in the Agency in 2011 Kurram’s siege was broken
and the Pakistani army was successful in driving the militants out of the region. However,
local tribespeople believed that, despite this military operation, elements of the Pakistani
military were also assisting these same militants, assisting them in relocating to new regions
where they were organizing to fight the U.S., Afghan and NATO forces in Afghanistan (Zia-ur-
Rehman 2014). It was due to this conflicting activity by the military that local tribespeople felt
the need to protect themselves from the militants, rather than rely on Pakistani army
protection, even after a successful military operation had taken place. That is why, in July
2017, tribal elders from Kurram Agency protested against a proposed move by the military to
de-weaponise the region (Ali 2017). The locals were of the view that such moves would
remove the capacity of local tribespeople in the Kurram Agency to protect themselves from
militant attacks (Ali 2017).
8.1.2.4. Bajaur Agency Lashkars
When, between 2006 and 2010, militant incidents and fatalities in FATA were on the rise, an initiative by the military resulted in the formation of Lashkars through Jirga consultations in
Bajaur Agency (Perlez and Shah 2008). The military encouraged tribes residing in the Bajaur
Agency to form their own Lashkars and fight the militants in the region (Perlez and Shah
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2008). This was a significant milestone as the military, by providing such encouragement, was
acknowledging the importance of such militias in conflict resolution within their local areas
(Wilkinson 2008). Yet from the perspective of many tribespeople, this initiative from the
Pakistani military caused confusion.
This is because, during the Jihad which the Pakistani army supported against the Soviets in
Afghanistan (1979-89), local Pashtuns (we saw earlier) were encouraged by the army to join militant groups and participate in this Jihad. Now the Pakistani army was encouraging local
Pashtuns to engage in actions against militant groups who were, once again, engaging in Jihad in Afghanistan (Wilkinson 2008). While the Pakistani state and army made a distinction between the two types of Jihad and the acceptability of each, many of the local “tribal”
Pashtuns did not.
In this regard, Mian ul Haq, a teacher from Bajaur, says that such Pakistani army policies appear contradictory from the perspective of many local Pashtun, with the result that ‘the ISI
[Pakistan's powerful military intelligence agency], the Americans and Pakistani government have created a lot of problems and then cannot disentangle themselves’ (Wilkinson 2008).
However, we have also seen, above, that actions by militant groups in local tribal elders, targeting the local population in a violent attack, have also shifted the perspective of much
local Pashtun tribespeople against the militants. This shift in perspective then gives the local
Pashtuns a greater capacity to distinguish between the Mujahedeen they supported during
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, who did not target the local tribespeople and some of
the militants who arrived after 2001, who do. This shift in perspective, therefore, makes the
Pakistani army policy of encouraging support for militants against the Soviets, in 1979-89, and
opposition to militants after 2001, less contradictory from the perspective of local Pashtuns.
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In 2008, when the conflict escalated in Bajaur Agency and resulted in the initiation of operation Sher Dil in Bajaur Agency in August, the local Salarzai tribe, through a Jirga of elders, again decided to raise Lashkars against the TTP and other foreign militants in the Agency
(Jones and Fair 2010, 65). This Lashkar was raised primarily after the efforts of a local elder
Haji Fazal Karim Baro, who was also a retired Bajaur Levies major in rank. The Lashkar was effective in pushing the militants out of the Agency, as a result of which, its members also came under attack from the TTP (see below, 8.1.3).
Then in 2009, when the military was unable to counter the militant groups, especially the TTP, the tribal elders of the Salarzai tribe again formed a Lashkar with support from the government (Yusufzai 2009). The Lashkar was successful in not only driving out the militant groups from the agency, but also in inflicting heavy losses on the groups (Yusufzai 2009). This
Lashkar was one of the major breakthroughs for the army giving it another option to fight militants through local support (Nawaz 2009b). Because of its success in countering militants, the Salarzai Lashkar become one of the success stories of Lashkars as the Bajaur Agency was mostly kept clear of militant networks and activities in the coming years (Jones and Fair 2010,
70).
In 2014, when the Pakistani military failed to achieve peace through an ongoing military operation against the TTP and other militant groups, the Mamond tribe, from Bajaur Agency, convened a Jirga to form tribal Lashkars, which ultimately helped in curbing violence in the region (Khan 2014a). However, the tribe has also experienced occasional targeted and suicide attacks from the TTP, especially because the tribes had been successful in containing the militant group in the agency.
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8.1.2.5. Khyber Agency Lashkars
The Khyber Agency, due to its proximity to Afghanistan, has also remained an important
region for transit trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan, along with the NATO supplies
going into Afghanistan. Hence, the Agency, over the years, has experience brief periods of
conflict because of a local militant group, Lashkar e Islam (LI), which has sought to implement
Sharia in the Agency. Also, this strategic location of the Khyber Agency has also brought an influx of the TTP (see above, Chapter 6). In order to fight such groups, various tribes in the
Khyber Agency have raised Lashkars to fight and expel militants from the region.
In 2008, the Mullagori Tribe, a relatively small tribe in the Khyber Agency, raised a Lashkar of around 3000 fighters to fight the local Taliban in Shagai village, located at a strategic point on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (Yusufzai 2008b). The Lashkar besieged the Taliban and forced them to surrender and retaliate (Yusufzai 2008b). The tribe also punished those tribesmen who gave refuge to militants by destroying their properties (Samdani 2011). This success inspired other tribes in the Khyber agency, namely Zakakhel and Kalakhel subtribes, to follow suit and raise their own Lashkars, after assurances of support from the government and military (Samdani 2011).
The Kalakhel Lashkar was raised after a Jirga meeting of the elders, where a force of 300 men was raised (Yusufzai 2008b). Moreover, the tribal elders also decided that militants fleeing the military operations of the Pakistani army would not be allowed to settle in their Agency, and anyone harbouring the militants would be punished in the form a penalty of Pakistani
Rupees (PKR) 5 million (approx. USD 38,000) and demolition of their homes (Yusufzai 2008b).
Then, in 2011, when the local militant factions had been creating unrest in Khyber Agency, the locals formed Lashkars to fight against these militant elements (Babar and Recknagel
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2011). The Zakakhel tribe from the agency raised these Lashkars against militants, initially, with little or no state support, and the tribe faced defeats from Lashkar e Islam (Aman 2013).
These Lashkars, especially the Mullagori Lashkar, claimed that its initial success was negated due to lack of state support and inaction by the Pakistani army against the militants in the tribal Agency, which also resulted in the Lashkar members coming under attacks from the militants (Taj 2011, 49).
However, the tribes in Khyber, even with the limited assistance provided by the Pakistani military, and the perception that the ISI, far from countering militancy, was a cause of militancy in the region, nevertheless kept forming Lashkars over the years to fight the militants. An example is provided by Fahimuddin, a former businessman and local councillor, who was one of the most well-known Lashkar commanders from Bazed Khel, a village on the outskirts of Peshawar and running into the Khyber Agency (Dawn 2009). Fahimuddin quit his business in 2009 and decided to mobilise a local Lashkar to fight Mangal Bagh’s Lashkar e
Islam and other militants in the region. According to him, he was fed up with kidnapping, bombings and growing insecurity in his area, and therefore decided to take the matters into his own hands (Dawn 2009).
During his fight against the militants, Fahimuddin gained a reputation as a famous anti-Taliban
Lashkar commander. He initially survived three suicide and several roadside attacks on his life
(Crilly 2012). He was also once quoted saying, ‘how can I leave my family, my village and my children? I will fight all those who attack my village whether they are Taliban, Lashkar-e-Islam or anyone else’ (Crilly 2012). However, after surviving various attempts on his life, he was gunned down by the Lashkar e Islam in Peshawar in June 2012 (Crilly 2012).
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In more recent developments towards conflict resolution, the Khyber Agency tribal elders, in
2016, met with the Political Administration and reported that much of the peace had been restored in the agency due to the Lashkar’s efforts and resistance against local factions, especially Lashkar e Islam (Shinwari 2016). However, the Lashkar, commonly known as Aman
(peace) Lashkar or Aman Committee, encountered a militant incursion in October 2017 from
Islamic State (IS) militants bordering Afghanistan. In response, the Lashkar succeeded in killing two members of the IS (Shahid 2017).
8.1.2.6. Mohmand Agency Lashkars
Like other tribal Agencies, tribes residing in the Mohmand Agency have also formed anti-
Taliban Lashkars in the Agency. On July 14, 2009, it was reported that a Mohmand Agency
tribal Lashkar, in an operation against various militant groups in the region killed 23 militants
(Samaa 2009). Then in January 2010, not only did the tribal elders hand over more than 120
militants to the government, but a tribal Jirga also vowed to support the government in its anti-militant operations (The-News 2010).
As a result of this support for the state, in July 2010, a major Jirga gathering in Mohmand
Agency was attacked by the TTP, resulting in more than 100 deaths (Ali 2010c). The attack
was composed of twin suicide blasts, which targeted a busy area in the Agency, destroying
over 70 shops, vehicles and offices (Ali 2010c). It was reported that the Jirga had been
convened to form a Lashkar against the local militants. However, the attack negatively
affected the will of the local tribes to fight the militants.
Then in December 2010, another twin suicide attack killed more than 40 tribal elders and
Lashkar members, with the TTP again claiming that the attack was a response to the
Mohmand tribes forming anti-Taliban Lashkars (Express-Tribune 2010). These attacks from
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the TTP indicate the militants’ efforts to eliminate tribal leadership that was perceived by the
TTP as a primary threat for the militant influence in the region. However, elders from the
tribal Agency continued their efforts, through Jirga, to counter the militants in the Agency.
In 2011, the government asked the Mohmand tribes to form a “Peace Committee”, promising
support by providing cash, arms and ammunition (Mohmand 2015b). The weapons were
provided by the Political Agent’s office, with the political administration asking the local tribes to support the military operation (see Operation Brekhna in 7.1.1. below) and fight militants in the region. The “Peace Committee” was successful in supporting anti-militant Pakistani
army operations in the Agency until December 2015, when the government finally decided to
disband the “Peace Committee”, with the tribes returning all the weapons provided by the
state (Mohmand 2015b). Even after the return of arms, the tribal elders from the Agency, in
a Jirga meeting in November 2016, assured the government and the Political Administration
that the tribes will ensure law and order and support peace activities in the Agency (Khyber-
News 2016).
8.1.2.7. Orakzai Agency Lashkars
Conflict in the Orakzai Agency came to prominence in 2008 when Hakeemullah Mehsud,
leader of the TTP, started disturbing the harmony between the Shias and Sunnis, especially
among the Ali Khel tribe, the largest tribe in Orakzai that comprises of 5% Shias and 95%
Sunnis (Taj and Rothing 2011).
Initially, some local tribal members of the Sunni sect decided to side with the TTP that had
already forced a number of Shias to leave their homes due to the militant group’s harsh
treatment of them. However, when the Ali Khel were forced by the TTP to expel 100 Shia
families from the Agency, a grand Jirga was called, which refused the TTP demand and
268 decided to form a Lashkar against the group (Taj 2011). The Lashkar was comprised of 2000
Shia and Sunni men, who effectively fought against the TTP and forced them out of the agency
(Taj 2011).
Following that, another Jirga was convened to decide on the fate of those tribesmen who had sided with the TTP, along with repatriation of Shia families (Shah 2010). However, this Jirga was attacked on October 10, 2008, by a teenage suicide bomber, carrying 150 kg of explosives, killing nearly 200 people and effectively eliminating most of the Ali Khel leadership (Taj 2011,
131; Shah 2010).
Soon after, the families of the Jirga elders moved to nearby villages to live with their relatives or in the IDP (internally displaced persons) camps. Some members also went to the Stoori
Khel tribe (both Shia and Sunni) in the Orakzai agency, with the TTP already in control of the
Shia side of the tribe (Taj 2011). The Shia members of the tribe then formed a Lashkar, with the armed guard placed on the entry points of their territory. Interestingly, in 2010, female members of the Shia tribe, whose relatives were killed by the TTP, initiated a violent resistance against the TTP by capturing their five members and severely beating them (Taj and Rothing 2011, 33).
In 2009, the Stori Khel tribe, after the influx of the TTP in Orakzai Agency, again formed a tribal
Lashkar to oppose and fight the armed Taliban militants in their Agency (Jan 2010b). One of the major motivations for the tribe was their Shia religious orientation, motivating them to fight against the anti-Shia TTP, which was Sunni in composition (Jan 2010b). Their mobilisation against the TTP occurred under the leadership of tribal elder Malik Waris Khan.
These efforts by the Stori Khel tribes and their Lashkar, under the leadership of Malik Waris Khan, were also recognised by the government of Pakistan. In 2011, Waris Khan was
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conferred with the Tamgha e Imtiaz, the fourth highest Pakistani civilian award, by the Government of Pakistan, for his efforts towards peace in the Orakzai Agency (Express- Tribune 2012). This award for Khan meant that the government and the military recognised the importance and efforts of these Lashkars towards conflict resolution and fighting militancy in the tribal areas. However, due to lack of security arrangements provided to Khan, he was killed by armed militants in Orkazai Agency in March 2012 (Express-Tribune 2012). 8.1.2.8. Adeyzai Lashkar (Peshawar)
Because of the rising militancy in the tribal areas, the adjoining areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
province, especially its provincial capital of Peshawar, also witnessed the formation of
Lashkars in the Adeyzai village. Adeyzai is a small village on the outskirts of Peshawar city and
borders the former-FATA region via FR Kohat and FR Peshawar (Taj 2011, 169).
The villagers first formed the Lashkar in 2008 after local militants attacked local infrastructure
and schools in the village (Yousafzai 2016). Haji Abdul Malik, a local councillor, after a Jirga
meeting with the local elders, then decided to raise a Lashkar against future attacks and
incursions from the Taliban. The Lashkar was finally formed after approval of a 40 member
Jirga of the Adeyzai elders, with two members each from two neighbourhoods of the village
(Taj 2011). Many believe that it was the Adeyzai Lashkar which played a major role in
defending not only their village but also Peshawar (capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) from the
TTP (Taj 2011).
Abdul Malik went as far as saying that ‘without the Adeyzai Lashkar, the Taliban would have
been controlling Peshawar today’ (Taj 2011, 172). However, in 2010 when the conflict was at
its peak, the tribe also suffered at the hands of the militants with people losing the heads of
their families, their children being stopped from going to schools, and young members of the
tribes quitting lucrative jobs abroad to take up arms against the militants (Ali 2010a). While
narrating his personal account, in 2010, Abdul Malik’s son, who led the Lashkar after his
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father’s death in 2009, said that 25 children in his family alone stopped going to school (Ali
2010a).
The Adeyzai tribesmen also believed that even though the formation of the Lashkar was the
need of the hour in 2008, lack of moral and financial support from the government created
resentment among the tribesmen towards the military and the state (Yousafzai 2016).
Further, once peace was achieved in the village, the Lashkar complained of the government’s
lack of attention towards the issues of the tribe. These issues were mainly related to the lack
of security provided to the Lashkar members. Also, the Lashkar also accused the military of
“using” the tribes for protecting Peshawar’s outskirts, which was the military’s duty in the
first place (Yousafzai 2016).
8.1.3. Constraints on the Effectiveness of Jirga and Lashkars
As discussed above in 8.1.1 and 8.1.2., the Jirga, in some instances, have effectively engaged
in countering militancy in the tribal areas through the formation of its Lashkars. However,
their effectiveness has been limited due to a number of factors. One such factor has, in some
cases, been a lack of support from the Pakistani military. At other times, their effectiveness
has been limited by targeted attacks by the militant groups on Jirga and Lashkar members.
The TTP and other militant groups in the tribal areas have targeted Jirgas and Lashkars
because they recognize that both have been directing their actions against militants and so
are a threat to the latter’s consolidation of power in the tribal areas.
According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, as many as 149 prominent tribal elders have
been killed in the tribal areas by militant groups since 2005, with the number of dead Jirga
and Lashkar members over 1400 (SATP 2018; Khan 2016c). However, some sources suggest
that the number could be far higher, especially because of the limited media access to the
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region (Khattak 2017a). Moreover, FATA Research Centre’s 2017 Annual report suggests that
out of a total of 153 militant attacks in the tribal areas in 2017, a total of 5% (7 attacks) were
targeted at members of tribal Lashkars, suggesting that anti-militant tribesmen remained a
target for the militant groups (Din et al. 2018).
However, it is argued that the number of tribal elders killed in militant attacks could be in thousands, especially because it was a strategy of the militant groups, especially Al Qaeda, to eliminate the tribal leadership in order to establish their control in the tribal areas (Shah
2014c). Sher Muhammad Khan, a human rights activist from the tribal areas, believes that nearly 2000 tribal elders were killed between 2004 and 2016 (Shah 2014c). These numbers, even though difficult to verify, suggest that the tribal elders, who wanted peace in former-
FATA, remained the primary target of militant groups. Further elaborating on this adverse situation, Khan says,
The tribal leaders who wanted to prevent their homeland from war and worked for peace
have been systematically eliminated. They are being singled out for seeking peace and
punished for living under their ancient tribal traditions (Shah 2014c para 6).
These attacks on tribal elders, Jirga gatherings, and Lashkar members in the tribal areas also
explain why and how tribal forces of peace enforcement and conflict resolution remained
vulnerable to such attacks. These attacks actively started in early 2005, when it was reported
that between 2005 and 2006, the militants killed more than 100 tribal elders who had wanted
to resist and oppose the Taliban influence in the FATA region (Lian 2010, 87).
However, these numbers, again, could also be higher as, until recently, the access to the tribal
areas for any journalist was highly restricted by the military. Hence, even until recently, many
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attacks on tribal elders were not reported. Aman (2013) also supports this argument through
his investigations among the residents of the Khyber Agency. According to him, a number of
pro-government elders and peace committee members were killed between 2010 and 2013,
however, their killings could not be reported due to a ban on the release of such information
as well as an afternoon curfew imposed by the military (Aman 2013). However, there have
been other major attacks reported by the electronic and print media. On the other hand,
according to official figures of the FATA Secretariat, more than 1400 Lashkar and Jirga
members have lost their lives between 2004 and 2016 (Khan 2016c). These causalities have
forced a number of tribal elders, Jirga and Lashkar members to permanently move to
Peshawar, Islamabad and other settled cities. (Khan 2016c). This has not only been necessary
to protect themselves but also their families, who migrated with them, as militants have
targeted not only tribal elders but also their families (Khan 2016c).
In terms of their distinction, two major “categories” of tribal elders were targeted and
attacked by the militant groups. The first group of elders were those who were alleged by the
militants to be “spies” working for the state and army of Pakistan (Khan and Saeed 2017, 99).
The second category of elders were those who were members of Jirgas and Lashkars and had taken an open stance against the militant groups and militant activities in the region (Khan and Saeed 2017). This, again, created various complications for the tribal elders who complained that lack of state-supported made them vulnerable to militant attacks.
Additionally, as discussed in the preceding chapter, any expansion of presence or influence of the militant groups in the tribal areas often occurred at the expense of traditional sources of authority in the region – these being tribal elders. However, the authority of tribal elders is also challenged by direct and violent attacks on the elders by militants, in particular when
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such attacks are directed against Jirga and Lashkar, since these are the instruments by which
the elders seek to influence outcomes regarding militants.
A tribal elder from the Khyber Agency pointed to this challenge of the authority of tribal elders
arising from the actions of militants in the tribal regions:
In a peace Jirgah (read Jirga) attended by the government and the militants, one of my close
relatives, who was actually a mashar (elder) at that time, only committed the mistake of
supporting government's stand on some problem under discussion. He just pointed out to the
militants [Lashkar-i Islam] that their stand was perhaps wrong over the said issue. The very
next week, he was kidnapped by the militants and severely tortured. Even the government
could not secure his release. He was rich so his relatives paid the militants for his release from
captivity (Aman 2013, 184).
This incident suggests that if a resourceful tribal elder was vulnerable to militant targeting,
the situation for common “tribal” Pashtuns was even worse. Hence, even friends and families
of the Jirga and Lashkar members were attacked and kidnapped by the militants (Khan
2017b). This was part of a strategy by militants to intimidate anyone who sought to mobilise power and influence against the militants or challenge their presence in an area.
In March 2008, a major attack, allegedly by Al Qaeda, took place in Darra Adam Khel, a town in FR Kohat, on a Jirga gathering killing 42 tribal elders and injuring dozens (Khan 2008a). The attack was, again, directed at undermining of the tribal authority as the Jirga meeting was
taking place to discuss the formation of a Lashkar to fight against the militants (Khan 2008a).
Before the attack, the meeting included around 1000 tribesmen, who had gathered to discuss
the worsening situation of conflict and influx of the Taliban in the region (Taj 2011). After the
meeting, most of the men left the meeting, with only the elders left behind to discuss future
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Lashkar strategy against the Taliban. This is when the attack by the militants occurred. This meant that tribal elders were significant casualties in the attack. However, the dead-count could have been much greater if the attack had taken place when all 1000 tribesmen were on the location (Khan 2008a).
Another major attack occurred on the Salarzai Tribe of Bajaur Agency in November 2008.
After the government decided to launch Operation Sher Dil, the Salarzai tribe also decided to raise a Lashkar of its own to support the military in its efforts of countering militancy in Bajaur.
However, on November 7, 2008, when around 200 tribal elders and Lashkar members were discussing the anti-militant strategy of their Lashkar, their consultative Jirga was attacked by a suicide bomber, killing over 10 tribal elders (TIT 2008).
Then, later in November 2008, four other tribal elders from Bajaur were beheaded by the members of the TTP (Jones and Fair 2010, 65). However, even after these incidents, Kamal
Khan, a tribal elder from Salarzai, said that the attack had only strengthened their resolve to fight the miscreants and drive them out of the region (TIT 2008). Then in 2011, in April and
May, two attacks killed more than 12 members of the Salarzai tribe in Bajaur, most of whom had taken part in anti-TTP Jirgas and Lashkars (Ali and AFP 2011).
In July 2010, a major Jirga gathering in Mohmand Agency, aimed at countering the Taliban, was attacked allegedly by the TTP resulting in more than 100 deaths (Ali 2010c). The attack was composed of suicide blasts, which targeted a busy area in the Agency, destroying over 70 shops, vehicles and offices (Ali 2010c). The Assistant Political Agent of Mohmand Agency, after the blast, said that the suicide blasts were targeting a Jirga gathering in his office where the plans for restoring peace in the area were being discussed (Ali 2010c).
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Later in the year, on December 6, 2010, another suicide blast, launched by a member of the
TTP, killed over 45 tribesmen, local journalists, and security personnel, who were attending a
Jirga gathering (Roul 2011). According to a TTP spokesperson, the Jirga was attacked by the group because it was discussing the formation of a Lashkar to fight the TTP in the region. The
TTP spokesperson said, ‘Those who will work against the Taliban and make Lashkars (tribal militias) or peace committees will be targeted’ (Roul 2011, 4).
This was once more an indication of how Jirga and Lashkar were vulnerable to such attacks.
This is because the militants saw them as a threat because they were directly seeking to challenge and curtail the power and influence of militants in the tribal regions (Taj 2011). It was also because the militants perceived those engaging in Jirga and Lashkar as “allies” of the
Pakistani military, whom the militants were fighting against.
In the last few years, there have been periodic attacks on the tribal elders and Lashkar members. More recently, another peace Jirga gathering was attacked by TTP in 2016, killing four tribal elders (Dawn 2016b). This Jirga of Mehsud tribesmen was attacked in South
Waziristan as the tribal elders were meeting to discuss a plan to monitor the movement of miscreants and militants in the area (Dawn 2016b). Moreover, this Jirga was also convened to discuss a security plan for the tribal Agency as the tribesmen had been receiving threats from the TTP militants.
In more recent attacks, in January and February 2018, tribal elders and Jirga members were
attacked and killed through three IED (improvised explosive device) and roadside landmine
attacks in Bajaur, Orakzai and Kurram agency (Express-Tribune 2018; Khan 2018a). No group
claimed the responsibility for the attack. The attack in Bajaur on Malik Abdur Rehman, in the
Mamond district, was particularly significant as he had formed a peace committee in 2009,
276 with the Public Administration acknowledging his role in restoring peace and fighting militancy in the agency (Khan 2018a).
These recent attacks highlight the vulnerability of not only the security situation in the tribal areas but the ease of targeting former and current Jirga and Lashkar members. Also, the number of tribal elders killed also suggests the impact of these attacks on traditional lines of tribal authority in these regions.
The families of tribal elders who took part in Jirga and Lashkar activities also came under attack from various militant groups. In one such incident in February 2014, in the outskirts of
Peshawar, the militants attacked and killed a former Lashkar leader, Pir Israr, and eight members of his family (Amir 2016). Pir Israr’s elder brother, Pir Zafar, was also a member of a peace Lashkar and killed by the militants during the same year (Shahid 2014). Once again, some tribal members blamed such attacks on lack of support and protection from the
Pakistani army and government. Khushdil Khan, former deputy-speaker of the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Assembly and a former leader of a local Lashkar, argued that these attacks mainly happened because the government had pulled all support from Lashkars,
“leaving them at the mercy of the TTP” (Amir 2016).
However, it was not only the militants who attacked tribal elders, including when they were attending Jirgas, and other tribal members when they were participating in Lashkars. Such individuals were also often collateral damage in US drone strikes targeting militants in the tribal regions. The tribal elders feared that if they escaped attacks of militants, they still had to worry about signature drone strikes by the U.S. (Braithwaite and D’costa 2018, 314). For instance, a regular Jirga gathering, in Datta Khel, North Waziristan, discussing a local mining dispute, was targeted by a series of US drone strikes on March 17, 2011, killing between 26
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to 42 tribesmen (Amnesty-International 2013, 14). Even though there were reports that the
gathering had “some Taliban members” as well, a majority of the gathering consisted of tribal
elders from the village (Masood and Shah 2011). We see therefore how the U.S. drone strikes
were an added danger for Pashtun tribespeople. Not only did they need to fear targeting but
militants, but also one of the means by which militants were targeted. Hence, these tribesmen
were left in a complicated and dangerous situation, where choosing a side carried its own dangers (Aman 2013).
It is also important to discuss that the formation of Lashkars to engage in conflict resolution measures within the tribal regions had consequences for the Pakistani state and army. We
saw above that in many cases the state and army were criticised by Pashtun tribespeople for
not providing enough military and other forms of support for Lashkar once these were
convened by Jirga and directed towards specific objectives. But the actual convening of
Lashkar by Jirga also had some negatives on the tribal society. According to Amir (2012), a
major negative impact of the convening of armed Lashkars was the perception this created
among a number of local tribespeople that the Lashkars were seeking to achieve objectives,
against the militants, because the army was not capable of doing so. Hence, because of these
developments, local civilians started losing faith in the state security apparatus and its ability
in fighting militants (Ali, Ahmed and Aqeel 2015).
We saw above that in initial years, when Jirga first began to convene Lashkars in response to
the presence of militants in their region, the army did not provide sufficient support. But we
also saw that in later years, the state came to recognize, in some circumstances, the valuable
role Lashkar could play in curtailing militant activity, and so began to provide Lashkar with
greater support. However, a potential negative impact of this on the state and army is that
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sometimes problematic members of the local tribes, such as local criminals, who participated
in Lashkar, were armed by the army (Amir 2016). Hence, some of these criminal elements were criticised by the local, for using their weapons, provided by the state, for kidnapping for
ransom (Ahmad 2015; SATP 2011). This was particularly the case in the outskirts of
Peshawar19 (Ahmad 2015). This also suggests that the state, especially the military, valued
only the militarised versions of Pashtun indigenous conflict resolution methods. Hence, the
military failed in promoting the idea that the Jirga could have offered a better form of justice
delivery for the local population compared to the harsher “Islamic” justice model promoted
by various militant groups over the years in tribal areas (Bacha 2008; Aman 2013).
However, the prior analysis shows that the “tribal” Pashtuns have still shown their will to protect the tribal areas against militants. Moreover, the discussion also suggests that the members of Lashkars and peace committees, even after restoring peace in some areas, were still under threat of attacks from militants (Desk 2015). This is despite a claim of the military that, from 2015, the presence of militants in the tribal regions was much “subdued” (Desk
2015). A combination of all these factors has, consequently, resulted in limiting the effectiveness of tribal elders in maintaining peace in the region. However, even with these
19 Such “anti-social” elements resurfaced in the tribal areas, in form of the Maulvi Nazir Group and under the guise of “Peace Committees”, enforcing “Taliban-style” sanctions on the local population in South Waziristan in 2017 (Dawn 2017). The locals argue that these “Peace Committee”, or Peace Lashkars, were the “good Taliban” that the military tacitly supports and considers them a deterrent against other anti-Pakistan militants (Dawn 2017). As per latest developments, even though the government has constantly denied reports of existence of this “Peace Committee”, the group was responsible for attacking a gathering in South Waziristan, killing 3 and wounding 40 people (Khan 2018b). The gathering was organised by the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), where the military was criticised for its treatment for the tribal areas in the gathering (Khan 2018b).
279 limitations and criticisms, the Jirga still enjoys legitimacy and “some” support, discussed below in 8.2, among the “tribal” Pashtuns.
8.2. Public Support for Jirga
Many tribespeople from the former-FATA, as well as other commentators, still consider the
Jirga as a legitimate medium of peace and conflict resolution in the region. Safdar Dawar, a journalist from former-FATA, while ruing the rise of militancy since 2002, says that the situation before 2001 in the tribal areas was peaceful primarily because the Pashtuns had their own cultural mechanisms, such as Jirga and Lashkar, to ensure peace (Tameez 2015,
453).
In terms of its general acceptance, various surveys and studies among the people from the tribal areas have shown significant support for the use of Jirga as a conflict resolution mechanism. In one such study, Fakhr-ul-Islam, Faqir and Atta (2013), found that out of the total 80 respondents, 78 supported the continuation of the Jirga in the Pashtun society. They also concluded in their study that with the current security concerns and conflict in the tribal areas, only a “reactivation” of the Jirga could help in resolving the conflict (Fakhr-ul-Islam,
Faqir and Atta 2013, 94).
On the other hand, Yousaf (2017b), in his research investigating the negative effects of drone strikes in FATA, found that only 53 per cent of the respondents, out of total 132, from the tribal areas, supported the Jirga as a counter-terror measure and form of conflict resolution in their region (see 8.2 below). In the study, even though there was some support for the military operations and drone strikes, a majority supporting the Jirga suggested that cultural means of conflict resolution were still important for “tribal” Pashtuns.
280
Chart 8.1: Support for Jirga in former-FATA
Source: (Yousaf 2017b)
Röder and Shinwari (2015, 45-46), in a survey of 571 Pashtuns who experienced disputes, found that 43 per cent respondents took their disputes to a Jirga, 30 per cent to individual
tribal elders to act as mediators, 10 per cent to a local cleric, and only 6 per cent took their
disputes before the state; either to the Political Agent or the courts in the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province. This shows a greater willingness of “tribal” Pashtuns to resort to
traditional tribal forms of conflict resolution (such as Jirga) rather than to official lines of
authority centred on the Pakistani state.
In Naveed Shinwari’s study of 1500 tribespeople, tribal elders and community leaders,
involving interviews, surveys and focus group discussions, three-quarters of the respondents
believed that the Jirga played a pro-active role in resolving conflicts in the tribal areas
(Shinwari 2011, 6). In another study, Shinwari (2015) suggests that Pashtuns put a higher
percentage of confidence in their traditional conflict resolution methods (Jirga) compared to
other ethnic groups in the country. 281
In 2017, Islamabad-based think tank Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS)
published a report based on its Radio project Mung Qabail (“We, the tribes”) that discussed various issues surrounding the tribal areas and its people (Asif 2017). The project included taking phone calls from residents of the tribal areas during live radio shows and asking them about their issues in their respective tribal agencies. According to the report, the Frontier
Crimes Regulations [FCR] (which we saw was a colonial legacy of the British Raj but still administered by the Pakistani state in the tribal regions) was considered the biggest issue, with many respondents wanting it to be repealed due to its inhumane provisions and sections
(Asif 2017). However another significant finding arising from the report was that many
respondents were of the view that they still supported the Jirga system for quick and effective
delivery of justice, but also believed that the state of Pakistan, through its nominated Political
Agents had corrupted the centuries-old conflict resolution method of “tribal” Pashtuns (Asif
2017).
The “concept” or “idea” of Jirga also holds some legitimacy among the educated youth of
tribal areas. In October 2017, an alliance of youth from FATA called the “FATA Youth Jirga”,
was formed by various young members of civil society from the tribal areas to campaign for
FATA’s merger with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Mailk 2017). The formation of this
Youth Jirga was significant as it had representation from all seven tribal Agencies,
transcending tribal, sectarian and political differences, and uniting to work towards reforms
in the tribal areas (Yousafzai 2017). The alliance was unique in a manner that it also had
female representation in its executive body, and hence, deviating from the patriarchal and
conservative pattern of the Pashtun tribal society (Yousafzai 2017). The choice of the model
of Jirga by these youth to advance their organization and aims shows “some” relevance of
282
this traditional tribal body amongst younger generations of Pashtun tribespeople. However, on the contrary, Naveed Shinwari also believes the young and educated population of the tribal areas is not only the formal institution of Jirga but is also against gender and human rights violations committed by these Jirga under the garb of Pashtunwali (Farooq 2017b).
According to him,
The youth are against the formal Jirga institution in FATA, and they are equally against their
elders. They are not against all the elders, but the young generation understands the elders
to be part of the problem. They have, in a way, revolted against them (Farooq 2017b).
Jirga’s popularity can also be witnessed in parts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province as well.
Many individuals in the Swat region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa regard the Jirga as a legitimate
mode of speedy dispute resolution. The region went through a major military operation after
the rise in militancy in 2009. As a result, in order to support the military operation and post-
conflict situation in the region, thousands of residents of Swat, after Jirga meetings, formed
Lashkars to protect their villages from a further influx of militants (Rodriguez 2009).
Moreover, after the successful completion of the military operation, local Jirgas were
convened to bring together various sections of the society, which also played a major role in
conflict transformation (Dennys and Marjana 2012). A female member from the Swat region
during a group discussion noted that the ‘…post-conflict Swat needed a forum which can
reunite the society and such a function can be well performed by Jirga’ (Dennys and Marjana
2012, 58).
The Jirga “model” has also proven effective in the urban areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa when
used in conjunction with the local police system. The Musalihati (“Making wrongs right”)
Committees are one such model where local tribal elders have the backing of police and try
283 to resolve conflicts through mediation and negotiation in the local police stations (Dawn
2016c). Ali Gohar, a renowned expert and practitioner of Jirga in Pakistan, has successfully worked with the provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to introduce and train such committees, where enmities are resolved through reconciliation and mediation (Ahmed
2010). He believes that even though modern courts punish the culprit, they still fail in reconciling the rivalries and rival families, and therefore these committees have effectively resolved many rivalries and enmities between families (Ahmed 2010). Also, a qualitative study conducted by Braithwaite and Gohar (2014b) on Musalihati committees found that such
Jirga-based committees have helped in reducing violence and making the police force, with low public trust, more accountable to the public.
However, even with this trust placed by the “tribal” Pashtuns in Jirga, the structure still has its flaws when it comes to human rights, gender rights, and its operation under the colonial system of FCR (see above Chapter 4). Hence, there have been repeated calls for abolishing the Jirga altogether and replacing it with the modern justice system. This, some argue, will ensure that gender rights, especially women rights, are not violated by a “male-dominated”
Jirga (Dennys and Marjana 2012; Ali 2018a). In this regard, one of the major criticisms on the
Jirga has been its decisions forced upon the women, in many cases, resulting in honour killings, when women are not mostly present in Jirga themselves (Khan 2017a). Hence, the
Jirga, for such gender rights violations, has been “reviled” by civil society and human rights activists in Pakistan for such a role in relation to women (Khan 2017a).
However, in a counter-argument, John Braithwaite and Ali Gohar (2014b) cite a case study of some “self-accountability” and debate among tribal elders in cases of gross gender rights violations, suggesting why there might be room for change in the tribal structures, especially
284 with ‘educated’ tribal elders. According to this case, before honour killings were outlawed, one such ‘educated’ tribal elder told Ali Gohar, one of the two authors:
One day I passed by the village Hujra where there was a big gathering. After my greeting and
salaam, I asked what’s going on . . . A man replied toor (honor case). Honor crimes were very
rare because the code, Hujra and Jirga were very strong at that time. Jirga procedure was in
progress and the man and woman involved in the adultery were both brought to be killed as
per the Jirga decision. When the man took a rifle to kill both, the girl asked for her last will to
be expressed. But the Jirga stopped her as women are not allowed to say anything who had
already brought so much shame on the community and Hujra. But I being educated and
knowledgeable of law and rules asked the Jirga that I am a guest, have no right to interfere in
your decision but will because the girl is right by all means, traditionally, religiously and
according to law. After a lot of arguments and my stand, the Jirga allowed the girl to speak. I
went close to her and said “say what do you want; I am with you.” Before speaking anything
she asked for a ladder to climb on the rooftop of Hujra. This was strange but I requested
someone to bring a ladder and put it on the jirga building. The girl climbed on it followed by
me. When she reached to the top, she raised her full voice and said: ‘Oh, women, girls of this
village, don’t cry if some man wants to take your honor. My fault is that I cried and called to
save my honor safely. Today I am also dying along with the perpetrator because I cried for
help.’ She then asked me to come down and asked the Jirga to kill her. There was pin-drop
silence at the Hujra; I opened the discussion again inviting jirga to look in depth at what the
girl is saying. Discussion started again and at the end, it was decided that in such scenario
women should be left while the only man should be killed. That became law for the rest of the
area later on (as cited in Braithwaite and Gohar 2014b, 539).
285
However, even with these internal ‘checks and balances’, and as discussed in this thesis, the
Pashtun tribal society has a long way to go in terms of rights protection and women
participation and inclusion in the decision-making process of Jirgas.
Moreover, there also remains a major question of whether these Jirga and Lashkars, challenge Pakistan’s sovereignty?
To answer this question one can see what tribespeople have argued regarding their fight against the militants. In one such instance, during their interviews with Farhat Taj (2011), tribespeople from FATA argued that being part of Lashkars fighting the militants was not a
life they desired. They only took up arms to fight the militants in self-defence and especially
because the government did not take enough action against the militant groups (Taj 2011,
45).
Also, as seen from the example of Mohmand Agency Lashkars (see above, 8.1.2.6), the tribes,
once the militants were successfully defeated through military operations and efforts of the
Lashkar, agreed to return all the arms and ammunition provided by the state. However, even
though many tribes in the tribal areas have agreed to disarm and return heavy weapons
provided by the state, they have also asked that the state that with such disarmament, the
military is now “solely” responsible for their protection (Wazir 2015a).
The Jirga, like most structures of peace and justice delivery, has both its positives and
negatives, as observed in prior discussion in this research. However, the discussion above (in
section 8.1.) also suggests that even with its drawbacks, this peace and conflict resolution structure continues to have significant support among “tribal” Pashtuns, achieving outcomes
286 which they believe to be helpful and meaningful and to possess legitimacy. It has therefore shown its potential in playing some role in the maintaining long term peace in the tribal areas.
8.3. Conclusion
This chapter aimed to answer the major research question, which is: “How has the Jirga engaged in peace and conflict resolution in the Pashtun tribal areas of Pakistan?” In aiming to answer this research question, the chapter focused on how the Jirga played a significant role in responding to the presence of militant groups within the tribal regions. The first section of the chapter, 8.1, discussed how tribal elders convened various Jirga gatherings not only to condemn the militants but also express their desire to achieve peace in the region. Further in the same section, various Jirga initiatives of forming tribal Lashkars, in seven tribal Agencies and Peshawar, were discussed. Discussion of these Jirga-based Lashkars suggested that in the situation of conflict and militancy, various tribes in the former-FATA region took initiatives, both for self-defence and for supporting military operations, to counter the threat of militancy in the region.
However, the chapter also pointed to various limitations imposed on Jirga by outside forces, including attacks by militants, which were directed at undermining the ability of the traditional tribal authority to respond to militants. But other limitations applied particularly in the early years of Lashkar activity in response to the rise of militancy in the region since
2002. This limitation concerned a lack of sufficient support from the Pakistani military.
Coupled with this, a number of “tribal” Pashtuns and other authorities pointed to what they perceived as contradictory or selective policies by elements of the Pakistani military, involving tacit support or, at least, tolerance of some militant groups while actively seeking to prosecute others. This led to a lack of confidence in the Pakistani military, by some “tribal”
287
Pashtuns, in particular concerning the military’s ability to protect local tribes. We saw it was
this perception which was also an additional factor in motivating the tribes to engage in their
own self-protection through the decisions of Jirga and convening of Lashkar.
However, the chapter also pointed to what was seen by “tribal” Pashtuns and others as significant limitations of Jirga themselves. However, despite such criticism of Jirga themselves, the chapter also identified “some” support for Jirga among “tribal” Pashtuns, and
their continuing recognition of Jirga as legitimate decision-making bodies.
288
Conclusion
289
Conclusion
This research thesis sought to answer the following primary research question:
How has the Jirga engaged in peace and conflict resolution in the Pashtun tribal areas of
Pakistan?
To this end, first in Chapter three, the thesis discussed various facets of Pashtun tribal society in the former-FATA region. Chapter three also provided a broad historical and cultural discussion of Pashtun tribal societies in the former-FATA, including important elements of
Pashtun culture, known as Pashtunwali, and what role segmentation played in the Pashtun tribal society.
Chapter four looked at the tribal institution of Jirga and Jirga-based Lashkars, in the Pashtun tribal society, identifying its features and elements, as well as the tribal relationships of authority in which it is situated. Chapter five focused on the relationship of the Pakistani state and military to the Pashtun tribal areas, seeking to show how important elements of the
Pakistani state and military’s attitudes and practices towards the Pashtun tribes were informed by colonial attitudes inherited from the British Raj.
Chapter six then focused on the history of militancy in the former-FATA region, particularly
since the rise of “Mujahedeen” during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It was shown
how the post-2001 period has involved a significant shift in allegiance for the state of Pakistan,
and the military, since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. After 2001, with its formal
allegiance to the United States in the “War on Terror”, the Pakistani state and military
“officially” opposed to the militants who seek to oppose the presence of the United States
and its allies in Afghanistan. Chapter seven then looked at Pakistani army military operations
290
in the former-FATA and the series of peace deals negotiated between the army and the
militants, with Pashtun tribal elders often included as “mediators” in these deals.
Chapter eight then focused on the role of Jirga, and the use of Lashkar, in responding to the
militants in the tribal areas. This chapter was particularly concerned to show how Pashtun
tribespeople themselves have, on their own initiative, engaged in action to respond to
militants and reduce their influence or their capacity to cause unrest and violence in their
region. The chapter also considered external limitations placed on Jirga and Lashkar in this
process, not least the violent response of militants, as well as internal limitations of the Jirga
themselves. Finally, the chapter sought to assess the level of continuing support for Jirga
within Pashtun tribal societies, despite the limitations identified, and also the extent to which
its decisions were still recognized as authoritative and legitimate by “tribal” Pashtuns.
Important Findings
When this thesis was started, the focus of this research was primarily on how indigenous
methods - the Pashtun Jirga - have played a role in conflict resolution in the Pashtun tribal
areas of Pakistan. However, during the course of this research and analysis, a number of
important findings were also made.
In the first half of the thesis, while discussing tribal societies and segmentation in Chapter 3, it was discovered that the concept of segmentation, or segmentary lineage, still played
“some” role in the tribal Pashtun society. While discussing the “tribal” Pashtuns and Jirga, it was discovered that segmentary association played a major role in how “tribal” Pashtuns engaged in shifting alliances with each other, or united in situations of an outside threat.
Moreover, in Chapter 4, it was also discovered how traditional sources of tribal authority, centred on the Pashtun Jirga, still played a major role in maintaining order in the tribal
291 societies. This was witnessed through limited historical accounts of Jirga’s mediation and negotiation role even during the colonial era.
Discussions in the second half of this dissertation (Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8) suggested that the
Pakistani state, influenced by a strong military, had treated the Pashtun tribal areas (former
FATA) as a “periphery”. This attitude towards the tribal areas and the practices arising from it was a legacy of the colonial era. Actions of the Pakistani state and army within the tribal areas were therefore investigated within this wider framework of the colonial legacy.
Such colonial legacies were particularly evident in specific state practices within the tribal areas, such as the decision of the Pakistani state, upon achieving independence in 1947, to continue to govern the former-FATA under the colonial administration of the Frontier Crimes
Regulation (FCR). We saw that this was a series of laws enacted by the British to deal specifically with the “frontier” of the British Raj, occupied by the Pashtun tribes, and imbued with all the colonial assumptions we identified.
Furthermore, it was discovered (in Chapter 5) that Pashtun cultural and traditional structures were negatively affected during the colonial era. This negative impact of the colonial legacy on tribal structures persisted after independence, due to the Pakistani state’s retention of the
FCR and the executive powers given to the Political Agent under these regulations. These powers also resulted in the corruption of some tribal elders, whose “consultative” role in the
FCR Jirgas was manipulated through by the PA.
In Chapter 7, it was further discovered that even when the military moved into the tribal areas in 2002, all peace initiatives in the form of peace deals with the militants were heavily influenced by the military. We saw how, in some cases, although the tribal elders were often
292
part of these deals, the deals also, at times, had the effect of undermining their tribal
authority. This further resulted in the militants negotiating from a position of strength due to
their status as an “equal party”, whereas the tribespeople were sandwiched between the
military operations and the militant attacks.
In conclusion, various themes discussed in the research, mainly postcolonialism and
segmentation among tribes, helped explain various dimensions of intrastate conflict on the
periphery in a postcolonial state, which in this case was the former-FATA region. It was
explained in section 3.3 how segmentation still played “some” role in the Pashtun tribal
society, which was evident when various tribes took it upon themselves to convene Jirga
meetings and form Lashkars against a “common” enemy, which was the militant groups
operating the region.
The Research Question
In the Introduction the following major research question was asked.
How has the Jirga engaged in peace and conflict resolution in the Pashtun tribal areas of
Pakistan?
While discussing the importance and effectiveness of Jirga (in Chapter 4 and Chapter 8), it
was concluded that the Jirga played an important role in conflict resolution and peace in the tribal Pashtun society. Also, from the discussion in Chapter 8, it can be argued that the Jirga has played a significant role in countering militant threats in respective tribal Agencies. Even with some support from the military, the Pashtun tribesmen, through Jirga, were able to raise
Lashkars to fight various militant groups in their region.
293
Because the Jirga mobilized their authority against the militants, tribal elders have been targeted and attacked by the militant groups. We saw that this placed heavy pressure on traditional sources of tribal authority, with the elimination of many tribal elders or their migration outside their region. However, in other instances, tribal elders have remained resilient and have remained in their tribal areas to resist the influence of militants.
What gives hope is that traditional tribal sources of authority have a role in peace and conflict resolution in the future and that, despite targeted militant attacks, these tribespeople have persisted with convening Jirgas in the tribal areas against militants. Moreover, with various accounts of Jirga efforts against militancy, it was discovered that even with their drawbacks and major human rights concerns, there still remains some support, on certain levels, for the
Jirga among the Pashtun tribespeople, thereby suggesting that it can play “some” role in lasting peace in the tribal areas. However, even if the Pakistani state, in the near or distant future, seeks to formally incorporate the Jirga its peace and conflict resolution policy, it should do so by ensuring that these tribal structures do not violate gender and human rights.
The Pakistani state, in this regard, can follow various hybrid models of dispute resolution in
Afghanistan that encourage women participation. A study conducted by Rebecca Gang (2011) in a Hazara Shia part of Kabul found that a hybrid dispute resolution programme, which also included women in the decision making process, had positive outcomes especially because the government in Kabul did not have the capacity to effectively resolve local conflicts
(Wardak and Braithwaite 2012, 201). Such models can be studied and efforts can be made to incorporate them in Pakistan’s Pashtun ‘tribal’ areas.
294
Scope for Future Research
Even though the use of Jirga in the Pashtun tribal areas, especially under the FCR, was
discussed in this research, there still remains scope for future research on the Pashtun tribal
areas in terms of FATA’s merger with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Such a research
project can focus on various challenges faced by the “tribal” Pashtuns during the reforms
process, along with how tribal elders and Jirga played a role in supporting or opposing the
merger.
Secondly, there is also scope to discuss and investigate the rise and role of Pashtun Tahafuz
(Protection) Movement (PTM) in the tribal areas, and how the PTM questioned, and
challenged, the military’s unchecked influenced in the tribal areas.
Third, there still remains scope for further investigating the legal and constitutional side of the Jirga and how can it play a role in justice delivery in the remote areas of the former-FATA region.
Finally, there is also scope to investigate the negative effects of postcolonial governance and militancy on gender rights in the tribal areas. Various works on hybrid models of dispute resolution and women participation in Afghanistan by Wardak and Braithwaite (2012) and hybrid community policing model based on the Jirga model Pakistan Braithwaite and Gohar
(2014b) can provide good starting points in this regard. Moreover, these negative effects on gender rights can also investigate whether, and how, the Jirga negatively affected women empowerment, inclusion and education in the Pashtun society, and what measures could be taken to incorporate the role of women in the decision-making process in Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal areas.
295
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URL: 333 Annex 334 Annex 1: A Brief History of Pashtun Tribal Areas The tribal areas of Pakistan that makeup FATA today were historically the focus of a battleground between the Russians and the British Empire since the 19th century, and the United States in the late 20th century (Leake 2016, 17). For that reason, the region has historically remained the epicentre of the ‘Great Game’ (Pande 2011, 60). For the British Empire in the Indian subcontinent, these areas were not only an important focal point for the defence of their possessions in India but also a safeguard against the Russian and then the Soviet expansion in Central Asia (Pande 2011, 60). Yet, even with a number of efforts, the British Raj failed to enforce its writ in the region and attempted a number of measures, including collective punishment under the FCR (Wazir 2007). These tribal areas have come under the sway of famous invaders including Alexander, Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, with all failing to bring to bring these tribes under their domination or control, resulting in historical persistence of tribes on the highlands (Caroe 1958, xxi). The spread of Islam here started in the eighth century, whereas it was the Turkish dynasty’s invasion and rule over Afghanistan in the tenth century that started a mass propagation of Islam in Afghanistan and among “tribal” Pashtuns (Singh 2013; Caroe 1958, 117-118). Thus, by 1000 A.D., most of the Pashtun population had accepted Islam (Siddique 2014). Before the introduction of Islam, various religions in the region included Zoroastrianism, Paganism, and Buddhism (Bosworth 2008; Caroe 1958). Since then, various Turk – Ghaznavids, Ghorids, and Tughlaqs – and Afghan (Pashtun) dynasties – Khiljis, Lodhis, and Suris – ruled the Indian subcontinent and controlled the throne in New Delhi, yet none of them succeeded in controlling the tribal belt (ul Haq, Khan and Nuri 2005). 335 A number of factors – such as the Russian advances in Afghanistan – played a major role in the formulation of policies, especially towards Afghanistan, in the Indian subcontinent (Nawid 1997, 589). The advances of the Russian fears were explicitly mentioned in a selection of papers presented before the British parliament where it was argued that in Afghanistan Russia had a close ally that could hurt British interests in India (Afghan-Committee 1879, 319). Major challenges that were overcome by the British between 1757 and 1849 included various territorial battles with Hindu and Muslim rulers in Mysore, the Maratha Confederacy and finally the Punjab annexation (Barua 1994). Additionally, James Brown Ramsey, also known as Marquess of Dalhousie or Lord Dalhousie, used his ‘doctrine of lapse’ to annex further estates whose princes were deceased including Satara (1848), Udaipur (1852), Jhansi (1854), Tanjore (1853), Nagpur (1854), and Oudh (1856) (Gupta and Vohra 2016). In the meantime, the British Parliament also enacted a series of Laws in order to curb the unrestrained activities of the East India Company in the territories under the Company’s control, including the 1773 Regulating Act (Parliament 2017a). There was also an introduction of the Charter Act of 1813 which introduced the British moral responsibility in its Raj to abolish certain cultural norms and practices (Parliament 2017a). There was also William Pitt’s India Act of 1784 which helped in establishing the British authority over political policy making the region, and any policies were to be approved by a designated Parliamentary board of six members (Parliament 2017a). The British parliament then abolished the Company’s monopoly over affairs in 1813, whereas in 1857, after the famous ‘mutiny of 1857’, it was decided to appoint a Lieutenant Governor General to oversee regions of Bengal, Bihar, and Odisha, whereas a Governor-General was directed to govern the entire colony of India (Viswanathan 1988; Parliament 2017a). Most 336 important of all these annexations, for British consolidation in the Indian subcontinent, was The Punjab region, or province, in the North West, including the Pashtun tribes near Afghanistan. While facing various resistance movements and potential threats from the North and North West, the British Raj annexed Punjab in 1849 (Caroe 1958, 329). The Sikh Empire until 1849 (Indiatimes 2017) From 1849 to 1947, the British faced constant issues and rebellion movements from the “tribal” Pashtuns. Such was the resistance in tribal areas especially Waziristan agency where the ratio of troops to civilians was almost similar (Beattie 2011). The Punjab region, before the annexations was a part of the Sikh empire where one of the reasons for the fall of the Sikh rule was the death Maharaja Ranjith Singh ten years earlier. Talbot (2011) argues that the before the annexation of the Sikh Kingdom in 1849, the British ruled most parts of the Indian subcontinent. It was during 1849 that the British annexed most of the parts of what today 337 constitutes the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (or previously known as North West Frontier Province), including Bannu, DI Khan, Hazara, Kohat, Mardan and Peshawar (Ernst 2015). Substantial British interests in Frontier, as well as Afghanistan, could be traced back to the first Anglo-Afghan War (1838-1842), particularly 1839, when the British, fearing Russian advances in Afghanistan, not only attacked an Iranian island in the Persian Gulf, but with the help of Ranjit Singh, installed a deposed Sadduzai (Durrani) king, Shah Shuja, against Amir (King) Dost Muhammad Khan of Barakzai dynasty, who offered little resistance to the Army of the Indus led by the British (Nawid 1997, 587). During the 19th Century, none of the Afghan Amirs were capable of stabilizing the internal fragility in Afghanistan, especially because of the lack of internationally demarked borders, and thus time and again sought assistance from Russia and Britain (Qureshi 1966). It is also worth noting that Shah Shuja also had a close alliance defence alliance during his first reign, signed between him and British envoy Mountstuart Elphinstone in 1809. Soon after Shuja defeated Dost Muhammad with the help of the British army, William MacNaughten, British representative in Kabul, took an open charge of affairs. The locals, especially clerics and religious heads, proclaimed jihad against the British administration and Shuja (Nawid 1997, 587). This uprising resulted in the deaths of Shah Shuja and MacNaughten, as well as further deaths of 4500 British soldiers who were evacuating from Afghanistan (Nawid 1997). The British thus withdrew from Afghanistan after signing a negotiated peace settlement with the new rulers in Afghanistan. King Dost Muhammad, who was previously overthrown by Shah Shuja, was reinstated particularly because of the role played by his son, Sardar Akbar Khan, during the mutiny between November and December 1841 (Clements 2003, 284; Nawid 1997). In December 1842, Dost Muhammad was recognised as the Emir of Afghanistan by the 338 British and thus begins his twenty-one year rule (Clements 2003, 285). The second Anglo- Afghan War 1878-1880 again put Pashtun tribes in the middle of major conflict (Clements 2003, 45; Nawid 1997). This war again was waged because of Czarist advances in Central Asia, where the British, by defeating the Amir of Afghanistan, were aiming to create a buffer state in Afghanistan to protect its Indian colony (Rubin 2002, 48). The war part of the ‘forward policy’ was initiated by the then British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli who moved on from the ‘masterly inactivity’ policy that was put in place after the First Anglo-Afghan War (Nawid 1997). Even though the British failed to completely gain control of Afghanistan, its new Amir Abdul Rehman, nephew of Amir Sher Ali who was ruling before the war, still ceded his foreign policy to the British (Rubin 2002, 48). This control by the British over Afghan foreign policy helped them enforce a new demarked border on the Frontier known as the Durand Line, with the agreement signed in agreement in 1893 Sir Mortimer Durand, then foreign secretary of India, (Alikuzai 2013, 719; Ahmed 2013a, 59). This border helped the British administration to eliminate areas in the frontier previously known as ‘no man’s land’, and thus limits on the line were defined on both sides (Caroe 1958, 382). Even though this demarcation, which divided Pashtuns on both sides, helped the British administration gain some control over the tribal belt, it did not ensure a smooth administration of affairs in the tribal belt. Punjab was an important link in the British chain of rule over the subcontinent, as its frontier was the passage that was used by great rulers in the past to invade this region (Williams 2015). From 1849 to 1947, even with the Durand Line in 1893, the British faced countless skirmishes and rebellions from the Frontier tribes, which also forced them to introduce draconian laws based on collective responsibility and punishment, such as the Frontier Crimes Regulations (Rashid 2002). Additionally, in order to 339 better control the Frontier region, the British created a separate North West Frontier Province, in November 1901, which also included the current tribal areas and placed them under the control of Chief Commissioner Lt. Colonel H A Deane (Caroe 1958, 414; Howell 1979, 34). This province at the time, had five tribal agencies, namely Dir-Swat-Chitral, Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan, whereas five settled areas namely Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohat, Peshawar and Hazara (ul Haq, Khan and Nuri 2005; Sligo 2012). Khan (2018c) argues that other than the Soviet Expansion, the British also feared a unified Pashtun threat, which played a major role in the division of Pashtuns in the sub-continent and Afghanistan. However, one of the major setbacks in the early 20th century for the British from the Pashtun tribal areas was in the aftermath of the First World War (Rubin 2002, 54). When in February 1919 Amanullah seized power after the murder of Habibullah, he not only declared Afghanistan a sovereign state – accepted by Russia – but also encouraged Pashtuns on the other side of the Durand Line to wage Jihad against the British, who initially refused to accept Afghanistan’s sovereignty (Rubin 2002, 54). Of all the tribes in the North West, it was the Wazir and Mehsud tribes in Waziristan that always proved to be the most troublesome for the British Army forcing the colonial administration to launch a number of military operations in the region between 1860 and 1940 (Caroe 1958, 397). It is also worth mentioning here that Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan, Pakistan’s deadliest militant organization was initially formed, and later run, by Mehsuds; namely Baitullah and Hakimullah (Bergen and Tiedemann 2010). Both the Mehsuds and Wazirs were more or less independent during most of the 19th century, even though Afghan kings claimed their authority over it, 340 hence resisting any efforts by the British to annex the tribal areas (Beattie 2011). Warren describes the complexity of Waziristan, pre-partition, in the following words: But in Waziristan the main tribes were not integrated with the Indus plains to any great extent; local intrigues were considerably enhanced by Afghan interference, and the Wazirs were self- sufficient in the short term. All the local advantages lay with the tribesmen. Waziristan was one of the tribal areas where a pacification policy was least likely to have succeeded and most likely to provide the kind of provocation needed by a tribal leader looking to rally support for a revolt (Warren 1997, 55). Also, both the Meshuds and Wazirs were also involved in raiding surrounding areas under British control, forcing the British administration to ensure that the region comes under its control – especially because of the vulnerability India was facing from the North West (Beattie 2011). Additionally, the British Army was also facing threats from the Afridi tribes in the Khyber agency (Caroe 1958, 342). Ahmed (2013a, 59) argues that during the 1930s the British had more troops in the tribal areas alone compared to the rest of the Indian Empire. Such was the complexity of the affairs in the region that at one point, Lord Curzon, the viceroy of India, took direct control of the region (Ahmed 2013a, 59). Of notable Pashtun fighters resisting against the British, three famous names have been often discussed in the pre-partition history of FATA. These included Haddah Mullah, a Mohmand leader in 1890s, Powindah Mullah from the Mehsud tribe, and Faqir of Ipi from North Waziristan (Hauner 1981; Hopkins 2009). Also, these Pashtun fighters mainly came in focus in the early 20th century, with the overstretch of the British and Indian armies due to Anglo-Afghan war of 1919 and the First World War (Sligo 2012). 341 The first of many issues that the British faced in the tribal areas in the early 20th century was from the Mehsuds, when in 1900 they killed official border police personnel near two isolated posts, along with accumulating unpaid fines (Sligo 2012). Rather than initially sending a military expedition, Lord Curzon ordered a blockade of the Mehsuds, reducing the supply of necessities to almost a famine level. When the results were not achieved, Curzon followed a more aggressive approach after twelve months sending battalions to burn down villages, and destroying food supplies and cattle (Sligo 2012). This approach finally helped the British achieve the Mehsud submission, but only for a short time. Also, during the First World War, the British had to work repeatedly to curb uprisings in both 1915 and 1917, whereas in during the 1919 Afghan War the British did not have enough soldiers to commit to both Khyber Pass and Waziristan, and thus opted for the former. Additionally, a number of tribal Pashtun soldiers, working in the British army and a majority of whom were either Wazirs or Afridis, deserted the British (Moreman 1998, 104). The period post-Third Afghan War also saw the most extensive use of RAF aircraft during the military operations in tribal areas, especially Waziristan (Moreman 1998, 130). Also, during this time, tribal raids were also regularly taking place from Waziristan into settled areas of North West Frontier Province, which forced the British administration to take further action. Further troubles ensued in 1924 when four tribes from Waziristan, even after military operations, remained autonomous. Therefore, in 1925, the Royal Air Force (RAF) decided to unanimously take action without army support – a war also known as Pink’s War after Wing Commander RCM Pink (O'Connell 2007, 187). Soon after the RAF’s operations, the tribal elders in mountainous strongholds sought peace. It was Waziristan that produced one of the most well-known rebel leaders, Mirza Ali Khan (1897- 1960), famously known as the Faqir of Ipi, who led a strong revolt against the British forces in 1936, and who had remained elusive to the British forces (Moreman 1998, 155). Khan’s revolt 342 started when a British judicial decision convicted a Muslim in Bannu for forcefully converting a minor Muslim girl (Trench 1985, 148-149). This enraged Khan and motivated him to unite rival tribes, especially Mehsuds and Bhittanis, and declare Jihad against the British. This was the start of one of the major wars, for which the British had to use a multi-tier strategy, including construction of roads, and employing Mehsuds and Wazirs for paid work (Sligo 2012). It was in then in 1939 that the situation in Waziristan quietened, with some instances of violence until 1947. Yet the British army never succeeded in apprehending Khan. Warren (1997), while specifically commenting on the British operations in Waziristan, argues that historical records from both Wazir and Mehsud tribes show that none of the British policies succeeded in establishing full British authority or control over the Waziristan region. 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