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Comparative Constitutional Law SPRING 2012 Comparative Constitutional Law SPRING 2012 PROFESSOR STEPHEN J. SCHNABLY Office: G472 http://osaka.law.miami.edu/~schnably/courses.html Tel.: 305-284-4817 E-mail: [email protected] SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS: TABLE OF CONTENTS Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 .................................................................1 Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26. An Act respecting the Supreme Court of Canada................................................................................................................................11 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) .............................................................................................12 Kenya Timeline..............................................................................................................................20 Laurence Juma, Ethnic Politics and the Constitutional Review Process in Kenya, 9 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 471 (2002) ..........................................................................................23 Mary L. Dudziak, Working Toward Democracy: Thurgood Marshall and the Constitution of Kenya, 56 Duke L.J. 721 (2006)....................................................................................26 Laurence Juma, Ethnic Politics and the Constitutional Review Process in Kenya, 9 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 471 (2002) .......................................................................................34 Migai Akech, Abuse of Power and Corruption in Kenya: Will the New Constitution Enhance Government Accountability?, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 341 (2011).................................................................................................................................35 Laurence Juma, Ethnic Politics and the Constitutional Review Process in Kenya, 9 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 471 (2002) .......................................................................................39 Alicia L. Bannon, Designing a Constitution-Drafting Process: Lessons from Kenya, 116 Yale L.J. 1824 (2007) ........................................................................................................40 Migai Akech, Abuse of Power and Corruption in Kenya: Will the New Constitution Enhance Government Accountability?, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 341 (2011).................................................................................................................................48 Simon Roughneen, Cynicism and Corruption at the Root of Kenya’s Problems, The Sunday Business Post (Ireland), Jan. 6, 2008 ....................................................................49 Eric Kramon and Daniel N. Posner, Kenya’s New Constitution, J. Democ., 22(2) (April 2011), at 89-103.................................................................................................................51 Migai Akech, Abuse of Power and Corruption in Kenya: Will the New Constitution Enhance Government Accountability?, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 341 (2011).................................................................................................................................56 David Schneiderman, Comparative Constitutional Law in an Age of Economic Globalization.......................................................................................................................58 Stephen J. Schnably, The OAS and Constitutionalism: Lessons from Recent West African Experience..........................................................................................................................60 Bringing the Courts Back Under the Constitution: NEWT 2012 Position Paper Supporting Item No. 9 of the 21st Century Contract with America (Draft 10/7/11), pp. 13-16 ............................................................................................................................72 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010)...................................................................................75 Jim Kelly, U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Limits on Its Use of International Law, Global Governance Watch, May 19, 2010 ....................................................................................80 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010)..................................................................82 Aaron Fellmeth, International Law and Foreign Laws in the U.S. State Legislatures, ASIL Insights, 15(3) (May 26, 2011) ................................................................................84 Daniel Mclaughlin, Landslide victory for centre-right in Hungary, The Irish Times, April 27,.......................................................................................................................................89 Cillian O’Donoghue, Fidesz looks to alter Constitution, The Prague Post, Nov. 3, 2010 ............90 Judy Dempsey, Hungary Waves Off Criticism Over Media Law, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 2010....................................................................................................................................91 Judy Dempsey, Hungary approves a new Constitution; Socialists and liberals boycott vote in dispute over checks and balances, The International Herald Tribune, April 19, 2011..............................................................................................................................92 Cillian O’Donoghue, Hungary passes new constitution amid concerns, The Prague Post, April 27, 2011 ....................................................................................................................93 Nicholas Kulish, Overhauling Hungary, bit by bit; As Fidesz Party leverages its majority, opponents see a slow-motion coup, International Herald Tribune, Dec. 23, 2011............94 Neil Buckley and Kester Eddy, Hungary dismisses concerns over new constitution, Financial Times, Jan. 3, 2012 ............................................................................................96 Stephen Castle, Europe Takes Hungary to Task, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2012................................97 Stephen Castle, As Lenders Apply Pressure, Hungary Drops Bank Plan, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 2012..............................................................................................................................98 Paul Krugman, Depression And Democracy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 2011....................................99 Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 2011 .........100 Kim Lane Scheppele, The Unconstitutional Constitution, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 2012 .................103 European Parliament Resolution of 5 July 2011 on the Revised Hungarian Constitution ..........105 Venice Commission, Opinion on the New Constitution of Hungary (17-18 June 2011)............109 European Centre for Law and Justice, Memorandum on the Hungarian New Constitution of 25 April 2011, May 19, 2011 ......................................................................................137 The Supreme Court [UK].............................................................................................................162 Lord Clarke, The Supreme Court – One Year On, Bracton Law Lecture, Exeter University, 11 November 2010........................................................................................164 Lecture delivered by Lord Phillips at UCL Constitution Unit, launch of research project on The Politics of Judicial Independence, 8 February 2011............................................166 TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT (2007)....................................................................168 Taiyyaba Ahmed Qureshi, State of Emergency: General Pervez Musharraf’s Executive Assault on Judicial Independence in Pakistan, 35 N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 485 (2010)...............................................................................................................................215 Shoaib A. Ghias, Miscarriage of Chief Justice: Judicial Power and the Legal Complex in Pakistan under Musharraf, 35 Law & Soc. Inquiry 985 (Fall 2010) ...............................223 Taiyyaba Ahmed Qureshi, State of Emergency: General Pervez Musharraf’s Executive Assault on Judicial Independence in Pakistan, 35 N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 485 (2010)...............................................................................................................................230 Shoaib A. Ghias, Miscarriage of Chief Justice: Judicial Power and the Legal Complex in Pakistan under Musharraf, 35 Law & Soc. Inquiry 985 (Fall 2010) ...............................234 Taiyyaba Ahmed Qureshi, State of Emergency: General Pervez Musharraf’s Executive Assault on Judicial Independence in Pakistan, 35 N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 485 (2010)...............................................................................................................................235 Note, The Pakistani Lawyers’ Movement and the Popular Currency of Judicial Power, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1705 (2010)........................................................................................237 Shoaib A. Ghias, Miscarriage of Chief Justice: Judicial Power and the Legal Complex in Pakistan under Musharraf, 35 Law & Soc. Inquiry 985 (Fall 2010) ...............................241 Declan Walsh, Pakistan Court Orders Prime Minister to Testify, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 2012..................................................................................................................................243 Declan
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