Pakistan Response Towards Terrorism: a Case Study of Musharraf Regime
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PAKISTAN RESPONSE TOWARDS TERRORISM: A CASE STUDY OF MUSHARRAF REGIME By: SHABANA FAYYAZ A thesis Submitted to the University of Birmingham For the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science and International Studies The University of Birmingham May 2010 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT The ranging course of terrorism banishing peace and security prospects of today’s Pakistan is seen as a domestic effluent of its own flawed policies, bad governance, and lack of social justice and rule of law in society and widening gulf of trust between the rulers and the ruled. The study focused on policies and performance of the Musharraf government since assuming the mantle of front ranking ally of the United States in its so called ‘war on terror’. The causes of reversal of pre nine-eleven position on Afghanistan and support of its Taliban’s rulers are examined in the light of the geo-strategic compulsions of that crucial time and the structural weakness of military rule that needed external props for legitimacy. The flaws of the response to the terrorist challenges are traced to its total dependence on the hard option to the total neglect of the human factor from which the thesis develops its argument for a holistic approach to security in which the people occupy a central position. Thesis approach is also shown to hold the solutions for eliminating the causes of extremism on which terrorism feeds and grows. In sum the study deconstructs Musharraf’s regime’s response to terrorism by examining the conceptual mould of the strategic players in the country and postulates a holistic and integrated security framework to deal with terrorism on a pro-active and sustainable basis. An approach such as this would logically entail the redefining of the role of the state vis-à-vis its people as the fulcrum and medium of ensuring traditional and non traditional security of the country. Contents Acknowledgements CHAPTER 1: Introduction 1 - 19 1.1) Research Contributions 1.2) Aims and Structure CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 20 - 42 Key studies on Pakistan‟s experience with Violence and terrorism Gaps in existing literature on National Security, Terrorism and Pakistan CHAPTER 3: Theoretical Framework 43 – 76 Part One: The wider debate around the concept of “security” Traditionalist / Positivist Perspective on Security Non-Traditionalist / Post-Positivist Perspective on Security Part Two: Proposed Framework to Understand and Critique Pakistan‟s Response to Terror Expanded Conception of Security: An Integrated Framework for Pakistan‟s Response to Terrorism A. Barry Buzan - A Holistic View of Security B. Mahbub-ul-Haq‟s Human Security Framework C. Buzan‟s concept of „Regional Security Complex‟ D. Concept of “Subaltern Realism” Operationalising integrated Framework CHAPTER 4: Historical Background of Terrorism in Pakistan 77 – 128 Introduction Part One: Genesis of Extremism and Political Violence in Pakistan 4.1) Islam as Strategic Tool in State Policy 4.2) Jinnah‟s Idea of Pakistan Vs Reality 4.3) General Zia‟s Islamaization program 4.4) Genesis of Pakistan‟s Involvement in Afghanistan after Soviet Occupation of Kabul in 1979 4.5) „Jihad‟ in Kashmir since 1989 Part Two: 4.6) Security Implications of Pakistan‟s Involvement in Afghanistan and Kashmir 4.7) Harkat- ul - Mujahidin (HUM) 4.8) Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) 4.9) Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LT) 4.10) Musharraf - Pre 9/11 Phase Conclusion CHAPTER 5: Military Response towards Terrorism: Home Front? 129 - 182 Pakistan as US Partner in the War on Terror (WOT) – Post 9/11 Phase Introduction Part one: 5.1) Why Musharraf Regime joined the War on Terror vis-à-vis Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda? Part Two: Goals Versus Challenges: Mishmash of Pakistan‟s Internal and External Security Dimensions. 5.2) Secure Pakistan‟s strategic assets 5.2.1) To safeguard the cause of Kashmir 5.2.2) Peaceful and stable Afghanistan and deal with home-grown religious militancy Part Three: Pakistan as Front-line US Partner in the WOT – Musharraf Regime 5.3) Provision of Air Bases and Air fields 5.4) Sharing of Intelligence and Joint Anti-Terrorism Cooperation 5.5) Logistic Support to ISAF/NATO in Afghanistan Apprehending Al-Qaeda Terrorists Conclusion CHAPTER 6: Military Response towards Terrorism: Home Front? 183 - 240 Introduction Part One: FATA – A Unique Entity! Part Two: Military Actions – 2002 - 2010 6.2) Operation Al Mizan 2002–06 6.3) Shikai Agreement – April 2004 6.4) Sra Rogah Peace Deal – February 2005 6.5) Military Action and Peace Agreements in North Waziristan – 2006 6.6) Military Actions, inactions, peace overtures and reactions in FATA; 6.7) Swat: Operation Rah-e-Haq in late November 2007 and July 2008 6.8) Operation Silence on Jamia Hafsa and Red Mosque, 3-10 July 2007, Islamabad 6.9) Operation Zalzala in South Waziristan - 2008 6.10) Operation Sher Dil in Bajaur - 2008 Part Three: Impact of Military actions Conclusion CHAPTER 7: Musharraf Reform based Approach to Terrorism in Pakistan 241 -291 Part One 7.1) Challenge of Reforming Education System in Pakistan Part Two 7.2) Legal and Institutional Measures to Counter Terrorism 7.2) Police Reforms under Musharraf Part Three 7.3.1) Musharraf‟s Political and Social Measures in the name of counter Extremism in Pakistan 7.3.2) Concept of Enlightened Moderation 7.3.3) Promoting „Soft Image‟ of Pakistan 7.3.4) Musharraf‟s Media Measures: Freedom versus Repression 7.3.5) Human Resource Development as part of Enlightened Moderation under Musharraf Conclusion CHAPTER 8: Conclusion 292 – 315 Bibliography 316- 341 Appendices i-xxxxxviii CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION: RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS, AIMS AND STRUCTURE ―For some time Pakistan has been the main contender for the title of most dangerous country on earth,‖ 1 warned The Economist while the Musharraf regime was still in power. Pakistan‘s approach to the War on Terror remains enigmatic not only for the US- led international community but also for the people of Pakistan. On the eve of 9/11 Pakistan perceived an immediate military threat from the United States if it chose not to side with the US in its war against Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. When General Musharraf led Pakistan into the US camp in its war against terror, his decision to side with the US-led NATO forces in their attack on Afghanistan was seen as a U-turn of Pakistan‘s policy toward Afghanistan. Thereafter, Pakistan became the ―most allied ally‖ of the US in its war against terror. But despite public declarations of the strength of US- Pakistan relationship during General Musharraf‘s rule, there existed deep-rooted suspicions on both sides. Within the US there was a sense that Pakistan continued to distinguish between ―good Taliban‖ and ―bad Taliban‖, and that General Musharraf was running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. The peace deals concluded between General Musharraf‘s government and tribal militant groups (later to join hands under the banner of Tehreek-e- Taliban Pakistan) irked the US and was seen as evidence of the policy of duplicity being pursued by General Musharraf in relation to the US policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan‘s tribal belt. Pakistan-US differences over strategies and tactics to be employed in fighting 1 The Economist, 5th January, 2008. 1 the war on terror have only grown overtime. After a decade of US war in Afghanistan wherein Pakistan continues to function as a formal ally, the mutual suspicion in US- Pakistan relationship is at an all time high. While the US administration has continued to push Pakistan to ―do more‖, policy makers within the US have been openly debating a range of options from direct military strikes within Pakistan‘s tribal areas to military and economic sanctions against Pakistan to protect what is seen as US interest in the war raging across Afghanistan and within Pakistan‘s tribal areas. On the other hand, there has been an entrenched perception within Pakistan that despite being an ally of the coalition forces fighting against Al-Qaeda and Taliban, Pakistan remains under direct external military threat due to US presence in Afghanistan.2 Notwithstanding the worst case scenarios under contemplation in the US and Pakistan, Pakistan-US relationship has been tense and tenuous due to differences over Pakistan‘s commitment and approach toward fighting terrorism. Within Pakistan over the last decade there has been an intense debate on whether the war on terror is Pakistan‘s war or if Pakistan is acting as a mercenary to promote US security interests. One school of thought argues that US presence and its war in Afghanistan has destabilized Pakistan and has resulted in proliferation of violence and terrorism in the country. Cited as evidence are the post 9-11 military operations with Pakistan‘s tribal areas, the simultaneous break-down of traditional structures of governance within these areas, and the advent and escalation of suicide bombings within Pakistan against citizens and security agencies. The adherents of this argument have held that the decision to engage Pakistan with the US war on terror has imported and spread 2 According to a poll conducted by Gallup in June 2008, 4 in 10 Pakistanis (40%) thought US military presence in Afghanistan posed a direct threat to Pakistan.