TLO Policy Brief / 3 October 2010

Reconciliation and Reintegration in Loya Paktia Local Perspectives and Recommendations

1 Introduction Summary Loya Paktia is very much embedded in  While the local population considers tribal traditions and its social organization the idea of reconciliation as a good and necessary one at this juncture, it still regulated by the customary law is unclear what this will mean to them in practical terms. known as Pashtunwali. Compared to  There are doubts as to the lessons other parts of Afghanistan, the region has learned from past reconciliation programs. long benefited from strong and cohesive  Reintegration necessitates guarantees tribal structures. Indeed, tribes in this for foot soldiers, i.e. that they will not be arrested by Afghan National part of the country are traditionally the Security Forces or the International Military. largest permanent political and social  The role of the foreign military in this units, where elites (khans, maliks) and process should be reconsidered given the antagonism and resentment notables (spin giri) hold great influence. caused by military action in the region, particularly in light of the While the integrity of these institutions behaviour of Special Operations Forces (SOF). has steadily eroded since the jihad  Attempts to broker meaningful 1 relations with ‘foreign elements’ of the against the Soviet occupation, until insurgency would be considered relatively recently, security at both the unsustainable.  The regional dimension of the conflict district and provincial levels in Loya (e.g. the presence of cross-border Paktia were guaranteed by agreements sanctuaries) must be taken into consideration when designing a among tribes, and between tribes and the reintegration program. 2 government. The Afghan government still relies in certain areas on tribes to

provide community-based policing 3 (arbakai). The Liaison Office is grateful for funding provided by the Heinrich This said, several windows of opportunity Böll Stiftung to its programmes in Paktia and Nangarhar. have been lost since 2001 when district 2

councils and tribal leaders were willing to security, neither in the districts or join forces with the Afghan government in provincial centres. order to broker a meaningful partnership Against this backdrop, elders in Loya in the area of governance and security. Paktia (see Map 1) are being asked to Security has deteriorated to such an support a peace and reintegration extent in the past few years (and most initiative between insurgents and the notably since 2005) that tribes can no government both locally and at the longer guarantee the full security of their national level. However, the outcome of communities or their land. Agreements the process could be undermined given between tribes and the government have that the actors in the Southeast who come under increasing pressure and the should ultimately be a part of a insurgency forces traditional tribal leaders reconciliation and reintegration process to disengage from the Afghan (i.e. the government, tribes, the government with numerous incidences of International Military) have either been threats and assassinations.4 As a weakened, have poor relations or view consequence, people across the each other with mistrust. Southeast region no longer view the This policy paper discusses the problematic relations between these main actors, why reconciliation initiatives to date have failed in the Southeast, and puts forward some practical suggestions to ensure a more effective strategy.

Definition of Terms This brief focuses on the process of reintegration rather than the broader Legend national political process of negotiating Provincial Boundaries with high level insurgent leaders. Here, the term reintegration refers to the Pakistan process taking place more locally, of enabling low to mid-level insurgents to rejoin their communities, involving a Map 1. Loya Paktia (Paktia, Paktika financial ‘package’ and guarantees of and Khost) protection by the state. current government as a meaningful partner in the areas of governance and

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2 An Ever-Widening Gulf Between development projects in the region the Tribes and the Government especially in comparison with other, more Several factors have contributed to a volatile parts of the country, namely the deterioration of tribe-government South.6 This has eroded the authority of relations, the undermining of pro- pro-government tribal leaders who have government tribal leadership and the been unable to channel development increasing loss of faith in government by benefits and services to their the community, which the insurgency has communities, which in turn has been steadily exploiting. contributed to a perception among tribes that they have been politically and Tribal leadership has come under economically sidelined. increasing pressure and intimidation from a more robust and well-organized Currently there are few legitimate insurgency that is transiting easily across interlocutors between the government the region’s porous border with Pakistan.5 and the people as the Provincial Council Association with the government has holds no meaningful role in terms of proven increasingly dangerous for tribal bridging gaps between the two, let alone leaders. between the government and local insurgents. Government appointments An important window of opportunity was based on patronage networks rather than lost during the years following the Bonn merit render the state unpopular. Conference, when a political roadmap was laid out for the country. The Line departments are woefully weakness of sub-national governance understaffed, underpaid and under- structures meant that alliances with resourced, creating incentives for influential tribal leaders were not nefarious activities in order to capitalised upon, and key tribal leaders supplement meagre incomes. This has from the region were not drawn into the widened what is an increasingly large gap state building process. between the government and the people.

The willingness of tribes to engage with The minimal presence of Afghan National the government has, over the years, Security Forces (ANSF) in most rural been taken for granted by both the districts (in particular the police, who also Afghan government and their lack proper training and equipment and international supporters. Subsequently are often involved in criminal activities) less funding has been earmarked for

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exacerbates the poor security second chance at peace and sustained governance and economic environment. development.”9 Lastly, unpopular military and Special ...the same objectives that the PTS was Forces (SOF) counter-insurgency mandated to carry out. operations, sometimes based on what is Briefly, the PTS was established through perceived to be inadequate information, a presidential decree in May 2005 and undermines the local government who chaired by former mujahideen have little apparent oversight, control or commander Sibghatullah Mojaddedi10 the knowledge as to when such operations purpose of which was to end inter-group are taking place.7 This perception has armed hostilities, resolve unsettled contributed to an estrangement from, or national issues, facilitate the healing of at least ambivalence toward, the state wounds caused by past injustices, and and international military forces (IMF) take necessary measures to prevent the unable to protect their own people. repeat of the civil war and its All this has decreased the willingness of destruction.11 tribal leaders to engage with local However due to a lack of funding and a government. series of missed opportunities, local 3 Old and New Reconciliation communities in the Southeast claim that Initiatives – No Lessons Learned the PTS was largely useless and its offices The new Afghan Peace and Reintegration only brought in “ordinary or unimportant Program (APRP) differs remarkably little individuals” for reconciliation in order to from the objectives of the Program show they were being active and to Tahkim Sulh (the government’s National continue working.12 One reason for this Program for Reconciliation commonly was due to the conditions attached to referred to as the PTS), a program widely reconciliation. The PTS head in Khost, for perceived to have been unsuccessful:8 example, had been instructed by his “the aim of the [new] Peace and superiors in Kabul not to reconcile Reintegration Program is to promote fighters unless they also turned in their peace through a political approach and encourages Taliban fighters and weapon(s) whilst offering nothing in leaders, previously siding with return. This rendered the proposition armed opposition and extremist groups, to renounce violence and unacceptable for most potential join a constructive process of participants.13 reintegration to benefit from a

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Furthermore, under the PTS program, offered to them without leaving the there was continued fear of arrest by the insurgency, or they will wait and see what ANSF and IMF even after insurgents happens before they join any such joined the program, as there was never initiative. any guarantee they would not be arrested Similarly, without taking into once they handed themselves and their consideration the regional dimension of weapons over. In 2009, for example, the conflict and marginalised tribes, and eleven reconciled insurgents were without any serious attempts at political detained by the NDS or IMF, and nine reform within the government at both the were killed by insurgents.14 national and sub-national levels, such a

The new APRP, a complex and possibly peace initiative will hold little traction. deliberately vague initiative, proposes utilizing the existing capacities of the 4 Ambiguous Role of the Provincial Government and the Importance former PTS program, as well as of Choosing the ‘Right’ consolidating the Disarmament of Illegal Interlocutors Armed Groups (DIAG); a program also In 2007, the Afghan Government widely seen as unsuccessful. The recognized the contribution that all prevailing lack of security and weakness provincial governors make to stabilization of the ANSF gives little hope that the new through the process of political outreach program will provide any similar by mobilizing funds to support them in guarantees of safety for newly reconciled their work.15 Indeed the new peace insurgents. initiative puts mediation between

Whilst the new plan certainly does not provincial and district governors on the lack the financial resources the PTS did, one hand, and local insurgents on the the complexity, breadth and scope of the other, in the foreground of its strategic initiative could undermine any tangible reconciliation plan, stating that governors success unless long-standing underlying will “play a pivotal role in coordinating the causes of the conflict are addressed and support of the line ministries with local some form of serious public restorative peace and reintegration processes”. process dealing with past injustices and However, the influence and popularity of grievances between rival political groups local government in the Southeast differs or tribes gets underway. Most fighters will from province to province and district to either take the reintegration money

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district, and is determined by a myriad of party to the conflict, they are not always factors, including a particular uluswal’s seen as a credible counterparts by other tribal or political affiliations with his stakeholders. The ability and political will constituents, levels of service delivery, of provincial governors varies a great deal perceptions of corruption within local in Loya Paktia (and across the country), government, security and so on. and with this the degrees of power and influence that they wield in their In interviews conducted throughout the respective provinces. course of a jirga organized by TLO in

Gardez in March 2010, a number of When it comes to resolving conflicts for respondents stated that no insurgent example, provincial governors in the would be interested in talking to corrupt region, whilst they may not necessarily or weak government representatives. be popular, can show effective leadership Indeed, respondents in the region have through positive contributions to repeatedly stated that if government resolving inter-tribal conflicts. institutions remain as they are,16 even if Former Governor Jamal in Khost, for they are brought in, insurgents will soon example, actively sought to create a be inclined to rejoin the insurgency.17 conflict resolution mechanism18 at the A genuine reconciliation effort will require provincial level to help relieve the burden established relations and a degree of of formal provincial justice actors, who trust and respect between the provincial were overwhelmed with the number of government and the local population. If (predominantly) land disputes being provincial government officials are not brought before him. Governor Hamdard supported by the local community and do in Paktia province subsequently not seek input from different sectors of requested that a similar body be society (including civil society established in his province. organizations, influential community In Khost, Governor Abdul Jabar Naimi members, tribal elders, mullahs and was only recently appointed following spiritual leaders) – particularly in a region months of a lack of recognised leadership such as the Southeast, where tribes pride in the province. Initial accounts of his themselves on being highly effective performance have been positive, in that mediators, a governor-led process to he is apparently trying to boost bring in local level insurgents could government public accountability and encounter difficulties. Besides being a

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forcing line departments to inform the given sufficient resources for such Khosti people about their activities extensive outreach efforts, the ability of through media conferences and provincial government institutions to struggling to reduce corruption within line broker sustainable peace deals is dubious departments. He has already established and remains highly dependent on the a commission to look into various ongoing individuals in question and on local land disputes. However, Governor Naimi conditions. put forward 18 advisors to the Peace 5 Traditional Actors’ Perceptions of Jirga held in Kabul in June, with no prior a Reconciliation Process consultation with tribes from the Many tribal elders spoken to across the province, which generated a degree of Southeast region stated that they could mistrust in the province. play a far more instrumental role than the government in bringing insurgents to the Governance in Paktika is weak given the negotiation table, and as mentioned size, remoteness and prevailing above, have long regarded themselves as insecurity. There is also a significant being effective mediators. political divide, with Urgun district elders advocating for the Urgun area to become In their opinion, only through traditional a province in its own right (as 11 districts means of negotiations would peace be of Paktika’s 22 districts fall under its found, i.e. through consultations and jurisdiction; Urgun and these districts jirgas with impartial tribal elders and were formerly a single province). This respected ulema figures. Elders could division within the province would likely then act as mediators between local undermine any role played by the newly government and former combatants. appointed governor, Mahibullah Samim (a However, if they are to take on a more former jihadi) to exert influence and prominent role, i.e. negotiating on behalf pressure on insurgents in the province to of the state, there needs to be a formal reintegrate. recognition and endorsement of this role.

In light of the above, while there is scope Whilst not as traditionally dominant as in for enabling provincial governors to play other, less tribal parts of the country, the a mediation role at the provincial level importance and influence of local mullahs provided they consult with and receive cannot be underestimated, though their 19 the consensus of key tribal stakeholders significance differs across the region. As in the province, and provided they are with tribal leaders, there is a fundamental

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lack of trust between the ulema shuras Coalition Forces (CF) under Operation and government authorities. In Paktika, Enduring Freedom (OEF) focusing on as in other provinces of the Southeast, counter-terrorism rather than state- these religious bodies will be instrumental building and counter-insurgency as in any peace process, as they are widely ISAF/NATO does, the impact on the trusted and legitimate bodies. Their ground by international military actors involvement in a reconciliation initiative in has often been negative. the Southeast will be key. Even though IMF presence in the Reconciliation outreach efforts would also Southeast has contributed to keeping the include trying to gauge how people might insurgency at bay, the nature of their feel about commanders from the region operations have been heavily criticised. being reintegrated into society, and how Aerial bombardments and night raids in this could be done without intensifying or particular have created a negative public creating new tensions in areas where a perception of the IMF, seen to be fragile peace exists only due to disrespecting Afghan culture, the sanctity agreements brokered between tribal of the home and the strict privacy of leaders and certain insurgent female members of the household as well commanders,20 who request safe passage as undermining the Afghan state unable or havens in return for people not being to reign in its international supporters.21 harassed or harmed. This common sentiment is summed up in A widely held view in the region is that the words of a leader of the Tani tribe in Afghan fighters or commanders should be Southeastern Khost: “How can we trust a allowed to join the government and government which does not have the important (Afghan) Taliban commanders power to regulate illegal IMF night raids, be removed from the UN blacklist, though searches and operations? Civilians are some people indicated that there would being killed yet our corrupt government be little support for welcoming back ISI- does nothing to stop this.” backed groups. Members from the Zazi tribe in Paktia voiced similar discontent and stated that 6 Can International Military Forces whilst they had been supportive of the Help Bring Peace and Stability? government since the Bonn process, what Given that there has been a conflict of they perceive as arbitrary detentions in mandates from the onset, with US-led

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their areas are eroding the tribe’s support To the GoA: for the government.22  Any reconciliation and reintegration Moreover, ISAF/NATO is seen as strategy in the Southeast must incapable of protecting civilians against happen in consultation with the Taliban, and is not allocating influential tribal representatives sufficient time or resources into and the ulema. Unless the process strengthening the ANSF to do so. Despite is inclusive of these two groups, it ISAF/NATO recently changing course on will lack the legitimacy or trust to aerial bombardments and the practice of be effective; night-raids, the humiliation,  Subnational-governance reform is disempowerment and resentment caused key to improving people’s current by such operations should not be perceptions of the government as underestimated when bearing in mind being a self-serving corrupt body. practical reconciliation and reintegration Ensuring fair appointments based strategies, such as seeing IMF as a trust- on merit as opposed to connections worthy partner in this effort. is key;

7 Conclusion and Recommendations  Effective relations must be built or This policy brief has attempted to consolidated between government highlight some of the current problems authorities and tribal/religious and the difficult relationship between actors, as this will help to create local community leaders, the Afghan trust between key stakeholders. government and their international To the GoA and the International backers in the Southeast that, if not Community: taken into account, will serve to undermine any genuine  The central government must lead reconciliation/reintegration process. While and publicly endorse any the will for such a new reconciliation meaningful reconciliation and initiative in the Southeast is there and reintegration process with the full elders have pledged their services and backing of the International support, the following issues need to be Community; addressed prior to once again embarking  Some higher level commanders on such a process: from the region should be removed

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from the UN blacklist – without the pre-existing elite migrating to Kabul, resettling this, low-level fighters will have outside of Afghanistan, or compromising with the newly emergent local power structures. little incentive to trust the process; 2 For more information, see Tribal Jurisdiction and Agreements: The Key to Sub-National Governance in South-eastern Afghanistan (TLO Policy Brief December  A process of restorative justice 2009) 3 Schmeidl, Susanne and Karokhail, Masood (2009) ‚The must be encouraged and take place Role of Non-State Actors in ‚Community-Based Policing’ – An Exploration of the Arbakai (Tribal Police) in at the grassroots level to address Southeastern Afghanistan’, Contemporary Security Policy, 30:2, 318-342. past rights abuses by government 4 Cases have been recorded by UNAMA’s Southeast actors and to help avoid built-up Regional office, with this trend increasing particularly since 2007-2008. resentment from turning into long- 5 One example is the Mangal tribe of eastern Paktia and Khost. Mangal tribal leaders, who had adopted a pro- standing blood feuds, creating government stance after the Bonn agreement and maintained an impressive degree of unity among their further instability; sub-tribes, are no longer in a position to guarantee security through much of their territory. Formerly secure districts such as Qalandar and Musa Khel in Khost To the GoA and ISAF: (Mangal strongholds) for example, or Sayed Karram and Jani Khel in Paktia have increasingly become havens or easy transit routes for Taliban and other insurgent  There must be firm guarantees that groups, some of which are comprised of foreign elements on occasion, including Pakistanis, Arabs, Uzbeks and returning fighters will not Chechens. 6 Waldman, Matt (2008) Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness subsequently be arrested by in Afghanistan. Kabul: ACBAR. 7 Having said this, McChrystal’s new strategy to Afghan National Security Forces or increasingly include Afghan National Security Forces and improve the way in which operations are being carried by the International Military; out will hopefully have a positive impact on people’s perception of the military. 8 The PTS supposedly only reintegrated 2% of the total  There must be more robust and number of fighters it initially aimed to reach out to, and of those a number have already rejoined the insurgency. systematic post-operation follow- 9 The Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (taken from the London Conference’s program summary outline, up efforts similar to those January 28th 2010). 10 who will likely also chair the new High Council for employed by RC-East in order to Peace rather than former President Rabbani, another potential contender – and also former mujahid -- to chair address civilian casualties the Program’s Secretariat 11 (including through compensation For more information on the Government’s former reintegration efforts, see the PTS website: for loss of life and injuries and http://www.pts.af/ 12 A number of tribal representatives have also said that damage to physical property). PTS officials are on a payroll, but do nothing more than receive their monthly salaries. 13 Source: UNAMA Southeast region. Similar views were expressed at a recent jirga organized by TLO and held in Gardez on April 5th 2010, including approximately 300 participants from Paktia, Paktika and Khost. Endnotes 14 Source: UNAMA Southeast region 15 Michael Semple: Reconciliation in Afghanistan, p.58 (USIP) 2009. 16 i.e. either lacking strong or trusted leadership, or if 1 Both the successive PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of they remain corrupt Afghanistan) regime and the jihadi parties sought to 17 Whether this sentiment has become more widespread weaken tribal structures and create new more due to the severe unpopularity of the IM forces in the cooperative power brokers within the tribes, with much of

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region and the negative consequences of SOF operations is unclear 18 TLO responded to Khost’s provincial governor’s request by helping to establish the Commission on Conflict Mediation (CCM), which to date has effectively helped the government to resolve a number of protracted land disputes. For more information, see Between the Jirga and the Judge: Alternative Dispute Resolution in Southeastern Afghanistan (TLO Policy Brief March 2009). 19 Indeed, as a rule Taleban networks stem from old or newly created deobandi networks. In the Southeast, because the strength of the tribal structure and the depth of encapsulation are inversely proportional with the strength of these deobandi networks and the social status of mullahs, it follows that before the revolution, traditionalist religious networks and social status of mullahs were weakest in the mountainous areas of Loya Paktia under special tribal administration, medium in those plain areas of Loya Paktia (neighboring Ghazni) under special tribal administration, and strongest in the Pashtun districts of Ghazni under direct government administration. There is one exception to this: the presence of strong traditionalist religious networks in some mountainous and deeply tribal areas of Loya Paktia (Zadran Arc and some districts of Khost). This anomaly can be explained by the fact that in the last 30 years or so, Haqqani with much Arab financial support, has patiently woven a new network of traditionalist madrassas in areas under his influence, thus creating the conditions for strong Taleban support to emerge in these areas. Taken from Sebastien Trives’ Tackling the Insurgency, the Case of the Southeast in Politique Etrangere (2006). 20 As is the case in areas of Jani Khel in northern Paktia, or Qalandar or Musa Khel in Khost. 21 For more information, see the joint TLO-OSI report, Strangers at the Door (February 2010). 22 Source: UNAMA

TLO Policy Brief 3 / October 2010