POLICY BRIEF

October 2009 Caught in the Crossfire: TOM GREGG Tel: +33 683 949 263 The Pashtun Tribes of [email protected] Southeast Afghanistan

W h a t i s t h e p r o b l e m ?

There is increased recognition of the importance of engaging tribes in Afghanistan, but the government of Afghanistan and the international community are yet to come up with a coherent and coordinated approach. While more effective tribal engagement won’t work everywhere, there is an opportunity to engage more fully with Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan‘s southeast. A meaningful and well resourced tribal policy would help improve stability in this strategically important region and also help avoid any mismanagement that could make things worse.

W h a t s h o u l d b e d o n e ?

First, the Afghan government should formulate and execute a policy of tribal engagement which the international community should support through efforts to reform of the Ministry of Tribal and Border Affairs.

Second, the international military forces must pay closer consideration to the local tribal dynamics in their efforts to shift toward a more counter-insurgency driven approach on the ground in Afghanistan. A key element in this will be establishing mechanisms to address tribal grievances towards aspects of international military operations.

Third, a Tribal Outreach Commission (TOC) should be formed in LOWY INSTITUTE FOR relevant provinces, chaired by the provincial governor and including INTERNATIONAL POLICY representatives from the relevant government line ministries, provincial 31 Bligh Street council, ISAF, UNAMA, the Liaison Office and prominent tribal and Sydney NSW 2000 religious leaders, to build knowledge for, prioritise and manage tribal Tel: +61 2 8238 9000 Fax: +61 2 8238 9005 engagement at the local level. www.lowyinstitute.org The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent international policy think tank. Its mandate ranges across all the dimensions of international policy debate in Australia — economic, political and strategic — and it is not limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to:

• produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s international policy and to contribute to the wider international debate.

• promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an accessible and high- quality forum for discussion of Australian international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues and conferences.

Lowy Institute Policy Briefs are designed to address a particular, current policy issue and to suggest solutions. They are deliberately prescriptive, specifically addressing two questions: What is the problem? What should be done?

The views expressed in this paper are entirely the author’s own and not those of the Lowy Institute for International Policy. Policy Brief

Caught in the Crossfire

There is a well-worn Pashtun story of a famous McChrystal, refers to tribal engagement as part Indian wrestler who visits a Pashtun village and of ‘a holistic counterinsurgency campaign’.2 It challenges the tribesmen to put forward their is important to note that the concept of tribal best fighter. The following morning a crowd engagement, while new for the US military, has gathers to watch the fight. The two fighters been called for, and worked on by several duel all day, and by mid-afternoon it becomes actors, such as provincial governors, UNAMA clear the Indian will defeat the Pashtun. A and the Afghan NGO, the Liason Office (LO). tribesman calls out from the crowd asking if anything can be done to reverse his fortune but Yet engaging Afghanistan’s tribes is neither the fighter replies that nothing can be done, straightforward, nor is it suited to all parts of only that the tribe may bring hay and lay it on the country. Against this background the the ground to cushion the blow from his purpose of this paper is to argue for an impending fall. enhanced effort to engage Pashtun tribes in one, albeit, strategically significant part of This story is a metaphor of today’s reality for Afghanistan, its southeast, specifically the many of the tribes in the southeast of provinces of Paktya, Paktika and Khost. Afghanistan. The Pashtun tribal structure, having for centuries been the main unified Unlike the relatively isolated south of the political entity, is fracturing under the country that is suffering from a full-blown competing pressures of a Taliban-led insurgency, tied partly to the opium industry, insurgency which appears to be gaining the southeast region has been relatively more political ascendency on the one hand, and a stable. Its location, however, is of great corrupt (and at times predatory) government, significance to the security of Kabul, and its supported by an international military that surrounds, serving as it does as a buffer openly acknowledges it has little understanding between the capital and a long (578 kilometre) of the tribal structure, on the other. Without porous border with the Taliban-controlled any change to the status quo, tribal North and south Waziristan in Pakistan. This communities are left to ‘cushion their fall’ by region is also the tribal home of the Haqqani striking deals with the Taliban while subtly network that, according to the US Military, withdrawing their support from the political ‘remains one of the most lethal Taliban process. organizations’ and whose militants have ‘become the main source of attacks against The government of Afghanistan along with its American troops and their Afghan allies’.3 international civilian and military backers cannot afford for this to happen. US Secretary What makes this part of Afghanistan of Defense Robert Gates recently stated that ‘at particularly prospective to a tribal approach is the end of the day the only solution in the fact that, unlike other Pashtun tribal areas Afghanistan is to work with the tribes and of the country, the tribal structure in the provincial leaders’.1 Likewise, Commander of southeast remains relatively more intact. A the US forces and the International Security meaningful and well resourced tribal policy in Assistance Force (COMISAF), General the southeast could help the overall effort to

Page 3 Policy Brief

Caught in the Crossfire

improve stability and security. It is also true, It is due to this unique history that Loya Paktya however, that mismanaging tribal engagement avoided co-option by the state until much later in the southeast could end up aggravating the than other Pashtun regions, and the tribal increasingly difficult situation faced by the structure in the region remains stronger and international community and the Afghan more unified than in other parts of the government in the country more generally. country.4 Practically, this has meant that within the tribal structure today Pashtunwali (the traditional customary law), common to all The Pashtun tribes in southeast Pashtuns, is better preserved than in other Afghanistan Pashtun-dominated parts of the country. Further, the tribes of the southeast region have Historically, the Pashtun tribes of Loya a unique tribal mechanism of policing (arbakai) (Greater) Paktya, covering the provinces of for defence from external aggression and Paktya, Paktika and Khost, enjoyed a special natural resource protection.5 While the administrative status. Unlike the remainder of coherence and strength of the tribal structure the Pashtun tribes, the special status afforded has been eroded in many parts of the region, them exemption from state taxes and military there is still sufficient coherence among tribes conscription, minimal state intervention and to allow them to play a significant role in the right to bear arms. In return, the state peace-building. For example, such is the received the much-needed tribal loyalty, and if strength and authority of a tribal ruling, that required, could call on the tribes to come to its when the elders of the southeast, as a gesture of defence. This agreement was formalised in goodwill to President Karzai and the Bonn 1929 under King Nadir Shah as an Process, decreed that poppies would not be acknowledgement of the role the people of grown in the region, it all but obliterated the Loya Pakya played in bringing him to power. local opium economy. It was honoured, uninterrupted, for 20 years. By the early 1950s, some shifts in the balance It is important to note that such tribal unity, if of power began to emerge between the state not managed correctly, could become a thorn and the tribes, and the government began to in the side for any Afghan government and its penetrate the southeast region through the international backers. For example, if the construction of roads and schools. In response tribes chose to support the insurgency rather to this encroachment by the state, the large and than to resist it, or simply chose to challenge united Mungal tribe led a tribal revolt, which the legitimacy of the state by refusing to work quickly resulted in a withdrawal by the with it, the government would be rendered government and an acceptance of the status quite powerless. The threat of the government quo anti. In the pre-revolution years up to ‘losing’ the tribes has been a long-standing 1978, the tribal elite of Loya Paktya held source of insecurity for ‘all Afghan rulers since significant sway over politics in the capital, the establishment of the modern Afghan state, a facilitated by a number of key posts, threat which has usually been partly placated particularly in Afghanistan’s military. through the implementation of a tribal policy.6

Page 4 Policy Brief

Caught in the Crossfire

Today, it is difficult to speak of a well- Second, Pashtunwali, the traditional tribal articulated tribal policy that has been customary law, is overlooked by both the developed in Kabul and implemented in the international community and by some elements provinces. Instead there is, at best, an ad hoc of the Afghan government as being out of place approach to tribal engagement in the provinces, in a new Afghan state. On the part of the with most tribes remaining relatively alienated international community, Pastunwali is from the political process. perceived as undemocratic, a violation of universal human rights and therefore, counter On the part of the international community, to the larger state-building exercise. This is there are two main causes of this neglect.7 First echoed by some elements within the Afghan is a perception that the tribal communities are government. This is particularly true of the illiterate and uneducated and hence, fast-rising non-traditional elite, who are thirsty uninformed pawns in the politics of the region. for modernisation and for whom the tribal This was most dramatically demonstrated by system is merely an archaic relic of a bygone the US military operating in the region, which period. until recently categorised the tribes as part of the terrain rather than as actors. This could These prejudices are compounded by a spurious not be further from the truth. While many and unfortunate connection made between tribal elders who are appointed to the district conservative Pashtun tribal culture and the or provincial tribal shura (council) are Taliban. Consequently, a conservative Pashtun uneducated, they still remain well-informed and villager dressed in a turban, with a long beard connected to regional and global events. In and traditional robes, is often equated to the fact, over two-thirds of Afghans tune in daily to Taliban. This was starkly demonstrated by a shortwave radio and, as a matter of status, all twist in the definition of the acronym ACM tribal elders that sit on a shura own a mobile that was used by the US military to describe phone. Such categorisation stems from the Anti-Coalition Militia. In the deeply difficulties of the international community and conservative province of Paktika, ACM was the the international military forces in ‘placing’ the title some elements of the US military used to tribes.8 Too often the myopic lens used for describe the Pashtun women of the province – political analysis permitted few categories this time meaning ‘Anti-Coalition Multipliers’. beyond the Afghan government on ‘our’ side This expression was not official and was used and the Taliban on the other. A former US in jest, but it does offer an insight into how ambassador to Afghanistan once said ‘I some US soldiers perceived the local understand the tribes are important, but no one population. Needless to say, this depiction is can tell me why they are important’. It is for baseless. In fact, in much of the region it is the this reason that General McChrystal is tribal communities that are victims of terrorist understood to recommend the US use their violence and intimidation, including targeted intelligence assets ‘less to hunt insurgents and assassinations of those who do not support the more to understand local, tribal and social insurgents, and it is the same communities that power structures in the areas where they suffer from Taliban-enforced school and clinic operate’.9 closures. Moreover, it is often tribal leaders

Page 5 Policy Brief

Caught in the Crossfire

themselves that have launched peace initiatives. Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and have In 2006, one of the largest demonstrations saw been remobilised over the past 5 years. The over two thousand tribal elders and religious most prominent and effective of these networks leaders gathered in the border city of Khost to in the southeast region is that of Jalaluddin condemn suicide attacks, denounce ‘external Haqqani, but other networks such as the influences’ in the province and present a Mansoor network and Hekmatyar also play a declaration of peace to the Provincial destabilising role. These disparate insurgent Governor, calling on the US military to consult groups have successfully mobilised the with the tribes in an effort to bring security to disenfranchised, unemployed, illiterate male the province.1 0 youth underclass with cash incentives and anti- Western propaganda. The motivation of this group to take up arms is less ideologically Why the fighting? driven than it is fiscally driven (although involvement perhaps also affords young Unlike the relatively stable North and Central recruits a sense of purpose).1 1 Unlike regions of Afghanistan, the security situation in ideologically driven fighters, this broad group the southeast is volatile and has continued to would be more responsive to a meaningful deteriorate despite a higher tempo of military reconciliation process and to outreach operations and an increased presence of ANA initiatives. and US military forces over recent years. In spite of this decrease in security, levels of Absence of a credible government presence violence in the region remain consistently lower The absence of a credible government presence than those in the south of the country. at the district level is a destabilising factor for the entire region. It is here that communities Factors behind insecurity in the tribal areas of interact with the government, via the local the southeast are far more nuanced than it may district sub-governor, as well as the security appear at first glance. It can be broadly divided (particularly the Afghan National Police) and into four separate but related factors: the administrative authorities. And it is at this presence of local Taliban networks with links level that the government needs to gain the to prominent commanders; the absence of a trust of the people and address their problems. credible government presence; resentment Instead, conservative tribal communities are toward the modus operandi of some elements often confronted by a corrupt district of the international military forces; and existing administration and an ill-trained, poorly tribal divisions. equipped police force which is more interested in profiteering and predation than serving and Local Taliban networks protecting.1 2 Other elements of a formal legal The backbone of the insurgency in the system, such as an impartial judiciary, are southeast is formed by local Taliban networks equally weak or nonexistent at the local level. with links to prominent commanders who have This has led to increasing levels of both relocated to Pakistan. These former opportunistic criminality and resentment of the mujahideen networks were forged during the government. A prominent tribal elder from the

Page 6 Policy Brief

Caught in the Crossfire

region who had spent two and a half years in an end to the practice. In one extreme case, a detention in Guantanamo Bay before being parliamentarian from Khost province (who released captured the sentiment when he happened to also be a prominent Mullah) claimed ‘we [the tribal shura] are happy to suffered the indignity of having his house support President Karzai and the political searched on three separate occasions within a process, but we would sooner take to the hills six-week period (and in one instance his front and fight than be governed by the current doors blown off).1 8 corrupt and immoral district sub-governor and chief of police’.1 3 It has been suggested that the failure of the outgoing COMISAF, General McKiernan, to Modus operandi of the international military address such incidents in a meaningful way forces precipitated his premature departure from A United Nations report released in late July Afghanistan.1 9 Such has been the public outcry 2009 claimed that the number of Afghan over how the war has been managed that his civilians killed in the conflict had jumped 24 replacement, General McChrystal, recently per cent so far this year, with bombings by stated what should be an obvious fact, namely insurgents and airstrikes by international forces that ‘this fight is for the Afghan people, it's not the biggest killers. The report said 310 civilians with the Afghan people. It's to protect the had been killed by international military and Afghan people. And so I think, that's got to be Afghan forces so far in 2009, including 200 foremost in how we operate’.2 0 killed by airstrikes.1 4 These alarming figures are compounded by a less widely known Existing tribal divisions practice that produces fewer casualties but stirs A further source of instability stems from tribal similar anti-coalition forces emotion – night- conflict. The bulk of such disputes are over time house searches. In the southeast region, access to natural resources, or of frequent night-time house search operations, representation, whereby the marginalisation of conducted mainly by US Special Operations a particular tribe or sub-tribe from provincial Forces (US SOF), have infuriated local and district government is a cause of communities and Afghan government resentment. A lesser number of disputes stem officials.1 5 Even Provincial Reconstruction from family or business dealings. However, all Team (PRT) and Maneuver Element disputes can be exacerbated by the three Commanders have acknowledged that the destabilising factors listed above. The Taliban, USSOF house search operations often as a matter of practice, exploit divisions to undermine the US military’s ‘hearts and minds’ spread instability.2 1 One of the most successful campaign.1 6 According to the Centre for approaches is to inflame a tribal conflict. Conflict and Peace Studies, revenge against Hence, the smouldering embers of a heated Coalition Forces is a key motivation for joining land dispute between two tribes (which corrupt the insurgency.1 7 Moreover, it undermines the courts and a weakened customary tribal system credibility of a provincial governor, who failed to resolve) will be fanned. Most despite receiving protests from several hundred commonly it takes the form of local Taliban tribal and religious leaders is powerless to put networks offering weapons, ammunition and

Page 7 Policy Brief

Caught in the Crossfire

financial incentive to both sides to take up arms ‘donated’ by the ‘Zadran tribe’ to the against each other. Similarly, it is not government so that construction could uncommon for one party to a conflict to commence. What the PRT and the USAID approach the military forces with ‘intelligence’ official did not know, was that Shwark district against its adversary to have the military forces is clearly divided between two sub-tribes and target and harass the other party. that constructing the government centre squarely in the centre of one of the sub-tribes In one particularly brazen case, one tribe ‘gave’ territory was creating a tribal dispute. The land for the US military to establish a Forward provincial governor and UNAMA were asked Operating Base (FOB) in its opponent’s tribal to intervene and an alternative site was area. The US military then began constructing negotiated on the border between the two sub- the FOB that was subsequently attacked by the tribes. Still, the PRT commander expressed tribe who had rightful claim to the land (and bewilderment that each sub-tribe had placed its who had not been consulted). The US then own interests ahead of the ‘collective interests’ counterattacked and within a matter of ten of the Zadran tribe. days a district that bordered Pakistan, that was pro-government, and had few links to the Simlarly, in the winter of 2006/07 the US PRT insurgency, was destabilised. While timely awarded a 1 million USD ‘snow-clearing’ intervention from the provincial governor and project for a mountain pass on the Gardez- the UNAMA facilitated resolution of the Khost road to a Panshiri contractor from a dispute, the lesson is clear: tribal conflict can be province north of Kabul. The contractor enormously destabilising for a region and can required additional machinery and the project have knock-on benefits for the insurgency. In budget was nearly doubled. What the PRT did the absence of the rule of law and a well- not know was that such a figure, if spent funded and respected Ministry of Tribal and locally, would have bought a significant Border Affairs, these conflicts are left open to amount of goodwill from the tribes if they’d be manipulated by the insurgents and others chosen to engage them. If engaged, the local that seek to profit. tribes could also have informed the PRT that a snow-clearing project was unnecessary as the Existing tribal divisions can also be inflamed by particular pass they were investing in was the awarding of local (and lucrative) blocked by snow only once, maybe twice a reconstruction, development and security year. Rather than snow, the problem is mud contracts. These contracts, if not negotiated and water that makes the road unpassable for carefully by someone with knowledge of the several weeks a year. As it transpired, the local local tribal dynamics, can fast become part of tribes did not benefit financially and had to the problem. Unfortunately, examples abound. suffer from the road being unpassable due to A telling example from the southeast was in mud, while the contractor, who had signed a 2005 when the US PRT (with support from ‘snow-clearing’ not a ‘mud-clearing’ contract, USAID) agreed to fund a district government pocketed the money and cleared the snow on centre in the Zadran district of Schwark. two or three separate occasions. Hence, too Suitable land was identified and quickly often the potential reservoir of goodwill created

Page 8 Policy Brief

Caught in the Crossfire

by a project is never harnessed and instead to create short-term paid community councils many projects stir resentment. in selected regions has prompted suspicion on the part of some that the program is little more than a Karzai Administration targeted vote- What is being done? buying campaign in the lead-up to the recent Presidential elections, which could in fact Despite the belated recognition by the undermine outreach at the district level. In a international community of the importance of recent report, the International Crisis Group the tribes in achieving stability, and the cautioned that ASOPs ‘centralised control of necessity for a more coherent policy of tribal council appointments may simply reinforce engagement, at present there are few targeted central government patronage rather than meet programs. In theory, developing and the stated aim of encouraging grassroots implementing a tribal policy would be the representation and outreach’.2 3 Similarly, a purview of the Ministry of Tribal and Border briefing paper prepared in April this year for Affairs. In practice, this is not the case. the NATO Heads of State and Government Currently, the two main programs accorded the Summit by eleven prominent international task of ‘outreach’ are national programs that NGOs operating in Afghanistan concluded that do not take into account tribal specificities. ‘the programme carries a high risk of failure The highest-profile government outreach and may even exacerbate local security program at present is the Afghan Social conditions’ and therefore ‘should be suspended Outreach Program (ASOP), that aims to and subject to a full review’.2 4 While ASOP address disaffected communities. It has been still has the backing of some donors, it seems, followed by a more controversial program, the in the provinces at least, the program has not Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), which gained traction. is a community-based policing initiative under the Interior Ministry. Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) More contentious than ASOP has been the Afghan Social Outreach Program proposal to establish an Afghan Public Early last year, the Independent Directorate of Protection Force (APPF). This appears to be a Local Governance (IDLG) established ASOP. second iteration of the much-criticised and now ASOP, which has been endorsed by the Joint disbanded Afghan National Auxiliary Police Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), (ANAP).2 5 The APPF involves the creation of a (a body that has the United Nations (UN) and community force tasked with protecting GoA as co-chairs) has a stated goal to government and community assets and playing ‘strengthen security and peace, improve the a district-level counterinsurgency role. The effectiveness and responsiveness of service APPF should not be confused with the delivery and build local governance through the traditional practice of the arbakai of the revival of traditional practices of collective southeast region that was de facto endorsed by decision-making and community solidarity and President Karzai in June 2006 and is not a the promotion of cooperation and partnership permanent local militia.2 6 Today in the with government’.2 2 However, ASOPs strategy southeast, where the tribes are strongest, an

Page 9 Policy Brief

Caught in the Crossfire

arbakai exists and is controlled locally, while in occupies the Head of the Department position. districts where the tribes are more fractured the Hence, the very department that should have a arbakai does not exist. Moreover, in those hand in resolving tribal conflicts on the sub- districts where an arbakai is active, they national level, or at a minimum, being a currently play a stabilising role.2 7 In the conduit for conveying issues of tribal southeast region, now is the time to strengthen dissatisfaction to the central level, is ultimately the existing institutions, not to create tenuous another example of the weakness and parallel security structures. As the ICG warned corruption of the Karzai administration. This in its most recent report; ‘Afghanistan is awash reality is a far cry from the outgoing with weapons and armed groups. Creating COMISAF’s vision that there should be an unaccountable local militias – based on false ‘Afghan-led effort on how to engage the tribes analogies with Iraq – will only worsen ethnic and what the incentives are and how to use the tensions and violence’.2 8 traditional tribal authorities to help with community security and community Ministry of Tribal and Border Affairs2 9 assistance.’3 1 If the primary interface between the tribes and the GoA on the district level is with the ANP and sub-governor, the natural first stop in the Tribal engagement in practice provincial centre should be the Department of Tribal and Border Affairs, referred to While the GoA, international community and colloquially as the Department of Tribes. international military forces agree that it is However, with the international community necessary to engage the tribes, there are few firmly focused on funding and building the practical examples of how this might be capacity of the traditional line ministries, such achieved; how the main players may work in as Defence, Education, Finance, Health, and concert; and how to ensure that working with Interior, the Ministry of Tribal and Border the tribes does not come at the expense of Affairs has little capacity or funding. Its head, existing fragile government structures, but acting Minister Asadullah Khalid, who received instead serves to strengthen them. a no-confidence vote from Parliament earlier this year on the grounds of accusations of fiscal One such example was a joint Afghan and moral corruption, has a dubious track government/UNAMA Stabilisation Initiative record. In his previous posts as Governor of with the Zadran tribe in the southeast Region. Ghazni and Kandahar, he was accused of This initiative was a local integrated torture and running private prisons, an stabilisation/counterinsurgency initiative that accusation he vehemently denied.3 0 focused on three districts of Paktya province Notwithstanding these allegations, other than and represented a practical attempt at an being a close ally of President Karzai, Khalid integrated approach. The initiative combined lacks the requisite experience or status that the the need to leverage the specifics of the tribal post demands. At the provincial level, the system in order to shift or preserve the balance Department has few resources, and a political of power in the government’s favor within the appointee with few tribal credentials often target tribal groups while at the same time

Page 10 Policy Brief

Caught in the Crossfire

improving government capacity and confidence between government and reconstruction. international actors and the tribes. This in turn resulted in improved credibility for the The three Zadran districts of Paktya are nestled government and its international partners and a in mountainous terrain, located strategically in reduction in operational space for the Taliban. the heart of the southeast region, straddling one For example, not a single attack on projects of the main infiltration routes used by the implemented through the protocols took place Taliban from Pakistan bases in North during the initiative, demonstrating that tribal Waziristan to the greater Kabul region. One of engagement and local ownership can work. the districts is also the family home to Further, when the Taliban attacked the district Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani, now based government building in June 2007, it was the in Pakistan and high on the US most wanted tribes that responded to the district sub- list. Prior to the launch of the initiative, there governor’s call and defended the premises. The was minimal operational space for government initiative also became the preferred conduit for as well as non-military political and problem resolution between tribal community reconstruction actors due to the existence of and reconstruction actors for nearly all Taliban sympathisers within the tribes. This reconstruction projects in the three districts situation meant that after the fall of the Taliban targeted by the project. the three districts were particularly under- served in terms of reconstruction and The promotion of dialogue under the auspices development. of the initiative also provided a more intimate understanding of the local tribal complexities, Due to the nature of the insurgency in the area, which in turn allowed UNAMA and the it was recognised that no single approach, be it government to prevent insurgents from governmental, political, military, exploiting divisions within tribes. More reconstruction, religious or tribal, would be a importantly, it promoted a degree of dialogue success. To develop an effective stabilisation that previously did not exist between the initiative and for the balance of power to shift provincial government and the tribes. The back in favour of the government, it was initiative also provided the US PRT with a necessary to have an integrated approach more nuanced understanding of the complexity including all the above-mentioned elements. of the causes of violence in the districts, and The initiative was developed in collaboration highlighted the need for enhanced strategic between UNAMA and the Provincial coordination with non-military actors. Finally, Government, with the strong support of the the initiative itself promoted dialogue between Zadran tribes of Paktya province, the US PRT, the international military forces in Paktya and USAID, US Department of State, and the UNAMA and highlighted common objectives, German Embassy in Kabul. as well as providing a framework for the PRT, USAID and the German government to Launched in June 2005, the initiative delivered implement projects that maximised impact. reconstruction to the district level, took steps to improved district governance and increased

Page 11 Policy Brief

Caught in the Crossfire

Despite these achievements, by September 2007 the capacity-building effort, such as Defence, the protocols were severely strained due to two Education, and Health. As part of any such main factors; the increasing virulence of the reform effort, the Ministry of Tribal and cross-border insurgency (according to United Border Affairs would require a well-respected Nations figures, insurgent incidents increased in tribal leader at its helm and some increased the southeast every year since 2001) and the funding. Building the capacity of the Ministry lack of capacity and corruption of the itself should include the traditional ‘package’,3 2 provincial and district government. but also capacity building in less traditional Nevertheless, in spite of the deterioration of fields such as the mapping of the various security conditions throughout the region, the conflicts and actors. 33 There are several initiative served to maintain operational space organisations well placed to support such a for the government and international task, not least of which is the Kabul-based reconstruction actors in districts that would NGO, The Liaison Office (formerly Tribal otherwise have been inaccessible. So while Liaison Office), which in the field often plays such an approach requires a modicum of the de facto role of the Ministry. UNAMA, stability, and also has much tribal specificity with its institutional knowledge of the tribes that cannot be duplicated, it is possible to distill and its geographic spread, should also play a general elements that inform the current ‘good offices’ role between the Ministry in discussion on tribal engagement. Kabul and its departments in the provinces. Given the mandate of the IDLG and the attention and support it receives from President A tribal strategy for engagement Karzai and the international community, working more closely would be a logical It is not the purpose of this paper to present a coupling for the two bodies.3 4 To begin with, comprehensive strategy for tribal engagement, IDLGs budget allocation for the Afghan Public but to suggest some underlying principles Protection Force in the southeast should be distilled from the Zadran Initiative, that must redirected to ‘paying’ the arbakai. Importantly, underpin any attempt at a tribal strategy if it is such a payment should reward the whole tribe, to be successful. not just members of the arbakai. Such a mechanism could be established via regular First and foremost, there must be the political payments to the tribal shura. 35 will and commitment on the part of the central government to formulate and execute a policy Second, in their efforts to implement a ‘cultural of tribal engagement. It would also require a shift’ in their wider operations, the corresponding commitment from the international military forces must pay international community to support the reform particular consideration to the local tribal of the Ministry of Tribal and Border Affairs. dynamics. Regardless of how good US PRTs’ Already the Afghan people and the civil-military relations may be, when US SOF international community have seen the conduct house searches in Regional Command- improved performance and delivery from the East, it is the entire US military that loses the ministries that have enjoyed the lion’s share of support of the tribal population. In 2005, a US

Page 12 Policy Brief

Caught in the Crossfire

airborne commander stated that the US As part of such a strategy, the US Military Military was in a fight to convince the tribal should develop specific mechanisms to address communities to support the international some of the grievances of the tribes. military forces and government over the Establishing a mechanism for locating and Taliban.3 6 He characterised the challenge in the communicating with tribesman who have been southeast as ‘the battle of the fence sitters’ and detained by the US military would be a good saw that every school and clinic built, and place to start. A surprising number of every positive engagement between the tribes tribesmen of all ages are detained for and the US military ‘was like dropping a bomb questioning before being released days, weeks on the Taliban’. Four years down the road, the or months later. These detainees fall into an international military forces’ inability to administrative ‘black hole’ and could be in one provide population security to the Afghans in of several detention facilities in the region or the southeast has posed an enormous challenge even in Bagram Air Force Base, near Kabul.4 0 ‘to the battle of the fence sitters’. This effort is Having no access to information about a equally undermined by recent public statements detainee’s whereabouts or well-being places an by prominent members of the international unnecessary (and avoidable) degree of suffering community on the need to negotiate with the on the family and tribal shura, which quickly Taliban.3 7 Such talk on the sensitive and turns to resentment. Such a mechanism would important issue of political dialogue does little be uncomplicated to implement and would add to foster faith in the international military to the reservoir of goodwill that is fast forces’ ability to rein in the Taliban, and only evaporating. serves to reinforce the current logic of ‘sitting on the fence’.3 8 Third, to implement a policy of tribal engagement requires a high degree of Today, association with the international coordination between the government, military forces or government can bring swift international community and the international reprisal from the Taliban, who wish to make military forces on the provincial level. The examples out of individuals who openly declare importance of coordination cannot be themselves pro-international military forces.3 9 overstated, as the uncoordinated actions of In insurgency-ridden districts, the local some (especially the military in their perception is that it is ‘too dangerous’ to side operations) can seriously undermine such a with the international military forces and strategy.4 1 Hence, in each relevant province Afghan government and that, at best, the there should be a Tribal Outreach Commission people will remain neutral, while others will (TOC). The TOC would be chaired by the offer some support to the Taliban in order to Provincial Governor and should have be afforded some immunity from attacks. In representatives from the relevant government this regard, General McChrystal’s new strategy line ministries, Provincial Council, ISAF, UN, for the international military forces to place the Liaison Office and prominent tribal and security of the population at the centre of its religious leaders. The Commission would goals is a positive development. begin by systematically profiling each district, documenting active (and latent) conflicts and

Page 13 Policy Brief

Caught in the Crossfire

jointly identifying which conflicts could be reconstruction and development. The Obama resolved, in which order, with what resources, administration has initiated a new civilian and according to what time frame.4 2 Districts strategy for Afghanistan. General McChrystal would be then categorised as high, medium or has delivered his assessment with low risk. Beginning in the low and medium recommendations in Washington, and risk districts, the Commission would then deliberations on troop numbers and strategy engage the respective tribal shura and sign continue. The Afghan government, backed by formal protocols between the tribe and the the international community and international Afghan government (witnessed by the military forces, cannot afford to let the tribes Commission). One of the main lessons learnt cushion their own fall. from the Zadran initiative is that a balance must be struck between insecure areas and those where tribes have kept their environment secure. This helps to prevent a secure area from sliding towards insecurity and to dispel a widely held conception that only tribes that facilitate the insurgency are rewarded. The protocols would guarantee cooperation between the government and the tribe (and tribal participation in the reconstruction effort, as well as the security of reconstruction projects). On the basis of these contracts, projects would be implemented and government presence strengthened. Ultimately, these contracts are based on goodwill, which takes time to foster and must then be sustained.

At this time, the 2009 Presidential election has only served to exacerbate the myriad of problems facing the government, international community and the international military forces. These problems will only intensify in Afghanistan’s southeast in the absence of a well-articulated tribal strategy. As one tribal elder put it, ‘governments are coming and going but our system is the same…’.4 3 Such a strategy is long overdue, and despite the pressure faced by the tribes in the southeast, even the most insurgency-affected communities have stated their desire to support peace and stability in order to receive the practical benefits of

Page 14 HINA CCH A m 64 u 66 68 70 72 Mur 74 H ˚ D ˚ ˚ ˚ -ye Pa ˚ ghob ˚ a ya nj ry UZBEKISTAN r INA a a AFGHANISTAN D Qurghonteppa TAJIKISTAN Kerki (Kurgan-Tyube) Mary Kiroya iz M rm Dusti Khorugh u e BADAKHSHAN r

g T

a Keleft Fayzabad b Rostaq ir Qala-I-Panjeh Andkhvoy Jeyretan am JAWZJAN Mazari P KUNDUZ Taluqan Jorm TURKMENISTAN Sheberghan Sharif Kholm Kunduz h Eshkashem s Dowlatabad BALKH Khanabad TAKHAR u T K e d Baghlan Farkhar 36 z ˚ h Shulgarah 36 e u

n Sari Pul Dowshi ˚ Meymaneh Samangan d y g BAGHLAN h n Gilgit s SAMANGAN u FARYAB Tokzar i G Khavak ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF Qeysar H r AFGHANISTAN Gushgy PANJSHER a SARI PUL n u Jammu Mahmud NURISTAN K Towraghondi BADGHIS Raqi tan uris Taybad Charikar N KUNAR Qala-I-Naw Mo N and rghab BAMYAN PARWAN KAPISA A Dowlat M Mehtarlam Asadabad Bamyan H G Kashmir H Hirat Chaghcharan Yar Karokh A ar Owbeh Meydan Kabul irud L Jalalabad Shahr KABUL Mardan 34 WARDAK REPUBLIC ˚ GHOR DAY NANGARHAR 34˚ HIRAT LOGAR K h Puli Alam y Peshawar KUNDI Peywar Pass b Islamabad e d r an Pa Nili lm Gardez ss He Ghazni Rawalpindi PAKTYA KHOST Shindand- GHAZNI Qarah Bagh Khost Bannu Anar Darreh Khas Uruzgan Sharan PAKISTAN b a d URUZGAN n a ut FARAH gh ar r PAKTIKA H Now Zad A Farah Tirin Kot h OF ra ZABUL h 32 a Kajaki a F ur ˚ m L 32 a k e Tank ˚ lar Qalat na - De ar d T ow R

Lashkar Gah Kandahar sh IRAN IRAN National capital Kha s Zhob u Provincial capital Kadesh d Zabol n KANDAHAR I Town, village HILMAND The boundaries and names shown and the designations

Zaranj used on this map do not imply official endorsement or INDIA Spin Buldak ✈ Airports Chaman acceptance by the United Nations.

NIMROZ Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control International boundary in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been Provincial boundary He Chehar lmand Deh Shu agreed upon by the parties. 30 Main road ˚ Borjak Quetta 30 0 50 100 150 200 250 km Secondary road ˚ Zahedan Gowd-e Railroad Zereh 0 50 100 150 mi 62˚ 64˚ 66˚ 68˚ 70˚ 72˚ 74˚

Map No. 3958 Rev. 6 UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support July 2009 Cartographic Section Policy Brief

Caught in the Crossfire

NOTES 10 Resolution letter of religious scholars, tribal 1 Greg Bruno, A tribal strategy for Afghanistan, leaders, participants and residents regarding the Council on Foreign Relations, November 7, 2008. strengthening of security in Khost. Copy of file with 2 Quigley, Samantha, Afghan strategy requires the author. ‘holistic’ approach, General tells Senate, American 11 Jakes, Lara, Afghans aim at reconciliation with so- Forces Press Service: called ‘ten-dollar Taliban’. Associated Press, 24 http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id August 2009. Available: =54599. http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/world/ap/545 3 Cooper, Helen, U.S. military says its force in 27962.html#. Afghanistan is insufficient, New York Times, 23 12 Andrew Wilder, Cops or robbers? The struggle to August 2009: reform the Afghan National Police, Issues Paper http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/24/world/asia/24m Series (Kabul, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation ilitary.html?_r=1&ref=global-home. Unit, July 2007); James Neuger, Corrupt Afghan 4 Trives, Sébastien, Afghanistan: tackling the police targeted in U.S. policy, Holbrooke says, insurgency, the case of the southeast. Paris, The Bloomberg News, March 21, 2009. French Institute of International Relations, 2007. 13 Personal discussion with ‘Commander’ Naeem, 5 The arbakai can be defined as ‘a community-based Zurmat District, Paktya Province, February 2007. customary policing structure with a central focus on 14 United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, keeping law and order and stopping fighting within Human Rights Unit, Afghanistan Mid Year Bulletin tribal communities’. See Schmeidl, Susanne and on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, July Masood Karokhail, The role of non-state actors in 2009. ‘community-based policing’ - an exploration of the 15 Chris Lamb and Martin Cinnamond, The way Arbakai (Tribal Police) in south-eastern Afghanistan, forward in Afghanistan: improving unity of effort is Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 30 (2) 2009, pp the key to success for implementing the new strategy, 318-342. See also Tariq, Mohammed Osman, National Institute of Strategic Studies, September Tribal security system (Arbakai) in southeast 2009. Afghanistan, CSRC Occasional Paper No. 7, 2008. 16 Stockman, Farah, US alters strategy, makes gains 6 Trives, Afghanistan: tackling the insurgency. after botched raid, http://www.boston.com. 7 The term international community is used to 17 Hekmat Karzai, Is the West losing the Pashtuns? denote the international civilian presence in Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies, Kabul, 29 Afghanistan, such as the UN, EU, INGOs etc. June 2008. 8 The term International Military Forces is used to 18 Without access to US intelligence it is difficult to describe both the troops under the International assess the validity of targeting the individual. Security Assistance Force mandate and Operation However, the fact is he was never detained and there Enduring Freedom mandate. The southeast region were no subsequent operations against him. From an (part of Regional Command East) is the US forces information operations perspective, targeting a battle space. democratically elected leader had a negative effective 9 Associated Press, McChrystal preparing new for the US presence in the region. Afghan war strategy, likely to include more US 19Sara A. Carter and Bill Gertz, Ousted troops, 1 August 2 0 0 9 . Commander’s aide blames deaths on Taliban:

Page 15 Policy Brief

Caught in the Crossfire

McKiernan faulted on Afghan civilian casualties, of Justice in charge of civil cases, which can preside Washington Times, May 12, 2009, p 1. over land disputes between tribes. However, due to 20 Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, McChrystal corruption and partiality in the Ministry, most says solution in Afghanistan is developing parties seek alternative mechanisms. governance, June 30, 2009. 30 Koring, Paul, Ottawa kept abuse charges against 21 Equally such conflicts can be, and are, exploited by Afghan ally secret, The Globe and Mail, February 1, local powerbrokers or strongmen who are often part 2008. of the non-traditional tribal elite who benefited from 31 Bruno, A tribal strategy for Afghanistan. early support by the international military forces 32 This package includes enhanced funding, capacity (particularly USSOF). building, development of management and 22 Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan, The Independent administrative skills, training in financial oversight Directorate Of Local Governance, Afghanistan procedures, mentoring etc. Social Outreach Programme Document, April 2008. 33 One group doing some interesting work on conflict 23 Afghanistan: new U.S. administration, new mapping is the local Afghan NGO Cooperation for directions, Crisis Group Asia Briefing No. 89, 13 Peace and Unity (CPAU). See for example: Christian March 2009. Dennys and Idrees Zaman, Trends in local Afghan 24 Caught in the conflict: civilians and the conflicts, CPAU, June 2009. international security strategy in Afghanistan, A 34 The president expressed his expectation that IDLG briefing paper by eleven NGOs operating in connect people with the Government and achieve Afghanistan, April 2009. significant improvements in service delivery at sub 25 See, for example, Speech by ICGs Nick Grono, national level. Success in Afghanistan: how to define it, how to 35 For more discussion see Schmeidl, Susanne and make it happen, 2 April 2008: Karokhail, Masood, The role of non-state actors in http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5371 'community-based policing', pp 318-342. &l=1. 36 Conversation with LTC McGuire, 1/508 Airborne 26 Karokhail, Masood and Susanne Schmeidl, Division. Paktika Province, September 2005. Integration of traditional structures into the state- 37 See, for example, Talk to Taliban, Miliband urges, building process: lessons from the Tribal Liaison BBC News, 27 July 2009: Office in Loya Paktia. In: Publication series on http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8169789 Promoting Democracy under Conditions of State .stm. Fragility - Issue 1: Afghanistan. Berlin, Heinrich Böll 38 This is not to say that there should be no Foundation, 2006, pp 59-81. discussion on a broader reconciliation program, only 27 Mohammed Osman Tariq, Tribal Security System that such public statements are premature and (Arbakai) in southeast Afghanistan, Occasional should come from the Afghan government. Paper No. 7, Crisis States Research Centre, 39 Insurgent abuses against Afghan civilians, Afghan December 2008. Independent Human Rights Commission, December 28 Afghanistan: new U.S. administration, new 2008. directions. 40 The US government is currently reviewing 29 In addition to Tribal Affairs Ministry, there is a operations in Afghanistan and some positive steps General Department of Huqooq under the Ministry have been taken regarding information of detainees.

Page 16 Policy Brief

Caught in the Crossfire

See, Schmitt, Eric, U.S. shifts, giving detainee names to the Red Cross, New York Times, 22 August 2009. 41 See Chris Lamb and Martin Cinnamond, The way forward in Afghanistan. 42 Various actors have already completed much of this profiling. However, it is rarely shared and its current utility is therefore limited. 43 Tariq, Tribal security system (Arbakai) in southeast Afghanistan.

Page 17 ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Tom Gregg is currently working as a consultant for the Geneva based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. He previously served with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan for four years as Special Assistant to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and as the Head of UNAMA's Southeast Region. Prior to UNAMA, he worked for the Australian Council for International Development on Pacific Policy, and as an independent researcher based at the Australian National University. He has also worked for a local NGO in the Fiji Islands. He is co-author of How Ethical is Australia: An Examination of Australia's Record as a Global Citizen (2004) and holds a Master of Arts (International Relations) from the Australian National University.

www.lowyinstitute.org