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Home , Baitullah Mehsud, Haqqani network, Jalaluddin Haqqani, Khaama Press, Loya Paktia, Middle East Institute

MEI Policy Focus 2016-23 The Tenacious, Toxic

Marvin G. Weinbaum, Meher Babbar

Middle East Institute Policy Focus Series

September 2016 While global jihadist franchises al-Qaeda and ISIS compete for the public spotlight, the Haqqani Network has steadily and stealthily acted as a formidable insurgent force in . The group has skillfully established and utilized ties to a wide array of militant groups in Afghanistan and , while also maintaining close ties to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). In the Haqqani Network's willingness to be submerged within the Afghan movement, it often draws attention away from itself and allows the mainstream Taliban to take credit for leadership of the insurgency. The ISI's relationship with the Haqqani Network remains a thorn in U.S.-Pakistan relations, and will undoubtedly continue to plague relations with the coming of the next U.S. administration. Key Points

♦♦ The Haqqani Network is the strongest and most disciplined force in the Afghan insurgency

♦♦ The Afghan Taliban is heaviliy reliant on the Haqqani Network, despite appearances to the contrary

♦♦ The Haqqani Network has woven a web of alliances with fellow jihadist groups, including al-Qaeda, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Lashkar-e-Taiba

♦♦ Pakistan's ISI considers the Haqqani Network an asset to help expand its influence in Afghanistan, as well as counter Indian influence, and is unlikely to alter this policy in the near future, despite U.S. pressure

♦♦ Washington's counterinsurgency strategy has accomplished little in terms of dismantling the Haqqani Network Marvin G. Weinbaum Marvin G. Weinbaum Introduction is professor emeritus of political science at the f the several insurgent groups con- University of Illinois at fronting the Afghan state, none have Urbana-Champaign, O and served as analyst been bolder or more resolute in pursuit of for Pakistan and than the Haqqani Network (H.N.). Afghanistan in the U.S. The H.N. is thought to be the strongest and Department of State’s most disciplined force in the Afghan insur- Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 1999 gency. Post-9/11, H.N. has executed some to 2003. He is currently of the most carefully planned attacks on Af- a scholar-in-residence at the Institute in ghan soil, undertaken numerous high-pro- Washington DC. file kidnappings, and been involved in a wide array of criminal activities. The Au- Meher Babbar gust 25 attack on the American University Meher is a research in that killed 16 people, including associate at the Middle eight students, and injured 53, was likely East Institute. carried out by H.N.

Long a semi-autonomous component of the Taliban’s , the group occupies a prominent place in the insurgent move- ment. Alongside aiming to bring about the collapse of the Afghan government, expel all foreign forces, and restore the Islamic Emirate ousted in 2001, the H.N. has proved itself to be a key promoter of transnation- Uzbekistan (I.M.U.) and Lashkar-e-Tai- al terrorist operations. The recent move by ba (LeT). The H.N. aided al-Qaeda in its the to suspend critical fund- emergence in Afghanistan after 1996 and ing to the over its failure to has continued to provide the organization clamp down on the H.N. is testimony to the tactical assistance post–9/11. Unlike other threat the group is perceived to represent to Taliban factions reluctant to allow foreign American interests. fighters into their ranks, the H.N. has since its inception welcomed insurgents from Since its inception in 1994, the H.N. has around the world.1 offered various other insurgent groups and fighters safe haven from which to dissemi- Owing to its independent financing, the nate their ideas as well as training and fund- H.N. remains a remarkably resilient organi- ing. It has fostered close ties with numerous zation. Through the operation of a number terrorist groups including Tehrik-i-Taliban of businesses, both licit and illicit in and out Pakistan (T.T.P.), the Islamic Movement of of Afghanistan, as well as a steady stream of

The Tenacious, Toxic Haqqani Network 1 donations from various sources in the Arab viets, whom he saw as the common enemy Gulf, the H.N. has proved itself a capa- of not merely Afghans, but all Muslims.2 By ble and self-sustaining terrorist franchise. emphasizing early on the transnational na- With no need to bend to the will of other ture of the conflict, Jalaluddin helped to set groups and/or agencies, it maintains both into the motion the birth of the modern day itself and, consequently, the global jihad it worldwide terrorist syndicate. Establishing supports. In addition, the H.N. has enjoyed bases in , , and Af- more than two decades of support from Pa- ghanistan’s , he worked to create kistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in a space for the various foreign insurgents exchange for the promotion of the latter’s comprising the —Afghan, Pa- interests in Afghanistan. This ongoing rela- kistani and Arab—to intermingle. The rad- tionship remains a thorn in U.S.-Pakistan icalization in the region owes much to Jal- relations and stands to impede, if not com- uluddin’s jihadist propaganda. He helped to pletely block any chances of a peace pro- inspire Pakistani fighters to reignite the con- cess within Afghanistan. If its influence is flict in Kashmir.3 One of those nurtured by allowed to expand, the H.N. could become Jalaluddin, Zakiur Rahman Lakhvi, would a disruptive force across the region, as well later be among the top leaders of Lash- as on the global stage. kar-e-Taiba, the militant group responsible for the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, Origins . In the late 1980s, Jalaluddin funneled weapons to a nascent al-Qaeda in and Paktia, and continued his support for The founder of the H.N., Jalaluddin Haqqa- the group even after the latter’s departure ni, first rose to prominence as a command- from Afghanistan. Khost, in particular, was er within the mujahideen in the 1980s. a strategic location for Jalaluddin, who con- Following the Soviet invasion, he founded quered the city in 1991. The city has routes fundraising offices across the Gulf to court between Pakistan and Afghanistan and is donations from wealthy ideological sup- used through to the present day as one of porters. Jalaluddin recruited sympathetic the main routes for smuggling weapons Arab fighters for the jihad against the So- into Haqqani territory.

Following the collapse of “The H.N. has enjoyed more than two the , Jalalud- decades of support from Pakistan’s din called for jihad against the United States, accus- Inter-Services Intelligence.” ing it of colluding with to oppress Muslims worldwide.4 He pledged

2 Weinbaum, Babbar “H.N. fighters hide within plain sight; allegiance to the Taliban’s - mosques, bazaars, and madrassas have ate in 1996, later serving as Min- all served as areas for covert planning ister of Borders and Tribal Affairs and execution of attacks.” under the revenue by expanding into drug trade, im- Omar-led government. Unlike port and export businesses, and numerous his ally , whose al-Qaeda shady operations. Although H.N. claims its was in part focused on the Arabian Penin- revenue is funneled toward jihad, certain sula,5 or his comrades in the Taliban, who scholars counter that much of it has gone zeroed in on Pashtun issues, Jalaluddin toward war profiteering.10 advocated for jihad on a global level. As a more immediate goal, however, after 2001, The military and political activities of the H.N. joined with the Taliban in seeking to H.N. are primarily focused around gaining regain governance of Afghanistan. control of southeastern Afghanistan and forcing the Kabul government into yielding For his efforts, Jalaluddin earned respect to its demands. By claiming to act under and recognition from the ISI, who in turn the banner of the Afghan Taliban, the H.N. granted him unprecedented access to the aims to avoid exposure. A remarkably effi- more than $12 billion funneled to the in- cient organization, the H.N.’s leadership is surgency during the 1980s.6 The H.N. was family based. Highly structured and hierar- initially heavily dependent on the ISI, with chical at the top, leadership becomes more the latter providing everything from shelter diffuse and localized below.11 Fighters, both and supplies to tactical assistance.7 Jalalud- local and international, are recruited from din was uncomfortable with this reliance, Pakistani madrassas such as the Darul however, and worked early on to build up Uloom Haqqania, referred to by some as the group’s assets, particularly revenue gen- the “University of Jihad”12 for its notable erated from illegal businesses, so as to im- alumni, including Taliban leader Mullah prove his group’s autonomy. Following the Omar and Jalaluddin himself. H.N. fighters end of the Soviet conflict, Jalaluddin sold hide within plain sight; mosques, bazaars, scrap metal to fund his jihadist exploits.8 and madrassas have all served as areas for His sons Sirajuddin and Badruddin main- covert planning and execution of attacks.13 tained close relations with their father’s The H.N. has operated its own council, the Gulf supporters, increasing the number of Miramshah Shura, led by Sirajuddin, and fundraising offices in the region.9 Careful coordinates with the , the Tal- with their spending, the H.N. also sought iban’s main leadership organ. The H.N. has new and primarily illicit ways of generating

The Tenacious, Toxic Haqqani Network 3 been called upon as an intermediary be- attacks by the United States against both tween the Quetta Shura and the ISI, as well the H.N. and al-Qaeda over the last decade as the T.T.P.14 have only served to solidify ties between the two groups and reaffirmed their shared Collaborations ideological convictions.18 The relationship between the H.N. and the The H.N. has long fostered close ties with Taliban is complex as the H.N. maintains ideologically aligned groups in the region complete financial autonomy from the Tal- and beyond. Al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, iban, but readily professes loyalty to the and the T.T.P. have been major partners in latter’s high command. Keen on portray- collaborative attacks within Afghanistan. ing itself as subordinate to the Quetta Shu- The H.N.’s closeness to al-Qaeda began ra council, the H.N. has appeared to some during Jalaluddin’s service in the mujahi- scholars as more in need of the Taliban deen. But even predating Osama bin Laden’s than vice versa. Yet the reality could not be more different: the Taliban relies heavi-

“the Taliban relies heavily on the H.N.” ly on the H.N. to do its bidding in Loya Paktia, the south- return to Afghanistan in 1996, Jalaluddin west mountainous area long inhabited by was spreading awareness in the Gulf of the the Haqqanis.19 Beyond Loya Paktia, the anti-Soviet jihad. Unlike his fellow Pash- H.N. offers the Taliban a platform from tun commanders, Jalaluddin welcomed Ar- which to project its leadership and present abs as well as other foreign fighters,15 and a unified face for the insurgent front. The through this policy met bin Laden. At one H.N. carries out numerous attacks in the point he provided bin Laden a cave com- Taliban’s name, awarding the latter cred- plex in which to train his fighters.16 it for targeted strikes. This careful policy of ostensibly deferring to the Taliban and Following bin Laden’s fatwa declaring war avoiding association with terrorist attacks on the United States, while the Taliban carried out outside Afghanistan by other tended to distance itself from the anti-West- allies (most notably al-Qaeda) has allowed ern rhetoric of al-Qaeda,17 Jalaluddin saw the Haqqanis to often evade the close scru- al-Qaeda as central to the greater mission tiny the group warrants. of global jihad and maintained his close ties to bin Laden. Even after 9/11, the H.N. Leading up to the U.S. military’s 2001 inter- continued to arm the jihadists and spread vention in Afghanistan, efforts by top U.S. their militant propaganda. The heightened officials to persuade Jalaluddin to abandon

4 Weinbaum, Babbar his allegiance to the Taliban were wholly ers during the Taliban’s military campaign unsuccessful.20 Jalaluddin’s long refusal to in the late 1990s. , the late disengage from the Taliban is carried for- T.T.P. leader, and his successor, Hakimullah ward in the rhetoric of his son and successor, Mehsud, fought alongside Jalaluddin in the Sirajuddin, who flatly proclaimed in 2011, Shomali Plains north of Kabul.26 Sourc- “We would support whatever solution our es suggest Jalaluddin may have been Bait- [Quetta] Shura members suggest for the ullah’s commander, and thus a close bond future of Afghanistan.”21 The following developed between the two; Baitullah later year, he added, “We are one of the fronts of worked for the H.N.27 The T.T.P. has since the Islamic Emirate […] and we obey […] operated in tandem with the H.N. so as Emir [Mullah Omar].”22 Following the an- to maximize their output of attacks. The nouncement of Mullah Omar’s death in groups share training camps in which they 2015, Sirajuddin was made deputy emir disseminate jihadist propaganda to young of the Taliban in 2015 and reportedly oversees much of the group’s military operations.23 The H.N.’s alliance with “The H.N., has managed to the Taliban works to not only maxi- mize their joint utility, but also sustain distance itself from the anti- their individual bodies. For instance, Pakistan jihad of the T.T.P.” with the revelation of Omar’s death, the Quetta Shura threatened to dissolve into warring factions. The in recruits.28 These recruits are often shuffled Afghanistan sought to exploit this vulnera- between the groups—the T.T.P., for exam- bility by inviting Taliban dissidents to join ple, is known to send suicide bombers by forces. The H.N. intervened and eased the way of Loya Paktia.29 The H.N. does not ac- transition into Mullah Mansour’s leader- tively participate in the T.T.P.’s attacks, nor ship, while also helping to stave off armed does it openly collaborate with the group. attacks from the Islamic State against the It does, however, facilitate the execution of Taliban. 24 The H.N., al-Qaeda, and the Tal- the T.T.P.’s jihad. This would seem to put iban furthermore jointly expressed their H.N. in an awkward position, as the T.T.P.’s dislike of the Islamic State and their view main adversary is Pakistan’s army, which that the group threatens the unity of the also offers the H.N. protection. The H.N., Muslim world and the task of global jihad has managed, however, to distance itself that was so central to Jalaluddin’s original from the anti-Pakistan jihad of the T.T.P. mission.25 and has reportedly compelled the latter to refrain from specifically attacking the mil- Contact was first established between the itary’s ISI.30 H.N. and Pakistan’s future insurgent lead-

The Tenacious, Toxic Haqqani Network 5 ISI and the U.S. are served by a weak Afghan state may be debatable. Not arguable is that the H.N.’s at- The partnership between the ISI and the tacks have sorely tested the Afghan security H.N. is mutually beneficial. The H.N.’s in- forces’ ability to provide for their country’s fluence in Afghanistan is of key strategic security and have contributed to under- importance to Pakistan as it helps assure mining the confidence of Afghans in their Pakistan’s influence across the border and government. serves as a proxy for defending the state’s The ties between the H.N. and the ISI have 31 interests in tribal conflicts. In Pakistan, long put a strain on U.S.-Pakistan relations. the H.N. has also aided the ISI to strength- The ISI’s enduring loyalty toward the Haqqa- en its grip on the Federally Administered nis, in spite of their brazenly anti-Ameri- Tribal Areas (FATA). With Pakistan’s fears can activities, has frustrated U.S. officials. regarding a two-front war with India and The United States has been slow to directly Afghanistan dominating its regional strate- confront Pakistan over the ISI’s well-evi- gic thinking, through groups like the H.N., denced sponsorship and shielding of H.N. the ISI hopes to neutralize any Indo-Af- and other terrorist organizations. Despite ghan military alliance and create a bulwark repeated complaints by Washington, Paki- against Indian political and economic in- stan refused to remove H.N. sanctuaries, terests in Afghanistan. In its most notable claiming that either none existed or that if terrorist strike on Pakistan’s behalf, the pursued the group’s fighters could join with H.N. targeted the Indian embassy in Kabul, those forces attacking the Pakistani state.33 setting off a that killed 54 people In September 2011, in addressing Paki- at the site in 2008. stan’s ties with the H.N., the soon retiring In return, the ISI has aided H.N. to expand Admiral , Chairman of the its penetration and maintain its influence Joint Chiefs of Staff, directly accused the in southeast Afghanistan. The H.N. has en- H.N. of being “a veritable arm of Pakistan’s 34 joyed the ISI’s protection when planning Inter-Services Intelligence Agency.” But its attacks from North and re- Washington, still concerned about already cuperating from armed operations in Af- strained U.S.-Pakistan relations, backed off ghanistan.32 Whether Pakistan’s interests as President effectively re- futed Mullen’s statement in arguing that no clear con- “the ISI has aided H.N. to expand nection between the two had been found.35 Although its penetration and maintain its as Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton repeatedly called influence in southeast Afghanistan.” on Pakistan to take action

6 Weinbaum, Babbar against the Haqqanis, she “From the beginning of the Zarb-e- also sought to calm wa- Azb operation, doubts existed over ters by disavowing any American intention to the seriousness of Pakistan’s policy undertake cross-border raids against the H.N. change toward the H.N.” without ’s con- seph Anderson proclaiming that the oper- 36 sent. ation “[has] very much disrupted their [the It was not until September 2012 that the H.N.’s] efforts […] and has caused them 42 H.N. was designated by the Department of [the H.N.] to be less effective.” State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. A Yet from the beginning of the Zarb-e-Azb large-scale attack by the H.N. in 2011 on the operation, doubts existed over the serious- U.S. embassy in Kabul and the Internation- ness of Pakistan’s policy change toward 37 al Security Assistance Force (ISAF) finally the H.N. Multiple reports claimed that the catalyzed a shift in attitudes within the U.S. H.N. had been warned in advance by the government. During 2012, the U.S. began ISI about the coming military campaign so air and ground strikes against the H.N. in- as to afford the group time to flee across the 38 side Afghanistan. In 2014, a special mil- border.43 There was also concern raised that itary unit in Kabul was founded solely in H.N. might be allowed to return to its safe 39 order to combat the H.N. haven in North Waziristan. In May 2016, A notable shift in Pakistan’s willingness to the U.S. Congress proposed a $300 million combat terrorist networks occurred follow- cutoff of the U.S. Coalition Support Fund if ing the T.T.P.’s June 2014 attack on Jinnah the Haqqani network’s “safe haven and free- International Airport. The Pakistani gov- dom of movement” were not “significantly 44 ernment vowed to wipe out all militants, disrupted.” Two months later, American including the long-favored H.N., through defense secretary Ash Carter refused to Operation Zarb-e Azb. And then, in re- certify that Pakistan had taken sufficient sponse to a T.T.P. faction’s December 2014 action again the H.N. and other terrorist massacre at Peshawar Army Public School, groups, and reimbursement intended for Pakistan outlawed the H.N.40 Regarding the Pakistan military’s counterterrorism the decision, a senior government official and counterinsurgency operations were added, “Pakistan no longer believes in sep- suspended. arating the ‘good’ Taliban from the ‘bad’.”41 The United States praised efforts made by the against the H.N. in particular, with Lieutenant General Jo-

The Tenacious, Toxic Haqqani Network 7 A Growing Threat son for the H.N.’s longevity, but this ignores the self-sufficiency of the group. Pakistan’s The resilience of the H.N. is perhaps its protection is only useful insofar as it offers most discernable and troubling feature. The the jihadists a safe haven; the strategic uti- shift in leadership from Jalaluddin to his lization of this space, as supported by their sons does not appear to have slowed down budget and tactical expertise, is what em- 45 the network. In his time at the helm, Sir- powers the group. ajuddin has expanded territory and diver- Pakistan’s counterinsurgency campaign sified sources of revenue, while successfully has had an indirect effect on the H.N. Its withstanding the dislocations of Pakistan’s intensified monitoring of allied domestic military operations. The past several years terrorist groups has likely reduced recruit- have seen the group’s stronghold extend to ment and fundraising in madrassas and both southern and northern Afghanistan mosques.46 But the unwillingness by Pa- and, critically, encircle Kabul. The H.N.’s kistan to directly target the H.N. through strengthened alliances with the Taliban, Operation Zarb-e Azb suggests that Paki- al-Qaeda, T.T.P., I.M.U., and LeT have al- stan continues to view the group as an as- lowed it to further bolster its funding of set. And even were H.N. more constrained, global jihad and widen its operations. The though it might affect its command struc- H.N.’s desire to seize power in Kabul and ture and mobilization networks, the group’s its ambitions that transcend Afghanistan’s operations would probably not be severely borders are critical to predicting the group’s disrupted. The United States could further direction going forward. increase pressure on Pakistan to oust the In the transformative landscape of con- H.N., but it seems doubtful that Washing- flict, they are undeniable winners. An un- ton will impose strong sanctions and re- fettered hold on leadership has brought the tract all or most of the country’s aid. The family and associated H.N. commanders bilateral relations serve other purposes not both money and power. Observers often likely to be discarded over differences about point to the ISI as being the primary rea- the Haqqanis. The Afghan Na- tional Director- “The unwillingness by Pakistan to directly ate of Security has been mak- target the H.N. through Operation Zarb-e ing small strides Azb suggests that Pakistan continues to in Afghanistan toward disarm- view the group as an asset.” ing the group by

8 Weinbaum, Babbar “The U.S.’s counterinsurgency conducting raids, arresting se- nior commanders,47 and foiling, strategy has apparently most recently, a plot in Khost during .48 Meanwhile, accomplished little in terms of the U.S.’s counterinsurgency dismantling the H.N.” strategy has apparently accom- plished little in terms of dis- is fighting occupying foreign forces. A be- mantling the H.N. Despite some successes leaguered Afghan public is told by H.N. pro- of American drone strategy, the loss of key paganda that for peace and order to return leaders has not slowed the oligarchic H.N. to the country, it must be rid of meddling down. Unlike the Taliban, the H.N. has sus- foreign powers. The H.N. is savvy enough tained itself without pause in the decade to know that winning the support of the since 9/11.49 people they aim to govern is as important as militarily defeating the government they Those who had expected Sirajuddin—a wish to depose. Thus, they offer social ser- controversial figure lacking his father’s vices in areas of control, providing educa- reputation for political skills—might pale tion (primarily religious) and healthcare.51 next to his illustrative father have been The group actively promotes its image as a proven wrong. As leader, Sirajuddin has stabilizing force, with the Haqqani family outdone Jalaluddin to become the Taliban working as mediator to resolve tribal dis- movement’s second-in-command as well putes and enforce rulings and agreements.52 as its de facto military leader. His ascen- dance diminishes prospects that pragma- The psychological impact of the H.N.’s at- tists will lead the Taliban toward agreeing tacks is equally significant. Zabihullah Mu- to a political compromise with the Kabul jahid, the public persona used by the H.N. government. Sirajuddin has expressed his and Taliban, has stated that the group’s at- opposition to peace talks unless “they are tacks are, “not aimed at controlling [Kabul] held in line with and if the inter- physically but … captur[ing] it psycholog- national community agrees to this.”50 Un- ically,” by making more grave “the political der his command, the and financial costs of doing business for for- is almost certain to push vigorously for a eign forces and diplomatic missions located military victory. i n Kabu l .” 53 The H.N. purposefully crafts its attacks to demonstrate its capacity to strike Continued warfare in Afghanistan has at high value military and civilian targets. served to reaffirm the H.N.’s credibility Consistent focusing on foreign targets and as an insurgent force. The presence of the prolonging the onslaught so as to maximize United States and its military allies fits the publicity contributes to the perception that H.N.’s recruitment-fueling narrative that it Afghanistan is under siege. The group’s use

The Tenacious, Toxic Haqqani Network 9 “Pakistan’s Afghan policy will go Sirajuddin’s leadership.57 The public image of H.N. unchanged and the H.N. unchecked.” under Sirajuddin blurs to some extent the difference of improvised explosive devices, suicide between the group as freedom fighters and vests, and fighters able to penetrate the cap- mere criminals. His dabbling in criminal ital of Kabul’s security perimeter generates activities, in particular kidnappings for ran- considerable media coverage and cements som, draws unfavorable comparisons with the notion that the Afghan government is his father. Jalaluddin’s reputation as a muja- incapable of defending .54 The hideen leader earned him the respect of his H.N. was the first group to consistently use colleagues and others. Sirajuddin appears suicide bombers in its attacks in Afghani- to value most the cause of jihad, even if it stan, indicating a preference for spreading stands the risk of alienating some elements fear as much as actual destruction through of the Afghan public. .55 The prevalence of suicide bombers increases paranoia and The H.N. has emerged as an even more crit- uncertainty amongst the populace. ical player in the Afghan insurgency. It has been allowed to expand and strengthen its The Afghan public’s loss of confidence in role in Afghanistan, while also increase its the national unity government serves to appetite for the proliferation of worldwide benefit the H.N. as it relentlessly works to jihad. The United States, with its greatly re- undermine the state’s ability to protect its duced ground presence in the Afghan the- citizens and deliver justice. At the same ater, is limited in what it can do militarily time, it also targets sites of development— toward thwarting an H.N. that has become roads, schools, businesses—that could raise more difficult to strike with drones. The people’s hopes for an economy that prom- play remains in Pakistan’s hands. To get Pa- ises a better life.56 For the H.N., a war of at- kistan’s ISI to sever its ties to H.N. would trition can be winnable if it leads the public require a broad reassessment by Pakistan and the international community to aban- of its interests in Afghanistan. This remains don faith in the country’s future. a dim possibility; if anything, events are Despite the H.N.’s gains, some pushback conspiring to make it less likely. The fur- has occurred owing to the increasingly vi- ther souring of Afghan-Pakistani relations, olent nature of their attacks, and especially the growing fragility of the Afghan unity for the civilian lives lost. The legitimacy the government, India’s increased activity in group has brought to the insurgency has Afghanistan and, most of all, the Taliban’s also been tarnished by the H.N.’s illicit activ- recent military gains serve the argument ities, many of which have originated under instead that Pakistan’s Afghan policy will go unchanged and the H.N. unchecked.

10 Weinbaum, Babbar The Tenacious, Toxic Haqqani Network 11 ous-haqqani-patron-in-pakistan/2011/07/18/ Endnotes gIQAtWmcLI_blog.html.

1. Don Rassler and Vahid Brown, “The Haqqani Nexus 18. Rassler and Brown, “The Haqqani Nexus,” 42. and the Evolution of al-Qa’ida,” Combating Terror- ism Center-West Point, July 2011, 39. 19. Ibid, 13.

2. Ibid, 19. 20. Sarah Handel, “Who Are The Haqqanis?” NPR, last modified October 3, 2011, http://www.npr.org/ 3. Ibid, 27. blogs/thetwo-way/2011/10/03/141016637/who- are-the-haqqanis. 4. Ibid, 31. 21. Dean Nelson, “Feared Haqqani network announce 5. Ibid. support for Taliban peace talks,” The Telegraph, Sep- tember 17, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 6. Ibid, 9. worldnews//afghanistan/8770587/Feared- Haqqani-network-announce-support-for-Taliban- 7. Gretchen Peters, “Haqqani Network Financing: The peace-talks.html. Evolution of an Industry,” Combating Center-West Point, July 2012, 14. 22. “Haqqani Network,” Counter Extremism Project, 2.

8. Peters, “Haqqani Network Financing,” 9. 23. Yochi Dreazen, “The Taliban’s New Number 2 Is a ‘Mix of Tony Soprano and Che Guevara’,” For- 9. Rassler and Brown, “The Haqqani Nexus,” 39. eign Policy, July 31, 2015, http://foreignpolicy. com/2015/07/31/afghanistan-taliban-war-terror- 10. Peters, “Haqqani Network Financing,” 9. ism-alqaeda-cia-mullahomar-haqqani/. 11. Ibid, ii. 24. Umair Jamal, “Why Won’t Pakistan Act against the 12. “EU snub for hardline Pakistan MP,” BBC, last mod- Haqqani Network?” The National Interest, May 7, ified April 20, 2005,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/ south_asia/4466019.stm. why-pakistan-wont-act-against-the-haqqani-net- work-16085. 13. Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat,” Institute for the Study of War, March 2012, 25. “Haqqani Network,” Counter Extremism Project, 2. 16. 26. Rassler and Brown, “The Haqqani Nexus,” 12. 14. Rassler and Brown, “The Haqqani Nexus,” 10. 27. Michael Kugelman, “The Haqqani Threat to the 15. Ibid, 19. US-Pakistan Détente,” The Diplomat, July 31, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/the-haqqani- 16. “Interview with ,” Frontline, “Return of threat-to-the-us-pakistan-detente/. the Taliban: ,” PBS, October 3, 2006. 28. Dressler, “The Haqqani Network,” 34.

17. Jason Ukman, “The Haqqani network: Al-Qae- 29. Rassler and Brown, “The Haqqani Nexus,” 47. da’s dangerous patron,” , July 30. Ibid. 18, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ checkpoint-washington/post/al-qaedas-danger- 31. Dressler, “The Haqqani Network,” 38.

12 Weinbaum, Babbar 32. Ibid. articles/militants-slip-away-before-pakistan-offen- sive-1405637710#:Ql82r0NY6oNXHA. 33. Kugelman, “US-Pakistan Détente,” The Diplomat. 44. Kugelman, “US-Pakistan Détente,” The Diplomat. 34. “Adm Mike Mullen’s address”, BBC, last modified September 22, 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/ 45. Dressler, “The Haqqani Network,” 13. world-us-canada-15024941. 46. Peters, “Haqqani Network Financing,” 34. 35. “Obama won’t back Mullen’s claim on Pakistan,” AP, NDTV, last modified October 1, 2011, http://www. 47. Khaama Press, “Key Haqqani Network terrorist ar- ndtv.com/world-news/obama-wont-back-mullens- rested in ,” Khaama Press, June 14, claim-on-pakistan-565162 2016, http://www.khaama.com/key-haqqani-net- work-terrorist-arrested-in-logar-province-01257. 36. “Clinton demands action in ‘days and weeks’,” , October 21, 2011, http://www.dawn.com/ 48. Khaama Press, “Haqqani network Ramadan attack news/668052/clinton-demands-action-in-days- plots foiled in ,” Khaama Press, June and-weeks. 26, 2016, http://www.khaama.com/haqqani-net- work-ramadan-attack-plots-foiled-in-khost-prov- 37. “Haqqani Network,” Counter Extremism Project, 7. ince-01355.

38. Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Seeks Aid 49. Dressler, “The Haqqani Network,” 8. From Pakistan in Peace Effort,”, October 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes. 50. Tahir Khan, “Rare audio message: Taliban open to com/2011/10/31/world/asia/united-states-seeks- talks ‘under Sharia’,” , 15 June pakistan-spy-agencys-help-for-afghan-talks.html. 2016, http://tribune.com.pk/story/1123156/ra- re-audio-message-taliban-open-talks-sharia/. 39. “Haqqani Network,” Counter Extremism Project, 7. 51. Peters, “Haqqani Network Financing,” 22. 40. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 41. Shamil Shams, “Could the next Taliban leader pose a bigger threat to peace?”, Deutsche Welle, last mod- 53. Dressler, “The Haqqani Network,” 31. ified April 23, 2016,http://dw.com/p/1IstC . 54. Dressler, “The Haqqani Network,” 31. 42. “US commander commends Zarb-e-Azb for dis- rupting Haqqani network’s ability to target Afghan- 55. Dreazen, “The Taliban’s New Number 2,” Foreign istan,” APP, The Express Tribune, November 6, 2014, Policy. http://tribune.com.pk/story/786641/us-command- 56. Peters, “Haqqani Network Financing,” 3. er-commends-zarb-e-azb-for-disrupting-haqqa- ni-networks-ability-to-target-afghanistan/. 57. Ibid, 65. 43. Daud Khattak, “Pakistani Offensive Seen As Spar- ing Taliban Factions,” Gandhara, last modified July 25, 2014, http://gandhara.rferl.org/a/25470427. html; Baqir Sajjad Syed, “US finds action against Haqqani network inadequate,” DAWN, August 20, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1201551; Saeed Shah, Safdar Dawar, and Adam Entous, “Militants Slip Away Before Pakistan Offensive,” The Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/

The Tenacious, Toxic Haqqani Network 13

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