AUTHOR Matt Bryden The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab A Strategy of Choice or Necessity? 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW | Washington, DC 20036 t. 202.887.0200 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org Cover photo: ABDIRASHID ABDULLE ABIKAR/AFP/Getty Images. FEBRUARY 2014 A Report of the CSIS Africa Program Blank The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab A Strategy of Choice or Necessity? Author Matt Bryden A Report of the CSIS Africa Program February 2014 About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full- time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. 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Center for Strategic & International Studies 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab A Strategy of Choice or Necessity? Matt Bryden Introduction The September 2013 attack on Nairobi’s Westgate Shopping Center, which left more than 70 people dead, has positioned the Somali extremist group, Al-Shabaab, firmly in the global spotlight. While some observers have interpreted the attack as a sign of “desperation,”1 others perceive it as an indication of Al-Shabaab’s reformation and resurgence under the leadership of the movement’s Amir, Ahmed Abdi aw Mohamud Godane.2 The reality is, as usual, more complex. Westgate provided a glimpse of a movement in the throes of a protracted, fitful, and often-violent transition: Al-Shabaab is in the process of reinventing itself. Al-Shabaab’s steep decline in recent years has made radical reform a matter of survival. The jihadist movement has fallen far from its heady zenith in 2009–10, when it was without question the most powerful force in southern Somalia, controlling most major towns including much of the capital, Mogadishu, and earning tens of millions of dollars a year in tax revenues. Since then, Al-Shabaab has been steadily ceding territory—including its principal income-earner, the port of Kismayo—to the combined efforts of African Union troops, the Kenyan and Ethiopian armed forces, and their Somali allies. At the same time, the ranks of its leadership have been eroded by intelligence-led air strikes and commando operations. For more than two years, between 2011 and 2013, wrangling within Al-Shabaab’s top leadership over ideology, strategy, and tactics hindered any decisive action to reverse the movement’s downward spiral. In June 2013, however, Godane finally succeeded in purging the movement of his most vociferous critics, leaving him—for the time being, at least—as Al-Shabaab’s undisputed leader. The implications of Godane’s coup, both for Al-Shabaab and for its adversaries, are beginning to take shape. First, the question of Al-Shabaab’s core ideological identity and affiliation appears to have been definitively settled. Within the strictures of its Salafi-jihadi orientation, Al- Shabaab’s leadership was once relatively heterogeneous, including nationalist and politically pragmatic figures such as Hassan Dahir Aweys and Mukhtar Roobow. Internal debates within the leadership circles of Al-Shabaab raged over the value of a relationship with Al-Qaeda, the wisdom of attacks on civilians, and the role of foreign fighters within the organization. What now remains of Al-Shabaab is the more 1 Andrew McGregor, “Hot Issue: Westgate Mall Attack Demonstrates al-Shabaab’s Desperation, Not Strength,” Jamestown Foundation, September 24, 2013, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5 Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=westgate&tx_tt news%5Btt_news%5D=41399&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=935464970e9996fd9a406a25f1f76ba3 #.UujuZGTfquU. 2 Also known as Mukhtar Abdirahman Abu Zubeyr. | 1 extremist fringe: an Al-Qaeda franchise in Somalia, imbued with the “takfiri” ethos that legitimizes the killing of other Muslims, and a recommitment to the cause of international jihad and the restoration of an Islamic caliphate. On the ground in Somalia, as a reinforced African Union peace support mission in Somalia (AMISOM) prepares to resume offensive operations, Al-Shabaab is likely to suffer military reverses—including the loss of its remaining strongholds. Whether by accident or by design, Godane’s reforms appear to have anticipated this development, preparing Al-Shabaab to withdraw in good order, preserving its forces for a long, asymmetrical struggle. For the near term at least, Al-Shabaab is not playing to win, but to survive, subvert, and surprise—to become, as T.E. Lawrence once described his irregular army during the Arab Revolt, “an influence, a thing invulnerable, intangible, without front or back, drifting about like a gas.”3 It is a strategy of necessity rather than of choice, but one that would permit Al-Shabaab to survive as a potent force in Somalia and the region. From an international perspective, Al-Shabaab (and its affiliated networks, such as Kenya’s Al-Hijra) remains a persistent threat—especially to Somalia’s immediate neighbors and other troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to AMISOM. The loss of its remaining Somali safe havens will degrade the movement’s ability to plan and prepare major operations, but under Godane’s leadership, Al-Shabaab’s aspirational horizon will widen, rather than shrink, and it is plausible that Al-Shabaab will seek to expand its relationships with transnational jihadist groups. Despite his apparent consolidation of power, Godane himself may be vulnerable. Even within his own faction of Al-Shabaab, tensions remain; and as the going gets tougher, he will have to work hard to persuade his remaining followers that the path he has chosen is the correct one. An even greater vulnerability, however, remains Al- Shabaab’s lack of popular support within Somalia. Most Somalis—including much of the country’s growing Salafi community—have been alienated by the movement’s draconian style of governance and its deliberate killing of civilians. By divesting his inner circle of its nationalists and political pragmatists, Godane’s purge has narrowed the group’s appeal even further and alienated many former sympathizers. Al-Shabaab will soon face its greatest military challenge since the Ethiopian invasion of 2006. Godane’s coup has depleted its ranks, splintering the organization and leaving it more isolated than ever at a critical moment. At the same time, however, he has succeeded in restructuring what remains of Al-Shabaab to weather the coming AMISOM offensive and to retain to some degree the strategic initiative by engaging in asymmetrical warfare. The AMISOM surge offers an opportunity to significantly disrupt and degrade Al- Shabaab’s capability to threaten Somalia and the region. But it requires that military operations be firmly anchored in a broader strategy that denies Al-Shabaab the opportunity to disengage and wage a successful asymmetrical campaign. In addition to AMISOM’s planned offensive, the group should be kept off balance with continued strikes to decapitate and degrade its leadership, including second- and third-tier players; and the administrations in Puntland and Somaliland should be encouraged to take coordinated measures to deny Al-Shabaab a safe haven in “Sharqistaan” as it 3 T.E. Lawrence, “The Evolution of a Revolt,” Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (October 1920). 2 | MATT BRYDEN vacates former bases in southern Somalia. Perhaps most importantly, however, will be the Somali federal government’s (SFG) commitment to practice genuinely inclusive politics, disallowing Al-Shabaab the opportunity to entrench itself among disaffected clans and communities, and working with local partners to ensure security in newly recovered territories. Previous transitional Somali governments have neglected these responsibilities, permitting Al-Shabaab to recover from successive military defeats. It remains to be seen whether the current SFG leadership is capable of rising to the challenge. Godane’s Coup Godane’s 2013 purge was only the most recent—and probably most decisive—chapter in a long history of discord in the senior ranks of Al-Shabaab. Indeed, one of the movement’s key strengths has long been its ability to manage divergence and disagreement between its competing factions, while remaining united and cohesive. That era of accommodation has now come to an end. The first serious rifts in Al-Shabaab emerged following Ethiopia’s