DOCSLIB.ORG

Al Shabaab's American Recruits

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Al Shabaab's American Recruits Al Shabaab’s American Recruits Updated: February, 2015 A wave of Americans traveling to Somalia to fight with Al Shabaab, an Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group, was described by the FBI as one of the "highest priorities in anti-terrorism." Americans began traveling to Somalia to join Al Shabaab in 2007, around the time the group stepped up its insurgency against Somalia's transitional government and its Ethiopian supporters, who have since withdrawn. At least 50 U.S. citizens and permanent residents are believed to have joined or attempted to join or aid the group since that time. The number of Americans joining Al Shabaab began to decline in 2012, and by 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) replaced Al Shabaab as the terrorist group of choice for U.S. recruits. However, there continue to be new cases of Americans attempting to join or aid Al Shabaab. These Americans have received weapons training alongside recruits from other countries, including Britain, Australia, Sweden and Canada, and have used the training to fight against Ethiopian forces, African Union troops and the internationally-supported Transitional Federal Government in Somalia, according to court documents. Most of the American men training with Al Shabaab are believed to have been radicalized in the U.S., especially in Minneapolis, according to U.S. officials. The FBI alleges that these young men have been recruited by Al Shabaab both on the Internet and in person. One such recruit from Minneapolis, 22-year-old Abidsalan Hussein Ali, was one of two suicide bombers who attacked African Union troops on October 29, 2011. He was identified by his family as speaking in an audio message released by Al Shabaab claiming credit for the bombing. Somali authorities reported that 10 people were killed in the ensuing firefight. Ali is the third American suicide bomber. The first, Shirwa Ahmed, carried out a suicide bombing at 1 the Ethiopian Consulate and the presidential palace in Hargeisa killing 24 people in October 2009. The second, Farah Mohamad Beledi, carried out a suicide bombing on May 30, 2011, targeting a military base outside Mogadishu, the Somali capital, killing two African Union peacekeepers and a Somali soldier. Federal investigators have also looked into reports about whether another American was involved in a suicide attack in Mogadishu in September 2009 that killed 21 people. The identity of that attacker has never been confirmed. Additionally, Al Shabaab claimed that three Americans took part in its assault on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, on September 21, 2013. Al Shabaab named Ahmed Mohamed Isse of St. Paul, Minnesota, Abdifatah Osman Keenadiid of Minneapolis, and Gen Mustafe Noorudiin of Kansas City, Missouri as attackers via the organization’s Twitter feed. As of October, 2013, Al Shabaab’s claims had not been verified by American law enforcement. In addition, other Twitter accounts claiming to be Al Shabaab have suggested that other Americans were also involved. FBI director Robert Mueller said he was "absolutely" concerned that the young American men may return to the U.S. with their passports and attempt to carry out an attack on U.S. soil similar to the foiled plot in Australia, in which Somali-Australians allegedly affiliated with Al Shabaab planned to carry out a suicide attack on a Sydney army base after returning from Somalia. While there have been no similar plots in the United States to date, Al Shabaab's desire to expand its operations outside of Somali and its ability to attract American recruits, presents a significant threat to the U.S. Recruitment in the U.S. Al Shabaab, the FBI alleges, has made an "active and deliberate attempt" to recruit young American men both in person and on the Internet. "These young men have been recruited to fight in a foreign war by individuals and groups using violence against government troops and civilians," said B. Todd Jones, U.S. Attorney for the District of Minneapolis, who brought charges against some of the men. Mahamud Said Omar, a former janitor at Abubaker As- Saddique Islamic Center, a mosque many of the defendants attended, played a major role in recruiting some of the young men, according to the Department of Justice. In November 2009, Omar was arrested 2 in the Netherlands and charged in a Minneapolis District Court with providing the young men funding to travel to Somalia. He also allegedly visited Shabaab safe-house and donated money to the group for the purchase of AK-47 rifles for the Minneapolis men to use. In October 2012, Omar was found guilty of five charges related to his recruitment for Al Shabaab and was sentenced to 20- years in prison on May 13, 2013. The Department of Justice has found no evidence that the mosque's leadership was involved in recruitment. Two men who pleaded guilty to providing material support to terrorists, Abdifatah Yusuf Isse and Salah Osman Ahmed, claimed in their defenses that they were recruited in Minneapolis to join Al Shabaab. In a motion filed by Isse's lawyer, he said the recruitment happened "at a place of worship." Ahmed reportedly admitted that he attended "secret meetings" beginning in October 2007. Isse and Ahmed were both sentenced to 3-years in prison on May 14, 2013. Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Minneapolis who the Department of Justice alleges previously fought "jihad" in Somalia, held meetings at private residences and a mosque where described his experiences in Somalia as "true brotherhood." There is also concern that some American recruits return to the United States after spending time in Somalia with the goal of radicalizing others. After having been trained by Al Shabaab, they are able to assimilate back into their home communities, particularly in Minnesota, and “pose a significant threat” according to local law enforcement. Young American men have also been targeted for recruitment by Al Shabaab through propaganda videos posted on the Internet. Omar Hammami, an Alabama native who became the public face and voice of Al Shabaab, has appeared in several videos urging foreigners "to come and live the life of a mujahid." After an ambush shown in a March 2009 video, Hammami, who is identified in the video as Abu Mansour al Amriki (Arabic for "Abu Mansour the American"), praised a killed fighter as a martyr and said, "We need more like him, so if you can encourage more of your children and more of your neighbors and anyone around you to send people like him to this jihad, it would be a great asset for us." Hammami 3 also maintained an active Twitter feed with which he regularly interacted with Americans. Hammami has since become a cautionary tale for supporters of Al Shabaab. In March 2012 it became clear that he was in an open and public conflict with Al Shabaab’s leadership, primarily over differences between a global and local view of Shabaab’s mission. That same month, Hammami publicly declared that he fears that “my life may be endangered by [Al Shabaab] due to some differences that occurred between us regarding matters of the Shariah and matters of strategy.” The conflict between Hammami and Al Shabaab leadership grew over the course of the year to the point where he publicly broke from both Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda on September 5, 2013, claiming that he was still a terrorist but was disenchanted with Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda. The rift culminated in Hammami’s killing on September 12, 2013, ostensibly by Al Shabaab’s elite intelligence service, the Amniyatt Mukhabarat. Al Shabaab has put together numerous additional videos with the goal of recruiting Americans. In April 2009, two men who identified themselves as Abu Muslim and Abu Yaxye appeared in another video claiming to be "Somali youth" from the United States who joined Al Shabaab. "We came from the U.S. with a good life and a good education, but we came to fight alongside our brothers of Al Shabaab…to be killed for the sake of God," Abu Muslim reportedly said in the video. Later in the video, Abu Yaxye added, "We are here to invite others to come and join us." Another video, released in August 2013, is specifically focused on the large Somali-American populations of Minneapolis and St. Paul. Titled “The Path to Paradise: From the Twin Cities to the Land of the Two Migrations,” it presents a standard Islamist narrative of the obligation to fight and then focuses on the importance of leaving the US to join Al Shabaab, including personal narratives by different individuals who have made the trip. One of the featured jihadists, named Muhammed, tells viewers, “This is the best place to be, honestly.… If you guys only knew how much fun we have over here – this is the real Disneyland.” He concludes by urging, “Everyone who is a real Muslim…who really wants to serve in the cause of Allah…come here and join us so that we can die for the sake of Allah.” In 2014, Al Shabaab began calling for homegrown attacks against the U.S. in its videos as well. A video released in May 2014 presented Muslims living abroad with two options: undertaking a “lone wolf mission” in their home countries or traveling abroad to join the group. And a video released in February 2015 called on Image from 2015 video calling for attacks on Western shopping centers 4 followers to attack “American and Jewish-owned shopping centers across the world,” with specific threats directed at “the Mall of America in Minnesota, or the West Edmonton Mall in Canada, or in London’s Oxford Street, or any of the hundred or so Jewish-owned Westfield shopping centers.” Prior to leaving Minnesota, several of the men who trained with Al Shabaab reportedly listened to a sermon titled "Constants on the Path of Jihad" given by Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born Muslim cleric living in Yemen who targets English-speaking Muslim audiences with radical online lectures that encourage attacks against the West and non-Muslims.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • H. Con. Res. 441
    IV 110TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION H. CON. RES. 441 Recognizing the threat that the spread of radical Islamist terrorism and Iranian adventurism in Africa poses to the United States, our allies, and interests. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SEPTEMBER 29, 2008 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. ROYCE, Mr. CHABOT, Mr. FORTUN˜O, and Mr. PENCE) submitted the following concur- rent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Recognizing the threat that the spread of radical Islamist terrorism and Iranian adventurism in Africa poses to the United States, our allies, and interests. Whereas nearly 500,000,000 Muslims live in Africa, and Islam reportedly is the fastest growing religion on the continent; Whereas according to the World Bank, Africa hosts the world’s largest proportion of people living on less than $1 per day; Whereas despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Africa practice moderate and tolerant forms of Islam, poverty, corruption, and political marginalization have facilitated the spread of radicalism VerDate Aug 31 2005 02:00 Sep 30, 2008 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6300 E:\BILLS\HC441.IH HC441 smartinez on PROD1PC64 with BILLS 2 in a number in areas in Africa, particularly among grow- ing populations of impoverished and disaffected youth; Whereas the spread of radical Islam undermines the histori- cally moderate influence of Islam in Africa, exacerbates existing political and religious tensions within African na- tions, provides
    [Show full text]
  • The Foreign Fighters Problem, Recent Trends and Case Studies: Selected Essays
    Program on National Security at the FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE Al-Qaeda al-Shabaab AQIM AQAP Central The Foreign Fighters Problem, Recent Trends and Case Studies: Selected Essays Edited by Michael P. Noonan Managing Director, Program on National Security April 2011 Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute (www.fpri.org). If you would like to be added to our mailing list, send an email to [email protected], including your name, address, and any affiliation. For further information or to inquire about membership in FPRI, please contact Alan Luxenberg, [email protected] or (215) 732-3774 x105. FPRI 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610 • Philadelphia, PA 19102-3684 Tel. 215-732-3774 • Fax 215-732-4401 About FPRI Founded in 1955, the Foreign Policy Research Institute is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization devoted to bringing the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance U.S. national interests. We add perspective to events by fitting them into the larger historical and cultural context of international politics. About FPRI’s Program on National Security The end of the Cold War ushered in neither a period of peace nor prolonged rest for the United States military and other elements of the national security community. The 1990s saw the U.S. engaged in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and numerous other locations. The first decade of the 21st century likewise has witnessed the reemergence of a state of war with the attacks on 9/11 and military responses (in both combat and non-combat roles) globally. While the United States remains engaged against foes such as al-Qa`ida and its affiliated movements, other threats, challengers, and opportunities remain on the horizon.
    [Show full text]
  • The Limits of Punishment Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism
    i n s t i t u t e f o r i n t e g r at e d t r a n s i t i o n s The Limits of Punishment Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism May, 2018 United Nations University – Centre for Policy Research The UNU Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR) is a UN-focused think tank based at UNU Centre in Tokyo. UNU-CPR’s mission is to generate policy research that informs major UN policy processes in the fields of peace and security, humanitarian affairs, and global development. i n s t i t u t e f o r i n t e g r at e d t r a n s i t i o n s Institute for Integrated Transitions IFIT’s aim is to help fragile and conflict-affected states achieve more sustainable transitions out of war or authoritarianism by serving as an independent expert resource for locally-led efforts to improve political, economic, social and security conditions. IFIT seeks to transform current practice away from fragmented interventions and toward more integrated solutions that strengthen peace, democracy and human rights in countries attempting to break cycles of conflict or repression. Cover image nigeria. 2017. Maiduguri. After being screened for association with Boko Haram and held in military custody, this child was released into a transit center and the care of the government and Unicef. © Paolo Pellegrin/Magnum Photos. This material has been supported by UK aid from the UK government; the views expressed are those of the authors.
    [Show full text]
  • Al-Qaeda's Keys to Success
    DIGITAL-ONLY VIEW Al- Qaeda’s Keys to Success MAJ RYAN CK HESS, USAF ver the past 20 years, al- Qaeda has been the most recognizable and infa- mous terrorist organization on the planet. The group has planned and executed thousands of violent attacks, spurred dozens of offshoot affiliate Oand copycat groups, and even created rival Islamic extremist organizations. De- spite all this, and subsequently spending the past 20 years at war with the world’s most effective militaries, the group continues to carry out its operations. More- over, the success of foreign al- Qaeda affiliates illustrate that the group has become a global threat. Analyzing the tools that the organization has used to succeed will give us a better understanding of how to combat al-Qaeda. Perhaps more impor- tantly, it will also help intelligence agencies recognize what strategies the group will likely employ in the future. There are some who argue that al- Qaeda is dying. In this article, I argue that not only is it far from dead, but that the main factors contributing to al- Qaeda’s continued global success are decentralization, effective narratives and propaganda, and the specific targeting of locations with a preexist- ing history of instability and violence. This article will use three al-Qaeda affiliates and allies—al-Shabaab, Ansar al- Dine (AAD), and al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) — to demon- strate each of the above listed success factors. However, before we can discuss how al- Qaeda has achieved their success, we must first define success. If success is to be defined as the completion of each organization’s stated goals, none of them have yet succeeded.
    [Show full text]
  • Al Qaeda and US Homeland Security After Bin Laden-1
    CERI STRATEGY PAPERS N° 12 – Rencontre Stratégique du 10 novembre 2011 Al Qaeda and U.S. Homeland Security after Bin Laden Rick “Ozzie” NELSON The author is the Director of the Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. Portions of this paper relating to al Qaeda and its affiliates are drawn from The Al Qaeda and Associate Movements (AQAM) Futures Project, a collaboration between the CSIS Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program and the CSIS Transnational Threats Project. More information on The AQAM Futures Project can be found at http://csis.org/program/future- al-qaeda-and-associated-movements-aqam. Introduction In the past year al Qaeda has suffered a series of staggering blows that have severely damaged the group and will irrevocably alter the way it operates. Last spring, Osama bin Laden was killed in a dramatic raid on his compound in Pakistan, followed by strikes on a number of other prominent al Qaeda leaders, including Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman in Pakistan, and Fazul Abdullah Mohammed in Somalia, among others1. Further, al Qaeda was caught off-guard by the “Arab Spring” revolutions that broke out across the Middle East and North Africa. These revolutions have since succeeded in toppling several regional strongmen, an avowed goal of al Qaeda that it has been unable to accomplish through terrorism. With al Qaeda’s leaders on the defensive and the efficacy of its ideology threatened by a new generation of political activists, many policymakers are increasingly questioning the future of the group2.
    [Show full text]
  • The Parallax View: How Conspiracy Theories and Belief in Conspiracy Shape American Politics
    Bard College Bard Digital Commons Senior Projects Spring 2020 Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects Spring 2020 The Parallax View: How Conspiracy Theories and Belief in Conspiracy Shape American Politics Liam Edward Shaffer Bard College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2020 Part of the American Politics Commons, and the Political History Commons This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. Recommended Citation Shaffer, Liam Edward, "The Parallax View: How Conspiracy Theories and Belief in Conspiracy Shape American Politics" (2020). Senior Projects Spring 2020. 236. https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2020/236 This Open Access work is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been provided to you by Bard College's Stevenson Library with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this work in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights- holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the work itself. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Parallax View: How Conspiracy Theories and Belief in Conspiracy Shape American Politics Senior Project Submitted to The Division of Social Studies of Bard College by Liam Edward Shaffer Annandale-on-Hudson, New York May 2020 Acknowledgements To Simon Gilhooley, thank you for your insight and perspective, for providing me the latitude to pursue the project I envisioned, for guiding me back when I would wander, for keeping me centered in an evolving work and through a chaotic time.
    [Show full text]
  • Foreign Military Studies Office
    community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/ Foreign Military Studies Office Volume 8 Issue #5 OEWATCH May 2018 FOREIGN NEWS & PERSPECTIVES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT CHINA’S REACH MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA LATIN AMERICA 3 Tension between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea 24 Colombia and Brazil Look for Solutions to Deal with 44 China Holds Naval Review in the South China Sea 4 Disputes over Natural Gas Exploration in the Eastern Massive Venezuelan Migration 45 China’s Carrier Aviation Unit Improves Training Mediterranean 25 Brazil’s Federal Government Open Border Policy 46 Relocation in Southern Xinjiang: China Expands the Program 6 Iran and Russia Compete for Influence in Syria Challenges Frontier States 47 Perspectives on the Future of Marawi 8 “Turkey-Russia Rapprochement” Continues 26 Colombian-Venezuelan Border Ills 48 Indonesia Brings Terrorists and Victims Together 9 Turkish Defense Companies Reach Agreements with 27 Bolivarians Gain Influence over Colombian Resources 49 Thailand and Malaysia Build Border Wall Qatar’s Armed Forces 29 Venezuelan Elections Worth Anything? 10 A New Striking Power for the Turkish Armed Forces 30 Regarding the Colombian Elections 11 Will Iran Interfere in Kashmir? 31 Archbishop of Bogotá Confesses Left CAUCASUS, CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA 12 Rouhani Speaks about the Internet 31 Peruvian President Resigns, Replaced 50 India’s Red Line for China 13 Why Did the Mayor of Tehran Resign? 32 Brazilians Send Former President to Jail 51 The Future of Indian-Russian Security Cooperation 14 Former Governor: ISIS May
    [Show full text]
  • The Kismayo Bubble - Justice and Security in Jubbaland
    CONFLICT RESEARCH PROGRAMME Research at LSE Conflict Research Programme Research Memo 26 March 2021 The Kismayo Bubble - Justice and Security in Jubbaland Nisar Majid and Khalif Abdirahman Overview The absence of a credible and functional government, in Somalia, since the late 1980s has been felt particularly strongly in the arena of the rule of law. Under President Siad Barre, the judicial system was resented for being corrupt, politically manipulated and for rejecting Islamic precepts, and many welcomed its demise. It was perhaps inevitable that in the absence of a system of state courts that Islamic law and courts would emerge. As Muslims, Somalis were able to call upon a well-formed body of jurisprudence and practice that enjoyed social legitimacy and historically validated practices, to establish courts. Islamic law has a particular advantage in this regard in that it encompasses a penal code, a civil code, and commercial and tax codes. All of these are essential for the conduct of everyday life. Recent analyses of the justice and security sector have highlighted its politicisation and, particularly in Mogadishu, a political economy centred around clan-based mobilization and conflict, ideological divisions between supporters of different versions of Islamic and secular law as well as rent seeking behaviour. At a practical level, although some significant developments are noticeable, government courts remain subject to high levels of corruption and manipulation, are slow, limited by poor security and a lack of enforcement capacity. The persistence of Al Shabaab as a credible actor in the provision of justice sits in stark contrast to that of the Government.
    [Show full text]
  • The Security Bazaar Aisha Ahmad Business Interests and Islamist Power in Civil War Somalia
    The Security Bazaar The Security Bazaar Aisha Ahmad Business Interests and Islamist Power in Civil War Somalia Many intractable civil wars take place in countries with large Muslim populations.1 In these pro- tracted conºicts, Islamists are often just one of many actors ªghting in a com- plex landscape of ethnic, tribal, and political violence. Yet, certain Islamist groups compete exceptionally well in these conºicts. Why do Islamists some- times gain power out of civil war stalemates? Although much of the existing research points to either ethnic or religious motivations, I argue that there are also hard economic reasons behind the rise of Islamist power.2 In this article, I offer a micro-political economy model of Islamist success in civil war that highlights the role of an important, but often-overlooked, class: the local busi- ness community. The convergence of business and Islamist interests is relevant across a wide range of cases of contemporary civil war. In present-day Syria and Iraq, jihadi groups have built strong ties to smuggling and criminal networks to fund their Aisha Ahmad is Assistant Professor at the University of Toronto and a former fellow of the International Se- curity Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. The author is especially grateful to outstanding colleagues in Kenya and Somalia, including Jabril Abdulle, Sahal Abdulle, Dr. Ibrahim Farah, Dr. Yahya Amir Ibrahim, and Dr. Deqo Mohamed. The author also thanks Theodore McLauchlan, Stephen Saideman, Stuart Soroka, and the anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts, as well seminar and workshop participants at the Belfer Center and McGill University who provided helpful feedback.
    [Show full text]
  • Somalia Conflict Insight
    PEACE & SECURITY REPORT Vol. 1 December 2019 SOMALIA CONFLICT INSIGHT ABOUT THE REPORT The purpose of this report is to provide analysis and recommendations to national, regional and continental decision makers in the implementation of peace and www.ipss-addis.org/publications security-related instruments. IPSS PEACE & SECURITY REPORT CONTENTS SITUATION ANALYSIS 2 CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT 3 ACTORS 6 DYNAMICS OF THE CONFLICT 11 RESPONSES 15 SCENARIOS 17 STRATEGIC OPTIONS 18 REFERENCES 19 SOMALIA CONFLICT TIMELINE (1960-2019) 21 CONTRIBUTORS Dr. Mesfin Gebremichael (Editor in Chief) Tsion Belay (Author) Alagaw Ababu Chedine Tazi Cynthia Happi Moussa Soumahoro Muluka Shifa Pezu Mukwakwa Tigist Kebede Feyissa EDITING, DESIGN & LAYOUT Michelle Mendi Muita (Editor) Abel B Ayalew (Design & Layout) © 2019 Institute for Peace and Security Studies | Addis Ababa University. All rights reserved. 1 SOMALIA CONFLICT INSIGHT SITUATION ANALYSIS PO G LI P DP FE U P E L E X A R P T E I C C O A T N A P I N T C A Y 13.611M 500 USD 56.5 A T B I R T H ( ) Y S E R A HU NE RE M IG Cs A H N B O D Figure 1: Country profile U E Djibouti R and demographics V S E Ethiopia Index: Unknown L IGAD O Kenya Rank: Unknown P COMESA 1 M Yemen (maritime Source: Populationdata.net. (2019) E N borders) 1 Populationdata.net. (2019, March T I N 25). Country profile/Somalia. Retrieved D ) E I X D ( H fromhttps://en.populationdata.net/ countries/somalia/ Located in the Eastern part of Africa, Somalia is one of As a result of several peace and reconciliation efforts the world’s most geographically strategic countries, by international and regional actors, a Transitional connecting the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Gulf National Government (TNG) was formed in 2000.
    [Show full text]
  • Countering Terrorism in East Africa: the U.S
    Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response Lauren Ploch Analyst in African Affairs November 3, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R41473 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response Summary The United States government has implemented a range of programs to counter violent extremist threats in East Africa in response to Al Qaeda’s bombing of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 and subsequent transnational terrorist activity in the region. These programs include regional and bilateral efforts, both military and civilian. The programs seek to build regional intelligence, military, law enforcement, and judicial capacities; strengthen aviation, port, and border security; stem the flow of terrorist financing; and counter the spread of extremist ideologies. Current U.S.-led regional counterterrorism efforts include the State Department’s East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI) and the U.S. military’s Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), part of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). The United States has also provided significant assistance in support of the African Union’s (AU) peace operations in Somalia, where the country’s nascent security forces and AU peacekeepers face a complex insurgency waged by, among others, Al Shabaab, a local group linked to Al Qaeda that often resorts to terrorist tactics. The State Department reports that both Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab pose serious terrorist threats to the United States and U.S. interests in the region. Evidence of linkages between Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen, highlight another regional dimension of the threat posed by violent extremists in the area.
    [Show full text]
  • Disaster, Terror, War, and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) Events
    Disaster, Terror, War, and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) Events Date Location Agent Notes Source 28 Apr Kano, Nigeria VBIED Five soldiers were killed and 40 wounded when a Boko http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/World/2017/ 2017 Haram militant drove his VBIED into a convoy. Apr-28/403711-suicide-bomber-kills-five-troops- in-ne-nigeria-sources.ashx 25 Apr Pakistan Land mine A passenger van travelling within Parachinar hit a https://www.dawn.com/news/1329140/14- 2017 landmine, killing fourteen and wounding nine. killed-as-landmine-blast-hits-van-carrying- census-workers-in-kurram 24 Apr Sukma, India Small arms Maoist rebels ambushed CRPF forces and killed 25, http://odishasuntimes.com/2017/04/24/12-crpf- 2017 wounding six or so. troopers-killed-in-maoist-attack/ 15 Apr Aleppo, Syria VBIED 126 or more people were killed and an unknown https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Aleppo_suici 2017 number wounded in ISIS attacks against a convoy of de_car_bombing buses carrying refugees. 10 Apr Somalia Suicide Two al-Shabaab suicide bombs detonated in and near http://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia- 2017 bombings Mogadishu killed nine soldiers and a civil servant. security-blast-idUSKBN17C0JV?il=0 10 Apr Wau, South Ethnic violence At least sixteen people were killed and ten wounded in http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan- 2017 Sudan ethnic violence in a town in South Sudan. violence-idUSKBN17C0SO?il=0 10 Apr Kirkuk, Iraq Small arms Twelve ISIS prisoners were killed by a firing squad, for http://www.iraqinews.com/iraq-war/islamic- 2017 reasons unknown.
    [Show full text]