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S/2016/919 Consejo De Seguridad Naciones Unidas S/2016/919 Consejo de Seguridad Distr. general 31 de octubre de 2016 Español Original: inglés Carta de fecha 7 de octubre de 2016 dirigida al Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad por el Presidente del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad dimanante de las resoluciones 751 (1992) y 1907 (2009) relativas a Somalia y Eritrea En nombre del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad dimanante de las resoluciones 751 (1992) y 1907 (2009) relativas a Somalia y Eritrea, y de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el párrafo 32 de la resolución 2244 (2015) del Consejo de Seguridad, tengo el honor de transmitir adjunto el informe sobre Somalia del Grupo de Supervisión para Somalia y Eritrea. A este respecto, el Comité agradecería que la presente carta y el informe adjunto se señalaran a la atención de los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad y se publicaran como documento del Consejo. (Firmado) Rafael Darío Ramírez Carreño Presidente Comité del Consejo de Seguridad dimanante de las resoluciones 751 (1992) y 1907 (2009) relativas a Somalia y Eritrea 16-16743 (S) 021116 021116 *1616743* S/2016/919 Carta de fecha 28 de septiembre de 2016 dirigida al Presidente del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad dimanante de las resoluciones 751 (1992) y 1907 (2009) relativas a Somalia y Eritrea por el Grupo de Supervisión para Somalia y Eritrea De conformidad con el párrafo 32 de la resolución 2244 (2015) del Consejo de Seguridad, tenemos el honor de transmitir adjunto el informe sobre Somalia del Grupo de Supervisión para Somalia y Eritrea. (Firmado) Christophe Trajber Coordinador Grupo de Supervisión para Somalia y Eritrea (Firmado) Jay Bahadur Experto en grupos armados (Firmado) Charles Cater Experto en recursos naturales (Firmado) Bogdan Chetreanu Experto en finanzas (Firmado) Déirdre Clancy Experta en asuntos humanitarios (Firmado) Tapani Holopainen Experto en finanzas (Firmado) Rufus Kalidheen Experto en armas (Firmado) James Smith Experto regional 2/253 16-16743 S/2016/919 Informe del Grupo de Supervisión para Somalia y Eritrea presentado de conformidad con la resolución 2244 (2015) del Consejo de Seguridad: Somalia Resumen El programa Visión 2016 estableció tres parámetros ampliamente aceptados para el éxito de la transición política prevista para Somalia a partir de septiembre de 2016: la celebración de elecciones nacionales basadas en el principio de “una persona, un voto”, la finalización del proceso de formación del Estado federal y la aprobación de una nueva Constitución. En el momento de redactar el presente informe, el formato de las elecciones se había modificado y la fecha se había aplazado; el proceso de formación del Estado federal aún tenía que incorporar los estados regionales de Hiran y Shabelle Medio y resolver la situación de la región de Banadir; y la negociación de una nueva Constitución había quedado en suspenso debido a imperativos electorales más inmediatos. Entretanto, la comunidad internacional y el Gobierno Federal de Somalia han dado prioridad a mantener el proceso electoral bien encaminado y han tratado por todos los medios promover un progreso gradual, aunque hayan cambiado los parámetros de lo que constituye el éxito. Por otro lado, las investigaciones del Grupo de Supervisión para Somalia y Eritrea revelan un proceso de transición incompleto y fragmentado, con consecuencias adversas para la paz y la seguridad, la reforma del sector de la seguridad, la aplicación del embargo de armas, las cuestiones humanitarias y de derechos humanos, la financiación del conflicto y la gobernanza de los recursos naturales, y la corrupción. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab) sigue siendo la amenaza más inmediata para la paz y la seguridad en Somalia. Contrariamente a las ideas prevalentes de que la lucha contra la insurgencia y contra el terrorismo está dando frutos, el Grupo de Supervisión considera que la situación de la seguridad en Somalia no ha mejorado durante el mandato actual. Al-Shabaab conserva la capacidad operacional para lanzar ataques a gran escala contra los contingentes de la Misión de la Unión Africana en Somalia (AMISOM), como la ofensiva del 15 de enero de 2016 contra una compañía del ejército de Kenya estacionada en una base de operaciones de avanzada en El Adde, en la región de Gedo. Al-Shabaab también ha seguido lanzando ataques complejos en Mogadiscio; en seis ataques dirigidos contra hoteles durante el mandato actual hubo un total de unos 120 muertos, incluidos tres parlamentarios y el Ministro de Medio Ambiente. También ha surgido una nueva facción rival de Al-Shabaab en la cordillera de Golis, en Puntlandia, compuesta de unas dos docenas de miembros dirigidos por Sheikh Abdulqader Mu’min, que ha prometido lealtad al Estado Islámico en el Iraq y el Levante. En un aparente intento de eliminar esa facción, Al-Shabaab lanzó una fallida incursión anfibia en Puntlandia el 13 de marzo de 2016, que se saldó con más de 300 miembros muertos en enfrentamientos con fuerzas de la Administración Provisional de Puntlandia y Galmudug. Por último, aunque Al-Shabaab no ha logrado lanzar ningún ataque terrorista de envergadura fuera de Somalia desde la masacre cometida el 2 de abril de 2015 en la Universidad de Garissa, en Kenya, el Grupo de Supervisión considera que 16-16743 3/253 S/2016/919 tiene tanto la capacidad para llevar a cabo otro ataque de ese tipo como la autoproclamada motivación para atacar a países que aportan contingentes a la AMISOM. Aunque el Gobierno Federal se ha comprometido a llevar a cabo una reforma a fondo del sector de la seguridad, los constantes problemas de corrupción, mala gestión y limitaciones financieras han comprometido la eficacia del Ejército Nacional Somalí. A pesar de los esfuerzos realizados para abordar la cuestión, el proceso de identificación y registro de las tropas, incluida la exclusión de su nómina de los denominados “soldados fantasma”, sigue incompleto. Las investigaciones del Grupo de Supervisión también han puesto de manifiesto importantes incoherencias en la justificación del pago de salarios. El hecho de que persistan los atrasos en el pago de los salarios ha contribuido al aumento de los repliegues de posiciones estratégicas del sur y el centro de Somalia y al subsiguiente retorno de Al-Shabaab, aunque temporalmente en algunos casos. Las investigaciones del Grupo de Supervisión para Somalia y Eritrea también han puesto de manifiesto la posible apropiación indebida de raciones y suministros destinados a soldados en virtud de un contrato firmado entre el Gobierno Federal y una empresa privada. En el apoyo proporcionado al ejército por los Estados Miembros también podría haber casos de apropiación indebida, en particular cuando las mercancías se proporcionaron a granel y a través de contratistas externos en lugar de entregarse directamente a las tropas. Ha habido varios problemas graves en la aplicación del embargo de armas durante el mandato actual: el incumplimiento de las obligaciones de presentación de informes por parte del Gobierno Federal, la falta de cumplimiento por los Estados Miembros en lo que se refiere a la prestación de apoyo a las instituciones del sector de la seguridad de Somalia distintas de las fuerzas del Gobierno Federal y el uso de un artefacto explosivo improvisado dirigido contra la aviación civil. Aunque el Gobierno Federal ha mejorado algunos aspectos de su cumplimiento de las obligaciones de presentación de informes en relación con la suspensión parcial del embargo, no ha presentado todos los informes exigidos al Consejo de Seguridad, y aún carece de la capacidad institucional para gestionar armas y municiones de forma eficaz. Las peticiones realizadas por el Gobierno Federal de que se levante totalmente el embargo se basan en una premisa falsa de que el bloqueo constituye un obstáculo a la importación de armas y municiones; sin embargo, los Estados Miembros han presentado notificaciones anticipadas para más de 20.000 armas y 13 millones de cartuchos de munición destinadas a las fuerzas del Gobierno Federal desde que se suspendió parcialmente el embargo en marzo de 2013. Entretanto, los Estados Miembros también han aumentado su apoyo militar a las fuerzas regionales que no son parte del Gobierno Federal, si bien han incumplido repetidamente los requisitos de notificación, permitiendo así que armas y municiones se transfieran a esas entidades sin ningún tipo de control. Esto ha socavado el embargo en su conjunto y reforzado las tendencias hacia un enfoque cada vez más fragmentado del sector de la seguridad. Durante el actual mandato han aumentado las intercepciones de armas ilícitas por vía marítima: tres incautaciones por las Fuerzas Marítimas Combinadas y una incautación por un Estado Miembro. Por último, el ataque con un artefacto explosivo improvisado contra un avión de Daallo Airlines que volaba de Mogadiscio a Djibouti el 2 de febrero de 2016 es indicio de que una nueva amenaza grave se cierne sobre la aviación civil dentro de la región. 4/253 16-16743 S/2016/919 La obstrucción de la asistencia humanitaria y las violaciones del derecho internacional humanitario que afectan a la población civil siguen siendo problemas fundamentales. Entre los obstáculos cabe citar la falta de acceso humanitario debido a los bloqueos económicos de Al-Shabaab, los ataques contra el personal humanitario, y el desvío y la apropiación indebida de la asistencia humanitaria. En situaciones extremas, una reducida red de personas ha controlado las operaciones humanitarias con tal firmeza a través de un monopolio del poder político, las finanzas y el uso de la fuerza que constituyen de hecho un cartel de delincuentes. Las tendencias de las violaciones del derecho internacional humanitario padecidas por la población civil durante el mandato anterior se acentuaron durante el actual, especialmente en cuanto a la intensidad y alcance de los ataques de Al-Shabaab, la violencia ejercida contra la población civil por las fuerzas internacionales (en particular como resultado de la utilización de armamento aéreo) y los efectos del conflicto armado asociado a los enfrentamientos políticos y entre clanes en los que muchas veces participaron las fuerzas federales y regionales y milicias locales.
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