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2012Ending the Transition? DISCUSSION PAPER 4/2012 SOMALIA Ending the 2012 Transition? Knox Chitiyo and Anna Rader With contributions from Mohamed A Omaar, Fred Mugisha, Ken Menkhaus and Bahsan Ahmed Said Strengthening Africa’s economic performance SOMALIA Ending the 2012 Transition? Contents Abstract .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3 Introduction.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4 Political Transition and Transformation .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5 The Consequences of Failure .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7 The Challenges of Ending Somalia’s Transition .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9 Securing Somalia: AMISOM, Piracy and Security Sector Reform ����������������������������������������������������������������������� 11 AMISOM and Counter-Insurgency in Somalia. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14 Humanitarian Relief and Recovery. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15 Marginalisation and Gender-Based Violence in South-Central Somalia ����������������������������������������������������������� 16 Recommendations .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 17 Eight Points for Consideration .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 19 Concluding Remarks ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19 Endnotes . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 20 Annex. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 22 About the Authors Knox Chitiyo is an Africa Fellow at Chatham House and a Brenthurst Foundation Associate. Anna Rader is an Associate Fellow of RUSI. Published in June 2012 by: The Brenthurst Foundation E Oppenheimer & Son (Pty) Ltd PO Box 61631, Johannesburg 2000, South Africa Tel +27–(0)11 274–2096 · Fax +27–(0)11 274–2097 www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org All rights reserved. The material in this publication may not be reproduced, stored, or transmitted without the prior permission of the publisher. Short extracts may be quoted, provided the source is fully acknowledged. Layout and design by Sheaf Publishing, Benoni. SOMALIA 2012: EndInG THE TRAnSITIOn? Abstract This is a critical time for Somalia. There are less than In response to the changing dynamics within Somalia 90 days until the end of the transitional federal gov- and the growing regional and international interest in ernment’s mandate on 20 August 2012, and the stakes the country’s future, RUSI and the Brenthurst Foundation are high for the delivery of the key components of the convened a one-day roundtable discussion in London in political ‘roadmap’, not least a new constitution. At the november 2011 to discuss the key issues facing Somalia same time, the five-year insurgency that has wracked during this time of political transition. This report sum- the south and central regions has entered a new phase, marises the roundtable discussion. It also includes three with fighting now along numerous fronts as the African important essays from leading Somalis and Somalia Union peacekeeping mission has expanded to include observers, each of which emphasise the centrality of forces from Kenya, with more promised from djibouti Somalis in shaping their own political future, as well as and Sierra Leone. Al-Shabaab, the Al-Qa’ida-linked con- the continued role of the regional and international com- glomerate, appears to be on the back foot: it has been munity; together with a special focus on the situation of bruised by Somali Army and AMISOM offensives and is women in Somalia during this time of change. internally divided. But the complex, changeable dynam- ics of Somalia’s recent past suggest that it is too early to call time on this persistent opponent of the TFG. BRENTHURST DISCUSSION PAPER 2012/04 3 SOMALIA 2012: EndInG THE TRAnSITIOn? Introduction This is a critical time for Somalia. There are less long is now a focus of both economic and environ- than 90 days until the end of the transitional fed- mental scrutiny. More generally, Somalis who have eral government’s mandate on 20 August 2012, and supported the final phase of the transition period the stakes are high for the delivery of the key com- will now expect to reap the dividends of peace, but ponents of the political ‘roadmap’, not least a new the sheer scale of the development infrastructure constitution. At the same time, the five-year insur- required suggests that many will be frustrated by the gency that has wracked the south and central regions pace of change. has entered a new phase, with fighting now along In response to the changing dynamics within numerous fronts as the African Union (AU) peace- Somalia and the growing regional and interna- keeping mission has expanded to include forces from tional interest in the country’s future, RUSI and the Kenya, with more promised from Djibouti and Sierra Brenthurst Foundation convened a one-day round- Leone. Al-Shabaab, the Al-Qa’ida-linked conglom- table discussion in London. erate of Islamists, international jihadists and clan The roundtable focused on four central themes: militants, appears to be on the back foot: it has been recovery and rehabilitation following the 2011 bruised by Somali Army and AMISOM offensives famine in southern Somalia, and the current human- and is internally divided. But the complex, change- itarian aid picture; the political roadmap; securing able dynamics of Somalia’s recent past suggest that it Somalia, in particular against the threats posed by is too early to call time on this persistent opponent of Al-Shabaab and piracy; and the role of the diaspora the transitional federal government (TFG). and external actors, including regional organisations Meanwhile Somalis are recovering from the dev- and foreign donor countries such as the US and astating drought of 2011 that affected an estimated the UK. Overall, participants were optimistic that 10 million people across the Horn of Africa. In six with international support and domestic political regions of southern Somalia famine claimed lives and will, Somalia’s key contemporary challenges – most livelihoods, and displaced tens of thousands more notably countering the entrenched insurgency in the Somalis across the country and into cramped and south and achieving important political and consti- tutional milestones – can be met. However, this was tempered by an awareness of the resource constraints, Somalis who have supported the final infrastructural obstacles and political dissonance that phase of the transition period will now has marked the TFG’s last five years in power; as well as the scale of assistance required on a number of expect to reap the dividends of peace different fronts. This report summarises the engaging, compre- hensive and thoughtful roundtable discussion: the overflowing refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia. panellists’ comments are unattributed, and gen- The long-term effects of the humanitarian crisis, eral themes and points of note highlighted. It also compounded by more displacement from the co- includes three important essays from leading Somalis ordinated military campaign near the Somali–Kenya and Somalia observers, each of which emphasise the border, will be felt for years to come. centrality of Somalis in shaping their own political Widespread food insecurity and displacement future, as well as the continued role of the regional now join Somalia’s other conflict drivers, such as the and international community; together with a special control of economic resources. The charcoal export focus on the situation of women in Somalia during industry that supported Al-Shabaab financially for so this time of change. BRENTHURST DISCUSSION PAPER 2012/04 4 SOMALIA 2012: EndInG THE TRAnSITIOn? Political Transition and Transformation Somalia has notoriously been without an effective process. The subsequent Arta Declaration established central government able to fulfil the key functions of a transitional national government that was recog- a state since 1991. It has been described as a ‘black nised by the United Nations, a significant measure of hole’1 and a ‘shattered state’,2 and consistently tops progress. In 2002, a follow-up conference in Kenya the failed state index.3 Since the Arta Declaration of agreed a federal structure for Somalia, which would 2000 that established the first transitional administra- be more fully fleshed out in 2003, with agreement tion, Somalia has spent over ten years ‘in transition’ to a transitional charter; and in 2004, with the crea- to a permanent political configuration. Efforts to tion of the transitional federal institutions, leading draft a new constitution and federal system have been to the inauguration of the parliament that year and underway during this time, as well as discussion on a government in early 2005. In 2008, these politi- how best to hold presidential and parliamentary elec- cal structures were further endorsed following a tions to select representatives for Somalia’s political peace accord with the oppositional Alliance for the institutions. However, the insurgency by Harakat al- Re-liberation of Somalia – a consortium of disgrun- Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab) that erupted in tled warlords and former members of the Union 2006, following the demise of the Union of Islamic of Islamic Courts – for whom
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