A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Beyond Fragility:

Barakat, Connolly, Hardman, Lewis, Lineker, Menkhaus, Rzeszut and Shanks

POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION & Institute for DEVELOPMENT UNIT Effective Education

Beyond Fragility:

A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Barakat, Connolly, Hardman, Lewis, Lineker, Menkhaus, Rzeszut and Shanks

POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION & Institute for DEVELOPMENT UNIT Effective Education ii Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Authors’ Declaration

This report should be quoted as: Barakat, Connolly, Hardman, Lewis, Lineker, Menkhaus, Rzeszut and Shanks, 2014.

This independent report was commissioned by UNICEF; however, the views presented are those of the authors. The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations or UNICEF concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The authors are responsible for the choice and the presentation of the facts contained in this report and for the opinions expressed therein, which are not necessarily representative of those held by the United Nations or UNICEF.

Photographs Full-page photos © UNICEF Smaller photos © Sultan Barakat

Designed and typeset by Gavin Ward Design Associates (www.gwda.co.uk) Acknowledgements iii

Acknowledgements

This Conflict Analysis forms part of UNICEF’s global Peace Building, Education and Advocacy in conflict-affected contexts programme (PBEA) (2012–2015) operating in 14 priority countries, including Somalia, with its three administrative zones of Somaliland, Puntland and Central South Somalia.

A multi-disciplinary research team from the University of York led by Professors Sultan Barakat (Conflict and Recovery Specialist), Frank Hardman (Education Specialist) and Ken Menkhaus (Somalia Conflict Specialist) undertook the complex process of training research teams to gather, review and analyse field data from the three zones over a 9-month period (March–December 2013). The York Team was supported by Daryeel Associates based in Mogadishu, led by Abdi Gama Ghedi.

This study was made possible by the support and contributions from various individuals, groups and institutions. Specifically, we would like to thank the Somali communities, teachers, head teachers, civil society organisations, and the representatives of governments, non-governmental organisations, United Nations and bilateral aid agencies, for their participation in the study.

We would like to recognize the contribution of Julia Smith and Sansom Milton who provided crucial support during the drafting and editing of the final stages of the report, and are grateful to Sally Clark from the PRDU and Sharmarke Hashi from Daryeel for their administrative support throughout the study.

Professor Sultan Barakat Team Leader Director, Post-war Reconstruction & Development Unit, University of York

York, March 2014 iv Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Research and Analysis Team

Professor Sultan Barakat Somaliland Researchers: Team Leader and Conflict Analyst Dr Alexandra Lewis Director, Post-war Reconstruction & Dr Hassan S. Ahmed Development Unit, University of York Dr Osman Warsame Dr Mustafa Othman

Dr David Connolly Conflict Analysis Trainer Puntland Researchers Head of Conflict Prevention, Kathryn Rzeszut The Hague Institute for Global Justice Herzi Aynab Burhan Adan Omar

Professor Frank Hardman Deputy Team Leader and Education Specialist South Central Researchers Director of Research, Institute for Effective Dr Kelsey Shanks Education, University of York Dr Abdullahi Alhaj Dr Hassan Mohamed Ali Dr Abdullah A. Omar Abdi Jama Ghedi Dr Ahman Alkadir Nur Somali Field Research Team Leader Director, Daryeel Associates, Mogadishu Research Assistants: Bradley Lineker Professor Ken Menkhaus Dr Sansom Milton Somalia Conflict Advisor Julia Smith Department of Political Science, Davidson College

Kathryn Rzeszut Security and Gender Specialist Research Fellow, Post-war Reconstruction & Development Unit Contents v

Contents

Authors’ Declaration ii Part 1: Acknowledgements iii The Conflict, Peace, Research and Analysis Team iv and Situation Analysis Abbreviations and Acronyms viii

Chapter Three: Executive Summary 1 A Synthesis of the Findings 23 Background 2 The Somali Conflict 24 Purpose 2 Cross-Cutting Themes 27 Methodology 2 A Theoretical Understanding of Somali Conflict 29 Drivers of Conflict 2 A Synthesis of Findings 30 Educational Challenges 3 Structural Drivers of Conflict 31 Conclusions 4 Proximate Drivers of Conflict 34 Recommendations 4 Current Conflict Trends 35 Prioritising of Youth 4 Attitudes to Violence 4 Nomadic Communities 5 Chapter Four: Curriculum Reform 5 Analysis of South Central Zone 39 Building Capacity within the Education Sector 5 Context 40 Chronology of Conflict 41 Situational Dynamics 42 Chapter One: Location Dynamics 46 Introduction 7 Kismayo 48 Structure of the Report 10 Mogadishu 50 South Galkacyo 52 Baidoa 53 Chapter Two: Dhusamareeb 54 A Composite Approach to a Jowhar 55 Conflict and Education Analysis 13 Beletweyne 56 The Conflict Analysis Approach 14 Conflict Drivers 57 Guiding Principles and Methodology 15 Structural Drivers 57 Guiding Principles 15 Proximate Drivers 62 Methodology 16 Key Conflict Actors 65

Chapter Five: Analysis of Puntland 71 Context 72 Chronology of Conflict in Puntland 75 Situational Dynamics 78 Location Dynamics 79 The Core 80 The Periphery 80 Conflict Drivers 81 Structural Drivers 82 Proximate Factors 89 Cross Cutting Issue: Vulnerable Populations 90 Key Conflict Actors 91 vi Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Chapter Six: Part 2: Analysis of Somaliland 97 The Conflict and Education Nexus Context 98 Chronology 99 Situational Dynamics 104 Chapter Seven: Location Dynamics 105 Education and Peacebuilding Maroodijeex 106 in the Somali Context 119 Togdheer 106 Education and Peacebuilding 120 Sanaag 107 Conceptualising the Relationship between Awdal 107 Education and Peacebuilding 121 Sool 107 Theory of Change 122 Summary 108 Addressing Drivers of Conflict through Education 124 Drivers of Peace and Conflict 108 Somali Primary Education 124 Structural Drivers 108 Somali Secondary Education 128 Proximate Drivers 110 Gender Disparities 129 Actors 111 Violence Against Children 129 Business Community 114 Population Demographics 130 Agriculturalists 114 Marginalised Youth 130 Nomads 114 Inequitable Access 131 Women 114 IDPs 131 Youth 114 Conflict and Community Response 132 Gangs and Organised Crime Networks 115 The Conflict and Education Nexus at the Zonal Levels 132 Neighbouring States 115 Conclusions and Recommendations 140 International Community 115

Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Ways Forward 143 Synthesis of the Zonal Analyses 144 South Central Zone 144 Puntland 145 Somaliland 146 Conflict Drivers 146 The Conflict-Education Nexus 148 Governance 149 Schools 149 Resources 149 Teaching 149 Curriculum 149 Lessons Learned 150 Ways Forward 152 Curriculum Support 152 Building Community Resilience 152 Youth Programmes 153 Professional Development of Teachers 154 Recommendations 155 Curriculum Reform 155 Political inclusion 155 Attitudes to Violence 155 Nomadic Communities 155 Monitoring and Evaluation 156 Building Partnerships in Peacebuilding 156 Building Capacity within the Education Sector 156 Contents vii

Appendices

Appendix A: Data Collection Methodology 160 Phase I: Inception and Initiation 161 Element 1: Identification and Mapping of Existing Conflict/Peace/Situation Analyses of Somalia 162 Element 2: Contextual Analysis of Somaliland, Puntland, and the South Central Zone 162 Element 3: Peace-Building and Education Literature Review 163 Element 4: Preliminary Consultations with UNICEF and Local Partners 163 Element 5: Designing a Conflict/Peace and Situation Analysis Framework 163 Element 6: Preparation of the Training Workshops 164 Phase II: Conflict/Peace/Situation Analyses 165 On-going Consultations 166 Recruitment of Local Data Collection Teams 166 Conflict Analysis and Data Collection Training 166 Training Approach 167 Data Collection 168 Submission and Ongoing Use of the CPSA 170 Challenges and Mitigating Approaches 170 Delays in the Data Collection Phase 170 Sampling 171

Appendix B: Works Cited 173

Appendix C: Works Consulted 181

Appendix D: Glossary of Key Terms 187

Appendix E: Selected Key Interviewees 189

Appendix F: Stakeholders Consulted 191 viii Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABE Alternative Basic Education SAFE School Association for Formal Education

AMISOM African Mission for Somalia SCOTT Strengthening Capacity of Teacher Training

CPSA Conflict, Peace and Situation Analysis SCA Strategic Conflict Assessment

DFID Department for International Development SCZ South Central Zone

EMIS Education Management Information System SEDA Somali Education Development Association

FENPS Formal Education Network for Private Schools SFG Somalia Federal Government

FGM Female Genital Mutilation SMoEHE Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Education

FPENS Formal Private Education Network in Somalia SNA Somali National Army

HEI Higher Education Institution SNM Somalia National Movement

I/NGOs International/ Non-governmental Organisation SOFE School Organisation for Formal Education

ICG International Crisis Group SOFEN Somali Formal Education Network

ICU Islamic Courts Union SOFEL Somali Formal Education Link

IDP Internally Displaced Person SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front

IED Improvised Explosive Device SUHA Students of University and Higher Institutions Association IEE Institute for Effective Education TFG Transition Federal Government IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development TNG Transitional National Government IO International Organisation TSC Technical Selection Committee IQS Integrated Quranic Schools TVET Technical and Vocational Education Training IRIN Integrated Regional Information Network UNDP United Nations Development Programme KDF Kenyan Defense Force UNFPA United Nations Population Fund NCA National Constituent Assembly UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, NGO Non-Governmental Organisation and Cultural Organisation

ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees

PBEA Peace Building, Education and Advocacy UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund in Conflict-Affected Contexts UNSC United Nations Security Council PDIED Personal-borne Improvised Explosive Device USAID United States Agency for International Development PMoE Puntland Ministry of Education USC United Somali Congress PRDU Post-war Reconstruction & Development Unit WFP World Food Programme Executive Summary 2 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Background peacebuilding sectors, community and religious elders, business leaders, head Since the 1970s, large parts of Somalia1 have teachers and teachers, as well as students experienced the collapse of the central state, and their parents. varying levels of instability, and protracted, multi-level armed conflict in one form or The stakeholder sampling strategy aimed to another, resulting in very limited service achieve an inclusive sample from urban and delivery throughout much of Somalia. rural environments, different clans and sub- Following the civil war in the early 1990s, clans, and settled and displaced communities. it is estimated that 90% of all schools were The community-level data collection took an destroyed in the fighting. The large-scale lack education perspective taking the school as a of education is still being felt throughout much starting point and moving outwards to include of Somalia with recent statistics suggesting that families and the wider community. This less than 42 per cent of children of primary approach specifically targeted children and school age were enrolled in school, one of the youth. Careful attention was also paid to lowest student enrolment rates in the world. inclusion of minority and marginalised groups, With the destruction of the formal education ensuring that their voices and perspectives and the resulting low enrolment rates, there is were represented in the final analyses. now an entire generation of Somalis who have grown up knowing nothing other than conflict. Drivers of Conflict

Purpose A number of drivers were identified across the three zones of Somalia (Somaliland, Puntland This report provides findings from a conflict and the South Central Zone) that included analysis undertaken as part of the UNICEF clan-identities, state fragility, resource issues, Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy social violence and crime, ideology and Programme funded by the Government of the regional and international interests. Although Netherland. By investigating a range of conflict communities within each of the three zones drivers at the federal, zonal and community generally experienced similar zonal-based levels, its purpose was to unpack the narratives of conflict, the local level socio- relationship between conflict and education, economic and security situation within each and help in the identification of entry-points zone was characterized by a high degree for education programming to positively impact of variability. on conflict drivers in the Somali context. In South Central Somalia, it was reported that weak governance, clan dynamics, competition Methodology over resources, poverty and unemployment, particularly amongst the youth, had led to The conflict analysis used a highly feelings of frustration and hopelessness decentralised approach, beginning with and the recruitment into criminal gangs the local level and moving outwards into the or extremist groups. zonal, federal, and international levels, to systematically collect and analyse data to Whilst the situation in South Central Somalia is investigate the underlying causes of conflict at symptomatic of systematic state collapse, the each of these levels, and to help identify dynamics in Puntland are markedly different. education programming to address the conflict Here, the ‘core’ regions, or areas near centres drivers and support conflict transformation and of power and heightened state capacity, peacebuilding. Field data were collected over generally exhibit developmental pressures like a 9-month period in each of the three zones, urban planning, while the ‘periphery’, or the comprising interviews and focus group areas relatively cut off from the Puntland 1 discussions with stakeholders that included government’s authority, often experience The term ‘Somalia’ as used in this report refers to the geographical government officials and civil society increased levels of armed banditry, piracy boundaries as they existed prior to organizations working in the education and and other forms of low to mid-level violence. the collapse of the state in 1991. Executive Summary 3

In the northwest, Somaliland has undergone population. All three have a large youth bulge self-led inter-connected processes of post-war and their educational and training needs to reconstruction, economic recovery, regain legitimate employment are not being met. establishing the rule of law, demobilising Unemployment and poverty amongst young armed groups and reconciliation. The main people is very high across Somalia and issues in this self-proclaimed independent estimated to be running at sixty-seven per cent. state are the ongoing borderland conflicts in It is very high amongst displaced communities Sool and Sanaag, as well as developmental living in urban areas across all three zones, pressures such as limited service delivery and and significant numbers of young people are the return of the diaspora which can cause resorting to alternative forms of income heightened resentment by those who generation, including petty theft, organized remained. criminal activity and joining Islamist groups, particularly in South Central.

Educational Challenges Families without the financial means to pay for school fees in both the state sector and private In all three zones, it was found that sector continue to be excluded. Such inequities governments are struggling to provide basic have a particular impact upon girls, nomads social services such as education and the void and internally displaced communities. While is being filled by the private sector, non-profit, more than sixty per cent of the Somali self-help groups, or international aid agencies, population is pastoralist and nomadic, growing particularly in South Central where the urbanisation and dispute over natural resources government is planning to introduce state are placing restrictions on traditional ways of education provision. In addition to very low life. Such groups are finding that their levels of educational funding, all three zones indigenous forms of education are no longer are lacking in human resources in the sufficient for the development of skills likely to ministries and the technical capacity to lead to employment and a sustainable manage the education service. Given the livelihood, forcing them to move to urban extremely challenging context for educational areas. Here they often remain marginalised development across each of the three zones, from the clan-based political decision making education indicators for enrolment, processes and excluded from education. progression and completion of basic education remain the lowest in the east and southern Similarly, internally displaced people are also African region. being forced into urban areas as they flee conflict and food insecurity, particularly from Wide gender disparities were also apparent, South Central. They are facing increasing levels particularly in more vulnerable groups such of marginalisation as they are largely as internally displaced and nomadic dependent on informal employment, petty communities, and were affected by a range of trades and food hand-outs for their livelihoods factors including youth pregnancy, early/forced and survival, and cannot afford to pay school marriages, inability of families to afford school fees for their children. Internally displaced fees or expenses related to education, and the people are also placing increasing strain on prioritization of income generating activities host communities in urban areas by competing such as cattle rearing or agriculture. for severely stretched resources, including Violence against children was also found housing, employment and the provision to be prevalent within schools, homes, of other social services such as education and communities across all three zones, and health. adding to the general culture of violence and perpetuating the intergenerational transfer While there are generic features in the of violent conflict resolution methods. challenges facing education across all three zones, a major finding to emerge from the Another common feature of the three zones interviews with major implications for with major implication for educational education programming was the large variation provision was the demographics of the in levels of conflict at district and community 4 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context level across and within all three zones. While Recommendations much of Somalia remains very vulnerable to The following are a number of specific low-intensity clashes and periodic terrorist recommendations based on the findings attacks, the findings suggest villages and of the analysis: districts in relative proximity to each other are experiencing dramatically different levels of conflict. In communities living in relative Prioritising of Youth peace, governance at the municipal and local level has been remarkably resilient and Given the youth demographic, a common has remained the primary source of protection concern that emerged from the analysis was and rule of law, usually relying on a mix the need to engage youth. In South Central this of stakeholders including elders, business was felt necessary to prevent the radicalisation people, women’s groups and professional of youth by militant Islamist groups, and in the to negotiate for and keep the peace. case of Puntland and Somaliland for preventing them being drawn into criminal activity due to piracy and the narcotics trade. Conclusions Prioritising formal and non-formal education Given the three very different zonal contexts programming with youth will allow for a focus reported in this study, responses to conflict on two key areas: political inclusion and cannot be prescribed and must be tailored to attitudes to violence. The former may involve fit the variations within and between the formulating a strategy in partnership with other zones. However, they do indicate that policies agencies, developing capacity and beginning and interventions are needed to improve implementation of pilot programmes. It will educational provision and outcomes that are also necessitate a more detailed consultation sensitive to regional, district and community and analysis of the situation facing youth, conditions that contribute to conflict particularly the most marginalised amongst prevention, social transformation, civic IDP and minority groups living in urban areas, engagement and economic progress. as well as gathering input from young people themselves on what could be possible Overall, the conflict analyses of each of the strategies for engagement and programming. zones suggest education can act as a catalyst for peacebuilding by addressing the drivers of conflict. It can help re-establish social bonds Attitudes to Violence by addressing underlying inequities that fuel conflict, providing relevant education and Concerns about social norms that accept employment opportunities to disenfranchised violence as a means of resolving disputes were youth, empowering adolescent girls and evident at the district and community levels in women as actors in the peacebuilding many areas across all three zones. There was a process, imparting civic and political strong belief amongst many focus groups that education, and modelling democratic interventions that seek to change attitudes and participation and decision making. This can behaviours at multiple levels within society be achieved through strengthening the (interpersonal, intergenerational within education sector at the policy, institutional and families, at school, between clans in certain community level by integrating peacebuilding regions) may have an impact on social norms and conflict transformation into educational and the disposition of individuals to use policies and practices, increasing institutional violence. The development of pilot programmes capacities to supply conflict sensitive related to these issues may also provide an education addressing triggers of conflict, and opportunity to monitor and test such claims. developing the capacity of students, parents and teachers to promote peace and conflict As South Central is the most conflict-affected transformation practices. zone, increasing access to high quality and conflict sensitive education as a peace dividend should be made a priority. Working with young Executive Summary 5

people to identify sustainable livelihoods Curriculum reform will therefore help address strategies would also reduce their vulnerability underlying socio-cultural drivers of conflict. to radicalisation and being recruited into armed An important element of supporting the militias. implementation of the zonal curricula will be teacher education and training, specifically on peacebuilding and citizenship that emphasises Nomadic Communities inclusion and conflict resolution. This will equip them to mediate conflict within the The challenge for programmes for nomadic community and develop appropriate pedagogic communities will be to simultaneously address skills for dealing with controversial issues in school enrolment and to work with young the classroom. people who are not in school to establish livelihoods that address a variety of priorities (economic realities, resilience to climate Building Capacity within change, dynamics of local conflicts over land the Education Sector and livestock). In addition, working with young people to identify sustainable livelihoods As part of the recommendations set out above, strategies and reduce vulnerability to conflict by it will be necessary to develop existing addressing any underlying social tensions (for capacities within UNICEF, Governments and example tensions over political representation) other education actors in each of the three should be strategic priorities. zones to encourage more of a peacebuilding perspective. It will require the development of Working with nomadic and pastoralist new areas of expertise, for example, expertise communities so they can access formal in working at secondary level, with youth, or education seems to be a priority in Puntland non-formal education programmes – these and Somaliland. Here pastoralist and nomadic should be identified as part of the planning for groups are finding their traditional ways of life the new education programme to address are under threat due to growing urbanisation drivers of conflict. It will also require the and disputes over natural resources, and so are development partnerships between education being forced to move to urban areas where providers and other agencies to help build they often remain marginalised from the clan- peacebuilding capacity within the education based political decision making processes. sector, avoid duplication of effort, and ensure there in coherence in the approach that is taken. Curriculum Reform

Working with ministries at the zonal level on revisions to existing curricula provides an ideal opportunity to introduce a peacebuilding perspective into school and into the training of teachers. The importing of curricula reflecting ideological and political interests of countries providing funding to education, adding to segregation of communities and radicalisation, was identified as a particular problem in South Central. In Puntland and Somaliland the lack of citizenship education to promote political, social and moral responsibility was perceived to be contributing to clan-based politics and a breakdown in social norms between youth and elders. The lack of relevance of the curriculum to employment needs and entrepreneurial skills of youth was also thought to be contributing to unemployment and criminality.

Chapter One 7 Chapter One

Introduction 8 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

nsecurity and state fragility are some of the development. Following independence in Imain barriers to the achievement of the 1960, the Somali government built a relatively Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), comprehensive, if limited, state education including the right to universal primary system; however, the widespread closure of education in fragile, conflict-affected countries what was already a limited number of state like Somalia (World Bank, 2011; UNICEF, schools due to the collapse of the government 2011). Since the 1970s, large parts of in 1991 decimated the education system. Somalia – particularly the South Central Zone Indeed, UNICEF (2003) estimates that 90% (SCZ) and, at times, parts of the autonomous of all schools were destroyed in the fighting state of Puntland and the self-declared that followed the fall of Siad Barre’s regime. independent state of Somaliland – have Subsequently, national literacy rates fell experienced varying levels of instability, state dramatically to less than 38% with an collapse, and protracted, multi-level armed estimated 4.5 million Somalis unable to read conflict in one form or another.1 Now in its and write (Somalia Federal Republic, 2013), third decade, the conflict has had catastrophic thereby contributing to what has been effects on the country’s development. On- described as a process of ‘‘de-development’’ going violent conflict, along with the collapse (Abdi, 1998 and 2003) or ‘‘development in of the state’s central authority in 1991 and the reverse’’ (Collier et al., 2003). subsequent multiple iterations of interim governments between 1991 and 2012 have In the absence of a formal state education led to some organisations describing Somalia system, a variety of stakeholders, including as the world’s “most failed state” (Fund for community education committees, zonal Peace, 2013). administrations, community-based organisations, private businesses, diaspora The impact of the conflict and state fragility collaborations, NGOs and religious groups on the Somali people and society has been opened schools across the country in an intensified at times by drought and famine. attempt to redress the academic consequences The two combined have resulted in the flight of conflict on the education system. The of over 1.5 million refugees throughout the majority of these schools operated on a fee world and the internal displacement of over a system, excluding access for families without million people.2 Indeed, one of the most the necessary financial resources. Schools severe famines to hit the Horn of Africa in worked in isolation from one another, often recent years struck in 2011, further deepening with different sources of support, curricula, the effects of systemic conflict on the Somali fee structures, and critically, policies on fee population, particularly vulnerable groups like exemption for the most needy. What replaced women, the elderly and children. With the state education system throughout large fluctuating security and stability throughout sections of SCZ, where the most sustained the past four decades and the weak central violent conflict was centered, was a system of 1 state currently battling Al Shabaab, a violent ‘umbrella’-groups of for-fee schools supported The term ‘Somalia’ as used in this Islamic jihadist group linked to Al Qaeda that by and employing curriculum from a variety of report refers to the geographical boundaries as they existed prior controls significant portions of the South sources, including the UN through UNICEF to the collapse of the state in 1991. Central Zone (SCZ) and is making its presence and UNESCO, NGOs, and foreign states. 2 felt in parts of Puntland, Somalia consistently Koranic schools of varying degrees of quality These calculations were made from ranks as one of the world’s most fragile also flourished and now constitute a large part estimates of the number of victims 3 and displaced persons of the states. As a result of the weakened state and of Somalia’s current educational capacity. famines in 1991 and 2011 available limited service delivery, it lags behind the rest from media sources and UNHCR (CNN, 2008; FCO, 2012; AP, 2013; of sub-Saharan Africa and other low-income Currently in SCZ, ongoing violent conflict BBC, 2013; Brookings, 2011; countries on many key development along with additional displacement caused by UNHCR, 2014). indicators, including primary school drought and famine, combined with a lack of 3 enrolment, household income, and life a functioning government with control over the Since 2008, Somalia has been ranked first in the Failed States expectancy (World Bank, 2014). entire zone, has necessitated a more informal Index, published by the Fund for response to educational needs, which has Peace. To review the yearly rankings, reports, and data, please visit The Somali education system was a victim relied on for-fee and Koranic schools, rather http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings- of the conflict and the subsequent stunted than a centrally managed education system. 2013-sortable. Chapter One 9

Meanwhile, the governments Somaliland and provision is another cause for concern, with Puntland are taking steps to build stronger girls making up only one-third of lower primary state education systems. In 2011, the school enrolment – a figure that decreases Somaliland government introduced free rapidly in later grades. Such low levels of primary and secondary education. While some girls’ enrolment have been attributed to a experts question this policy because of the combination of insecurity, traditional attitudes current lack of government capacity and towards education, class timetabling, and resources (IRIN, 2011), education provision, economic considerations. measured in the number of schools, has shown signs of improvement. The Somaliland In an effort to address such gaps in education 2011/2012 Primary School Census reported provision as well as other public services and that there a total of 839 primary schools provide much-needed support to the fledgling there – 452 in urban areas and 387 in rural federal government, the international areas (Somaliland Ministry of Education and community has recently pledged $2.4 billion Higher Education (SMEHE), 2012). USD to support a ‘New Deal’ package of Somaliland also hosts 68 Alternative Basic assistance for the country. This is in addition Education (ABE) centers and 11 Integrated to the aid that international organisations, Quaranic Schools (IQS) (SMEHE, 2012). their implementing partners, international and Similarly, Puntland has strengthened the local NGOs, non-traditional donors, other civil education system since recovering from the society organisations, and the Somali diaspora fall of the central government. With the have been providing over the past twenty-three support of international organisations and the difficult years, when ongoing conflict and diaspora, Puntland’s education system now natural disasters combined on several consists of 439 formal primary schools, 58 occasions to create extremely challenging ABE schools, and 11 IQS, according to the complex humanitarian emergencies. 2011/2012 primary education census (Puntland Ministry of Education (PMoE), Knowing how and where to target interventions 2012). Additionally, Puntland is home to 54 is essential for effective and sustainable secondary schools, 200 adult learning programme design and implementation in schools, and eight universities (Omar, 2012). the complex Somali environment where the needs often exceed the human and financial resources. In order to ensure that best practice for engagement in conflict-affected contexts is Knowing how and where to target interventions in a followed, programming should be rooted in a thorough appreciation of the interconnected complex environment like Somalia, where the needs are relationships between actors and variables across and within the three zones. Aid often so great, is essential for effective and sustainable provided in conflict-affected countries becomes part of that conflict, therefore a programme design and implementation. nuanced understanding of the conflict drivers, manifestations, and dynamics, allowing policy-makers and practitioners to identify and Today, education provision varies widely mitigate the risks of assistance they provide across and within the three zones, a fuelling further violence (Anderson, 1996; phenomenon which will be discussed Saferworld, 2004). in further detail in Chapter 7. Indeed, educational opportunities are limited and Education programming, in particular, has an access remains unavailable for the majority of important role to play in the transformative Somali children. As a result, recent statistics process that a post-conflict society experiences. suggest that less than 42 per cent of primary It has the potential to address drivers of education-aged children were enrolled in conflict in a positive way, but can also serve school, one of the lowest student enrolment to strengthen the social divisions that fuel rates in the world (UNICEF, 2012). Gender conflict, leading to unequal provision, disparity in education access and quality of generating grievances over access and quality, 10 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context and reinforcing existing prejudices. Due to education’s dual nature and its possible negative impact on conflict, it is especially crucial to identify and understand the nexus of conflict and education when designing education interventions (UNESCO, 2011). A conflict or situation analysis is a useful tool to isolate the ways that education and conflict interact in a given context. It can also identify entry points for education programming that will not exacerbate tensions and can potentially have significant positive impact on conflict drivers and dynamics.

It is with this goal in mind that UNICEF Somalia commissioned this conflict, peace, and situation analysis (CPSA). Funded by the Government of the Netherlands through the Peace-building Education and Advocacy (PBEA) Program, this CPSA aims to:

Q Provide a snapshot of the various conflict drivers in the Somali context; Q Unpack the relationship between conflict and education; and Q Pinpoint entry-points for education programming that can positive impact on conflict drivers in the Somali context.

As such, this analysis has adopted an education lens, focusing on the experience of peace and conflict from the perspectives Figure 1: of students, their teachers, their families, and framework adopted by this CPSA follows Structure of the and their wider communities. Through this in Chapter Two. CPSA Report approach, existing conflict analyses that focus on the high-level political situation are Part I, which is comprised of Chapters Three augmented and strengthened by the voices through Six, presents the conflict analysis of of local communities throughout the three zones which constitutes the core of this Somali context with the view to provide report. Chapter Three synthesises the findings recommendations for education of the CPSA at the aggregate level, drawing programming strategies. attention to the cross-cutting contextual themes common to the zonal analyses. Chapters Four to Six present the findings of the zonal Structure of the Report analyses, providing first a contextual background and conflict chronology of the Because the situation within each of the zone. The zonal analyses then outline the three zones of Somalia fluctuates dramatically conflict dynamics, drivers, and actors found in between peace and conflict, often varying SCZ, Puntland, and Somaliland, respectively. widely by community, this CPSA report explores both conflict and peace relative to Part II is devoted to an exploration of the the zonal and local contexts. This introductory education-conflict nexus in the Somali context. chapter provides a brief overview of the Chapter Seven discusses the current status of Somali context and education system. the education system across the three zones, A review of the conflict analysis approach analysing the impact of conflict on service Chapter One 11

provision and quality and unpacking the relationship between education and the conflict drivers in the individual zones and the aggregate level. It also identifies opportunities to engage with the drivers and entry points for education and peacebuilding programming. Finally, Chapter Eight presents the conclusions of the analysis and offers recommendations for further engagement in education and peacebuilding programming in the three regions.

A detailed discussion of the research methodology is presented in Appendix A and lists of references, relevant background literature, interviewees, and focus groups can be found in Appendices B to E.

Chapter Two

A Composite Approach to a Conflict and Education Analysis 14 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

he situation across and within the three Q Resources: This can include territory, TSomali zones fluctuates widely between money, energy sources, food and how these conflict and peace. To appropriately take into resources should be distributed. consideration these variations, this report Q Power: The ability to get what one wants or explores both conflict and peace relative to the how control and participate in political aggregate, zonal, and local contexts. To set the decision making. stage for the in-depth analysis of the conflict Q Identity: This involves the cultural, social, presented in Part I, this chapter will present an and political communities to which people overview of the conflict analysis approach feel tied. adopted by this study. It first outlines briefly Q Status: Whether or not people believe they what a conflict analysis is, then discusses the are treated with respect and dignity; whether CPSA’s guiding principles before concluding their traditions and social positions are with a discussion of the specific conflict respected. analysis methodology utilized in this CPSA Q Values: Related particularly to those through a brief presentation of each of the embodied in systems of religion, culture, or steps included in the analytical process.4 ideology.

By and large, conflict is multi-causal and is the The Conflict Analysis Approach product of interaction and not simple systemic conditions. It often becomes violent where A conflict analysis involves the systematic there are inadequate mechanisms to allow for collection and analysis of data and information its management through dialogue, addressing to determine the scope and dynamics of a grievances, injustice, fear, etc. (Fisher et al., given conflict. Typically, it seeks to identify the 2005). In the CPSA, conflict is defined as: parties, issues, drivers, and the larger context of a dispute. Conflict analysis can also be used “Armed violence between two or more to identify options for conflict management or parties which results from a real or resolution. Over the last decade, it has become perceived incompatibility of objectives or a staple of international engagement in conflict interests and values, particularly as affected and fragile states (Barakat and concerns the sharing or distribution of Waldman, 2011). In fact, since DFID launched finite resources (or resources which are its Strategic Conflict Assessment Guidance perceived as being finite or in short (SCA) in 2002 with its methodological focus supply), including but not limited to on understanding conflict by examining its political authority/access, justice, structures, actors, and dynamics, many donors revenue, and natural or public resources and international agencies have since (e.g., land, water, social spending, etc.).”5 introduced their own analytical frameworks, often explicitly modelled on DFID’s SCA In recent years, conflict theories in fragile (Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002). This countries have moved beyond the somewhat includes the USAID’s guidance on conducting limiting greed and grievance dichotomy of the conflict assessment (USAID, 2004) and the late 1990s, with more nuanced United Nations Inter-Agency Framework for understandings of conflict causation, Conflict Analysis in Transition Situations particularly in relation to the issue of natural (UNDG/ECHA, 2004). resources. Currently, the discourse around conflict is being informed with issues related to The approach adopted by this analysis is personal and societal behaviours by rooted in a composite understanding of these peacebuilding practitioners from a concern that various tools and is rooted in an understanding such factors are not fully captured by the of conflict as an inherent human activity that in traditional political economy approach, which 4 its basic form is a relationship between two or focuses on issues of structural violence, For a detailed discussion of the study’s methodology, please more parties (individuals or groups) who have, inequity, and poor governance. Recent studies see Appendix A. or believe they have, incompatible goals of horizontal inequalities, particularly by 5 (Fisher et al., 2005). This incompatibility can Frances Stewart at Oxford University, have Adapted from Ramsbotham, arise from a variety of reasons: shed light on the group dimensions of Woodhouse, and Miall (2011). Chapter Two 15

peace – particularly as it impacted education – Conflict theories have moved beyond the and has adopted a highly decentralised approach, beginning with the local level and somewhat limiting greed and grievance dichotomy incorporating it outwards into the zonal, federal, and international levels. to reflect a more nuanced understanding of conflict drivers. As a result of focusing largely on the federal level, there is a considerable gap between the analysis and identifying entry points for inequality and their link to the risk of instability programming at the zonal or community level. and conflict. There is now also a clearer This is largely due to the fact that the conflict recognition of the importance of understanding analysis process was not always particularly the regional aspects of conflict. In addition, the inclusive of local voices.6 However, with the 2011 World Development Report findings are recently improving security and political important with respect to the understanding of situation, several UN agencies, donors, and conflict, particularly in terms of its concern private institutes are undertaking more locally- with citizen expectations, confidence building, focused analyses. Collectively, these new multiple transitions, global drivers and external analyses – once completed – should provide a shocks. Finally, culture and emotion have more nuanced picture of the conflict actors, increasingly come to be seen as important drivers, and potential for peace at the elements of contemporary conflict and community and district level. It is the aim of violence, particularly in relation to terrorism this assessment to add to that growing body of and radicalisation. knowledge of the local understanding of the Somali conflict.

Guiding Principles and Methodology Guiding Principles

Conflict analyses nominally start from a To address the current local versus federal gap specific analytical perspective, whether that is in the understanding of the Somali conflict and the international, regional, national, or local to develop its own theoretical framework of the level. Many of the current Somali conflict Somali conflict, this CPSA followed four analyses, many of which are several years old, guiding principles. have universally focused on the international or federal level, with little attention paid to the Participation unique and shifting dynamics of conflict at the The first guiding premise for this analysis was zonal, district, and community levels. These participation. Understanding conflict in such a analyses include: fluid environment requires a highly localised view of the way conflict manifests itself within Q A 2001 report for the Finnish Foreign the structure and dynamics of society. This Ministry; requires a conflict analysis that emphasises the Q A 2004 analysis of the South Central Zone local-level relationships and social cohesion conducted for the World Bank; between clan-structures and other groups. Q The World Bank’s 2005 national level Indeed, it has undoubtedly been Somalia’s analysis; vibrant civil society that has probably saved the Q Other analyses conducted on behalf of other country from even more devastation 6 For example, the World Bank’s donors, such as DFID and USAID, looked at (Menkhaus, 2012). Therefore, it is important 2005 conflict analysis openly the conflict in Somali regions of Ethiopia and that civil society is sufficiently engaged with in acknowledges its limitations regarding listing the manifestations the Kenya-Somali borders, respectively; and an analysis of the drivers, processes, and of conflict at the sub-regional and Q Several conflict analyses conducted for the opportunities that come with any conflict local level and instead focuses upon a thematic analysis pitched United Nations by Ken Menkhaus. analysis. A participatory conflict analysis is at the national level and which considered best practice from a peacebuilding potentially disregards the fluidity of conflict structures in-country In a departure from this approach, this CPSA is point of view, as the perspectives of those who (World Bank, 2005). rooted in community experience of conflict and are directly impacted by a conflict are part of 16 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context the dynamics and the act of participation in a conflict analysis can serve as a peacebuilding It is important that civil society is sufficiently engaged activity (Van Brabant, 2010). with in an analysis of the drivers, processes and opportunities Incorporating complexity A second guiding principle of this conflict that come with any conflict analysis. analysis is that conflict in Somalia cannot be understood as a linear process between two or more actors, such as an ongoing war between forces loyal to the Somali Federal Government activities, a cadre of UNICEF staff and Somali (SFG) and Al Shabaab, where much of researchers/data collectors now have previous analysis has focused. While this may knowledge about the concepts of conflict and have been possible in the early 1990s, it peace, experience in conducting data would be an oversimplification to prescribe this collection, and an overview of the conflict method of analysis today. Instead, there are a analysis approach. It is the ultimate goal of this number of different conflicts in Somalia, which CPSA process that these human resources will overlap and often interconnect in fluid be relied upon for future analysis activities. processes of conflict formation and transformation. This process is made altogether more complex by the total absence of any Methodology functioning state, and its respective institutions, in many areas of the country since The CPSA was organised into three phases: the eruption of the civil war in 1988 combined Inception, CPSA, and Utilisation. The first with the erosion of traditional mechanisms of phase determined, in close consultation with conflict resolution. UNICEF and other key stakeholders, the basic purpose and parameters of the second, Informing programme design analytical phase which included the collection and implementation and analysis of data, as well as the drafting of A third guiding principle has been the need to the CPSA report. The third phase focuses on close the gap between analysis and the dissemination of the CPSA and the programme design. As such, main findings utilisation of its findings in the design and from the analysis were fed into the early stages implementation of future education of programme design. Discussions during the interventions. This section seeks to further design phase centred on the conflict drivers explain the ways in which the information identified in the three zones and how gathered throughout communities in the three education and peacebuilding programming Somali zones were categorized and analysed. interventions could engage with them for positive change. Phase One: Inception The Inception Phase sought to synthesise the Capacity development pertinent contextual information prior to Finally, the principle of capacity development collection and analysis of the field data. It also as the means to institute a culture of on-going aimed to align the analysis with UNICEF analysis and reflection amongst staff members programming interests. This was accomplished of UNICEF and its key partners in Nairobi and through five distinct activities. First, the team the three Somali zones guided the CPSA. This identified and mapped the existing Somali approach focused on building local capacities conflict analyses in order to ascertain the most and included the training of nine Somali relevant documents for more in-depth study. researchers and sixty-eight local data collectors Secondly, they undertook a thorough review of in conflict analysis, equipping them with the existing Somali conflict analyses, attempting to knowledge and tools to gather data in capture the overall manifestations and effects communities across the three zones. It also of the conflict with a particular focus on the built the capacity of UNICEF zonal staff, who impact of conflict on Somali education participated in the conflict-analysis and field systems. Thirdly, the team clarified UNICEF’s research methods training. Through these orientation to the Somali conflict and its Chapter Two 17

engagement in education programmes there in Step Two: Typology of conflict order to align the future research activities and Bearing in mind that there are areas – analysis with UNICEF priorities. Next, the throughout Somaliland and Puntland in purpose and parameters of the CPSA were particular – where ‘armed conflict’, as viewed established at a workshop with UNICEF. The through the eyes of the Somalis living there, is field methodology was also refined at this not part of their daily reality, Step Two provided stage. Finally, the team piloted the training a typology of the conflicts currently found in programme for the Somali researchers and the three zones, rooted in the analysis of the their data collection teams that would conduct community and district-level data. This step in the research in SCZ. The three-day training the analysis showed that violent conflict in course covered the concepts of conflict and Somalia is not a single conflict but rather it is a peace, conflict analysis methodologies, and the large and complex composite of numerous data collection tools to be used in this analysis. conflicts that can be broadly defined around After the data collection methodologies and three categories: tools were piloted in two communities in South Central and adapted for use in Somaliland and Q Demarcated conflicts; Puntland, data collection training was later Q Thematic conflicts; and conducted for the researchers and the data Q Acute political disputes. collection teams for those two zones in Hargeisa. Geographically, violent conflict in the three Somali zones can be location or zonal based, Phase Two: Conflict/Peace and regional or international in nature. Situation Analysis Nevertheless, it should be appreciated that This second phase encompassed the main these characteristics are ideal-typical and body of the analysis and was initially designed to provide merely a brief outline of completed by a designated analytical team the types of conflicts identified by the CPSA. with a researcher for each of the three zones. Table 1 presents the typology analysis, They analysed data coming from the field and providing definitions, examples, and context of built upon the preliminary literature review the three types of conflict found in the three conducted in Phase 1. The CPSA sought to Somali zones. identify and categorize five main aspects of the Somali conflict: Step Three: Actors In Step Three, actors or parties to the conflict Q Context in each of the zones were mapped and Q Typology of Conflict grouped according to three types: primary, Q Actors secondary, and interested third parties. Primary Q Drivers actors are include those parties whose goals Q Institutional Resilience and Future Scenarios are, or are perceived by them to be, incompatible and who interact directly in Step One: Establishing the understanding pursuit of those respective goals through of the context violent means. Where the conflict parties are The first stage of the analysis established the organisations or groups, each may be scope and character of the context within each composed of smaller units differing in their of the zones. This was particularly critical involvement and investment in the conflict. because the experience of conflict and peace Secondary actors are those parties who have has varied dramatically across and within each an indirect stake in the outcome of the dispute zone. During this step, the team drafted the but who do perceive themselves as directly history of each zone and drew up a chronology involved in the conflict. As the conflict of conflict, which was crucial to understanding progresses, secondary parties may become current conflict dynamics and the behaviour of primary, however, and vice-versa. Interested key actors. This contextualisation also enabled third parties are those who either have an the team to identify key trends within each of interest in the successful resolution of the the zones. conflict or its escalation. 18 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Type Definition Examples Conflict Context

Domestic or Regional International Zonal

Demarcated A conflict with relatively fixed Galkayo North G G open conflict set of actors and possibly / South geographical area

Thematic A conflict that generally Counter- open and/or revolves around a particular terrorism G surface theme or resource. Tend to be operations conflict more dynamic and more difficult to define

Acute but Situations where tension is Elite G Table 1: latent conflict high and threatens open competition Typology of the conflict Somali Conflict

These different types of actors were, in turn, conflict resources, and constraining differentiated according to whether they are opportunistic elites — factors which feed into national, regional or global. Finally, analysis of ongoing conflict. In Step Five, the identification all the actors identified their needs, interests, of institutions or organisations that work across declared positions, capacities and resources, the conflict division was critical. Key areas in as well as relationships to other actors. terms of a society’s institutional capacity to support resilience included: Step Four: Conflict dynamics and drivers The next task was to understand and map the Q State institutions: Fragility, governance, various drivers of conflict in the three Somali provision of security, capacity to fulfil core zones. Typically, conflict develops around a functions, delivery of basic services, rule of number of interrelated issues within a given law, ability to deliver economic growth and context. Due to the complex interplay of these job creation. issues, it is helpful to understand each issue Q Civil society: Strength and influence of clans, and its centrality to ‘driving’ the conflict. This NGOs, religious groups and informal social CPSA categorised the conflict drivers presented institutions, and the media. in the findings as systemic (or root), proximate, Q State-society relations: Functioning cultural (value-based) or immediate. representation, legitimacy, working tax Definitions of each of these categories are system, and an active citizenry. presented in Table 2. The analysis in Step Five also considered Step Five: Institutional Resilience, various other factors that can serve to regulate Regulation Factors and Future Scenarios or limit the conflict dynamics identified in the The fact that most Somali communities have previous steps. Some of these were ‘internal’ repeatedly ‘bounced back’ from periodic crises limiting factors, such as common values and and episodes of backsliding into violent armed interests among the conflicting parties, in conflict attests to the extraordinary resilience of particular traditional techniques of conflict Somali ‘peace’ and ‘security’ arrangements at management familiar to the different conflict the local level. This leads to a more rounded actors and those known to have been useful understanding that centres on the ability and elsewhere. Other factors were considered capacity of Somali society to manage and ‘external’, such as a higher authority that could contain conflict, including addressing the intervene to force a settlement or an incentives for violence, blocking access to intermediary from outside the conflict. Chapter Two 19

Drivers of Conflict Definition

Systemic or root drivers Structural conditions that cause objective changes in parties’ material circumstances. This can include unequal control of power, authority, or distribution of resources and services; natural resource dependence; horizontal inequalities; corruption; poverty; income decline and disparities, unemployment, environmental deterioration, population growth, resource scarcity and competition, the colonial or Cold War legacy, breakdowns of values and traditions, or ethnicity, to name a few.

Proximate drivers Problems in the social and political processes and institutions that mediate the effect of systemic conditions on peoples’ lives and behaviour and shape social and state–society relations. Some examples are: political exclusion and lack of representation; distribution of resources, social difference, government policies, social organisation, problems of political and economic liberalisation, militarisation and external military aid, abusive security services; ungoverned areas; and uncontrolled borders.

Value-based drivers Issues of identity, culture, belief, values and ways of life that, when challenged or threatened, can lead to conflict. Such causes are often rooted in the history of societies, but can be manipulated by groups for strategic reasons. In the short term, conflict often results from attacks on cherished symbols of culture or religion. These causes are not adequately captured in standard political economy approaches and require separate consideration.

External factors Regional and international factors, as well as exogenous factors carried out by third parties. This includes ‘bad neighbours’ and regional instability; flow of refugees and regional mercenaries; cross-border smuggling and trafficking; income shocks; international organised crime; world food prices; decisions/actions of international organisations and judicial bodies.

Conflict enabling factors Factors that facilitate the overall environment that makes violent conflict thrive. An enabling factor may include the ‘presence’ of a key element such as weapons or easily ‘lootable’ resources like conflict diamonds. They may also be defined by ‘absence’, as in the absence of international support for mediation efforts.

Triggers A trigger, as the name suggests, is an event that initiates hostilities. Triggers are closely related to proximate causes with the distinction that they may not necessarily be causes of conflict per se; because, plausibly, triggers may be benign or commonplace events that just so happen to unleash the forces that have previously been allowed to build up. This distinction is important because certain conflicts would have been likely to occur whether the original trigger existed or not. Therefore triggers can often be replaced by other factors and variables. Furthermore, triggers often tell us little about the nature of a conflict, just how it started.

Table 2: Conflict Drivers

Phase Three: Utilisation highlight issues of continuity, improvements, The primary aim of Phase Three is to ensure and deterioration. Finally, feedback sessions the findings of the CPSA presented and that are linked to future analysis and disseminated in a way that is relevant and programming activities would ensure that they utilized in UNICEF’s policy-making and are receptive to the varying contexts in the programming in the three Somali zones. This three zones, as well as identify and address CPSA was designed to be regularly updated in needed improvements in the CPSA order to provide UNICEF country and zonal methodology and process. teams, as well as other relevant stakeholders, the most current analysis. Linked to this process, monitoring of indicators against baseline measurements should be conducted on a regular basis to track relevant deteriorations or improvements. Indicators of success form a peacebuilding perspective, such as input, process, outcome, and process indicators should be included. These should then feed into a reinterpretation of the conflict dynamics presented by this CPSA in order to

Part 1

The Conflict, Peace, and Situation Analysis

Part I of this report presents the findings of the

analysis conducted on the data collected

throughout the three Somali zones.

Chapter Three presents a short background of the

Somali context followed by a synthesis of the

findings at the aggregate level, identifying

cross cutting themes and common trends

across the zones within a broader framework.

Chapters Four through Six present the

zonal analyses of SCZ, Puntland,

and Somaliland, respectively.

Chapter Three 23 Chapter Three

A Synthesis of the Findings 24 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

ivided into three main sections, this pressures, the enduring role of local and Dchapter first presents an overview of the external spoilers, the rise of a political economy Somali conflict beginning with independence in of state collapse (or a ‘war economy’), and the 1960. It then outlines a broader theoretical reality that attempts at state revival have understanding of the Somali conflict before themselves been major drivers of conflict. synthesising the findings at the aggregate level. During this period, both Somaliland and In the third, final section the drivers of conflict Puntland transitioned to more stable and cross-cutting themes that are relevant to governments through grass-root locally-led the broader context and are common across initiatives. While neither process was without the three Somali zones are explored in detail periods of violent conflict, they did take a before concluding with a brief summary of markedly different trajectory than SCZ and the current conflict trends. federal government.

A critical development during this long period The Somali Conflict of failed transitional federal governments was the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), The Somali conflict has been one of the longest which, after winning a series of battles against running conflicts on the African continent, the militias of petty warlords in Mogadishu, going through multiple phases and varying took control of the capital in June 2006 and levels of violence throughout the three zones. governed much of southern Somalia for a six- Indeed, nine years after independence in month period. The ICU was a broad umbrella 1969, the country’s second president, group that included Somali nationalists, Sufi Abdirashi Ali Sharmarke, was assassinated: an clerics, moderate Islamists, non-violent event that triggered a military coup d’etat led Salafists, and jihadi elements with ties to Al by Colonel Siad Barre. The first few years of Qaeda. For a time, the ICU appeared to many Barre’s rule saw extensive modernisation Somalis to be the solution to the country’s long efforts and development throughout the crisis. It imposed impressive law and order in country, but the unsuccessful Ogaden War with the areas it controlled and enjoyed a high level Ethiopia in 1977 served as a catalyst for the of support from war-weary Somalis. breakdown of the political system and his International efforts to broker a power-sharing popular support. The Somali defeat in March arrangement between the ICU and the Somali 1978 critically weakened the military and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) failed. fragmented the government, leading to the By October 2006, it was apparent to all that creation of largely clan-affiliated opposition armed conflict between the two was inevitable, groups against which the regime of Siad Barre and in late December 2006 Ethiopia, with US cracked down viciously. The fight against the support, launched a major offensive into clan-based opposition groups led to a full-scale Somalia, crushing the ICU forces in the civil war from 1989 until the Barre government countryside and taking the capital Mogadishu finally collapsed in January 1991. That without a shot. summer, Somaliland, declared independence from Somalia and began its own, Somali-led The two-year Ethiopian occupation of path towards rebuilding state structures and Mogadishu and southern Somalia produced a infrastructure following the devastating conflict disastrous period of instability, involving armed between Barre’s government forces and the conflict, political violence, radicalisation and opposition there. polarisation, from which the country is still suffering. As noted above, one of the most Since 1991, Somalia has been the target of significant variables to emerge from this period many externally-sponsored attempts to revive a was the rise to prominence of Al Shabaab, a central government and broker a national group that began as the militant wing of the peace. These well-intentioned initiatives have, ICU and later developed close links to Al until recently, produced a string of failures. Qaeda. The group quickly became the main Repeated frustrations with both peacebuilding source of armed resistance to the Ethiopian and state building at the national level occupation and their ability to provide security highlight the existence of deep, unresolved and services in the areas they controlled Chapter Three 25

Figure 2: Map of Somalia (UN, 2011) 26 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context garnered initial significant support from Aweys, Al Shabaab continues to pose a threat. Somalis both at home and in the diaspora. It The group maintains control over large regions also attracted foreign jihadi fighters, along with of South Central and has shifted northwards to their associated implications for the global ‘War Puntland over the past five years. It has also on Terror’. Heavy clashes and shelling between increased its use of terrorist attacks against Al Shabaab and the Ethiopian military led international, government, and civilian targets further destruction of Mogadishu and produced both in Somalia and neighbouring Kenya. a flood of 700,000 displaced persons. By 2008, Al Shabaab regained control over most In addition to the conflict with Al Shabaab, a of southern Somalia and most of Mogadishu. growing number of local Somali clan militias The TFG, then led by President Abdullahi have also emerged, taking sporadic control of Yusuf, was only able to retain a nominal Mogadishu neighbourhoods vacated by Al presence in the capital thanks to armed Shabaab in August 2011. Some of these protection from Ethiopian and African Union militias routinely clash with Al Shabaab and Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping are providing various types of support to the forces. AMISOM forces. Additionally, both Kenyan and Ethiopian armed forces are presently inside Al Shabaab’s mishandled response during the Somali territory, backing local Somali proxies in major 2011 famine in areas under its control an effort to roll Al Shabaab back from its in southern Somalia further eroded its public strongholds in southern Somalia. These support. At the height of the famine in the countries’ military forces have directly engaged summer of 2011, the group unexpectedly Al Shabaab in short episodes of armed combat. withdrew from most of the capital Mogadishu, As a result, their military involvement and and over the course of the next year it was support of various factions can actively fuel the driven out of most major towns and cities in ongoing conflict. This process of external southern Somalia by AMISOM, Kenyan, and intervention by Somalia’s neighbors is also Somali forces. The shift of fortunes for Al geared to the economic and political agendas Shabaab has however not ended armed of the respective actors. Finally, international conflict and political violence in southern actors outside the region – the US, France, the Somalia. It has merely prompted a change in many states engaged in the naval task forces the group’s tactics, as it now relies heavily on patrolling Somalia’s waters against piracy, and asymmetrical urban guerrilla warfare, terrorist Al Qaeda – are also involved in the country’s bombings against soft targets in both Somalia armed conflicts and can actually fuel the and neighbouring states, and a campaign of ongoing violence there. targeted political violence. At the same time, areas of the country captured from Al Shabaab Despite ongoing conflict, SCZ in particular has are now seeing spikes in inter-clan violence experienced marked positive changes since over land and control of valuable resources. 2012. Two changes – the apparent weakening Indeed, it is becoming clear that while Al of Al Shabaab along with its retreat from most Shabaab had effectively kept the lid on South Central urban centres and the resource conflicts, the group had done little to establishment in August 2012 of a post- resolve the tensions between the clan-groups transitional government led by President at the local level. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud – have raised hopes among Somalis and foreign observers alike. Today, the main Somali conflict pits AMISOM Although similar optimism was present at the forces from Uganda and Burundi against an Al downfall of the Barre regime in 1991, it is Shabaab that is reported to receive material important not to dismiss claims that the support from sources in the Gulf, Eritrea, and members of the wider Somali diaspora. Despite being weakened, Al Shabaab has not been While there are reasons for optimism, defeated militarily. Although internal fighting within the group in the summer of 2013 serious challenges to Somali peace and stability remain. resulted in the deaths of several key leaders and facilitated the arrest of Hassan Dahir Chapter Three 27

country is enjoying a welcome and rare Poor governance ‘window of opportunity’ that must not be Patterns of governance by formal state squandered (Hammond, 2013). However, structures are weak, corrupt, and de- serious challenges to peace and stability institutionalised, a complaint voiced in focus remain, including: group discussions in all three zones. Nowhere is there strong capacity in civil services below Q The fledgling federal government is heavily the ministerial level, leading to highly dependent on external financial and personalised politics. Government service technical support for its existence. provision, even in core functions of policing Q The federal government is also unable to and the judiciary, is poor to non-existent, and control most of the territory in the southern most basic services – security, adjudication of part of the country and in the absence of disputes, health, education, power, water, even external military support, Al Shabaab would money supply – are provided by the private most likely take control of most of the South sector, non-profits, self-help groups, or once again, as it did after the Ethiopian international aid agencies. withdrawal in 2009. Q The issue of power-sharing in a federal state A primary factor in poor governance is a lack of has still not been addressed effectively in basic consensus on the core ‘rules of the game’ many areas, which means that conflict of politics – constitutions, division of power would not disappear with a defeat of Al between central and local government, systems Shabaab. The central state is still unstable of representation, rules and rights of at its core in the absence of a realistic, citizenship, rule of law, and the role of Islam in widely supported power-sharing agreement. political life – has led to deep contestation and, in many places, political paralysis. Additionally, Despite the recent emergence of an ‘elite the capacity of formal governmental structures political settlement’ at the federal level which across the three zones is weak in part because has set in motion a process of formulating a of very modest budgets, and hence an inability new structure of disseminating political power, to fund much beyond intermittent salaries for violence and instability remain an important the large security forces they nominally control. consideration of everyday life for the vast Chronic shortages of human resources – majority of the Somali population. Insecurity trained, experienced civil servants, especially in presents a substantial threat to humanitarian positions requiring technical expertise – are and development conditions and operations, also a factor in weak capacity. affecting the well-being of marginalised groups and, in particular, youth. Even in areas of Weak capacity tells only part of the story of relative stability, the attention and resources for poor governance. A lack of political will also the generation of employment opportunities, matters. As in so many other conflict-affected the expansion of basic social service delivery, settings, certain Somali political and economic the promotion of youth participation and other elites benefit from the perpetuation of a core elements of socio-economic recovery are government that exists in theory but not in negatively affected by the persistence of both practice. Their interests are served by de- low-level and pervasive insecurity and conflict. institutionalising government and keeping key political activities informal and beyond the scrutiny of an effective system of rule of law Cross-Cutting Themes (Englebert, 2000). In this setting, state building itself can undermine peace, security, Despite the considerable variations in the and good governance. Reform becomes much history, context, and conflict across the three more problematic, as it can threaten zones, a number of conditions are present entrenched economic and power structures. across SCZ, Puntland, and Somaliland. These The situation is made more critical by the constitute a wider context at the aggregate overall reluctance of the international level. This section highlights the most community to shift its assistance from short- significant. term, quick-fix programming to the long-term development processes required to facilitate 28 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context state building and good governance in conflict- throughout the three zones and can be affected contexts like Somalia. mobilised quickly when communal tensions arise. Private security forces, both domestic For external actors seeking to support state and foreign, are rapidly expanding in size and building and peacebuilding efforts in Somalia capacity. These include militias answering to and Somaliland, providing assistance without individual political figures in government. triggering conflict over resources or Armed criminal groups, including pirates, have strengthening corruption has been one of the long been a problem and often move freely in most vexing problems. It has led to high rates and out of other armed groups. Government of failure in efforts to build institutional capacity security forces are generally under weak and to a protracted debate over when and command and control. They are organised whether to work through state structures, along clan lines, answering to commanders however corrupt and inefficient, or around state whose primary responsibility is to their clan, structures in the name of efficiency and not the government. In this sense, most of the effectiveness (Menkhaus, 2008). government security forces today are in essence clan militias ‘hatted’ as defense forces. Informal local governance Except for Somaliland, clashes between Informal local governance arrangements remain different government security forces are the primary source of protection and rule of law common and predatory behaviour on the part across all of Somalia (Menkhaus, 2006/7). of government security forces is an enduring Even in areas controlled by Al Shabaab, part of the Somali security landscape. customary law administered by clan elders is sometimes permitted, as Al Shabaab lacks the Conflict micro-climates capacity to directly govern much of its thinly A common feature of the security context populated rural areas. Municipalities have across Somalia is enormous local variation in proven to be among the most effective, conditions. In some cases, villages and districts legitimate, and resilient forms of local in relatively close proximity have dramatically government, and typically rely on a hybrid different conflict settings. This is particularly arrangement involving mayors, elders, true in Mogadishu, where some businesspeople, women’s groups, and neighbourhoods have had a reputation for professionals. Local governance arrangements relative security while profound levels of vary in capacity and legitimacy but have violence have plagued others. At the micro collectively formed a patchwork-quilt of rule of level communities reported their ability to law, in some locations constituting the main manage a wide range of day-to-day conflict, source of protection and security since the but not necessarily to sustain peaceful collapse of the central government in 1991. outcomes because of lack of capacity, records This remains the case even in instances like and in some cases legitimacy. It is crucial to Somaliland, where the government has some understand Somalia’s ‘conflict micro-climates’ capacity and enjoys legitimacy. There, most that emerged from this analysis. criminal cases continue to be negotiated by clan elders under customary law. New ways High risks and a culture of risk aversion forward are required where the informal can For almost every collective endeavour – work hand in hand with the formal state including state building, peacebuilding, structures in a collaborative form of governance. humanitarian operations, development work, and private sector investment – many areas in Proliferation of armed groups the across the three zones, particularly in SCZ Autonomous armed groups are ubiquitous in are considered a ‘non-permissive environment’ Somalia and constitute a critical feature of the and are replete with risks. These include: Somali political and security context (Menkhaus, 2010). Of these, the most Q Security risks: the threat of assassination, dangerous and discussed is Al Shabaab which criminal violence, kidnapping, armed numbers several thousand Somalis and foreign conflict; fighters and has links with the global terrorist Q Investment risks: the threat of land group Al Qaeda. Clan militias also exist disputes, lack of insurance, corruption, Chapter Three 29

extortion, disrupted commerce due to armed of political, business, and civic leadership in conflict, uncertainty and poor market Somalia today. It is also the main source of information; and private capital and investment, operators of Q Political risks: the threat of personal attacks, almost all of the Somali websites. In this way, political paralysis, corruption, clan disputes, they serve as gatekeepers of much of the news and spoilers. and information from the country and the repository of most of the country’s professional A high threshold for risk and willingness to expertise. Members of the diaspora have accept high failure rates is required in Somalia. played both positive and negative roles in Acceptance of risk by investors has been Somali conflicts. Some have been critical in balanced by a demand for quick and preferably creating, funding, or participating in efforts to higher returns on their investment, which has build peace or mediate conflicts (Hammond, been translated into an exploitative culture that 2011). Others have stoked clan animosities, has unfortunately now found its way into basic fund-raised for armed groups, or supported Al services, such as education and health. Most Shabaab in some way. It is important to note local actors have adapted to this environment the ‘diasporisation’ of Somalia and the fact that by embracing risk-averse strategies. Risk- Somalis holding citizenship elsewhere now aversion is common in conflict-affected settings dominate the political and economic scene in which feature high levels of danger and the country, both for better and for worse. uncertainty, but it creates a context that is not conducive to peacebuilding which requires Enduring radicalisation risk-taking. Peacebuilding programmes that Somalia’s protracted crisis of state failure, help local actors manage, reduce, or at least fragmentation, foreign intervention, and armed anticipate risks are thus critical. conflict has produced many local responses, one of which has been a dramatic rise in Uneven development adherents to some form of radical Islamic All three zones of Somalia are starkly divided ideology or violent extremism. While the most into core and peripheral areas, a fact that violent of these, Al Shabaab, appears to have respondents consistently emphasised. Core peaked in its popular support and areas are the site of the main urban centres, attractiveness to disaffected Somalis in 2008, wealth, investment, and commerce. These it remains a powerful force, not only as a jihadi areas enjoy better infrastructure and services. movement but also as the vessel through The peripheral areas typically are remote, rural, which radical political and social sentiments extremely poor, and have few services. As a are expressed and refined. Even if Al Shabaab result, they generate flows of destitute migrants as an organisation shrinks or collapses, the into the core areas, the so-called ‘urban drift’. radical sentiments it has both expressed and The periphery also serves as the main base stoked will continue to contribute to a socio- today for armed groups, including Al Shabaab political context of polarisation, extremism, and and pirate cells. An additional dynamic of propensity for violence, particularly given that economic stratification in Somalia is occurring most of their grievances are global in nature within urban areas – namely, a sharp and and are linked to the perceived targeting of growing gap between rich and poor. This tends Islam following 9/11. to manifest itself in Somali discourse as the gap between the Somali diaspora and the rest of the population and is cited as a source of A Theoretical Understanding growing resentment. of Somali Conflict

Diaspora Based on the findings of the analysis and the As a contextual factor, Somalia’s extraordinarily collective experience of conflict and peace large diaspora – now estimated at 1.5 million throughout the three Somali zones, the CPSA people, or about 15% of the total population – team developed a general theoretical has come to play an outsized role in the understanding of the Somali conflict that has country’s politics, economy, and peace and informed the zonal analysis presented in conflict trends. The diaspora is the main source subsequent chapters. In such a complex 30 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Figure 3: The Multi-Conflict System of Somalia

context, collusion and shifting alliances make far from capturing the full reality of conflict and it exceedingly difficult for external actors to peace in the three Somali zones, attempts to map conflict lines with any degree of certainty; present a macro-level picture of the variety of however, broadly speaking, it is possible to actors and factors that make up the conflict categorize a range of distinct conflict drivers at there. This approach provides a clearer the aggregate level. These interrelated drivers perspective of the reality of conflict for many have, at times, acted independent of one Somalis, in that conflict is an interconnected another while at others have been caused by web of separate causalities that coalesce at or mutually reinforced one another. They various points to spawn conflict, which defy include: any attempt at rigid definition.

Q Local clan-based conflicts over resources; Q Politically-instigated clan conflicts over A Synthesis of Findings positions in peace talks or government; Q Warlord-driven violence; The context and the CPSA’s theoretical Q Clashes between rival business interests; understanding of the Somali conflict paints Q Direct and indirect external armed a picture of a country burdened with intervention; and extraordinarily complex, challenging conditions Q Jihadi violence, including armed clashes and a high vulnerability to armed conflict and between rival factions of Al Shabaab. insecurity. Almost all of the known conditions 7 that render a country susceptible to renewed Over the past decade an impressive Rather than being seen as a linear conflict or persistent armed conflict are present and body of research has been produced 7 on predictors of civil war. For a between Al Shabaab and AMISOM/government in some instances deeply rooted in Somalia. detailed recent synthesis of this forces, the situation in Somalia, therefore, can A recent study forecasting the future of fragile literature, see the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011, be categorised a ‘Multi-Conflict System’ as states in Africa concluded that Somalia is one Conflict, Security, and Development expressed in Figure 3. This concept, while still of ten states most likely to remain highly fragile (World Bank, 2011). Chapter Three 31

until 2050 and that it is caught in a set of This is stated with the caveat that most conflict mutually reinforcing conflict drivers – the drivers can, under the right circumstances, so-called ‘conflict trap’(Cilliers & Sisk, 2013).8 contribute to peacebuilding. For instance, land and water access has long been a platform for The findings of this CPSA did not produce routinised cooperation between clans as much substantial evidence to challenge this as it has been a resource over which groups pessimistic conclusion. They did reinforce have fought. Therefore, understanding a given the obvious point that the ‘core’ regions of context is critical in determining when these Somaliland remain an important exception structural factors are in fact sources of conflict. to prevailing conditions in the rest of Somalia. As for the rest of Somalia, even in the A few critical systemic causes of conflict10 are honeymoon period of guarded optimism that present across the three zones and, given their followed the establishment of the post- importance in understanding the Somali transitional government of President Hassan conflict and context, are explored more Sheikh Mohamoud in the fall of 2012, most thoroughly in the following section. analyses cautioned that Somalia would remain vulnerable to a host of different conflict threats Legacy of the civil war despite, and in some instances because of, Any discussion of structural factors which perceived progress on the political front.9 predispose Somalia to armed conflict must The findings of the CPSA supported these first acknowledge that twenty-five years of state conclusions. collapse and war have transformed Somali politics and society and are at the heart of the Under these circumstances, the fact that most ‘conflict trap’. The observation that “the single communities across the country have been greatest predictor of a civil war is a previous able to maintain at least a minimal amount of civil war” is especially relevant in the Somali peace and security most of the time over the case.11 The legacy of civil war includes, among past twenty-four years is remarkable. While other things, large-scale ethnic cleansing and half of the story of Somalia’s long crisis is one displacement in each of the three zones which 8 of war, communal violence, displacement, produced the deeply problematic realities of The “conflict trap” argument was developed in a series of empirical warlordism, jihadism, and state collapse, clan enclaves, clan hegemony over the capital studies for the World Bank by the other half is equally significant – a story Mogadishu, and occupied land. It also left a Paul Collier. See Paul Collier et al, Breaking the Conflict Trap of resilience and adaptation on the part legacy of small arms proliferation, warlordism, (World Bank, 2003). of households, neighbourhoods, towns, deep grievances and polarised clan narratives,

9 and clans, and the hard-earned creation a ‘lost generation’ (now two) without access to See for instance “Conflict Analysis: of pockets of peace. education, destruction or decay of most of the Somalia,” United Nations Political country’s economic infrastructure, the flight of Office for Somalia (October 2013). most of its skilled human resources, and a 10 Structural Drivers of Conflict breakdown of social norms and authority. As defined in Chapter Two, Underlying causes are understood These are all extremely difficult problems to to be conditions or dynamics which In general, interview respondents emphasised reverse, especially because they tend to be increase the propensity for armed violence, but only when other similar structural causes of conflict across self-reinforcing. conditions are present and when a all three zones. First and foremost, they trigger precipitates armed conflict. emphasised resource scarcity and mounting Spoilers and Warlordism 11 pressure on resources. These concerns focused The protracted nature of the Somali crisis is This observation – that 50% of all terminated civil wars since the early principally on rural competition for rangeland, itself a critical underlying factor. The causes 1990s have reignited within five farmland, and water, but included peri-urban of the initial civil war are not the same factors years of a peace accord – was first made in an empirical study by the land, jobs, and control over other resources. that help to perpetuate it. Over time, interests Work Bank. See Paul Collier et al., They also emphasised poverty and in maintaining a state of war, lawlessness, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy unemployment, especially among youth; bad and insecurity can arise, and become spoilers. (Washington: World Bank, 2003). governance; clannism; and the breakdown of This phenomenon is unquestionably relevant Since that study was published, the percentage of post-war countries social norms. These factors – as well as a few in SCZ, and is especially worrisome because slipping back into civil war has that were not highlighted by respondents but it appears to be fusing the interests of several dropped, but, as the current crisis in South Sudan reminds us, the threat which are stressed in secondary sources – are disparate armed groups. is backsliding is still very real. potential contributing causes of armed conflict. 32 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Poverty and Unemployment insecurity on pastoral migration. As a result of Poverty and unemployment are deceptively these two factors, disputes over land and obvious underlying causes of armed conflict natural resources are increasingly spiralling out that require nuanced treatment if they are to of the control of clan elders.13 Easy availability stand up to empirical scrutiny. On the one of small arms has rendered clashes much more hand, the link between deep poverty and high lethal than in the past. Clan disputes over land unemployment with armed conflict appears also have a close relationship to clan politics at straightforward. The combination of the zonal and federal level. Pastoral clashes can desperation, frustration, and lack of options spill over into wider clan tensions politically; provides recruitment opportunities for criminal likewise, political entrepreneurs seeking to gangs, clan militia, insurgencies, or radical foment clan tensions to advance their own extremist or revolutionary groups – in the case political interests have been known to of Somalia, Al Shabaab.12 Not surprisingly, orchestrate clan clashes over land, a poverty and unemployment – or more phenomenon Somalis refer to as ‘remote specifically, worsening poverty and control’ wars. unemployment – are universally cited in conflict analysis frameworks as an underlying source of tension and violence. Respondents A UN study found that nearly half of clashes over during this study were also of one voice in viewing poverty and unemployment as a natural resources in Somalia were concentrated in two structural driver of conflict. of the most poorly governed and arid regions in central Somalia. On the other hand, Somalia was one of the poorest countries in the world in the 1970s and 1980s, yet did not see an explosion of armed criminality or insurgencies during that Interestingly, actual patterns of resource clashes period. Likewise, Somaliland’s economic in Somalia do not correspond with the zones conditions are not much better than in SCZ, where land occupation since 1991 has been but its high unemployment and large most acute. An internal UN study of resource concentrations of the destitute in urban slums conflicts in Somalia found that in 2012 nearly has not to date produced armed conflict or half of all of the 61 communal clashes over high rates of armed criminality. High poverty natural resources that year were concentrated in and unemployment thus render a country or two regions of central Somalia, Hiran and region much more susceptible to armed Galgaduud (UNDSS Somalia, 2013). These are conflict, but do not doom those areas to two poorly governed areas and some of the instability. most arid areas of the country, but not areas where major clan displacement occurred over Resource Scarcity the course of the war. Further study about the This issue preoccupied respondents more than relationship between these factors is warranted. any other conflict driver. Armed clashes over land constitute the main source of conflict in Corruption rural areas, and in some locations occur on a The link between corruption in Somalia – which weekly basis. It troubles clan elders, is the is arguably as bad as anywhere in the world – subject of intense public discussion, and is one and armed conflict is also worth unpacking. 12 of the main reasons why history – more Corruption in governments and, in some cases, In the terminology of the conflict specifically, historical claims of a clan presence large aid programmes, is one of the top routes literature, high unemployment and desperation reduce the opportunity in rangelands and towns – is a Somali national to amassing great wealth in Somalia. As a costs of joining an armed group. pastime and source of widely divergent result, positions of authority in governments or 13 narratives. Access to pasture and wells is a large aid programmes are not merely desirable Most resource conflicts in rural matter of existential importance to pastoral for a monthly salary, but potentially act as a Somalia are over rangelands, but in some places clan disputes clans. At the same time, resources are catchment point where thousands or even over farmland are equally acute. becoming increasingly scarce due to a variety millions of dollars can be siphoned off, with The long-running tensions between the Gadabursi and Isaaq clans over of factors ranging from overuse of rangelands benefits accruing both to the political leader and farmland near Gabiley in Somaliland to private enclosures and the effect of his or her clan. This dramatically increases the are an example. Chapter Three 33

Shabaab) does not correspond to armed Endemic corruption in Somalia has a corrosive effect conflict and violence. Conditions of relative peace have obtained in some peripheral areas on governmental legitimacy and public trust where no government presence exists, or where the local ‘government’ is no larger in which are major challenges for the Somali federal government scale than a municipality. Conversely, some of the most dangerous conflict flashpoints are in and some regional administrations. areas where governments exist but are too weak to impose rule of law and disarm armed non-state actors. As the experience of state building in Somaliland and Puntland shows, stakes in securing a place at the table in the transitional phase from collapsed state to governments and employment in aid agencies institutionalised government is likely to be as and contractor companies. This in turn prone to armed conflict as was the period of increases the risk that positions of power or complete state collapse, as interests are employment are seen in strictly zero-sum threatened by the building of a state capacity. terms, with those shut out instantly becoming This process remains true in SCZ and at the rejectionists or spoilers. In these federal level as well. circumstances, political elites mobilise their clans to protest or oppose selection outcomes Clannism with the use of force. Were corruption to be As an underlying source of conflict, clannism is reduced, armed mobilisation of clans over the the most complex of the factors raised by composition of regional and national respondents. Clannism has played a central governments would be less likely. role in the worst of the armed conflict that has taken place in Somalia. There are several Endemic corruption in Somalia also has a reasons why it has been so interrelated to corrosive effect on governmental legitimacy and conflict in each of the three zones: on public trust, both of which are major challenges for the SFG and some regional Q It can be too easily mobilised to armed authorities. Low legitimacy and trust make it conflict by unscrupulous leaders to advance harder for government to assume a needed role parochial agendas; in public security and the rule of law. Q It is a major obstacle to national unity; Q It is the purveyor of polarising, chauvinistic State Failure narratives; Findings from the zonal analyses pointed to Q It is at the heart of the deep political state failure – the inability of the state to divisions over federalism in Somalia today; provide basic security, law, and services – as and an important underlying cause of conflict. This Q It is a major contributor to low levels of trust perception mirrors a commonly held view in and reciprocity in Somalia. the wider literature on state building, state failure, and armed conflict that conflates state The clan is also the basis for many of the failure with violent anarchy. The reality in the systems and structures in place in Somalia that three Somali zones is slightly different. In some provide basic law and protection, however locations, the complete absence of a formal imperfect. Customary law, or xeer, that is so political authority with coercive and legal critical in managing local disputes, is clan- power (whether central government, a regional based and negotiated by clan elders. Diya or state, or a quasi-state authority such as Al blood compensation serves as both the foundation of compensational justice and as a powerful deterrent to violence and it too is The clan is the basis for many of the systems and structures clan-based. The commitment of clans to protect and avenge their own is a further that provide basic law and protection in Somali communities. disincentive to violence, and the propensity of clans to form alliances of convenience tends to create a local balance of power and a high 34 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context degree of uncertainty about the consequences possible underlying source of armed conflict, of armed attack. a situation that peacekeeping operations elsewhere have experienced. Whether tapped for peaceful or violent purposes, clannism is a more dominant driver Foreign armed presence also includes of political behaviour and public discourse in Al Shabaab’s foreign jihadis in Al Shabaab and Somali politics today than in the period the Ethiopian and Kenyan forces currently in between 2000-2010, when other affiliations SCZ operating in collaboration with AMISOM and identities also constituted an organising forces. The US has also periodically launched force in the country. For external actors, direct attacks against Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab clannism constitutes a dilemma, especially leaders in Somalia, both by drones and with when questions of resource allocation and covert operations. The French military representation arise. To ignore clan is to invite conducted a fatal rescue attempt of a French disaster, as representation, employment, intelligence agent who had been kidnapped contracts, and resource distribution that by Al Shabaab. Additionally, over two dozen unequally benefit one clan can quickly trigger nations are part of anti-piracy naval patrols violence. Conversely, to explicitly recognise with the right to enter Somali waters. the clan as the basis of representation and resource allocation institutionalises and reinforces the very identity that most Proximate Drivers of Conflict Somalis view as part of the problem. Respondents struggled with this conflict Exclusionary Politics variable, frequently citing factors normally Despite practices such as the ‘4.5 formula’14 associated with structural causes. As a result, and other power-sharing arrangements, too this section of the CPSA draws more heavily often power-sharing has been on paper only, on secondary sources than findings from the with one clan or alliances of clans dominating fieldwork. The proximate drivers tend to be regional and national governments while relatively universal, and less context-specific, others are marginalised. This combination than many other conflict drivers. In of promised but unfulfilled power sharing contemporary Somalia, five are especially contributes to clan rejectionism and creates prominent. an environment conducive to armed clashes. Criminality Foreign Armed Presence First, criminal acts are a major conflict trigger, Somalia’s profound political weakness, and are especially likely to provoke armed combined with the top-level security threats it conflict when tensions are already high poses to regional and global actors (including between two lineages and when clan elders terrorism, piracy, and refugee flows), has are slow or incompetent in addressing the meant that the Somali context features heavy crisis. This trigger is impossible to predict. foreign occupation and external influence. This is most visible today in the form of the Misallocation of Resources 17,000 AMISOM peacekeepers in southern A second common conflict trigger is Somalia. At present AMISOM has an essential misallocation of resources – jobs, contracts, role in providing protection and stability in positions of power, services and representation southern Somalia, but, as a general rule, – in ways that appear to privilege one clan prolonged foreign armed presence in Somalia over another. This is also more likely to inflame produces discontent and eventually armed political protest and recourse to threats or acts attacks by Somali groups. A long-term of violence when tensions are already high commitment by AMISOM in support of and trust low. the federal government risks making the 14 peacekeeping force a lightning rod for armed Elections The ‘4.5 formula’ is a formal policy rejectionist groups. Thus, AMISOM is in the Elections in countries in transition and in post- of proportional representation, according positions to each clan paradoxical position of serving simultaneously conflict settings are always potential triggers of to ensure what is perceived as as a critical source of stabilisation and a armed conflict, as they determine the core inclusivity. Chapter Three 35

question of ‘Who rules?’ in a setting where that territory have created newly liberated space very question had previously been answered over which clans are likely to fight. Other by force of arms. Elections are a relatively current trends include: new conflict trigger in Somalia. Elections in Somaliland and more recently Puntland have Q Al Shabaab’s expansion of its target base raised tensions to worrisome levels, but to date towards soft targets – shopping areas, have not resulted in significant political restaurants, and hotels, especially those violence. populated by foreigners and what it considers ‘apostate’ Somalis – appears to be a tactic of Federalism choice for the group and is likely to continue. The ongoing, unresolved, and highly volatile It has also expanded its foreign targets to dispute over federalism is a driver of potential include humanitarian agencies. which may remain local but with national ripple effects. This has been most clearly in Q Initially high hopes that the post-transition evidence in the past year in Beledweyne and government would deliver rapid progress in Kismayo. In Bedelweyne, an attempt by the security, development, and services have central government to unilaterally appoint a faded as President Mohamoud’s governor provoked an armed response locally. administration has been beset by political In Kismayo, the unilateral declaration of a paralysis, infighting, corruption allegations, Jubbaland state by the Ras Kamboni Brigade and still more turnover at high levels (IRIN, militia, with ties to the Ogaden clan, after it 2014; Heritage Institute, 2013). This trend captured the port city attracted armed is not likely to reverse itself in the near resistance from multiple quarters in 2013. future, and contributes to a general climate of disaffection and desperation that can be Conflict Mismanagement exploited by armed groups. Finally, respondents pointed to a generic but important proximate driver of armed conflict, Q Security conditions in Mogadishu, which ‘mismanagement of tensions’. What they meant initially improved after the Al Shabaab partial by this is that political leadership in Somalia withdrawal in 2011, have deteriorated, usually has the capacity to prevent armed thanks to a combination of Al Shabaab conflict after a ‘trigger’ incident, through early terrorism and ineffective government security. and effective intervention and negotiation, and There are at present no strong reasons to reassuring gestures, but that some clan and anticipate a reversal of this trend in the next political leaders are ineffective. Conflict year or two. mismanagement can also be more insidious – the intentional stoking of clan animosities by Q The wave of Somali investment in political or clan leaders to advance their own Mogadishu after Al Shabaab’s partial interests. When the latter occurs, armed withdrawal in mid-2011 has levelled off, in clashes are virtually inevitable. response to continued terrorist attacks and more sober local assessments of security and governance trends. Current Conflict Trends Q Kismayo was the most dangerous conflict With few exceptions, there is at present a much flashpoint in 2013, and continues to be a lower risk of large-scale, sustained armed fault line. But the interim administration conflict in the three Somali zones. Instead, they brokered there appears to be holding, and remain very vulnerable to continued low- the administration is broad-based, so is less intensity conflict and periodic terrorist attacks. vulnerable to defections and rejectionism. The possible exceptions to this rule are: (1) Insecurity is still high in the city, however. Kismayo if the current pact there falls apart; (2) This, combined with Al Shabaab’s continued the disputed areas of Sool and Sanaag which occupation of most of the Jubba Valley up to have already seen sustained militia clashes in parts of Gedo region, renders an important the past year; and (3) the Lower Shabelle and very vulnerable part of southern Somalia region, where AMISOM efforts to capture new largely off-limits to aid work and investment. 36 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Q Deterioration in security conditions in Q Urban drift continues to accelerate Middle and Lower Shabelle, a combination throughout the three Somali zones, as of Al Shabaab attacks and clan clashes destitute rural dwellers crowd into peri-urban over land and power, does not appear to be slums. This is a long-term trend but one easily reversed in the short term, and which dramatically spiked during the 2010- poses a real threat to agriculture and food 12 famine, and created new risks for armed security in Somalia’s breadbasket. In the conflict. The expansion of large numbers of wake of the major 2011 famine, Somali unemployed, very poor, mainly illiterate, and authorities and the international marginalised populations in urban slums community must be mindful of the impact has facilitated recruitment by armed groups chronic insecurity has on food production of all types. there.

Q AMISOM operations to liberate towns in Lower Shabelle from Al Shabaab is likely to heighten tensions between Digle-Mirifle clans, which view Lower Shebelle as part of a wider clan territory they claim as their historic land, and other clans, including the Bimaal and Habir-Gedir Ayr, which have their own ambitions and claims to land and power.

Q The international commitment to stabilisation operations in SCZ has, despite a somewhat disappointing year, increased, in terms of the number of peacekeepers deployed, security sector training and support, and financial support for state building and development.

Q Insecurity continues to spread northwards into Puntland, a trend that has been in evidence for a number of years. It is the result of a combination of a shift in Al Shabaab’s focus, rising clan tensions, unemployment, the move of ex-pirates into criminal activity inland, regional elections, and the bid for autonomy by Khatuumo state in the Sool region. To date this insecurity has been manageable for Puntland, but is placing the region under growing strain.

Q Armed tensions and periodic clashes between the self-declared Khatuumo state authorities, Puntland, and Somaliland show no prospect for resolution and are certain to continue to destabilise portions of Sool region. This dispute has political costs for both Somaliland and Puntland, and human costs for the local population, but is largely contained in a remote area. 37

Chapter Four 39 Chapter Four

Analysis of South Central Zone 40 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

his chapter presents the analysis of the Tconflict in the South Central Zone (SCZ) of South Central Zone is home to approximately 6 million people Somalia. The main findings are based upon a review of the relevant secondary documents, – the highest concentration of the Somali population. as well as interviews with stakeholders and experts in Nairobi and Mogadishu. They also draw from 243 focus group interviews conducted in thirty-four communities in seven home to Somalia’s two river valleys — the locations across the zone. The first section of Jubba and the Shabelle — and their fertile this chapter sets out the context and general agricultural land. The Jubba River flows into history of the conflict in SCZ. The second the Indian Ocean at the strategic seaport of provides a chronology of conflict in the zone. Kismayo, one of the main economic hubs of Sections Three and Four discuss the situational the zone. With such a large amount of arable and location conflict dynamics, while in land within the zone, agriculture is one of the Section Five the structural and proximate key drivers of the economy in the zone and at drivers of conflict in SCZ are presented. Finally, the national level, providing livelihoods to Section Six discusses and analyses the key approximately sixty-five per cent of the conflict actors. population (African Development Bank Group (ADBG), 2013). Siad Barre’s socialist government implemented significant portions Context of its economic development strategy in Southern Somalia consists of eleven regions southern Somalia in part because of its and fifty-six districts, excluding the region of importance as the country’s breadbasket (US Banadir, where Mogadishu, the nation’s capital Library of Congress, n.d.). Unfortunately, much is located. A vast area of territory between of the infrastructure that supported agricultural South Galkacyo in the Mudug region and production in South Central linked to what has Kenya border, it has a long Indian Ocean been called the breadbasket of the country coastline in the east and shares a border with have been destroyed in the decades of fighting Ethiopia in the northwest. Unlike the other two in the region, undermining one of the zones included in this conflict analysis, South traditional pillars of the Somali economy. Most Central is not a separate administrative entity of the economy in the zone is concentrated in or independent state; however, with Mogadishu the informal sector, with most people working located there, the southern provinces of as petty traders, livestock, or grain producers, Somalia are universally considered to be a while a small group of businessmen have a strategically and politically important region. As monopoly on the more lucrative international a result, South Central tends to dominate the trade networks (ADBG, 2013). attention of the international community. The zone has also been the most contested and The political and social life of southern Somalia troubled part of the country since 1991, the is diverse, with conflict and peace varying epicentre of periodic war, population dramatically within the zone. With the displacement, famine, violent criminality, state collapse of the central state, governance failure, land disputes, international devolved to the local administrative level. In intervention, highly polarized political the intervening period, local information narratives, and in recent years violent political structures arose from coalitions of extremism in the form of Al Shabaab. Trends traditional elders, businessmen, and civic and events in the past two years have only organizations, providing communities with a reinforced this reputation. level of security, governance, and often social services (Menkhaus, 2007). In this way, while South Central is home to the highest successive attempts at forming a central state concentration of the Somali population — failed over the past two decades, localized approximately six million people, who come governance throughout the zone was able to mainly from the Darod, Digil, Rahanweyn, and assume some of the role vacated by the central Hawiye clans, as well as some minority ethnic government. groups like the Bantu (Lewis, 1993). It is Chapter Four 41

Chronology of Conflict Farah Aidid, targeted UN peacekeepers and US troops that were part of the humanitarian Somalia gained its independence in 1960, mission. In response, the US undertook unifying what had been the Italian colonies military operations against Aidid’s militia, that were the southern and north-east regions which culminated in a bloody battle on the with the British protectorate of Somaliland. It streets of Mogadishu in late 1993. Lack of experienced nearly a decade of relative stability support for continued military operations in the before its second President Abdirashid Ali country brought the withdrawal of US troops in Shermarke was assassinated in 1969. A early 1994. The UN mission concluded a year military cout d’etat followed a few days later later without bringing an end to the conflict and Colonel Siad Barre became president. that had transformed into warfare between Following nearly a decade of development and clan-based militias in Mogadishu and much of nationalist strategy, Barre attempted to achieve the South Central Zone. his goal of unifying historically ethnic Somali lands with an invasion of the Ogaden region of The struggle for political control and economic Ethiopia in 1977. The invasion was repelled power between clan-based warlords continued by an international force and the Somali army in the capital and the southern regions for met a humiliating and costly defeat in 1978. several years after the withdrawal of the UN The defeat served as the catalyst for the birth mission. While conflict continued, repeated of formal groups opposed to Barre’s rule, efforts to establish a central government failed, beginning with a failed coup attempt shortly while politicians jockeyed for power and after the Ogaden war by military officers from influence. In August 2000, the Transitional the Marjerteen clans from what is now National Government (TNG) was created in Puntland. Djibouti; however, it faced strong opposition with most Somalis. Four years later, the Clan based opposition groups formed in the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) north east region and Somaliland the years that replaced it. Initially, the TFG was a government followed and Barre began a cruel and bloody in exile in Kenya due to the ongoing violent crackdown. After an alliance with the Somali conflict between militias in the capital then National Movement (SNM) for several years, moved to Baidoa, a town located north-west of Hawiye clan elders in the south formed the Mogadishu. United Somali Congress (USC) in 1987 and continued the armed opposition to Barre’s In July 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), increasingly autocratic rule. Increasing military a group of Sharia courts seized control of pressure by the opposition groups in the south Mogadishu, defeating the US-backed group of and Mogadishu led to the fall of Barre’s secular warlords, the Alliance for the government in early 1991. In the immediate Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism aftermath of the collapse of the central state, (ARPCT). The ICU quickly took control over different factions of the USC began a fight for large parts of the southern region, confiscating control of Mogadishu. Although a cease- weapons from the warlords and integrating agreement was agreed in in the summer of their militias into their military (Roggio, 2007). 1991, a few months later the conflict Their short rule was the most peaceful the recommenced. southern part of Somalia had experienced in years; however, this stability came at the price: One of the chief impacts of the conflict was the the group imposed a strict interpretation of destruction of the agriculture in southern Islam, banning cigarettes and khat and closing Somalia, which led to a massive food shortage down soccer fields and theatres. in which approximately 250,000 people died of famine-related causes (BBC, 2013). The Ethiopian troops in support of the TFG invaded international humanitarian response by the Somalia in December 2006, defeating the ICU, United Nations in 1992-1993 was estimated taking control of Mogadishu and other key to have saved 100,000 lives (Clarke and southern cities. The TFG moved to Mogadishu Herbst, 1996). However, one of the clan-based with the support of Ethiopian and African militias, led by a former USC leader Mohamed Union peacekeeping troops (AMISOM). After 42 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context the defeat of the ICU, Al Shabaab, the group’s hard-line militant youth movement, re-emerged Al Shabaab has intensified its strategy of indiscriminate attacks throughout the south to fight against what they viewed as Ethiopian invaders and the TFG. against international organizations, government offices and staff, Peace talks with some elements of the Islamic Courts led to a peace agreement and a and private businesses. coalition government in 2009. But that peace did not last: Following the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in early 2009, Al Shabaab regained much of the territory lost by the ICU, Major conflicts in South Central are including large parts of Mogadishu and Baidoa, summarized in the timeline presented which was then the seat of the Somali in Table 3. Parliament.

Fighting between Al Shabaab and AMISOM Situational Dynamics troops continued in the capital and Ethiopian and Kenyan troops carrying out military Conflict and peace in Somalia — and the operations against Al Shabaab in areas of South Central Zone in particular — is of strategic importance to their respective significant strategic interest to the security countries. In 2011, a serious drought led to a throughout the region. Ethnic Somalis make up famine and humanitarian crisis in which an significant portions of the population in both of estimated 260,000 Somalis died and South Central’s immediate neighbors, Ethiopia hundreds of thousands were displaced (BBC, and Kenya. Historically, the idea of a ‘Greater 2013; OCHA, 2011). Al Shabaab withdrew Somalia’ which called for the unity of all ethnic unexpectedly from Mogadishu at the height of Somali lands set the tone for relationships the famine, allowing TFG and AMISOM forces between the federal government in Mogadishu to consolidate their control of the capital. and its neighbors following Somali Figure 4: Subsequent military operations by AMISOM independence. Siad Barre sought to unify Greater Somalia Map and TFG troops against Al Shabaab in an (Møller, 2009) attempt to extend the reach of the government’s control to key southern towns met with success, but resulted in additional displacement as residents fled the renewed conflict.

A new central government came into power in August 2012, when the TFG’s mandate ended. The Somali Federal Government (SFG) is the first elected and widely recognized government that Somalia has had in two decades. In the year and a half that the SFG has been in power, AMISOM, Ethiopian, and Kenyan troops, along with SFG forces, have continued their military efforts to defeat Al Shabaab and enforce the government’s control throughout the southern parts of the country. In response, Al Shabaab’s strategy has shifted away from conventional warfare, as the group has intensified its strategy of indiscriminate attacks against international organizations, government offices and staff, and private businesses—both in Somalia and in neighboring countries—as it seeks to undermine the country’s fragile peace and security. Chapter Four 43

Date Event

1960 Somali Independence.

1969 Military coup d’etat led by Colonel Siad Barre is triggered by the assassination of the second Somali president, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke.

1977 War against Ethiopia in its Ogaden Region results in the defeat of Somali Army.

April 1978 Failed coup d’etat attempt by Colonel Mohamed Osman leads to crackdown by Barre’s security forces.

1978 Formation of the opposition group Somali Salvation Front (SOSAF), later renamed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) by Lt. Col. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed.

1979 Formation of the opposition group the Somali National Movement (SNM)

1987 Hawiye clan leaders in the southern regions organized the United Somali Congress (USC).

1991 Barre’s government cracks down on Hawiye clan-based opposition in southern Somalia. The USC’s armed opposition puts increasing pressure on Barre’s regime.

February 1991 Siad Barre’s government collapses.

November 1991 The United Somali Congress, a Hawiye clan-based opposition group, splits into two factions when one of the leaders, Ali Mahdi Muhammad, is declared interim president. General Mohammed Farah Aidid leads the breakaway faction and the two groups fight for control of Mogadishu.

1991–1992 Ongoing conflict in southern Somalia destroyed agriculture, leading to food shortages and the deaths of approximately 300,000 people.

July 1993 Aidid’s militia attacks Pakistani peacekeepers in Mogadishu, killing 24 soldiers.

August 1993 Aidid targets US troops, killing four and injuring seven in two separate attacks. The US creates a special Task Force with the aim to capture Aidid.

October 1993 The US campaign against Aidid culminates in the Battle of Mogadishu. 18 US soldiers were killed, 73 more were injured, and 1 captured. 2 UN peacekeepers were killed and 9 others wounded. It is estimated that over 700 Somalis were killed, 1,500 were wounded, and 21 captured.

March 1994 US forces leave Somalia with Aidid still in control of his militia in Mogadishu.

August 1998 The USC factions, one under Hussein Mohamed Farah Aidid, the other led by Musa Sudi Yalahow, entered a peace agreement with each other, which led to a new split within the group between Yalahow’s faction and former interim President Ali Mahdi Muhammad. Violent conflict continued for control of Mogadishu.

2000–2004 The TNG, formed in Djibouti in May 2000 was the first internationally recognized central government of Somalia. Fight for the control between warlords continues in Mogadishu and throughout the South during this period.

Table 3 (continued on next page): Major Conflicts in South Central Zone 44 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Date Event

2004–2012 The TFG is the official government of Somalia, ruling initially in exile before moving to Baidoa, then to Mogadishu when security permitted. The TFG is the 14th attempt to create a central government in Somalia.

July 2006 The Islamic Courts Union defeats the US-backed Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), a group of Mogadishu warlords.

December 2006 Ethiopian troops defeat the ICU and take control of Mogadishu and other ICU-controlled areas.

2006–2009 Ethiopian troops remain in Somalia to enforce TFG control in Mogadishu and the southern areas. Al Shabaab, what was the militant youth movement of the ICU, emerges as an armed opposition to their presence. They withdraw after a peace agreement between the TFG and elements of the ICU and other groups mandates their withdrawal.

2009–2011 Following the Ethiopian withdrawal, Al Shabaab recaptures nearly all of the area formerly held by the ICU, including much of Mogadishu

July 2010 Al Shabaab attacks two locations in Kampala, Uganda where spectators were watching the FIFA World Cup. Their stated motivation was the fact that Ugandan troops were part of the AMISOM peacekeeping force in Mogadishu.

2011–present AMISOM and TFG, then SNG troops, with the support of Kenyan and Ethiopian troops in different parts of Somalia, successfully push Al Shabaab from key towns to rural areas in the south. While continuing its conventional conflict against government and peacekeeping forces, the group intensifies its strategy of terrorist attacks again international, national, and private targets.

February 2012 Al Shabaab leader Mukhtar Abu al-Zubair ‘Godane’ announced their partnership with Al Qaeda.

September 2012 Hizbul Islam, another Islamic group in Somalia, announces its split with Al Shabaab and its willingness to enter into political negotiations.

2013 Internal fighting within Al Shabaab became violent when Godane orders the execution of four commanders. Godane is eventually detained and is currently in prison in Mogadishu.

April 2013 Al Shabaab gunmen attack the main court complex in Mogadishu, killing 29 civilians.

June 2013 Al Shabaab attacked the presidential palace and the UNDP compound in Mogadishu. 15 people were killed in the attack at the UN offices.

September 2013 Al Shabaab fighters in Kenya attack the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, killing over 72 people in a siege that lasted for 3 days. The stated motivation of the attack was Kenyan troop presence in Kismayo.

January 2014 11 people were killed and 17 injured during a triple bomb attack at the Jazeera Hotel near the airport in Mogadishu. The targets were government officials, including two police commanders.

Table 3 (continued from previous page): Major Conflicts in South Central Zone Chapter Four 45

ethnic Somalis in Kenya and Ethiopia, which Violent clashes erupted there in June 2013, led to chilly and sometimes bellicose relations following the arrest of a government military between Somalia and its neighbors commander by Kenyan forces (Yusuf, 2013). (Nkaisserry, 1997). The situation devolved into conflict between clans, with the KDF allegedly supporting Currently, long-running instability caused by Ahmed Islam Sheikh Madobe’s Ras Kamboni over two decades of violent conflict in the Brigade (Wabala, 2014). In an agreement in South Central Zone and a lack of a strong August 2013, the Somali Federal Government central government with the capacity to enforce recognized the Jubaland administration with the rule of law throughout its territory Madobe as its head (Sisay and Kahlif, 2013). dominates the relationship between Somalia Since that time, the Somali government has and its neighbors along South Central’s border. called for the withdrawal of the KDF from In the past ten years, Ethiopia has repeatedly Kismayo due to its involvement in the conflict sent in military forces into the region to subdue in Kismayo and its support of the Madobe administrations hostile to the TFG or perceived faction (Wabala, 2014). The Kenyan troops as threatening to Ethiopia, as it did against the would be replaced with AMISOM peacekeepers Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006, or to from Sierra Leone, a move which some locals conduct military operations against Al fear would bring renewed fighting, as the Shabaab, as it has since 2010. It also AMISOM force is not seen as militarily strong leverages its position within the region to apply enough to maintain control of the territory now pressure on the Somali government, which can held by the Kenyans (Apa, 2014; Wabala, exacerbate existing divisions in the political 2014). sphere. Similarly, the international community has Similarly, Kenya became directly involved in been deeply involved in Somali politics and its the South Central Zone in October 2011, conflict, even prior to the fall of the Barre conducting military operations against Al government. In the Soviet Union had provided Shabaab in response a string of kidnappings technical advisors, as well as military and Westerners in Kenya allegedly linked to the financial support to the Barre regime as the group (Gettleman, 2011). The kidnappings country pursued a socialist development were damaging the tourism upon which Kenya strategy in the 1970s. Following the start of relies for nearly $1 billion per year and 10% of the Ogaden War in 1977 in which the Soviets its gross domestic product (McGregor, 2013). and Cubans supported the Ethiopian troops Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) attacked the Al against the Somalis, Barre expelled the Soviet Shabaab stronghold in the strategic port of advisors from the country and courted Kismayo in October 2012, taking control of the American support (EIR, 1977). The wider city which provided an important source of tax international community — IGAD, the UN and revenue for Al Shabaab and remaining as part other national governments — was involved in of the AMISOM mandate (CBS, 2012). the numerous attempts to form a viable central government throughout the chaotic years of inter-clan warfare in South Central Somalia (Cornwell, 2004). Military operations against the Al Qaeda-linked Al Shabaab The United States in particular has been – part of the American global ‘War on Terror’ – playing a significant role in the conflict in southern Somalia for many years, supporting add an international dimension to an already complex an anti-Islamist militia consortium in Mogadishu, which was defeated by the ICU in conflict dynamic, drawing international fighters to the country 2006 (Mazzetti, 2006). They also supported the Ethiopian takeover of Mogadishu and and providing those who feel their religion and society southern Somalia in late 2006. Since then, the US military has conducted a low-level, covert are under attack evidence to support their view. operations campaign of drone strikes and Special Forces operations, most recently an 46 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context unsuccessful attack against an Al Shabaab process. It is also important to stress that this stronghold in Baraawe, a coastal town south of model seeks to broadly typify violence in the Mogadishu, and a drone strike that killed an Al region and although the trends highlighted Shabaab intelligence officer (Londoño and below are nonetheless generally present across Wilson, 2013; The Associated Press, 2014). the zone, each of the individual locations Military operations in Somalia against the Al within southern Somalia experiences variations Qaeda-linked Al Shabaab — part of the in the way that their individual ‘conflict- American global ‘War on Terror — add an mechanisms’ are structured. international dimension to an already complex conflict dynamic, drawing international fighters Point 1 on the diagram depicts the core- to the country and providing those who feel internal logic of this mechanism of conflict and their religion and society are under attack the way it is perpetuated. The cyclic evidence to support their view. relationship between insecurity and the need for protection from violence and marginalisation creates an emphasis on group Location Dynamics relations, such as belonging to a clan and/or militia. In a context of insecurity, this process Within South Central Zone, the conflict engenders emergent norms of violence—where dynamics are variable and quite complex; violence is utilised by individuals and groups arising from a conflict has gone through several as a ‘normal’ recourse to achieve their own transformations over the past twenty-seven aims. This process often increases the years. The extended period of violent conflict presence of violence and then leads to further has led to the destruction of both the physical insecurity. In Jubaland for example, it is clear infrastructure and to a great extent the way that that the perpetuation of violence is more than a social systems worked within the zone.15 To ‘surface’ manifestation and events such as the present the conflict dynamics in southern latest rounds of clan fighting in Kismayo Somalia, one must first begin at the nexus demonstrate how violent conflict as means to between violence and ordered social reality, or resolve differences has become ingrained into a the regimentation of violence. In southern cyclical process that perpetuates itself. Somalia, systemic violence over more than two decades has undermined the social fabric and Point 2 indicates how the above process builds has become a norm unto itself. Indeed, it is the into the government’s general lack of capacity fundamental damage that has occurred to the to: social systems that has allowed violence to become ingrained in the ways that people Q Establish itself as the sole arbitrator of interact, becoming a self-reinforcing cycle. This disputes; does not imply that Somali society before the Q Dominate the use of violence; and fall of the Barre regime was without conflict or Q Instigate effective mechanisms for service violence; however, it does argue that the on- provision and resource distribution. going violent conflict in southern Somalia in particular has eroded the traditional conflict The use of violence dispute resolution tool management mechanisms and has reinforced undermines the implementation of any the conflict. The propagation of this cycle has coherent method of ordering society, while the led to what can tentatively be labelled a emphasis on clan-groups and private militias ‘conflict-mechanism’, to emerge in South further propagates the inability for governance Central Somalia. structures to achieve any degree of sustainability. This can be seen in South Figure 5 is an exploration of this conflict Galkacyo, as the cyclic nature of violence in mechanism. As previously stated, the conflict that city that has continued for decades has 15 dynamics and the way they manifest undermined the ability of central governance Information drawn from discussions with Somali themselves on the social fabric in southern structures to operate effectively. researchers during initial briefing Somalia are uniquely complex; therefore, this sessions in Mogadishu, Somalia, 1-2 April 2013, diagram is merely a model that attempts to The regional interests, as highlighted by Point and Hargeisa, Somaliland, encapsulate a fluid and changing social 3, build into the continued process of 30 May 2013. Chapter Four 47

Figure 5: Conflict Mechanism in South Central Zone

insecurity. This can be clearly seen in several violence. Conflict damages or destroys the locations throughout the zone. For example, in ability for resources to be effectively distributed, Kismayo, with the KDF forces’ support of the which speeds resource depletion. The result is Ras Kamboni Brigade’s bid to create an a reinforced cycle of a lack of resources independent state of Jubaland during the war continues. This dynamic is present particularly that erupted between clan militias there in June in strategic urban economic setting like 2013. Kenyan involvement, even if it were Mogadishu and Kismayo, where competing indirect, has caused continuing violence and warlords seek to dominate the lucrative port perpetuated insecurity. It further illustrates how areas and/or service provision. Coupled with the intervention of regional actors –ostensibly standing private armies and norms of violence, for the prevention of insecurity – actually fights over resources have destroyed much of propagates the cycles of violence. Furthermore, the infrastructure in southern Somalia, Ethiopia’s interventions – notably in 2006, especially in Mogadishu, leading to increased where it invaded to combat the Islamic Courts pressures on resources. While this dynamic is Union and its continuing see-saw border-region particularly acute in urban areas, especially the battles with Al Shabaab – have also fed into ports, it also is present in rural areas, where this process of continuing violence. competition over resources such as cattle, farmland or natural resources are prevalent. The conflict dynamic around resources is captured in Point 4. Here, as the diagram Finally, Point 5 captures the relationship that shows, the lack of access to resources, the highlighted ‘conflict-mechanism’ has with alongside standing norms of violence, leads to what has been termed the ‘high-profile 48 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context events/actors.’ The latter of these points are largely covered further on in this conflict In South Central, there are a number of separate micro-contexts analysis as ‘structural and proximate variables’ and ‘conflict actors’. Essentially, the distinction exhibiting separate conflict patterns and dynamics. that has been created in this diagram (demonstrated by the large dotted circle) is that of understanding how the mechanism of conflict itself comes into fruition. Thereby, this Kismayo mechanism distinguishes between high-level political events and actors and the Jubaland is a region rich in natural resources, development of a system of conflict that with good seasonal rainfall, year-round rivers, perpetuates itself independently from outside forests used for charcoal production, and farm influence. Simply put, this circle is the internal land. There are also potential offshore oil and logic of the conflict mechanism and a group gas deposits. Lower Juba is regarded as like Al Shabaab is as much an output as it is a arguably the agriculturally richest Somali contributing factor to its perpetuation. The region, with its combination of fertile soil, same is also true of international interventions grazing land and marine resources (Heritage and other external events such as Al Shabaab’s Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS), 2013). The attacks in Uganda and Kenya, which only regional claims to Jubaland are extremely reinforce the conflict-mechanism. complex as clan factions fight over the current and future distribution of resources. Armed While this mechanism captures the dynamics groups seek to control the strategic sea and of conflict in southern Somalia as a zone, its airports to collect duties and receive supplies. manifestations vary widely within South In the struggle to control these assets different Central, with certain aspects more pronounced groups abuse military power and seek to in some areas than in others. There is a high marginalize opposing communities to limit degree of variability within the locations, as competition. The more vulnerable members of well between the three zones that were society — the extremely poor, displaced, and surveyed as part of this conflict analysis. marginalized — suffer particularly as a There is relative stability in many areas across consequence. both Somaliland and Puntland so in these zones the analysis is organised thematically. Although Jubaland includes Gedo and Middle For example, conflict and peace in Puntland Juba, control of Lower Juba and the port of can be demarcated between the ‘core’ and Kismaayo is at the heart of the region’s conflict. ‘periphery’ areas of the semi-autonomous state, Kismayo is the region’s capital and serves as with specific variables are at operation in the gateway to this area’s wealth of resources. disparate geographic areas. This approach, The cosmopolitan city of Kismayo is dominated however, is not conducive to explaining the by clans by Darod/Harti, Darod/Marehan, and conflict-mechanism in South Central. In this various Hawiye communities, while the areas zone there are a number of separate micro- outside the city are home mainly to the contexts exhibiting separate conflict patterns Darod/Ogaden clans and a mixture of Hawiye, and dynamics that do not lend themselves to other smaller clans, and ethnic minority groups the same type of analysis employed with the like the Bantu (ICG, 2013). The area has a other two zones. Ascribing a thematic analysis history of inter-clan conflict between two main to the primary data from South Central would clan-based warlords, each vying for territorial have enforced a theoretical mould to what is a control of the area. The conflict between the unique series of contexts that should be clans is fluid and alliances often shift resulting considered individually. Instead, the best in changing clan conflicts. Power-plays approach to properly encapsulating the manipulate clan loyalty and vary from locations and their disparate conflict processes supporting the government to aligning with is by-location analysis that explores the causes opposition groups. Indeed, a long line of actors and dynamics of conflict in each of the have sought to control the region of Jubaland localities. since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. Chapter Four 49

Although the conflict in Jubaland is often This ‘foreign interference’ of neighbouring perceived as solely a struggle between Hawiye countries — Kenya in particular — was cited and Darod clan elites, both Al Shabaab and as a direct source of conflict in this region by regional neighbours maintain significant surveyed communities and interviewees.16 The presence in the region and serve to exploit its involvement of Kenyan troops in Kismaayo is existing divisions. Between 2008 and 2012, interpreted by the local population in terms of Kismaayo was an Al Shabaab stronghold and an extension of the competition for fishery, the group is believed to have generated up to agricultural and mineral resources and the ‘forty per cent of its operating revenue’ from Kenyan forces are accused of demonstrating activities in the city (HIPS, 2013). There are support for which ever militias will help currently three influential actors in Kismayo achieve their aims, currently the Ras Kamboni who share the short-term goal of defeating Al militias. Conversely, Ethiopia’s interest in Shabaab and recovering the cities under their Jubaland is primarily driven by the fact that an control in the region: The SFG, the Kenyan Ogaden-dominated Jubaland could complicate Defense Force (KDF) which serving under the its struggle against the Ogaden national AMISOM mandate, and the Ras Kamboni liberation front (ONLF) in Ethiopia’s south east Brigade. Despite this shared immediate aim, that is historically inhabited by ethnic Somalis. their strategic objectives differ considerably Ethiopia’s involvement is also reportedly driven (HIPS, 2013). by economic interest and the potential access route to the sea.17 The SFG seeks to consolidate power across the country, while the Ras Kamboni Brigade strives Calls for secession and the establishment of a to rule the Jubaland region with Kenya’s regional Jubaland administration came to the support. Kenya’s strategic and economic fore in 2009. Local business and political interests in the regional stabilization and elites, aided with support from Kenya Jubaland autonomy are clear: (including politicians of Ogaden Somali descent), sought to oust Al Shabaab from the Q A semi-autonomous Jubaland would serve region (ICG, 2013). Clan elders met in Kenya as a buffer-zone to protect Kenya’s tourist in March and April 2011 and elected the ex- industry and the Lamu port development TFG minister Mohamed Abdi as interim project from the militant actions of Al president. Unsurprisingly, given the regional Shabaab. agendas, Ethiopia and politicians from Gedo, Q The establishment of secure access to the stood in opposition to what they regarded as a Kismayo market and its economic resources; Kenyan driven Ogaden-clan dominated project including potential oil and gas deposits in (ICG, 2013). Kenyan military intervention in the contested maritime zone (ICG, 2012a). October 2011 led to subsequent negotiations Q Stability would also facilitate plans to in May 2012 where agreement between repatriate 500,000 Somali refugees now Ogaden, Marehan and Harti as well as many living in Kenya (IRIN, 2012). smaller clans was sought. A technical committee was finally charged with Another, important factor which has historically establishing a Jubaland administration, but the and strategically influenced the stability of the perception of clan dominance remained, as all region is the Ogaden Factor. The Ogaden clan but one of the main signatories from the has high demographic representation in both conference came from the Darod clan (ICG, Somalia’s Juba and Gedo regions and in 2013). Kenya’s North-Eastern regions. The Ogaden also dominate the 5th Ethiopian Region In addition to the clan dynamics in this zone as (Ogaden) politically, economically, and one of the principal structural drivers of

16 militarily. This common demographic link conflict, the responses from interviews and Information obtained during focus between the three States (Somalia, Kenya, and focus groups in Kismayo indicated that a group discussions and interviews conducted in Kismayo during the Ethiopia) has created historical, strategic, and complex and interrelated array of other conflict period 21 April – 16 May 2013. nationalistic interests. drivers in Kismayo and the wider Jubaland

17 region exists. These drivers include: Ibid. 50 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Q Lack of education. Meanwhile, the August 2013 agreement has Q Negative social practices, such as violent not advanced a meaningful partnership crime and robbery which, in turn, lead to between Ras Kamboni and the SFG, with clan-based revenge attacks. Madobe refusing meetings with the SFG and Q Unemployment. hesitation over his participation in the Q Food scarcity despite the potential Jubaland Reconciliation Conference (AllAfrica, abundance of resources. 2013). His leadership of the region is Q Competition over natural resources such as perceived by many as an unfair advantage of water supplies and land.18 the already majority Ogaden clan. The marginalization of other clans and further inter- Incidents of armed conflict severely restricted clan conflict poses a real threat to the region. the data collection in Kismayo. Different clan- Specifically, the local farmers represented by based militias competed for control of the city several clans (Bantu, Cawramalle, Shekhaal, and intense fighting between them forced etc.) are completely absent in the Madobe’s much of the population to flee. The interim administration and also in all reconciliation local authorities nervously displayed their conferences in Addis and Nairobi. These are power by frequently suspending flights, the clans that are part of the so-called .5 group shutting down telecommunication, and of “marginalized clans”, some of which have deploying their militia to key locations in the turned to Al Shabaab. In areas controlled by Al city. The actions of the local authorities are Shabaab these clans do not suffer the demonstrative of the continued conflict over consequences from the position of inferiority the region’s governance. Local authorities they have in the traditional Somali social ignored the Federal government’s installation system. of district level officials in Kismayo, holding a conference in which Ahmed Mohamed Islam ‘Madobe’, a former Islamic militant and leader Mogadishu of the Ras Kamboni, was elected as Jubaland’s president in May 2013. This Located in the coastal Banadir region, the city’s internal dynamic of ever-changing coalitions physical infrastructure was largely destroyed by finally resulted in Madobe signing a national the civil war. Mogadishu has been subject to reconciliation agreement with the Somali urban warfare between various Islamists and Federal Government in August 2013, but not clan or warlord-affiliated militias for over twenty before the region’s complex alliances were years. In August 2012, Somalia's first elected dragged into the dispute. and widely recognized government in more than 20 years was sworn in at Mogadishu The willingness of both the Federal airport, ending the eight-year transitional 18 Government and the Ethiopian-backed period. The city has since seen an intense Information obtained during focus Marehan militia leader Barre Hirale to period of reconstruction funded by the Somali group discussions and interviews conducted in Kismayo during the temporarily ally themselves with Al Shabaab diaspora and the international community. period 21 April – 16 May 2013. against the Ras Kamboni militia serves as a Bombings and shootings are still 19 reminder of how much deeper clan-based commonplace, but open warfare has, for now, Information obtained during focus calculations are than ideological ones in ceased. The respondents to focus groups group discussions and interviews conducted in Mogadishu during the contemporary Somalia. Pragmatism in clan surveys and interviews conducted in period 21 April – 8 June 2013. alliances leads to levels of collusion and Mogadishu overwhelmingly noted widespread 20 temporary alliances of convenience that can improvement in security across the city and a It should be noted that many of confound external observers looking for more new-found sense of optimism generated by the the focus group discussions and 19 interviews in Mogadishu were conventional alliance formation. Under these reconstruction process. Diaspora populations conducted prior to the renewed circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that are returning to their original homes and spate of attacks by Al Shabaab, including the attack on the UN the UN Monitoring Group report uncovered reopening businesses, which was regarded as compound on 19 June 2013, still more collusion in Kismayo, but in this a good indicator of stability by the local the attack on the Turkish Embassy 20 on 27 July 2013, and the bombing case between Ras Kamboni, the KDF, and Al population. at the Village restaurant on Shabaab, over division of profits from 7 September 2013. Recent reports indicate that Al Shabaab has also continued charcoal exports out of the seaport. Mogadishu proved to be the most complex renewed mortar attacks on the city context of South Central locations included in recently (Garowe Online, 2014). Chapter Four 51

Q High levels of wide-spread unemployment. Mogadishu proved to be the most complex context of Q The considerable youth bulge. Q Failure to provide guardianship for orphaned the South Central locations included in this analysis. youth resulting in both forced child recruitment and voluntary enrolment in It contends with simultaneous manifestations of conflict, militias or criminal gangs for financial gain or seeking representation through overlapping power-struggles, and unclear political responsibilities. ideologically defined groups.

As the country’s capital, and seat of the federal government, local authority is not as violently this analysis. The city is home to three levels of contested between clan and political actors as administration: the city, the district, and the it is in Kismayo, rather sporadic attacks on national federal government. As a result, it strategic targets demonstrate the underlying contends with simultaneous manifestations of conflicts and Al Shabaab’s continued resistance conflict, overlapping power-struggles, and to the SFG. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the unclear political responsibilities. There are a local district administration is contested by the myriad of violent actors in the city, each with community it serves. Focus group respondents different levels of influence over the region’s repeatedly reported that the three levels of stability. administration were portrayed as unobtainable and disinterested in the community’s needs, Analysis of focus group data revealed the demonstrating that the legitimacy of the central prevalence of unidentified militias, security administration is very weak in the capital due forces and criminal gangs, demonstrating that to the disengagement from the wider violence is proliferating in a fragile, conflict- community which it is meant to serve.23 Focus affected environment.21 Security in Mogadishu group respondents reported that this is the responsibility of a divergent mix of disconnect from the government occurs in a actors, who act primarily out of self-interest three key ways: across the national capital. In contrast to Kismaayo, where territorially defined contests Q Insufficient or absent channels of play out militarily, conflict in Mogadishu was communication between the community and reported to be generated by smaller scale any form of authority. financial self-interested projects; illegal road Q Incidents of illegal arrest and physical torture blocks, kidnapping, robbery and violent by government forces—wrongful arrest and crime.22 Alongside the government aligned accusations of being Al Shabaab operatives security forces are freelance militias working for were among the highest concerns among criminal profit or to protect the highest those surveyed. business bidder. The weak state-provided Q Land management, including demolition of security combined with the militarization of the property and land seizures. environment have given rise to further networks of neighbourhood or of vigilante Resource competition is also of considerable groups and private militias whose purpose it is significance in the capital.24 Land is the most 21 to protect their own communities. Saferworld contested resource in Mogadishu and land Information obtained during focus (2012) reported in 2012 that a significant claims by returnees from the diaspora and group discussions and interviews conducted in Mogadishu during the number of police and military personnel also IDPs are inflaming an already tense situation. period 21 April – 8 June 2013. work within the private militias, adding to the The emotive issue of access to land is raising

22 large numbers of freelance armed actors in the tension in Mogadishu with land becoming Ibid. city and complicating alliances and the increasingly privately claimed with no regard

23 establishment of security. for claims of returning Diaspora or pre-conflict Information obtained during focus ownership. group discussions and interviews conducted in Mogadishu during the The growth in militias can be attributed to a period 21 April – 8 June 2013. combination of wider factors: The combination of Al Shabaab control and

24 famine in rural areas outside of Mogadishu has Ibid. Q Weak state security capacity and policing. resulted in the presence of thousands of IDPs 52 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context in the city. Up to 369,000 IDPs — many of them squatting in government owned Up to 369,000 IDPs – many of them squatting in property25 — make their home in Mogadishu (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center government-owned property – make their home in Mogadishu (IDMC), 2013). The huge number of IDP'S in Mogadishu live in tents without proper (IDMC, 2013). sanitation or clean water (Amnesty International, 2013). They lack access to basic services including education, and health and suffer from serious food insecurity and have intended for Somalis. Respondents from placed additional stress on the government’s communities in Mogadishu stated that the already limited resources. To make their international aid community was a peace situation worse, Amnesty International (2013) spoiler in this respect and the Somalia would reports that ‘thousands of people’ have been benefit from their removal.27 forcibly evicted from makeshift camps in Mogadishu as the government presses ahead with its plans to ‘clean up’ the capital. Forced South Galkacyo evictions have gathered pace in recent months, compounding the authority’s failure to find an Galkayo is the capital of the Galmudug region. alternative safe location for the IDPs (Amnesty The city lies on the border between the South International, 2013). Central Zone and Puntland and is divided into two political zones: the regional government of The land crisis is exacerbated by wealthy Puntland controls the north, while the south is Somali diaspora who have been buying up governed by the Galmudug administration. residential and business plots mostly in The political divide is further entrenched by the 25 southern Mogadishu. Many of these transitions clan-based territorial division which sees a Information obtained during are deemed dubious, given that official title dominant Hawiye majority in the south and briefing sessions with researchers in Mogadishu, 2-3 April 2013. deeds are hard to verify from the defunct land equally strong Darod majority in the north. registry which has not been operational since 26 Information obtained during focus 1991. Focus group respondents throughout Galkayo was badly devastated by the civil war group discussions and interviews Mogadishu report that this is building and the city witnessed some of the most conducted in Mogadishu during the resentment between the local community of violent clan-based clashes in Somalia. Clan period 21 April – 8 June 2013. residents who have remained in the country segregation continues to shape the region and 27 Information obtained during focus throughout its most traumatic period and the communities report a lack of mutual trust and group discussions and interviews 28 returning diaspora communities who are inter-dependency. The memory of the conflict conducted in Mogadishu during the perceived as not only buying land, but also to has left a lasting imprint on the communities period 21 April – 8 June 2013. 29 monopolizing the key positions of power in the and fear of the past is still prevalent. The 28 city at the expense of those who have atrocities of the civil war remain a driving Information obtained during focus group discussions conducted 26 remained. feature of fear and interviews suggest that in Galkacyo during the period segregation and tribal negative stereotyping 3 May – 23 July 2013. 30 The international community’s presence in and polarization of tribes is apparent. With no 29 Mogadishu is also contributing to the land form of trauma healing and little engagement Ibid. tensions. The large, secured compound that with conflict mediation taking place, ongoing 30 houses the AMISOM peacekeeping force and inter-communal suspicion is further fuelled by Information obtained during interviews conducted in other international organizations near the the presence of what interviewee’s called ‘clan Galkacyo during the period airport is highly controversial for local bragging’ and apparent peace spoilers within 3 May – 23 July 2013. 31 residents. The policy to employ an entirely each community. Such tensions between the 31 foreign workforce to perform cleaning, catering two tribal based regional states of Galmudug Information obtained during interviews conducted in and security duties in the compound has and Puntland have led to hostages being taken Galkacyo during the period furthered frustrations and suspicion. There from each side and revenge killings still being 3 May – 23 July 2013. was a very strong distrust of the international common place. Evidence of ongoing violent 32 community presented from community focus clashes is evident in the location and people Information obtained during 32 focus group discussions conducted groups in the location, with accusations of visibly carry weapons. The local in Galkacyo during the period corruption and embezzlement of funding administration in South Galkacyo is attempting 3 May – 23 July 2013. Chapter Four 53

between the two administrations, and fuelled Clan segregation shapes the Galkacyo region and communities additional conflict between communities in North and South Galkayo. While the port there report a lack of mutual trust and inter-dependency. development is seen as advancement for the population of Galmudug, the Puntland view is that such as development would limit the current activities and income generated from to curb the risk of violent conflict in the city their regional Bossaso seaport. and a newly implemented law prohibits two or more armed men walking together. Equally, a recurrent theme from the focus group discussions in South Galkayo was the South Galkayo suffers from a marked absence attempt by North Galkayo to deliberately limit of INGO donors and United Nations agencies. South Galkacyo’s access to resources provided The population is mostly unemployed, and all by the international community and their public services, including education and implementing partners.36 Respondents healthcare, are privately owned, making them accused the north of maintaining the status unaffordable for the majority of people. Without quo by labelling the South as insecure and the aid of charitable organizations large therefore less viable for an operational base, numbers of the city’s population suffer from thereby safeguarding the North’s access to the lack of service provision. This neglect is made subsequent resources that they bring with more apparent by the presence of such them, including employment opportunities and agencies providing services in the northern part services. Focus group discussion respondents of the city. Focus group discussion respondents suggested that North Galkayo has a vested suggested that this has created suspicion and interest in marking South Galkayo and the resentment within the population of south wider Galmudug region as dangerous and 33 37 Information obtained during Galkayo, further dividing the two hampering the region’s development. focus group discussions conducted communities.33 However, the absence of Furthermore, respondents accuse the business in Galkacyo during the period 3 May – 23 July 2013. international support has resulted in an community of playing a role in perpetuating increasingly active civil society in the south and conflict for their own economic gain.38 They 34 Ibid. respondents were proud to draw attention to also perceive the business community to this.34 collaborate with other establishing groups such 35 Ibid. as pirates, and radical Islamists and arms From the perspective of the focus group dealers.39 36 Ibid. respondents, the political division of the city perpetuates the clan-based conflict and 37 violence as the two regional administrations Baidoa Information obtained during 35 focus group discussions conducted compete for resources and international aid. in Galkacyo during the period Both administrations appear to be driven by The Bay region is fertile and has a history of 3 May – 23 July 2013. the need to maintain their political and high agricultural production, which is currently 38 economic advantages and fear the formation of very limited because many farmers are now Ibid. a similar and adjacent state of the rival clan in living in the IDP camps in the region’s capital 39 Puntland. The proposed development of Hobyo of Baidoa, Mogadishu, and other regions of the Ibid. seaport in Galmudug has generated tensions country as a consequence of Al Shabaab’s continued control of rural locations outside of the city. Consequently, Baidoa’s population size has increased due to rural-urban migration. A recurrent theme from focus group discussions in The city was recovered from three years of Al Shabaab rule in February 2012 by government South Galkacyo was the deliberate attempt to limit their access forces and witnessed widespread fighting as government forces battled to retain control and to resources provided by the international community and their drive Al Shabaab out of surrounding areas. The town is slowly recovering from the massive implementing partners by labelling the South as insecure. destruction of infrastructure and property that resulted. Focus groups repeatedly reported the 54 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context general populations’ readiness for peace and reconciliation and there are visible signs of new The Bay region is occupied by a number of clan groups that, construction projects and renovation of the central town area. Despite a relative level of in contrast to other areas in South Central, have reached stability being achieved in Baidoa since the city has been freed of Al Shabaab, the conflict a strong negotiated alliance, resulting in an overall between the militants and the government forces continues and researchers reported road reduction of clan disputes and conflict. bombs and hit-and-run attacks by Al Shabaab militias occurring during the data collection period.40

The Bay region is occupied by a number of Dhusamareeb clan groups that, in contrast to Galkayo, have reached a strong negotiated alliance which has Dhusamareeb is the capital of the Galgaduud resulted in the overall reduction of clan region in central Somalia. Though the region disputes and conflict. All focus groups from this was mostly safe from the inter-clan conflicts region emphasized the absence of clan based that started in the early 1990s, recurrent conflict.41 Respondents reported that a change armed conflicts between the two religiously in people mind-sets and the current national defined rival groups – the Sufi Ahlu-Sunna political dynamic was primarily responsible for Wal-Jamaa’a (ASWJ) paramilitary group allied this change; however, some minority clans still with the federal government and Al Shabaab. noted feeling marginalized.42 The conflict between these two groups, with 40 Information received from ASWJ liberating and defending territory from Al researchers in Baidoa during Focus groups reported that lawlessness and Shabaab, who dominate eastern Galgaduud, the data collection period 30 April – 3 July 2013. crime are decreasing in recovered areas due to has heavily impacted this region and its the increased military presence, but they report inhabitants. Control of the region has changed 41 Information obtained during that Al Shabaab forces are reportedly hiding frequently and currently the districts are focus group discussions conducted within the recovered communities.43 Focus divided between the two rival groups which are in Baidoa during the period 30 April – 3 July 2013. groups reported violent attacks against those almost isolated from one another within their who openly supported the government by Al own areas of control. Yet the possibility of 42 Shabaab members who seek to install fear conflict erupting once more is a very real and Ibid. through extreme violence and retain a degree continuous threat. Focus group respondents 43 of influence in even recovered areas.44 The perceive the threat of impending conflict as Ibid. continued presence of Al Shabaab prevents impeding the arrival of international aid 44 greater levels of defection from the militias due organizations.49 It also prevents the Ibid. to fear of reprisals. Rejection of Al Shabaab is establishment of effective regional and federal 45 reportedly widespread in the location and government institutions. Ibid. communities wish to see greater government 46 influence, yet fear plays a large role in the The incorporation of ASWJ into the government Ibid. 45 50 ability to actively support the government. has created specific problems in this region. 47 The communities report the fear that their One of the main ways is the conflict between Ibid. youth will be recruited into Al Shabaab, as ASWJ’s interpretation of Islamic law, the 48 young men are frequently targeted for kidnap traditional clan structures, and official Information obtained during 46 focus group discussions conducted and forced to join the group. Equally, administrative structures. The three structures in Baidoa during the period respondents state that the spread of are in competition with each other and cause 30 April – 3 July 2013. fundamentalist teachings is a negative delays and conflicts within the decision-making 49 influence on youth, resulting in their voluntary mechanisms in the region. The religious Information obtained during focus 47 group discussions conducted in recruitment into Al Shabaab. Communities influence over the security provision infiltrates Dhusamareeb during the period also state that third party involvement from the wider governance structures. 12 May – 30 June 2013. arms traders has been identified as having 50 significant influence over conflict and peace in Respondents from Dhusamareeb report a high A theme that emerged from focus group discussions and interviews Baidoa and they act as deliberate spoilers level of unemployment with some villages conducted in Dhusamareeb during 48 exacerbating tensions within the community. totally dependent on diaspora remittance and the period 12 May – 30 June 2013. Chapter Four 55

when the Somali National Army and AMISOM Some villages in Dhusamareeb are totally dependent forces liberated it. The surrounding rural areas, to the north and east of Jowhar, however, on remittances from the diaspora for their livelihoods. remain under Al Shabaab control.

The region is mainly inhabited by the Abgal sub-clan of the Hawiye clan. Other clans that no members of the community working.51 live in the region include Galjecel, Jarer, When asked about the causes of conflict in Hawadle, Mobleyn and other small tribes of their communities, they state that the lack of Arab descent. Clan conflicts were suppressed 51 Information obtained during education generates ignorance and perpetuates under Al Shabaab’s rule, yet a USAID funded focus group discussions conducted conflict.52 Although clan disputes are not conflict analysis of the location suggests that in Dhusamareeb during the period 12 May – 30 June 2013. prevalent in this location, communities report these unresolved clan disputes and related that other factors that drive conflict remain, latent conflicts are now resurfacing in the 52 Ibid. such as minority clan representation and recovered areas (USAID, 2013). Themes unsettled clan disputes over territorial emerging from the interviews and focus group 53 Ibid. expansion to secure resources and resource discussions in Jowhar support this finding and competition over water sources and pasture minority clans reported that they feel under 54 53 56 Themes that emerged from lands. This problem is compounded by the represented. In addition, focus group interviews conducted in lack of a strong state government, leading to a respondents documented that the larger clans Dhusamareeb during the period 57 12 May – 30 June 2013. climate of lawlessness which is easily exploited remain armed. This combination of fear and for self-interest under the banner of clan militarization has resulted in a very fragile 55 Ibid. alliances a local governance system which is stability in the location. This is a consequence, plagued by corruption.54 The abuse of power in part, of continued resource competition over 56 experienced in this region has resulted in a fear land, grazing rights and competition for A theme that emerged from focus group discussions and interviews of future governance powers, as reported by humanitarian aid projects which assume clan conducted in Jowhar during the community focus group discussion lines.58 However, a positive emergent theme period 1 May – 27 June 2013. participants.55 This fear hampers reconciliation from the data was that clan conflict was 57 and undermines the government’s legitimacy. viewed as decreasing steadily, but not to the nformation obtained during focus group discussions conducted point that it has reached an alliance of in Jowhar during the period peaceful co-existence.59 1 May – 27 June 2013. Jowhar 58 This fragile clan dynamic is further complicated Ibid. Jowhar is the capital town of the Shabeellaha by the existence of freelance militias. These 59 Dhexe region of Somalia, ninety kilometres militias, largely comprised of disengaged youth, Ibid. north of Mogadishu. The location controls use violence as a means of earning a 60 access to Somalia's biggest road linking the livelihood. The groups use illegal road blocks to A theme that emerged from focus group discussions and interviews southern and central regions of the country. carry out looting, robbery, and rape of those conducted in Jowhar during the Like Baidoa, it also has a rich agricultural citizens trying to travel by road (USAID, 2013). period 1 May – 27 June 2013 that collaborated the findings history due to the Shabelle River. Jowhar has Additionally, conflict between rival gangs of of the USAID analysis. changed administrative control many times and youth from Jowhar and neighbouring locations

61 experiences conflict due to this strategic has resulted in a number of destabilising Information obtained during importance (USAID, 2013). In 2006, the TFG security incursions.60 focus group discussions conducted seized control of Jowhar from the ICU. Then, in in Jowhar during the period 1 May – 27 June 2013. 2009, Al Shabaab regained control until 2012 Finally, focus group discussions reported that competition for power in the region has given rise to ongoing political disputes between rival 61 The fragile clan dynamic in Jowhar is further complicated by the warlords. Political conflict has been marked by outbreaks of violence which continue to be existence of freelance militias largely comprised of disengaged a feature of the Jowhar region. Competition for power and established rule continues to youth who use violence as a means of earning a livelihood. influence security. All the while, the conflict between the government and Al Shabaab continues over territorial control of the region. 56 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

In this way, the region suffers from recurring episodes of violent conflict and instability Although the Al Shabaab-AMISOM conflict is central to leading to social disruption as well as economic and political instability. the dynamics in Beletweyne, resource competition was cited

by respondents as the most frequent source of conflict. Beletweyne

The South Central town of Beletweyne is the capital of the Hiran province. The city is of AMISOM maintains control of the city, the strategic importance to all actors in the SCZ threat of Al Shabaab remains, with Al Shabaab conflict. Close to the Ethiopian border, breaching the AMISOM security to conduct Beletweyne is the main gateway to the Ogaden attacks within the city. The most recent attack region in Ethiopia and a strategically vital area killed nine AMISOM troops at a café on 19 that Addis Ababa has often controlled. October 2013 (CNN, 2013). Additionally, the location straddles a major road link that provides passage between south- Although the Al Shabaab-AMISOM conflict is western Somalia to southern and northern central to the dynamics in Beletweyne, parts of the country, and serves as a key respondents in focus group discussions 62 transport route. Similar to Jowhar, due to its throughout the area reported resource Information obtained during focus group discussions conducted strategic importance and clan hostilities, the competition to be the most frequent source of in Beletweyne during the period city has frequently changed hands. conflict.62 Communities also cited livestock 23 May – 8 July 2013.

raids and fights over access to land as driving 63 The main conflict in Beletweyne exists between local level conflicts.63 Finally, respondents Ibid.

Al Shabaab and AMISOM forces, specifically a pointed to self-interest, the lack of education, 64 contingent from Djibouti, which are currently and poverty as factors the impact conflict and Ibid. the key security force in the location. Although peace in Beletweyne.64

Conflict Drivers Location Manifestations of Conflict

Structural

Resource Competition All areas Nominal low level violence that often spirals out of control; conflict over natural resources or farmland in rural areas, while there is continual struggle over urban resources like ports etc.

Clan Dynamics Evident in most areas, Tensions and disputes at the family and community levels, conflict at the sub-clan and clan level, petty but there is conflict to systemic armed conflict considerable variation

Marginalized Youth All areas Despondency, frustration, hopelessness, lack of opportunities, recruitment into extremist/criminal groups

Poverty and Lack of All areas Economic stagnation, frustration, hopelessness, petty crime, recruitment into criminal or extremist groups Opportunity

Militarisation All areas Proliferation of small-arms; escalation of petty conflict

Breakdown of All areas (except Armed criminality (gangs, piracy) and insurgent groups (Al Shabaab), assassinations, inability of traditional Traditional Social Baidoa) capacities to mediate violence, gang-culture Norms/Emergent Norms of Violence Chapter Four 57

Conflict Drivers Location Manifestations of Conflict

Proximate

Separatism Juba, particularly Clan or sub-clan groups vying for control of areas through conflict and pursuing a separatist agenda to Kismayo advance their interests

Criminality All areas Criminal groups controlling economic activities

Presence of Al Shabaab Varies Violent assertion of control over their areas, including the targeting of local elders who may oppose them. Attacks against international, government and civilian targets, including suicide bombers and coordinated attacks. More recently, conventional warfare against government and AMISOM forces is less pronounced.

Emergence from Varies Fragile security immediately following withdrawal of Al Shabaab and areas that transition frequently between Al Shabaab Control government and Al Shabaab control experience a period of transition which can foster an environment in which low-level local tensions can evolve into conflict.

External Influence Juba, Mogadishu, Exacerbated conflict due to external support of different actors at the local level, as seen with the Kenyan Baidoa forces in Kismayo. Military operations by international forces against Al Shabaab. International influence at the higher political level sees varying success.

Environmental Juba, along the coast Lack of central government control of natural resources and environment leads to environmental predation, Predation resulting in depleted resources, which drives conflict at a structural level in the zone. Criminal organizations controlling economic livelihoods derived from natural resources, undermining traditional forms of natural resource management.

Weak Governance All areas Weak state unable to provide security and services to population leads to lack of legitimacy. Armed groups seek to monopolize this dynamic.

Food Insecurity All areas Food insecurity interacts with other drivers such as poverty/unemployment, resource depletion, environmental predation, and weak governance to create an environment in which the breakdown of social norms can drive conflict, as the population struggles to meet daily needs.

Table 4 (left and above): Conflict Drivers Structural Drivers Conflict Drivers in South Central Zone Some drivers of conflict in the SCZ have shifted This section discusses in further detail the six dramatically over the past two decades, while structural drivers of the conflict throughout others have remained constant sources of South Central Zone, drawing upon the findings hostilities. It must be stressed that in many of the primary data and a review of relevant instances the structural and proximate causes literature. are inextricably linked. Additionally, with the long-running conflict in the zone, drivers that Resource Scarcity are proximate in other contexts have Natural resource competition has been a transformed into structural drivers in South conflict driver throughout Somalia’s history and Central. These structural and proximate drivers competing claims to pasture and water 65 of conflict vary by location and in their continue to generate localised conflict A theme that emerged from Information obtained during focus manifestations. Table 4 provides a summary of throughout the zone, with specific problems group discussions conducted in how the individual drivers are manifested presented in Galkayo, Jowhar, Beletweyne and Galkayo, Jowhar, Beletweyne, and 65 Dhusamareb during the period throughout South Central, as well as the Dhusamareeb. The organisation of resource 1 May – 23 July 2013. locations in which they are primarily present. access remains clan based and allocation is 58 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context defined by clan and sub-clan structures; therefore, water and pasture remain important Resource competition in South Central is not limited to points of contention among competing communities in the region. Indeed, it is this traditional conflict over natural resources like grazing land factor that seemed to preoccupy the participants in the focus group discussions in and water rights. Increased urbanisation and displacement these locations more than any other.66 The factors that contribute to the escalation of have brought land to the fore. conflict, according to comments raised in the focus group discussions, are the reduced opportunities for income generation and 66 livelihoods.67 Additionally, the lack of scarcity results in such competition becoming Ibid. alternative sources of income makes the violent even more likely to turn into violent conflict 67 conquest of natural resources a more attractive and subsequently overuse. Equally, parties to Ibid. 68 option than it may have previously been. the conflict are able to exploit resources for 68 their own means to generate income; this in Repeated theme in interviews Analysis of the information from the interviews turn leads to environmental degradation and conducted in Mogadishu during the period 31 March – 4 April 2013. and focus group discussions conducted limiting the available resources further. throughout the zone demonstrated that 69 Information during interviews and resource competition in South Central Somalia Urban resource competition now reportedly focus group discussions conducted is not limited to the traditional conflict over transcends clan affiliation.71 Our research throughout South Central during the period 21 April – 23 July 2013. natural resources such as grazing land and demonstrated that competition between the water rights. Increased urbanisation in the returning diaspora and the rest of the 70 This theme was also often zone, and the growing numbers of rural-urban population has created significant tension in repeated in interviews conducted migrants and IDP’s due to food insecurity and Mogadishu. In the capital resentment of in Mogadishu during the period 31 March – 4 April 2013. Al Shabaab, has seen resource competition diaspora’s land acquisitions is coupled with the take on a new dynamic. Respondents reported allocation of key government and NGO 71 Information obtained during that much of the conflict in SCZ is centred on positions to returnees as opposed to existing interviews and focus group the issue of land ownership, land disputes, and community members who have struggled to discussions in Mogadishu and 69 Kismayo during the period access points. Access to key strategic cities, provide stability throughout the twenty years of 31 March – 8 June 2013. such as Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa and conflict.72 Augmenting this process is the fact 72 their ports and airstrips have become key that many of those returning have actually left Information obtained during elements in the conflicts. Equally contested are their families back in their countries of refuge, interviews and focus group discussions in Mogadishu during the control of strategic checkpoints and the and are subsequently not viewed as having the the period 31 March – 8 June 2013. management of foreign aid. Lawlessness and same stake in the country’s peace process.73 the unregulated war economy have created This perceived inequality is serving to diminish 73 Information obtained from new economic incentives to profit from the legitimacy of certain administrations and interviews conducted in resources which extend far beyond access to organizations in the city.74 Mogadishu during the period 31 March – 4 April 2013. grazing land. Resource scarcity was specifically highlighted 74 Ibid. In the face of natural resource scarcity and as the most pressing cause of conflict for many weakened social institutions, criminal militias respondents.75 While armed clashes over land 75 Recurrent theme from interviews seek to control of key resources through force. occur across rural Puntland and Somaliland, and focus group discussions Historically, traditional leaders settled conflicts local capacity was reported to have sufficient conducted throughout 76 South Central during the period over resources using Somali clan negotiation capacity to deal with these issues. In the 21 April – 23 July 2013. practices (Ahmed, 1995). Yet, these resolution SCZ, coupled with norms around the use of 76 mechanisms, and Somali traditional structures violence as an appropriate mechanism for Please see the analysis of have weakened, as political leaders have solving disputes, the break-down of traditional Puntland and Somaliland on this issue presented in realized that whoever controlled the state forms of conflict resolution has entailed Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. would control the nation’s resources (Elmi, frequent large-scale violence due to resource 70 77 77 Abdi, and Barise, 2006). With no issues. Indeed, pastoral clashes can spill over Recurrent theme from interviews administrative regulation, communities face into wider clan tensions politically; at the same and focus group discussions conducted throughout open competition over natural resource access. time, political entrepreneurs seeking to ferment South Central during the period The wider environment of poverty and food clan tensions to advance their own political 21 April – 23 July 2013. Chapter Four 59

interests have been known to orchestrate clan clans which have been widely successful, at clashes over land, a phenomenon Somalis refer least at the local level (Interpeace, 2009). to as ‘remote control wars’.78 Often emerging out of practical traditional negotiations over natural resources known in Despite the diminished effectiveness of the Somali as deegan, these agreements have traditional Somali conflict management and widely enhanced public order and decreased legal systems, an emergent theme from across the incidence of violent conflict in their localities SCZ is that a return to traditional negotiation (Interpeace, 2009). The majority of these methods is still the most effective during times peace agreements have taken place at the of resource competition between clans.79 Yet it village or municipal level.82 Baidoa is an 78 is necessary that this return to tradition is not example where strong clan alliances and Ibid. achieved in isolation from the wider political negotiations have benefited the community in 79 system. In Mogadishu, respondents terms of stability. Because of the strong clan Ibid. consistently referred to the need to modernize alliance, traditional conflict resolution methods 80 the traditional structures and integrate them are supported throughout that region. There, This recommendation was also with the wider political system.80 Integrating participants reported that priority is given to the often repeated in interviews conducted in Mogadishu during the the two is increasingly important in terms of use of tribal elders, community leaders and period 31 March – 4 April 2013. providing longevity and legitimacy to the religious leaders to resolve disputes.83

81 resolutions that are brokered. Information during interviews Yet the weakness of these mechanisms lies in and focus group discussions conducted in Kismayo, Galkacyo, Clan Dynamics that fact that without official recognition within and Baidoa during the period Clan dynamics are the most complex of the the state system they are open to the 21 April – 23 July 2013. underlying structural drivers afflicting many manipulation. This has been the case in 82 parts of the SCZ. While on the one hand, Mogadishu where multiple interviewees Information obtained during an clannism is partly the cause of some of the suggested that the use of clan authority is often interview with peacebuilding 84 program officer in Mogadishu worst conflict across the zone, as is seen in out of self-interest. Renders and Terlinden on 3 April 2013. Kismayo and Galkacyo, it has also been an (2010) suggest that further support in the form 83 agent of change, as it was reported in of stricter checks and balances and enforced Information during interviews and Baidoa.81 Undoubtedly, though, the clan accountability and regulation is necessary to focus group discussions conducted in Baidoa during the period dynamic is still the ongoing structural cause of ensure that clan structures play a positive role 30 April – 3 July 2013. many of the conflict that is presently occurring in developing stable systems and communities. 84 within this region. For example, the Ras Supporting this assertion, communities Information obtained during Kamboni militia is larger than the Somali surveyed stated that elders and religious leaders interviews conducted in Mogadishu during the period National Army and has been a major player in need to be trained in international human rights 31 March – 4 April 2013. instigating large scale violence in the Jubaland and updated conflict resolution methodology.85

85 region. Moreover, there are actual parts of the Additionally resolutions created require Information obtained from focus Somali army that are largely independent of institutional recognition and incorporation into group discussions conducted throughout South Central during centralised command and instead operate as law, so that they have standing and longevity, the period 21 April – 23 July 2013. clan-affiliated units. as opposed to the current situation, whereby

86 the government administration is working in Information obtained during An Interpeace study suggested that the forging parallel to the traditional structures with no interviews conducted in 86 Mogadishu during the period of peaceful governance agreements should look official recognition. 31 March – 4 April 2013. to Somalia’s peace agreements between sub- Marginalized Youth/Youth Bulge Somalia’s demographic profile shows an evident ‘youth bulge’ with seventy-three per An Interpeace study suggests that the forging of cent of the population under thirty years (UNDP, 2012). The UNDP Somalia Human peaceful governance agreements should look to the Development Report 2012 points out that this quota is unlikely to decline in the future due to agreements between sub-clans which have been the country’s high fertility rate. Such a disproportionately large proportion of youth has widely successful at the local level. been identified as a potent driver of conflict, with the top 10 countries on the Failed States 60 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Index all having high proportions of young people (Fund for Peace Index, 2012). In Somalia, 73 per cent of the population is under 30 years of age. Countries in which young adults comprise more than forty per cent of the adult population Around sixty-seven of them are unemployed (UNDP, 2012). are more than twice as likely to experience an outbreak of civil conflict as countries with lower proportions (Mavrotas, 2011). In Somalia, youth aged between 15-24 make up through physical abduction and indoctrination fifty-seven per cent of the adult population was also presented as present in SCZ.91 The (UNDP, 2012). Youth bulges are not a risk of forced child abduction is an issue that necessary precursor of societal violence yet was raised by numerous agencies working in when combined with poor governance, SCZ and also by focus group participants in economic stagnation, poverty, unemployment recovered areas (Amnesty International, and inequality they have been statistically 2013).92 In locations under Al Shabaab control linked to conflict. the abduction of male children is very prevalent: respondents to interviews and focus When a large group of young people are group discussions reported that families live in disengaged, dissatisfied and unemployed they fear of losing their children to militias.93 In provide a fertile ground for recruitment into newly recovered areas the need for the ethnic, religious, and political extremists rehabilitation of child soldiers was of primary 87 groups who seek to mobilize violence. In such concern for many communities surveyed, in Interview with higher education provider conducted in Mogadishu 94 circumstances, voluntary reasons for joining Baidoa in particular. This dynamic is further on 2 April 2013. militias are generated through employment complicated in urban areas where large 88 opportunities and the provision of a means of numbers of orphaned youth are residing Information obtained from focus demonstrating grievance. Around sixty-seven without guardianship. There are no available group discussions conducted with young people throughout per cent of Somali youth are unemployed statistics on the size of the orphaned South Central during the period (UNDP, 2012), which is one of the highest population, but Mogadishu has attracted large 21 April – 23 July 2013. rates of joblessness in the world. A generation numbers of children from across the zone that 89 has been shaped by lost opportunities and have lost families due to famine or armed Ibid. marginalisation, as one interviewee put it; conflict. This young section of society is 90 ‘young people need hope, they need subsequently open to recruitment by Al Information obtained from interviews and focus group opportunities, and both are missing here in Shabaab, both forced and through ideological discussions conducted throughout Somalia.’87 indoctrination. Many of the individuals South Central during the period interviewed suggested that these children and 21 April – 23 July 2013. Youth unemployment and the need for services youth are specifically targeted by militias.95 91 and vocational training were raised by all youth Without assistance this highly marginalized Ibid. 88 focus groups across SCZ. The young people group may swell the ranks of militias and 92 who participated in the discussions reported a perpetuate the conflict further. The claims of organizations were supported by the Information significant disconnection between Somali obtained from interviews and youth, who are frustrated by the lack of Militarisation focus group discussions conducted throughout South Central during representation afforded them, and the The militarisation of South Central is an the period 21 April – 23 July 2013. administrative structures which are in place to additional factor which contributes to the risk 89 93 serve them. Youth in SCZ are joining violent posed by the youth bulge. Somalia is believed Information obtained from groups and militias due to a lack of alternatives to be one of the most heavily armed countries interviews and focus group discussions conducted throughout for survival and this is among the factors in the world with this market relying heavily on South Central during the period sustaining Al Shabaab’s appeal.90 Put simply traditional trade routes, military supply lines 21 April – 23 July 2013. the zone has too many young people and not and corrupt government actors to provide 94 enough jobs or opportunities for training. support to clansmen, warlords, and militants Information from interviews and focus group discussions conducted Somalia’s significant youth bulge presents a who purchase or barter for small arms. The in Baidoa during the period demographic challenge that could trigger weaponry provides opportunities for spoilers 30 April – 3 July 2013. further conflict if not addressed. seeking to undermine peace and state- 95 building, to militarize unemployed youth and Information obtained during interviews conducted in Voluntary enrolment was not the only concern children, teaching who use guns to loot, Mogadishu during the period referenced in focus groups—forced recruitment murder, and inflict horrific crimes. Arms are 31 March – 4 April 2013. Chapter Four 61

which the 60 of the population in the South Focus group participants identified easy access to weapons Central Zone depends for food and income (Rural Poverty Portal, accessed 2013). Yet, the as one of the main drivers of conflict in their communities lack of effective disease control strategies due to the lack of central government regulations led to outbreaks of disease which frequently went unchecked and untreated. This influenced associated not only with the pursuit of political export potential with Saudi Arabia imposing power, but also with international terrorism, several livestock bans because of disease protection and the furtherance of economic concerns. These bans have severely hampered objectives. The easy access of weapons was the agricultural sector and generated serious one of the points raised by participants in focus livelihood problems for the pastoralists whose group discussions when asked about the livelihoods depend upon the sale of livestock.98 drivers of conflict in their communities.96 Poverty can also be seen as a driving factor in Poverty the criminal culture and state of lawlessness in Existing poverty in South Central worsened the zone. Opportunities for legal, legitimate dramatically with the collapse of the profitable commerce are still scarce and this

96 government in the early 1990’s and the has led to an environment of ‘survival of the Information obtained from subsequent nearly perpetual conflict in the fittest’.99 The information provided in focus interviews and focus group discussions conducted throughout zone. Extreme poverty has become widespread groups throughout the zone indicated that small South Central during the period and as a result, large numbers of people are scale business were starting to open but with 21 April – 23 July 2013. unable to meet their daily needs for survival. no impact on the wider economy of the 100 97 Currently around 43 per cent of the population zone. Communities reported that desperation Ibid. lives in extreme poverty, on less than $1 per and lack of opportunity are pushing disengaged 98 day (Rural Poverty Portal, accessed 2013). youth toward freelance militias operating for Information obtained from briefings This figure rises to 53 per cent in rural areas, profit or to seek answers from ideological and with researchers in Mogadishu 101 during the period 1-2 April 2013. where extreme poverty is more prevalent (Rural religiously defined groups. Lack of Poverty Portal, accessed 2013). Additionally, opportunity leads therefore, not only to high 99 Information obtained in an the resilience mechanisms of SCZ communities levels of criminal activity, but also to furthering interview with government official had already been weakened by a protracted insecurity across the region, increasing the in Mogadishu on 1 April 2013. crisis defined by a combination of armed numbers of armed groups on the streets, the 100 conflict, natural disasters and adverse likelihood on confrontation and the ranks of Al Information obtained from interviews and focus group economic conditions. Focus group data Shabaab. In this way, poverty and discussions conducted throughout throughout South Central frequently mentioned unemployment plays a key role in perpetuating South Central during the period 21 April – 23 July 2013. the heavy reliance of villages on diaspora the conflict in SCZ. remittances in order to access basic privatized 101 97 Information obtained from services necessary for survival. Breakdown of traditional social norms/ interviews and focus group Entrenched emergent forms of violence discussions conducted throughout South Central during the period There are several ways poverty and conflict Another driver of conflict that emerged from the 21 April – 23 July 2013. reinforce each other in the zone. First, analysis is the degradation of Somali traditional

102 prolonged conflict has also greatly reduced the norms and values. This issue can be seen to Ibid. level of trade, particularly livestock exports on have influence over each of the drivers listed above. From the information provided in focus group discussions and interviews it can be ascertained that this breakdown has occurred Communities reported that desperation and a in two ways: First, traditional coping strategies for dealing with conflict are no longer in use lack of economic opportunities were pushing and, secondly, resilience to conflict factors has been lost.102 For example, traditional methods disengaged youth toward freelance militias for dealing with community conflicts, such as xeer (traditional Somali law) have been or towards ideological and religiously defined groups. devalued by the presence of corruption and abuse of the status of clan elders. Also, 62 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context traditional farming regulation is no longer in place leading to over use of land and resource Concern over the degradation of social norms and values were competition. echoed in focus group discussions throughout South Central. The degradation of social norms and values was a point of reference from across the zone. Focus groups and interviews pointed to the loss of the cultural practices which formally citizens. The flooding of the market with small structured Somali society.103 After twenty years arms further aggravated the security situation of violence and lawlessness it was presented and human rights abuses. Amnesty that the traditional Somali practices which International (2012) reports that the most underpinned morality and social cohesion had common crimes and human rights abuses been eroded. These norms were cited as the committed can be categorized into the basis for moral obligations to other community following: members and served to bind the community together.104 Focus group discussion participants Q Assassinations of political rivals, business suggested that this loss has fuelled the competitors, or rival clan members. localized conflicts, and allowed widespread Q Kidnapping of innocent civilians. crime and violence to spread.105 This Q Carjacking in major urban centers. breakdown of societal norms was also Q Road blocks. presented as being reinforced by the negative Q Rape. societal effects of twenty years of no formal state education system. Focus groups cited The evidence presented by the focus group ignorance and the uneducated as creating discussion participants and interviewees would conflict and furthering human rights suggest that a number of factors have violations.106 Helping to perpetuate this process contributed to eroding Somali social values and is the lack of capacity for dealing with youths, norms, leading to increased violence and as one respondent noted: “…once the clans conflict. The prolonged experience of violence, would ensure that if a child was alone, with no coupled with the lack of education and parents, then they would be cared for. But now manipulation of clan identity have all added to no one has enough and no one trusts young this degradation.108 In addition to this the people. We do not have the same community influence of the imported ideologies, such as practices anymore.”107 the Islamic fundamentalism of Al Shabaab and Ras Kamboni, the government’s use of Al Islah, In South Central, a permanent state of which is a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot and 103 lawlessness and criminality has become the other ‘secular’ political actors, have also been Ibid. norm. Freelance groups have taken advantage credited with corrupting traditional Somali 104 of the protracted state collapse and terrorize interpretations of Islam.109 But this prolonged Ibid. civilians. As the World Bank 2004 Conflict influence, with its ability to indoctrinate those 105 Analysis states “the traditional Somali respect disengaged youth, has impacted on the erosion Ibid. for human life and dignity has been sharply of Somali norms and values. In short, the loss 106 compromised by the years of turmoil. Positive of traditional coping strategies and community Ibid. social values that had been sanctioned by governing structures has resulted in violence 107 time-tested kinship ties, both those based on and crime becoming the primary source of Information obtained from briefings with researchers in Mogadishu morality, as well as those founded in Islamic addressing grievances for many actors in during the period 1-2 April 2013. principles, have all but been eroded” (World Somalia. 108 Bank, 2004). As overt conflict has abated in Analysis of the information locations throughout southern Somalia, human obtained in focus group discussions and interviews throughout rights violations have continued. Human rights Proximate Drivers South Central during the period are not given the weighting afforded to them 31 March – 23 July 2013. previously in Somali society (Amnesty Closely interrelated to the structural drivers of 109 International, 2012). The cycle of human conflict present in South Central are eight Information obtained during interviews conducted in rights abuses is commonly attributed to the proximate drivers which are outlined in this Mogadishu during the period high level of militarization among average subsection. 31 March – 4 April 2013. Chapter Four 63

Separatism governance. The presence of Al Shabaab also The separatist agenda has served as a undermines security at a more personal level. proximate cause of conflict in South Central. As pointed out in an earlier section, young Political actions that attempt to push forward people, parents, and their wider communities separatist agendas are major triggers of fear Al Shabaab and the possibility that the violence in local areas which then reverberate communities’ youth will be drawn into the to higher political levels. A good example of group, either voluntarily or through force.112 this driver and the impact it has throughout the zone is seen in Kismayo, where the unilateral Emergence from AS control declaration of an autonomous Jubaland Fragile security is one of the common administration by the Ras Kamboni militia after characteristics of the locations that the it captured the port city attracted armed government and AMISOM forces have resistance from multiple actors in 2013.110 reclaimed from Al Shabaab control.113 This is Insecurity linked to control of and the not unusual for areas of transition, as disposition of the newly created federal government forces attempt to enforce a rule of government has been highlighted over the past law. Additionally, in areas where the Ethiopian year in the showdown over this lucrative port troops withdraw only to return later to drive out city, a conflict that captures all of the wider Al Shabaab, security and governance structures issues over the scope of central government are negatively impacted. Weak governance and control and the nature of limited security can create space for low-level federalism/separatism. tensions at the local to evolve into violent confrontations. In this way, that period of time Criminality as locations make the transition from Al Criminal acts are a major conflict diver and Shabaab to clear government control can drive often provoke conflict when tensions are high conflict. and clan leaders are particularly slow at addressing the issues at stake. Focus group External Influence discussions throughout all seven locations in There are several layers of external influence which data was collected reported that that interact with conflict in southern Somalia criminality was widespread throughout the and with the federal government Mogadishu. zone and is one of the key factors that impacts First, there are the neighboring countries, on their security.111 This proximate driver is Ethiopia and Kenya, who have deployed their linked to the high levels of poverty and military forces in South Central and are active unemployment combined with the weak formal in military operations against Al Shabaab and governance structures prevalent in South other government opposition groups.114 As in 110 Central. Combined, these drivers coalesce to the case of Kenya, allegations of support of the The struggle for control of Kismayo is more thoroughly detailed earlier create a permissive environment for criminal separatist Jubaland authorities has fuelled in this chapter. activity, both petty crime and organized crime conflict and fostered prickly relationships 111 leading to high levels of insecurity with a between the Somali federal government and its Analysis of the information propensity to turn into violent conflict. neighbor to the west. Regionally, Eritrea has obtained in focus group discussions and interviews throughout provided financial and materiel support to Al South Central during the period Presence of AS Shabaab and anti-government opposition as 31 March – 23 July 2013. While areas under Al Shabaab’s control may well as criminal networks, promoting its own 112 experience relative stability and the group agenda and adding another dimension to an Ibid. provides levels of services to the population, already complex web of conflict dynamics and 113 their presence drives conflict, whether it comes actors (Kelshall, 2014). Individual western Analysis of the information obtained in focus group discussions and from their targeting of local and traditional countries—the United States particularly— interviews in South Central, but governance structures, seizing of resources, or have been supporting and conducting particularly Beletweyne, during the period 31 March – 23 July 2013. the armed conflict against the government operations against radical Islamic forces in the forces and their AMISOM counterparts. The zone for several years, adding to the complexity 114 The actions and interests of the group’s opposition to the government also of the conflict between Al Shabaab and Ethiopian and Kenyan governments further undermines the government’s ability to government forces and drawing foreign fighters and their militaries are detailed more thoroughly in the assert control over its territory, which to Somalia to support a country where they ‘Situation Dynamics’ section. strengthens another proximate driver – weak perceive Islam as being under attack (Mazzetti, 64 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

2006; Roggio, 2006). Finally, the wider the regime collapsed. The consequent state international community—other donors and failure removed the possibility of harnessing international organizations—are deeply political participation to protect civil rights or involved in the humanitarian, development, guarantee equality of resources. As such, and high-level political processes with varying Somalia’s legacy of corrupt and abusive success. All of this influence exerted by political leadership has stalled the external actors adds to an already complex establishment of an inclusive government. context in which competing internal agendas Consequently, the newly established and actors are often at odds and sometimes government seated in Mogadishu will have to resort to violent conflict to resolve their over-come two crucial factors to establish its differences. legitimacy in the eyes of the people and maintain stability: Environmental Predation The absence of a central government • Transparency and Accountability: Focus consequently resulted in the absence of group data gathered in Mogadishu suggests systems of regulation within the agricultural that communities felt disconnected from the sector. Many traditional forms of natural new government’s different levels of resource management have been abandoned administration.118 This demonstrates that as armed groups seek to control the means of government legitimacy is currently under income generation.115 The over-grazing of land threat. Communities reported feeling that the and deforestation has led to environmental channels of communication are closed to degradation in many regions. For example in them and there is very little transparency in north-west Kismaayo the production of the system.119 All of the focus groups charcoal has led to uncontrolled deforestation conducted in Mogadishu made reference to with unsustainable exploitation leading to long an inability to gain political representation term consequences for the environment and a consequent frustration with all levels (Rembold, 2013). The harvesting and export of administration.120 Self-interest was of charcoal has become a particularly lucrative frequently blamed for the failure of industry, a trade currently banned by UNSC politicians to engage with the communities resolution 2036, it nevertheless is flourishing, they serve.121 Ultimately, whoever controls both with cooperation of AMISOM, and under the State, controls the local power 115 Analysis of the information Al Shabaab control (ICG, 2012b). Equally, un- structures, national tax income and the obtained in focus group discussions regulated off-shore fishing has diminished the distribution of international aid with its and interviews throughout South Central during the period regions potential marine resources. When no related recognition and legitimacy. As one 31 March – 23 July 2013. regulatory measures like disease control and participant from a focus group in Mogadishu agricultural coping strategies are in place, commented; ‘They only contact us if we can 116 Ibid. natural resources remain a lucrative incentive help them, they do not ask how they can for groups to continue fighting. On this point, help us.’122 117 For further exploration of this theme, focus group discussion participants in the more please see Lyons and Samatar rural areas of South Central reported that inter- • Service Provision: Unless and until Somali (1995), Lewis (1995 and 2011), and Ciisa-Slawe (1996). group inequalities provoke competition over citizens have reason to believe that political natural resources, including land, forests, authorities have some commitment to their 118 116 Information obtained in focus group water, energy and marine resources. personal security and well-being, local discussions and interviews in resistance to any form of state-building is Mogadihsu during the period 21 April – 8 June 2013. Weak Governance and Institutions likely to remain reflexive. This observation Many Somali experts suggest that the country’s points to a very important conclusion – 119 Ibid. colonial experience resulted in the subsequent namely, that it is not enough to focus on development of a nationalist government with a building the capacity of the state to deliver 120 Ibid. centralized system of state control over power services. An even more important factor is and economic resources.117 It is understood the political will of state authorities to deliver 121 that this in turn led to an uneven distribution of basic services. Though it seems counter- Ibid. political and economic power across the intuitive to observers who presume states 122 Quote from a member of a focus various clans, and created the inter-clan always seek to maximize their power, group discussion conducted in hostility that fuelled the Somali civil war after comparative research in failed states Mogadihsu on 30 April 2013. Chapter Four 65

suggests that there are circumstances in TFG officials engaged in diversion of food aid at which political elites have a vested interest the Mogadishu seaport and in internally in presiding over a de-institutionalized state displaced persons camps (Menkhaus, 2012). structure which does not respond to basic While the floods and latest famine may not needs of its citizens, including the provision have directly created conflict, the displacement of relevant education.123 and food insecurity negatively impacted a population whose safety nets and resilience Food Insecurity mechanisms were already weakened at that Conflict and food security are interlinked in point by years of conflict, reinforcing the South Central and food insecurity drives conflict mechanism in the affected areas. conflict in different ways. In 1992, drought, coupled with the devastation of the agriculture sector due to the conflict between warlords Key Conflict Actors created a massive food shortage and famine. This situation was exacerbated by warlords This section provides an overview of the key controlling the food supply, including the actors in to the conflict in the South Central humanitarian relief being sent to the country. A Zone.124 Because the zone contains the seat of humanitarian mission led by the UN and the federal government and much of the supported with international peacekeeping conflict in Somalia is taking place in the south, forces was able to ensure that food reached the there is repetition with the actors presented in starving population in South Central; however, the synthesis chapter. the presence of the troops in support of the humanitarian mission fermented a conflict with Mohamed Farah Aidid’s militia, which attacked UN and US forces whose mandate was to support the humanitarian assistance. These attacks spurred the US to expand its operations to fight and capture Aidid, an objective that was ultimately unsuccessful, costing UN peacekeeping, US forces, and Somali lives.

In 2006, massive flooding destroyed food stores and contaminated water supplies and sanitation facilities, leading to the displacement of the affected populations and food shortages, which increased food insecurity for many in the zone. Similarly, between late 2010 and early 2012, South Central Somalia experienced massive food insecurity when a prolonged period of drought resulted in the poorest harvest since the 1992-1993 famine. Coupled with the ongoing conflict with Al Shabaab, who controlled much of the south at that time— including the capital of Mogadishu where thousands of displaced, starving people fled— food insecurity rapidly morphed into a complex

123 humanitarian emergency, in which delivery of For further discussion on this point, food relief was slowed considerably by an Al see Englebert (2009). Shabaab reluctant to allow international 124 agencies and their implementing partners The analysis of the actors is based upon information drawn access to many affected areas. Indeed, Al from the interviews and focus Shabaab blocked famine relief into its areas of group discussions, as well as the secondary data drawn from control and tried to prevent famine victims from the background literature. fleeing to areas where aid was available, while 66 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Name Characteristics Needs Interests Positions Resources Relationships

Somali Federal Newly elected and Financial and Maintaining its Legitimate Limited. Reliant on In violent conflict Government widely recognized technical support to legitimacy and government of external assistance. with Al Shabaab. central government, establish capacity regaining control of Somalia Donors pledged Has been in conflict Somali’s first in over and deliver services Al Shabaab $2.4 billion of with clan-based twenty years. It has in the areas of its controlled territory. support to Somalia groups in Kismayo limited control over control. in September 2013. over a new Jubaland its territory in South Within the authority. Currently Central and is Military support to government, various contentious reliant on AMISOM maintain control of factions, often relationship with peacekeeping, territory currently based along clan Kenya over their Ethiopian, and held and expel Al lines and self- support of the Kenyan forces to Shabaab and other interest, pursue Jubaland authority. enforce its authority anti-government varying agendas. Supported by throughout groups. Ethiopia, who Mogadishu and the maintains troops in south. Limited parts of South credibility with Central. Testy population who is relationship with waiting to see what independent state benefits the new Somaliland as government is negotiations about capable of providing the question of to its citizens. Somaliland’s independence continue.

Al Shabaab Militant Islamist Financial and Establishing an The government of The annual budget In violent conflict group that rose to materiel support, as Islamic nation Somalia is a puppet is estimated to be against the Somali prominence in 2006. well as new recruits governed by their of the West and an between $70 and federal government At one time it to allow the group to interpretation of enemy of Islam. $100 million (UN, and its allies. controlled most of maintain their Shari’a law. 2011). It generates Pursues a combined the south and conflict against the Islam and the its revenue through strategy of Mogadishu, but government and its Fighting against Somali way of life is a regional organized conventional government forces allies. It appeals to those it perceives as under attack from crime network. warfare and terrorist and their AMISOM, the marginalized infidels and friends the West and must attacks against Kenyan, and and unemployed of the west. be defended. civilians that extend Ethiopian supporters youth and other beyond Somali have pushed Al groups. It also fills borders to Kenya Shabaab out of the its ranks through and Uganda. If key urban areas in involuntary convenient, clans South Central. recruitment. and other actors – including those who are usually allies of the government like the Ethiopians – will ally with Al Shabaab against a rival group, as was seen in the conflict in Kismayo in 2013.

Table 5 (continued on next two pages): Summary of Conflict Actors in South Central Zone Chapter Four 67

Name Characteristics Needs Interests Positions Resources Relationships

AMISOM Arrived in 2007 with Financial, materiel, The military defeat Supports the federal 22,216 military and Supports the federal a mandate to and technical of Al Shabaab and government in their police from 15 government and protect and support support to maintain the federal push for legitimacy different African undertakes military the government. mission. government and control over countries. The operations against controlling its territory in southern mission is funded by Al Shabaab. territory. Somalia. international donors through the UN Trust Fund for Somalia

Ethiopia Historically Somali’s Mixed – while a Maintain their Generally, Military forces While Ethiopia primary regional stable, peaceful sovereignty over supporting the occupying key towns supports the federal rival with recurrent Somalia would their territory, federal government in the northern part government in its disputes over the positively impact including the of Somalia by of the zone. fight against Ogaden region. the Horn of Africa Ogaden. maintaining control Al Shabaab, the region, on-going of key towns near relationship can be conflict in Somalia Maintaining a buffer the Ethiopian border contentious. There allows Ethiopia to zone against Al and pushing back are pro- and anti- play a direct role in Shabaab. Al Shabaab. Ethiopian factions the country. within the Somali federal government which can cause deep rifts in internal Somali politics.

Kenya Kenyan troops A defeated Restrict the Supporting the Military forces Actively opposing began operations Al Shabaab that is fundamentalist government against occupying Kismayo. Al Shabaab. against Al Shabaab no longer capable of influence of Al Shabaab under Currently fraught in 2010 with similar operating in Kenya. Al Shabaab. the AMISOM relationship with the motives as Ethiopia: mandate, but federal government to protect their Facilitate the return provided support to over the Kenyan’s borders from of hundreds of the Jubaland support of the encroachments by thousands of Somali administration Jubaland the Islamists. refugees from against the administration. Kenya. government forces in the fighting in Protect its north Kismayo in 2013. eastern province from lawlessness across the border.

Economic interest from the charcoal trade in Kismayo.

Rumoured interest in the potential oil and natural gas deposits in southern Somalia. 68 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Name Characteristics Needs Interests Positions Resources Relationships

Criminal Organized criminal Weak government Maintaining the Anti-government, N/A Use violence and Militias groups including control, instability current status quo, self-interested intimidation against small arms traders which allows economic gain populations to and self-interested unregulated trade maintain control militias that seek to and sustains their and safeguard their destabilise the zone position of power businesses. for economic gain. throughout the zone.

Civil Society Extensive network of Financial support for Filling the vacuum Generally supportive Varies by Strong relationships Organisations well-organized operations; and provide services of the government organization. with the formal social opportunity to fill for the population in and working to build communities they groups. role in peace- the absence of peace at the serve. Their role building and state- government. community levels. could be expanded building process, as upon in terms of they are often legitimising the viewed as rivals by state-building the governments. processes and ensuring that social inclusion is promoted.

Table 5 (continued from previous page): Summary of Conflict Actors in South Central Zone 69

Chapter Five 71 Chapter Five

Analysis of Puntland 72 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

his chapter sets forth the conflict analysis Tof Puntland, the autonomous state in northeast Somalia. It is based on a literature review of relevant documents, interviews conducted with stakeholders and experts in Nairobi and Garowe, and focus group discussions conducted in thirty-two communities in eight locations in Puntland. In the first section, the context and general history of the Puntland state is explored, while the second section outlines the chronology of conflict in the region. Sections Three and Four discuss the situational and location conflict dynamics throughout the state. Structural and proximate conflict drivers are presented in Section Five and in the final section, key conflict actors are discussed and analysed. Figure 6: Map of Puntland Puntland’s creation and maintenance of Context sustainable political and administrative institutions through a grassroots-centred Established as an autonomous Somali state in approach as well as the increase of social 1998, Puntland represented an attempt by services – particularly education – and a residents of the former Northeast Region in growing private sector are points to be 125 Puntland clan structures include part to contribute to the eventual rebuilding of celebrated (Interpeace, 2008). Annual per the Harti sub-clans from the the Somali state while ensuring that the capita income typically ranges from $150 to Darood clan-family, which is made up of the sub-clan families interests of the citizens of Puntland were $300, with significant differences between of the Majeerteen, Dhulbahante, represented (Interpeace, 2008). The area different regions of the state. The most recent Warsangeli, Deshiishe, Geesaguule, Kaskiqabe, and liibaangashe that is now the state of Puntland has a history government figures estimate that Gross (Lewis, 2003; Interpeace, 2008). going back many centuries and is the historic Domestic Product (GDP) is $600 per capita Other Darood sub-clans are spread out throughout the state, home of the Warangal Sultanate – one of the (Puntland Chamber of Commerce (PCOC, along with minority groups such largest ruling houses established in Somalia 2013). as the Bantu and Madhibaan (Lewis, 2003; Interpeace 2008). with a history going back to the 13th century (Lewis, 2003). It is the geographic area home Sparsely populated, vast stretches of rangelands 126 It should be noted that the mainly to sub-clans of the Darood clan-family are the chief geographic feature of Puntland, population figures vary by and other minority groups.125 Indeed, the which along with the semi-arid climate and source and can be contentious, as regions of Puntland are contested Majerteen, the largest Harti sub-group, is limited rainfall during biennial rainy seasons, between Puntland and Somaliland, perhaps the largest and most important of the lends itself to nomadic pastoralism. Indeed, impacting population numbers. This CPSA uses the official various clan-groups within Puntland, as it approximately half of Puntland’s population are population estimates from arguably played the leading role in the nomads (PMPIC, n.d.). Livestock is the main the Puntland government. autonomous region’s creation.

The most recent official population estimate Puntland’s creation and maintenance of sustainable was 3.9 million people (Puntland Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation political and administrative institutions through a (PMPIC), n.d.).126 Puntland’s population is also very young: nearly 70% of the grassroots-centred approach as well as the increase of population are below the age of 30 (PMPIC, n.d.). With a third of Somalia’s geographic social services – particularly education – and a growing area and a third of its population, Puntland is relatively sparsely populated, with only 18 private sector are points to be celebrated (Interpeace, 2008). people per kilometre (PMPIC, n.d.). Chapter Five 73

seat located in Garowe, the international ... in the Puntland experience, clanship seemed to be organisations and NGOs that partner with the government can be found there as well. The the guiding rationale for the formation of the state, government and these organisations serve as a chief economic driver for the city. Additionally, with three main divisions of the Majeerteen sub-clan of the city has a range of advanced educational facilities as well as sports areas and good the Harti clan indigenous to much of Puntland dominating infrastructure.

political life and the economic centres of Bossasso and Galkacyo. Oil and natural gas exploration has the potential for altering the dynamics of Puntland’s economy. For example, in 2008, Canada’s Africa Oil Corp. started oil exploration in source of economic livelihood for most people Puntland (Reuters, 2008). Observers believe in Puntland, contributing 60% of the gross that with geology similar to that of Yemen, there domestic product (GDP) and employing an could be deposits of crude oil in Puntland, equal percentage of the active labour force which together with its other untapped mineral (PRDC, 2004; PCOC, 2013). Much of the resources, could form the bedrock for state’s GDP comes from livestock exports to the Puntland’s economy over the coming years. Gulf States (PCOC, 2013). Other important industries include fishing, agriculture, and Politically, Puntland is divided into nine regions spices (PCOC, 2013). Similarly, foreign and thirty-seven districts,127 with Garowe as the investment from the diaspora is an important capital. Its government includes the judiciary, source of funding for many small businesses the legislative branch, which includes a 66- (OCHA, 2006; PCOC, 2013). Total private member House of Parliament, as well as a transfers from Somalis abroad are the third House of Elders, and the executive branch. The largest contributor to Puntland’s GDP, executive branch is currently led by the newly accounting for approximately $204 million per elected Puntland President, Abdiweli Ali Gas, a year (PCOC, 2013; Food Security and Nutrition former Prime Minister who replaced outgoing Analysis Unit (FSNAU), 2013). President Abdirahman Farole following presidential elections in early January 2014 Puntland’s coastline stretches along 1,600 (BBC, 2014). kilometres on both the Red Sea to the north and the Indian Ocean to the east. It supported Political life in Puntland remains largely centred active fishing communities until the growth of around clan relationships (Bryden, 1999; piracy along the Somali coast over the past 10 Caddur, 2007). Indeed, in the Puntland years. Over the last four years, the Puntland experience, clanship seemed to be the guiding government has undertaken coordinated anti- rationale for the formation of the state, with piracy efforts in the communities and an three main divisions of the Majeerteen sub-clan international piracy task force at sea, which of the Harti clan indigenous to much of have together stemmed the growth of piracy. Puntland dominating political life and the Fishing is now reported to be the second economic centres of Bossasso and Galkacyo largest contributor to the state’s GDP and (Marchal, 2010). Majeerteen dominance overall employment rates (PCOC, 2013). requires that other sub-clans align themselves with others and jockey for representation in a A significant portion of the state’s commercial political process that often reflects ongoing deep and economic activity centres on its largest inter- and intra-clan divisions (Marchal, 2010; city, the port of Bosaso, where a recent port ICG, 2013). renovation project funded by the World Food 127 Programme (WFP) recently reconstructed the These divisions were very apparent throughout There is some dispute over the number of districts in Puntland, seabed to accommodate larger ships (Garowe the implementation of the Puntland with four districts (Cayn, Haylaan, Online, 2012a; WFP, 2013). Likewise, the constitution, which has led the state’s politics Sool and Sanaag) claimed by both Puntland and Somaliland capital of Puntland, the city of Garowe, is a toward a multi-party electoral system that seeks (ICG, 2013). vibrant and growing city. With the government to avoid clan-based parties (ICG, 2013). The 74 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context institutionalisation of the constitutionally- mandated electoral process has moved forward The elections were hailed as a model for slowly, often fraught with allegations of favouritism, clannism, and abuse of power by peaceful political process in other parts of Somalia, then President Farole, who declared a term extension of one year in early 2012 (Horseed while others see it as a step away from inclusive representation, Media, 2012). Issues like the demarcation of constituencies and polling place distribution particularly for less powerful sub-clans and women. have implications for clan representation and were points of contention (ICG, 2013).

In September 2012, political parties were able fragile alliances that underpin political stability to register with the Puntland Election in the state. While stability was maintained, it Commission for the first time; a demonstration came at the price of more inclusive of positive growth toward a political system representation (ICG, 2013). based on political parties and elections rather than informal clan consensus (Sabahi, 2013). Despite worries about a fraught election, When the registration period ended, seven Puntland’s Presidential election on 8 January political parties had registered, with five 2014 saw the thus far peaceful transition of making the ballot128 (ICG, 2013). Despite this power from President Farole to new President – seeming progress, some of the most vocal and former Prime Minister – Abdiweli Ali Gas opponents of then President Farole declined to (BBC, 2014; ICG, 2013). In Puntland, the register or participate in the process as a President is not elected by popular vote, but demonstration of their dissatisfaction, which rather by the members of Parliament. The could have negatively impacted the inclusivity election of President Abdiweli Ali Gas follows and legitimacy of the process (ICG, 2013). the informal system of rotating Presidencies between the three main sub-clans of the It was intended that District Council elections Majerteen (ICG, 2013). The elections were would be held in early 2013 and the three hailed as a model for peaceful political process political organisations that won the most seats in other parts of Somalia, while others see it as would constitute state’s official parties (All a step away from inclusive representation, Africa, 2013). In the months leading up to the particularly for less powerful sub-clans and elections, tensions between the government women (BBC, 2014; ICG, 2013). and the opposition parties rose to the point of stalemate over six key issues, including Governance varies by location in Puntland. important points like the completion of voter Whilst Bosaso and Garowe have relatively registration, voter card distribution, and the strong governance structures and administrative creation of a court that would arbitrate electoral processes in place, there are more remote areas disputes (ICG, 2013). By the time the already throughout the state – for example Eyl, located rescheduled elections were to be held in July, it along the coast – where the state government’s was clear that peaceful polling could only take presence is less pronounced and the resources place in a few locations, but then President and services found in more heavily populated Farole pushed forward until there was little urban areas of the capital and busy sea port choice but to postpone the first district are lacking. The variations in governance are elections since 1968 to ensure the tensions mirrored in the typology, trends and methods of did not escalate and destabilise the state (All conflict and its resolution across the region. In Africa, 2013; ICG, 2013). Following the some areas, as the following section shows, postponement, then President Farole dissolved conflict is localised to traditional clan and sub- 128 The political parties that registered the political parties and the electoral clan tensions that are typically resolved through were then President Farole’s committee, in effect suspending the state’s traditional methods of conflict resolution led by Horseed party, the Puntland Democratic Party (PDP), the Union progress to a multi-party electoral system (ICG, communities, sub-clans, and clan elders. of the People of the Regions party 2013). This episode shows clearly the strong However, other areas, like Galkacyo, exhibit (UGUB), Horcad, Midnimo, Udad, and Wadajir. The UGUB failed to ties that political structures have to the clan high-level structural issues that often exceed register completely and the PDP did system and the deep divisions and sometimes- local capacities to resolve them. not qualify for the ballot (ICG, 2013). Chapter Five 75

Chronology of Conflict in Puntland well as religious fundamentalists in the northeast (GoP, 2013; Interpeace, 2008). With Somali independence in 1960, the Between 1991 and 1993, there were twelve geographic area that is now the state of major armed conflicts between the SSDF and Puntland became part of the independent the USC centred in Galkacyo and the Mudug Somalia and those involved in the colonial region (Interpeace, 2008). Facing internal administrations played an important part in challenges and recognising that they had the new government. Prominent Majerteen reached a stalemate, Abdullahi Yusuf, leader of leaders became key figures in the government, the SSDF, and Moahmed Farah Aydiid, leader including President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke of the USC, brokered the Mudug Peace and Prime Minister Abdirizak Haji Hussein Agreement, which is hailed as one of the most (Interpeace, 2008). It was the assassination successful peace initiatives in Somalia during of President Sharmarke that brought about the this period (Interpeace, 2008). Following the military coup d’etat led by Colonel Siad Barre, peace agreement, the period from 1993 to who would rule Somalia until his regime fell in 1998 is characterised by internal power 1991. struggles within the SSDF and multiple conferences which served to lay the During Barre’s rule, the former Prime Minister foundations for what would become the state Hussein and other leading Majerteen figures of Puntland (Interpeace, 2008). Although state were targets of persecution. Following the governance structures did not exist during this defeat of the Somali Army in Ethiopia, officers period, events afforded political leaders the led by a Majerteen officer, Colonel Mohamed opportunity to practice governance, Sheikh Osman, failed at their attempted coup negotiation, and conflict resolution (Bryden, in April 1978. Fleeing the country after their 1999). failure, they formed the first organised opposition to Barre’s rule – first called the In 1998, at the Garowe Community Somali Salvation Front, then the Somali Constitutional Conference, over 460 delegates Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). In approved a provisional Charter that established retaliation, Barre cracked down on the region, the State of Puntland (Interpeace 2008). with his elite forces smashing water reservoirs Although Puntland’s grass-roots approach used by the Majerteen people and committing toward the creation of its government is hailed other atrocities against the population as an appropriate pattern for the rest of (Interpeace 2008). Along with the active Somalia, there are underlying issues that pose repression of certain sub-clans in the region, problems if unaddressed (Interpeace, 2008; very little economic development support was Bryden, 1999). These issues play out in the provided, leaving the region with little beyond ongoing political tensions throughout Puntland. basic infrastructure by the time Barre’s From 2001-2003, armed confrontations government fell (WSP, 2001). between then president, Abdullahi Yusuf, whose term was about to expire, and the newly After the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, elected President Colonel Jama Ali Jama, who the SSDF set about defending the north-east was from a traditionally rival sub-clan, areas from the groups invading from the threatened to destroy the newly formed south, spearheaded by USC (1991-1993) as government (ICG, 2009). President Yusuf refused to step down. His forces took over key towns and he declared himself President, ruling through fear and an iron fist (ICG, Although Puntland’s grass-roots approach toward the 2009). Negotiations were facilitated between the two factions by respected elders and creation of its government is hailed as an appropriate pattern businessmen, resulting in a peace agreement whereby Abdullahi Yusuf’s presidential term for the rest of Somalia, there are underlying issues was extended and Jama Ali Jama eventually became a member of the Transitional Federal that pose problems if unaddressed. Parliament (Interpeace, 2008). 76 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

In addition to leading to the deaths of Current conflict in Puntland is manifested in approximately 400 people, President Yusuf’s five main ways. It must be emphasised that it refusal to hand over the presidency peacefully varies widely across the state, with some had long-running consequences (ICG, 2009). areas, such as Iskushuban and Garowe being One of the victims of his determined fight for relatively calm, while in others – like Galkacyo power was the inter-clan consensus politics and the border regions with Somaliland – that had shaped the creation of the Puntland violence can erupt quickly. state (ICG, 2009). The erosion of clan cooperation is apparent in sub-clan conflicts Q First, there is the ongoing border dispute that arose in two areas in 2004, an indirect between itself and Somaliland over the Sool result of Yusuf’s actions. In Lass ‘Aanood, the and Sanaag region, arising from fractured provincial capital of Sool province, a territory clan allegiances to the two states in these that is disputed between Somaliland and areas (Höhne, 2007). Puntland, tensions that simmered for years Q Second, there is tension between Puntland boiled over. The situation was further and the autonomous regional administration exacerbated in 2007 when Somaliland troops of Galmudug over ownership of Galkacyo occupied the town, forcing the evacuation of and the surrounding area. Here, at least, clan elders and hundreds of families (ICG, tensions have simmered somewhat over 2009; Garowe Online, 2007). Much of the recent years with joint ventures between the foundation for the conflict there is drawn from two administrations to root out pirates and the grievances of the Dhulbahante and other forms of armed criminality in this area. Warsangeli clans that are victims of both the Q Third, there is a challenge to the security of Isaq clan in Somaliland and the Majerteen in the state posed by Al-Shabaab elements Puntland (ICG, 2009). Dhulbahante clan driven from the south and finding refuge in leaders, discouraged by the Puntland the state. government’s ability or willingness to regain Q Fourth, there are widespread issues with control of Lass ‘Aanood, have since determined lawlessness, piracy and other forms of to “chart an independent course” (ICG, 2009). armed criminality that undermine state In Galkacyo, similar tensions exist between the institutions, legitimacy as well as any Darood and Hawiye sub-clans. Galkacyo town prospective development planning initiative. is divided between the two clans and violence Q Finally, there are tensions surrounding between clans and sub-clans is frequent there politics that can be based in clan or sub- (ICG, 2009). Additionally, over the past few clan identity, an ongoing trend observed over years, clashes between government forces and the past few years that threatens to sub-clans have occurred, as with the ‘Battle for undermine the collaborative politics which Galkacyo’ in September 2009 (Jamestown served the state so well during its formation Foundation, 2011; Inside the Insurgency, (ICG, 2009). These tensions have the 2011). potential of spilling over into destabilising conflict, as was seen in the district elections While tensions remain in both Lass ‘Aanood which were postponed in July 2013. and Galkayo, the major violent conflicts have been resolved through extensive negotiations Despite these challenges to peace and stability and diplomacy. Despite the fact that these in Puntland and the sheer variability of conflict negotiations may have failed to resolve the throughout the state, generally the pattern fundamental grievances and sub-clan rivalries emerging from the state’s recent history is that that brought the tensions to the fore, Las tension and conflict exist to varying degrees in ‘Aanood, Galkayco, and the constitutional crisis several key cities and regions, but are good examples of what has become the relationships, clan leadership, and negotiation pattern for conflict in Puntland: tensions and have proved successful ad hoc conflict conflicts arise but are typically resolved through management processes as they arise. 129 Events listed are drawn from mediation led by clan elders and other information from Höhne (2007), respected leaders, avoiding the type of long- Major conflicts in Puntland are summarised in International Crisis Group (2009), running overt conflict seen in South Central the timeline presented in Table 5:129 Interpeace (2008), and a timeline of conflict in Puntland Zone. (Timelines Data Base, 2013). Chapter Five 77

Date Event Date Event

July 1960 Somali Independence 2003 Puntland Peace Agreement ending conflict between Yusuf and Jama’s supporters.

1969 Military coup d’etat led by Colonel Siad Barre is triggered by the assassination of 2004 Clan-based conflict in Lass Anood in Sool. President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, a prominent Majerteen leader. 2004-2005 Sub-sub clan conflict in Galkayo ending in the Ramada Peace Agreement. 1977 War with Ethiopia resulting in defeat of Somali Army. 2007 Fighting between Harti sub-clans resulting in Burtinle Peace Agreement. April 1978 Coup attempt by Colonel Mohamed Osman of the Majerteen. July 2007 Sanaag Region declares independence.

1978 Formation of the Somali Salvation Front (SOSAF), later renamed the Somali October 2007 Fighting breaks out between Somaliland Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) by and Puntland in the Sool region. Lt. Col. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed.

2009 The Puntland government begins a 1979 Somali National Movement (SNM) formed. crackdown on criminal gangs and pirates.

1989 United Somali Congress (USC) formed. 2010 Puntland forces undertake the Galgala campaign against Al Shabaab. Military operations against Al Shabaab have been 1991 Fall of Siad Barre’s government. ongoing since 2010.

February 1991 USC militia attack and control Galkayo. 2013 Tensions increase and threaten to erupt over district elections. The elections are postponed. May 1992 Seizure of Bosaso port and Garowe by Islamist group Al-Itihaad led by Hassan Dahir Aweys. 2014 Peaceful transition of executive power from outgoing President Farole to newly elected President Abdiweli Ali Gas 1991-1993 12 major armed conflicts between the following the presidential elections USC and SSDF in Galkayo and Mudug, held in early January. resulting in the Mudug Peace Agreement.

1998 Formation of the State of Puntland.

2001-2003 Violent conflict between supporters of Table 5: outgoing Puntland President Abdullahi Major Conflicts in Yusuf and newly elected President Jama Ali Jama. Puntland 78 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Situational Dynamics One negative aspect of a close relationship with other countries Variation underpins conflict dynamics in Puntland, whether it is at the regional, state, or is the influence that other countries can have local level. Beyond Somali borders, the Puntland government has maintained a on government policy and structures. generally good relationship with Ethiopia, its neighbour to the north, since the state’s formation in 1998. In 2002, Ethiopia reportedly provided between 200-300 troops structures. While foreign influence on the in support of President Abdullahi Yousef during government was not mentioned in the the constitutional crisis (News24, 2002). community level focus group discussions, it is Ethiopia opened a consulate in the state capital a factor in the wider dynamics, particularly in of Garowe in 2010, strengthening relationships the security services, where the Puntland with the state (Horseed Media, 2010). At Intelligence Agency (PIA) and the Puntland times, however, the conflict over succession in Security Force (PSF) are purported to receive Ethiopia’s Ogaden region spills over to nearly half of the state’s budget in addition to Puntland, with brief incursions of Ethiopian financial support from Western governments troops into Puntland causing a rise in tensions (Somaliland Press, 2010). The predecessor to (Garowe Online, 2010). In 2010, Ethiopia also the PIA/PSF, the Puntland Intelligence Services provided support to Somaliland troops in their (PIS) had aligned itself the United States in fight against an autonomous militia in the Sool that country’s ‘War on Terror’, rounding up and region, also increasing tensions temporarily extraditing suspected Islamist militants with (IRIN, 2010). Puntland’s President and other links to Al Shabaab (ICG, 2009). Their heavy- leaders travel frequently to Ethiopia to discuss handed tactics under the guise of ‘counter- security, governance, and the economic ties terrorism’, allegedly for personal and clan gain, between the two states, as well as issues eroded public trust in the security structures related to the Federal Somali Constitution (All and led to a reorganisation of the forces by Africa, 2013). Ethiopia, along with other IGAD then-President Farole in 2010 (ICG, 2009; states, officially supports a federalised Somalia. Salah, 2009; Somaliland Press, 2010).

Further afield, Puntland also has economic ties Puntland’s relationship with its Somali and agreements with key partners in the Gulf, neighbours is more contentious. As previously including Qatar and United Arab Emirates. mentioned, there are ongoing tensions in the Governments from Gulf States have supported Sool and Sanaag regions that sometimes turn anti-piracy efforts in Puntland, and private violent. These tensions are complex, related to enterprises have invested in the state’s divisions in the local communities, political infrastructure, including modernising Bosaso’s alliances, clan and sub-clan allegiances, blood seaport and airport, as well as managing a feuds, and undetermined border demarcations Free Trade Zone (Hiirraan Online, 2013; between the two states (Höhne, 2007). To the Pelton, 2012; Murphy, 2008). Additionally, south, Puntland’s relationship with the Federal international organisations and bilateral donors Government in Mogadishu remains troubled, support the Puntland government, providing with Puntland severing ties with the central on-budget support and assisting with social government in August 2013. While Puntland service provision. Generally, Puntland’s accepts and has long championed a federated relationship with its regional neighbours, other Somali government across all of the current countries, and the international community is territory of Somalia, it has nonetheless one of collaboration and cooperation and it retreated from accepting governance by the actively courts foreign investment (PCOC, government in Mogadishu over what it sees as 2013). the failure to share power and resources, as well as the federal government’s weakness in One negative aspect of a close relationship dealing with Al Shabaab (Reuters, 2013). with other countries is the influence that other countries can have on government policy and Chapter Five 79

Although not mentioned in the vast majority of Although diminished, the structures for local-level conflict the community level focus group discussions, corruption plays a significant role in the resolution by respected clan and political leaders remain dynamics within the state. Indeed, it has been reported to have “…permeated every tier of relatively intact, although these processes themselves government and become a way of life” (ICG, 2009).130 At the higher levels, it impacts the are sometimes contentious and manipulated politically. political and economic systems in Puntland in several ways. First, the lack of pay for civil servants – especially policemen and soldiers – leads to an environment where demanding payments from the public or taking bribes from Location Dynamics criminal groups to supplement a non-existent income is commonplace (ICG, 2009; Hiiraan Within the state itself, the dynamics of conflict Online, 2009). This type of corruption, in turn, and peace, as well as the relationships allowed piracy and other criminal enterprises to between them, are fluid. The area which now flourish in the absence of rule of law by the makes up the state of Puntland was the state. Likewise, corruption occurs when public historical territory of the Harti clans (Bryden, funds or external financial support meant to 1999), which would lend itself to the augment state budgets are diverted for assumption that a state dominated by a single personal or clan gain, as was alleged to be the clan would be less prone to conflict between case with the state’s security apparatus (ICG, groups given the area’s relative homogeneity. 2009; Hiiraan Online, 2009). Additionally, However, politics in Puntland is dependent taking bribes for import/export and fishing upon an uneasy consensus between three licenses, as well as the underhanded major Majerteen sub-clans that includes an distribution of mineral exploration rights, had informal rotation of the state’s executive devastating economic consequences (ICG, powers and control of commercial interests 2009). These type of activities and rumours (ICG, 2013; Marchal, 2010). Factions within that state officials were directly linked to piracy and between the dominant sub-clans that operations highlight yet another level of 130 were present during the intervening years prior corruption within the state – one in which Although corruption was not to the establishment of the state continue, leaders knowingly undermine stability and specifically mentioned by focus group discussions, it is raised by often playing out during elections, as legitimate economic activity for personal gain multiple secondary sources, thus demonstrated in the period leading up to the (Beloff, 2013). Finally, corruption at the should be mentioned. Because the data collectors did not probe this postponed local elections in July 2013 (ICG, political level, where votes or support for issue, one can only speculate on 2013). Indeed, the disintegration of the candidates are bought, undermines the the reasons why corruption was not raised at the community level. collaborative approach between various legitimacy of the political system and the Some reasons could include: factions that was present at the formation of public’s support for it (ICG, 2009). participants did not feel comfortable raising this point with the data the state in 1998 has diminished significantly, collection team; community driven by the erosion of intra-clan cohesion At the local level one can find the same sort of members view corruption at their level as the normal course for (ICG, 2009). Although diminished, the corruption, although in very remote locations doing business and see it less of structures for local-level conflict resolution by government presence is often limited, thereby a problem; in more remote areas of Puntland, communities are not respected clan and political leaders remain limiting the scale of corruption of officials. At closely linked to formal governance relatively intact, although these processes this level, it is in the informal government structures, so government corruption is not a major issue themselves are sometimes contentious and structures where corruption occurs. For for them. manipulated politically. example, clan and community elders also earn profits from criminal activities like piracy, often the only economic activity available to them (Beloff, 2013). However, corruption at the [Corruption has] “…permeated every tier of government community level is not limited to clan elders or criminal activities – it takes many forms. In the and become a way of life.” only stark example of corruption at the local level provided in a community focus group, students in Iskushuban reported that their 80 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context teacher sent them out to work in his fields, rather than teaching at school.131 Here [in the core areas] it is more accurate to speak of

When comparing the eight locations surveyed ‘developmental’ pressures rather than the systemic conflict that as part of this conflict analysis the variations of the dynamics throughout the state are very characterises much of Somalia’s South Central Zone in particular. stark. These locations vary by demographics, governance structures, the type and impact of conflict, and the actors and triggers, but for analysis purposes are best divided into two comments about the general situation in areas: the centre comprises an area 100 Somalia and/or Puntland and do not kilometres wide following the road north from necessarily impact their daily life.134 In many the state capital, Garowe, to Bosaso; and the areas, the conflict that does exist is fairly periphery, which includes all other areas, localised and based on clan or sub-clan including the urban area of Galkacyo North. affiliation, migration issues (particularly IDPs), religious sect, or access to resources whether it is land, water, jobs, or government The Core services.135 The chewing of qaat is often pointed to as a leading cause of conflict in Garowe and Bosaso, in particular, are marked these locations.136 Another key challenge cited by effective governance structures, the rule of was gender-based violence, particularly for law, increased security and a general lack of women in more vulnerable populations, such conflict. Here it is more accurate to speak of as IDPs.137 ‘developmental’ pressures rather than the systemic conflict that characterises much of In summary, rather than violent conflict, the 131 Information obtained in focus group Somalia’s South Central Zone in particular. core faces developmental challenges that discussions in Iskushuban during Most urban areas in Puntland, particularly its bring inter-communal tensions over land, clan the period of 6-8 September 2013, most important seaport and political capital, identities, resources or religion into sharp 132 have generally enjoyed marked peace and focus and which are solved more-or-less Information obtained in focus group discussions throughout stability since 1998, with a few exceptions. A peacefully by a well-run network of local Puntland during the period more visible security presence and active rule elders. 7 July to 21 September 2013. of law has largely discouraged the types of 133 violence and armed criminality seen elsewhere Information obtained during data validation workshop with in Somalia and made possible stability that The Periphery researchers, 11-12 October 2013, created an environment conducive to and interviews with local NGO development and service delivery. In these The locations included in the periphery are project managers, 14 October 2013. locations, improved education, business, generally further away from the urban areas 134 health facilities, and telecommunications were and the seat of government. In these areas, Information obtained in focus group discussions in Bosaso during the all listed as variables that respondents had fewer resources are allocated for creating or period 21-27 July 2013 and a seen improve over the past few years.132 An strengthening their infrastructure and their workshop with local peacebuilding organisations in Garowe, increase in agricultural production in the areas official governance structures are weaker, 13 October 2013. around these cities was also reported by although their traditional governance 135 respondents, as was an increase in the state’s structures are not necessarily so. Locations in Information obtained in focus group population, with people migrating from rural the periphery are often geographically remote discussions in Iskushuban during the period of 6-8 September 2013, areas and other areas of Somalia to take and difficult to access, creating further Bosaso during the period of advantage of the stability, improved challenges to service delivery. Some of these 3-14 August 2013, and Arno during the period 9-10 September 2013. infrastructure and services, and better more remote locations are home to a higher livelihood opportunities.133 percentage of nomads, whose lifestyle has 136 Ibid. different requirements from those of settled Despite the positive aspects of living in communities. 137 Information obtained during relatively conflict-free urban areas like Bosaso interviews with project managers and Garowe, community members cite general The periphery is also marked by context- at local NGO on 13 October 2013 and with research officers at the fears of Al-Shabaab, piracy and other forms of specific challenges that vary from area to area, Puntland Development Research armed criminality, but these appear to be but the aforementioned lack of infrastructure, Center on 14 October 2013. Chapter Five 81

service delivery, and strong official governance composition creates a volatile mixture where structures to match those of the core is the key dynamics seen elsewhere in the state – factor in the emergence of these factors and conflicts over clan affiliation and access to dynamics. For instance, over the past two resources for example – are exacerbated and decades, the town of Eyl has experienced have the potential to develop into more serious considerable economic stagnation due to its conflicts. remote and rugged geography, poor infrastructure, limited access to education and instability caused by piracy. These factors Conflict Drivers combined create local dynamics that mean the normal pressures over land, clan-based Much like the dynamics of conflict in conflict, and access to resources and Puntland, the drivers of conflict are also highly opportunities that occur elsewhere are, in Eyl, variable, due in part to large differences in the brought into sharp focus and often trigger specific local contexts – the remoteness of conflict.138 certain areas, the clan or sub-clan make-up, the level of development and services present, On the other hand, in Galkacyo, it is clear that or the presence of large communities of IDPs, insufficient and ineffective top-down direction for example. Any attempt to understand of a potent social mix of groups and people has conflict drivers in Puntland and the coalesced into a dangerously volatile relationships between them must begin with environment in an otherwise thriving urban the enormous differences in the manifestation area. In Galkacyo, multiple over-lapping issues and experiences of conflict throughout the

138 and group animosities manifest themselves state. Analysing the data collected from 32 139 Information obtained during through repeated and systemic violence. communities in eight locations across the focus group discussions in Furthermore, many of the residents in the state, as well as interviews conducted at the Eyl conducting during the period 3-17 September 2013. Jariiban area noted general concerns with community and state level, the differences fighting and clashes over land, pasture, and between locations in the type and make-up of 139 Information obtained during water between their clan and the neighbouring the conflict they experience are stark to the focus group discussions in clan in Galmudug.140 Moreover, idle pirates extent that each location represents its own Galkacyo during the period 13 July to 8 September 2013. were also identified as being a particular issue conflict system. Despite these differences, within the local area.141 This is because, as commonalities and general trends can be 140 Information obtained during focus stated above, one of the main concerns of the discerned at the local level that can be group discussions in Jariiban during community is that of being isolated from the synthesised into state-wide conflict drivers. the period 3-7 September 2013. Government’s influence. Some respondents These drivers can be furthered categorised into 141 noted that they do not feel the government has structural and proximate drivers, with Information obtained during a focus group discussion with enough presence in this area: it seems very ‘far structural drivers referring to those long-term community elders in Jariiban away’.142 causes that create preconditions for violence on 3 September 2013. (e.g. poverty, geography, political and social 142 In the periphery, then, it can be said that inequalities, history, or weak government Information obtained during focus group discussions in Jariiban during limited government presence and service structures) while proximate drivers exacerbate the period 3-7 September 2013. delivery, along with limited infrastructure these exiting conditions and often mobilise Quotation from a respondent in a focus group discussion in Jariiban combined with existent factors such as groups to turn to violence such as regime on 6 September 2013. geographic remoteness and population change, elections, external interventions, and insurgent violence (Stewart, 2002; Thoms & Ron, 2007). Table 6 provides a summary of the structural and proximate conflict drivers Any attempt to understand conflict drivers in Puntland identified in the analysis of the data collected at the community and state level. It also and the relationships between them must begin with provides the location where the drivers are present, the way in which the drivers are the enormous differences in the manifestation manifested, as well as the key actors in that conflict. and experiences of conflict throughout the state. 82 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Conflict Drivers Location Manifestations of Conflict

Structural

Access to Resources (land, All areas Low-level violence. grazing rights, water, livelihoods)

Clan Dynamics In most areas, although level Tensions and disputes at the familial and community levels, polarisation at the clan or sub- varies. Particularly noted in clan level, political tensions, petty violence/theft/criminality, violent conflict (Galkacyo). Galkacyo, Jariiban, Bosaso.

Economic Stagnation/Poverty All areas Frustration, hopelessness, petty crime, recruitment into criminal or extremist groups.

Marginalised Youth All areas Despondency, the cycle of hopelessness, recruitment into criminal or extremist groups, emigration, human trafficking.

Norms of Violence Galkacyo, Eyl Armed criminality (gangs, piracy) and insurgent groups (Al Shabaab), assassinations, inability of traditional capacities to mediate violence, gangs of youths engaged in turf-wars.

Proximate

Unresolved Border Dispute with Sool, Sanaag 143 Sporadic violent conflict, increased tension between sub-clans, increased tensions between Somaliland governments.

Increased presence Galkacyo, Jariiban, Eyl Armed conflict between Al Shabaab and government forces, recruitment of young men into of Al Shabaab Al Shabaab.

Table 6: Conflict Drivers in Puntland

Structural Drivers clan-related disputes. From the eight locations 143 surveyed in Puntland, Ufayn is the best Please note that community-level field research was not conducted Access to Resources example of communities where access to in the disputed areas in Sool and The first of the major conflict drivers reported physical resources is the key conflict driver – Sanaag. This driver was identified through background research and to varying degrees throughout the state is water provision being the primary challenge in state-level interviews. access to resources: land, water, grazing several of the communities surveyed there.144 144 rights, and economic opportunities. On this In urban areas like Bosaso and Garowe, Information obtained during point, ‘conflict’ must be conceptualised economic livelihood opportunities were viewed focus group discussions conducted in Ufayn during the period carefully, because many of the focus group as a resource, much like water and land are 4-5 September 2013. participants did not conceive of highly linked to livelihoods for residents of rural 145 145 localised conflicts over resources in the same communities. It is reported that access to Information obtained during way they consider problems with pirate gangs employment is often determined by familial interviews with a project manager of a local NGO in Garowe on and Al-Shabaab as conflicts. They also viewed and clan ties and those who do not benefit 13 October 2013. the localised conflicts over access to land or from the patronage system are marginalised, 146 146 water quite differently than the widespread leading to resentment. In Garowe, Ibid. ongoing conflict in the South Central Zone. particularly, jobs with the government and the 147 Most of the low-level and localised conflict numerous international organisations and Information obtained during a occurs around land ownership, petty NGOs are perceived as a key resource and workshop with local peacebuilding 147 organisations in Garowe, 13 October squabbles, religious disputes between sects, competition for these positions is fierce. 2013 and discussion with director of conflict over access to water and land, and a local NGO on 11 October 2013. Chapter Five 83

not managed in a transparent and equitable On this point, ‘conflict’ must be conceptualised carefully, manner and disputes on main points of contention resolved early. For example, because many of the focus group participants did not conceive disputes over which entity has the rights to licensing could drive conflict between the of highly localised conflicts over resources in the same way they Somali federal government and the Puntland government (Reuters, 2013). Somaliland has consider problems with pirate gangs and Al-Shabaab as conflicts. also been issuing concessions to oil companies for exploration in the Sool and Sanaag regions, which would further exacerbate existing tensions between the Puntland and Somaliland When asked about the origins of localised governments (Garowe Online, 2013). Oil conflicts over access to resources, respondents exploration in Puntland has the potential to pointed out that these were not ‘new’ conflicts undermine security and create conflict by – rather they were part and parcel of the providing a target for Al Shabaab in their fight configuration of the local societies.148 As such, against the oil workers that they call “Christian respondents reported that conflicts are resolved invaders and the Somali infidels that work for through the same mechanisms that have them” (Reuters, 2012). Finally, oil exploration existed throughout Somali history at the and extraction can become a source of conflict community level: consultation and negotiations between the people who live on the land and between groups of elders, religious leaders, the government and the oil companies, if the business leaders, and village councils with no population perceive that they are receiving little 148 need for outside intervention. benefits from what they could view as Information obtained in focus group discussions throughout encroachment on their lands. Puntland during the period It is notable that no focus group participants 7 July to 21 September 2013. specifically mentioned tensions between Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were 149 nomads and settled communities as a driver of frequently reported as drivers of conflict in Information obtained during focus 149 group discussions with IDPs and conflict – an expected driver of conflict Bosaso, Garowe, and Galkacyo; however, host communities in Bosaso during particularly in the rural areas with large the analysis determined that the presence of the period 11-14 August 2013, Garowe during the period nomadic populations. Rather, it is inferred from IDPs in communities, whether embedded in 25-29 August 2013, and Galkayco the more indirect references to conflicts over host communities or in IDP camps, was not during the period 13-17 July 2013. access to water and land that tensions between alone an indicator or driver of conflict or 150 settled and nomadic communities over violence. Rather the conflict stemmed from Information obtained during data validation workshop resources is a conflict driver. tensions over access to resources – housing, with researchers in Garowe, employment, education, social services – was 11-12 October 2013. One key resource that was not mentioned in the main factor, not necessarily the IDPs 151 the community level focus group discussions is themselves. This is an important distinction to Interview with project manager and project assistant with that of oil; however, this is a significant make, as Puntland is home to approximately international NGO on resource that has the potential to become a 149,000 IDPs – mostly concentrated the three 13 October 2013 and interview with project managers with conflict driver at multiple levels if the current main urban areas, with the majority, 84,000, a local NGO on 12 October 2013. exploration and future drilling operations are residing in Galkacyo (OCHA, 2012).

Many of these IDPs fled the ongoing conflict Oil exploration and extraction can become and famine in South Central, although some of the IDPs were originally from Puntland and a source of conflict between the people who live on the land returned to their ancestral homes at the time of the civil war.150 Interview respondents from and the government and the oil companies, if the population organisations that provide services to IDP communities explain that conflict can arise perceive that they are receiving little benefits from what they when host communities come to resent the assistance and services provided to the IDPs by 151 could view as encroachment on their lands. the government and organisations. Assistance and life-saving aid can be perceived as special treatment and access to resources 84 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context that host communities do not have. This fuels resentment and leads to grievances that can be Puntland is home to approximately 149,000 IDPs expressed in violence against IDPs. Several of the organisations providing services to IDP – mostly concentrated the three main urban areas, communities mitigate potential conflict by providing similar services to poor families in with the majority, 84,000, residing in Galkacyo. host communities, or providing services that benefit both host communities and IDPs.152

Clan Dynamics conflicts between other clans is a dynamic that The clan is the basic unit for much of the plays itself out both on the community and interaction that occurs within Somali society. state level, divisions that echo past dynamics Historically, Puntland was the ancestral home in the region. For example, the origins of the to the Harti clans and its chief characteristic Puntland state were based on Majerteen was kinship (Bryden, 1999). Modern Puntland leadership, leading to discontent with some of is comprised of regions that are extremely the minority sub-clans like the Dhulbahante homogenous, like North Mudug, and others and Warsangeli that felt excluded and that are home to a mixture of clans, such as unrepresented in the state structures. Over the Sool and Sanaag (Interpeace, 2008). Its clan past few years, the strong consensus between structure is generally composed of the Harti Darood sub-clans in Puntland that sub-clan of the Darood clan, other Darood characterised the early Puntland government clans, and minority groups. Puntland’s has disintegrated, leading to friction between homogeneity has been cited as one of the sub-clan groups and undermining stability factors that allowed the region to avoid the (ICG, 2009). In this way, clan structures devolution into ongoing civil war and other perform an accelerating role for conflict, in violent conflicts present in the South other words, they are not necessarily causes of (Interpeace, 2008). conflict themselves but hone, shape and bring other variables into sharper relief. Somali clan dynamics have both positive and negative impacts. Immediately following the A variety of context-specific triggers can dissolution of the central state in 1991, the instigate clan-based conflict, which can take clan network served as the interim local the form of spiralling cycles of violence, as authority, instituting rule of law creating a seen in the Galkacyo area. Indeed, focus group structure that created an environment of participants in several areas in Puntland report reasonable stability, allowing commerce to that clan-related conflict is a problem in their 152 Ibid. continue and the formal state-building process areas. This was particularly notable in to move forward (Interpeace, 2008). Galkacyo and Jariiban, where tensions 153 Information obtained during Additionally, in a state where much of its between the Darood in the north and Hawiye focus group discussions conducted population lives in remote areas, far from the in the south have been ongoing for decades.153 in Galkacyo during the period 13 July to 8 September 2013 seat of government, the local clan structures Low-level tensions were reported in the Bosaso and Jariiban during the period continue to provide the main source of area as well, while communities in the more 3-7 September 2013. governance. In this sense, the strong clan structures are a positive force for peace and stability in the region. While the social fabric in Puntland is, like the rest of Somalia,

While the social fabric in Puntland is, like the remarkably strong and provides structure and support rest of Somalia, remarkably strong and provides structure and support to its to its population, particularly in times of crisis, population, particularly in times of crisis, this same structure can lend itself to serve as a this same structure can lend itself to serve as a conflict driver, conflict driver, channelling tension and violence along clan lines. It is true that while Puntland, channelling tension and violence along clan lines. generally speaking, has a largely homogenous clan composition, sub-clan tensions and Chapter Five 85

positions and other favours in return for In the areas studied, many of the respondents seem to support for Somaliland governance there (ICG, 2013; Marshal, 2010). Similarly, an influx of place a great deal of faith in the conflict resolving capabilities large numbers of IDPs can shape the ways that conflict is propagated through clan structures. of these local elders. However, due to the relatively strong traditional governance structures that are present in many localities, outright and sustained clan conflict is limited through much of Puntland, although it homogenous areas of Iskushuban and Ufayn is a notable element of the ongoing violence in 154 experienced very little to no clan related Galkacyo. Information obtained during focus conflict.154 group discussions conducted in Ishkushuban during the period Lack of Economic Opportunity/Poverty 6-8 September 2013 and While perhaps not causing the same amount of Like other young, developing states, poverty Ufayn during the period 4-5 September 2013. devastation that one can witness in the south, and economic stagnation are chief challenges the struggle over resources and family honour facing Puntland. With its remote geography, 155 Information obtained during linked to clan and sub-clan affiliation is arid climate, and high percentage of nomads focus group discussions conducted ongoing in Puntland communities. These the cornerstone of its economy is livestock in Arno during the period 9-10 September 2013 localised conflicts are often over land, husbandry; however, a significant portion of and Bosaso during the period resources, water grazing rights and a myriad of the Puntland population relies heavily on 21 July to 22 September 2013. other variables that affect communities at the remittances for income. While the urban areas, 156 local level. Petty squabbles over these particularly the port city of Bosaso and the Information obtained in focus group discussions conducted throughout resources at the family level can quickly government seat of Garowe can boast thriving Puntland during the period escalate, taking advantage of fissures already business communities, economic livelihoods 7 July to 21 September 2013. in place in clan relationships, becoming more beyond animal husbandry are limited in much 157 problematic as more widely spread conflict. of the state. Focus group participants in each Information obtained in focus group However, it is equally clear that in many areas location reported that lack of economic discussions conducted with young people throughout Puntland during the clan-structures themselves are highly livelihood opportunities were one of the main the period 7 July to 21 September resilient to this type of conflict emerging, as challenges they faced.156 This is particularly 2013. local elders and other members of the clan true of the youth and most deeply felt by young 158 hierarchy are normally entrusted to bring the men (Bellof, 2013).157 Education levels did not Ibid. situation under control.155 In the areas studied, appear to be a factor in the lack of 159 many of the respondents seem to place a great opportunities, with uneducated and education Information obtained in focus group discussions with young people deal of faith in the conflict resolving capabilities respondents reporting the same challenges in conducted in Garowe during the of these individuals. finding suitable employment.158 period 16 July to 29 August 2013 and interviews with director of a local NGO conducted Lastly, external pressures can exacerbate People in Puntland respond to the lack of 11 October 2013. existing tensions or propagate conflict that economic livelihood opportunities and the 160 manifest through clan structures. In Puntland, resulting poverty in several ways. In Garowe, Information obtained in focus group discussions conducted with young the Somaliland government can play an young men in particular seek out the military people throughout Puntland during instigating role in conflict in the contested as a career, while others seek for jobs with the the period 7 July to 21 September 2013, data validation workshop regions claimed by both governments. government or the international organisations with researchers in Garowe in Somaliland at times exploits the divisions of and NGOs located there.159 For those who 11-12 October 2013, and interviews the Dhulbahante sub-clan located in the cannot find jobs, a chief response is with local NGO project managers 160 in Garowe 12-13 October 2013. disputed territories, promising government migration. While their initiative to migrate to other countries for work demonstrates initiative and resilience, at the community and state Focus group participants in each location level it has a negative impact on the state’s human capital and leads to brain drain, as reported that lack of economic livelihood opportunities those who are educated or could provide the foundation of the labour force in a growing were one of the main challenges they faced. economy leave for opportunities elsewhere. Illegal migration was reported as a challenge in several focus group discussions, particularly 86 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context amongst young people and IDPs.161 There were some reports of human trafficking, but the Piracy damages relationships between communities scope of this problem is unclear; rather, most migration seemed to be voluntary.162 due to the fact that some communities were supported by

Another response to the lack of economic the pirates located there, while others were victimised by pirates. opportunity and poverty is armed criminality: looting, banditry, piracy, gang violence and militia-based petty conflicts. This has had the result of widespread insecurity as individuals Ocean, over the past few years piracy see violence as a legitimate means to make a operations have found a less conducive living. It is in this way that poverty and environment. A lingering issue with linkages economic stagnation becomes a driver of to economic opportunity is related to pirate conflict and violence in Puntland. Poverty and demobilisation. For instance, there are areas minimal economic opportunities were reported in the Iskushuban area where groups of throughout Puntland, but the armed criminality ‘grounded’ pirates exist without much in the as a response is not. For example, respondents way of opportunities to take them away from in Bosaso report that it is relatively free from this occupation.167 While progress has systemic criminality; however, other areas such definitely been made on this issue, former as Galkacyo and some other areas that are pirates without economic livelihood quite a distance from the government centre opportunities pose a threat to security and are 161 Information obtained in focus group suffer from systemic armed criminality that a potential driver of violence and conflict. discussions conducted with young undermines stability, development, and people throughout Puntland during 163 the period 7 July to 21 September provision of services. It should be emphasised that only a small 2013 and with IDPs in Bosaso percentage of the Puntland population turn to during the period 3-10 August 2013, Galkacyo during the period Piracy is one of the chief forms of armed armed criminality as a response to the lack of 13-17 July 2013, and Garowe during criminality with clear linkages to economic economic constraints they face, but that the period 25-29 August 2013. 164 motivations. Although its exact origins are enough do so to make it a significant driver of 162 murky, piracy was concentrated around the conflict and violence in the state. The impact Ibid.

South Mudug region in South Central Zone, that armed criminality, whether it takes the 163 with a shift to Eyl in Puntland from 2008 form of piracy or armed gangs, can be Information obtained in focus group discussions conducted onward (Maouche, 2011). While it serves as significant and is thus of primary importance in Galkacyo during the period an investment opportunity for enterprising to provide alternative viable and sustainable 13 July to 15 August 2013, financiers and a livelihood to those who carry economic opportunities in order to address Jariiban during the period 3-7 September 2013, out attacks, piracy creates or intensifies an this conflict driver. Ishkushuban during the period environment of lawlessness and violence and it 6-8 September 2013, and Eyl during the period 3-17 September 2013. also negatively impacts the global economy to Marginalised Youth the tune of $18 billion annually (World Bank, As will be discussed later on in the section 164 Please see Bellof (2013), Hansen 2013). Focus group participants in Eyl that deals exclusively with education, (2006 and 2009), and Maouche reported that it also hurts communities – Puntland suffers from a youth bulge, whereby (2011) for a discussion of the economic motivations of piracy. impairing mobility, livelihoods, and the majority of the population (seventy-three investment.165 It also damages relationships per cent) is under the age of thirty (PMPIC, 165 168 Information obtained in focus group between communities due to the fact that n.d.). Simply put, there is an exorbitant discussions conducted in Eyl during some communities were supported by the amount of young people with little in the way the period 3-17 September 2013. pirates located there, while others were of opportunities in terms of education or 166 victimised by pirates.166 economic livelihoods. While youth bulges do Ibid.

not necessitate conflict, countries where 167 Although accusations have been made against young adults comprise forty per cent of the Information obtained in focus group discussions conducted in the Puntland government and business adult population are more than twice as likely Ishkushuban during the period community for being complicit in piracy, the to experience civil conflict when compared to 6-8 September 2013, and Eyl during government has undertaken anti-piracy those that do not (Fund for Peace, 2013). In the period 3-17 September 2013. initiatives since 2009 (Maouche, 2011; Bellof, the context of Puntland, this bulge, coupled 168 2013). Combined with the active international with poverty (addressed in the previous For more information on the linkages between a youth bulge and conflict, anti-piracy task force operating in the Indian subsection), undeveloped formal governance please see Lin (2012). Chapter Five 87

skills and capacities linked to legitimate livelihoods, reinforcing the cycle for the next generation.

While this cycle was reported by youth in each location, it varied dramatically in intensity and severity by location. For example, in Ufayn, all of the communities surveyed suffer from chronic youth unemployment.172 The situation is exacerbated by rising school dropout rates due to families’ inability to pay school fees, leading to a lack of capacity or relevant skills. Young people there were desperately looking for opportunities to improve their situation – either through scholarships for education or livelihoods.173 In Garowe, young people tend to have a higher level of education, taking advantage of the numerous education Figure 7: opportunities available to them. However, they 169 Information obtained in focus Cycle of Hopelessness for Youth in Puntland experienced the same lack of opportunities group discussions conducted when it came to employment and more intense with young people in Eyl during the period 3-17 September 2013. levels of disappointment and hopelessness structures in some areas of the state, and when their education did not lead to improved 170 174 Information obtained in focus group widespread unemployment indicate a strong job opportunities. discussions conducted with young propensity to conflict. people throughout Puntland during the period 7 July to 21 September Galkacyo exhibits the most troublesome 2013. In some areas – Eyl is a particularly good manifestation of conflict related to this cycle.

171 example – the main thematic driver of conflict Focus group discussions there reported the It must be stated that this cycle appears to be the position of youth.169 It following indicators: youth visibly carrying of hopelessness refers to the experience of young men. The should be stressed that although the lack of guns, playing roles in petty-clan conflicts, and opportunities for young women, economic opportunities for youth are an voluntary recruitment into gangs of bandits, particularly those who are 175 uneducated and living in rural areas, element of this cycle, the young people who pirates or Al Shabaab. All of these indicate are even fewer in Puntland society; participated in this study also reported feeling the perceived necessity of violence becoming however, very little information was provided on how young women disconnected from the decision-making an emergent norm. In other words, violence respond to their situation. More process in their communities and that their and violent activities are in the process of research is recommended to explore elders and the government did not becoming or have already become normalised further the cycle of hopelessness for young women in Puntland. understand or adequately address their by many youth and are perceived as legitimate needs.170 ways to solve issues. 172 Information obtained in focus group discussions conducted with young Figure 7 depicts the general trend of a cycle There are attempts to address this problem and people throughout Ufayn during the period 4-5 September 2013. of hopelessness that was described in the some progress has been made. In some of the focus group discussions held with youth schools in Galkacyo, a sense of brotherhood 173 171 Ibid. throughout the state. As the figure shows, and togetherness are created from disparate youth face a lack of opportunities, in some groups of children through the use of sport or 174 Information obtained in focus group cases coupled with a lack of capacity on their other group activities. This is a double-edged discussions conducted with young part. This, in turn, creates a feeling of acute sword, as sports can facilitate violence: in one people throughout Garowe during the period 17 July to 29 August 2013 hopelessness and despair, which creates the of the focus groups, when asked how they had and interviews conducted with conditions where young men are recruited worked for peace in their community, young project managers of a local NGO on 13 October 2013. into armed criminality or Al Shabaab as a people reported that they had been playing viable alternative. Some young men become football, when the other team killed the referee 175 Information obtained in focus group trouble-makers in their own communities, due to what they considered an incorrect call. discussions conducted with young driving conflict and instability, which in turn The young people considered themselves people throughout Galkacyo during the period 13 July to 8 September reinforces the lack of opportunities and peace builders because they were able to work 2013. stymies the chance for young people to gain together to resolve the conflict, but the incident 88 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context shows how readily violence is accepted as an appropriate response to a problem.176 Galkacyo’s residents have become accustomed

Young people from both genders around the to live in fear of sporadic, unpredictable violence. state called for scholarships, training programs, and better facilities for youth in order to address this conflict driver.177 injustice, discrimination, clan Systemic Violence (Galkacyo) expansion/prestige, and a shortage of pasture Historically, Galkacyo has witnessed periods of land.182 The main effect of this situation is a sustained violence and tension. At least twelve relatively destabilised society fractured along a violent conflicts took place in Galkacyo and the variety conflict lines: clan versus clan, IDP Mudug region between Hawiye-dominated versus host community, nomad versus settled, United Somali Congress (USC) and the and Al Shabaab/other armed groups versus Majerteen-led Somali Salvation Democratic traditional and formal governance structures. Front (SSDF) during 1991-1993 (Interpeace, While these groups may have relatively stable 2008). In 2004-2005 fighting between sub- social structures within themselves, there sub clans in Mudug and Galkacyo broke out seems to be little in the way of an effective over a killing at a checkpoint, resulting in a framework in bringing them together in cycle of revenge killings that impacted the dispute-solving or conflict resolution. security and trade in Galkacyo (Interpeace, 2008). Most recently, armed groups, including Respondents reported that they have little trust Al Shabaab and pirates, have been in the police and so petty-crimes and other destabilising forces with focus groups reporting minor disputes are often solved through the recurring, random violence due to the presence informal elder-networks.183 Ostensibly a good 176 178 Information obtained in a focus of these groups there. thing, this also has the impact of reducing the group discussion conducted legitimacy of more formalised conflict- with young people in Galkacyo on 20 August 2013. As a result, Galkacyo’s residents have become resolution (i.e., the police or judiciary). accustomed to and live in fear of sporadic, Tangible effects of this situation are: guns have 177 Information obtained in focus group unpredictable violence. It is evident that the become a common occurrence in and around discussions conducted with young propagation of violence as the intrinsic the town, petty crime was reported to be people throughout Puntland during the period 7 July to 21 September mechanism to achieve goals has created a extremely high by participants, systematic 2013. temporal culture of violence that has forcibly physical and sexual abuse of women 178 altered not only the behavioural patterns of (particularly IDPs) was reported (“we are like Information obtained in focus specific individuals, but the very conception of pieces of meat to be taken”), a culture of group discussions conducted normalcy (or ‘safety’ – the term used in the gangs and banditry, excessive use of qaat, in Galkacyo during the period 13 July to 21 September 2013. questionnaires) becomes warped. For instance, mistrust, and the general sense of a group of parents in the Garsoor community hopelessness felt by youth.184 179 Information obtained in focus near Galkacyo declared that they felt ‘safe’ in group discussions conducted their communities, but then noted third on a The general picture that focus group in Garsoor during the period 1-8 September 2013. list of five variables that they were concerned participants from the area painted of conflict about their children being caught in ‘cross-fires in North Galkacyo is one that operates on 180 Ibid. in the centre of town’.179 (Interestingly, the top multiple levels and works upon a fragmented two variables were ‘traffic accidents’ and and relatively chaotic social fabric, as depicted 181 Information obtained in focus ‘falling into water collection points’, in Figure 8. There appears to be a greater level group discussions conducted respectively).180 of social upheaval in Galkacyo relative to the in Galkacyo during the period 13 July to 21 September 2013. generally strong social structures reported On a basic level, much of the conflict in elsewhere in Puntland. In Galkacyo, clusters 182 Ibid. Galkacyo revolves around access to resources of IDPs, nomads, and various members of an (land, water, and livestock), and tribal/clan array of different clans have coalesced to form 183 rights and prestige.181 Focus group participants an unstable social fabric upon which the Ibid. cited several other variables as the main political tensions have been projected. 184 Ibid. The quote taken from a focus causes for the continued conflict: lack of Political division between Puntland and group discussion with female IDPs effective governance, widespread poverty, Galmudug, as well as turf wars between pirate near Galkacyo on 30 July 2013. Chapter Five 89

throughout the regions (Höhne, 2007). This conflict can be seen as an attempt by both Puntland and Somaliland to manipulate the simmering inter- and intra-clan tensions in this region. The Warsangeli, who live largely in eastern Sanaag, and the Dhulbahante, who inhabit the Sool region, continue to be active in both administrations. Politicians from the sub- clans have shifted allegiances at various points between Somaliland and Puntland (see Höhne (2007) for a more detailed discussion of the historical background of this dispute).

There are a variety of tensions between each of these groups, which frequently result in armed conflict (Mesfin, 2009). This situation has been exacerbated by the governments of Figure 8: Puntland and Somaliland going to war a Systemic Violence in number of times over the past decade in order Galkacyo to try and force a settlement of the border gangs and assassinations carried out by Al issue. In 2004, troops from Somaliland and Shabaab further undermine an already Puntland clashed near Cadhiadeye, but the unstable society. tensions were resolved through negotiations with traditional elders and civil society (Höhne, The two distinct conflicts – first, land disputes 2006). Again in 2007, armed clashes and the day-to-day clan relations and secondly, occurred in Las Anood, the capital of Sool, with high levels of political tension caused by Al Somaliland moving the administration to the Shabaab, pirate gangs, IDPs and relations city (Höhne, 2007). In 2010, Somaliland between Puntland and Galmudug – have troops, supported by Ethiopia, put down an become entwined in a number of areas. In uprising in Sool by a separatist militia (IRIN, some cases, the primary causes of conflict 2010). Tensions continue in this region, often actually resemble a combination of different slipping into localised violent conflict. As factors from the two main causes. For example, recently as late November 2013, fighting at times land could be the root cause of a between forces loyal to the Puntland conflict that is expressed in a narrative that administration and Khatumo state forces killed emphasises high politics. In other instances, and injured more than a dozen people (Hiiraan the situation is reversed. Exacerbating this Online, 2013b). It is expected that they will complex situation are universal factors that continue for the foreseeable future: Puntland’s sustain latent conflict: acute poverty, focus upon wider Darood clan unity and entrenched cultures of violence, and lack of Somaliland’s desire for separatism are at this opportunities for youth resulting in their moment mutually exclusive goals (Höhne, feelings of general hopelessness. 2007). Furthermore, the presence of oil and other precious minerals in the disputed areas further make this a problematic point of Proximate Factors friction.

Border Disputes Along its southern border, Puntland is also There are ongoing tensions that sometimes dealing with tensions between the Darood and lead to violent conflict with Somaliland over the the Hawiye clans, as sub-clans claim lack of an agreed border between Somaliland infringement of their respective territories and Puntland in Sool and Sanaag—a situation (Bryden, 1999). Galkacyo remains a city that has been unresolved since the creation of divided between Puntland [Galkacyo North] the Puntland state in 1998, with local and the Galmudug administration [Galkacyo administrations loyal to both sides functioning South]. With the disputed border with 90 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Somaliland and clan-based tensions between the Darood and Hawiye in Mudug, Bryden Although Puntland has allocated an 8% quota for (1999) described the then freshly minted Puntland state as a ‘newly built house with two female parliamentarians, at the local level women report that they walls already on fire’. “…are not allowed to elect or to be elected”. Increased Presence of Al Shabaab Focus group participants cited Al Shabaab (often referred to as ‘extremism’ or ‘terrorism’) as a conflict driver.185 The Islamic extremist to provide the most thorough analysis of peace group that originated in South Central following and conflict within Puntland society. While the collapse of the Islamic Courts Union some of these issues were not necessarily administration following the Ethiopian referred to directly in focus group discussions intervention in 2006 has ties to Al Qaeda. Over in the communities, they were emphasised in the past two years, military operations stakeholder interviews at the state level and in undertaken by a coalition of AMISOM the literature review. peacekeeping forces, the Somali federal army, and Ethiopian and Kenyan troops throughout The Role of Females in Society South Central has pushed Al Shabaab from Women in Puntland encounter regular social several of their areas. The group has shifted and cultural discrimination. Despite the fact into Puntland, particularly to Galkacyo and the that in urban areas they account for at least Golis and Galgala mountains (BBC, 2012). twenty per cent of all heads of households and The Puntland government has undertaken a in other families they are the primary series of operations against Al Shabaab since breadwinners, in many areas, especially 2010 and the group has reciprocated. In remote rural communities, conservative social November 2013, Al Shabaab attacked the norms prevent them from attending school or Bosaso Central Prison, reportedly killing two working in non-traditional roles (FSNAU, officers and wounding another two (Garowe 2013). Women and girls endure widespread Online, 2013b). The government responded prejudices, sexual harassment, and gender- immediately, dispatching soldiers to attack based violence (Lewis, 2008). known Al Shabaab bases in the Galgala region (Garowe Online, 2013b). Al Shabaab vowed Politically, women are marginalised in different more attacks against government targets. ways. Although Puntland has allocated an 8% quotas for female parliamentarians (Jama, The increased presence of Al Shabaab drives 2010), at the local level women report that conflict in two ways in Puntland. In Galkacyo, they “…are not allowed to elect or to be Al-Shabaab has a tangible impact on the elected” (Interpeace, 2010). Likewise, conflict dynamics, as they are responsible for although women serve an important role in many of the bombings and assassinations peacebuilding conferences and negotiations as there. In other regions of Somalia, respondents civil society activists, traditionally they are not view the threat from Al Shabaab in more permitted to formally represent their clans indirect terms in that they were afraid that their (Interpeace, 2010). As a result, they employ young men would be recruited.186 more indirect methods to influence events. The story is told in Puntland that a conflict was resolved when several elderly women Cross Cutting Issue: Vulnerable from several clans collectively lobbied their

Populations clan leaders for peace, insisting that they “… 185 have had enough displacement in our lifetime Information obtained in focus group discussions conducted Vulnerable populations in Puntland face many and at this age we can’t tolerate it anymore” in Bosaso during the period challenges in daily life and are particularly (Jama, 2010). Anab Xasan, a Puntland 21 July to 22 September 2013. affected by violent conflict. These groups are woman attending the 1998 Garowe 186 also more strongly impacted by the conflict conference that resulted in the formation of Information obtained in focus group discussions conducted drivers outlined in the previous section. It is the Puntland state moved the male audience throughout Puntland during the important to highlight their experiences in order members to tears with a poem calling for men period 7 July to 21 September 2013. Chapter Five 91

“We are people who work to survive for life and we tolerate

everything that happens to us for the sake of our safety”.

to understand the difficulties women face and their desire to be part of the peacebuilding process and play a role in establishing the state (Jama, 2010). It was at this conference that women were allocated seats in the government, in part due to her efforts (Jama, 2010).

Women activists in Puntland see their basic rights as inextricably tied to peace (Jama, 2010). Conversely, gender-based inequalities, harassment, and violence against women are linked to underlying currents of conflict and violence at all levels of society. Because women and girls are often the invisible but most directly affected victims of conflict and violence, peacebuilding efforts must also Minority Groups directly target them in order to build an There are several minority groups in Puntland, inclusive, thriving society. including the Arab Mohamud Saalah, Madhibaan, Tumaal, and Bantu (Interpeace, IDPs 2008). As minorities within a society based on As previously detailed, Puntland is home to a strong clan system where the strongest wield approximately 149,000 IDPs who are mainly power, they face social and political concentrated in Galkacyo, Garowe, and marginalisation. Many struggle to eke out Bosaso, as well as a few thousand in Sool and livelihoods and are the most impoverished in Sanaag. Focus group discussions with IDPs in their communities. Minority groups often find the three main urban areas in Puntland themselves facing the choice between their revealed that they experience the conflict rights and their security. In a 2010 study drivers more intensely. Their youth report being conducted by Interpeace and PRDC, a more affected by the lack of educational and representative from a minority group in Garowe economic opportunities, making them more succinctly described his situation in this way: likely to choose illegal immigration and more “we are people who work to survive for life and vulnerable to human traffickers. IDPs face we tolerate everything that happens to us for challenges finding economic opportunities and the sake of our safety” (Interpeace, 2010). increased levels of poverty. Additionally, because the more recent IDPs are not found 187 within the traditional Puntland clan structure, Key Conflict Actors Information obtained from focus group discussions conducted with they are further marginalised without strong IDP women in Bosaso during the advocates and safety nets. In focus group This final section outlines the key actors in period 3-5 August 2013, Garowe 188 during the period 25-29 August discussions, IDP women – who often lack the conflict in Puntland. It contains a brief 2013, and Galkacyo during the strong familial and clan ties that afford them discussion of each actor, analysing that actor’s period 29-31 August 2013. measures of protection against abuse – characteristics, needs, interests, positions, 188 reported greater threats of sexual violence and resources, and relationships. Actors studied The analysis of the actors is based upon information drawn harassment, which echoes information from include: the Government of Puntland, the from the interviews and focus IDP camps in other parts of Somalia (Amnesty Federal Government of Somalia, the group discussions, as well as 187 the secondary data drawn from International, 2013). Government of Somaliland, Clans, Al Shabaab, the background literature. Armed Criminals and Youth. 92 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Name Characteristics Needs Interests Positions Resources Relationships

Government of Official state Budgetary support, Generally, the Government seat in Limited. The official Contentious Puntland government technical maintenance of Puntland with state budget for relationship with the administration. assistance, stability and peace localised 2013 is $49 million. federal government support to provide in the state governance of Somalia. In direct infrastructure and Puntland. The structures and conflict (both violent service provision, representation of supporters conflict and clarification to end Puntland’s interests throughout the increased political border dispute with in the federal state. More limited tensions) with the Somaliland. government. The presence in remote Somaliland assertion of areas. government and its Puntland authority supporters in Sool in traditional Harti and Sanaag. sub-clan territory in Generally good Sool and Sanaag. relationships with Limiting the ability neighbouring of Al Shabaab to Ethiopia, although operate in the state. tensions can arise over incursions of Ethiopian troops on Puntland soil. Good ties to some Gulf States which are important economic partners.

Relationships between government officials and politicians can be difficult and the political process can lead to tensions and conflict, particularly around elections.

The government’s relationship with its citizens varies. Puntland’s people accept the government as legitimate and have high expectations for government service delivery.

Table 7 (continued on next three pages): Summary of Conflict Actors in Puntland Chapter Five 93

Name Characteristics Needs Interests Positions Resources Relationships

Federal Internationally Budgetary support, Generally, the Government seat in Limited, but the Tense relationships Government of recognised technical maintenance of Mogadishu. Fluid international with both Puntland Somalia government assistance, stability and peace and minimal control community has and Somaliland. administration of support to provide in the state of South Central pledged $2.4 billion Complex and federal Somalia. infrastructure and Puntland. The regions. Very limited as part of the ‘New contentions service provision. representation of presence in Deal’ to assist the relationship with Puntland’s interests Puntland. country in is neighbours Kenya Support to project in the federal recovery. and Ethiopia, who rule of law over government. The have troops in territory. Military assertion of Somalia to support support for ongoing Puntland authority the operations conflict with Al in traditional Harti against Al Shabaab. Shabaab throughout sub-clan territory in Generally good much of the south Sool and Sanaag. relations with and Mogadishu. foreign governments, regional and international organisations on whom they rely for financial support and technical assistance

Government of Formal government Budgetary support, Generally, the Capital in Hargeisa, Severely limited; Hostile relationship Somaliland of Somaliland; technical maintenance of with district and the state budget with the Puntland declared assistance, stability and peace local of Somaliland is government that independence from support to provide in Somaliland. The administrations $152 million. sometimes results Somalia, but is not infrastructure and resolution of the throughout the in armed conflict in internationally service provision, border dispute with region. Supporters the Sool and Sanaag recognised. clarification to end Puntland along the of Somaliland regions. Contentious border dispute with historical Italian- government in the relationship with the Puntland. English border. Sool and Sanaag federal government regions. of Somalia, but is participating in talks to resolve the question of Somaliland independence. Generally peaceful relationships with Ethiopia and Djibouti, with Ethiopia providing support in military actions against militias in the Sool region. 94 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Name Characteristics Needs Interests Positions Resources Relationships

Clans Strong allegiances Maintain integrity of Assert clan authority Varies, but the main Varies. Varies. Some clans based on family and historical clan within its area and Harti sub-clans are and sub-clans have clan identity which territory, honour, sphere of influence. found in the alliances; others play out in local and and position. Protect following regions: have difficult state politics. economic and social relationships status and interests Majerteen: between sub-clan of the clan and Bari, Nugaal and groups that result in leaders. Provide North Mudug armed conflict and protection and revenge killings. support for clan Dhulbahante: members. Sool and Sanaag There is ongoing conflict and Warsangeli: tensions between Sanaag and Bari the Darood and Hawiye clans in Dehiishe: Mudug. Bari Clan identity and Other Darood sub- traditional clan clans and minorities territory are factors are found in all in the unresolved regions of the state. border dispute with Somaliland.

Al Shabaab Armed Islamic group Retaining power and Establishing strict Spread over large Financial resources In direct armed with ties to control over areas Islamic government; areas of South unknown, but they conflict with the international they occupy, driving foreign Central, but have forcibly acquisition Puntland terrorist groups financial resources, peacekeeping forces moved into the Golis supplies from the government, federal weapons, from Somalia; Mountains and communities they government of transportation, attacking Western Galgala area in occupy and Somalia, AMISOM expanding area of targets in and Puntland over the implement tolls and peacekeeping force, control, recruiting outside of Somalia. past few years. taxation to raise and the new fighters. finances. There are governments of some rumoured Kenya, Ethiopia, and links to piracy in the United States. some locations in They directly target South Central. They Somali civilians and rely on unemployed internationals young men and (military, UN, and staunch Islamist civilian) in attacks. supporters for fighters. Chapter Five 95

Name Characteristics Needs Interests Positions Resources Relationships

Armed Armed criminal Economic Large financial gain Pirates are located Piracy is a relatively Varies. In some Criminals gangs and pirates. livelihoods; prestige for investors and mostly along the lucrative business locations they have and honour. managers of the coast, although they for investors and good relations with piracy operations; are reported to be pirate leaders, so community elders an economic operating in large amounts of and members, in livelihood for those Galkacyo; criminal cash are available others they commit who conduct the gangs are largely to reinvest in acts of violence and attacks against found throughout equipment and create an ships. the state. personnel. environment of fear; they have assassinated judges who sentence pirates to long prison terms. There were allegations of linkages between piracy operations and some state government officials, but these were not substantiated. The government has undertaken anti- piracy operations.

Youth Young people, Education Accessing education Throughout Labour, some with Potential direct generally 13-24. opportunities, skills and economic Puntland. education and skills. conflict driver if relevant to available opportunities, recruited into armed livelihoods, having their groups; broken economic interests relationship with opportunities, a represented in their central authorities; stake in their community, having some young men community and their needs met by join local gangs government, the government. which creates facilities for difficult education and social relationships with activities, their communities. opportunities to engage in their community and governance structures.

Table 7 (continued from previous three pages): Summary of Conflict Actors in Puntland

Chapter Six 97 Chapter Six

Analysis of Somaliland 98 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

n this chapter, the conflict and peace border with Puntland and are disputed by the Ianalysis of Somaliland is presented. The two states, which has led to open conflict findings of the analysis were based on between the two zones, especially in the early interviews with stakeholders and experts in and mid-2000s. The integrity and Nairobi and Hargeisa, as well as 404 focus independence of Somaliland is contested by group discussions conducted in sixty-two multiple stakeholders, not least of which is the communities throughout Somaliland. The first Somaliland Government itself. It rejects section of the chapter highlights the context Somaliland’s status as a part of the Somali and general history of Somaliland. The second state under the leadership of the federal section outlines the chronology of conflict and government in Mogadishu. The debate on peace in the region. In Sections Three and Somaliland’s status vis-à-vis federal Somalia is Four, the situation and location dynamics are ongoing and of central importance to explored, while Section Five presents the Somaliland’s leadership, headed by President structural and proximate drivers for peace and Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud Silanyo, leader conflict in Somaliland. The final section of the Kulmiye (Solidarity) party, who has been discusses the key actors in the state. in power since the 2010 elections.

The Somaliland Government is comprised of Context an elected presidential office and House of Representatives, as well as a clan-based Upper Somaliland, although not officially recognised House of Elders or Guurti, an by the international community, is a de facto institutionalisation of an indigenous clan and state located in Northwest Somalia. Bordering community power structure. Somaliland Ethiopia, Djibouti, Puntland, and the Gulf of regularly held local, presidential, and Aden, it is a distinctive zone declared its parliamentary elections between 2002 and independence from Somalia in 1991. From 2010, an indication of its support of 1888 to 1960, it fell under British representative democracy (Kilcullen, Mills, and administration and the current six major Pham, 2013). While its governance system is districts follow the borders and territories that democratic in nature, it is heavily dependent were recognised during that period.189 Two of upon clan politics and has integrated the clan the districts – Sool and Sanaag – form the structures into formal administrative institutions

Figure 9: Map of Somaliland

189 The six districts include Awdal, Maroodijeex (formally Woqooyi Galbeed), Togdheer, Sanaag, Sahil and Sool. Chapter Six 99

which serve to maintain connections between becoming home to a rapidly returning diaspora, centralised authorities, district representatives, who play a leading role in launching new and local-level leaders. This hybrid system is business and development initiatives that are based on the three dominant clans of diversifying Somaliland’s economy. Somaliland: the Isaaq, Dir and Harti clans (Walls and Kibble, 2011). While all three are Somaliland is largely free of ethnic and members of the Darood clan family, the Isaaq religious conflicts, with the majority of the is the largest clan in Somaliland and maintains population being ethnic Somalis and following political dominance. The patterns of alliance, Sunni Islam. Historic ties to Djibouti and competition, and division between the clans Ethiopia sometimes compromise the social and sub-clans of Somaliland are an important standing of clans in the far West, a dynamic aspect of the region’s politics (Walls and that will be discussed in greater detail later in Kibble, 2011), though the degree to which this chapter. Somaliland’s stability can be clan affiliations matter in day-to-day politics is misleading, however, as many reformist and heavily disputed, not least of all by Somalis radical movements integral to Somali-wide and Somalilanders themselves (Harper, 2012). politics have their roots in Somaliland, However, most conflicts are effectively including Al Wuhda, Al Itihaad (now Al managed by traditional mediation systems, in Ictisaam), and Al Shabaab. Though these which clan elders play a leading role. The fact groups may, at first glance, seem to have little that these conflict management and mitigation compromising effect in Somaliland, affiliates of structures have been well preserved in these groups have used Somaliland as a Somaliland has been attributed to the very recruitment and training base and have acted limited role of colonial powers during the as destabilising elements in neighbouring British rule and the absence of the wide-spread territories. Additionally, several top Al-Shabaab violent conflict that has plagued other regions commanders – Abu Zubeyr and Ibrahim Haji in Somalia since the central government Jaama ‘al-Afghani’, for example – are from collapsed in 1991.190 relatively stable areas of Somalia (Roque, 2009). With a population of approximately 3.5 million191 and an estimated average growth rate of 3.1 per cent, Somaliland’s inhabitants Chronology represent up to forty per cent of the estimated population of the wider Somali territory (Walls The political and economic evolution of and Kibble, 2011). They are divided between Somaliland has differed substantially from that urbanised settled communities, agricultural of the other two zones of Somalia, leading to a communities, and nomadic communities. unique development situation today. These Somaliland also hosts up to more than 84,000 differences are historically engrained and can IDPs – largely in urban settings – whose be traced back to the colonial era (and possibly displacement has been driven largely by the beyond), when Somaliland was declared a drought in 2011 (IOM, 2013). British protectorate in 1888, while the rest of the country was administered by an Italian With a high percentage of nomadic colonial regime (Møller, 2009). While Italy communities and an arid climate, Somaliland’s played an active role in the administration of economy is revolves around livestock, South Central and what is now Puntland, 190 Information obtained during a focus particularly camels. As the state’s leading Britain limited its involvement in Somaliland. group discussion with academics export, camel markets are central to As a result of this hand’s off approach, and clan elders conducted in Hargeisa on 1 June 2013 and Somaliland’s economy, with the values of investment in Somaliland was highly restricted, interviews with stakeholders goods and social commodities, including stalling infrastructure development and state conducted in Hargeisa during the period 1-5 June 2013. penalties incurred in judicial processes, being capacity-building. It also meant that home- linked to the street-price of camels (Mahmoud, grown governance structures, clan systems, 191 Please note that Somaliland 2013; Harper, 2012). Additionally, camels are and traditional mediation systems were largely population figures are contested. a key source of revenue for the zonal left untouched by foreign interventions. These An upcoming United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) administration, being one of the only readily intact indigenous social structures would prove study highlights this issue. taxable goods upon export. Somaliland is also important in determining future conflict- 100 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context resolution efforts in Somaliland. Although were also widespread. By the time when Siad persistent challenges and tensions remain, Barre’s regime fell three years later, Somalia, Somaliland has crucially been able to including Somaliland, was overrun by civil war. implement a stable political order based on a Significant costs of instability manifested in blend of traditional and contemporary Somaliland in the massive displacement crisis governance systems which has been crucial in deterioration of infrastructure and public generating and maintaining peace. services. Education was particularly affected due to the destruction of schools, a loss of In 1960, Somaliland achieved independence teaching capacity, and a severe reduction in from Britain and joined Somalia (Brooks, public safety. 2012). However, less than a year later, the inhabitants of Somaliland are said to have In 1991, the SNM was consolidating its hold begun to express doubts about the viability of over the region following successes in defeating the union when the majority of Somalilanders Siad Barre’s armed forces in the north (Lewis, boycotted a vote on the draft constitution for a 2008). At the same time, Somaliland’s clan united republic and most who actually voted elders banded together as a Guurti or council rejected it. Calls for separatism grew louder, and held a series of conferences to negotiate a particularly following the military overthrow of ceasefire across the zone. Somaliland’s clan Somalia’s elected government by General Siad system facilitated the Guurti’s efforts: Barre in 1969. After that point, the political Somaliland is dominated by the Isaaq clan union of Somaliland and Somalia quickly ran rather than being fragmented in its clan into difficulties, with Barre repressing composition like the South Central Zone, for Somaliland for much of his rule (Kilcullen, instance. Though competition exists between Mills, and Pham, 2013). The decades that clans and between sub-clans in Somaliland followed Barre’s coup brought armed conflict today, frequently resulting in low-level conflict, between the regime and the Somaliland the political dominance of the Isaaq clan has National Movement (SNM). While the conflict helped to bring some order to a chaotic and was largely a clan-based struggle by Isaaq- volatile situation without extensive abuse of the dominated Somaliland against Barre’s clan’s position through persecution of the clans authoritarian regime, non-Isaaq sub-clans of that were aligned with the previous other major groups, such as the Gadabuursi government (Farah and Lewis, 1997). It and the Dhulbahante, were integral supporters should be noted that this intra-clan unity is not of greater Somaliland autonomy throughout total, as in-fighting exists within the Isaaq clan this time, depending on their geographic itself, particularly between the Habar-Yonis and locality and historic allegiances (Walls and Habar-Je’lo sub-clans (World Bank, 2005). Kibble, 2011). The people of Somaliland remained divided on The conflict culminated in a brutal bombing the issue of independence in the immediate campaign on Somaliland’s capital, Hargeisa, aftermath of Somalia’s collapse. The Harti sub- by Somali air forces after the SNM briefly clan of the Dhulbahante were especially critical captured large portions of the Woqooyi Galbeed of independence from the early 1990s (Höhne, (now Maroodijeex) region in 1988. The SNM- 2007). Despite these reservations, the SNM, Somali conflict had a devastating toll on working with the Guurti, declared their human lives (Lewis, 2008). Hargeisa was partition from Somalia in 1991, a move mostly reduced to rubble and brutal campaigns viewed by many as a simple exit from the against the SNM were carried out in Burao and 1960 union. The Government of Somaliland other important Somaliland urban centres, has maintained its independence from the causing thousands of civilian casualties federal state of Somalia since that time. The (Kilcullen, Mills, and Pham, 2013). As a result popularity of secessionism has grown over the of the conflict, a major displacement crisis years, particularly when the relatively stability emerged with at least 500,000 refugees of Somaliland is contrasted with the ongoing fleeing to Ethiopia and Djibouti and thousands violent conflict in South Central Somalia. more going to Canada, Britain, Scandinavia, Shortly after Somaliland’s independence, the Italy and the USA. Poverty and devastation SNM disbanded and a democratic government Chapter Six 101

was established and the Guurti system was region as part of this investigation in Baki, integrated into it. Borama and Harirad.192 However, violent disputes in parts of Awdal greatly impacted on The rise of an independent Somaliland the CPSA field research. During the data government was also itself not entirely as rosy, collection period in Awdal, there is an ongoing peaceful and problem-free as some analysts dispute between clans with loyalties to imply (Balthasar, 2013). Somaliland’s first Somaliland and clans that are associated with President, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuur, had a groups living in Djibouti. The latter group is tumultuous term in office between 1991 and accused of facilitating Djibouti-based 1993, when hard-line military factions of the manipulations of local politics. Tensions turn SNM, the Calan Cas, vied fairly effectively for violent at key political intervals, and especially shadow control of the state. This resulted in during district-level elections. These periods violent conflict in 1994-95 between later tend to be marked by killings and revenge President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal’s regime killings, though conflicts between clans do not (in power in Somaliland between 1994 and normally lead to casualties and tend to be 2002), Calan Cas, and other marginalised limited to small skirmishes over resources and militias, including the Garhajis and Eidagalle. farm boundaries. Despite these difficulties, 4,000 were killed and approximately 180,000 Awdal focus groups claimed that their were displaced to Ethiopia during the fiercest communities have been largely peaceful and fighting since the anti-Barre struggle that any disputes had been resolved by their (Balthasar, 2013). elders.193

Over the past two decades, Somaliland has Pockets of Sool and Sanaag also remain maintained a situation of relative peace. contested territories among the local Despite the state’s stability, underlying tensions populations and between the administrations exist in Somaliland and have resulted in two of Somaliland and Puntland (World Bank, direct conflicts in 1994 and 1996. These 2005). In 1993, the Darood/Harti and the tensions are mirrored in Somaliland’s internal Isaaq clans reached an agreement on politics – while peace and unity have reconciliation at a conference in Ceerigaabo dominated Somaliland’s contemporary history, which enabled the return of co-existence and there is evidence of a fairly deep undercurrent civilian life. Ceerigaabo and Sanaag retained of fragmentation, with research indicating that weak ties with the capital Hargeisa, although alternative minority positions may not be fully the former not did reach agreement on represented in Somaliland’s press, media, and administration with the Somaliland government political structures (Höhne, 2008). One of the in 1998. However, Eastern Sanaag existed major points of underlying tension in beyond the reach of the state under the control Somaliland centers on territory. Border disputes of local strongmen affiliated with various local across all three zones remain unresolved, with clans (Höhne, 2011). Throughout much of multiple factions supporting either federalism these disputed territories, the Isaaq and the or independence for various zonal and sub- non-Isaaq clans ‘existed in limbo’ with neither zonal administrations. In Somaliland, these violent conflict nor state administration during disputes tend to be associated with debates the 1994-95 Somaliland civil war. Instead, surrounding two main areas: Awdal and the self-governance was provided by local leaders, disputed territories of Sool and Sanaag. diaspora members, and traditional authorities 192 Underlying hostilities are clearly (Höhne, 2011). evident and the apparent lack of In Somaliland’s early years of independence, relevance of the Awdal/Somaliland conflict could be an issue relating the potential creation of Awdalland or Awdal Paradoxically, this period of conflict in central to data coverage, whereby the State, an autonomous territory made up of Somaliland resulted in a consolidation of state Eastern most parts of Awdal, including Zeylac and Lughaye Awdal, as well as parts of Togdheer and authority and future peacebuilding in the districts, have not been surveyed. Sanaag was an important issue (Mukhtar, middle districts that has not fully trickled

193 1996). It is unclear whether Awdal autonomy outwards. The peaceful isolation of Information obtained through remains a current point of contention – these Somaliland’s peripheries during the civil war community observation in Baki, Harirad and Borama during the claims are not, for instance, reflected in the meant that central stability was not integrated period 1 July to 15 September 2013. community data collected from the Awdal uniformly across the zone through military 102 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context force thereafter (Balthasar, 2013). Instead, Although the border between them remains in their history of isolation and self-determination dispute, the last documented conflict between and lack of formal state administrative Puntland and Somaliland over the disputed structures rendered peripheral districts difficult territories in Sool and Sanaag occurred in to administer in the aftermath of President 2011. Egal’s rise to power. Conflict has since persisted in the peripheries, particularly in Sool Although tensions over land and clan-related and Sanaag, due to ongoing clan-based disputes persist, the general prevailing peace competition, most notably between Somaliland and stability in Somaliland is attributed to the and Puntland. Between 2003 and 2008, role of local elders and the government. For Puntland took over administration of much of example, in Qorilugud, participants in focus Sool until Somaliland regained control group discussions reported that disputes are 194 Information obtained through following armed conflict that began in 2007. resolved through open communication, in focus groups in Qorilugud, Horseed, Parts of Sool and Sanaag have also threatened writing, or through the use of the official court Qabrihulul, Coodanle, Balicanle, Bahiile, Kaarto and Gandahar to break away from both zones and to establish system, echoing the responses provided communities during the period their own administrative system, with sections elsewhere in Somaliland.194 1 July to 27 September 2013. of Sool seeking to establish Khatoumo state.

Table 7 (continued on next page): Timeline of Key Events in Somaliland

Date Event

1960 Somaliland joins the Somali union and forms Somalia.

1977-1978 Somalia goes to war with Ethiopia, resulting in severe poverty and casualties at the national level.

1980-1990 Somalia is over-run by civil war as Siad Barre’s regime collapses.

1981 Somaliland National Movement (SNM) forms to oppose Siad Barre’s rule and seek equal representation for the Isaaq clan.

1991 Siad Barre is overthrown.

Somaliland declares its independence from Somalia.

The SNM and Guurti negotiate a Somaliland-wide cessation of hostilities between the Isaaq and the other clans: Gadabuursi, Dulbahante and Warsangeli who had been on the side of Siad Barre.

Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuur is declared interim President.

Factions of the SNM are divided along clan lines between mainstream members and hardline military elements, known as Calan Cas. The latter undermine the effectiveness of President Tuur’s leadership and effectively take control of Somaliland.

1991-1992 Somaliland teeters on the edge of a civil war of its own as internal power struggles erupt across its districts. Violence is particularly severe in Burao and Berbera.

1993 Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal is declared Somaliland’s new President at the Boroma Conference, in the midst of significant violence in Burao, Berbera and Hargeisa.

Somaliland adopts a new national charter, making way for a Somaliland constitution. Chapter Six 103

Date Event

1994 Calan Cas declare Egal’s Government illegitimate and begins acting as a strong oppositional group.

Other marginalised militia groups, including the Garhajis and Eidagalle, begin taking land in key strategic locations in Berbera and Hargeisa.

1994-1995 Egal’s Government engages in all-out war against opposition forces, resulting in civil war.

Egal’s Government emerges as the clear victor of the conflict.

1996 Egal’s Government consolidates power at the Hargeisa Summit.

1997 Egal is re-elected as President in a Somaliland-wide election.

1998 Puntland declares itself an independent state, problematising the relationships between dominant Isaaq clans and Harti clans in Somaliland, with Dhulbahante and Warsangeeli seeing their representatives taking representative positions in the offices of both administrations, though remaining broadly marginalised in both zones.

2001 A referendum is held on a Somaliland constitution, explicitly declaring the zone as an independent state.

2002 President Egal dies. Vice President Daahir Rayaale Kahin takes over leadership of Somaliland.

Somaliland holds local elections.

President Kahin visits Sool on a zonal tour. Resulting violence leads to a withdrawal of Somaliland forces from the district.

2003 Somaliland holds presidential elections. Acting President Daahir Rayaale Kahin and head of the United Peoples' Democratic Party of Somaliland is formally elected into office.

2003-2008 Puntland takes over administration of Sool through military means. In 2004, it establishes a new Puntland-based administration in the district. Somaliland responds by sending troops into Cadhiadeye.

In 2005, Somaliland successfully holds parliamentary elections.

In 2006, Warsangeli clan members and troops from the Cadde Muuse’s Majerteen/Cismaan Maxamuud lineage clash over a mineral exploration deal signed between Puntland’s President Cadde Muse and an Australian mining company. Fighting spreads across the Galgala mountains.

Somaliland and Puntland forces clash outside Cadhiadeye in 2004 and in Laascaanood in 2007. Somaliland forcefully retakes Sool.

2010 Somaliland holds presidential elections, electing President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud Silanyo, leader of Somaliland’s Kulmiye (Solidarity) party, into office.

Fighting resumes between Warsangali clansmen and the Government of Puntland in the Galgala mountains transecting Somaliland and Puntland, causing insecurity and instability in Sool district.

2012 President Silanyo signs the Dubai Charter, agreeing to greater cooperation with Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, President of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government.

2013 Reconciliation talks resume between Hargeisa and Mogadishu. 104 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Situational Dynamics This leads to occasional localised and intergovernmental disputes. Local elections, which Somaliland has a complex relationship with its bring about changes in Awdal’s power neighbours and with the international relationships and accentuate divides, also act community, due to the lack of official as regular triggers for low-level violence recognition of its independence, strategic between communities across the district, as location, and stability. Its stability provides a confirmed in focus group interviews.195 relatively safe base of operations for Allegiances are reflected in local aid structures, international organisations in its capital city, with Djibouti acting as a regular donor to the Hargeisa which allows for increased physical Awdal district in times of drought and famine presence in the state, compared to the more (Hasan, 2012). insecure south. Stability has also led to some investment in local infrastructure, increased Tensions persist between the Somaliland economic activity, and key opportunities for Government, the federal Somali state, and the Somaliland-born individuals to access important Government of Puntland. They are multifaceted positions in leading development roles. The but mainly evolve around the recognition of diaspora have been particularly involved in Somaliland’s independence and its borders. local politics and development. Hargeisa Somaliland refuses to recognise the unity of the especially is home to a wide variety of grass- Somali state and sees itself as a separate roots non-governmental organisations, working country which declared its independence from in a variety of sectors – education, health, skills Somalia in 1991. As such, the Government of training, and capacity development to name a Somaliland strives to maintain its identity as a few. Conversely, the lack of state recognition country that dated back to its colonial partition undermines regional and international from the mainland in 1888. However, the collaboration. Some analysts have argued that 1888-1960 borders are themselves disputed, this has been the key to Somaliland’s success: especially by Puntland, which laid claim to the absence of interference by the international Sool in the early 2000s. The Sool region’s community in the 1990s allowed a nascent continuing strategic importance for Puntland in peace and governance processes to take hold the fight against Al Shabaab means that this (Kilcullen, Mills, and Pham, 2013). However, a dispute will not soon be resolved, despite continued lack of investment and engagement recent improvements in local security levels in at the level present in Mogadishu has negative the area, evidenced by focus groups conducted impact on Somaliland’s development. in Qorilugud, all of which claimed that local peace was on the increase.196 Somaliland’s relations with its regional neighbours are also complex. Somaliland’s The legacies of conflict in Sool are also much contentious history with the federal state of more recent than in the rest of Somaliland, Somalia, especially during Said Barre’s regime, with members of the Warsangeli clan, whose has also contributed to positive relations with its territory cuts across eastern Somaliland and immediate neighbour, Ethiopia (Höhne, 2007). Puntland, entering into regular violent Its relations with Djibouti, its other neighbour to skirmishes with the Puntland government. the west, are a bit more complicated. As Conflict erupted in 2006 when troops from the discussed in the previous section, parts of Cadde Muuse’s Majerteen/Cismaan Maxamuud Awdal have been historically contested by local lineage clashed with Puntland forces over a inhabitants, Somaliland, and Djibouti (Wells, mineral exploration deal signed between 2003). The Somaliland people have strong past Puntland’s President Cadde Muuse and an affiliations with Djibouti, which, along with Australian mining company (Höhne, 2011a). Ethiopia, took in hundreds of thousands of Fighting re-emerged in 2011 and 2012, 195 Information obtained through refugees from Somaliland during the Somali further impacting Sool’s stability and community observation in Baki, civil war (Lewis, 2008). Yet clan-based reinforcing the region’s contentious relationship Harirad and Borama during the structures that transcend national boundaries with the Puntland government. period 1 July to 15 September 2013. lead to mixed affiliations for local Dir clans in 196 Focus group discussions were Awdal between Isaaq-dominated Somaliland Another one of Somaliland’s main security conducted in Qorilugud between and the multi-ethnic, Dir stronghold, Djibouti. challenges is associated with Somali-wide 1 July and 27 September 2013. Chapter Six 105

threats of radicalisation and conflict-related When asked about recent positive changes in stress factors, including the spill over of conflict their locations, most focus group participants from other zones into Somaliland and the in surveyed communities cited peace and the involvement of Somaliland-born individuals in opportunities that increased stability has the ongoing fighting in Puntland and South provided for improved social mobility, business Central Somalia. Cross-zonal Somali sources of activity, education access and infrastructural instability are mainly observable through their development. They reported that there has impact on Sool, which is susceptible to the been considerable service provision expansion influence of conflict dynamics from South in recent years, and especially of healthcare Central, as well as local disputes between and education, across Somaliland, though Somaliland and Puntland that are inter-related. participants indicated that piped water For example, there have been speculative provision is limited across the zone and reports of Al Shabaab transit routes and active especially so in Sool and Sanaag.198 Focus training camps in the vicinity of eastern Sool’s groups reported that new roads have been Galgala Mountains which are said to be having constructed, leading to greater social a negative impact on security locally (Höhne, movement and improved interconnection 2011b). between locations.199 This, they claim, has enabled the growth of local businesses and foreign investment, though the latter has been Location Dynamics limited.

Much of the background literature about As has already been referenced, stability, Somaliland describes it as an example of especially in central locations, has led to the successful outcomes in the inter-connected large-scale return of the Somaliland diaspora, processes of post-war reconstruction, economic many of whom arrive educated and bring new recovery, re-establishing the rule of law, innovative approaches to development. Some demobilising armed groups, and reconciliation of these can be classified as ‘part-time (Bradbury, 2008). This assessment of diaspora’ who utilise opportunities opened up Somaliland’s stability was confirmed by focus by their transnational linkages to gain personal group participants in all nine locations advantages such as jobs in addition to surveyed.197 contributing to local development through their roles in peacebuilding, education, healthcare, and local NGOs (Hammond, et al., 2011). Location District Their arrival is perceived as a mixed blessing on the ground among focus group participants, Baki Awdal however. This is due to the fact that although some members of the diaspora have been 197 Harirad Awdal instrumental in launching new economic 7-8 communities were surveyed in each location, with an average of activity in Somaliland, many are also seen to approximately six focus groups Borama Awdal have an unfair advantage in the competition for conducted in each community. See Annex A for more details livelihood opportunities, which breeds Berbera Sahil about the methodology. resentment, a process depicted in Figure 10. A review of published literature indicates that it is 198 Gabiley Maroodijeex Information obtained in focus common for members of the Somaliland group discussions in Qorilugud and Ceerigaabo during the period Hargeisa Maroodijeex diaspora still overseas to send remittances 1 July to 21 September 2013. which have been described as the lifeline for

199 Ceerigaabo Sanaag Somalis (Hammond et al., 2011). While This was true of focus difficult to quantify, this type of investment is group discussions across 200 Somaliland during the period Qorilugud Sool associated with positive change. 1 July to 21 September 2013. Burao Togdheer 200 Yet development has not reached all members Some have cited an annual of Somaliland uniformly. Focus group contribution rate from remittances of roughly US $500 million Table 8: participants reported significant variations (Horst and Hear, 2002). Locations Surveyed in Somaliland between urban and rural locations and 106 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context between core and peripheral areas. Some of these variations are related to the proximity of communities to the capital, Hargeisa. Others seem to be linked to geography. This is potentially an issue relating to the equity of resource allocation and distribution, but it is more fundamentally linked to the “natural” development of Somaliland, which has seen economic expansion and the growth of new commercial enterprises in urbanised areas, Figure 10: within easy reach of government support and Relationship between connected to central districts by freely an increase in gang violence and human Stability, Diaspora Return, navigable roads. Conversely, areas that are trafficking (IOM, 2010). The migration of young and Build-up of harder to reach have had limited assistance people has been identified by many focus group Resentment from the state and have experienced only little participants as a key challenge. While most progress. young Somaliland migrants are from poor families those from better-off backgrounds are also increasingly attempting the risky journey to Maroodijeex the southern shores of Europe (IRIN, 2013).

Maroodijeex seems to have fared especially Togdheer well, according to focus groups surveyed there.201 The capital city of Hargeisa, with Focus groups reported similar dynamics in some of the zone’s most important markets, is Togdheer.203 Burao’s central location in located in Maroodijeex, with the port city of Togdheer has led to significant road Berbera – an important shipping centre – construction and the development of a vitally nearby in Sahil. This has led to the important cattle market, with links to Berbera’s construction of important roads that transect port. The district of Togdheer itself is famous for the district which have been instrumental in its animal husbandry and high quality dairy facilitating trade and economic activity across products, which are both major sources of local the area. The surrounding pastoralist and income according to focus group data. Herd agricultural communities are able to take sizes are directly proportional to social status: advantage of local infrastructure to expand those who cannot enter this market try to segue their own market reach. Meanwhile, improved into the agricultural sector. However, land transportation leads to improved access to availability is poor and competition for healthcare, education and other key services. resources is mounting across both agricultural The region is doubly blessed with some of the and pastoral sectors. Focus group participants most fertile areas in Somaliland and argued that clan-based disputes over land and experiences regular rainfall. water in particular are on the increase. Nevertheless, communities surveyed in Burao Due to its location and infrastructure, felt that peace and stability were the 201 Maroodijeex is a very popular area for foundations of sustained progress and Locations surveyed included; Mohamed Mooge, May, Sheikh Ali settlement. As a result, population density is development in the area. At present, conflicts in Osman, Aadan Dhamac, Abaarso, high and on the increase. Land costs are Burao are mediated informally through Awbakhadle, Beeyokhadar, and Toon. currently rising at a rapid rate, particularly in traditional dispute-resolution systems based on urban centres, so economic inequality is rising oral culture and mediation by clan elders, with 202 Maroodijeex and Sahil were between landowners and non-landowners. The no written records kept of these proceedings. surveyed in July, 2013. property market is difficult to break into and 203 young people find livelihood opportunities A significant difference between Togdheer and Communities surveyed from especially hard to come by. Focus group Maroodijeex is the level of infrastructure Togdheer were based in Burao in the following locations: discussions suggest that this is contributing to development. Transportation infrastructure in October, Qasabka, Hodan Qaylo, increases in crime rates in Maroodijeex and Togdheer is limited. Although some new roads Jarmarlka, Yirowe, Balihiile, 202 and Gandahar. Focus groups Sahil. Both the focus groups and the have been built more are needed to facilitate data was collected between background literature link this phenomenon to greater mobility. 1 July and 27 September, 2013. Chapter Six 107

Sanaag and registration.205 These tend to be managed by elders and other interested parties, but their Similar limitations are severely stalling continuous reoccurrence indicates an development in other Eastern districts. In underlying challenge that has yet to be Sanaag, for instance, local communities are resolved. This seems to be aggravated by a less capable of profiting from their animal recent resurgence of clannism across husbandry. Sanaag also has a long coast-line Somaliland, as some focus groups in have with potentially high economic impact port argued. There is also an underlying tension locations, but these are currently inoperative between farmers and herders in Somaliland, due to a lack of road connectivity. A lack of with the rising settlement of farmland in cross-district roads also prevents trade central regions leading to the disappearance of between Sanaag and the rest of Somaliland. grazing land and resulting in challenges for nomadic clansmen.

Awdal In Baki (Awdal District) several sources of tension were identified by focus group Elsewhere, in Awdal, central roads lead from discussants, including: Maroodijeex to Borama, but are otherwise limited in their coverage. The road’s limited Q Regular fighting between groups of youth coverage has restricted the spread of from different communities;206 development, though positive changes are Q Competition over access to child nutrition still widely evident. The inhabitants of Awdal centres, based on limited resources; struggle, however, with the quality of Q Clan-based disputes over land ownership; available agricultural land, an issue that came Q Conflict over water resources and canals; out particularly strongly in community Q Camel theft; observation reports.204 With Somaliland being Q Contested farm boundaries; largely divided between agricultural, Q Elections207; and, pastoralist, and livestock-based societies, this Q The formation of new political parties. challenge is very important. Awdal is a mountainous area. While communities Low level violence therefore continuously surrounding urban centres like Borama have impacts Baki, and likely the rest of Awdal, 204 Information obtained through access to fertile land with manageable rates with researchers reporting that this violence community observation in Baki, of competition, other communities face peaks during electoral years. Harirad and Borama during the period 1 July to 15 September 2013. continuous land degradation due to rainfall and to drought brought about by a lack of 205 capacity to collect and store rainfall. This has Sool The manipulation of land boundaries is a routinely reoccurring challenge, serious implications for local agricultural with some farmers actually moving productivity. The isolation of many Awdal In Qorilugud, in Sool district, sources of fence posts at night in order to try to expand their territories. communities from roads also makes them tension were listed at a much more basic level difficult to access and support in times of involving clan rivalries and disputes over 206 208 Information obtained through drought and famine. It also means that they access to land and water. These issues are focus groups in Daray-Macaane, are isolated from important basic services, interconnected: Land is more commonly a Dhabi Cad, Sh. Ali Jawhar, Haya- Yaabe, Abu-qays, Aasho-caddo, including healthcare and education (IOM, disputed resource if it is within easy access of Jir-jirka, Xamarta and Xooray 2008). a local water source, which increases its communities during the period 1 July to 15 September 2013. potential fertility as well as its value for Due to the importance of land in generating pastoralists. Water is used to enrich land as 207 The 2003 national elections seem economic activity in Somaliland, disputed well as to keep communities alive, and is to have been particularly turbulent borders between families and communities particularly important in Sool where the (World Bank, 2005). are a continuous source of conflict. supply of piped water is highly limited. When 208 Competition over farm land, grazing rights water and land are limited, or when Information obtained through focus groups in Qorilugad, Horseed, and water resources lead to frequent disagreements erupt over local natural Qabrihulul, Coodanle, Balicanle, confrontations between neighbours, families, resources, conflict breaks out along clan-lines. Bahiile, Kaarto and Gandahar communities during the period clans and sub-clans due to a lack of clear 1 July to 27 September 2013. state-based frameworks for land demarcation 108 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Summary also remain. Virtually all communities surveyed in Somaliland listed peace as a hugely Despite severe underdevelopment and important local commodity and claimed to feel entrenched challenges throughout the zone, it safe in their locations, but further probing needs to be emphasised that, generally revealed persistent low-level conflicts and speaking, peace and stability prevails in escalating crime rates. Somaliland. Continuing peace is attributed to zonal collective memory of conflict and a Although Somaliland is generally characterised cultural appreciation for the significant costs by peace and stability, the analysis identified of war. The Somaliland government, working underlying tensions that could be categorised with community elders, is at the centre of as structural and proximate drivers of conflict – maintaining the relative peace and managing although their manifestations in the Somaliland conflict across the zone. The bottom-up context does not typically reach the level of grassroots peacebuilding process pursued in armed conflict, with the exception of the Somaliland is said to have been particularly sometimes violent conflict in the disputed successful due to the role of authentic leaders territories. clan of the various warring clans whose efforts at achieving peace slowly moved from the local through district and finally regional Structural Drivers levels (Farah and Lewis, 1997). The Guurti system is crucial to ensuring that peace is Border Disputes maintained in Somaliland. A blend of As discussed in greater detail in previous traditional and democratic governance sections, one of the chief drivers of armed systems has balanced rivalries well, and conflict in Somaliland’s recent history are the successfully managed a wide range of unresolved issues of its borders with Puntland competing interests and political agendas. in the disputed territories of Sool and Sanaag. Elections have been held regularly across While the last recorded high level of violence Somaliland at multiple levels, and between Somaliland and Puntland in these representatives have been nominated within regions occurred in 2011, these regions districts, regions and the broader zone with remain a highly contentious area, with a positive impacts, though these do not extend complex web of issues ranging from limited to the Guurti Council. development, remote geographic location, inter-clan conflicts, and potential natural resources. Drivers of Peace and Conflict Resource Scarcity Peace and conflict in Somaliland are Somaliland’s situational dynamics and manifested in the long-term sustenance of contemporary history indicate that one of the relative stability and reoccurring low-level most common drivers of conflict in the zone is violence, respectively. Due to the important resource scarcity within a context of high role of elders and the Somaliland Government population growth and poor government in a variety of different districts, it should be capacity. Land availability is incredibly noted that most focus groups surveyed seem important, and communities have a tendency to perceive the Somaliland state as being to fall back on clan-based identity politics at legitimate and beneficial in its role.209 The key moments when they either feel threatened consensual politics that emerged in the post- by new competitors, or when they worry that civil war period is a major factor in the peace their needs will not be met. Lack of services and stability enjoyed by Somaliland, relative and infrastructure in some districts mean that 209 Information obtained in focus to its neighbouring regions, over the past two those who are not able to support themselves group discussions throughout decades (Kilcullen, Mills, and Pham, 2013). through legitimate livelihoods opportunities do Somaliland during the period However, widespread allegations of corruption not have access to welfare-based safety nets. 1 July to 27 September 2013. emerging from individual interviews Their situation is desperate, and this can lead 210 Information obtained during undermine the positive implications of these to violence. interviews conducted in Hargeisa 210 findings. Other discrepancies in the data during the period 1-5 June 2013. Chapter Six 109

Marginalised Youth that no militias or armed society members can Due to a number of reasons youth feel the be seen influencing the daily lives of impact of resource scarcity most strongly. Somaliland citizens. Baki is perhaps the only Children and young people in Somaliland face exception to this, where some people can be several other challenges, including: seen carrying guns.

Q Substantial labour migration due to lack of Surveyed communities across Somaliland also opportunities;211 expressed concerns that the collective memory Q Human trafficking victimisation (IOM, of war and conflict was fading among younger 2010); generations who are not perceived to value Q Narcotics addiction; and peace as highly. This could lead to an increase Q Gang recruitment. in conflict across Somaliland in the future. Young people themselves, surveyed in Sahil, Those who are born into families with either Maroodijeex and Gabiley, agree with this limited land or limited herds either cannot overall assessment of their generation. With equitably balance resources between siblings, young people are also distanced from collective or cannot acquire resources that are central to memories of conflict and peacebuilding, they the main Somaliland livelihoods sectors on are therefore less likely to share Somaliland’s their own. Combined with a broad lack of other peace-preserving agenda as it was developed legitimate economic opportunities, this means and maintained by older generations. that young people feel pressured to provide for themselves without having the lawful means to With poor levels of representation recorded do so. Apart from needing to provide for among surveyed youth focus groups, many themselves to meet their basic needs, young stated that their communities are not people, especially young men, also face adequately responding to their needs.212 immense social pressure to succeed financially, Nevertheless, youth expectations of the state many of whom cannot get married or start are very high, with many looking for assistance families without meeting unaffordable wedding in terms of employment, vocational training, and dowry prices. This means that many adopt and improved educational access. To respond violent or deviant identities, falling into patterns to these needs, there is a need for the of criminal behaviour. They are an easy Somaliland government, with the support of its recruitment base for criminal organisations and partners in the international community, to gangs, especially because they tend to be prioritise the linkages between education and isolated from mainstream society. livelihoods for young people, in order to avoid further youth disillusionment. Training for These last challenges have strong implications participation in small-to-medium enterprises is for education. Violence between children particularly important, as is the generation of occurs within the school environment and is new job opportunities by the state through broadly attributed to the under-staffing of infrastructure rehabilitation and development. schools (which leads to low teacher-to-student Young people in Somaliland who participated ratios) and the lack of training for children and in the focus group discussions also requested young people in dispute-resolution. Conflicts support from the international community in among youth occur outside the school the form of conflict resolution training environment and are related mainly to turf- workshops. They were keen to help resolve wars. There is an absence of youth centres tensions between youth, but felt that they 211 across Somaliland that could otherwise be needed support and encouragement to do so. This came out of focus group discussions in Maroodijeex helping to resolve disputes. Young people are particularly, in which parents, elders also said to be intimidating local communities Uneven Development and teachers were concerned that heightened levels of migration were with knives in urban centres in Maroodijeex Across Somaliland, uneven development was actually altering local demographics. and Gabiley. This in itself may, however, seen as being problematic by most of the

212 indicate that guns are not overly prevalent in communities surveyed. Indeed, one of the Information obtained in youth Somaliland districts, and community most common requests from focus groups for focus group discussions throughout Somaliland during the period observations conducted across the zone government support to provide equal and just 1 July to 27 September 2013. corroborate this conclusion in their assertion distribution of development between urban and 110 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context rural areas and between districts. Generally, focus group participants wanted to see a more equitable distribution of services, including education. The information provided in focus group discussions, particularly in the periphery point to a significant gap between the development that has occurred and the opportunities that many people in Somaliland have for improved livelihoods and access to key services, as depicted in Figure 11. This gap leads to tensions which have not yet proven sufficient to compromise the peace in Somaliland, but has the potential to lead to Figure 11: conflict if not addressed. Development and their areas. Meanwhile, in Awdal, satisfaction Opportunity Gap in with levels of representation varied among Somaliland Proximate Drivers surveyed focus groups.214 This seems largely to be the result of tensions between Somaliland Proximate drivers of peace and conflict and Djibouti-affiliated clans, as has already comprise the social, political, and been argued in previous sections. Depending communications-based methods used by on the levels of representation for particular societies to navigate structural challenges. As clan members in district-level politics, some such, they are central to determining whether groups are either marginalised or become disputes escalate into violence and open dominant. Changes in levels of representation, conflict. If structural drivers of conflict in especially in election years, are therefore hotly Somaliland are decreases in resources and contested issues. increases in local competition, then proximate causes are reflected in the mismanagement of Feelings of representation also varied according those tensions. On the one hand, poor to demographics in surveyed focus groups.215 infrastructure and underdevelopment result in Elders and religious leaders, due to their strong a reduction of the state’s ability to reach its political and cultural authority, felt well citizens and provide solutions to local represented and were generally integrated into challenges. the structures of the state. Teachers and business professionals also had formal systems Representation of representation to rely on. Women too varied On the other hand, the dominance of the Isaaq in their experiences. Those surveyed who were clan in Somaliland’s politics, while offering more centrally located in Maroodijeex and Sahil stability, also causes increased competition seemed less satisfied with their overall levels of between the centre and the peripheries, which representation than those who were not, has caused conflict, especially in Sool. though some women in Maroodijeex still said However, probing further into the issue of that they felt represented. Those women who equal representation reveals parallel challenges were surveyed in Sool and Sanaag would not in terms of leadership in different districts, comment on their levels of representation, and 213 particularly in Gabiley and Sahil. Focus group instead explained that they chose not to share Information obtained in focus group discussions in Gabiley and discussants complained that local government their opinions with their communities or to put Berbera locations during the period representatives have failed to adequately put their ideas forward in local governance 1 July to 21 September 2013. 213 their needs forward for them. Explanations processes. This means that, though they were 214 for this vary among focus groups. Broadly, not as vocal as women in Maroodijeex, Awdal Information obtained through community observation in Baki, participants argued that district or regional and Sahil about their lack of satisfaction with Harirad and Borama during the governments were corrupt, that their their representation levels, they were actually period 1 July to 15 September 2013. representatives do not listen to them, that by far less represented in local governance and 215 representatives are unconcerned by their administration than their counterparts. Despite Based on focus group discussions throughout Somaliland, complaints or unable to follow through on their marginalisation from political processes, it carried out during the period them, or there is no strong local leadership in has been found by observers that women 1 July to 27 September 2013. Chapter Six 111

Physical Economic Social Psychological Political Cultural

Direct impacts of Underdevelopment Unemployment Rising levels of Lack of sufficient Lack of uniform Clan-based power key challenges in and poor (especially youth criminal violence, safe spaces for agreement between politics Somaliland government unemployment), especially against children, especially international, capacity have poverty, rising women. parks and national, zonal, led to uneven inequality. playgrounds regional and infrastructure (leading to turf- district level actors across Somaliland, skirmishes and as to how to as well as growing fighting in and out conceptualise resource of schools). and deal with competition. Somaliland.

Indirect impacts Rising conflicts over Disenfranchisement Wide-scale Growing culture of Electoral disputes, of the key farm land, a return of youth, infiltration narcotics addiction. violence among clan-based challenges in of clannism. of criminal younger confrontations, Somaliland networks. generations. resource and land- based conflicts.

Table 9: Direct and Indirect Impacts of key challenges played a central role in establishing and The summary of the direct and indirect impacts in Somaliland maintaining peace in Somaliland, becoming of the key challenges in Somaliland on the active in dialogue whenever peace is physical, economic, social, psychological, threatened (Dini, 2009). Meanwhile, the same political, and cultural aspects of life in the zone cannot be said of youth: across the board, are summarized in Table 9. surveyed young people felt that their needs were not understood and not adequately dealt with by their communities, but seemed more Actors likely to become actors in escalating violence, rather than in restoring stability. This final section outlines the key actors in conflict in Somaliland.216 The major actors Nevertheless, Somaliland itself is credited as contributing to peace and conflict in being a relatively free and open society, in Somaliland are discussed in the table below, which freedom of speech is an essential right, followed by a brief outline of secondary actors and this is an important driver of peace, and interested third parties. despite variations in media representation between clans. Though in practice, journalists have not always been free from the threat of arrest, both daily and weekly newspapers in Somaliland are frequent critics of the government and are not afraid to speak out on political issues and sensitive topics which “shows that freedom of speech is guaranteed in Somaliland in theory” (Höhne, 2008). Nevertheless, this relatively free media plays an important role in providing political information to citizens and enables better- informed choices in particular in elections 216 (Höhne, 2008). Large portions of the The analysis of the actors is based upon information drawn population are politically aware and engaged, from the interviews and focus legitimising mainstream political fora for group discussions, as well as the secondary data drawn from voicing discontent, above violent alternatives. the background literature. 112 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Name Characteristics Needs Interests Positions Resources Relationships

Government of Central Extensive External/ Stronghold in Severely limited. Strong Isaaq support, Somaliland administrative infrastructure International Hargeisa, relatively poor relationships authority of development. recognition, internal even coverage with other zonal Somaliland. power consolidation, across central administrations border security. districts, limited marked by sporadic peripheral reach conflict, inconsistent within Somaliland. relationships with regional neighbours, including Ethiopia and Djibouti, limited/ weak relationships with the United Nations and other important members of the international community.

Guurti Clan-based Greater Continued Based in Hargeisa, Severely limited. Strong Isaaq leadership of representativeness Somaliland stability, with relatively even support, good Somaliland. and greater the preservation of coverage across cooperative inclusion of Somaliland’s central districts and relationships with non-Isaaq clan cultural and limited peripheral Somaliland’s members. traditional practices reach within Government, and mediation Somaliland. relatively consistent systems. perforation at the zonal, district and local level.

Isaaq Clan Numerically and Increased, targeted Continued control Situated in the Relatively good Beneficial politically dominant development over Somaliland. central Somaliland access to land, water relationships with clan structure of assistance from the districts, especially and infrastructure, the Somaliland state Somaliland. international Maroodijeex, Sahil compared to other and Guurti, community. and Togdheer, but clans, but still competitive and also in Eastern severely limited in sometimes violent Awdal and Western terms of relationships with Sool and Sanaag. development. other clans.

Darood and Numerically and Increased, targeted Interests vary Situated in the Severely limited. Fluctuating relations Harti Clans politically development between members. peripheral areas of Both districts of with the Governments marginalised clan assistance from the Some would like to Somaliland, in the Sool and Sanaag are of Somaliland and structure in international achieve increased Western districts of isolated from central Puntland, marked by Somaliland. community and the representation in Sool and Sanaag, roads and reoccurring conflict. Somaliland Somaliland and transcending infrastructure, Unclarified relations Government. Puntland. Others disputed borders leading to severe with some members Resolution of would prefer not to with Puntland. underdevelopment, of the Isaaq clan, but ongoing disputes be a part of either especially in Sool. peaceful relations between Somaliland zone. with the Isaaq and Puntland. federation itself.

Table 10 (continued opposite): Summary of Actors in Somaliland Chapter Six 113

Name Characteristics Needs Interests Positions Resources Relationships

Dir Clan Numerically and Increased, targeted Interests of the Dir Situated in the Mixed, depending on Fluctuating relations politically development clan vary. Some peripheral areas of location in Awdal, with the marginalised clan assistance from the members would like Somaliland, in the with some clans Government of structure in international greater autonomy; Eastern district of having access to Somaliland, Somaliland. community and the others would like to Sool, transacting the roads and fertile depending on Somaliland extend representation Djibouti and lands in the East of changes in Government. in the Somaliland Ethiopian borders. the district, and representation state. However, they others living on levels, marked by have traditionally difficult to navigate, some disputes and achieved strong mountainous terrain low-level violence representation in and deteriorating surrounding Somaliland: in fact, land in the West of elections. the third President of the district. Unclarified relations Somaliland, Dahir with the Isaaq clan. Rayaale Kahin was a member of the Dir clan.

Government of Central Extensive Resolution of clear, Located in the Severely limited. Hostile relations with Puntland administrative infrastructure ongoing security Puntland, with the Government of authority of development, threats emanating fluctuating control Somaliland, unclear Puntland. clarification of border from Somaliland- over Somaliland and shifting definitions, security- controlled districts, borderlands. relationships with based negotiations such as Sool. Somaliland-based with Somaliland and Warsangeli and a cessation of Dhulbahante clan hostilities. members.

Federal Central Extensive Extension of Located in the South Limited resources, Inconsistent Government of administrative infrastructure effective control Central Zone, using though the relations with the Somalia authority of development. over Somaliland. Mogadishu as its Government is Government of Somalia. capital. Fluctuating supported militarily Somaliland, marked reach across South and financially by by recent Central itself, and the international improvements and limited influence over community. attempts at Somaliland and reconciliation. Puntland. 114 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

In addition to the key described actors above, are mainly pastoral communities, living off those described below constitute secondary camels and goats. Though they are often able actors and interested third parties who to sustain themselves, they are increasingly contribute to peace and conflict in Somaliland. encountering difficulties in maintaining their lifestyles mainly due to expanding settled agriculturalists’ farm boundaries. They are Business Community frequently seen to be coming into conflict with settled communities over water and grazing The business community has been rights. They are also facing pressures from the instrumental in spearheading economic frequent droughts that are hitting the Horn of growth. Its activities are limited, however, by African with greater frequency and severity. stringent international restrictions on money transfers to Somaliland and poor infrastructure. Economic life in the zone is Women characterised by an underdeveloped banking sector and, as already discussed, a lack of Women’s representation in Somaliland politics physical infrastructure, including roads, which varies from the core to the peripheries and are essential for facilitating trade. Despite across urban and rural areas. Women in these difficulties, business activity is on the central urban areas seem to be more increase across the zone, with an especially politically engaged than their rural active Somaliland diaspora community counterparts. Both rely on male-dominated supporting innovation and working to clan systems for representation, however. overcome these restrictions. Unfortunately, Nevertheless, women are generally Somaliland’s poorest communities have not acknowledged as having an active role to play shared in the resulting economic development, in peacebuilding, and have a vested interest breeding resentment between those returning in building peace and security. they are from abroad with money to invest and those increasingly being seen as a vulnerable group who have remained in-country throughout in Somaliland society, facing growing security periods of civil war, conflict, and challenges arising from crime and gender- underdevelopment. based violence.

Agriculturalists Youth

Agriculturalists are settled, permanent As previously discussed, youth are the most communities across Somaliland, and represent marginalised demographic in Somaliland. At a one of the main livelihood sectors in the zone. local level, youth surveyed in focus groups They form a rapidly expanding section of did not feel that their needs were understood Somaliland society, taking over more and more or met by their communities; at a zonal level, fertile land. This is causing a number of socio- youth do not have access to opportunities for economic stresses, with competition between political participation.217 Due to increasing farmers for increasingly populated lands resource scarcity, population growth and resulting in rising hostility between farmers competition for resources, young people have and pastoralists. So far, the tensions have few avenues for entry into mainstream society been managed by elders, but competition and and economic activity in Somaliland, leading conflict is likely to increase in the coming to growing frustration, marginalisation and years, caused by population growth and land violent, criminal activity. Though they have erosion through over-use. the potential to play an important peacebuilding role as future Somaliland leaders, they are currently rapidly becoming

Nomads conflict actors and spoilers of zonal peace and 217 stability. Information obtained in youth focus group discussions throughout Nomads are transient migratory communities, Somaliland during the period highly romanticised in Somali society. They 1 July to 27 September 2013. Chapter Six 115

Gangs and Organised Crime Networks

Gangs and organised crime networks are symptoms of youth marginalisation, filling a void created in Somaliland by a lack of legitimate opportunities.

Neighbouring States

Ethiopia: Past relations between Somaliland and Ethiopia have been mainly positive, but Ethiopia is now mainly engaged in South Central and other areas of Somalia, with limited engagement in Somaliland.

Djibouti: Djibouti has a complex relationship with the Government of Somaliland and its people, based on cooperative past relationships in which it provided relief and protection to Somaliland refugees, as well as more recent instances in which it delivered humanitarian assistance to victims of drought and famine on its shared border with Somaliland. However, anecdotal evidence shows rising competition between Djibouti and Somaliland over Dir- dominated Awdal.

International Community

The international community’s role in Somaliland has been limited, due to Somaliland’s lack of recognition as a state in its own right. Bilateral donors and international organisations are required to engage through the federal administration, which can negatively impact project implementation due to underlying inter-zonal tensions.

Part 2

The Conflict and Education Nexus

Part II of this CPSA explores the

conflict-education nexus in the Somali context.

Following a discussion of education and peacebuilding, Chapter 7 unpacks the relationship

between education and the aggregate and

local level conflict drivers identified in Part I.

Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the zonal analyses,

drawing conclusions and presenting some

entry points for context-appropriate education

and peacebuilding programming.

Chapter Seven 119 Chapter Seven

Education and Peacebuilding in the Somali Context 120 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

his chapter presents an overview of how Tconflict has influenced the development of Armed conflict in the world’s poorest countries education and the way education influenced the conflict dynamics at the regional and zonal is one of the greatest barriers facing Education for All goals. level in Somalia. First it begins with a discussion of the growing recognition of education’s role in peacebuilding. This section also explores how peacebuilding in terms of its and calls upon the international community to rationale and conceptualisation of the strengthen the role of education systems in relationship between education and preventing conflicts and building peaceful peacebuilding, informs education societies. The provision of education in such programming. In the final section, building on contexts adopts a ‘human needs’ understanding the finds of this CPSA conducted for the and approach in response. It also assumes that current study at the aggregate and zonal levels, tackling education needs can have a ‘multiplier the chapter considers how education effect’; in other words, that tackling education programmes can systematically address the needs can create other humanitarian gains and identified conflict drivers, as well as the initiate additional developmental reforms. The challenges and opportunities such educational 2011 EFA report concludes that while post- interventions will provide. conflict reconstruction in education poses immense challenges, success in education can help underpin the peace process, build Education and Peacebuilding government legitimacy and set a country back on course to recovery. Throughout the last decade there has been a growing recognition of education’s role in While education systems have the potential to responding to conflict and in the building of act as a powerful force for peace, reconciliation peace (Machel, 2001). It is now widely and conflict prevention by promoting mutual accepted that schools and teachers can be respect, tolerance and critical thinking, all too used to provide a safe space and sense of often they fuel violence by providing too little normalcy during situations of instability, and provision, unequal access and the wrong type contribute to the physical, psychosocial, and of education (Davies, 2004). In terms of cognitive protection of children, adolescents, education programming, it is necessary to first and adult learners. School can also become a understand how the existing system interacts focal point for interventions to improve child with the conflict. Davies (2004) suggests that protection and as a cross-cutting the assessment of any education system is developmental factor in capacity development, likely to demonstrate ways in which it is either gender, social cohesion and human rights fuelling conflict in a politicized way or awareness. In the long term, education can contributing towards peace-building. When help reduce violence, and build bridges large numbers of young people are denied between deeply divided communities, giving access to education, the resulting poverty, hope and opportunity to young people unemployment and disaffection can act as a (Barakat, et al., 2013). powerful recruiting ground for armed militia. Unequal access to education resulting in wide Violent conflict, war and natural disparities between communities can also hazards/disasters, inequality and poverty are cause conflicts, as can the use of education seen as the greatest obstacles to human systems to reinforce political domination and development. The growing importance of the subordination of marginalised groups and education in conflict in the international arena ethnic segregation (Sommers, 2005). When was reflected in the 2011 EFA Global the rebuilding of an education system following Monitoring Report, The hidden crisis: Armed conflict does begin, it is often in an conflict and education (UNESCO, 2011). In environment marked by high levels of political the report, it was argued armed conflict in the instability and uncertainty, chronic financing world’s poorest countries is one of the greatest deficits, low levels of capacity and teacher barriers facing the Education for All (EFA) goals shortages. Chapter Seven 121

Education in post-conflict recovery has become capacity building, and ensuring external the focus of a growing body of research among support for education builds on the efforts of educationalists and others as it is seen as local communities and authorities already being critical to the reconstruction process and active in supporting education. The need for consolidating peace and stability (Penson and inter-sectoral collaboration on HIV/AIDS Tomlinson, 2009). Over the last ten years, programmes, health education, safety and education in countries affected by conflict has security in schools, landmines and also undergone significant changes in policy psychosocial support is also recognised and practice, and the way it is conceptualised together with the need to align education (Rappleye and Paulson, 2007). More recently, reconstruction with social and economic due to concerns over states being labelled as development (Brannelly, et al., 2009). fragile and therefore being seen as high risk, the terminology has shifted to fragile situations Despite these recent contributions, however, or states affected by fragility. This allows for a the field of education in conflict is still in its deeper level of analysis beyond the state level infancy and there is a need to carry out more to include all actors who are perpetuating research and evaluation to understand the conditions that limit the provision of basic complex and critical processes of educational services, including security, justice, health and reconstruction, and the processes through education (Tebbe, 2009). which educational systems contribute to promoting or preventing conflict, and building Within the education and conflict area, peace (Novelli and Cardozo, 2008). As practitioners, policy makers and academics UNICEF’s own literature review of the role of have begun to engage collaboratively in education in peacebuilding concludes, discussion regarding education in post-conflict virtually all of the literature refers to a weak transitions, deepening insights into the evidence base for linkages between education, complex, often contradictory, relationships conflict and peacebuilding due to a lack of between education and those affected by correlational and experimental studies conflict or natural disaster (Davies, 2004). The (UNICEF, 2011). While it recognises that the findings have informed the development of volatile environment in conflict affected increasingly targeted and sophisticated societies mean that operational conditions are programme planning and management tools, difficult, and short programme cycles, high for use by government ministries, UN agencies, levels of staff mobility and poor institutional and non-governmental organizations in memory, make systematic research difficult, it education in conflict, such as the development calls for more rigorous research to be carried of the INEE Minimum Standards for education out to generate a knowledge base of effective provision in countries affected by natural and approaches to rebuilding education systems man-made disasters (INEE, 2010). emerging from conflict.

This research and evaluation has led to the identification of problems common to many Conceptualising the Relationship between post-conflict situations. These include the Education and Peacebuilding inability of governments to fund capital or recurrent expenditure, a chronic shortage of UNICEF’s approach to education and peace qualified teachers or over supply of under- building posits that education has an qualified teachers, poor record keeping, important part to play in the transformative corruption and lack of transparency in process that post-conflict society need to go educational governance, and a failure to through by addressing drivers of conflict. develop initiatives to build the skills of young Education is seen as having the ability to act people and prevent their recruitment into as a medium for social reconciliation and military or criminal activity World Bank peacebuilding as children from different (2005). There has also been an emerging communities come together to go to school. consensus over the need for an early focus on Likewise, schools, youth clubs and non-formal getting schools functioning, decentralising learning centres can provide a forum for reforms to allow community ownership and integration, as children and youth from host 122 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context and IDP communities have access to basic and secondary education throughout conflict Improvement in the level and quality of education provision affected areas. Education can also have an equalizing effect on children, youth and is one way that governments can demonstrate communities with different political, developmental, and economic histories. a return to normality after conflict.

There are three broad rationales concerning the role education can play in supporting peacebuilding. Firstly, education can act as a conditions by encouraging political awareness, ‘peace dividend’ where an end to violent engagement and participation, and the conflict offers an opportunity for the state to development of skills likely to lead to devote increasing resources to social employment and a sustainable livelihood. development such as education and health by diverting expenditure away from security. Improvements in the level and quality of Theory of Change education provision is one way that governments can demonstrate a return to While the three arguments for the role of normality and its ability to provide services for education in peacebuilding overlap and are the public good. It also said to increase the often implicit in many of UNICEF’s education legitimacy of government as such improved programmes at the country level, UNICEF’s provision is very visible to the population and peacebuilding programming is informed by a may be perceived as a benefit arising from the theory of change that assumes a clear link peace and rebuilding of the state. between education and peacebuilding, and which makes explicit underlying assumptions Secondly, education that is ‘conflict sensitive’ and approaches, or logic, as to why and how can be viewed as helping to build the peace by certain programme interventions will contribute being careful not to fuel or trigger inequalities (or not) to peacebuilding. The accuracy of the or grievances or reinforce prejudices and underlying theory of change of each education animosities. For example, it can address intervention is to a large extent used to inequalities of access and provision between determine whether or not a programme is regions and between different ethnic groups or successful in achieving the change it was set clans groups. It can also to address the out to achieve, informed by a conflict analysis recruitment, training and development of conflict analysis to systematically the profile, teachers to enable them to be more sensitive to causes, actors and dynamics of a conflict as in diversity, language and equality issues in their the current study. teaching. In addition, it can bring about reform of the curriculum and textbooks by removing Within UNICEF’s approach to education and negative stereotypes and social and historical peacebuilding, an identification of agents of narratives based on discrimination, and change and drivers of change within the ensuring they are relevant to the lives and education sector at the national and local level linguistic communities from which the students is essential. By understanding the interaction come. between the program intervention and the context in which the project is implemented, Thirdly, education can transform values, the conducting of a conflict analysis and attitudes and behaviours by encouraging non- examination of the theory of change will assist violent ways of dealing with conflict and in avoiding negative impacts and maximize creating opportunities for dialogue between positive impacts. It is also intended that the people and groups in conflict by bringing them conflict analysis will be regularly updated together around the common goal of educating alongside systematic monitoring and evaluation their children. It can build people’s sense of to determine how far the education security by addressing attitudes to violence or interventions have impacted on the drivers of their confidence in the justice system. It can conflict and drivers of change. also transform political and economic Chapter Seven 123

As discussed in the previous section, in conflict sensitivity. The first recognises the need addition to seeing education as a peace for donors and agencies to be more sensitive to dividend, the theory of change assumes that conflict dynamics and to adapt policies and education can contribute to other dimensions programmes accordingly so they are ‘conflict of peacebuilding, such as conflict prevention, sensitive, by making sure they do not reinforce social transformation, civic engagement and inequalities or fuel division, whereas the economic progress. For example, it can second has a more explicit focus on conflict contribute to improved governance by management and resolution, and deliberately addressing underlying inequities that fuel seeks to build peace by explicitly engaging with conflict, providing education and employment drivers of conflict. Conflict sensitive opportunities to disenfranchised youth, programmes therefore consciously seek to empowering adolescent girls and women as avoid or minimize negative impacts (‘do no actors in the peacebuilding process, imparting harm’) and try to create positive impacts on the civic and political education, and modelling conflict dynamics. However, there is no democratic participation and decision making. guarantee that they will address key drivers of This can be achieved through strengthening conflict, and while doing no harm may be the education sector at the policy, institutional necessary it will not in itself be sufficient. and community level by integrating peacebuilding and conflict transformation into In contrast to conflict sensitivity, peacebuilding educational policies and practices, increasing is a type of programming with the specific aim institutional capacities to supply conflict of explicitly addressing the key drivers of sensitive education addressing triggers of conflict and ultimately changing the conflict conflict, and developing the capacity of dynamics, with particular emphasis on students, parents and teachers to promote reducing or preventing violence as a means of peace and conflict transformation practices. addressing political, social and economic problems and injustices. As will be discussed In planning education programmes to address in the subsequent sections, understanding the drivers of conflict, UNICEF’s education and relationship between the two will be essential peacebuilding programming argues the need to for effective peacebuilding programming in draw a distinction between peacebuilding and each of the three zones of Somalia. 124 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Addressing Drivers of Conflict through Education Context is the critical factor in Somali conflict dynamics,

Building on the conflict analysis of the three with widely divergent patterns across and within the three zones. zones presented in Chapters 3-6, this section discusses potential entry points for education in addressing the identified drivers of conflict. First, this chapter begins with a look at the way validity and reliability, education and conflict has influenced the way education has management information systems (EMIS) have developed in the region of Somalia and the been introduced in Somaliland (MoEHE, way it has contributed to the conflict dynamics 2012) and Puntland (MoE, 2012), based on across the three zones. Secondly, it discusses UNDP population projection estimates, with at what level and how education can address the technical assistance of UNICEF and other conflict drivers in each of the three zones. partners. Currently, no equivalent data set Finally, potential entry points for education to exists for SCZ following two decades of state address the conflict drivers and triggers are collapse out of which it is only just emerging. identified.

What comes out of the conflict analysis is that Somali Primary Education context is a critical factor in Somali conflict dynamics, producing widely divergent patterns According to EMIS data In Somaliland, the across Somaliland, Puntland and SCZ. The gross enrolment ratio (GER)218 for primary age zonal analyses also highlight how the children (ages 6 to 13) from thirteen of the dynamics and drivers of conflict are not regions is said to be fifty per cent for boys and uniform across and within the zones, thirty-eight per cent for girls, giving a total ratio suggesting the need for programming of forty-four per cent. It is estimated there are responses to be differentiated by zone and 940 primary schools (of which ninety-six are within the zones. Despite the considerable private and three are run by NGOs) staffed by variation in context across the three zones, a 983 female and 5,174 male teachers, giving a number of common themes can be identified, pupil-teacher ratio of 31:1. Out of the 6,157 which are further expanded in Table 10. teachers, just under half are said to be qualified. However, it is acknowledged that Many of these have been dealt with in earlier there are wide regional disparities in the data chapters, so this chapter will concentrate on and many private schools have not been those that pertain to educational provision. In registered. Little data also exists to verify the all three zones, governments are struggling to number of out-of school-children in provide basic social services such as education Somaliland, particularly in rural areas. and the void is being filled by the private sector, non-profit, self-help groups, or In Puntland, EMIS data show the GER for international aid agencies, particularly in SCZ primary age children from seven regions to be where government is planning to introduce forty-six per cent for boys and thirty-seven per state education provision. In addition to very cent for girls, giving a total ratio of forty-one per 218 low levels of educational funding, all three cent. It is estimated that there are 535 GER is the total enrolment in zones are lacking in human resources in the primary schools (of which sixty-one are a specific level of education, regardless of age, expressed ministries and the technical capacity to described as community schools, twelve as a percentage of the eligible manage the education service. private and three run by NGOs) staffed by 920 official school-age population corresponding to the same level female and 4,173 male teachers, with a pupil- of education in a given school year. Given the extremely challenging context for teacher ratio of 21:1. Out of the 5,093 To show the general level of participation in a given level of educational development across each of the teachers, ninety-eight per cent are said to be education, it indicates the capacity three zones, instability and under-investment qualified. Again, it is acknowledged that there of the education system to enrol students of a particular age group. in education are evidenced by significantly low are wide regional disparities in the data, many It can also be a complementary school education indicators across the board. private schools have not been registered, and indicator to net enrolment rate (NER) by indicating the extent While data on service provision are difficult to little data exists to verify the number of out-of of over-aged and under-aged find and very questionable in terms of their school-children in Puntland, particularly in enrolment. Chapter Seven 125

Conflict Drivers Key dynamic factors that could lead to the escalation and de-escalation of conflict

Characterisation Manifestation Fall out Impact on Education

Clan Identity-based drivers Manipulation and Leading to mobilisation in the In some areas leading to IDPs, nomads and other politicisation of clan identities name of clan protection ethnic/clan cleansing minority groups have limited access to education

Erosion of clan traditional Inability to resolve day-to-day Escalation of conflict Decline in traditional values leadership and customary conflict and conflict resolution laws systems at community level

Clan alliances and Dynamic cross clan alliances; Led to localised peace partnerships alliances with businessmen, agreements, such as in Federal state, AS, etc. Baidoa

State Fragility based Elite political settlement Lack of inclusivity. Unclear and sometimes Education not accessible to drivers leading to the creation of the Competition with other more contentious relationships with non-elite groups fuelling Federal State of Somalia established state structures the federal government feelings of alienation in Somaliland and Puntland

Inability to control territories Increase in non-state actors Lack of accountability, Attacks on education as and to provide state-led providing security (private exploitation and deterioration contested sites leads to security militias, security firms, clans, of state legitimacy closure of schools etc.)

Weak Governance Multiple layers of governance Absence of communication institutions; corruption, lack channels between citizens of transparency and and the state accountability

Lack of control over revenue Weak State Institutions and Lack of employment Lack of state education (from taxation, ports, etc.) structures; Inability to finance opportunities within the state provision at primary and services, in particular ones secondary level that were free for all before the Regime Collapse in 1991

Fluid demarcation between Contested control over Creating potential triggers for regions regions/districts/areas often conflict overlapping with clan competition and economic control over resources (e.g. Lower Juba, Galkayo, Mudug, Sool and Sanaag

Table 10 (continued on next two pages): Drivers of the Somali Conflict at the Aggregate Level 126 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Conflict Drivers Key dynamic factors that could lead to the escalation and de-escalation of conflict

Characterisation Manifestation Fall out Impact on Education

Resource-based drivers Traditional competition over Conflict amongst pastoralists Weakened abilities of Children in nomadic land, pasture and water over grazing land and traditional leaders to settle communities have limited sources between them and conflicts over resources, access to education fuelling agriculturalists over often complicated by marginalisation cultivating areas close to involvement of political elites watering points or preventing access to grazing land and water

Competition over control of Conflict over supplies and Criminal militia seek to ports, airstrips, checkpoints fees control key resources through and points of access force

Competition over emerging Conflict over fishing rights, oil Conflict at the local level over Growth in private schools only forms of resources. and gas, humanitarian aid resources available to urban elites management, hiring cars to leading to greater inequalities Diaspora investments, humanitarian aid agencies, in education provision and remittances letting them properties, etc. fuelling grievances of excluded groups

Urban landownership, Eviction of illegal Further displacement and Returning diaspora and occupants/settlers marginalisation. investors Creation of further grievances

Social violence and crime Human rights abuses. Reliance on weapons to settle Warlords economic interests Promoting culture of violence based drivers disputes. that benefited from the in families and schools Because there is no structure lawlessness. of accountability, a culture of Kidnapping, assassination, impunity persists. car hijacking, etc. Financing violence and criminal groups Proliferation of small weapons.

Qaat.

Trade with illegal medicine, expired foodstuff, etc. Chapter Seven 127

Conflict Drivers Key dynamic factors that could lead to the escalation and de-escalation of conflict

Characterisation Manifestation Fall out Impact on Education

Ideologically based drivers Conflict over the The interpretation seems to Violent conflicts between Curriculum hijacked for interpretation of Islam and in have shifted from the core Islamic sects and groups ideological reasons, conflict particular over providing values of justice and security generated over attempts to justice, security and to social aspects of control curriculum/schools at economic opportunities. appearances, marriage, etc. social and political indoctrination tools, Islamic fundamentalism of Al Sharia courts were active in undermining legitimacy of Shabaab and Ras Kamboni, the absence of the state out state and potential of social Government use of Al Islah, of necessity. services to act as a tool for secular movements etc. peacebuilding. Advances in communication Much of the ideologies are made it easier to spread such Range of curriculum provision imported from outside and thoughts. reflecting ideological and are linked to international vested interests of external happenings. Further alienation and de- funders of private schools. legitimisation of the state. Counter-terrorism and piracy operations Drone attacks and covert operations by US forces and others

Regional interest-based Ethiopia and Kenya Perceived invasion and Contentious relationship with drivers (Neighbouring occupation by foreign Kenya and divisive political countries) forces–adding legitimacy to politics over Ethiopia’s claims by Al Shabaab and military involvement in others conflict with Al Shabaab

International interest- International war on Attacks by US and other Additional dimension to the Importing of curriculum based drivers terrorism, USA and UK. militaries against terrorist conflict with Al Shabaab reflecting ideological and targets in Somalia, feeding political interests of country Arab states and Turkey the perception that Islam is providing funding to under attack education adding to segregation of communities

Table 10 (continued from previous two pages): Drivers of the Somali Conflict at the Aggregate Level 128 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context rural areas. Overall, both sets of EMIS data, suggest that Somali education indicators are EMIS data suggests that Somali education indicators the lowest in the east and southern Africa region. are the lowest in the east and southern Africa region.

Private sector provision In the absence or availability of government schools, the private sector plays a prominent were expressed about the shift in religious role in the provision of education across all emphasis in Madrasahs towards more three zones, although reliable figures on the ‘militant’ strains of Islam, exported from the number of schools are hard to obtain due to a Saudi peninsula throughout the past 20 years. lack of research and registration. In SCZ, In newly recovery areas across SCZ, following the collapse of the state, virtually all communities were warning that education education is privately funded and managed by authorities are ignoring calls to regulate a variety of businesses, diaspora organisations, Madrasahs, which have been free to teach NGOs and faith-based groups. Funding is also radical religious doctrines to young people being provided by groups in Arabia, the Gulf acting as a fertile ground for recruiting region and Turkey. While the SCZ government jihadists. In newly liberated areas, it was has pledged to move towards a state education reported that Al Shabaab incorporated the transition faces a number of challenges fundamentalist teachings into the curriculum with conflicts of interest as many private of schools in areas where they had been schools are housed in former state owned operating, aiding their campaign to target buildings, and many political figures and youth with their extremist ideology and recruit ministry officials are also members of umbrella them into militias to increase their numbers. In organisations, operating across all three zones SCZ, and to a lesser extent in Somaliland and running the private sector. The majority of Puntland, the challenge over the next few these schools operate on a fee system, thereby years will be to find ways of regulating the full excluding the poorest families who cannot range of state, private and faith-based school afford to pay the levies, and operate their own provision to develop and assure the quality of curriculum often reflecting the interests and education being offered and ensure they do ideology of those who are funding them. not become drivers or triggers of conflict.

Koranic and madrasah schools Koranic and Madrasah school have also filled Somali Secondary Education the void left by the collapse of state education Before colonial rule, Koranic and Madrasah While there is no equivalent EMIS data on schools were the only source of education in secondary education, official figures suggest Somalia fulfilling a religious and social function very few students graduate from primary to in the country and receiving wide community secondary school across Somalia. In support, in terms of donated land, school Somaliland, the 2011 National Development buildings and maintenance. Their historical Plan suggested there were 627 primary legacy and collapse of the state following the schools with 170,930 students (thirty-six civil war has led to them playing a significant percent of which are girls) and sixty-eight role in providing religious education, and as secondary schools with 20,460 students such they continue to thrive because of their community ownership and the assigned value given within the community (Cassanelli and Abdikadir, 2007). Since the collapse of the state school system in South Central,

Since the collapse of the state school system in Koranic schools have been expanding their remit by adding Arabic, SCZ, Koranic schools have been expanding their remit by adding Arabic, arithmetic, and arithmetic, and the Somali language to the curriculum. the Somali language to the curriculum (Bekaloet, et al., 2003). However, concerns Chapter Seven 129

interviews also reveal related issues of early Focus groups across all three zones expressed marriages and teen pregnancies place significant strain on the communities in concerns about attitudes to gender-based violence. question. School drop-out rates for girls were affected by a range of factors, particularly in more vulnerable groups such as IDP and nomadic communities, including youth (twenty-seven per cent of which are girls) pregnancy, early/forced marriages, and lack of (Penny and Matseshe, 2013). Therefore, the sanitary pads for girls, inability of families to secondary places available suggest less than afford school fees or expenses related to twelve per cent of students were able to education, and the prioritization of income progress to secondary school. Similarly in generating activities such as cattle rearing or Puntland, in the same year it was estimated agriculture. there were 563 primary schools catering for 112,998 students (forty-seven per cent female) and thirty-seven secondary schools Violence Against Children with places for 11,050 (twenty-nine per cent girls), suggesting a transition rate of eleven per Violence against children appears to be cent (Global Partnership for Education, 2013). prevalent within schools, homes, and communities, adding to the general culture of violence and perpetuating the intergenerational Gender Disparities transfer of violent conflict resolution methods. Women and children reported that violence is It is also important that primary and secondary used as a means to resolve disputes or in an education address the gender disparities, attempt to instil discipline. This cyclical unequal power dynamics in sexual violence needs to be addressed through the relationships and rise in gender-based violence incorporation of peaceful dispute resolution revealed in the focus group interviews and mechanisms, some of which are already education indicators, particularly in more enshrined in community tradition whereby vulnerable populations, such as IDPs, nomads disputes between clan are resolved by elders and other minority groups. Across all three and other community stakeholders groups. zones, respondents in the focus group Building upon traditional dispute resolution interviews expressed concerns about attitudes methods (both at a district, community/ to gender-based violence, how it was accepted household level) could provide an opportunity as part of social norms, and how it manifests to address the widespread violence. It also in many different contexts (interpersonal family, suggests the need for a large-scale reform in domestic, school). This suggests that a focus school management, reporting mechanisms, on the social norms regarding violence might and prevention efforts throughout the zones. be a strong focus for new education programming across the zones. Addressing Research from other contexts suggests that gender disparities, and empowering girls and children or young people who have been women to be agents of peace in schools and in physically or sexually abused are significantly their communities will provide an opportunity more likely to engage in abusive or for addressing the conflict drivers identified at maladaptive behaviours as adults (Craig and the community level. The focus group Sprang, 2007). Breaking this cycle will be important in address the general culture of gender and child-based violence as it affects Building on traditional dispute resolution methods the way children and youth, particularly males, understand and approach conflicts throughout could provide an opportunity to address the widespread violence their lifetimes. In absence of non-violent dispute resolution methods, young people are that is prevalent within schools, homes, and communities. more likely to resort to violence, unless they are equipped with alternative tools and approaches at a formative age. Addressing the 130 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context root-causes of violence at the household level, as well as providing training to teachers, caregivers, and community members on non- violent methods and approaches to dispute resolution could provide an opportunity for education programmes to break the cycle of violence at the most basic level, and empower the younger generation with effective tools for non-violent mediation.

Population Demographics

Another common feature of the three zones with major implication for educational provision is the demographics of the population: all three have a large youth bulge and their educational and training needs to gain legitimate employment are not being met. As reported in earlier chapters, unemployment and poverty amongst this group are very high across Somalia, particularly amongst IDPs in urban areas. The high drop-out rates reported in the education data also suggests there is a large number of children and youth who are their communities, their sense of not enrolled in formal education. While some marginalisation, and lack of economic in Somaliland and Puntland may have joined opportunity. The high youth unemployment alternative education programmes, and some rate suggests serious consideration should be have entered the workforce, the focus group given to the relevance of secondary education interviews suggest a significant number of from a peacebuilding perspective. To this end, young people have resorted to alternative as suggested in the focus group interviews, income generating activities, including petty adopting a more vocational approach to theft, organized criminal activity and joining secondary school, and supporting youth Islamist groups. Finding ways to reintegrate transition into entrepreneurship, apprenticeship this demographic, or support them through or vocational training, is a priority in order to alternative education/vocational training provide opportunities for youth to build much- programmes, will be important for stability in needed practical skills relevant to the changing each of the three zones that have seen an economic realities and growing urbanisation increase in criminal activity. across Somalia.

By generating destitute migrants attracted by Marginalised Youth the prospect of work and better infrastructure and services into the core urban areas, part of While general unemployment levels are the so called ‘urban drift’, unemployment is estimated to be fifty-four per cent while youth unemployment stands at sixty-seven per cent – one of the highest rates in the world. Across all three zones, the focus group discussions The high youth unemployment rate suggests identified unemployment as a critical problem, driving much of the conflict, as frustrated youth serious consideration should be given to the relevance of are more likely to join criminal gangs, clan militia or radical Islamist groups. Many focus secondary education from a peacebuilding perspective. groups interviews with youth also spoke about the lack of political engagement with elders in Chapter Seven 131

growing and the gap between rich and poor Inequitable Access widening, leading to growing resentment and alienation of the unemployed youth. Cyclically, Despite the steadily increasing rates of this sometimes fuels a view among parents enrolment across the zones, inequity of access that education is not worth the investment if remains a issue and a driver of conflict. Those there are few jobs available to graduates. Lack families without the financial means to pay for of opportunity for those who are educated in school fees, in both the private and state the urban areas is also leading to a ‘brain sector, continue to be excluded, particularly drain’, adding to Somalia’s large diaspora with girls, IDP’s, and nomads and little appears to a large impact on the political and economic have changed since the studies conducted life of the country as discussed in Chapter 3. 2007 (Dennis and Fentiman, 2007). More than sixty per cent of the Somali population is The majority of Somalis still rely on agriculture pastoralist and nomadic. For centuries, for their livelihoods, economic growth in urban nomadic people educated their children areas in such as Garowe, Hargeisa, and through traditional indigenous sources, Mogadishu is providing more employment passing on from generation to generation the opportunities. However, focus group socio-cultural and economic knowledge interviews with youth suggested access to required to pursue their traditional employment was often determined by familial occupations. Yet growing urbanisation and and clan affiliation and those who do not dispute over natural resources has created benefit from the patronage system are restrictions for this way of life. In order to marginalised. Business leaders also suggested prosper (even within their own traditional the adoption of improved technologies has livelihoods) nomadic groups are finding that been slow, and educators pointed to a lack of their indigenous forms of education are no targeted vocational skills training in the school longer sufficient forcing them to move to urban curriculum as one possible reason. areas, and they often remain marginalised Furthermore, while many young Somalis aspire from the clan-based political decision making to highly skilled jobs like engineering, IT, and processes. Children from these communities medicine, there was recognition that more are not easily accommodated by urban- general vocational skills would better serve the orientated school systems so enrolment is low needs of the majority of the unemployed youth. and almost non-existent at secondary level. In Likewise, educators emphasised the need for order to increase enrolment in schools among an integrated vocational approach to education nomadic children, the Somaliland which does not thwart the ambitions of those administration has created a separate who wish to become doctors, lawyers and curriculum based on a 6-month attendance engineers, but compliments and builds these cycle, when seasons permit this. Families can skills needed as part of Somalia’s future choose whether to enrol children in the economic growth. Finally, there was a specially designed 6-month, or the recognised need to develop an entrepreneurial mainstreamed 10-month one. However, such mind-set amongst the youth to equip them to targeted education appears to be doing little to start businesses and take on vocational jobs as reverse severe poverty for nomadic a way of addressing the underlying economic communities overall, and, in practice, only and social challenges among the bulging youth twenty-two per cent of nomadic children take population. up formal education (Carr-Hill and Ondijo, 2011).

IDPs Despite the steadily increasing rates

of enrolment across the zones, inequity of access As discussed earlier, both Somaliland and Puntland have received a high influx of people remains an issue and a driver of conflict. fleeing conflict and food insecurity in SCZ. Puntland has an estimated 149,000 IDPs mainly concentrated in Bossaso and Galkyo, 132 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context while Somaliland has 67,000 IDPs and SCZ a staggering 1,253,000, making a total of 1.46 Organizations working with IDPs mitigate million IDPs within the country. Such IDPs largely depend on informal employment, petty potential conflict between IDP and host communities trades and food hand-outs for their livelihoods and survival, and cannot afford to pay school by providing services that benefit both. fees for their children. They also place increasing strain on host communities in urban areas by competing for severely stretched resources. For example, as reported in focus economy of Somalia since the start of the civil group in Galkacyo in Puntland, conflict war in 1991 has been one of war and state stemmed from tensions over access to collapse, followed by clan-driven politics and resources: housing, employment, education, low-intensity clashes and periodic terrorist and the provision of other social services were attacks, governance at the local level has been the main factors driving conflict. remarkably resilient, and communities have been able to function in relative peace. Despite interventions from development actors Informal, local government arrangements have to support IDP education provision, increasing remained the primary source of protection and numbers of school-age populations in IDP rule of law across Somalia through the settlements in Somaliland and Puntland need administering of customary law by clan elders. critical support. As discussed in earlier Across all three zones, municipalities have chapters, many of IDPs have fled the ongoing provided a legitimate and resilient form of local conflict and famine in SCZ. Interview government, usually relying on a mix of respondents from organisations that provide stakeholders including elders, business people, services to IDP communities explained that women’s groups and professional to negotiate conflict can arise when host communities for and keep the peace. come to resent the assistance and services provided to the IDPs by the government and organisations. Assistance to IDPs can be The Conflict and Education Nexus at the perceived as special treatment and access to Zonal Levels resources that host communities do not have. This in turn fuels resentment and leads to This section summarises the main conflict grievances that can be expressed in violence drivers at each of the three zonal levels and against IDPs. Several of the organisations discusses in more detail potential entry points providing services to IDP communities have for education programmes. It argues that the tried to mitigate potential conflict by providing challenge will be to build on existing similar services to poor families in host programmes by ensuring they adopt a stronger communities, or providing services that benefit peacebuilding dimension, and through the both host communities and IDPs. creation of new programmes explicitly addressing peacebuilding, youth engagement and livelihoods. Conflict and Community Response

Another common theme to emerge from the focus group interviews with major implications for education programming is the large variation in levels of conflict at district and community level across all three zones. While Somalia remains very vulnerable to low- intensity clashes and periodic terrorist attacks, the findings suggest villages and districts in relative proximity to each other experience dramatically different levels of conflict. As discussed in earlier chapters, while the political Chapter Seven 133

Nexus between Conflict drivers/ education and Entry point for education triggers violent conflict

Land and water Curriculum not Public awareness, advocacy and education programmes on traditional land and water management resource disputes addressing issues of mechanisms. human rights. Invite elders who deal with such disputes to come to schools to speak to students and their parents. Take into consideration issues of land and water management when deciding on locations of schools. Work with elders and communities representatives to resolve any lingering land disputes through public meetings, school-based, meetings.

Unemployment and Lack of primary and Ensure that education programmes address the causes of local poverty and help students appreciate its effects poverty secondary education on health, education and other aspects of life. provision and Build up an education sector to provide vocational education which meets the needs of technical industries. relevance of curriculum to needs of youth. Build up networks of students/parents volunteers to work on addressing issues of poverty in their societies, including documentation and mobilisation of charitable assistance. Equip youth with entrepreneurial skills so they can innovate and start businesses to meet new needs of economy. Consider ways of networking schools across regions to facilitate mobility and expand potential of knowledge exchanges and collaboration.

Radicalisation of Inappropriate pedagogy Dis-incentivise radical political Islam by allowing youth the space to discuss politics peacefully while youth by militant and instructional emphasising the way in which Islam encourages dialogue and diversity of opinions. Islamists materials for teaching Increase youth engagements in building social and economic alternatives. about democracy, civic and moral Allow youth the space to engage in political debates peacefully in a structured and supervised way. responsibility. Consider building networks of youth volunteers and support groups in which youth could act as auxiliary teachers. Build upon the strong emphasis and value in sports to bring youth together and engage communities in constructive recreational competition. Employ ‘reformed’ militants to be advocates for peacebuilding in schools through cross-age peer tutoring.

Clan-driven conflict Lack of citizenship Emphasise the values of national belonging and citizenship in curriculum over narrow clan-based interests. education to promote Train teachers in understanding clan dynamics and in facilitating discussion of controversial issues in the political, social and classroom. moral responsibility. Build up the capacity of educators and teachers to act as community mediators for low-level conflicts. Discriminatory Consider issues of identity, including clan, displacement, nomads and minority groups when structuring practices of school education governance structures at all levels. administration. Use schools as centres to bring together communities to discuss common goals of educating children and to promote social cohesion. Encourage the use of the school as a forum for the community to engage in constructive dialogue about peacebuilding. Engage religious leaders in mediation and conflict resolution, and as change-agents to mobilise communities around common goals – such as children’s education. Increase access to high quality education which promotes peacebuilding and reconciliation.

Table 11 (continued on next page): Conflict and Education Nexus in South Central Zone 134 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Nexus between Conflict drivers/ education and Entry point for education triggers violent conflict

Breakdown of social Lack of citizenship Build upon the strong emphasis and value in sports to bring youth together and engage communities in norms and authority education to promote constructive recreational competition. political, social and Employ ‘reformed’ youth to be advocates for peacebuilding in schools through cross-age peer tutoring in moral responsibility. schools. Discriminatory Understand, distil and disseminate positive aspects of social norms and Islamic moral teachings with emphasis practices of school on the role they play in development and peacebuilding. administration. Ensure that governance structure are inclusive of individuals who enjoy moral authority in the community as well as being representative of all groups in community.

Gender/family/ Teachers lack training Ensure gender balance in educational governance structures at all levels. school-based in alternatives to Train teacher in alternative disciplinary techniques to be able to identify, counsel and prevent violence against violence corporal punishment. children in and beyond the school. Gender-based violence Address gender disparities in recruiting and training of teachers. and equality not Empower girls and women teachers to be agents of peace in schools and in their communities by training them addressed in in mediation and negotiation skills. curriculum and teacher training. Address violence against children, and domestic violence both at the household and community levels.

Table 11 (continued from previous page): Conflict and Education Nexus in South Central Zone Chapter Seven 135

Nexus between Conflict drivers/ education and Entry point for education triggers violent conflict

Land and water Curriculum not Public awareness, advocacy and education programmes on traditional land and water management resources addressing issues of mechanisms. human rights. Invite elders who deal with such disputes to come to schools to speak to students and their parents. Take into consideration issues of land and water management when deciding on locations of schools. Work with elders and communities representatives to resolve any lingering land disputes through public meetings, school-based, meetings.

Armed criminality/ Lack of relevance of Support youth in building the skills to maximize on legitimating trade and businesses opportunities through piracy curriculum to exports/imports and trade in gulf region , and to innovate around market opportunities in the region. employment needs and entrepreneurial skills of youth.

Clan-based politics Lack of citizenship Emphasise the values of national belonging and citizenship in curriculum over narrow clan-based interests. education to promote Train teachers in understanding clan dynamics and in facilitating discussion of controversial issues in the political, social and classroom. moral responsibility. Build up the capacity of educators and teachers to act as community mediators for low-level conflicts. Discriminatory practices of school Consider issues of identity, including clan, displacement, nomads and minority groups when structuring administration. education governance structures at all levels. Use schools as centres to bring together communities to discuss common goals of educating children and promote social cohesion. Engage religious leaders in mediation and conflict resolution, and as change-agents to mobilise communities around common goals— such as children’s education. Increase access to high quality education which promotes peacebuilding and reconciliation.

Decline of Lack of relevance of Tailor education initiatives to pastoral needs and the developmental challenges faced by their environment and pastoral sector curriculum and lifestyle. provision of education Provide primary and secondary education with curriculum based on attendance cycles sensitive to seasonal to needs of pastoral work cycles. community. Help pastoralists gain access to complementary economic opportunities in order to increase their resilience beyond animal husbandry.

Migration of IDP to Lack of educational Provide greater access to primary and secondary education. urban centres provision for IDPs. Ensure that curriculum and teacher training address issues and challenges of displacement. Lack of relevance of Provide vocational training and entrepreneurial skills in formal and non-formal education centres. curriculum to employment needs and Ensure that IDP communities are represented in education governance structures at all levels. entrepreneurial skills of Provide greater access to primary and secondary education. IDP youth. Support integration of IDP populations into the national education system, and ensure equitable education Lack IDP service delivery to IDPs and host communities. representation on school management committees.

Table 12 (continued on next page): Conflict and Education Nexus in Puntland 136 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Nexus between Conflict drivers/ education and Entry point for education triggers violent conflict

Unemployment Lack of primary and Ensure that education programmes address the causes of local poverty and help students appreciate its on and poverty secondary education health, education and other aspects of life. provision. Build up an education sector to provide vocational education which meets the needs of technical industries. Lack of relevance of Build up networks of students/parents volunteers to work on addressing issues of poverty in their societies, curriculum to including documentation and mobilisation of charitable assistance. employment needs and entrepreneurial skills of Equip youth with entrepreneurial skills so they can innovate and start businesses to meet new needs of youth. economy. Consider ways of networking schools across regions to facilitate mobility and expand potential of knowledge exchanges and collaboration.

Breakdown of Lack of citizenship and Build upon the strong emphasis and value in sports to bring youth together and engage communities in social norms personal and social constructive recreational competition. development education Employ ‘reformed’ youth to be advocates for peacebuilding in schools through cross-age peer tutoring in to promote political, schools. social and moral responsibility. Understand, distil and disseminate positive aspects of social norms and Islamic moral teachings with emphasis on the role they play in development and peacebuilding. Discriminatory practices of schools. Ensure that governance structure are inclusive of individuals who enjoy moral authority in the community as well as being representative of all groups in community.

Elections Lack of citizenship and Incorporate citizenship and political education into curriculum and teacher training. personal and social Equip and empower teachers to become agents of peacebuilding and to discuss current events in the development education classroom. to promote political, social and moral responsibility.

Gender/family-based Gender-based violence Ensure gender balance in educational governance structures at all levels. violence and equality not Train teacher in alternative disciplinary techniques to be able to identify, counsel and prevent violence against addressed in children in and beyond the school. curriculum and teacher training. Address gender disparities in recruiting and training of teachers. Empower girls and women teachers to be agents of peace in schools and in their communities by training them in mediation and negotiation skills. Address violence against children, and domestic violence both at the household and community levels.

Violence against Teachers lack training Building community ownership of schools to make them child-friendly and to provide protection to children. children in school in alternatives to Training of teachers in alternative class management approaches to corporal punishment. corporal punishment and child friendly education.

Table 12 (continued from previous page): Conflict and Education Nexus in Puntland Chapter Seven 137

Nexus between Conflict drivers/ education and Entry point for education triggers violent conflict

Clan-based politics Lack of citizenship Emphasise the values of national belonging and citizenship in curriculum over narrow clan-based interests. education to promote Train teachers in understanding clan dynamics and in facilitating discussion of controversial issues in the political, social and classroom. moral responsibility. Build up the capacity of educators and teachers to act as community mediators for low-level conflicts. Discriminatory practices of school Consider issues of identity, including clan, displacement, nomads and minority groups when structuring administration. education governance structures at all levels. Use schools as centres to bring together communities to discuss common goals of educating children and promote social cohesion. Engage religious leaders in mediation and conflict resolution, and as change-agents to mobilise communities around common goals – such as children’s education. Increase access to high quality education which promotes peacebuilding and reconciliation.

Table 13 (continued on next two pages): Conflict and Education Nexus in Somaliland 138 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Nexus between Conflict drivers/ education and Entry point for education triggers violent conflict

Breakdown of Lack of citizenship and Build upon the strong emphasis and value in sports to bring youth together and engage communities in social norms personal and social constructive recreational competition. development education Employ ‘reformed’ youth to be advocates for peacebuilding in schools through cross-age peer tutoring in to promote political, schools. social and moral responsibility. Understand, distil and disseminate positive aspects of social norms and Islamic moral teachings with emphasis on the role they play in development and peacebuilding. Discriminatory practices of school Ensure that governance structure are inclusive of individuals who enjoy moral authority in the community as administration. well as being representative of all groups in community.

Marginalisation of Lack of citizenship Engage youth in political decision making and in local political processes. Provide peaceful and youth education to promote constructive opportunities for young people to voice political opinions and grievances. democratic Encourage open debates around the role of youth in society. participation of youth. Encourage a culture of voluntarism that has the ability to bridge, home, school, mosque and community. Empower youth and youth groups with mediation skills, and information about access to justice and case referral. Incorporate elements of peacebuilding into the education curriculum to foster long-term social cohesion.

Rising levels of Lack of relevance of Understand better the extent of the phenomenon and ensure that education addresses its negative impact on criminality amongst curriculum to individuals, families and the wider society. youth fuelled rising employment needs, Disincentivise criminal activity by building economic alternatives for people (esp. youth) engaging in criminal by narcotic addition entrepreneurial and life activities, gangs and drugs trade. skills of youth.

Generational shifts in Lack of citizenship Identify role models in society and from history to be used as exemplars for youth. attitudes towards education. Increase access to high quality education which promotes peacebuilding and reconciliation. peace Empower teachers through an improved peacebuilding curriculum to address current events and issues around national identities.

Nexus between Conflict drivers/ education and Entry point for education triggers violent conflict

Table 13 (continued from previous two pages): Conflict and Education Nexus in Somaliland 140 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Conclusions and working alongside the ministries of Recommendations education at the zonal level to ensure systemic change through curriculum reform, Despite the different nature and level of teacher training and the development of conflicts in each of the three zones and secondary, vocational and technical consequences for education, recurrent education with an explicit focus on peace themes did emerge. Overall, the conflict building. As has been discussed in earlier analysis findings from each of the zones chapters, all three zones have been able to suggest basic and secondary education can maintain a reasonable level of peace and act as a catalyst for peacebuilding, security at the micro-political level through particularly at a local level, by providing a the resilience and adaption of communities. platform for re-establishing social bonds and This suggest there is a strong case for forming partnership with government once working with municipal and district level the conflict subsides. In each of the three actors to implement education programmes zones the focus group interviews suggest at the community level to help manage some communities have been surprisingly reduce and reduce violence, manage resilient to the violence and natural disasters environmental changes, and create around them, and who are well on the road economic opportunities for unemployed to recovery. While the examples provide youth – an important point that is revisited grounds for optimism, it is essential that in the final chapter. they are provided with resources and external support from the international community over the long-term to allow trust and relationships to reform and spread to other communities.

The findings also illustrate that the longer- term and broader impacts of interventions are ultimately dependent on the structural factors that maintain the conflict and thus the broader political, social and economic context. In the communities visited in Somaliland and Puntland, and to a lesser extent in SCZ, education was providing a clearly visible peace dividend. However, local grievances and perceived injustices linked to identity, faith and clan that had underpinned the intra-zonal conflict were still evident. To address such grievances, the post-conflict environment needs to be carefully assessed and an on-going conflict analysis carried out as legacies of violence and mistrust are long-standing and will continue into the future.

In light of the fact that education will have less direct impact on the political economy of a state driven by clan ‘clientism’ and narrow political and economic interests, it may make sense to concentrate efforts on education and peacebuilding ‘downstream’ at the municipal and district level, while 141

Chapter Eight 143 Chapter Eight

Conclusions and Ways Forward 144 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

his report has examined the Somali context overall in Mogadishu. In addition, a variety of Tthrough an extensive CPSA conducted unidentified militias, including vigilante groups, zonally and with an emphasis on participatory freelance militias, and government-aligned and field-based research. The findings security forces were reported to create an presented below indicate the widespread environment of militarisation, using a presence of a number of conflict drivers proliferation of small scale, self-interested throughout the three zones, although there are tactics for financial gain. Failure to provide wide degrees of variance between them. There guardianship for orphaned youth was indicated are also stark differences in conflict and peace to result in both forced child recruitment and between locations within the zones. With voluntary enrolment for criminal and extremist regards to education at the federal and zonal activities. levels, the findings highlight the limited educational opportunities available at various In Jubaland, surveys undertaken in the capital levels of education, discrepancies in the quality city of Kismaayo revealed the long-standing of the education that is offered, and the history of inter-clan conflicts, with influential resultant limited opportunities. Likewise at the actors present including the Somali Federal zonal level, the findings demonstrate the Government, the Kenyan Defense Force, and disparities in education between male and the Ras Kamboni militias. While currently female students, as well as some of the united in attempting to clear the area of Al- challenges faced by minority groups, nomadic Shabaab presence, the three actors have populations, and internally displaced persons. various strategic aims, with the President elected in May 2013 implicated marginalising minority farming groups through their current Synthesis of the Zonal Analyses exclusion from political participation. Kenya was also seen as pushing for the region’s At the zonal level, the conflict analysis heavily secession or semi-autonomy in order to emphasised the conflict drivers present in each facilitate refugee repatriation from Kenya and area and their interaction with key conflict access to Jubaland’s oil and gas reserves. The actors, offering an up-to-date situational consequences of these tensions were analysis with key lessons learned. manifested in a proliferation of militias in the area, and according to survey respondents, low educational opportunities and negative social South Central Zone practices, including revenge-attacks and robbery. In the South Central Zone, conflicts over regional control and resource management Galkayo, in the South Central Galmudug dominated. Out of the seven locations Region, is divided into two political zones; the surveyed, Mogadishu was recognised as the regional government of Puntland controls the most complex. Conflict drivers here included, north, and the south is under the as a major source of tension, conflicts over administration of Galmudug. With a marked land, with land claims by returnees from the absence of NGO and UN agencies in the diaspora and IDPs competing with privately southern half, service provision has been claimed land. Poor land management practices privatised and has become unaffordable to the by the local administration, including majority of the population, leading to suspicion demolitions and land seizures, contributed to and resentment between the administrations, the erosion of trust in government in the specifically in regards to plans for development surveyed areas. The forced displacement of of a sea-port in South Galkayo. Whilst there IDPs who live in makeshift homes presented was a vibrant civil society noted, the an array of human rights abuses, while the population was described as mostly return of wealthy diaspora members and the unemployed, with services such as healthcare presence of the international community in and education in Southern Galkayo Mogadishu on what is perceived as occupied inaccessible to the majority of the local land further provoked the resentment of local population. residents, who feel that there is a land crisis Chapter Eight 145

In Baidoa, a number of clans have reached a effectively resolve conflict on their own. As strong, negotiated alliance that has resulted in developed in Chapter 5, in Puntland it is relative calm and stability. The region’s analytically useful to talk of two ideal-typical remaining conflict is centred on the struggle areas, which have contrasting needs and between government forces and Al Shabaab, challenges. The first is the ‘centre’ area, which who have been driven out of major cities but is typically marked by effective governance are still in control of some rural areas. In structures, the rule of a centralised legal recovered areas, fear of militia recruitment by system, increased security and a general Al-Shabaab- and through fundamentalist absence of the type of cyclic conflict witnessed tactics- was expressed, as well as problems in the South-Central Zone. Indeed, most urban with rural-urban migration due to the previous areas, particularly Puntland’s major seaport, conflict and the marginalisation reported by Bosaso, and its capital, Garowe, fall into this minority groups. area and can be viewed as having developmental challenges rather than being In Dhusamareeb, power is divided between afflicted by systemic conflict. Furthermore, in two rival groups, with poverty reported to be a many areas, the conflict that does exist is fairly driving factor of conflict. An underlying issue of localised and based on clan or sub-clan minority clan representation, unsettled clan affiliation, migration issues (particularly IDPs), disputes over territorial expansion to secure religious sects, or access to resources, whether resources and resource competition, and they be land, water, jobs, or government conflicting administration practices between services. These petty conflicts are nominally official and tribal are seen to contribute to within the capacities of local communities to government inefficiency and dissatisfaction. manage, through sub-clan or clan elders and community leaders. Finally, despite the positive In Jowhar, resource competition over land, aspects of living in these areas (as compared grazing rights and competition for with the South-Central Zone, for instance), it humanitarian aid projects were seen to be the was clear that general fears of high-level face of latent clan tensions, with rival gangs of politicised violence remained. youth being reportedly engaged in criminal activities. However, an emergent theme from The other analytical area of Puntland may be the data was that clan conflict was viewed as termed as the ‘periphery’, as these areas are steadily decreasing, but not to the point that it generally geographically remote and difficult to has reached an alliance of peaceful co- access, which create further challenges for existence. service-delivery, governance and resource distribution from centralised operating Beletweyne suffers still from continued mechanisms. Moreover, these areas are also incursions from Al-Shabaab, in addition to marked by context-specific challenges that vary ongoing resource competition resulting in land from area to area; such as having higher competition such as the raiding of livestock. concentrations of nomadic groups, or other Furthermore, data indicated that respondents highly specific social or economic issues. In noted that a lack of education and poverty these areas, conflict ranges from systemic and were causes of continued tensions. destabilising violence in Galkacyo, to fighting and clashes between clans in the Jariiban area over resources, and includes the aftermath of Puntland piracy and economic stagnation in Eyl. On the one hand, conflicts in these areas have Conflict in Puntland is marked by a high disparate causes, but they are uniformly degree of variation. On the one hand there are propelled by a lack of attention from the central areas, like Galkacyo, where systemic conflict governance structures seen elsewhere. overwhelms local capacities. On the other hand – and in the absence of conflict – the One of the main findings from the primary findings demonstrate a need to focus on the data, in which education can have a significant developmental challenges in order to augment role to play, was that there was a general lack existing social structures that by-and-large of economic and livelihood opportunities 146 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context coupled with low levels of education for young example, were reported to lead to frequent people in the majority of the locations studied. confrontations between neighbours, families, Even educated youth in the state’s main clans and sub-clans, and tensions persist commercial centres expressed frustration with between the Somaliland Government, the their lack of livelihood opportunities. The latter Somali federal government in South Central, has created a cycle of despair which causes and the Government of Puntland. youth throughout the state to resort to migration, or in many cases, violence, as Other factors include the uneven infrastructure young males turned to either armed criminality across Somaliland, clan-based power politics, (such as piracy, other forms of armed and a lack of uniform agreement between criminality or even voluntary recruitment into international, national, zonal and regional Al Shabaab) in areas like Eyl and Galkacyo. powers related to electoral and land-based issues. Unemployment, especially youth In order to address this cycle of despair, which unemployment, was linked to a series of acts as a driver of conflict in the state, vulnerabilities, including: poverty, rising education policy in Puntland would ideally be inequality, the infiltration of criminal networks, drafted with both the local conditions in mind, and rising levels of criminal violence, especially and in conjunction with state-run economic against women. In addition, survey initiatives to draft these otherwise listless respondents remarked on the phenomena of individuals into tangible employment. This specific human rights related issues, including would not only give young people a sense of human trafficking and human smuggling, and purpose and hope, but it would also enable a limited amount of sufficient spaces for them to develop a continuing stake in the children to play in, leading to fighting in and community to see it develop, rather than outside of schools. looking elsewhere.

Currently, the state education structure in Conflict Drivers Puntland is dynamic in the sense that it is open to lasting and positive growth. This is due Several conflict drivers were seen to be largely to the current administration at the prescient in all areas surveyed. Their Ministry of Education, which established a implications for future phases of Somali’s clear vision for an inclusive, state-run development are significant, as well as their education system. Great efforts have been implications for relevant, scalable policy made towards establishing a formal and options taken by the appropriate actors. coherent education system in the state, creating optimum conditions for policy Clan-Identity Based Drivers engagement. In addition to working towards In all regions, clan-identity based drivers, the goal of inclusive, relevant, and widely including the manipulation and politicisation of available education in the state, there is room clan identities, and the erosion of customary for the Puntland education system and its leadership and laws, is present. These drivers partners to directly engage with the cycle of can lead to either mobilisation in the name of despair expressed by many youths by clan protection, dynamic cross clan alliances or addressing the lack of coordination between alliances with commercial figures, and economic and education policies. sometimes the inability to resolve day-to-day conflict. This, in turn tends to lead to either the escalation of conflict or the degradation of Somaliland social norms, or, in the case of Baidoa, localised peace agreements. In Somaliland, nine locations were surveyed, with overwhelmingly positive responses related State Fragility Based Drivers to recent developments in security. Low-level Secondly, poor governance, power struggles, violence similar to those in the other regions and weak institutions have led to significant was found; however, competition over farm erosion of the legitimacy of the state. Elite land, grazing rights and water resources, for political settlements, an inability to control Chapter Eight 147

territories and to provide state-led security, a Social Violence and Crime-Based Drivers lack of control over revenue and an inability to In addition, conflict drivers prevalent in all organise effective institutions of administration areas could be grouped under a category of are present in all surveyed areas. This has led social violence and crime. With limited to the absence of communication channels economic opportunities available to youth and between citizens and the state, an inability to with poor structures of accountability, a culture finance services, and a lack of employment of impunity has arisen. A proliferation of small opportunities being generated and a weapons, various new trade routes in black subsequent lack of accountability and the market commodities, and a large culture of exploitation and deterioration of state narcotic use has led to a reliance on weapons legitimacy. to settle disputes, and a range of commercially motivated crimes, including kidnapping, Resource-Based Drivers assassinations, and car hijackings, among Thirdly, a large contributor to the ongoing others. tensions observed in all locations included competition over both natural and urban Religious Ideology resources. This included traditional competition Asides from these identified main national over land, pasture and water resources, drivers of conflict, other drivers of conflict that combined with more recent competitions over deserve mention include ideological ones, such ports, as in Galkayo, airstrips, checkpoints and as the conflict over the interpretation of Islam points of access. Even competition over in providing justice, social and economic emerging forms of resources such as fishing opportunities according to traditional rights, oil, gas, and the services provided to the viewpoints and imported, fundamentalist ones. humanitarian aid community drive conflict at different levels. A weakened ability of International Influence traditional leaders to settle conflict over Finally, international drivers, such as the resources was noted, as well as the increasing linkages and vested interests of Ethiopia and emergences of criminal militias motivated to Kenya in clan-based disputes, and the control key resources through force and presence of other international actors such as extortion. the United States, Arab Countries and Turkey, were mentioned frequently. 148 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Conflict Drivers

Resource-based Governance- Social Violence Clan-Identity- Religious drivers based drivers and Crime-based based drivers Ideology drivers

Governance low medium low high medium (committees, governing boards, district offices)

Schools (physical high medium medium low low structures, Aspects of an sanitation facilities) Education Sector

Resources high high medium medium high (budgets, scholarships)

Teaching (numbers, low high high high high gender, attendance, qualifications)

Curriculum high high high high high

Table 14: The Estimated Impact of The Conflict-Education Nexus main conflict drivers – of Somalia, certain key Interventions in the overlapping areas warrant attention and Education Sector on The conflict drivers listed above can be seen to intervention. In the table below, the potential of Conflict Drivers be affecting various aspects of the education an intervention in an aspect of the education sector in Somalia. These include the governance sector to impact on previously-identified of education structures, the physical aspects, conflict drivers is categorised according to a the resources available to the education sector, high potential impact, a medium potential and the quality of teachers and curriculum. impact, or a low potential impact. International Findings in all zones indicated limitations in all influence, identified as a major conflict driver these sectors that were perpetuated by ongoing in the section above, was excluded from the constraints and insecurity and in turn the lack matrix as no aspect of the education sector was of education opportunities was an oft-repeated seen to have the potential to significantly contributor to youth disenfranchisement and impact international influence. social marginalisation, specifically of nomadic populations, IDPs, girls and women, and minority groups. The lack of education opportunities was an oft-repeated

Whilst improvements in the education will not contributor to youth disenfranchisement and social marginalisation, be a panacea to address conflict in Somalia, certain areas of the education sector may be specifically of nomadic populations, IDPs, girls and women, worth targeting for an education-centred peacebuilding intervention. Indeed, if we and minority groups. evaluate these various aspects of an education sector with the current context – and identified Chapter Eight 149

Governance for drawing some youth into extremist and violent pursuits. Assistance in managing The unequal progress of education between budgets and scholarship programmes – or even the zones over the last twenty years, in developing the guidelines, transparency and highlighted in Chapter 7, coupled with the accountability of such programmes – may also geographical disbursement of clans, has the contribute to resource and governance based potential to add to clan hostilities in the conflict drivers at the community level. country. One way in which to limit horizontal inequalities in access to education may be the increased participation by beneficiaries in the Teaching decision making structures of the schools, whether through parent-teacher associations at As the first point of contact for many in the the primary school level, or through civic education sector, teachers, including secular education programmes for members of teachers and mullahs, have the potential to governing boards or district offices. These serve as role models in all types of schools, interventions may have the highest impact on including Koranic schools, Madrasahs, mobile conflict drivers associated with clan-identity schools, and universities. Well qualified and social marginalisation. teachers, by serving as role models and appropriately delivering sensitive topics in the humanities, have the unique potential to Schools contribute to peacebuilding through building the capacity of a local community to engage in The physical aspects of the education sector governance and clan-based conflicts, while may include whether or not the structures in providing a role model to deter youth from place have facilities for girls and young engaging in social violence, crime, and extreme women, and whether they are located at a religious ideology. reasonable walking distance from the members of the community expected to benefit from the school. Other infrastructural aspects, such as Curriculum ventilation, class size, and accessibility to displaced-or nomadic- communities are Curriculum was found by the project team to important physical characteristics that can be have the potential to impact all levels of main improved upon. Assistance to these identified conflict drivers, other than considerations, in the form of infrastructural international influence. The unity of rehabilitation, will presumably reduce tensions curriculum, the language it is taught in, and over the allocation of resources, and pose the the quality of its accuracy and relevance was possibility for reducing crime and social seen to have a high impact on conflict drivers- violence through the provision of adequate and for example, subject appropriate material for culturally appropriate learning environments. more agricultural communities could reduce For example, mobile schools may cater better resource-related tensions, whilst vocational to the lifestyle of nomadic children, who would training development – through skills otherwise exhibit high recidivism due to development programs or vocational colleges – economic pressures. for demobilised combatants, unaccompanied youth or at-risk youth can offer a partial solution to social violence by increasing the Resources technical skills of the Somali workforce.

The public/private school divide requires the management of community expectations, especially noted in Somaliland in Chapter 6. In addition, the resources available to various types and levels of schools may have a high impact on the establishment of more religiously fundamentalist schools, deemed responsible 150 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Lessons Learned The best entry-point for education-centred interventions would be at the community In sum, the report has demonstrated a level. number of lessons that are summarised This report has also solidly established the below. These findings are not prescriptive, variance between communities in clan concrete indicators of activities, yet serve as tensions, border disputes, local education broad guidelines for maximum impact, and employment opportunities, with strategic planning. overarching, national conflict drivers including issues in service provision and Programming must take into account that government legitimacy, which are best the variance in current conflicts across the addressed by coordinated inter and intra- three zones and the fact that the conflict- ministerial efforts. With a high level of education nexus in Somalia is not linear. disconnect and discord between ministries As highlighted throughout the progress of at present, highest impact could at present the report, important historical, be achieved through student-centred topographical, and economic differences interventions at the community level. throughout zones have shaped the Working with local stakeholders on development of conflict drivers. As such, the developing sector plans and meeting nexus between education and conflict will community needs on a strategy that reaches differ between locations, and education will the level of distinct communities is, at have varying impact on certain aspects of present, the way forward indicated by this conflict. The conflict-education nexus matrix report. illustrated above further illustrates how education-centred interventions may not Programming should use a model of have a direct impact on national composite partners to identify local peacebuilding, but rather, a limited impact stakeholders, and incorporate on only certain conflict drivers. education resilience programming. In identifying local stakeholders as Taking a pragmatic approach to education- suggested above, reference should be made centred interventions requires small to the models previously developed by the projects that would have a large impact. UNICEF ESARO and its partners which Following from the above logic, targeted indicate beneficiaries and actors related to a interventions may need to be pragmatic, resilient school. This model includes primary working with community-level actors. and secondary actors, including, at the local Experimentation and innovation can be level, pupils, parents, teachers, NGOs and tested and tried, including public-private IOs, parent teacher associations, and district partnerships, parent teacher-associations, officers; and at the secondary level, using retired teachers as volunteers, and partnerships, volunteers, community creating partnerships with institutions that contributions, and national policies. It is may be able to provide technical experts for intended to reduce the vulnerability of teaching subjects, such as in agronomy or schools to unexpected shocks and stresses, production. by taking the school as the centrepiece of a multi-level system. Incorporating resilience in education planning will serve two purposes- aligning Somalia’s strategies with regional efforts in education in emergencies, while also bringing concrete and relevant concerns to the attention of stakeholders and thereby developing local capacity. Chapter Eight 151

Projects should be piloted where the This report has, through its participatory impact would be tangible, measureable approach and subsequent findings identified and scalable. the 'soft' power of the school at bringing It is suggested that programming potentially disparate or vulnerable groups incorporating the findings of this report together in order to build a consensus. In should be, not only based at the community many of the areas that research was level, engaging local stakeholders, and conducted in Somalia, the local school was targeting identified conflict drivers, but also repeatedly perceived by participants to be measureable in its outputs. By choosing the cornerstone of building an important projects which have a tangible and stake for varied groups in the continuation of measureable outcome, and indicators which the community. It is this power of are specific, measureable, achievable, perception, especially in the case of relevant and time bound (SMART), effective stationary/ nomadic or stationary/migrant subsequent evaluations can be used to relations, clan struggles, and the other advocate for the effective allocation of variety of social struggles in Somali society, resources. In addition, baseline data at the which help give these potential conflict- start of projects must be collected given the actors a reason to work towards the high divergence in current conditions across maintenance of the community. Through surveyed areas. providing such reasons, there is an opportunity to condition individuals away Interventions must be evaluated according from the recourse to social violence, and to to their relevance and cultural support the next generation to tackle some appropriateness. of the considerable challenges ahead. Given the broad recommendations above, a caveat will be that local ideologies may appreciate education needs with a different set of values. The way that education is defined by various cultures needs to be further defined in order to understand possible conflicts with local values and provide appropriately flexible education alternatives.

As such, this report should be considered a living document to be refreshed, and the staff and partners trained in its production should find ways to retain the evaluation methodologies learned- and update the report’s findings after a suitable time period.

Education is a local capacity for peace – and can be a peace dividend. Finally, it is important to consider the full symbolic value of having a well-equipped, functioning school – complete with well- trained teachers – in a community previously afflicted by large-scale social disintegration due to systemic conflict, natural disasters or their effects. 152 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Ways Forward The three very different zonal contexts suggest that The three very different zonal contexts explored in this CPSA suggest that responses responses to conflict cannot be prescribed. to conflict cannot be prescribed. However, they do indicate that all three zones can be assisted in constructing policies and interventions to improve educational outcomes that are sensitive to regional, Curriculum Support district and community conditions. Putting in place a systematic monitoring and evaluation The benefits of supporting educational system with input from stakeholders across curriculum implementation are numerous. all levels of the education system will help First, it is a form of assistance with systemic test the logic of the theory of change and nation-wide impact. Curriculum reform is underpinning the education programmes and also a preventive measure, addressing improve the gathering and analysis of data to underlying socio-cultural drivers of conflict, and evaluate promising variables and trends replacing them with values and skills in across a range of contexts. This in turn will peaceful conflict mediation and negotiation at a allow for the pooling of knowledge for inter- critical stage. If well done, the curriculum will agency coordination of the most promising then be adapted to the individual needs and research findings for further investigation and particularities of local communities. Possible contextualisation in regions, districts and limitations include the need to very clearly schools across the zones. Developing a solid define the needs. Such support also requires a evidence base to inform policy and practice sufficient level of funding to support a thorough will be crucial in winning over detractors and level of engagement. in mobilizing evidence to demonstrate conclusively the important role played by The level of skills among teachers remains a education in peacebuilding. variable as well. Even the most thoughtful and progressive educational curriculum relies on Based on stakeholder consultations, and an skilled, motivated, and hard-working teachers analysis of conflict drivers, the education for implementation (Hardman, et al., 2011). sector in Somalia have a range of options in As such, the impact of this type of assistance how to proceed in developing education and may vary with the capacities of teachers in peacebuilding programming. At the zonal different parts of the country. One element of level, taking into account, the macro- and supporting the implementation of the zonal micro-level conflict drivers, programming curriculum could be through teacher training, could prioritize a systemic approach to specifically on peace education, as well as supporting implementation of the newly other relevant skills, to allow them to mediate revised curriculums with a specific focus on conflict within the community and develop the implementation of life skills, peace appropriate pedagogic skills for dealing with education and psychosocial education. It controversial issues in the classroom. will also require focus on equipping schools and teachers to deal with current events, and the need to combat accepted norms in Building Community Resilience violent conflict resolution at the household level. The following are suggestions for This might take the form of working through possible programme areas. In each case the community or other youth-oriented groups to challenge is to demonstrate the engage young people and community decision ‘peacebuilding logic’ or rationale that links makers and build their skills in non-violent the programming response to the conflict conflict mediation and negotiation. One of the analysis. benefits to taking a community-level approach is that doing so engages household decision makers, and those who typically have a greater level of influence on conflict and dispute Chapter Eight 153

resolution at the community level. Assistance there was an urgent need to provide in this area has the potential to be genuinely assistance in integrating IDPs into the zonal transformative in equipping young people education systems. Assisting in this way has with alternatives to violent dispute resolution. the potential to be protective and preventive, The concept of extending the role of the especially in respect to promoting smooth school beyond education to include health, integration with host communities. water, sanitation, nutrition, child protection, and youth programmes will also provide opportunities for it to play a greater social Youth Programmes transformation at the community level. As the focus group discussions across all Implementing effective education systems zones make clear, moving beyond UNICEF’s will requires community participation and recent emphasis on basic education to buy-in. In conflict affected areas this address the needs of youth should be made presents an opportunity to bring together a priority in education programming explicitly communities who have a history of conflict addressing peacebuilding. The high youth around the common goal of providing their unemployment rate suggests that serious children with quality, conflict-sensitive consideration should also be given to the education to build up community cooperation provision of secondary education that is and cohesion. Similarly, promoting relevant to the lives of young people and recreational engagement in schools and allows them to gain legitimate forms of youth clubs, through the use of sport, mobile employment. To this end, adopting a more theatre, dance and drama, presents vocational approach to secondary school, opportunity to foster healthy competition and and supporting youth transition into to build community awareness through entrepreneurship, apprenticeship or cultural mediums. Such programmatic vocational training, should be made a priorities could help to address underlying priority. Pilot secondary school programmes issues through positive, community level with a focus on youth and political engagement. It must also emphasize engagement and livelihoods/vocational building resilience against relapse into training need to be developed, monitored and conflict, and dealing practically with the evaluated to determine their effectiveness in legacies of conflict. providing legitimate employment opportunities and deterring youth from Such support should be trans-generational, joining criminal gangs and militia groups. and engage with state, municipal and clan- based power structures. Increasing access to With the low enrolment and high drop-out basic and secondary education throughout rates across the three, a comprehensive conflict affected areas could also have an approach to engaging children and youth in equalizing effect on children, youth and peacebuilding must account for those who communities with different political, have missed out on school. As such, working developmental, and economic histories. through youth centres, and non-formal Working with partners to support IDPs is also education programmes provides a promising a priority. Focus group interviews suggested opportunity for engagement and peacebuilding in each of the target areas of the programme. Depending on the contextual and age particularities, programmes may The high youth unemployment rate suggests that have an education or livelihoods emphasis, but all should emphasize engaging young serious consideration should be given to the provision of people in constructive activities which promote peacebuilding and economic secondary education that is relevant to the lives of young people growth. and allows them to gain legitimate forms of employment. 154 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Professional Development of Teachers building. It will also be necessary to encourage transparency about budgets, to The quality of any education system is build capacity at all levels of the system, and to inextricably linked to the quality its teachers, so consult all stakeholders on the distribution of investments in this area will be key in responsibilities, resources and incentives. supporting high-quality implementation of the Putting in place a systematic monitoring and national education. Addressing teacher attitude evaluation system with input from stakeholders and sensitivity to conflict drivers can be done across all levels of the education system will through curriculum reforms, but it will also help improve accountability, planning and require a teacher training component, implementation, and assist in knowledge especially on education and peace building, sharing. and psycho-social education. In addition to building community resilience against conflict to address gender-based and domestic violence, violence in school should also be a top priority for education actors. This can be promoted by working closely with teachers and administrators to build a child-friendly school though alternative approaches to class management to remove the widespread use of corporal punishment, and chid protection agencies to put in place reporting and support mechanisms and local law-enforcement structures.

Key questions about the design of new education programmes with a peacebuilding logic that build on existing capacities and successes and are realistic in terms of the current zonal office work plans and capacities will need to be addressed. In addition to these questions, UNICEF Somalia will need to address the question of UNICEF inter-sectoral and UN integration with programmes such as the Peace Building Fund. A question also remains about the degree to which zonal offices work ‘upstream’ in supporting education ministry counterparts to facilitate systemic change or work ‘downstream’ to support municipalities and communities will affect the programmatic priorities in peacebuilding and should be taken into consideration during the programme design phase.

As well as addressing capacity development needs at the zonal level, it is also recognised that the needs of those charged with implementing reforms at the municipal and school level also need to be addressed. This will ensure that all actors in the education system are involved in addressing the drivers of conflict and an alignment of policies, plans and institutional arrangements with regard to peace Chapter Eight 155

Recommendations specialist partner to design a programme to address issues of political inclusion, The following are a number of specific concepts of citizenship, and other areas of recommendations, based on the findings civic engagement will also help build from this conflict analysis, while recognising capacity within the UN. that decisions about which to take forward may depend on further consultations and availability of resources. Attitudes to Violence

Concerns about social norms that accept Curriculum Reform violence as a means of resolving disputes were evident at the district and community Working with ministries at the zonal level on levels. There was a strong belief amongst revisions to existing curriculums provides an many focus groups that interventions that ideal opportunity to introduce a seek to change attitudes and behaviours at peacebuilding perspective into school and multiple levels within society (interpersonal, into the training of teachers. intergenerational within families, at school, between clans in certain regions) may have an impact on social norms and the Political inclusion disposition of individuals to use violence. The development of pilot programmes Prioritising formal and non-formal education related to these issues may also provide an programming with youth will allow for a opportunity to monitor and test such focus on two key areas: political inclusion claims. Working to develop such and attitudes to violence. The former may approaches at the community level will involve using the next two years of the PBEA demonstrate a commitment to the programme to formulate a strategy in empowerment of communities to be partnership with other agencies, develop accountable for their own solutions to capacity and begin implementation of pilot peacebuilding challenges. It will also open programmes. It will also necessitate a more up opportunities to strengthen partnerships detailed consultation and analysis of the that have local credibility and some situation facing youth, particularly the most capacity for peacebuilding. marginalised amongst IDP and minority groups, as well as gathering input from young people themselves on what could be Nomadic Communities possible strategies for engagement and programming. It should also include Part of the challenge of developing relevant soliciting the views of rural youth who are peacebuilding programmes that meet the not always represented in conflict needs of nomadic communities has a assessments, and engaging with youth strong cultural dimension as the pastoral organisations involved in peacebuilding to lifestyle does not sit well with traditional assess their respective strengths in providing forms of settled schooling. The challenge for input into the fields of livelihoods, political programmes will be to simultaneously engagement and vocational training. As a address school enrolment and to work with starting point, the UN could review current young people who are not in school to education programming (both formal and establish livelihoods that address a variety informal) relating to civic and citizenship of priorities (economic realities, resilience to education. It would be extremely important climate change, dynamics of local conflicts to establish a baseline regarding youth over land and livestock). In addition, perspectives on current opportunities for working with young people to identify political engagement and how their sustainable livelihoods strategies and expectations can be met. Working with a reduce vulnerability to conflict by 156 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

addressing any underlying social tensions Depending on the stage of implementation, (for example tensions over political zonal offices will conduct a process or representation) could be strategic priorities. impact evaluation to judge the effectiveness of the PBEA interventions, carried out by an independent team of evaluators. Where Monitoring and Evaluation possible, it is anticipated that impact evaluations will use comparison-group The creation of baselines at the start of studies to compare schools and each programme will to allow for the communities who have/have not received monitoring and evaluation of the impact of the PBEA interventions in the first stage of the interventions education so as to implementation. This will allow for generate more knowledge and evidence on comparison of the factual with the the linkages between education, conflict, counterfactual – what would have happened and peace building. Potential areas could without the intervention – and allow for include gathering a more in-depth causal attribution to help determine what understanding of youth livelihoods has produced the outcomes and impacts challenges, building up a body of that have been observed. It will allow zonal knowledge around opportunities for political offices to assess whether the results are engagement of youth, or investigating consistent with the theory of change. livelihoods strategies currently being adopted by young people. Putting in place a monitoring systems at the outset of a Building Partnerships in Peacebuilding programme will need to include indicators of success from a peacebuilding perspective Working with other development partners that include input, process, outcome and with expertise in peacebuilding will help context indicators build capacity in education and peacebuilding within the education sector Although evaluations can take many forms, and avoid duplication of effort and ensure they can be broadly categorized as process there in coherence in the approach that is or impact evaluations depending on what is taken. to be evaluated and the criteria and standards that will be used to judge the effectiveness of the intervention. Whereas Building Capacity within the Education an impact evaluation tells us whether Sector something has had an impact, the purpose of a process evaluation is to explain the As part of the recommendations set out results found in order to understand how. above, it will be necessary to develop Importantly, process evaluations allow existing capacities within UNICEF, evaluators to identify key ingredients of Governments and other education actors to programmes, inform appropriate encourage more of a peacebuilding modifications, and understand how the perspective. It will require the development programme is likely to function if taken to of new areas of expertise, for example, scale. Process evaluation can include both expertise in working at secondary level, with quantitative and qualitative methods to youth, or non-formal education programmes investigate patterns in the numeric or – these should be identified as part of the textual data. A process evaluation therefore planning for the new education programme documents and analyses the development to address drivers of conflict. and implementation of a program, assessing whether strategies were implemented as planned and whether an expected outcome was actually produced. 157

Appendices 159

Appendices 160 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context Appendix A: Data Collection Methodology

This CPSA conducted by the joint team from approach specifically targeted children and the University of York and Daryeel, was divided youth. Careful attention was also paid to into three distinct yet overlapping phases: inclusion of minority and marginalised groups, ensuring that their voices and perspectives Inception and Initiation Phase were represented in the final analyses. (Phase I): Information gathering was carried out on two During the first phase, the University of York levels. A joint team composed of staff from the team conducted a literature review of the University of York and their Somali partner existing peace/conflict/situation analyses for organization, Daryeel conducted interviews and Somalia and the individual regions of focus group discussions with policy-makers Somaliland, Puntland, and SCZ. They also and other key stakeholders at the state and reviewed some of the leading policy-oriented federal level. Additional interviews at the state conflict analysis tools. Building on conflict level, as well as interviews with education assessments and literature relating to officials and stakeholders at the district level education and peace-building, the team were completed by Daryeel researchers, while developed and finalised the design of a local-level data collection in the communities comprehensive conflict/peace and context was carried out by teams of trained data analysis which focused on the specific linkages collection teams under the supervision of the between education, peace, and conflict. This York/Daryeel team. approach enabled the team to gain an understanding of the current context, the risks Programme Design/Utilisation Phase involved in conducting data collection in (Phase III): Somalia, and the stakeholders with whom the This phase was originally designed to enable team needed to engage. the York team to work in close collaboration with UNICEF Somalia Country and Zonal Conflict/Peace and Situation Analysis Phase Offices to develop the outline of an Education (Phase II): and Peace-Building Programme for the three The CPSA was implemented during the second regions that was grounded in the findings of phase, which involved an investigation of the the CPSA. Their efforts were intended to main aspects of conflict and peace dynamics in directly support and inform the agreed each zone and their linkages to education. This activities in the Annual Work Plans (AWPs) for phase was grounded in a long period of field 2012/13 between the Ministries of Education research in the three zones, comprising and UNICEF in Somaliland, Puntland, and interviews and focus group discussions with SCZ. Unfortunately, delays during the data stakeholders that included government officials collection and analysis period required that this and civil society organizations working in the phase be curtailed. The role of the University of education and peacebuilding sectors, York in the actual programme design activities community and religious elders, business was reduced significantly to focus on the steps leaders, head teachers and teachers, as well as required to ensure the utilisation of the conflict students and their parents. The stakeholder analysis in the design of the programme and sampling strategy aimed to achieve an implementation of future education inclusive sample from urban and rural interventions. The comparison of the original environments, different clans and sub-clans, and actual dates of the different phases are and settled and displaced communities. The presented in Figure 12. community-level data collection took an education perspective taking the school as a The following sub-sections outline in greater starting point and moving outwards to include detail the proposed three phases of the project. families and the wider community. This Appendix A 161

Figure 12: Original and Actual Timeline of the CPSA

Phase I: Inception and Initiation analyses previously conducted. Priority was given to analyses carried out by the United The inception and initiation phase of the Nations and those by other donor project lasted approximately eight weeks organisations such as the World Bank, starting with the project’s initiation at the USAID, etc., as well as studies by reputable beginning of February 2013. It involved an think tanks, universities, and NGOs. initial desk review at the University of York Gathering existing analysis on the conflict conducted in consultation with UNICEF was crucial in the development of a Somalia staff. During this phase, members of ‘baseline’ to be used at a later stage to map the York Team conducted an introductory trends and shifts in cycle of conflict, information-gathering workshop with UNICEF manifestations, dynamics, positions, etc. staff, local partner organisation staff, and other key stakeholders in Nairobi. The analysis Q Clarification of UNICEF’s Orientation to the design process began by considering the Conflict: Understanding UNICEF’s own special characteristics and needs of each of the interests and motivations in relation to the zones in order to address the unique contexts conflict was crucial. It was important to of Somaliland, Puntland, and SCZ. It was clarify, beyond the written Terms of concluded upon UNICEF’s final approval of the Reference, the reasons for undertaking the Inception Report in June 2013. Phase I analysis and the motives underlying the comprised five elements or steps: required form and content of the analysis. In particular it was important to be clear about Q Identification and Mapping of Existing UNICEF’s intention to not only utilise the Somali CPSA: The first step in studying the findings of the analysis in the design of its Somalia conflict was to define with which future interventions, but also its willingness conflict the CPSA was concerned. This to share the findings broadly and to attempt entailed describing the essential contours, to keep the analysis updated over the characteristics, levels, and features of the coming couple of years. The history and conflict history and sought through a current status of UNICEF educational literature review to answer a number of programmes were also examined. basic questions, for instance: What is causing and driving the conflict? Who are Q Establishment of the purpose and the known parties to the conflict? Are there parameters of the analysis and design multiple layers to the conflict? This step also methodology: The next step was to attempted to capture the overall determine, based on the preceding steps, manifestations and effects of the conflict, in what the purpose of the conflict analysis particular its effect on civilians and was in order to shape the nature of the field education. work process and in particular the nature of the information the conflict analysis team Q Review of Existing Conflict Assessments of hoped to gather. A joint workshop between Somalia: The next step involved a members of the CPSA team and UNICEF comprehensive search and review of was held in Nairobi in February 2013 and 162 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Figure 13: Key Elements of Inception and Initiation Phase

brought together key representatives from and identified gaps in existing knowledge, the relevant stakeholders. This helped shape some of which the team attempted to address the subsequent scope and content of the during the data collection in Somalia. These field work including the identification of studies provided a foundation for localities to visit and people to train, understanding the Somali context, which was timetable, etc. The field methodology was continually built upon throughout the CPSA. also refined at this stage. The pre-existing situation analyses overviewed include those conducted by: Q Initiation of data collection and training: Training of the Somali researchers and their Q The World Bank and UN agencies, as part data collection teams that would be of inter-agency planning processes conducting research in South Central was Q Multi-lateral/bi-lateral donors like the UK conducted in April 2013 in Mogadishu. The Department for International Development three-day training course covered the (DFID), the United States Agency for concepts of conflict and peace, conflict International Development (USADI), and the analysis methodologies, and the data Danish government collection tools used in this analysis. After Q Agencies, NGOs, and private institutions the data collection methodologies and tools working in Somalia like Saferworld, were piloted in two communities in South Interpeace, and the International Crisis Central and adapted for use in Somaliland Group (ICG). and Puntland, data collection training was conducted for the researchers and the data This initial context analysis phase also mapped collection teams for those two zones in out relevant policies, strategies and frameworks Hargeisa in May 2013. in education at the national level.

Based upon the four aims of the CPSA and feeding into the five broader outcomes of the Element 2: Contextual Analysis of Peace-Building, Advocacy and Education in Somaliland, Puntland, and the Conflict-Affected Contexts, the Inception Phase South Central Zone included six main elements, as set out in Figure 13.219 One of the chief aims of this project was to provide zone-specific information on the conflict and peace dynamics unique to the Element 1: Identification and Mapping of individual zones, thus the second element of 219 Adapted from Barakat and Waldman Existing Conflict/Peace/Situation Analyses the Inception Phase focused on gathering (2012). Revising the SCA: Toward of Somalia existing Somaliland, Puntland, and SCZ a Joint Framework for Conflict Analysis. DFID: London. conflict/peace/situation analyses, education This stage built on the work of UNICEF documents such as education sector policies 220 These documents are listed in Somalia staff by summarising and mapping and plans, and other relevant information to Appendix C of this report. existing situation analyses and other similar assess relevance and identify knowledge gaps 220 221 documents. It served to familiarise the York to be addressed by the community-level data These documents are listed in 221 Team with available information on Somalia collection. The resulting contextual analysis Appendix C of this report. Appendix A 163

included a stakeholder analysis – a venture element was the York team’s initial that UNICEF Somalia had already initiated – information-gathering workshop in Nairobi, that sought to identify the key stakeholders to conducted with UNICEF Somalia staff and be consulted in each zone. This was an other key stakeholders in February 2013. ongoing process carried out in close Additional meetings with UNICEF Somalia collaboration with local and UNICEF partners staff-members in Mogadishu in March/April throughout the data collection period. The 2013 fostered a shared sense of purpose, stakeholder analysis and mapping aimed to process, and desired outcomes relating to the provide real time information and reflect CPSA and programme design and permitted current challenges and opportunities to UNICEF staff to share their in-depth ultimately inform the design and knowledge of the Somali context.223 Crucially, implementation of the peace-building during this phase, the team launched initial programmes in each of the zones. consultations with its partner, Daryeel, to develop a good working relationship and a common understanding of the research Element 3: Peace-Building and methods to be used during data collection. Education Literature Review During this period, Daryeel also helped to identify research teams comprised of their own An extensive review of the peacebuilding and pool of researchers combined with data- education literature was conducted in order to collectors and individuals from a stratified establish a solid understanding of the current sample of locations in each of the three zones. debates and context for the PBEA programme. The Inception Phase further enabled the York It also sought to highlight areas that should be Team to develop a better understanding of the investigated by the CPSA in each of the three current security situation, as observed by zones. This review was also meant to inform those in country, and this knowledge fed into the development of relevant indicators for planning of the fieldwork. future programmes, especially those relating to the five outcomes of UNICEF’s global programme. In addition to the relevant Element 5: Designing a Conflict/Peace academic literature, the documents gathered and Situation Analysis Framework during the desk review period included core programme and policy-related documents and A review of key conflict analysis frameworks other relevant existing programme information. was conducted in order to design a bespoke Specific documents and reports consisted of CPSA framework that was flexible enough to internal programme reviews, external reports, be adapted in each of the different zones of programme documents, and all other relevant Somalia. Frameworks overviewed included the internal documentation made available by UK Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability, the UNICEF staff. Other international agency and DFID Strategic Conflict Assessment, USAID’s Ministry/Directorate of Education (M/DoE) Fragile States Strategy, and Saferworld’s documents related to education sector support conflict analysis tools, amongst others. They or peacebuilding in each of the three zones had been previously analysed as part of a were also consulted, as well as relevant project recent broad review of strategic conflict studies/baseline surveys produced by partner assessment methodologies, carried out by the organisations.222 Team Leader and the PRDU on behalf of 222 224 These documents are listed DFID. in Appendix C of this report.

223 Element 4: Preliminary Consultations The CPSA framework developed by the York Further meetings with UNICEF with UNICEF and Local Partners Team built on their conceptualisation of Somalia staff in Puntland and Somaliland occurred during the conflict analysis, the PRDU’s work in countries CPSA Phase and fostered a similar From the initiation of the Inception Phase, the such as Afghanistan (“Understanding collaboration in those zones. York team worked closely with the UNICEF Afghanistan 2007-2008”) and Yemen (“Post- 224 Somalia team, fostering a collaborative Conflict Needs Assessment of Sa’ada, Yemen”, Barakat, B. and Waldman, T. (2013), Conflict Analysis in the 21st approach to the finalization of the Education 2009), as well as its recent work on Century. London: DFID. Context Analysis design. A key aspect of this developing a framework for conflict analysis 164 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Figure 14: Components of the Training

for DFID. The CPSA process was aligned with Element 6: Preparation of the the York Team’s Five Guiding Principles for Training Workshops Conflict Analysis, in addition to a variety of UNICEF’s relevant documentation, including: Building upon and synthesizing the Conflict Analysis Preparation Guidelines, the information gathered during the above UNICEF Technical Guidance on Conflict elements, the team developed a Sensitivity and Peace building, the Lessons comprehensive and relevant training Learned Report: Conflict Analysis Workshop programme designed to provide the local data Pilot Study, Sierra Leone and the Guidance collectors with the knowledge and skills Note for Conflict Analysis Process, UNICEF required to understand the purpose of conflict Somalia. and peace analysis and the tools required to gather detailed, appropriate, and accurate The framework developed for this CPSA was information in a sensitive, inclusive, and unique in that it adopted an education lens participatory manner. Included in the training and focused on the education sector. It was program were sessions on community designed to be participatory and field-based, sampling and focus group selection with a with a special focus on the perceptions of strong emphasis on encouraging female children and the impact of conflict on children, participation and inclusion of minority or as well as on their education prospects. marginalised groups. In addition to sessions on the specific methods and tools employed in this CPSA, it aimed to provide general knowledge of and experience in conflict and peace analysis that could be applied beyond this project with the goal of building long-term capacity.

The training was designed to examine and elucidate the participants’ capacity to identify and explore the very nature of conflict and conflict vulnerability in their communities. The training context centered on the following four key elements which are more fully depicted in Figure 14: Appendix A 165

Phase II: Conflict/Peace/Situation This CPSA utilised a composite research Analyses approach to provide an up-to-date assessment, which built upon existing conflict analyses, The CPSA formed the second phase of the offering a comprehensive view on conflict in the project. Informed by and building upon the six- three zones. Crucially, it aimed to provide a element initial analysis conducted during the broad view of the context, dynamics, stake- Inception Phase, the CPSA was originally holders and their corresponding interests, and schedule to last for a total of four months from structural factors underpinning conflict in each April to July 2013. Due to a number of delays, zone and district. It focused on the education it was extended to 10½ months, with the final sector and was based on the perspectives of key submission deadline shifted to 15 February stakeholders at the community level, in addition 2014, with the final revised report submitted to regional and national level actors. The York on 17 March 2014. During this phase, data Team’s analysis engaged directly with a sample collection was carried out at the federal, zonal, of communities – many of them recently district, and community levels in South Central, affected by violent conflict – in a participatory Puntland, and Somaliland. The six objectives study carried out in all three zones, featuring an for this phase are presented in Figure 15. individual analysis for each region, as well as an overarching macro-analysis. The UNICEF Somalia office noted that previous conflict analyses carried out in Somalia were, In order to achieve this goal, the team employed in many cases, outdated. Similarly, those a participatory research method involving two conducted prior to Phase II tended to be largely levels of analysis, which aimed to desk-based, with limited participatory and simultaneously achieve the six key objectives field-based research, particularly in South laid out in Figure 15. The York Team carried out Central, due to security-related access issues, policy-level consultations featuring workshops, particularly in Al Shabaab-controlled territories. focus group discussions, and semi-structured Few also have engaged with the complex interviews with national and regional-level conflict dynamics of the different zones, stakeholders. This process was complemented instead taking a view of the macro-Somalia by an inclusive community-level data collection context, or exploring a narrower, programme- process, centred on schools, carried out by local focused narrative. Fewer still have taken data collection teams trained and supported by Figure 15: education as a particular focus. the joint York/Daryeel Team. Phase Two Objectives 166 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

The methodological approach of centring data held in South Central Zone, Somaliland, and collection around community schools and Puntland.227 The overall information-gathering enabling local data collectors – including team was originally meant to be composed of service users, staff, and community elders – sixteen community-led data collection teams, to conduct and/or actively participate in the one team from each accessible district of the planning, design, and implementation of three zones; however, the final team surveys in their own communities has the composition was four teams in Somaliland, potential to address many of the weaknesses three in Puntland, and eight in South Central. of traditional assessments and evaluations. Eight teams were required in South Central in Primarily, it was argued and verified that order to reflect the region’s population density, community members have a better to access its large number of districts, and to understanding of the local context, know secure data collection across areas facing culturally-appropriate ways to seek conflict and other security challenges. information, particularly about sensitive issues, and can gain access more easily to The number and distribution of teams was households.225 This community-led process based on a stratified sampling process, also has the potential to generate the active representing different geographic regions, mobilisation of community members to including urban, rural, remote and 225 resolve problems that they know more about, marginalised locations. The teams had a Chambers, R. (1983). Rural Development: Putting the Last First. understand better, are no longer intimidated unique make-up, comprising three to four Longman: Harlow; Chambers, R. by, and feel mandated to confront.226 At a people. The original plan called for, ideally, the (1999) Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last. Intermediate more immediate and fundamental level, inclusion of at least one youth representative, Technology Publications: London; community involvement can extend, enrich, one teacher, a female representative, and a Barakat, S. (1992). Reviving War damaged Settlements: towards interpret, and validate survey results. community leader. The participation of an international charter for teachers and other education-sector staff was reconstruction after war. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University to ensure that education is at the centre of the of York: York; Anderson, M. (1999). On-going Consultations conflict analysis and the participation of Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace through Aid. community leaders meant to provide the study Local Capacities for Peace Project: Throughout the entire field research period, greater legitimacy and access, as well as Cambridge; Barakat, S. and Deely, S. (2001). ‘Somalia: programming for the joint York/Daryeel team, with the support providing a better local understanding. While sustainable health care’ World of UNICEF, engaged in consultations with key every effort was made to follow this Disasters Report 2001: Focus stakeholders at national and regional levels. composition for each data collection team, not on Recovery IFRC: Geneva. In the three zones, the consulted stakeholders all teams were able to contain youth 226 Barakat, S., Chard, M., Jacoby, T. represented a diverse array of actors, representatives or community leaders. and Lume, W. (2002). ‘The including UN agency staff, government Composite Approach: research representatives, NGO partners, civil society, Special attention was paid to the issue of design in the context of war and armed conflict’ in Third World religious leaders, academics, the Somali gender, which is particularly important in a Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 5.; Barakat, diaspora, and other stakeholders. In addition, context like Somalia where some communities S. and Deely, S. (2001). ‘Somalia: programming for sustainable health separate consultations were conducted in are sensitive to this issue. To mitigate this, the care’ World Disasters Report 2001: Nairobi with key donors at the headquarters’ teams consisted of at least one female Focus on Recovery IFRC: Geneva; Long, C. (2001). Participation of the level; including representatives of INGOs, key member, facilitating data collection with Poor in development Initiatives: UN agencies, the Education Sector women and girls in the more closed Taking Their Rightful Place. Earthscan: London; WHO (2000) Committees and the Education Clusters. communities. The World Health Report 2000 Health Systems: Improving Performance. World Health Organization: Geneva. Chambers, R. Recruitment of Local Data Collection Conflict Analysis and Data Collection (1999) Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last. Intermediate Teams Training Technology Publications: London.

227 The Inception Phase involved consultations Once the recruitment of the local data Due to delays in the piloting period with UNICEF and local partners in Nairobi collection teams was finalised, the York team in South Central and the resulting time constraints on subsequent and the three zones to finalise the piloted the training workshop in Mogadishu for project activities, the training composition of research teams and logistical the Daryeel researchers and data collectors in sessions in Somaliland and Puntland for the data collection preparations for what was originally meant to the South Central Zone. The training session teams were combined and held be three research training workshops to be was held 1-3 April 2013 in Mogadishu. Two of in Hargeisa, June 2013. Appendix A 167

the Puntland researchers and four of the local for piloting due to ease of access for the data collectors also attended, with the training researcher and data collection teams involved of the researchers and all data collectors from in the pilot phase, infrastructure availability, Somaliland and Puntland taking place in and diversity of political challenges — Hargeisa, Somaliland 2-4 June 2013. including conflict. Piloting in Mogadishu allowed for the testing of a more diverse set of One of the goals of the CPSA was to contribute data collection tools than Somaliland or towards the long-term capacity building and Puntland would have permitted, in which training of the local data collectors, UNICEF questions relating to either long-running violent (education) staff, UNICEF’s government conflict or administration may not have been counterparts, and other partners in the areas of as relevant. conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity, and peacebuilding programming. To achieve this aim, all of the above stakeholders were invited Training Approach to participate in training sessions in Mogadishu and Somaliland, along with the local data The training approach was designed to be collectors. Because the training for the highly participatory and interactive. researchers and local data collectors in Participants were encouraged to take an active Puntland had taken place in Hargeisa, a part in the training through role-play, conflict analysis training session for simulations, demonstrations, discussions, government staff and civil society organizations panels and presentations. While there was a was held in Garowe, Puntland on 13 October need for lectures and demonstrations to explain 2013. The overall objective of including key concepts or provide relevant examples, the UNICEF and local partner organization staff in training relied heavily on small-group activities the training with the local data collectors and to allow participants to reflect upon, critique, researchers was to provide them with a and demonstrate concepts presented in the thorough and practical grounding in peace and lectures in practice. The structure of the conflict analysis and a variety of context- trainings alternated between large-group and 228 Although the training was first appropriate data collection methods. small-group activities to ensure that provided in South Central and the information was provided in an efficient yet piloting conducted there, this should not imply that preference or special As previously mentioned, the joint York/Daryeel engaging manner. This enabled participants to attention was given to SCZ in the team employed a phased approach in their ask questions, discuss concepts, and CPSA. Once the initial phase of data collection was completed, the same training and data collection, piloting, collecting, participate in exercises and activities in a more weight was given to all three regions and reviewing initial data and findings from interactive and comfortable atmosphere. equally in terms of data analysis. The data from each reason was two communities in South Central before Training was sensitive to local cultural values analyzed independently by a York revising, finalising, and conducting the training and practices, with sessions scheduled around researcher assigned to that zone in collaboration with the Daryeel programmes in Somaliland and Puntland. This prayer times and local business hours. It was researchers from that zone. approach permitted the adaptation of methods, also delivered in a manner that was respectful Findings from all three regions were then integrated into the national data collection tools, and training material in of local participants and adapted to their synthesis presented in Chapter 3 response to difficulties or challenges to the needs. The training programme activities were of this report without giving 228 additional emphasis to any training and data collection in South Central. structured in the following way: one of the three zones. Two communities in Mogadishu were selected

Figure 16: Structure of Training Programme Activities 168 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Number of Data Collection Zone Location Region Communities Following the training workshops, the joint Mogadishu Banadir 8 York/Daryeel researchers conducted data Jowhar Middle Shabelle 4 collection at the district, regional, and national levels, while the local data collection teams Beletweyn Hiiran 4 returned to their respective districts and began South Central Dhusamareeb Galgadud 6 gathering information, under the direct Galkacyo Mudug South 8 supervision of the Daryeel researcher assigned to their zone. The data collection period was Kismayo Juba Hoose 8 initially scheduled to last eight weeks in each Baidabo Bay 8 zone following the training workshop; however, Galkacyo North Mudug North 4 unforeseen delays extended this period from April to September 2013, as detailed below. Jariban Mudug North 4 Growe Nuggal 4 Locations for Data Collection Eyl Nuggal 4 Staff from UNICEF Somalia’s zonal offices first Puntland identified the locations to collect the Bosaso Bari 4 community-level based on their in-depth Ufayn Juba Hoose 4 understanding community demographics and Iskushuban Bay 4 history. Table 15 below lists the locations selected in each zone and the number of Armo Bay 4 communities where data was collected within Hargeisa Woqooyi Galbeed 8 that location. Berbera Awdal 4 Community Sampling Strategy Gabiley Awdal 4 The community sampling strategy was based Borama Awdal 4 on two core variables and up to five situational Somaliland Harirad Awdal 4 variables, which changed depending on the local context. Each data collection team Baki Awdal 4 selected eight communities where data Qorilugod Togdheer 4 collection would be conducted. The selection Buro Togdheer 4 criteria they employed are outlined in Table 16 below. Contested Territories Erigao Sanaag 4 Total: 118 The final community selection reflected the diversity within and between different Table 15 (above): categories of stakeholders, including the Locations Included minorities and the most marginalised within in Data Collection Table 16 (below): communities. Community Selection Criteria Respondents In each community, data collectors first Core Variables: Geographic: Rural / Suburban / Urban The community sample needed to include engaged with community leaders in order to at least two of each. Economic: Poor / Middle / Rich gain access to the communities. Once permission was granted for data collection to Clan Divisions take place in the community, data collectors conducted focus group discussions with the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Situational Variables: following core groups in each community: Each of the selected communities Religious Sects in the sample must have at least Q Community elders; one of these factors. Nomadic Tribes Q Religious leaders; Q Representatives from the business Pro/Anti Government Militias community; Appendix A 169

Q Head teachers and teachers; Q Out-of-school children and youth; Q Parents; and Q Marginalised communities; Q Children and youth. Q Minority clans and ethnic groups; Q IDPs; The focus group discussions were also Q Nomadic groups; augmented by individual discussions and Q Traditional and religious leaders; and interviews with community elders and head Q People with disabilities. teachers. Data Collection Tools Because this conflict analysis adopted an The data collectors engaged with a education perspective and centred on the representative sample of all levels of society school as the entry point to the community, the and at various locations, employing several key group of stakeholders consulted was research tools, including: children and adolescents of various different social and economic backgrounds.229 During Q Community and classroom observation; the conflict analysis process, children Q Community mapping and demographic participated in focus group discussions, information; classroom observations, and conflict mapping Q Classroom activity with students; and exercises. The children and youth sampled Q Focus group discussions and semi- reflected the greatest extent the diversity of structured interviews with the aid of a different groups of children and adolescents questionnaire. (up to the age of 18) as well as youth (aged 15-24). Types of Data Collected The local data collection teams gathered local This child and youth centred approach was perspectives on conflict, peacebuilding and adopted with the firm belief that the more education, asking participants to discuss: integrated children were from the start of the analysis leading into the peacebuilding Q The history of conflict and peace in their education programme, the more likely it would community; be that they would be afforded the opportunity Q Changes in conflict and peace that the to claim their rights, ultimately strengthening community has recently experienced; and ensuring the overall success of the Q Actors that support peace in the community; subsequent PBEA programme. Not only do and children hold the right to participate in the Q Challenges that the community faces research processes that can impact them, they currently. are the primary source of information on how ongoing conflicts affect their lives. As such, Joint Data Validation and Program Design they offer a unique perspective on how to Workshops mitigate conflict and build peace in their Because of the truncated project schedule due communities. to the extended data collection period, the data validation workshops with Daryeel researchers As relevant to the context, focus group and the local data collectors that were discussions at the community level also originally planned for in each zone did not take included key sub-groups will include those place. Data validation with the South Central from the most marginalised sections of Somali researchers occurred mostly via email and society, including a reasonable balance of girls, Skype, while data validation with the Puntland out-of-school children, unemployed youth, and Somaliland researchers was conducted in urban/rural children, and youth from the person in Garowe and Hargeisa in October pastoralist/nomadic groups, displaced and 2013. minority clans.

229 Instead, the York Team, along with UNICEF Consultations with children and Special efforts were also made to engage with Somalia staff, presented their preliminary youth followed strictly by the ethical standards put forward by UNICEF the following populations: findings in a joint data validation and initial and the University of York. program design workshop with country office 170 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context staff in Nairobi 17-18 October 2013. Data validation with zonal office staff followed in Hargeisa 21-22 October 2013. These discussions fed into the design workshop for the PBEA programme conducted with the UNICEF zonal office staff on 23 October 2013 in Hargeisa.

During the meetings with the researchers and the UNICEF staff, the joint York/Daryeel team presented their initial findings, with participants critically reflecting on the conflict drivers that were presented. The workshops aimed to identify common themes, challenges and discrepancies within the research and explore the reasons for them. These workshops served several purposes: Figure 17: Key Features of Ensuring Q To verify the veracity of the findings with projects in Somalia. The steps of this ongoing the Continued Utilisation researchers and staff knowledgeable of the process are depicted in Figure 17 and, if of Conflict Analysis context. followed, can ensure that the information that Q To foster an emerging picture of conflict and UNICEF Somalia relies on to inform its peace in each of the three zones, their programming decisions in Somalia remains up- impacts upon education, and the to-date and reflective of the dynamics and possibilities for peacebuilding education needs on the ground. interventions in each zone. Q To identify commonalities and differences between the three zones to inform a Challenges and Mitigating national-level analysis. Approaches

The feedback from the researchers and As with any research project conducted in UNICEF Somalia staff in these workshops was unstable, unpredictable, and widely varying incorporated into final analysis by the York local contexts, the CPSA in SCZ, Somaliland, team and presented in the CPSA report. and Puntland experienced several challenges which are grouped below as delays in the data collection phase. The summary also includes Submission and Ongoing Use of the CPSA the mitigating measures employed by the team. The York Team was originally due to submit the final Education Context Analyses to UNICEF Somalia country office in August 2013. Again, Delays in the Data Collection Phase unforeseen delays in the data collection and analysis period postponed the submission, as There were a number of factors that explained in the Challenges and Mitigating contributed to the delays experienced during Measures section. the data collection period which necessitated the postponement of deadlines in subsequent It is also important to recognise that the phases of the project. conflict/peace analysis process is designed to be ongoing. The data collection tools were End of Term designed to be updated and employed to Due to the longer period of time required to provide continued analyses as needed. The finalise the contract between UNICEF and the cadre of researchers and local data collectors University of York, the data collection period employed by Daryeel are a resource that can began shortly before schools closed for their be called upon for future research and analysis end of term break, with many teachers Appendix A 171

returning to their own communities and some the research design phase. In hindsight, students travelling to stay with extended allowing eight weeks to conduct research in families elsewhere. Because the CPSA used eight largely remote communities was not the school as the basic unit for analysis, this realistic in considering the conditions on the posed a problem in terms of conducting focus ground. Future research work plans should be group discussions with teachers and students, tailored to local conditions with greater time as well as conducting classroom observations allowed for delays. and activities with children. The data collection teams attempted to mitigate this problem by Security contacting the head teachers in the The security of the York and Daryeel communities selected and working with them researchers and data collectors was of to gather students together for discussion paramount concern throughout the data groups; however, classroom observations were collection period, particularly in those locations not possible in most communities. Future where the risk of violent conflict or criminal research activities centring on schools should activity was high. Indeed, there was extensive plan around the school term carefully. violent conflict in Kismayo mid-way through the data collection there. With little or no Ramadan access, the only option was to cease the The training workshop with the Somaliland and research activities and relocate the Daryeel Puntland researchers was delayed due to the researcher and some data collectors. Access extended period of time required to obtain the was also problematic in other communities in results from the piloting of the data collection each of the three zones. In response, the team tools in the two communities in Mogadishu selected replacement communities from a and the subsequent revision of the data prepared list of relevant alternatives where data collection tools. As a result, the data collection collectors could operate. In these cases, every period in these two zones ran into Ramadan, a effort was made to ensure that the replacement period where research with local communities communities carefully reflected the same proved difficult due to the heat and the demographic make-up of the original selection. challenges of travelling while fasting. Local For future research activities, flexibility in data collection teams understandably location is recommended due to the fluid continued to work at a slower pace during this nature of conflict and general security in each period, conducting research activities in zone. communities that were more easily accessible. Despite these efforts, significant delays still A large part of the training workshops was occurred, particularly in Puntland, where many dedicated to identifying risks and delays. locations were very remote and difficult to Procedures at all relevant levels of the data reach. For future studies, the timing of collection were put in place. Together with Ramadan should be taken into account at the coordination and communication throughout, beginning of the research design process. especially between Daryeel and the York team, Mitigating measures, like those above, should the safety of the data collectors and be discussed, agreed upon, and in place prior participants was upheld. Overall, the impact of to the start of the research. the delays was mitigated while maintaining the integrity and validity of the data. Remote Locations In Puntland, in particular, access to many communities was extremely limited due to their Sampling remote location and the poor condition of the roads. Additionally, the researchers in Puntland While care was taken to ensure that the had difficulties arranging suitable sampling of communities within the locations transportation for the data collection teams. stipulated in the Terms of Reference were Both of these factors combined to create delays representative, factors came into play that in the data collection period. In a context like could impact the inclusiveness of the findings, Somalia, access and travel to remote locations particularly in Somaliland. This is particularly should be considered in the earliest stages of relevant to the issue of the Awdal. Due to 172 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context access and security issues, research was not carried out in the eastern locations of the district. There are significant differences between the eastern and western regions of the district in terms of clan identity and ties to Somaliland and neighbouring Djibouti. Because the research only was able to obtain the perspectives of residents in the western parts of the district, it is likely that those living in the non-surveyed eastern communities, which remain poorly accessible, under-served, and potentially conflict-affected would have responded differently to the focus group discussion questions. While there was nothing that could be done to mitigate this challenge during the data collection period, the team has highlighted the areas in this report that reflect information that may be one-sided and where additional research would provide more nuanced findings.

Additionally, this CPSA was focused on the impact of conflict on education and used an education-centered approach with a focus on the school. This was done in order to capture the experiences and perspectives of students, teachers, their families, and their wider communities in an attempt to understand how conflict impacts them and the education they receive. Because of focus on education, the sampling included only communities with schools and a control group of communities without schools was not used. In addition requiring more time for data collection than was available, this sampling strategy was adopted because the specific aim of the CPSA to provide a better understanding of the impact of conflict and peace on the existing education systems and providers, rather than to compare or contrast between these types of communities. Instead, attempts were made to include the voices of out-of-school youth through their participation in focus group discussions. Further comparative study into the different impact that conflict has on communities with access to education and those without would be useful. Appendix B 173 Appendix B: Works Cited

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Wise, R. 2011. Al shabaab. [pdf] Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM %20 Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf

Zakharia, Z. 2011. The Role of Education in Peacebuilding: Case Study – Lebanon. New York: UNICEF. Appendix D 187 Appendix D: Glossary of Key Terms

4.5 Formula A policy of proportional representation, according positions to each clan to ensure inclusivity

Armed conflict Armed violence between two or more parties which results from a real or perceived incompatibility of objectives or interests, particularly as concerns the sharing or distribution of finite resources (or resources which are perceived as being finite or in short supply), including but not limited to political authority/access, justice, revenue, and natural or public resources (e.g., land, water, social spending, etc.).

Autonomous Self-declared polities that oppose Al Shabaab but which have only Authorities tenuous links to the Somali Federal Government (e.g. areas in Gedo region and Central Somalia controlled by the Al Sunna Wal Jamma militia, the self-declared regional authority of Galmudug, and the self-declared regional authority of Himan and Heeb).

Conflict enabling Factors that facilitate the overall environment that makes violent conflict factors thrive. An enabling factor may include the ‘presence’ of a key element such as weapons or easily ‘lootable’ resources (e.g., conflict diamonds), but they may also be defined by ‘absence’, as in the absence of international support for mediation efforts.

Conflict trap A set of mutually reinforcing conflict drivers.

Conflict triggers An event that initiates hostilities. Triggers are closely related to proximate causes with the distinction that they may not necessarily be causes of conflict per se; because, plausibly, triggers may be benign or commonplace events that just so happen to unleash the forces that have previously been allowed to build up. This distinction is important: because certain conflicts would have been likely to occur whether the original trigger existed or not. Therefore triggers can often be replaced by other factors and variables. Furthermore, triggers often tell us little about the nature of a conflict, just how it started.

Diasporization Used to capture the phenomenon of how Somalia’s extraordinarily large diaspora – now estimated at 1.5 million people – has come to play an outsized role in the country’s politics, economy, and peace and conflict trends.

Diya Compensation paid by a person who has injured or killed another person. 188 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

External Regional and international factors, as well as exogenous factors carried conflict factors out by third parties. (e.g. bad neighbourhood and regional instability; flow of refugees and regional mercenaries; cross-border smuggling and trafficking; income shocks; international organised crime; world food prices; decisions/actions of international organisations, judicial bodies, etc.).

Koranic School A school concentrated on the teaching and memorization of the Koran.

Madrasah A specific type of religious school or college for the study of the Islamic religion, though this may not be the only subject studied.

Proximate Problems in the social and political processes and institutions that or subjective mediate the effect of systemic conditions on peoples’ lives and conflict drivers behaviour and shape the human relations within society and between society and the state (e.g.: political exclusion and lack of representation; distribution of resources, social difference, government policies, social organisation, problems of political and economic liberalisation, militarisation and external military aid, abusive security services; ungoverned areas; uncontrolled borders, etc.).

Systemic Structural conditions that cause objective changes in parties’ material or root circumstances (e.g. unequal control of power, authority, or distribution conflict drivers of resources and services; natural resource dependence; horizontal inequalities; corruption; poverty; income decline and disparities, unemployment, environmental deterioration, population growth, resource scarcity and competition, the colonial or Cold War legacy, breakdowns of values and traditions, ethnicity, etc.).

Umbrella An association of (often related, industry-specific) institutions, who work organization together formally to coordinate activities or pool resources.

Value-based conflict Issues of identity, culture, belief, values and ways of life that, when drivers challenged or threatened, can lead to conflict. Such causes are often rooted in the history of societies, but can be manipulated by groups for strategic reasons. In the short term, conflict often results from attacks on cherished symbols of culture or religion. Such causes are not adequately captured in standard political economy approaches and require separate consideration.

Xeer The polycentric legal system of Somalia. Under this system, elders serve as judges and help mediate cases using precedents. Appendix E 189 Appendix E: Selected Key Interviewees

Name Title/Department Government Officials, Somalia and Somaliland Ministry of Education, SCZ Mohamed Abdulkadir Nur Director of Education Ministry of Education, SCZ Faiza Hassand Assistant to the Minister of Social Development Services Social Development Services Maryan Qasim Minister Ministry of Education, Puntland Abdi Farah Juxa Minister Civil Society, Academic Institution, and NGO Representatives Somali Chamber of Commerce Adbi Abshir Director General IPC, UOH Adam Haji Ali Ahmed n/a Daikonia n/a Programme Officer Kaalo Mohamud Hamid Mohamed Executive Director UOH Cabdi Gas President UOH SONSAF Mohamed Barawni SONSAF n/a Muna Elmi Independent consultant PhD n/a Nasra Egeh Medical Doctor EMIS: Ministry of Education Ubah Mohamed n/a Legal Clinic Mohamoud Hussein Farah n/a n/a Hibo Mohamed- Independent Consultant n/a Amran Abdilahi University Student SNDF Mukhtar Osman Fpens Education Umbrella Abdulkadir Cotel Director SAFE Education Umbrella Adirahman Moalim Ahmed Director Benadir University Abdirizah Ahmed Dalmar President Benadir University Dr. Adnan Mo’Alim Dean of Education Faculty Africa Educational Trust Mohamud Arush Project Co-ordinator SOYDEN Osman Moallim Director Benadir University Mohamed Shadyalow Administration Advisor PRDC Abdurahman A Osman Shuke Director PRDC Ali Farah Ali Research coordinator PRDC Hassan Aden Mohamed Researcher PRDC Ahmed Osman Adam Researcher PRDC Fatuma Mohamed Administrator PRDC Sharmark Ali Interpeace Programme Coordinator PRDC Ruqia Mohamed Researcher n/a Hassan Mahdole Professor New Generation University College Nasir M. Ali Lecturer n/a David Bowers Private School Principal 190 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Name Title/Department UNICEF Representatives UNICEF Sheema Sen Gupta Child Protection

UNICEF Mohamed H. Ibrrahim WASH

UNICEF Nur Ali Mohaud Nutrition UNICEF Amilu Achilingulo Education UNICEF Ahmed Aden Jama Communication for Development UNICEF Mohamad Hashi Education UNICEF Maureen Njoki Community Development Specialist UNICEF Issa Ahmed Nur UNICEF Child Protection Officer UNICEF Elicad Nyabeeya UNICEF Head of WASH UNICEF Safia Jibril Education Specialist, UNICEF UNICEF Imran Navji UNICEF Head of Health and Nutrition UNICEF Jim Ackers Regional Education Advisor International Organizations, United Nations, and Donor Agency Representatives NRC Eric Demers n/a DFID Mike Eytle Somalia Advisor UNESCO Hassan Abdi Keynan n/a Save the Children Illaria Manunza Deputy Director, Program Development & Quality USAID Mary Beth McKeever Program Officer Appendix F 191 Appendix F: Stakeholders Consulted

Zone: South Central Location: Mogadishu Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 1, Focus Group 1 Business Community 1, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 1, Focus Group 3 NGO Community 1, Focus Group 4 Parents Kaaran – Jabuti Community 1, Focus Group 5 Religious Community 1, Focus Group 6 Teachers Community 1, Focus Group 7 Women Community 1, Focus Group 8 Youth Community 2, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 2, Focus Group 2 Youth Community 2, Focus Group 3 Business Community 2, Focus Group 4 NGOs Juungal Community 2, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 2, Focus Group 6 Religious Community 2, Focus Group 7 Teachers Community 2, Focus Group 8 Women Community 3, Focus Group 1 Business Community 3, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 3, Focus Group 3 IDPSSs Community 3, Focus Group 4 NGOs Hodan Taleh Community 3, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 3, Focus Group 6 Religious Community 3, Focus Group 7 Teachers Community 3, Focus Group 8 Women Community 3, Focus Group 9 Youth Community 4, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 4, Focus Group 2 NGOs Community 4, Focus Group 3 Religious Community 4, Focus Group 4 Women Dharkenley Community 4, Focus Group 5 Business Community 4, Focus Group 6 IDPs Community 4, Focus Group 7 Parents Community 4, Focus Group 8 Teachers Community 4, Focus Group 9 Youth 192 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Zone: South Central Location: Mogadishu Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 5, Focus Group 1 Business Community 5, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 5, Focus Group 3 Parents X/weyne Community 5, Focus Group 4 Religious Community 5, Focus Group 5 Teachers Community 5, Focus Group 6 Women Community 5, Focus Group 7 Youth Community 6, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 6, Focus Group 2 NGO Community 6, Focus Group 3 Religious Community 6, Focus Group 4 Women B/Xuubey - Wadajir Community 6, Focus Group 5 Business Community 6, Focus Group 6 IDPs Community 6, Focus Group 7 Parents Community 6, Focus Group 8 Teachers Community 6, Focus Group 9 Youth Community 7, Focus Group 1 Business Community 7, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 7, Focus Group 3 IDPs Community 7, Focus Group 4 Parents Hawa Tako Community 7, Focus Group 5 Religious Community 7, Focus Group 6 Teachers Community 7, Focus Group 7 Women Community 7, Focus Group 8 Youth Location: Jowhar Community 8, Focus Group 1 Teacher Community 8, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 8, Focus Group 3 Religious Kulmis Community 8, Focus Group 4 Women Community 8, Focus Group 5 Business Community 8, Focus Group 6 IDPs Community 8, Focus Group 7 Elders Appendix F 193

Zone: South Central Location: Jowhar Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 9, Focus Group 1 IDPs Community 9, Focus Group 2 Business Community 9, Focus Group 3 Elders Community 9, Focus Group 4 NGO Halane Community 9, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 9, Focus Group 6 Religious Community 9, Focus Group 7 Teachers Community 9, Focus Group 8 Women Community 10, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 10, Focus Group 2 Teachers Community 10, Focus Group 3 Parents Community 10, Focus Group 4 Youth

Hanti Wadaag Community 10, Focus Group 5 Business Community 10, Focus Group 6 IDPs Community 10, Focus Group 7 Women Community 10, Focus Group 8 Religious Community 10, Focus Group 9 Scholars Location: Beletweyn Community 11, Focus Group 1 Business Community 11, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 11, Focus Group 3 IDPs Community 11, Focus Group 4 Religious Hawo Tako Community 11, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 11, Focus Group 6 Women Community 11, Focus Group 7 Youth Community 11, Focus Group 8 Teachers Community 12, Focus Group 1 Business Community 12, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 12, Focus Group 3 NGO Koshin Community 12, Focus Group 4 Religious Community 12, Focus Group 5 Teachers Community 12, Focus Group 6 Women Community 12, Focus Group 7 Youth Community 13, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 13, Focus Group 2 Youth Community 13, Focus Group 3 Business Hanti Wadaag Community 13, Focus Group 4 IDPs and Parents Community 13, Focus Group 5 Religious Community 13, Focus Group 6 Teachers 194 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Zone: South Central Location: Dhusamareeb Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 14, Focus Group 1 Teachers Community 14, Focus Group 2 Business Community 14, Focus Group 3 Koranic Schools Dhusomareeb U Community 14, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 14, Focus Group 5 Women Community 14, Focus Group 6 Youth Community 15, Focus Group 1 Teachers Community 15, Focus Group 2 Women Community 15, Focus Group 3 Business Eel-Dheere Community 15, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 15, Focus Group 5 Religious Community 15, Focus Group 6 Youth Community 15, Focus Group 7 Healthcare Workers Community 16, Focus Group 1 Religious Community 16, Focus Group 2 Youth Community 16, Focus Group 3 Community Leaders Abudwak (u) Community 16, Focus Group 4 Teachers Community 16, Focus Group 5 Women Community 16, Focus Group 6 Soccer Team Community 17, Focus Group 1 Teachers Community 17, Focus Group 2 Business Community 17, Focus Group 3 Elders Community 17, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 17, Focus Group 5 Religious Godinlabe (s) Community 17, Focus Group 6 Head Community 17, Focus Group 7 Teachers Community 17, Focus Group 8 Youth Community 17, Focus Group 9 Community Leaders Community 17, Focus Group 10 Women Community 18, Focus Group 1 Religious Community 18, Focus Group 2 Youth Community 18, Focus Group 3 Elders Community 18, Focus Group 4 Teachers Hananburo Community 18, Focus Group 5 Minorities Community 18, Focus Group 6 Business Community 18, Focus Group 7 Community Education Committee Community 18, Focus Group 8 Women Appendix F 195

Zone: South Central Location: Galkacyo Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 19, Focus Group 1 Community Education Committee Community 19, Focus Group 2 Parents Community 19, Focus Group 3 Elders Community 19, Focus Group 4 Teachers Galkacyo Community 19, Focus Group 5 IDPs Community 19, Focus Group 6 Religious Community 19, Focus Group 7 Peace Committee Community 19, Focus Group 8 Youth Community 20, Focus Group 1 Teachers Community 20, Focus Group 2 Youth Community 20, Focus Group 3 Elders Community 20, Focus Group 4 Religious El Guula Community 20, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 20, Focus Group 6 Community Education Committee Community 20, Focus Group 7 Pastoralists Community 20, Focus Group 8 Women Community 21, Focus Group 1 Teachers Community 21, Focus Group 2 Youth Community 21, Focus Group 3 Elders Garsoor Community 21, Focus Group 4 Religious Community 21, Focus Group 5 Community Education Committee Community 21, Focus Group 6 IDPs Community 22, Focus Group 1 Women Community 22, Focus Group 2 Pastoralists Community 22, Focus Group 3 Religious Hobo Community 22, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 22, Focus Group 5 Parents and Community Education Committee Community 22, Focus Group 6 Youth Community 22, Focus Group 7 Teachers Community 23, Focus Group 1 Religious Community 23, Focus Group 2 Youth Community 23, Focus Group 3 Pastoralists Haar Haar Community 23, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 23, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 23, Focus Group 6 Women Community 23, Focus Group 7 Koranic Teachers 196 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Zone: South Central Location: Kismayo Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 24, Focus Group 1 Youth Community 24, Focus Group 2 IDPs Community 24, Focus Group 3 Religious Calanley Community 24, Focus Group 4 Teachers Community 24, Focus Group 5 Elders Community 24, Focus Group 6 Parents Community 24, Focus Group 7 Business Community 25, Focus Group 1 Business Community 25, Focus Group 2 Youth Community 25, Focus Group 3 Religious

Emperitoria Community 25, Focus Group 4 Parents, Community 25, Focus Group 5 Elders Community 25, Focus Group 6 Head Community 25, Focus Group 7 Teachers Community 26, Focus Group 1 Youth Community 26, Focus Group 2 Religious Fanole Community 26, Focus Group 3 Parents Community 26, Focus Group 4 Teachers Community 26, Focus Group 5 Women Community 27, Focus Group 1 Teachers Community 27, Focus Group 2 IDPSSs Farjano Community 27, Focus Group 3 Youth Community 27, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 27, Focus Group 5 Women Location: Baidabo Community 28, Focus Group 1 Teachers Community 28, Focus Group 2 Business Bulla Nuuria Community 28, Focus Group 3 Elders Community 28, Focus Group 4 Youth Community 28, Focus Group 5 Peace Committee Community 29, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 29, Focus Group 2 Youth Isha Community 29, Focus Group 3 Peace Committee Community 29, Focus Group 4 Head teachers Community 29, Focus Group 5 Business Appendix F 197

Zone: South Central Location: Baidabo Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 30, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 30, Focus Group 2 IDPSSs Community 30, Focus Group 3 Women Howlwadaag Community 30, Focus Group 4 Business Community 30, Focus Group 5 Farmers Community 30, Focus Group 6 Teachers Community 30, Focus Group 7 Youth Community 31, Focus Group 1 Women Community 31, Focus Group 2 Teachers Horseed Community 31, Focus Group 3 Pc Community 31, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 31, Focus Group 5 Business Community 32, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 32, Focus Group 2 Teachers Community 32, Focus Group 3 Youth Community 32, Focus Group 4 IDPSSs Bulla Awderow Community 32, Focus Group 5 Farmers Community 32, Focus Group 6 Women Community 32, Focus Group 7 Peace Community 32, Focus Group 8 Committee Community 33, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 33, Focus Group 2 Youth Community 33, Focus Group 3 Peace Committee Berdaale Community 33, Focus Group 4 Women Community 33, Focus Group 5 Teachers Community 33, Focus Group 6 Business Community 34, Focus Group 1 Farmers Community 34, Focus Group 2 Peace Committee Community 34, Focus Group 3 Youth Idaada Community 34, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 34, Focus Group 5 Teachers Community 34, Focus Group 6 Women Community 34, Focus Group 7 IDPSs 198 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Zone: Puntland Location: Armo Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 35, Focus Group 1 Women Community 35, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 35, Focus Group 3 Teachers Carmo Community 35, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 35, Focus Group 5 Merchants Community 35, Focus Group 6 Youth Community 36, Focus Group 1 Women Community 36, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 36, Focus Group 3 Teachers Barookhle Community 36, Focus Group 4 Merchants Community 36, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 36, Focus Group 6 Youth Community 37, Focus Group 1 Women Community 37, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 37, Focus Group 3 Teachers Ceel Daahir Community 37, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 37, Focus Group 5 Youth Community 37, Focus Group 6 Merchants Location: Bosaso Community 38, Focus Group 1 Women Community 38, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 38, Focus Group 3 Youth Bender Siyaada (Qaw) Community 38, Focus Group 4 Teachers Community 38, Focus Group 5 Merchants Community 38, Focus Group 6 Parents Community 39, Focus Group 1 Youth Community 39, Focus Group 2 Children Community 39, Focus Group 3 Parents Biyo Kukule Community 39, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 39, Focus Group 5 Business Community 39, Focus Group 6 Women Community 39, Focus Group 7 Teachers Community 40, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 40, Focus Group 2 Women Bolqolka Bush IDPs Community 40, Focus Group 3 Teachers Community 40, Focus Group 4 Parents Appendix F 199

Zone: Puntland Location: Bosaso Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 41, Focus Group 1 Business Community 41, Focus Group 2 Teachers and Head Teachers Community 41, Focus Group 3 Elders Bosaso Shabelle IDPs Community 41, Focus Group 4 Business People Community 41, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 41, Focus Group 6 Women Community 42, Focus Group 1 Business People Community 42, Focus Group 2 Women Buulo Eley Community 42, Focus Group 3 Elders Community 42, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 43, Focus Group 1 Business People Community 43, Focus Group 2 Head teachers Community 43, Focus Group 3 Elders Karin Community 43, Focus Group 4 Teachers Community 43, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 43, Focus Group 6 Women Community 44, Focus Group 1 Parents Community 44, Focus Group 2 Teachers Laantada Hawada Community 44, Focus Group 3 Elders Community 44, Focus Group 4 Women Location: Eyl Community 45, Focus Group 1 Parent Community 45, Focus Group 2 Women Community 45, Focus Group 3 Village Committee Badey Community 45, Focus Group 4 Religious Leaders Community 45, Focus Group 5 Business People Community 45, Focus Group 6 Teachers and Head teachers Community 45, Focus Group 7 Elders Community 46, Focus Group 1 Teachers and Head teachers Community 46, Focus Group 2 Village Committee Community 46, Focus Group 3 Teachers and Head teachers Community 46, Focus Group 4 Parents Daawad Community 46, Focus Group 5 Religious Leaders Community 46, Focus Group 6 Elders Community 46, Focus Group 7 Business People Community 46, Focus Group 8 Women 200 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Zone: Puntland Location: Eyl Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 47, Focus Group 1 Secondary School Teachers Community 47, Focus Group 2 Religious Leaders Community 47, Focus Group 3 Elders Community 47, Focus Group 4 Parents Hasbahale Community 47, Focus Group 5 Business People Community 47, Focus Group 6 Village Committee Community 47, Focus Group 7 Women Community 47, Focus Group 8 Teachers and Head teachers Community 48, Focus Group 1 Women Community 48, Focus Group 2 Head teachers Community 48, Focus Group 3 Village Committee

Qarhis Community 48, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 48, Focus Group 5 Head teacher and Teachers Community 48, Focus Group 6 Elders Community 48, Focus Group 7 Religious Leaders Location: Galkayo North Community 49, Focus Group 1 Women Community 49, Focus Group 2 Elders Garsoor Community 49, Focus Group 3 Teachers Community 49, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 50, Focus Group 1 Women Community 50, Focus Group 2 Elders Halaboqad Community 50, Focus Group 3 Head teacher and Teachers Community 50, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 51, Focus Group 1 Women Horumar Community 51, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 51, Focus Group 3 Teachers Community 52, Focus Group 1 Women Community 52, Focus Group 2 Parents Israc Community 52, Focus Group 3 Teachers Community 52, Focus Group 4 Elders Location: Garowe Community 53, Focus Group 1 Women Community 53, Focus Group 2 Teachers Community 53, Focus Group 3 Elders Hanti Wadag Community 53, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 53, Focus Group 5 Village Committee Community 53, Focus Group 6 Business Leaders Appendix F 201

Zone: Puntland Location: Garowe Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 54, Focus Group 1 Women Community 54, Focus Group 2 Elders Horseed Community 54, Focus Group 3 Village Committee Community 54, Focus Group 4 Teachers Community 54, Focus Group 5 Business People Community 55, Focus Group 1 Women Community 55, Focus Group 2 Community Education Committee Community 55, Focus Group 3 Parents Shabelle IDPSSs Community 55, Focus Group 4 Teachers Community 55, Focus Group 5 Community Leaders Community 55, Focus Group 6 Elders Community 56, Focus Group 1 Women Community 56, Focus Group 2 Business Sunajif Community 56, Focus Group 3 Teachers Community 56, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 56, Focus Group 5 Parents Location: Iskushuban Community 57, Focus Group 1 Women Ciiradhame Community 57, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 57, Focus Group 3 Parents Community 58, Focus Group 1 Women Community 58, Focus Group 2 Teachers Dharor Community 58, Focus Group 3 Parents Community 58, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 58, Focus Group 5 Merchants Community 59, Focus Group 1 Women Community 59, Focus Group 2 Parents Hubabays Community 59, Focus Group 3 Teachers Community 59, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 59, Focus Group 5 Merchants Community 60, Focus Group 1 Women Community 60, Focus Group 2 Elders Iskushuban Community 60, Focus Group 3 Parents Community 60, Focus Group 4 Teachers Community 60, Focus Group 5 Merchants 202 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Zone: Puntland Location: Jariiban Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 61, Focus Group 1 Women Community 61, Focus Group 2 Teachers Bali Busle Community 61, Focus Group 3 Elders Community 61, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 62, Focus Group 1 Women Booco Community 62, Focus Group 2 Parents Community 62, Focus Group 3 Elders Community 63, Focus Group 1 Women Bubi Community 63, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 64, Focus Group 1 Women Community 64, Focus Group 2 Parents Jariiban Community 64, Focus Group 3 Teachers and Head teachers Community 64, Focus Group 4 Elders Location: Ufayn Community 65, Focus Group 1 Women Community 65, Focus Group 2 Teachers Geeso Qabad Community 65, Focus Group 3 Merchants Community 65, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 65, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 66, Focus Group 1 Women Community 66, Focus Group 2 Teachers Kobdhexaad Community 66, Focus Group 3 Elders Community 66, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 66, Focus Group 5 Merchants Community 67, Focus Group 1 Women Community 67, Focus Group 2 Teachers Ufayn Community 67, Focus Group 3 Merchants Community 67, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 67, Focus Group 5 Parents Appendix F 203

Zone: Somaliland Location: Buroa Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 68, Focus Group 1 Parents Community 68, Focus Group 2 Women October Community 68, Focus Group 3 Youth Community 68, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 69, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 69, Focus Group 2 Parents Qasabka Community 69, Focus Group 3 Youth Community 69, Focus Group 4 Women Community 70, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 70, Focus Group 2 Women Community 70, Focus Group 3 Head Teachers Hodan Qaylo Community 70, Focus Group 4 Teachers Community 70, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 70, Focus Group 6 Youth Community 71, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 71, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 71, Focus Group 3 Women Community 71, Focus Group 4 Women Community 71, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 71, Focus Group 6 Parents Jarmarlka Community 71, Focus Group 7 Head Teachers Community 71, Focus Group 8 Head Teachers Community 71, Focus Group 9 Teachers Community 71, Focus Group 10 Teachers Community 71, Focus Group 11 Youth Community 71, Focus Group 12 Youth Community 72, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 72, Focus Group 2 Women Community 72, Focus Group 3 Youth Yirowe Community 72, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 72, Focus Group 5 Head Teachers Community 72, Focus Group 6 Teachers Community 73, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 73, Focus Group 2 Youth Bahiile Community 73, Focus Group 3 Teachers Community 73, Focus Group 4 Parents 204 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Zone: Somaliland Location: Buroa Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 74, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 74, Focus Group 2 Women Community 74, Focus Group 3 Parents Gandahar Community 74, Focus Group 4 Head Teachers Community 74, Focus Group 5 Teachers Community 74, Focus Group 6 Youth Location: Baki Community 75, Focus Group 1 Youth Community 75, Focus Group 2 Women Daray-Macaane Community 75, Focus Group 3 Elders Community 75, Focus Group 4 Religious Community 75, Focus Group 5 Teachers Community 76, Focus Group 1 Youth Community 76, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 76, Focus Group 3 Parents Community 76, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 76, Focus Group 5 Elders Dhabi Cad Community 76, Focus Group 6 Business Community 76, Focus Group 7 Teachers Community 76, Focus Group 8 Elders Community 76, Focus Group 9 Parents Community 76, Focus Group 10 Women Community 76, Focus Group 11 Youth Community 77, Focus Group 1 Religious Community 77, Focus Group 2 Teachers Community 77, Focus Group 3 Elders Sh. Ali Jawhar Community 77, Focus Group 4 Women Community 77, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 77, Focus Group 6 Youth Appendix F 205

Zone: Somaliland Location: Baki Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 78, Focus Group 1 Women Community 78, Focus Group 2 Youth Community 78, Focus Group 3 Teachers Community 78, Focus Group 4 Head teachers Community 78, Focus Group 5 Elders Haya-Yaabe Community 78, Focus Group 6 Parents Community 78, Focus Group 7 Women Community 78, Focus Group 8 Youth Community 78, Focus Group 9 Teachers Community 78, Focus Group 10 Elders Community 78, Focus Group 11 Business Community 79, Focus Group 1 Head teachers Community 79, Focus Group 2 Head teachers Community 79, Focus Group 3 Youth Community 79, Focus Group 4 Women Community 79, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 79, Focus Group 6 Parents Abu-qays Community 79, Focus Group 7 Teachers Community 79, Focus Group 8 Teachers Community 79, Focus Group 9 Women Community 79, Focus Group 10 Elders Community 79, Focus Group 11 Elders Community 79, Focus Group 12 Youth Community 80, Focus Group 1 Traders Community 80, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 80, Focus Group 3 Parents Aasho-caddo Community 80, Focus Group 4 Teachers Community 80, Focus Group 5 Youth Community 80, Focus Group 6 Women Community 80, Focus Group 7 Elders Community 81, Focus Group 1 Women Community 81, Focus Group 2 Teachers Community 81, Focus Group 3 Parents Jir-jirka Community 81, Focus Group 4 Business Community 81, Focus Group 5 Youth Community 81, Focus Group 6 Elders 206 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Zone: Somaliland Location: Baki Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 82, Focus Group 1 Teachers Community 82, Focus Group 2 Parents Xamarta Community 82, Focus Group 3 Youth Community 82, Focus Group 4 Women Community 82, Focus Group 5 Teachers Community 83, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 83, Focus Group 2 Head Teachers Xooray Community 83, Focus Group 3 Parents Community 83, Focus Group 4 Women Community 83, Focus Group 5 Youth Location: Erigavo Community 84, Focus Group 1 Youth Community 84, Focus Group 2 Teachers Kulmiya Community 84, Focus Group 3 Elders Community 84, Focus Group 4 Women Community 84, Focus Group 5 Children Community 85, Focus Group 1 Youth Community 85, Focus Group 2 Teachers Dallo Community 85, Focus Group 3 Elders Community 85, Focus Group 4 Children Community 85, Focus Group 5 Women Community 86, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 86, Focus Group 2 Teachers Community 86, Focus Group 3 Parents Laanqaciya Community 86, Focus Group 4 Youth Community 86, Focus Group 5 Women Community 86, Focus Group 6 Children Community 87, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 87, Focus Group 2 Teachers Yufle Community 87, Focus Group 3 Parents Community 87, Focus Group 4 Youth Community 87, Focus Group 5 Children Community 88, Focus Group 1 Women Community 88, Focus Group 2 Youth Community 88, Focus Group 3 Elders Dagaar Community 88, Focus Group 4 Teachers Community 88, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 88, Focus Group 6 Children Appendix F 207

Zone: Somaliland Location: Erigavo Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 89, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 89, Focus Group 2 Head Teachers Community 89, Focus Group 3 Teachers Karin Community 89, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 89, Focus Group 5 Women Community 89, Focus Group 6 Youth Community 89, Focus Group 7 Children Community 90, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 90, Focus Group 2 Head Teachers Community 90, Focus Group 3 Teachers

Dhahamo Community 90, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 90, Focus Group 5 Women Community 90, Focus Group 6 Youth Community 90, Focus Group 7 Children Location: Harrirad Community 91, Focus Group 1 Business Community 91, Focus Group 2 Religious Leaders Community 91, Focus Group 3 Elders Harirad Community 91, Focus Group 4 Youth Community 91, Focus Group 5 Women Community 91, Focus Group 6 Head Teachers Community 92, Focus Group 1 Religious Leaders Community 92, Focus Group 2 Youth Habaas Community 92, Focus Group 3 Business Community 92, Focus Group 4 Women Community 92, Focus Group 5 Head Teachers Community 93, Focus Group 1 Women Community 93, Focus Group 2 Business Community 93, Focus Group 3 Head Teachers Abdikadir Community 93, Focus Group 4 Religious Community 93, Focus Group 5 Youth Community 93, Focus Group 6 Women Community 93, Focus Group 7 Teachers Community 94, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 94, Focus Group 2 Youth Community 94, Focus Group 3 Religious Darayadhere Community 94, Focus Group 4 Business Community 94, Focus Group 5 Youth Community 94, Focus Group 6 Women 208 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Zone: Somaliland Location: Harrirad Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 95, Focus Group 1 Business Community 95, Focus Group 2 Religious Community 95, Focus Group 3 Elders Ceelbaxay Community 95, Focus Group 4 Women Community 95, Focus Group 5 Youth Community 95, Focus Group 6 Teachers Community 95, Focus Group 7 Parents Community 96, Focus Group 1 Women Community 96, Focus Group 2 Youth Community 96, Focus Group 3 Business Community 96, Focus Group 4 Elders Malaas Community 96, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 96, Focus Group 6 Teachers Community 96, Focus Group 7 Religious Community 96, Focus Group 8 Women Community 97, Focus Group 1 Business Community 97, Focus Group 2 Parents Jidhi Community 97, Focus Group 3 Religious Community 97, Focus Group 4 Teachers Community 97, Focus Group 5 Women Community 98, Focus Group 1 Business Community 98, Focus Group 2 Parents Community 98, Focus Group 3 Religious Fiqi Adan Community 98, Focus Group 4 Teachers Community 98, Focus Group 5 Women Community 98, Focus Group 6 Youth Location: Gabiley Community 99, Focus Group 1 Parents Community 99, Focus Group 2 Religious Community 99, Focus Group 3 Teachers Laagbarako Community 99, Focus Group 4 Women Community 99, Focus Group 5 Children Community 99, Focus Group 6 Elders Community 99, Focus Group 7 Youth Appendix F 209

Zone: Somaliland Location: Gabiley Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 100, Focus Group 1 Women Community 100, Focus Group 2 Religious Community 100, Focus Group 3 Elders Wadajir Community 100, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 100, Focus Group 5 Teachers Community 100, Focus Group 6 Children Community 100, Focus Group 7 Youth Community 101, Focus Group 1 Teachers Community 101, Focus Group 2 Religious Community 101, Focus Group 3 Elders New Gabiley Community 101, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 101, Focus Group 5 Women Community 101, Focus Group 6 Youth Community 102, Focus Group 1 Teachers Community 102, Focus Group 2 Religious Community 102, Focus Group 3 Youth Salaawo Community 102, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 102, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 102, Focus Group 6 Women Community 103, Focus Group 1 Teachers Community 103, Focus Group 2 Parents Community 103, Focus Group 3 Religious Galooley Community 103, Focus Group 4 Women Community 103, Focus Group 5 Youth Community 103, Focus Group 6 Elders Community 104, Focus Group 1 Women Community 104, Focus Group 2 Youth Community 104, Focus Group 3 Parents Kalabaydh Community 104, Focus Group 4 Religious Community 104, Focus Group 5 Children Community 104, Focus Group 6 Elders Community 104, Focus Group 7 Teachers Community 105, Focus Group 1 Women Community 105, Focus Group 2 Children Community 105, Focus Group 3 Parents Hadhley Community 105, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 105, Focus Group 5 Religious Community 105, Focus Group 6 Teachers Community 105, Focus Group 7 Youth 210 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Zone: Somaliland Location: Gabiley Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 106, Focus Group 1 Children Community 106, Focus Group 2 Teachers Community 106, Focus Group 3 Parents Arabsiyo Community 106, Focus Group 4 Religious Community 106, Focus Group 5 Women Community 106, Focus Group 6 Youth Community 106, Focus Group 7 Elders Location: Maroodijeex Community 107, Focus Group 1 Youth Community 107, Focus Group 2 Business Community 107, Focus Group 3 Elders Community 107, Focus Group 4 Parents Mohamed Mooge Community 107, Focus Group 5 Teachers Community 107, Focus Group 6 Women Community 107, Focus Group 7 Youth Community 107, Focus Group 8 Children Community 108, Focus Group 1 Women Community 108, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 108, Focus Group 3 Business May Community 108, Focus Group 4 Religious Community 108, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 108, Focus Group 6 Religious Community 108, Focus Group 7 Teachers Community 109, Focus Group 1 Children Community 109, Focus Group 2 Women Community 109, Focus Group 3 Elders Community 109, Focus Group 4 Parents Sheikh Ali Osman Community 109, Focus Group 5 Teachers Community 109, Focus Group 6 Religious Community 109, Focus Group 7 Youth Community 109, Focus Group 8 Business Community 110, Focus Group 1 Parents Community 110, Focus Group 2 Business Community 110, Focus Group 3 Teachers Community 110, Focus Group 4 Religious Aadan Dhamac Community 110, Focus Group 5 Youth Community 110, Focus Group 6 Elders Community 110, Focus Group 7 Women Community 110, Focus Group 8 Children Appendix F 211

Zone: Somaliland Location: Maroodijeex Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 111, Focus Group 1 Religious Community 111, Focus Group 2 Children Community 111, Focus Group 3 Elders Community 111, Focus Group 4 Women Abaarso Community 111, Focus Group 5 Teachers Community 111, Focus Group 6 Business Community 111, Focus Group 7 Parents Community 111, Focus Group 8 Youth Community 112, Focus Group 1 Teachers Community 112, Focus Group 2 Children Community 112, Focus Group 3 Business Community 112, Focus Group 4 Elders Awbakhadle Community 112, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 112, Focus Group 6 Religious Community 112, Focus Group 7 Women Community 112, Focus Group 8 Youth Community 113, Focus Group 1 Children Community 113, Focus Group 2 Teachers Community 113, Focus Group 3 Business Community 113, Focus Group 4 Elders Beeyokhadar Community 113, Focus Group 5 Religious Community 113, Focus Group 6 Women Community 113, Focus Group 7 Youth Community 113, Focus Group 8 Parents Community 114 Focus Group 1 Children Community 114 Focus Group 2 Elders Community 114 Focus Group 3 Parents Toon Community 114 Focus Group 4 Religious Community 114 Focus Group 5 Teachers Community 114 Focus Group 6 Women Community 114 Focus Group 7 Youth Location: Qorilugud Community 115, Focus Group 1 Women Community 115, Focus Group 2 Youth Community 115, Focus Group 3 Parents Qoriluqud Community 115, Focus Group 4 Teachers Community 115, Focus Group 5 Elders Community 115, Focus Group 6 Business 212 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Zone: Somaliland Location: Qorilugud Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 116, Focus Group 1 Women Horseed Community 116, Focus Group 2 Youth Community 116, Focus Group 3 Business Community 117, Focus Group 1 Business Community 117, Focus Group 2 Parents Community 117, Focus Group 3 Women Qabrihulul Community 117, Focus Group 4 Youth Community 117, Focus Group 5 Teachers Community 117, Focus Group 6 Elders Community 118, Focus Group 1 Women Community 118, Focus Group 2 Youth Coodanle Community 118, Focus Group 3 Teachers Community 118, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 118, Focus Group 5 Business Community 119, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 119, Focus Group 2 Women Community 119, Focus Group 3 Youth Balicanle Community 119, Focus Group 4 Teachers Community 119, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 119, Focus Group 6 Businessmen Community 120, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 120, Focus Group 2 Teachers Bahiile Community 120, Focus Group 3 Parents Community 120, Focus Group 4 Youth Community 121, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 121, Focus Group 2 Women Community 121, Focus Group 3 Youth Kaarto Community 121, Focus Group 4 Teachers Community 121, Focus Group 5 Business Community 121, Focus Group 6 Parents Community 122, Focus Group 1 Principals Community 122, Focus Group 2 Women Gandahar Community 122, Focus Group 3 Teachers Community 122, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 122, Focus Group 5 Youth Appendix F 213

Zone: Somaliland Location: Sahil Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 123, Focus Group 1 Youth Community 123, Focus Group 2 Women Community 123, Focus Group 3 Teachers B. Sheikh Community 123, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 123, Focus Group 5 Elders Community 123, Focus Group 6 Business Community 124, Focus Group 1 Youth Community 124, Focus Group 2 Women Wadajir Community 124, Focus Group 3 Teachers Community 124, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 124, Focus Group 5 Business Community 125, Focus Group 6 Women Community 125, Focus Group 7 Elders Community 125, Focus Group 8 Parents Geellookor Community 125, Focus Group 9 Youth Community 125, Focus Group 10 Teachers Community 125, Focus Group 11 Business Community 126, Focus Group 1 Parents Community 126, Focus Group 2 Youth Community 126, Focus Group 3 Elders Laalays Community 126, Focus Group 4 Teachers Community 126, Focus Group 5 Business Community 126, Focus Group 6 Women Community 127, Focus Group 1 Teachers Community 127, Focus Group 2 Women Community 127, Focus Group 3 Youth Daraygodle Community 127, Focus Group 4 Parents Community 127, Focus Group 5 Elders Community 127, Focus Group 6 Business Community 128, Focus Group 1 Women Community 128, Focus Group 2 Youth Community 128, Focus Group 3 Business Xamaas Community 128, Focus Group 4 Elders Community 128, Focus Group 5 Parents Community 128, Focus Group 6 Teachers 214 Beyond Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context

Zone: Somaliland Location: Sahil Community Reference Participant Backgrounds Community 129, Focus Group 1 Business Community 129, Focus Group 2 Elders Community 129, Focus Group 3 Parents Abdaal Community 129, Focus Group 4 Teachers Community 129, Focus Group 5 Women Community 129, Focus Group 6 Youth Community 130, Focus Group 1 Elders Community 130, Focus Group 2 Parents Community 130, Focus Group 3 Youth Dooxo Guban Community 130, Focus Group 4 Business Community 130, Focus Group 5 Teachers Community 130, Focus Group 6 Women

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‘... linking theory and practice for enablement and development.’ The Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) is a leading centre for research, consultancy and learning on post-war reconstruction and development. Founded in 1992 at the University of York, the PRDU’s mission is to advance education and learning in the management and planning of reconstruction after war, humanitarian intervention in complex emergencies and peacebuilding. PRDU links theory and practice for the enablement and development of war-affected societies. The Unit’s work focuses on three core areas: Conceptualisation: Facilitating the development of a vision for reconstruction with participatory needs assessment, context analysis and strategy development. Institution Development and Transformation: Supporting the development of human resources, appropriate administrative systems and institutional responses in the transition from crisis management to long-term development programmes. Participatory Evaluation: Promoting people-centred evaluation of progressive goals and strategies and the dissemination of good practice. Tel: +44 (0) 1904 322640 Email: [email protected] Fax: +44 (0) 1904 322641 Web: www.york.ac.uk/prdu Institute for Effective Education

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