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Policy Briefing Policy Briefing Africa Briefing N°92 Nairobi/Istanbul/Brussels, 8 October 2012 Assessing Turkey’s Role in Somalia clear political understandings they had with Ankara (such I. OVERVIEW as the traditional elders’ planned trip to Istanbul to partic- ipate in the civil society gathering) and openly criticised Turkey is the newest country to intervene in Somalia and and confronted their host on seemingly benign issues. Tur- its involvement has produced some positive results. Prime key overcame these unexpected impediments because of Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s courageous visit to diplomatic insights gained from its on-the-ground pres- Mogadishu in August 2011 at the height of the famine ence and support from international partners. It should and his decision to open an embassy gave fresh impetus use its new experience to build consensus and improve to efforts to establish lasting peace. Widespread Somali external coordination if its intervention is to be effective. gratitude for Turkish humanitarian endeavours and the country’s status as a Muslim and democratic state estab- As a new Somali government is established, Turkey is lished Turkey as a welcome partner. Ankara has signalled expected to, and can, play an important role in helping sta- it is in for the long haul. However, it must tread prudently, bilise and develop the war-ravaged country. In order to play eschew unilateralism and learn lessons to avoid another a major and sustained role in Somalia, Ankara should: failed international intervention. Over twenty years, many lay out a public, clear and realistic long-term strategy states and entities have tried to bring relief and secure for its Somalia policy, backed by secure funding and peace in Somalia, often leaving behind a situation messier an increase in the number of specialists in both Moga- than that which they found. Ankara must appreciate it dishu and Ankara dedicated to its efforts in Somalia, alone cannot solve the country’s many challenges, but must and in particular build up its knowledge of Somalia secure the support and cooperation of both the Somali peo- and coordinate with other countries and international ple and international community. Trying to go solo could agencies active in the country; backfire, hamper ongoing efforts and lose the immense good-will it has accumulated. remain impartial in internal politics and avoid being manipulated by Somali politicians long experienced in Turkey’s presence on the ground is relatively small, but outwitting foreign newcomers; because of its timely famine relief and the apparent strength of its commitment, as well as Somalis’ gratitude, expand targeted assistance to peaceful regions outside its contribution is seen as colossal. In addition to its embas- of Mogadishu; sy, there are about a dozen governmental and non-govern- prioritise institution building and knowledge transfer, mental organisations (NGOs) with a limited presence on including investing in the return of educated diaspora the ground working in Mogadishu. But Somalis’ dream of Somalis; a quick and comprehensive recovery has created great expectations in the regions that are not receiving Turkish help with political party development, constitutional assistance, particularly because of their highly visible ac- reform and the creation of accountable institutions; tivities in Mogadishu. Yet, besides generous diplomatic and political support, its means are modest and its material take a more active role in UN peacebuilding efforts; support to Somalia will probably remain limited. If the manage Somali expectations of how much assistance Somali people’s high expectations are not moderated and it can provide; if Ankara is unable to expand its relief and development aid to peaceful regions outside Mogadishu, the Turkey- establish a standardised and transparent bidding pro- Somalia partnership could be strained or quickly trans- cess for contracts and subcontracts to avoid empowering formed into a relationship beset by resentment. predatory businesspeople; Vocal Somali criticism of the two conferences (civil soci- offer mediation expertise and financial assistance to ety and government) held in Istanbul from late May to peace and reconciliation efforts; early June 2012 should serve as an important reminder stop being indifferent to the endemic Somali corrup- about the volatility of and multiple fault lines in Somali tion and tie diplomatic and development assistance to politics. Somalia’s main political actors backpedalled on Assessing Turkey’s Role in Somalia Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°92, 8 October 2012 Page 2 upholding the rule of law and establishing accountable to now, Turkey’s intervention is seen differently by most and effective institutions; Somalis. Its humanitarian motives are not questioned, and as a relatively developed Muslim state, it is seen as a coun- provide more support to AMISOM and integrate secu- try to emulate, rather than an external power to be feared. rity assistance within existing international mechanisms, Former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed stated that unlike rather than embarking on a parallel and duplicate process; some Arabs, who characterise the Ottoman rule as coloni- 2 help Somalia create a professional, decentralised po- sation, Somali memories of this era are positive. lice force, which, rather than external forces such as AMISOM, will be responsible for the consolidation of A. HISTORICAL TIES peace and security; Turkish-Somali relations date back to the sixteenth centu- coordinate with other countries and international agencies ry when the Ottomans came to Somalis’ aid fending off to prevent overlap and ensure aid is provided strategi- 3 cally; Ethiopian and Portuguese expeditionary forces. By the seventeenth century Somali coastal towns were controlled ensure Turkish businesspeople operating in Somalia by local sultanates with nominal links to the Ottoman neither exploit vulnerable Somalis nor are exploited by Empire.4 Contemporary Turkey-Somalia relations began Somali elite; and with the opening of the Somali Embassy in Ankara in 1979 and in May 1993 Lieutenant General Çevik Bir was ap- support the Joint Financial Management Board agreed pointed force commander of the UN Operation in Somalia to at the London and Istanbul conferences to ensure (UNOSOM) II.5 During Somalia’s civil war, some Turkish that government revenue and international assistance is used appropriately and efficiently. This briefing outlines Turkey’s ongoing operations and achievements so far. As Somalia enters a new and uncer- Group Africa Report N°88, Somalia: Continuation of War By tain post-transition phase, Ankara may likely face obstacles Other Means?, 21 December 2004. After the Islamic Courts and will run into the country’s complicated political and Union took control of Mogadishu in June 2006 and subsequent- security environment in delivering on numerous expecta- ly much of south and central Somalia, Addis Ababa invaded in tions as its honeymoon with Somalis ends. To avoid this, December 2006 and re-imposed the first TFG of Abdullahi the briefing suggests practical steps to make the Turkish- Yusuf, and sparked an insurgency that led to the growth of Al- Somalia cooperation sustainable and mutually beneficial. Shabaab. 2 Crisis Group interview, President Sheikh Sharif, Mogadishu, 1 May 2012. The president also maintained that the traditional donors were “jealous” of all the good-will and attention Turkey II. TURKEY’S ARRIVAL IN SOMALIA had generated in Mogadishu. 3 I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali, op. cit., p. 26. Current Somali and Turkish leaders cherish these historical ties. Turkey’s humanitarian action is particularly welcome, be- “Somalia and Turkey have profound historical relations dating cause it comes after two decades of political turmoil and back to the Middle Ages and the ties between the Adal Sultan- acute vulnerability. Somalis place much of the blame for ate [based in the port of Zeila, near the present-day Djibouti] the state’s continued crisis on external involvement, par- and the Ottoman Empire going back to the 16th century… Tur- ticularly on Ethiopia, the country’s historical enemy.1 Up key has recently revived this relationship in a very unique way and the people of Somalia are ever indebted …”. Dr Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, “Opening Statement”, Istanbul II Conference, 31 May-1 June 2012. “You are home, Turkey is your mother- 1 I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali (Athens, 2002), land, sixteenth century Ahmed Gurey fought occupying forces pp. 231-232. Both countries harboured the other’s armed oppo- with Ottoman support”. “Opening Remarks by Foreign Minis- sition groups (then rebel leaders Meles Zenawi, the late Ethio- ter of Turkey Ahmet Davutoğlu”, Somali Civil Society Gather- pian prime minister, and Isaias Afewerki, the Eritrean presi- ing, Istanbul, 27 May 2012. dent, were both based in Mogadishu for some time) and the re- 4 I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali, op. cit., p. 33. bel groups that toppled the Somali government in 1991 operated Somalia’s 19th century anti-colonial fighter Sayid Mohammed from Ethiopia. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have armed feuding Abdulle Hassan’s emissary signed a pact that put his anti- Somali warlords for their own geopolitical purposes. See re- colonial Darwish movement under the Ottoman Sultan’s nomi- ports of the panel of experts and the monitoring group on So- nal authority. Aw Jaamac Cumar Ciise, Taariikhdii Daraa- malia, as well as the monitoring group on Somalia and Eritrea, wiishtaiyo
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