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Somalia: the Transitional Government on Life Support

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Somalia: the Transitional Government on Life Support SOMALIA: THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT ON LIFE SUPPORT Africa Report N°170 – 21 February 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. STRUCTURAL AND OTHER FACTORS OF INSTABILITY .................................. 2 A. THE FIXATION ON CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ................................................................................. 2 B. A LARGE AND UNWIELDY GOVERNMENT .................................................................................... 2 1. Cabinet ......................................................................................................................................... 3 2. Parliament and the rivalry of the two Sharifs .............................................................................. 4 C. REFUSAL TO SHARE POWER ......................................................................................................... 5 1. Failure to reach out ...................................................................................................................... 5 2. Reluctance to federalise ............................................................................................................... 6 3. Local administrations going their own way ................................................................................. 7 D. A DIVIDED EXECUTIVE ................................................................................................................ 8 E. THE 4.5 CLAN QUOTA SYSTEM .................................................................................................... 9 III. THE FAILURES OF SHEIKH SHARIF’S GOVERNMENT .................................... 10 A. LACK OF VISION ........................................................................................................................ 10 B. WEAK LEADERSHIP ................................................................................................................... 12 C. CORRUPTION .............................................................................................................................. 12 D. THE PUSH FOR A MANDATE EXTENSION .................................................................................... 14 IV. INADEQUATE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM ...................................................... 15 V. AMISOM: WINNING THE BATTLE, LOSING THE WAR? .................................. 17 VI. A WAY FORWARD ....................................................................................................... 19 A. SUPPORTING LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS .................................................................................... 19 1. Redirecting aid and resources .................................................................................................... 20 2. Realistic and transparent benchmarks ........................................................................................ 21 3. Inclusive and viable governance ................................................................................................ 21 B. DEVOLVING SECURITY .............................................................................................................. 22 C. THE GOVERNMENT PAST AUGUST 2011 .................................................................................... 23 1. Nature of the consultative forum ............................................................................................... 23 2. Relationship between local administrations and the government in Mogadishu ....................... 23 3. Structure of the national government ......................................................................................... 23 4. The division of national power and unified leadership .............................................................. 24 5. Pulling the plug? ........................................................................................................................ 24 VII. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 25 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SOMALIA ............................................................................................................................ 26 B. SOMALIA: AREAS OF CONTROL AS OF JANUARY 2011 ...................................................................... 27 C. THE TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL CHARTER’S DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE TFG AND STATE GOVERNMENTS .................................................................................................................... 28 D. GLOSSARY ....................................................................................................................................... 29 E. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 30 F. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2008 ..................................................... 31 G. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 33 Africa Report N°170 21 February 2011 SOMALIA: THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT ON LIFE SUPPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has TFG is even less willing to share power than previous squandered the goodwill and support it received and transitional administrations, which explains the recurrent achieved little of significance in the two years it has been tensions between it and self-governing enclaves like in office. It is inept, increasingly corrupt and hobbled by Puntland, Galmudug, Ximan and Xeeb and local grass- President Sharif’s weak leadership. So far, every effort to roots movements like Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ). make the administration modestly functional has come Not surprisingly, many are going their own way. Indeed, unstuck. The new leaner cabinet looks impressive on paper Somalia today is experiencing a multi-faceted, chaotic, but, given divisive politics and the short timeframe, is clan-driven and virtually countrywide revolt against the unlikely to deliver significant progress on key transitional centre. objectives, such as stabilising Somalia and delivering a permanent constitution before August 2011, when the Nothing highlights the general ineptitude of the TFG in TFG’s official mandate ends. Although the Transitional forging political alliances and achieving wider reconcilia- Federal Parliament unilaterally has awarded itself a further tion better than the botched power-sharing agreement three-year-extension, urgent attention needs to be given to with the ASWJ. Originally, an alliance of clans seeking to the government’s structural flaws that stymie peacebuilding protect their traditional version of Sufi Islam, ASWJ is in central and south Somalia. If the TFG does not make the only group in south and central Somalia able to oppose serious progress on correcting its deficiencies by August, the extreme Islamist movement Al-Shabaab effectively. the international community should concentrate its support It was a natural ally of the TFG but was only brought into a on the more effective local entities, until a more appropri- formal power-sharing agreement under tremendous pres- ate and effective national government is negotiated. sure from regional and other international allies. That accord is now in tatters, though officials in Mogadishu insist it To blame the TFG or Sharif solely for the continued catas- still officially holds. The movement is itself deeply frag- trophe would be unfair. At the core of Somalia’s govern- mented, and no one knows which of the plethora of emerg- ance crisis is a deeply-flawed centralising state model. ing splinter factions speaks for the “old” ASWJ. The TFG The international community has not yet learned the lesson appears in no hurry to save what is left of the deal. that re-establishing a European-style centralised state, based in Mogadishu, is almost certain to fail. For most The level of corruption within the TFG has increased sig- Somalis, their only experience with the central govern- nificantly, and many local and foreign observers regard ment is that of predation. Since independence, one clan, or the current government as the most corrupt since the cycles group of clans, has always used its control of the centre to of ineffectual transitions began in 2000. A cabal within take most of the resources and deny them to rival clans. the regime presides over a corruption syndicate that is Thus, whenever a new transitional government is created, massive, sophisticated and extends well beyond Somalia’s Somalis are naturally wary and give it limited, or no, sup- borders. The impunity with which its members operate and port, fearing it will only be used to dominate and margin- manipulate the system to serve their greed is remarkable. alise them. They are not fit to hold public office and should be forced to resign, isolated and sanctioned. The logical alternative is a more decentralised system of governance, but despite serious attempts, since 2004, to TFG military prospects are not good, despite gains in push transitional governments to devolve power away from Mogadishu since the end of Ramadan in late September Mogadishu, the political class – and much of the interna- 2010. The army is ineffectual, and the government’s sur- tional community – has
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