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Somalia Risk Assessment 2014 INSCT MIDDLE EAST and NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE

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Somalia Risk Assessment 2014 INSCT MIDDLE EAST and NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE INSCT MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM Somalia Risk Assessment 2014 INSCT MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report, developed from open-source information including congressional and federal reports, academic articles, news media accounts, and NGO papers— concerns one of the most developmentally deficient and war-torn countries in the world. The name “Somalia” and the phrase “failed state” unfortunately have become synonymous. Since the 1991 overthrow of dictator Said Barre and the resulting civil war, successive incarnations of a Somali government have time and again attempted to rise above the seemingly perpetual instability and begin exerting state control. Since 2012, when an internationally supported government was installed in Mogadishu (the US recognized the government in January 2013), Somalia has taken baby steps toward restoring stability and security in parts of the country. The presence of forces from neighboring counties, such as Kenya and Ethiopia (as part of an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)), has brought a measure of stability to regions in the country’s south that were until recently controlled by non-state militias, FIGURE 1: Map of Somalia and Region (University of Texas). mainly the militant Islamic organization and Al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Shabaab. But despite recent AMISOM battlefield gains and encouraging signs of increasing government capacity, the central government still controls only a portion of Mogadishu and almost no other territory in the rest of the country. And even these gains are precarious. This report will examine four topics that provide a cross-section of national security issues in Somalia: ! Defense Capabilities—Including Somalia’s attempts to re-build its national military, partnerships with friendly and donor nations, and the US military posture in East Africa. ! Security Threats—Including the complex and balkanized clan/political situation, the collusion between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda, piracy, and exogenous threats involving other Horn of Africa nations. ! Oil, Gas, and Other Extractives—An overview of oil and gas exploration and extraction on land and off shore, as well as the economic potential of metals and gemstones. ! Key Personalities— Hassan Sheik Mohamud, the current president of Somalia, and Ahmed Abdi Godane, the emir of Al-Shabaab. 1 INSCT MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE DEFENSE The Somali Armed Forces (SAF) In the post-independence period, between 1960 and the outbreak of civil war in 1991, the Somali military was one of the largest in Africa. The 1991 civil war, which led to Said Barre’s flight from Mogadishu, precipitated the almost complete disintegration of the once proud military.1 Recent years have seen a renewed effort by the Somali government to invest in national defense and policing through partnerships with foreign allies (such as Italian assistance in developing naval forces) and enhanced arms procurement. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2093, passed in March 2013, has facilitated more robust procurement efforts by lifting a 21-year arms embargo on Somalia. The resolution allows Somalia to purchase light weapons for a one-year provisional period, but it still restricts the country’s ability to purchase heavy weapons such as surface-to-air missiles, howitzers, and cannons.2 However, a 2011 report by the International Crisis Group cited corruption and procurement issues as major impediments to military reform in Somalia. Powerful vested interests and corrupt commanders are the biggest obstacles. Efforts to provide the army with better equipment have been sluggish and dogged by allegations that some is sold on by officers. Attempts, led by AMISOM, to develop a coherent structure for the disparate militias and whip their estimated 8,000 members into fighting shape have been problematic. There remains resistance to creation of an effective chain of command, rational military formations, and even a credible troop roster. The respected former army chief, General Gelle, tried to improve the situation, but he was marginalized, then dismissed. 3 Nevertheless, some reforms and improvements have been made. For instance, the SAF created a Special Forces unit in August 2011 that reportedly consists of 300 FIGURE 2: Members of the Somalian Armed Forces (Reuters). trained soldiers. The unit is mandated with protecting relief shipments and distribution centers in Mogadishu and combatting banditry.4 In terms of cooperation with other forces, the SAF recently has joined with the African Union Mission in Somalia in an effort to combat Al-Shabaab. The SAF has taken the lead on a number of key offensives, including the 2012 capture of Kismayo and recent battlefield gains in the country’s south. 1 “Somalia: The Warrior Tradition and Development of a Modern Army,” Library of Congress Country Studies, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi- bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+so0116) 2 “UN Eases Oldest Arms Embargo for Somalia,” The Australian, March 7, 2013, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/un-eases-oldest-arms- embargo-for-somalia/story-fn3dxix6-1226592031840 3 “Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support,” International Crisis Group, Feb. 21, 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of- africa/somalia/170%20Somalia%20The%20Transitional%20Government%20on%20Life%20Support.pdf 4 “Somalia to Set Up Aid Protection Force,” Africa Review, Aug. 14, 2011, http://www.africareview.com/News/Somalia+to+set+up+aid+protection+force/- /979180/1218894/-/ykbgcnz/-/login 2 INSCT MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE Furthermore, on Aug. 7, 2012, Prime Minister Ali announced that his government would re-establish the Somali Navy. This is a significant development because an effective Somali Navy could police territorial waters, slow piracy, and wean Somalia off dependence on foreign maritime security. Reflecting more domestic concerns, Ali indicated that his government seeks to "establish well-trained maritime forces that will be charged with patrolling the coast and putting a stop to the foreign countries and companies from taking Somalia's resources illegitimately."5 For instance, Somalia is seeking to boost coastal policing in order to prevent illegal fishing and the dumping of toxic waste. However, Somalia is starting virtually from scratch with building naval capabilities, so positive results may not be seen for many years. Ali has asked the international community to boost its commitment to helping Somalia develop maritime capabilities, in particular through the acquisition of speedboats and warships. The US Military in Somalia In October 2013, the United States secretly deployed military trainers and advisors to Somalia, marking the first time that the US has had an extended (for more than a few hours) “boots on the ground” presence in Somalia since the Black Hawk Down incident in 1991.6 The Americans are stationed in Mogadishu and are tasked with advising and coordinating operations with AMISOM troops fighting Al-Shabaab. Prior to the deployment of the advisors, American military activity in Somalia had been limited to drone surveillance (and the occasional JSOC drone strike) and Special Operations raids. One such raid, an assault by sea on a compound in the coastal city of Barawe in October 2013, failed to kill or capture the targeted high-level Al- Shabaab leader.7 Overall US strategy in Somalia is mainly devoted to anti-piracy operations under the Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa (based in Djibouti) and NATO maritime security, but direct anti-Al-Shabaab operations on the mainland have been more frequent in recent years. Policymakers in Washington have a very high threshold for significant US involvement in Somalia after the mishaps of 1991, but President Barack Obama has slightly increased US attention on the country in recent years. The lack of US engagement in Somalia from the early 1990s until the late 2000s is reflected in US national defense documents from the period, all of which do not include African security issues as core US national security priorities. US Africa Command (AFRICOM) was not established until 2008, a move that reflected the military’s increasing focus on the African continent. Specifically, US national security policymakers began to show greater concern for non-state threats that emerge from un-governed areas. Somalia is a case in point. The 2008 National Defense Strategy argues that “the inability of many states to police themselves effectively or work with their neighbors to ensure regional security represents a challenge to the international system” and that “if left unchecked, such instability can spread and threaten regions of interest to the United States, our allies, and friends.”8 5 “Somalia to Make Task Marine Forces to Secure Its Coast,” All Africa, July 31, 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201208010023.html 6 “US Has Deployed Military Advisers to Somalia, Officials Say,” The Washington Post, Jan. 10, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us- has-deployedmilitary-advisers-to-somalia-officials-say/2014/01/10/b19429f2-7a20-11e3-af7f-13bf0e9965f6_story.html 7 “How the US Raid on Al-Shabaab in Somalia Went Wrong,” The Guardian, Oct. 9, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/09/us-raid-al-shabaab- somalia-navy-seals 8 “National Defense Strategy,” The United States Department of Defense, June 2008, http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf 3 INSCT MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE The FY2011 Department of Defense budget request further emphasizes that “threats to our security in the decades to come are more likely to emanate from state weakness than from state strength.”9 Yet despite acknowledgement of growing threats from countries such as Somalia, the US remains committed to maintaining a relatively light footprint on the continent. As of today, US presence in most of Africa takes the form of training national militaries in allied countries. Many US policymakers are concerned that increasing an American footprint on the continent increases the risk of blowback.
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