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4.18

Somalia

After more than a decade-long hiatus, peacekeepers returned to in 2007. This AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) followed the ouster of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) by the Transitional Federal Insti- • Authorization Date 19 January 2007 (AU PSC/PRI Comm. tutions (TFI), with military support from Ethi- LXIX); 6 December 2006 (UNSC Res. 1725) opia. While the Ethiopian intervention quickly • Start Date March 2007 restored a measure of authority to the TFI, and • Strength as of Troops: 1,600 made way for the partial deployment of the AU 30 September 2007 Mission in (AMISOM) in March 2007, the security vacuum that followed plunged So- malia back into chaos. Throughout the year, a dispersed and disaffected UIC functioned as a establishing a peace support mission, which heavily armed and active insurgency, while a was approved by the AU in February 2005. widespread humanitarian crisis loomed large However, local groups in Somalia, includ- and a multitude of divergent external interests ing the UIC, immediately expressed their op- converged in what looked like a proxy war. position to the deployment of peacekeepers, During the year in review there was little especially those from neighboring countries. peace to keep in Somalia, and the restoration An initial AU assessment mission in February of stability seemed unlikely, absent a shift in 2005 was met with violent protests. The Secu- both international engagement and the national rity Council cautioned that any peace support reconciliation process. The situation was ag- mission “would require the support of the So- gravated by power struggles between TFI mali people,” while IGAD promised not to in- president Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Prime clude troops from the neighboring states of Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi that culminated in , Kenya, or in the proposed the resignation of Gedi on 29 October 2007. mission. IGAD authorized its Peace Support Mis- sion in Somalia (IGASOM) in April 2005 with Background a mandate for robust “peace enforcement.” After his election in October 2004, Abdullahi The concept of operations was approved by Yusuf Ahmed appealed to the international the transitional parliament and authorized by community for a multinational peacekeeping the AU in May 2005. On 13 September 2006, force of up to 20,000 troops to restore security the AU’s Peace and Security Council approved in the country and enable his institution’s re- the deployment plan of IGASOM: 8,000 troops turn from exile to , the capital. The to provide security for the TFI and create an request was eventually supported by the AU in environment conducive to inclusive dialogue early 2005 and then by the UN Security Coun- and reconciliation. Deployment was not legally cil. The Inter-Governmental Authority on De- feasible until December 2006, when the UN velopment (IGAD) agreed to take the lead in Security Council amended its long-standing

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arms embargo on Somalia with Resolution year came to a close only Burundi had begun 1725. The altered embargo authorized IGAD deploying. Ethiopian troops remained in coun- and AU states to establish a “protection and try at the end of 2007, despite opposition to training mission” in Somalia, where neighbor- their presence by some local Somali groups, ing states, including Ethiopia, would be prohib- most notably the defunct UIC. ited from contributing troops to the mission. The AU peacekeepers have been targeted Meanwhile, throughout 2006 the UIC em- by insurgents, and have been largely confined barked on a broad campaign against a loose as- to Mogadishu. As in the past, the country is sociation of secular warlords, asserting its ju- awash in weapons reportedly supplied by var- risdiction over the majority of Somalia’s south, ious regional players, further complicating including Mogadishu, and imposing Islamic peacekeeping efforts. Scores of civilians have sharia on the bulk of the Somali population by been displaced by the violence, with severe October 2006. While this campaign was con- humanitarian consequences. Consequently, AU ducted in a largely nonviolent manner—return- chairperson Alpha Omar Konare appealed to ing a level of stability to the country not seen the UN to provide assistance to AMISOM since the late 1980s—the UIC’s alleged con- along the lines of the Light and Heavy Support nection to organized terror groups, especially packages it provided to the AU Mission in Al-Qaida, drew the attention of neighbors and Sudan (AMIS). Acting on the request, in Au- the international community, in particular gust 2007 the Security Council called on the Ethiopia and the United States. Secretary-General to begin exploring options In December 2006, Ethiopia, citing na- for the possible deployment of UN troops to tional security interests as its impetus, began Somalia. Reporting to the Security Council in strongly supporting the TFI with troops and early November, UN Secretary-General Ban equipment, and eventually engaged the UIC Ki-Moon, however, questioned the feasibility in open combat. Ethiopian forces swiftly de- of deploying a UN peace operation in Somalia, feated the UIC, causing its dissolution by 27 and ultimately urged the international commu- December. The victory, however, was super- nity to consider other options. ficial, as remaining UIC elements quickly as- Progress toward an inclusive political similated into the general population, creating framework followed a similarly difficult tra- chaos over much of the country’s territory jectory during the year. A six-week national and restricting TFI control to the borders of reconciliation conference—delayed three times Mogadishu. because of threats of violence, but finally con- vened on 15 July 2007—was deemed largely insignificant due to the glaring absence of the Major Developments dominant Hawiye clan. At a rival conference As quickly as the UIC had fallen, talk of Ethio- held in the Eritrean capital, Asmara, in Sep- pian withdrawal began in early 2007. In Janu- tember, members of the dissolved UIC met ary, the AU’s Peace and Security Council au- and pledged to oust the TFI and its Ethiopian thorized deployment of AMISOM to support backers under the newly established Alliance the TFI in restoring stability to the country. The for the Liberation of Somalia, a move that UN Security Council endorsed AMISOM the many observers saw as a call for increased in- following month and the force began deploying surgent activity. in March. But efforts to deploy the 8,000- As the year drew to a close, prospects for strong AU force have been painfully slow. In stability in Somalia remained bleak in the ab- fact, by October, only one contributor, Uganda, sence of either concerted efforts to reconcile had deployed troops, approximately 1,600. the varied and competing national groups Several countries—Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, vying for control of the country, or the full de- and Burundi—all pledged troops, but as the ployment of a robust peacekeeping force.