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ﳎﻠﺲ ﺍﻷﻣﻦ Arabic Original: English

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ﳎﻠﺲ ﺍﻷﻣﻦ Arabic Original: English ﺍﻷﻣــﻢ ﺍﳌﺘﺤـﺪﺓ S/2012/544 Distr.: General 13 July 2012 ﳎﻠﺲ ﺍﻷﻣﻦ Arabic Original: English ﺭﺳﺎﻟﺔ ﻣﺆﺭﺧﺔ ١١ ﲤﻮﺯ /ﻳﻮﻟﻴﻪ ٢٠١٢ ﻣﻮﺟﻬﺔ ﺇﱃ ﺭﺋﻴﺲ ﳎﻠﺲ ﺍﻷﻣﻦ ﻣـﻦ ﺭﺋـﻴﺲ ﳉﻨــــﺔ ﳎﻠــــﺲ ﺍﻷﻣــــﻦ ﺍﳌﻨــــﺸﺄﺓ ﻋﻤــــﻼ ﺑــــﺎﻟﻘﺮﺍﺭﻳﻦ ٧٥١ (١٩٩٢) ﻭ ١٩٠٧ (٢٠٠٩) ﺑﺸﺄﻥ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﻣﺎﻝ ﻭﺇﺭﻳﺘﺮﻳﺎ ﺑﺎﺳﻢ ﳉﻨﺔ ﳎﻠﺲ ﺍﻷﻣـﻦ ﺍﳌﻨـﺸﺄﺓ ﻋﻤـﻼ ﺑـﺎﻟﻘﺮﺍﺭﻳﻦ ٧٥١ (١٩٩٢) ﻭ ١٩٠٧ (٢٠٠٩) ﺑــﺸﺄﻥ ﺍﻟــﺼﻮﻣﺎﻝ ﻭﺇﺭﻳﺘﺮﻳــﺎ، ﻭﻭﻓﻘــﺎ ﻟ ﻠﻔﻘــﺮﺓ ٦ (ﻡ) ﻣــﻦ ﻗــﺮﺍﺭ ﳎﻠــﺲ ﺍﻷﻣــﻦ ٢٠٠٢ (٢٠١١ )، ) ﺃﺗــﺸﺮﻑ ﺑــﺄﻥ ﺃﺣﻴــﻞ ﻃﻴــﻪ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳــﺮ ﺑــﺸﺄﻥ ﺍﻟــﺼﻮﻣﺎﻝ ﺍﻟــﺬﻱ ﺃﻋــﺪﻩ ﻓﺮﻳــﻖ ﺍﻟﺮﺻــﺪ ﺍﳌﻌــﲏ ﺑﺎﻟــﺼﻮﻣﺎﻝ ﻭﺇﺭﻳﺘﺮﻳﺎ (ﺍﻧﻈﺮ ﺍﳌﺮﻓﻖ). ﻭﰲ ﻫـﺬﺍ ﺍﻟـﺼﺪﺩ، ﺗﺮﺟـﻮ ﺍﻟﻠﺠﻨـﺔ ﳑﺘﻨـﺔ ﻋـﺮﺽ ﻫـﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺮﺳـﺎﻟﺔ، ﻭﺿـﻤﻴﻤﺘﻬﺎ، ﻋﻠـﻰ ﺃﻋـﻀﺎﺀ ﳎﻠﺲ ﺍﻷﻣﻦ، ﻭﺇﺻﺪﺍﺭﳘﺎ ﻛﻮﺛﻴﻘﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻭﺛﺎﺋﻖ ﺍﺠﻤﻟﻠﺲ. (ﺗﻮﻗ ﻴﻊ) ﻫـ. ﺱ. ﺑﻮﺭﻱ ﺭﺋﻴﺲ ﳉﻨﺔ ﳎﻠﺲ ﺍﻷﻣﻦ ﺍﳌﻨﺸﺄﺓ ﻋﻤﻼ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺮﺍﺭﻳﻦ ٧٥١ (١٩٩٢) ﻭ ١٩٠٧ (٢٠٠٩) ﺑﺸﺄﻥ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﻣﺎﻝ ﻭﺇﺭﻳﺘﺮﻳﺎ 180712 180712 12-37638 (A) *1237638* S/2012/544 ﺭﺳﺎﻟﺔ ﻣﺆﺭﺧﺔ ٢٧ ﺣﺰﻳﺮﺍﻥ /ﻳﻮﻧﻴـﻪ ٢٠١٢ ﻣﻮﺟﻬـﺔ ﺇﱃ ﺭﺋـﻴﺲ ﳉﻨـﺔ ﳎﻠـﺲ ﺍﻷﻣـﻦ ﺍﳌﻨـﺸﺄﺓ ﻋﻤــﻼ ﺑــﺎﻟﻘﺮﺍﺭﻳﻦ ٧٥١ (١٩٩٢) ﻭ ١٩٠٧ (٢٠٠٩) ﺑــﺸﺄﻥ ﺍﻟــﺼﻮﻣﺎﻝ ﻭﺇﺭﻳﺘﺮﻳــﺎ ﻣــ ﻦ ﺃﻋﻀﺎﺀ ﻓﺮﻳﻖ ﺍﻟﺮﺻﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﺼﻮﻣﺎﻝ ﻭﺇﺭﻳﺘﺮﻳﺎ ﻧﺘﺸﺮﻑ ﺑﺄﻥ ﳓﻴﻞ ﻃﻴﻪ ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺮ ﻓﺮﻳﻖ ﺍﻟﺮﺻﺪ ﺍﳌﻌـﲏ ﺑﺎﻟـﺼﻮﻣﺎﻝ ﻭﺇﺭﻳﺘﺮﻳـﺎ ﺍﻟـﺬﻱ ﻳﺮﻛـﺰ ﻋﻠـﻰ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﻣﺎﻝ، ﻭﻓﻘﺎ ﻟﻠﻔﻘﺮﺓ ٦ (ﻡ) ﻣﻦ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﳎﻠﺲ ﺍﻷﻣﻦ ٢٠٠٢ (٢٠١١) (ﺗﻮﻗﻴﻊ) ﻣﺎﺕ ﺑﺮﻳﺪﻥ ﻣﻨﺴﻖ ﻓﺮﻳﻖ ﺍﻟﺮﺻﺪ ﺍﳌﻌﲏ ﺑﺎﻟﺼﻮﻣﺎﻝ (ﺗﻮﻗﻴﻊ) ﺇﳝﺎﻧﻮﻳﻞ ﺩﻳﺴﺮ ﺧﺒﲑ ﺃﺳﻠﺤﺔ (ﺗﻮﻗﻴﻊ) ﺃﻭﺭﻳﻠﻴﺎﻥ ﻟﻮﺭﻛﺎ ﺧﺒﲑ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻄﲑﺍﻥ (ﺗﻮﻗﻴﻊ) ﻳﻮﺭﻍ ﺭﻭﻓﺜﻮﻓﺖ ﺧﺒﲑ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻨﻘﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺮﻱ (ﺗﻮﻗﻴﻊ) ﻏﺴﺎﻥ ﺷﺒﻠﻲ ﺧﺒﲑ ﻣﺎﱄ (ﺗﻮﻗﻴﻊ) ﺑﺎﺑﺎﺗﻮﻧﺪﻩ ﺗﺎﻳﻮﻭ ﺧﺒﲑ ﰲ ﺍﳉﻤﺎﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﺤﺔ (ﺗﻮﻗﻴﻊ) ﻛﺮﻳﺴﺘﻴﻞ ﻳﻮﻧﺲ ﺧﺒﲑﺓ ﰲ ﺍﻟﺸﺆﻭﻥ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ 12-37638 2 S/2012/544 ﺗﻘﺮﻳـــﺮ ﻓﺮﻳـــﻖ ﺍﻟﺮﺻـــﺪ ﺍﳌﻌـــﲏ ﺑﺎﻟـــﺼﻮﻣﺎﻝ ﻭﺇﺭﻳﺘﺮﻳـــﺎ ﻋﻤـــﻼ ﺑﻘـــﺮﺍﺭ ﳎﻠـــﺲ ﺍﻷﻣـــﻦ ٢٠٠٢ (٢٠١١) ﺍﶈﺘﻮﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺼﻔﺤﺔ ﻣﻮﺟﺰ. ٦ ﺃﻭﻻ - ﻣﻘﺪﻣﺔ . ١١ ﺃﻟﻒ - ﺍﻟﻮﻻﻳﺔ . ١١ ﺑــﺎﺀ - ﺍﳌﻨﻬﺠﻴﺔ. ١١ ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺎ - ﺍﻷﻋﻤﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﱵ ﻬﺗﺪﺩ ﺍﻟﺴﻼﻡ ﻭﺍﻷﻣﻦ ﻭﺍﻻﺳﺘﻘﺮﺍﺭ ﰲ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﻣﺎﻝ . ١٣ ﺃﻟﻒ - ﺳﻮﺀ ﺍﻹﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﳌﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻔﺴﺎﺩ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻘﻄﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ. ١٤ ﺑــﺎﺀ - ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺸﺒﺎﺏ ﺍﺠﻤﻟﺎﻫﺪﻳﻦ. ١٧ ﻴﻢﺟ - ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺸﺒﺎﺏ ﻛﻤﺼﺪﺭ ﻬﺗﺪﻳﺪ ﺇﻗﻠﻴﻤﻲ ﻭﺩﻭﱄ. ١٩ ﺩﺍﻝ - ﺍﻟﻘﺮﺻﻨﺔ ﻭﺍﻻﺧﺘﻄﺎﻑ ﻣﻦ ﺃﺟﻞ ﺍﳊﺼﻮﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻓﺪﻳﺔ . ٢٠ ﺛﺎﻟﺜﺎ - ﺍﻧﺘﻬﺎﻛﺎﺕ ﺍﳊﻈﺮ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻭﺍﻟﻜﺎﻣﻞ ﻟﺘﻮﺭﻳﺪ ﺍﻷﺳﻠﺤﺔ . ٢٥ ﺃﻟﻒ - ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﺍﻷﺟﻨﺒﻴﺔ ﰲ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﻣﺎﻝ. ٢٥ ﺑــﺎﺀ - ﺷﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﺍﻷﻣﻦ ﺍﳋﺎﺻﺔ. ٢٦ ﻴﻢ ﺟ - ﺷﺮﻛﺎﺕ ﺍﻷﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺮﻱ ﺍﳋﺎﺻﺔ/ﻣﺴﺘﻮﺩﻋﺎﺕ ﺃﺳﻠﺤﺔ ﻋﺎﺋﻤﺔ. ٣٠ ﺩﺍﻝ - ﻋﺪﻡ ﺍﻻﻣﺘﺜﺎﻝ . ٣١ ﺭﺍﺑﻌﺎ - ﻋﺮﻗﻠﺔ ﺇﻳﺼﺎﻝ ﺍﳌﺴﺎﻋﺪﺍﺕ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ . ٣١ ﺃﻟﻒﻣ - ﻨﻊ ﻭﺻﻮﻝ ﺍﳌﺴﺎﻋﺪﺍﺕ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ . ٣٢ ﺑــﺎﺀ - ﲢﻮﻳﻞ ﻭﺟﻬﺔ ﺍﳌﺴﺎﻋﺪﺍﺕ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻭﺇﺳﺎﺀﺓ ﺍﻟﺘﺼﺮﻑ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ. ٣٣ ﻴﻢﺟ - ﺃﻓﻀﻞ ﺍﳌﻤﺎﺭﺳﺎﺕ . ٣٤ ﺧﺎﻣﺴﺎ - ﺍﻧﺘﻬﺎﻛﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﱐ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﱄ . ٣٥ 3 12-37638 S/2012/544 ﺃﻟﻒ - ﺍﳍﺠﻤﺎﺕ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﳌﺪﻧﻴﲔ. ٣٦ ﺑﺍــﺎﺀ - ﺍﻟﻌﻨﻒ ﳉﻨﺴﺎﱐ . ٣٦ ﺟﻴﻢ - ﺍﳉﻨﻮﺩ ﺍﻷﻃﻔﺎﻝ. ٣٧ ﺩﺍﻝ - ﺍﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﺪ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎﺯ ﺍﻟﻘﺴﺮﻱ. ٣٨ ﺳﺎﺩﺳﺎ - ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﺍﳌﻮﺣﺪﺓ. ٣٩ ﺳﺎﺑﻌﺎ - ﺗﻌﺎﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻝ ﻣﻊ ﻓﺮﻳﻖ ﺍﻟﺮﺻﺪ . ٤٠ ﺛﺎﻣﻨﺎ - ﺍﻟﺘﻮﺻـﻴﺎﺕ . ٤٠ ﺃﻟﻒ - ﺍﳌﺨﺎﻃﺮ ﺍﻟﱵ ﻬﺗﺪﺩ ﺍﻟﺴﻠﻢ ﻭﺍﻷﻣﻦ . ٤٠ ﺑــﺎﺀ - ﺍﻟﻘﺮﺻﻨﺔ. ٤٠ ﺟﻴﻢ - ﺍﻧﺘﻬﺎﻛﺎﺕ ﺣﻈﺮ ﺗﻮﺭﻳﺪ ﺍﻷﺳﻠﺤﺔ . ٤١ ﺩﺍﻝ - ﻋﺮﻗﻠﺔ ﺍﳌﺴﺎﻋﺪﺓ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ. ٤٢ ﻫﺎﺀ - ﺍﻧﺘﻬﺎﻛﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻥ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﱐ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﱄ . ٤٢ ﺍﳌﺮﻓﻘﺎﺕ* * ﺗﻌﻤﻢ ﺍﳌﺮﻓﻘﺎﺕ ﺑﺎﻟﻠﻐﺔ ﺍﻟﱵ ﻗﺪﻣﺖ ﻬﺑﺎ ﻓﻘﻂ. 12-37638 4 S/2012/544 Annexes Somalia 1. Misappropriation of financial resources ............................................ 44 1.1. Public sector financial mismanagement and corruption............................ 45 1.2. Passport production, corruption and fraud ...................................... 69 1.3. Currency printing .......................................................... 145 2. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin ............................................... 156 2.1. Al-Shabaab Charcoal Exports in 2011-2012..................................... 157 2.2. Al-Shabaab activities, tactics, techniques and procedures in 2011-2012 .............. 172 2.3. Al-Shabaab Northeast Somalia (ASNE) ........................................ 181 3. Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat .................................... 185 3.1. Muslim Youth Centre (Al Hijra)** ............................................ 186 3.2. Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC), United Republic of Tanzania................ 187 4. Piracy and kidnap for ransom..................................................... 204 4.1. Piracy overview: trends, judicial challenges and impunity ......................... 205 4.2. Kidnap for Ransom ......................................................... 222 4.3. Indian Ocean Network** .................................................... 227 4.4. Movement of piracy proceeds offshore** ....................................... 228 5. Violations of the general and complete arms embargo................................. 229 5.1. Violations of the arms embargo by air and related incidents........................ 230 5.2. Foreign Military Operations in Somalia ........................................ 234 5.3. Private Security Companies and Organizations .................................. 245 5.4. Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) and Floating Armouries ............. 288 5.5 Non-compliant States and Organizations ....................................... 292 6. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance ............................................. 305 6.1. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance and attacks on aid workers August 2011 to May 2012 ................................................... 306 6.2. “Gatekeepers” and other forms of diversion of humanitarian assistance .............. 320 7. Violations of international humanitarian law ........................................ 329 7.1. Attacks on civilians*** ..................................................... 330 7.2. Gender-based violence ...................................................... 331 7.3. Recruitment and use of child soldiers .......................................... 335 7.4. Forced displacement, confinement and returns*** ............................... 337 8. State Cooperation with the Monitoring Group ....................................... 338 * The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only. ** The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential. *** The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is confidential. 5 12-37638 S/2012/544 ﻣﻮﺟﺰ ﻣــــــﻦ ﺍﳌﻘــــــﺮﺭ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻨﺘــــــﻬﻲ ﻓﺘــــــﺮﺓ ﻭﻻﻳــــــﺔ ﺍﳌﺆﺳــــــﺴﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﲢﺎﺩﻳــــــﺔ ﺍﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴــــــﺔ ﰲ ﺁﺏ/ﺃﻏــﺴﻄﺲ ٢٠١٢. ﺇﻻ ﺃﻥ ﻣــﺎ ﻳﻬــﺪﺩ ﻧﻘــﻞ ﺍﻟــﺴﻠﻄﺔ ﺇﱃ ﻫﻴﺌــﺔ ﻭﻃﻨﻴــﺔ ﺷــﺮﻋﻴﺔ ﺫﺍﺕ ﻗﺎﻋــﺪﺓ ﻋﺮﻳــﻀﺔ ﺃﻛﺜــﺮ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻴــﺔ، ﺍﳉﻬــﻮﺩ ﺍﻟــﱵ ﺗﺒــﺬﳍﺎ ﳐﺘﻠــﻒ ﺍﻟﺰﻋﻤــﺎﺀ ﺍﻟــﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﲔ ﺍﻟــﺼﻮﻣﺎﻟﻴﲔ ﻭﺃﻧــﺼﺎﺭﻫﻢ ﳋﻄﻒ ﺃﻭ ﺇﺧﺮﺍﺝ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺍﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴ ﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻣﺴﺎﺭﻫﺎ - ﻭﺳﻴﺘﻤﺨﺾ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻋﻦ ﺗﺄﺟﻴﺞ ﺍﺳﺘﻤﺮﺍﺭ ﻋـﺪﻡ ﺍﻻﺳﺘﻘﺮﺍﺭ ﻭﺍﻟﱰﺍﻉ، ﻭﺇﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﺇﺣﻴﺎﺀ ﺣﻈﻮﻅ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺸﺒﺎﺏ ﺍﳌﻘﺎﺗﻠﺔ. ﻭﰲ ﺣﲔ ﻳﺸﻜﻞ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺴﻠﻮﻙ ”ﺍﳌﻔﺴﺪ“ ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺎ ﺗﻌﺒﲑﺍ ﻋـﻦ ﻣﻨﺎﻓـﺴﺔ ﺳﻴﺎﺳـﻴﺔ ﻣـﺸﺮﻭﻋﺔ، ﻓﺈﻧــﻪ ﻳ ـ ـ ﻨُ ﻢّ ﺃﻳــﻀﺎ ﻋــﻦ ﺍﻟﻔــﺴﺎﺩ ﺍﳌﺴﺘــﺸﺮﻱ ﺩﺍﺧــﻞ ﺍﳌﺆﺳــﺴﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﲢﺎﺩﻳــﺔ ﺍﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴــﺔ . ﻓﻤﻨــﺬ ﺍﻬﻧﻴــﺎﺭ ﺍﳊﻜﻮﻣـــﺔ ﺍﻟـــﺼﻮﻣﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﰲ ﻋـــﺎﻡ ١٩٩١، ﺍﳔﺮﻃـــﺖ ﺃﺟﻴـــﺎﻝ ﻣﺘﻌﺎﻗﺒـــﺔ ﻣـــﻦ ﺍﻟﻘـــﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟـــﺼﻮﻣﺎﻟﻴﲔ ﰲ ﳑﺎﺭﺳــﺎﺕ ﺳﻴﺎﺳــﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻗﺘــﺼﺎﺩﻳﺔ ﺿــﺎﺭﺓ ﺃﺩﺕ ﺇﱃ ﺗﻔــﺎﻗﻢ ﺍﻟــﱰﺍﻉ ﻭﺳــﺎﻋﺪﺕ ﻋﻠــﻰ ﺇﻋﺎﻗــﺔ ﺍﺳــﺘﺘﺒﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﺴﻠﻢ ﻭﺍﻷﻣﻦ ﰲ ﺍﻟﺒﻠﺪ . ﻓﻔﻲ ﻇﻞ ﺍﳌﺆﺳـﺴﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﲢﺎﺩﻳـﺔ ﺍﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴـﺔ، ﺃﺻـﺒﺢ ﺍﻻﺧـﺘﻼﺱ ﻭﺍﻻﺣﺘﻴـﺎﻝ ﺍﳌﻨـــﺘﻈﻤﲔ ﻭﺍﻟـــﺴﺮﻗﺔ ﺍﻟـــﺼﺮﳛﺔ ﻟﻠﻤـــﻮﺍﺭﺩ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣـــﺔ ﺃﺳﺎﺳـــﺎ ﻟﻨﻈـــﺎﻡ ﺍﳊﻜـــﻢ، ﻭﲡـــﺴﺪﺕ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻌﺒـــﺎﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﻣﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺸﻌﺒﻴﺔ ’?Maxaa igu jiraa‘ ”( ﻣﺎﺫﺍ ﳝﻜﻨﲏ ﺃﻥ ﺃﻏﻨﻢ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﺍ؟“). ﻭﻛﺸﻒ ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺮ ﺻﺪﺭ ﰲ ﺃﻳـﺎﺭ /ﻣـﺎﻳﻮ ٢٠١٢ ﺑﺘﻜﻠﻴـﻒ ﻣـﻦ ﺍﻟﺒﻨـﻚ ﺍﻟـﺪﻭﱄ ﻋـﻦ ﺃﻥ ﻫﻨـﺎﻙ ﻣﺒﻠﻐــﺎ ﻗــﺪﺭﻩ ١٣١ ﻣﻠﻴــﻮﻥ ﺩﻭﻻﺭ ﺃﻣﺮﻳﻜــﻲ ﰲ ﺇﻳــﺮﺍﺩﺍﺕ ﺍﳊﻜﻮﻣــﺔ ﺍﻻﲢﺎﺩﻳــﺔ ﺍﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴــﺔ ﻣﻔﻘــﻮﺩ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻔﺘــﺮﺓ ٢٠٠٩-٢٠١٠: ٧٩ ﰲ ﺍﳌﺎﺋــﺔ ﻣــﻦ ﳎﻤــﻮﻉ ﺍﻹﻳــﺮﺍﺩﺍﺕ ﺍﳌــﺴﺠﻠﺔ ﻟﺘﻠــﻚ ﺍﻟﻔﺘــﺮﺓ . ﻭﺗــﺸﲑ ﺍﻟﺘﺤﻘﻴﻘﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﱵ ﺃﺟﺮﺍﻫﺎ ﻓﺮﻳﻖ ﺍﻟﺮﺻﺪ ﺃﻥ ﺣﺠﻢ ﺍﻟﻔﺴﺎﺩ ﺍﳊﻘﻴﻘﻲ ﺭﲟﺎ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺃﻋﻠﻰ ﻣـﻦ ﺫﻟـﻚ، ﻷﻧـﻪ ﻻ ﳚـــﺮﻱ ﺗـــﺴﺠﻴﻞ ﻣﻼﻳـــﲔ ﺍﻟـــﺪﻭﻻﺭﺍﺕ ﻣـــﻦ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﺋـــﺪﺍﺕ . ﻭﺑﻌﺒـــﺎﺭﺓ ﺃﺧـــﺮﻯ، ﻓﻤـــﻦ ﺃﺻـــ ﻞ ﻛـــﻞ ١٠ ﺩﻭﻻﺭﺍﺕ ﺃﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴــــﺔ ﺗﻠﻘﺘــــﻬﺎ ﺍﳊﻜﻮﻣــــﺔ ﺍﻻﲢﺎﺩﻳــــﺔ ﺍﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴــــﺔ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻔﺘــــﺮﺓ ٢٠٠٩-٢٠١٠، ﱂ ﻳــﺪﺧﻞ ﺇﱃ ﺧﺰﻳﻨــﺔ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟــﺔ ﺇﻻ ٨ ﺩﻭﻻﺭﺍﺕ ﺃﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴــﺔ. ﻭﰲ ﻋــﺎﻡ ٢٠١١، ﺍﺳــﺘﺄﺛﺮﺕ ﻣﻜﺎﺗــﺐ ﻛﺒﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ - ﺭﺋﻴﺲ ﺍﳉﻤﻬﻮﺭﻳﺔ، ﻭﺭﺋﻴﺲ ﳎﻠﺲ ﺍﻟﻮﺯﺭﺍﺀ، ﻭﺭﺋـﻴﺲ ﺍﻟﱪﳌـﺎﻥ، ﺑﺮﺑـﻊ ﺇﲨـﺎﱄ ﺇﻧﻔﺎﻕ ﺍﳊﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﺍﻻﲢﺎﺩﻳﺔ ﺍﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴﺔ (ﺃﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ ١٢ ﻣﻠﻴﻮﻥ ﺩﻭﻻﺭ ﺃﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ)، ﺍﻟﱵ ﲤﺜـﻞ ﳓـﻮ ﻧـﺼﻒ ﺩﺧﻞ ﺍﳊﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﺍﻻﲢﺎﺩﻳﺔ ﺍﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﺍﶈﻠﻲ ﻭﻣﺎ ﺗﻨﻔﻘﻪ ﺍﳊﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺒﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻷﻣﻦ ﰲ ﻓﺘﺮﺓ ﺍﻟﱰﺍﻉ. ﻭﳚــﺪ ﻗــﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﳊﻜﻮﻣــﺔ ﺍﻻﲢﺎﺩﻳــﺔ ﺍﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴــﺔ ﻛــﺬﻟﻚ ﺳــﺒﻼ ﺃﺧــﺮﻯ ﻟﺘﺤﻘﻴــﻖ ﻣﻨﻔﻌــﺔ ﻣــﻦ ﻣﻨﺎﺻﺒﻬﻢ ﺍﻟﺮﲰﻴﺔ . ﻭﻗﺪ ﻋﻠﻢ ﻓﺮﻳﻖ ﺍﻟﺮﺻﺪ ﺃﻥ ﺇﻋﺪﺍﺩ ﻭﺇﺻﺪﺍﺭ ﺟﻮﺍﺯﺍﺕ ﺍﻟـﺴﻔﺮ ﺍﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴـﺔ ﲤـﻨﺢ ﺳِـﺮﺍ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺮﺑﲔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳊﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﺍﻻﲢﺎﺩﻳـﺔ ﺍﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴـﺔ، ﳑـﺎ ﺃﺩﻯ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻧﺘـﺸﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻔـﺴﺎﺩ ﻭﺍﻻﺣﺘﻴـﺎﻝ ﻋﻠـﻰ ﻧﻄـﺎﻕ ﻭﺍﺳــﻊ ﻣﻨــﺬ ﻋــﺎﻡ ٢٠٠٧. ﻭﰲ ﺍﻟﻔﺘــﺮﺓ ٢٠١٠-٢٠١١ ﻭﺣــﺪﻫﺎ، ﻓﹸﻘــﺪ ﻣــﺎ ﻳﻘــﺎﺭﺏ ١,٥ﻣﻠﻴـ ـﻮﻥ ﺩﻭﻻﺭ ﺃﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﺩﺍﺕ ﺟﻮﺍﺯ ﺍﻟﺴﻔﺮ. 12-37638 6 S/2012/544 ﻭﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣـﻦ ﺃﻭﺟـﻪ ﺍﻟﻘـﺼﻮﺭ ﺍﻟـﱵ ﺗﻌﺘـﺮﻱ ﺍﳌﺆﺳـﺴﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﲢﺎﺩﻳـﺔ ﺍﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴـﺔ، ﹸﺻـﻴﺒﺖﺃ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺸﺒﺎﺏ ﺑﺎﻧﺘﻜﺎﺳـﺎﺕ ﻛـﺒﲑﺓ ﺧـﻼﻝ ﺍﻟـﺴﻨﺔ ﺍﳌﺎﺿـﻴﺔ، ﺇﺫ ﻣﻨﻴـﺖ ﻬﺑـﺰﺍﺋﻢ ﻋـﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ، ﻭﻓﻘـﺪﺕ ﺃﺭﺍﺽ، ﻭﺗﺂﻛﻠﺖ ﻗﺎﻋﺪﺓ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﺩﺍﻬﺗـﺎ - ﻭﻫـﻲ ﺍﻧﺘﻜﺎﺳـﺎﺕ ﺃﺩﺕ ﺇﱃ ﺗﻔـﺎﻗﻢ ﺍﳋﻼﻓـﺎﺕ ﺩﺍﺧـﻞ ﺍﻟﻘﻴـﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻴﺎ ﻟﻠﺤﺮﻛﺔ، ﻭﺭﲟﺎ ﺩﻓﻌﺘﻬﺎ ﺇﱃ ﺣﺎﻓﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﻄﻴﻌـﺔ . ﻭﻗـﺪ ﺃﺣـﺮﺯﺕ ﻗـﻮﺍﺕ ﻋـﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﺃﺟﻨﺒﻴـﺔ ﺑـﺼﻮﺭﺓ ﺭﺋﻴـــﺴﻴﺔ ﳒﺎﺣـــﺎﺕ ﻋـــﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﺃﺧـــﲑﺓ ﺿـــﺪ ﺣﺮﻛـــﺔ ﺍﻟـــﺸﺒﺎﺏ، ﻟﻜـــﻦ ﺍﻻﺳـــﺘﺜﻤﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻴـــﺔ ﰲ ﻣﺆﺳﺴﺎﺕ ﻗﻄـﺎﻉ ﺍﻷﻣـﻦ ﰲ ﺍﻟـﺼﻮﻣﺎﻝ - ﻻ ﺳـﻴﻤﺎ ﻗـﻮﺓ ﺍﻷﻣـﻦ ﺍﻟـﻮﻃﲏ ﺍﻟـﺼﻮﻣﺎﻟﻴﺔ، ﺑـﺪﺃﺕ ﲢﻘـﻖ ﺃﻳــﻀﺎ ﻧﺘــﺎﺋﺞ ﻋﻠــﻰ ﺃﺭﺽ ﺍﳌﻌﺮﻛــﺔ . ﻭﺳــﻴﻮﺟﻪ ﺗﻨﻔﻴــﺬ ﺣﻈــﺮ ﺍﻷﻣــ ﻢ ﺍﳌﺘﺤــﺪﺓ ﻋﻠــﻰ ﺍﺳــﺘﲑﺍﺩ ﺍﻟﻔﺤــﻢ ﺍﻟــﺼﻮﻣﺎﱄ ﺿــﺮﺑﺔ ﻫﺎﻣــﺔ ﺃﺧــﺮﻯ ﻟﺘــﺪﻓﻖ ﺍﻹﻳــﺮﺍﺩﺍﺕ ﺇﱃ ﺣﺮﻛــﺔ ﺍﻟــﺸﺒﺎﺏ، ﳑــﺎ ﺳــﻴﺰﻳﺪ ﻣــﻦ ﺗﻘــﻮﻳﺾ ﲤﺎﺳــﻜﻬﺎ ﻭﻗــﺪﺭﻬﺗﺎ ﻋﻠــﻰ ﺍﳌــﺸﺎﺭﻛﺔ ﰲ ﺍﻟﱰﺍﻋــﺎﺕ ﺍﳌــﺴﻠﺤﺔ . ﻟﻜــﻦ ﺍﳌــﺴﺘﻮﺭﺩﻳﻦ ﺍﻟﺮﺋﻴــﺴﻴﲔ ﻟﻠﻔﺤــﻢ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﻣﺎﱄ، ﻻ ﺳﻴﻤﺎ ﺍﻹﻣﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ ﺍﳌﺘﺤﺪﺓ ﻭﺍﳌﻤﻠﻜﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﻌﻮﺩﻳﺔ ﱂ ﻳﻔﻮﺍ ﺑـﺎﻟﺘﺰﺍﻣﻬﻢ ﺣـﱴ ﺍﻵﻥ ﺑﺘﻄﺒﻴﻖ ﺍﳊﻈﺮ ﺍﳌﻔﺮﻭﺽ ﲟﻮﺟﺐ ﻗﺮﺍﺭ ﳎﻠﺲ ﺍﻷﻣﻦ ٢٠٣٦ (٢٠١٢). ﻭﻻ ﺗــﺰﺍﻝ ﺣﺮﻛــﺔ ﺍﻟــﺸﺒﺎﺏ ﺗــﺸﻜﻞ ﻬﺗﺪﻳــﺪﺍ ﺧﻄــﲑﺍ ﻟﻠــﺴﻠﻢ ﻭﺍﻷﻣــﻦ ﻭﺍﻻﺳــﺘﻘﺮﺍﺭ، ﻻ ﰲ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﻣﺎﻝ ﻓﺤﺴﺐ، ﺑﻞ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺴﺎﺣﺔ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻊ ﻧﻄﺎﻗﺎ . ﻓﻔﻲ ﺷﺒﺎﻁ /ﻓﱪﺍﻳـﺮ ٢٠١٢، ﺃﻋﻠﻨﺖ ﺍﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﺍﻧﺪﻣﺎﺟﻬﺎ ﻣـﻊ ﺗ ﻨﻈـﻴﻢ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻋـﺪﺓ ﻭﺗﻌﻤـﻞ ﻋﻠـﻰ ﺗﻌﺰﻳـﺰ ﺻـﻼﻬﺗﺎ ﺑﻨـﺸﺎﻁ ﻣـﻊ ﲨﺎﻋـﺎﺕ ﻣﺘﻄﺮﻓﺔ ﺃﺟﻨﺒﻴﺔ ﺃﺧﺮﻯ، ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﺮﻛﺰ ﺍﻟﺸﺒﺎﺏ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻢ ﰲ ﻛﻴﻨﻴﺎ، ﻭﻣﺮﻛﺰ ﺃﻧـﺼﺎﺭ ﺍﻟـﺸﺒﺎﺏ ﺍﳌـﺴﻠﻢ ﰲ ﺗﱰﺍﻧﻴﺎ ﻭﺗﻨﻈﻴﻢ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻋﺪﺓ ﰲ ﺷﺒﻪ ﺍﳉﺰﻳﺮﺓ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ (ﺍﻟﻴﻤﻦ). ﻭﺗﻜﺸﻒ ﺍﻟﺘﺤﻘﻴﻘﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﱵ ﺃﺟﺮﺍﻫـﺎ ﻓﺮﻳـﻖ ﺍﻟﺮﺻﺪ ﺃﻥ ﻣﺮﻛﺰ ﺍﻟﺸﺒﺎﺏ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻢ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻳﺴﻌﻰ ﻻﺳﺘﺨﺪﺍﻡ ﻣﻼﺫﺍﺗﻪ ﰲ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﻣﺎﻝ
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  • Country of Origin Information Report Somalia July 2008
    COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT SOMALIA 30 JULY 2008 UK BORDER AGENCY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION SERVICE 30 JULY 2008 SOMALIA Contents Preface LATEST NEWS EVENTS IN SOMALIA, FROM 4 JULY 2008 TO 30 JULY 2008 REPORTS ON SOMALIA PUBLISHED OR ACCESSED SINCE 4 JULY 2008 Paragraphs Background Information GEOGRAPHY ............................................................................................. 1.01 Maps .............................................................................................. 1.04 ECONOMY ................................................................................................. 2.01 Currency change, 2008 ................................................................ 2.06 Drought and famine, 2008 ........................................................... 2.10 Telecommunications.................................................................... 2.14 HISTORY ................................................................................................... 3.01 Collapse of central government and civil war ........................... 3.01 Peace initiatives 2000-2006 ......................................................... 3.14 ‘South West State of Somalia’ (Bay and Bakool) ...................... 3.19 ‘Puntland’ Regional Administration............................................ 3.20 The ‘Republic of Somaliland’ ...................................................... 3.21 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................... 4.01 CONSTITUTION .........................................................................................
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  • Security Council Distr.: General 3 March 2014
    United Nations S/2014/140 Security Council Distr.: General 3 March 2014 Original: English Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia I. Introduction 1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 2102 (2013), in which the Council requested me to keep it regularly informed of the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and to provide an assessment of the political and security implications of wider United Nations deployments across Somalia every 90 days. The present report covers major developments that occurred during the period from 16 November 2013 to 15 February 2014. II. Political and security developments A. Political situation 2. The political landscape in Somalia was dominated by the formation of a new cabinet, with regional political processes showing promising signs. Indirect elections in Puntland State of Somalia led to the selection of a new President. In addition, the inauguration of the Interim Juba Administration, witnessed by the international community, and the holding of talks between the Federal Government of Somalia and “Somaliland” were positive steps forward. 3. On 2 December 2013, Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon lost a no confidence motion in the Somali Federal Parliament. On 12 December, following extensive consultations, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud nominated Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed as the new Prime Minister. He was endorsed by the Parliament on 21 December, and on 17 January, Mr. Ahmed announced the formation of his expanded cabinet composed of 25 members, including 2 women. 4. Elsewhere, on 8 January, the Parliament of Puntland elected Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas President for a five-year term.
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  • Report of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group
    ADVANCED COPY – CONFIDENTIAL Letter dated 27 June 2012 from the members of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea We have the honour to transmit herewith the report focusing on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea in accordance with paragraph 6 (m) of Security Council resolution 2002 (2011). (Signed) Matt Bryden Coordinator Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (Signed) Emmanuel Deisser Arms Expert (Signed) Aurélien Llorca Aviation Expert (Signed) Jörg Roofthooft Maritime Expert (Signed) Ghassan Schbley Finance Expert (Signed) Babatunde Taiwo Armed Groups Expert (Signed) Kristele Younes Humanitarian Expert ADVANCED COPY - CONFIDENTIAL 2 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011) Contents Page Abbreviations 5 Summary 6 I. Introduction 9 A. Mandate 9 B. Methodology 9 II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia 11 A. Public sector financial mismanagement and corruption 11 B. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin 14 C. Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat 15 D. Piracy and kidnap for ransom (KFR) 16 III. Violations of the general and complete arms embargo 19 A. Foreign military operations in Somalia 20 B. Private Security Companies (PSCs) 21 C. Private Maritime Security Companies/ Floating Armouries 24 D. Non-compliance 24 IV. Obstruction of Humanitarian Assistance 25 A. Denial of access 25 B. Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance 26 C. Best practices 27 V. Violations of International Humanitarian Law 27 A. Attacks on civilians 28 B.
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  • Somalia: the Transitional Government on Life Support
    SOMALIA: THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT ON LIFE SUPPORT Africa Report N°170 – 21 February 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. STRUCTURAL AND OTHER FACTORS OF INSTABILITY .................................. 2 A. THE FIXATION ON CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ................................................................................. 2 B. A LARGE AND UNWIELDY GOVERNMENT .................................................................................... 2 1. Cabinet ......................................................................................................................................... 3 2. Parliament and the rivalry of the two Sharifs .............................................................................. 4 C. REFUSAL TO SHARE POWER ......................................................................................................... 5 1. Failure to reach out ...................................................................................................................... 5 2. Reluctance to federalise ............................................................................................................... 6 3. Local administrations going their own way ................................................................................. 7 D. A DIVIDED EXECUTIVE ...............................................................................................................
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  • European Union Training Mission Somalia
    European Union Training Mission Somalia PRESS SUMMARY 4th August 2018 “In ‘Media’ stat virtus” EUTM - SOMALIA 04/08/2018 SUMMARY TITLE PAGE US military airstrike in Somalia kills 4 l Shabab fighters 2 ISIL claims killing of 3 soldiers near Mogadishu 3 MPs call off meeting over security fears 4 Federal Council of Ministers Holds Meeting With Puntland 5 Counterparts Race To Fill Top Post Of CBS At The Corner As Governor Bashir’s First 6 Term Ends In Somalia, Schools Are a Bulwark Against Recruitment: Study 7 Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia to carry out polio vaccination exercise 9 concurrently African Union Works to Tackle Corruption in Africa 10 So, why is Somaliland Africa's most successful non-country? 13 Battle Of The Ports: Emirates Sea Power Spreads From Persian Gulf 16 To Africa EUTM - SOMALIA 1 EUTM - SOMALIA 04/08/2018 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-6023295/US-military-airstrike-Somalia-kills-4- al-Shabab-fighters.html EUTM - SOMALIA 2 EUTM - SOMALIA 04/08/2018 ISIL claims killing of 3 soldiers near Mogadishu 3rd August 2018 MOGADISHU, Somalia – The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS) group has claimed to have shot and killed at least 3 government soldiers near Somali capital Mogadishu. In an online statement by the group says its fighters shot dead 3 soldiers late on Thursday at Elasha area, some 15km west of Mogadishu. The group’s attackers fled from the crime scene as security forces reached at spot and launched an operation. No arrests were made over the operation, according to local residents.
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  • Somalia Risk Assessment 2014 INSCT MIDDLE EAST and NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE
    INSCT MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM Somalia Risk Assessment 2014 INSCT MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report, developed from open-source information including congressional and federal reports, academic articles, news media accounts, and NGO papers— concerns one of the most developmentally deficient and war-torn countries in the world. The name “Somalia” and the phrase “failed state” unfortunately have become synonymous. Since the 1991 overthrow of dictator Said Barre and the resulting civil war, successive incarnations of a Somali government have time and again attempted to rise above the seemingly perpetual instability and begin exerting state control. Since 2012, when an internationally supported government was installed in Mogadishu (the US recognized the government in January 2013), Somalia has taken baby steps toward restoring stability and security in parts of the country. The presence of forces from neighboring counties, such as Kenya and Ethiopia (as part of an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)), has brought a measure of stability to regions in the country’s south that were until recently controlled by non-state militias, FIGURE 1: Map of Somalia and Region (University of Texas). mainly the militant Islamic organization and Al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Shabaab. But despite recent AMISOM battlefield gains and encouraging signs of increasing government capacity, the central government still controls only a portion of Mogadishu and almost no other territory in the rest of the country. And even these gains are precarious. This report will examine four topics that provide a cross-section of national security issues in Somalia: ! Defense Capabilities—Including Somalia’s attempts to re-build its national military, partnerships with friendly and donor nations, and the US military posture in East Africa.
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  • AMISOM Magazine Issue 13
    www.amisom-au.org Issue 13 Aug - Dec 2013 AMISOM Expands AU Welcomes Increase in Troops Celebrating 50 Years of African Unity Contents 2 SRCC Message 4 News Roundup Message 7 Expansion of AMISOM: Just the First Step from 8 The Mogadishu Florist: Replacing Fear With Flowers the 10 AMAN Radio: Empowering the Women of Somalia Editorial by SpecialSRCC Representative, Ambassador Mahamat Saleh Annadif 12 Kismayo Field Marshall: 30 Years and Still Going Strong 14 Change of Guard: A Term Well Served elcome to the 13th edition of the in Europe and North America. The Somalia, and the Gender Office is helping WAMISOM Review. participation of the diaspora is critical to give voice to the voiceless victims of 16 Somalia’s Top Military Chief Declares Military Revival We have come to the end of yet to Somalia’s re-emergence and stability. such assaults. another momentous year for AMISOM Their remittances back home are not This issue also spotlights AMISOM’s and look forward to the beginning only Somalia’s largest source of both activities in the Hiiran region where the 18 A Thousand Words: AMISOM Engages the Diaspora of what is likely to be another year of hard currency and “foreign” direct Djiboutian contingent has been extremely progress in Somalia. In this issue, we assistance, but the returning members active, despite its limitations in terms 20 Enhancing AMISOM’s Image in TCCs and PCCs take a look at the UN Security Council of the diaspora also bring with them of numbers and equipment, not only in authorization in November of the much- needed skills in commerce and training members of the national security expansion of AMISOM’s strength by governance.
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  • Somalia: the Transitional Government on Life Support
    SOMALIA: THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT ON LIFE SUPPORT Africa Report N°170 – 21 February 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. STRUCTURAL AND OTHER FACTORS OF INSTABILITY .................................. 2 A. THE FIXATION ON CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ................................................................................. 2 B. A LARGE AND UNWIELDY GOVERNMENT .................................................................................... 2 1. Cabinet ......................................................................................................................................... 3 2. Parliament and the rivalry of the two Sharifs .............................................................................. 4 C. REFUSAL TO SHARE POWER ......................................................................................................... 5 1. Failure to reach out ...................................................................................................................... 5 2. Reluctance to federalise ............................................................................................................... 6 3. Local administrations going their own way ................................................................................. 7 D. A DIVIDED EXECUTIVE ...............................................................................................................
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  • Annual Report 2017 with Audited Financial
    Central Bank of Somalia CENTRAL BANK OF SOMALIA Annual report 2017 i CENTRAL BANK OF SOMALIA ANNUAL REPORT Central Bank of Somalia ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND STATISTICS DEPARTMENT 2017 i CENTRAL BANK OF SOMALIA ANNUAL REPORT Annual Report 2017 In the case of quotation, please refer to this publication as follow: - Central bank of Somalia (CBS) Annual report 2017: Mogadishu – Somalia To request a complimentary copy of this report, an electronic copy is available at www.centralbank.gov.so 55 Corso Somalia P. O. Box 11 Mogadishu, Somalia Phone: + (252) 1866131 + (252) 1866151 + (252) 1866152 Fax: +2521241152 Email: [email protected] Website: www.centralbank.gov.so ii CENTRAL BANK OF SOMALIA ANNUAL REPORT iii CENTRAL BANK OF SOMALIA ANNUAL REPORT iv CENTRAL BANK OF SOMALIA ANNUAL REPORT Mr. Bashir Isse Ali - Governor and Chairman Ms. Maryan Abdullahi Yusuf - Deputy Governor Mr. Abdirashid Mohamed Siraaji - Member Dr. Omar Ibrahim Hussein - Member s Board of Directors of s Board Mr. Maya Mohamed Shekhuna - Member CBS’ Mr. Yusuf Mohamed Ali - Member Ms. Hodan Said Isse - Member v CENTRAL BANK OF SOMALIA ANNUAL REPORT LIST OF ACRONYMS CPI Consumer Price Index RDNA Rapid Drought Needs Assessment FAO Food and Agriculture Organization AML/CFT Anti-money Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism CBS Central Bank of Somalia FGS Federal Government of Somalia GDP Gross Domestic Product UN United Nations UAE United Arab Emirates US United States of America IMF International Monetary Fund FMS Federal Member States UAE United Arab Emirates AFDB
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  • Somalia: the Transitional Government on Life Support
    SOMALIA: THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT ON LIFE SUPPORT Africa Report N°170 – 21 February 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. STRUCTURAL AND OTHER FACTORS OF INSTABILITY .................................. 2 A. THE FIXATION ON CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ................................................................................. 2 B. A LARGE AND UNWIELDY GOVERNMENT .................................................................................... 2 1. Cabinet ......................................................................................................................................... 3 2. Parliament and the rivalry of the two Sharifs .............................................................................. 4 C. REFUSAL TO SHARE POWER ......................................................................................................... 5 1. Failure to reach out ...................................................................................................................... 5 2. Reluctance to federalise ............................................................................................................... 6 3. Local administrations going their own way ................................................................................. 7 D. A DIVIDED EXECUTIVE ...............................................................................................................
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