Special Section: September 11, Background and Consequences for the Middle East
USAMA BIN LADIN AND AL-QA’IDA: ORIGINS AND DOCTRINES By Benjamin Orbach*
The September 11, 2001, attack on the United States made Usama bin Ladin and his al-Qa’ida group the center of a major global crisis. This research essay examines the evolution of al-Qa’ida’s doctrine as well as bin Ladin’s origins and experience. It discusses the development of this group’s ideology and strategy, showing how it switched from an emphasis on promoting revolution in Saudi Arabia to a priority on attacking the United States.
In his February 2001 testimony to the Senate who often ended up embroiled in shouting Intelligence Committee, CIA director George matches and fistfights with other young men Tenet called al-Qa’ida, “The most immediate over an attractive night-club dancer or and serious threat” to U.S. national security.(1) barmaid.”(4) Just seven months later, the horrific attacks of Bin Ladin embraced his present-day path September 11, 2001 demonstrated to the following the events of 1978 and 1979—the American public and to the world the threat Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of posed by al-Qa’ida and terrorist groups with a Afghanistan. These events, and especially the “global reach.” Yet many questions still Afghan issue, provided him with a purpose that remained regarding the background and he previously lacked in his life. Shortly after his ideology of the forces involved in these and graduation, bin Ladin relocated to Afghanistan previous attacks, as well as the basis of broader and supported the Afghani resistance to the support for the movement. Soviet invasion. He raised money, visited Bin Ladin’s personal history is integral to wounded soldiers, constructed roads and understanding his self-proclaimed mission and tunnels, and compensated the families of the creation of al-Qa’ida. He was born in 1957, martyrs. According to several accounts, bin the 17th of 52 children to one of the wealthiest Ladin fought in the successful battle of Ali construction contractors in Saudi Arabia. Khel, though his battlefield role has since been Today, the CIA estimates his family’s worth to mythologized into much larger dimensions. be $5 billion, of which bin Ladin can access For bin Ladin, the war in Afghanistan and roughly $300 million.(2) Neither of bin Ladin’s the triumph over a superpower there was a parents were Saudis—his father was from watershed moment in Islamic solidarity and a South Yemen and his mother was Syrian— personal turning point. He once said, “One day making him an outsider in a country obsessed in Afghanistan was like 1000 days of praying in with parentage.(3) an ordinary mosque.”(5) In Afghanistan, “The His childhood and status within Saudi myth of the superpower was withered in front society were further complicated by the death of the mujahideen cries of Allahu Akbar!”(6) of his father in 1968. Prior to completing his Gilles Kepel, an expert on contemporary Islam, studies in civil engineering at King Abdul Aziz characterized the mujahideen as “intoxicated by University in 1979, bin Ladin spent time in the Muslim victory in Afghanistan. They Beirut in the early 1970s living the lifestyle of a believed that it could be replicated elsewhere— playboy. He was reportedly a “heavy drinker that the whole world was ripe for jihad.”(7) Bin Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) 54 Benjamin Orbach
Ladin has since gushed that the Afghanistan Islamic holy places—presented bin Ladin and experience was so important that “it would others with the opportunity to reenact the exact have been impossible for me to gain such a situation in which they felt their jihad had benefit from any other chance.…This jihad was succeeded in Afghanistan. great.”(8) Bin Ladin’s links to his pre-Afghanistan past While the 1989 Soviet withdrawal left bin and outside of his revolutionary commitment Ladin with a triumphant feeling that anything were further reduced when Saudi Arabia was possible, it is likely that bin Ladin and revoked his citizenship in 1994, and he was others experienced a feeling of emptiness, too, stripped of some financial assets. Bin Ladin at the struggle’s end. There was no longer an was displaced once again in 1996. In response immediate enemy through which he could to U.S. pressure, Sudan expelled him from his define both himself and his view of Islam. Yet new home, despite that government’s self- he longed to continue the struggle and had been image as an Islamist regime, the economic convinced in Afghanistan that the mujahideen projects he had financed, and his establishment could succeed again. It is roughly at this time, and financing of training camps and at the end of the war in Afghanistan, that al- guesthouses for Islamic militants. Qa’ida was formed. From bin Ladin’s standpoint, these Bin Ladin returned from Afghanistan to rejections occurred in reaction to his attempts to Saudi Arabia as a hero. However, this status voice and apply the lessons that he had thought was short-lived as he vocally criticized the typified the proper practice of Islam, implying regime’s corruption and policies. When that the Saudi regime did not share this Saddam Husayn invaded Kuwait in 1990, commitment and that American behavior was a though, bin Ladin immediately offered to key factor in this failure to fulfill Islam. Bin protect Saudi Arabia from the Iraqi forces with Ladin returned to Afghanistan where he rebuilt his mujahideen. Bin Ladin saw the opportunity destroyed roads and was welcomed by the cash for a cause that could recapture the glory starved Taliban government. He cemented his achieved in Afghanistan—defending the holy relationship with the Taliban through building a mosques from invasion. personal relationship with Mullah Omar, the The royal rejection of his offer coupled with movement’s spiritual leader. the royal request for U.S. protection must have Political psychologist Dr. Jerrold Post been a stunning and embarrassing blow to his argues that people are drawn to political personal pride and vision of the world. After violence not purely from ideological all, it was bin Ladin’s view that the mujahideen considerations but also through personal and could defeat a great power and Muslims did not psychological factors, as an end in itself: need a superpower’s protection. This stance, of “Individuals become terrorists in order to join course, was based on a selective reading of the terrorist groups and commit acts of war in Afghanistan, where U.S. help was terrorism.”(9) This view also applies to bin critical to the mujahideen’s victory. Ladin and his colleagues. Fighting provides Shortly thereafter, bin Ladin’s criticism of them with an identity, a group that functions as the regime led to his expulsion from Saudi a community, a respected leadership position, Arabia and he fled to Sudan. His ties with his and a set of ideas providing a purpose to life. old life were further weakened when bin Mona Yacoubian, a former State Department Ladin’s family disavowed him. With the build- expert, called these young holy warriors, up of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, bin Ladin “Angry lost souls...[and] a mishmash of applied to the United States the Soviet-Afghan disgruntled people.”(10) analogy of an invading infidel to the Muslim For a poor, “disgruntled,” and culturally heartland. A new conflict—this one even more insulted young man, the appeal of killing in the inflammatory due to a perceived threat to the path of God, belonging to a great movement,
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) 55 Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida: Origins and Doctrines overcoming incredible odds to triumphantly loathing and a determination to punish the change history, and ensuring a future in system, which lured them off the proper path. paradise, are all tempting reasons to become a Having drunk alcohol, gone to strip clubs, and militant. By the same token, the “newcomer” played video games, some of the suicide status to being a pious Muslim make bin Ladin bombers apparently felt that militant action and some other radical Islamists less influenced would redeem them. by normative Islam as practiced for centuries. In the four-page letter attributed to Atta, They feel free to pick and choose among texts, point seven alludes to such a mindset. Atta interpreting their religion as they please, in a (allegedly) wrote, “The time for play is over manner quite different from many generations and the serious time is upon us. How much of respected Islamic clerics. For example, it is a time have we wasted in our lives?” For basic tenet of Islam that only trained clerics can militants like Atta, their relatively greater issue fatwas (decrees), but bin Ladin has not contact with the West—or at least Western hesitated to do so. lifestyles—makes them more likely to identify Such “lost souls” are also susceptible to such lures as dangerous tempters. Since these recruitment in militant groups perhaps partly factors have undermined their own commitment due to past personal failures. Ahmad Ressam, to Islam, they can more easily see the West as the Algerian who attempted to cross the U.S.- trying to undermine Islam in general. Canadian border before New Year’s 2000, was In the 1980s, thousands of militants traveled unable to hold a job, spent a good deal of time to Afghanistan, the “school for jihad” to fight watching Clint Eastwood movies, and “the communist infidel.”(14) Many of them did attempted to join the Algerian military security not know where Afghanistan was but were and police before becoming a holy warrior.(11) galvanized by a chance to find an outlet for Nizar Trabelsi, who intended to blow himself their anger at the conditions they lived under up along with the U.S. embassy in Paris, is a and a ticket out of their empty, routine divorced failed professional soccer player who existence. They could join a group of holy forfeited his career by not training hard enough. warriors, become a hero, fight, and die as a He became a petty criminal, cocaine addict, and martyr—a fate bringing honor to one’s family, heavy drinker before involving himself with forgiveness for one’s sins, and a desirable Islamic militants.(12) afterlife in paradise. One young warrior stated, Furthermore, as demonstrated by some “It’s not the main idea to be a shahid...but it’s perpetrators of the September 11 attacks, the part of my plan.”(15) Another such fighter, appeal of becoming a holy warrior is not just a Obeida Rahman from Yemen, who came from a product of poverty. Militants like Mohammad poor family with ten children, described the Atta come from a wealthier background. Atta, joys of training and fighting: “When you have a an Egyptian, became a radical while living and gun, you’re free. You feel as if you can do studying in Germany. Fouad Ajami, an expert anything.”(16) For their services, they were on Arab political thought, argues that Atta and paid not in money but by gaining honor, hope, others “were placed perilously close to camaraderie, and purpose. modernity, but they could not partake of it.”(13) THE DOCTRINE OF BIN LADIN AND The availability of opportunities that are AL-QA’IDA simultaneously highly attractive and forbidden Of course, bin Ladin’s background, the by their cultural background or identity could Afghanistan experience, and the motives behind create a rejection of Western values along with becoming a holy warrior cannot explain al- a questioning of familiar values at home. After Qa’ida alone without a consideration of the indulgence in what Iranian militants have called organization’s doctrine. Its central principle is Westoxification, individuals can engage in self- to expel the forces of unbelievers and heresy
56 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) Benjamin Orbach from the Middle East. Al-Qa’ida considers the betrayal of the Islamic people, bin Ladin United States and its allies, the region’s expects the royal family to be expelled from the "oppressive, corrupt, and tyrannical regimes," faith and to face a similar fate as that which to be heretics that wage war against Muslims befell the Shah of Iran. through murder, torture, and humiliation.(17) After long emphasizing the U.S. Most offensive to bin Ladin and his followers is presence in Saudi Arabia, bin Ladin moved to the U.S. "occupation of the land of the two other issues dealing with the U.S. attempt to Holy Places," Saudi Arabia.(18) destroy Islam. These included an opposition to The 1998 "fatwa" of al-Qa’ida and its UN sanctions against Iraq (which he blamed on allies, the "Declaration of the World Islamic the United States) as killing the Muslim Iraqi Front for Jihad against the Jews and the people and the assertion that the United States Crusaders," described the U.S. presence as a was supporting the Jews in an effort to "achieve catastrophe that had humiliating and full control over the Arab peninsula."(23) Bin debilitating effects on the Muslim people. Bin Ladin claimed the United States did not rest Laden wrote, "Since God laid down the after the "slaughter" of the Gulf War but instead Arabian peninsula, created its desert, and pushed for the "dismemberment and the surrounded it with its seas, no calamity has ever destruction...of what remains of this people and befallen it like these Crusader hosts that have to humiliate their Muslim neighbors."(24) spread in it like locusts, crowing its soil, eating These actions, according to bin Ladin, are its fruits, and destroying its verdure."(19) meant to divert attention from the Jewish A Western power has never occupied occupation of Jerusalem and the killing of the Hijaz in Muslim history. Traditionally, non- Muslims in Palestine.(25) In a 1996 interview, Muslims are not permitted to enter the Hijaz bin Ladin outlined American and Israeli crimes based on the Prophet’s deathbed statement, "Let against Islam from Iraq to Qana to Bosnia and there not be two religions in Arabia."(20) detailed the "killing [of] weaker men, women, Historian Bernard Lewis explained that the and children in the Muslim world."(26) To sanctity of the Hijaz is clear from the disparate further demonstrate America’s brutality, he difference between the fall of Jerusalem to the cited the use of atomic weapons on Hiroshima Crusaders in 1099 and Saladin’s attack on and Nagasaki in non-Muslim Japan at the end Reynald of Chatillon in 1182. In the case of of World War Two. Jerusalem, the Crusaders roused little interest in From bin Ladin’s perspective, these Damascus and Baghdad when they captured the attacks in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Palestine city. In contrast, when Reynald attacked meant a declaration of war on God and the Muslim caravans in the Hijaz, including those Prophet, making it Muslims’ duty to fight a of pilgrims to Mecca, his actions were holy war "to glorify the truth and to defend perceived as a "provocation" and a "challenge Muslim Land, especially the Arab directed against Islam’s holy places."(21) peninsula."(27) More recently, he has also Saladin responded by declaring jihad upon the elevated the plight of Muslims in Kashmir, East Crusaders. Timor, and other places such as the Sudan, More than eight hundred years later, bin Somalia, and Chechnya to his list of top Ladin applies the same principle and interprets grievances. Bin Ladin believes that all Muslims the U.S. presence as an equal provocation need to pool their resources, stand together, and requiring a similar solution. As retribution, bin fight against the threat to Islam, acting as a Ladin anticipated "a black future for America. unified nation that overcomes superficial, Instead of remaining [the] United States, it shall contrived national differences to fight against end up separated states and shall have to carry its common enemies. the bodies of its sons back to America."(22) In a sense, al-Qa’ida, an umbrella And in revenge for the Saudi regime’s alleged framework of groups committed to Jihad that
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) 57 Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida: Origins and Doctrines acts together in recruiting, training, and have all changed since 1992. In regard to al- planning of guerrilla actions, is a symbol of the Qa’ida’s target of criticism, bin Ladin started goal. Like bin Ladin’s vision for the future, al- his mission with a focus on the Saudi regime Qa’ida crosses national boundaries through a and its subservience to American forces. Since bridge of Islamic brotherhood and a hatred for then, his belligerency toward the United States the United States and its allies. While each has grown and his advocacy against the United group and even different cells have local States has become more prominent. At the same interests, they share a common enemy and a time, his proposed attack against the Saudi greater common goal. regime has become a less frequently stated This perceived clash of worlds allows priority. bin Ladin to adopt a romanticized vision about In his 1996 Declaration of War that was the battle of Islam against the West. This is issued after his expulsion from the Sudan, after clearly visible in his 1996 "Declaration of War offering praise to Allah, bin Ladin immediately Against the Americans Occupying the Land of launched into a global list of wrongs committed the Two Holy Places." In a section directly by the “Zionist-Crusaders alliance” against the addressed to then U.S. Secretary of Defense Muslim people from Iraq to Palestine to William Perry, bin Ladin wrote of the holy Chechnya to Bosnia.(29) While the declaration warriors who will take on the United States: was replete with graphic threats to the United A youth fighting in smile, returning States, these threats did not characterize the with the spear colored red. content of the first section of the Declaration of War. Instead, the specifics of the Saudi May Allah keep me close to knights, regime’s treachery, its compliance with the humans in peace, demons in war enemy, and the effect that these actions had on the Saudi people were the true emphasis of the Lions in jungle but their teeth are spears first part of the document. Bin Ladin attacked and Indian swords. the regime’s religious behavior and accused it of reversing the principles of Sharia, The horses witness that I push them “humiliating the Umma, and disobeying hard forwarded in the fire of battle . . . Allah.”(30) Such an emphasis on the Saudi I am willing to sacrifice self and wealth regime is not as clear in later interviews and in for knights who never disappointed me his second fatwa, issued in February of 1998. Throughout the Declaration of War, the Knights who are never fed up or belief that all power and acquisition of power deterred by death . . .(28) can only occur through God was repeated Such rhetoric painted a clear picture of continuously. The Saudi regime, according to bin Ladin’s perception of the world into exactly bin Ladin, violated this premise through its defined and opposing spheres of the right and compliance with the United States, its arrest of the heretic, his commitment to the battle, and prominent scholars and activists, and its the pleasing emotions stirred up by this war for disregard for the reforms put forth by the July himself and other mujahideen. 1992 “glorious Memorandum of Advice.”(31) Bin Ladin’s declaration outlined the complaints CHANGES IN THE AL-QA’IDA of the memorandum, which include: the MESSAGE, 1992 TO 2001 intimidation of religious officials, the regime’s Through a detailed analysis of bin Ladin’s arbitrary departure from Sharia, the state of the written documents and interviews, it is clear press, the forfeiture of human rights, the that the scope of al-Qa’ida ’s doctrine, the government’s corruption, the poor state of the methods endorsed to achieve its purpose, and economy and social services, and an army that the popular political appeal it seeks to generate 58 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) Benjamin Orbach could not defend the country and which “Fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find ultimately led to the American occupation.(32) them, seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in Expanding on these complaints, the wait for them.”(38) After stating the previously declaration listed economic problems such as mentioned American crimes of the occupation the depreciation of the Saudi currency, high of the holy places, the war on the Iraqi people, foreign debt, and inflation. Bin Ladin accused and the support of Jewish aggressions, bin the royal family of pursuing an oil policy that Ladin asserted that the United States had suited the American economy and not Saudis or declared war on God. The language of the the Gulf states. He emphasized the importance document shifted the emphasis of responsibility of protecting Saudi oil as it is “a great Islamic to the United States for dictating policy to the wealth and a large economic power essential Saudi regime and other local rulers. for the soon to be established Islamic Because of the 1998 fatwa’s exclusive focus state.”(33) on the United States, the 1996 Declaration of These complaints regarding internal Saudi War’s detail concerning local and practical Arabian conditions tried to appeal to popular problems is interesting. The 1996 document sentiment, as they demanded an improved clearly asserted the guilt of the United States in political, spiritual, and economic situation for regard to creating such domestic problems, but the Saudi people. Moreover, bin Ladin blamed was more critical of the Saudi regime for the regime as religiously failed, unjust, and allowing such American influence and labeled it “the agent” of the “American-Israeli transgressions. While U.S. offenses were given alliance.”(34) The declaration actually stated definite attention, it seemed as if bin Ladin was that to “use man-made law instead of the Sharia more concerned with rectifying the situation in and to support the infidels against the Muslims Saudi Arabia, starting with the expulsion of is one of the ten ‘voiders’ that would strip a U.S. forces and the reform of the government in person of his Islamic status” and make him a an Islamic manner. non-believer.(35) It is possible that the Saudi regime was more Based on a comparison with the of a direct threat to bin Ladin and his supporters assassination of Egyptian President Anwar in 1996 and that he judged religious reform Sadat, where Abd al-Salam Faraj declared there still possible or the regime’s overthrow Sadat to be a non-believer,(36) bin Ladin relatively easier. The 1996 declaration perhaps justified similar action against the Saudi regime also reflected his recent clashes and humiliation and its backers. With this declaration of war, he by the Saudi regime. Two years later, he seems called violence against the regime and the to have concluded that only by striking directly United States in Riyadh and Khobar the at the United States could he mobilize popular “volcanic eruption emerging as a result of the support and convince Arab regimes to overlook severe oppression” and the suffering from his operations in those countries or their “excessive iniquity, humiliation, and neighbors’ lands. This shift in emphasis poverty.”(37) He presented a situation in which between overthrowing Arab governments and the regime was a transgressor and he and his prioritizing attacks on the West also had supporters were religious correctors. happened with earlier Arab revolutionary In contrast to previous declarations, the movements, such as the Nasserists, Ba’thists, February 23, 1998 fatwa was more global in its and neo-Marxist groups. focus. Aside from the primary objection to the In addition to a different focus of blame, the occupation of the land of the two holy places, spectrum of targets also evolved in the period there was no emphasis on the failures of the between the two “fatwas.” In a March 1997 Saudi regime and the internal difficulties of interview with CNN, bin Ladin emphasized the Saudi society. The fatwa’s tone was set from importance of driving Americans from all one of its first lines, a citation from the Koran, Muslim countries. When questioned about the
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) 59 Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida: Origins and Doctrines target of the jihad, bin Ladin stated that the told ABC News that Americans are “the worst jihad is aimed against “soldiers in the country thieves in the world today, and the worst of the Two Holy Places,” not against the terrorists.”(45) Bin Ladin took issue with being “civilians in America.”(39) He explained that called a terrorist. In the same interview, he said, the special nature of the holy places required they have “compromised our honor and our American civilians to leave the country, but dignity and dare we utter a single word of they were not targeted for killing. protest against the injustice, we are called This contrasts with both bin Ladin’s 1998 terrorists.” fatwa and his ABC interview in which he called Aside from the factors mentioned above, bin for violence to punish the United States and Ladin’s decision to expand the scope of al- Israel. In the February 1998 fatwa, he stated Qa’ida’s targets might also have been a that any Muslim wishing the rewards of God response to U.S. pressure to capture him and must adhere to the order to “kill the Americans combat his organization because of earlier and plunder their money wherever and attacks. It is also possible that bin Ladin whenever they find it.”(40) The fatwa declared wanted to sanction actions such as the embassy that: bombings in Kenya and Tanzania so as not to inhibit the planning of future attacks and to To kill the Americans and their allies, encourage attacks that had a greater chance for both civil and military, is an individual success due to their softer nature as civilian duty for every Muslim who is able, in targets. any country where this is possible, until Bin Ladin’s statements since the September the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Haram 11 attacks demonstrate a further change in the Mosque are freed from their grip and al-Qa’ida message. In his October 7 message he until their armies, shattered and broken shuffled al-Qa’ida’s priorities to maximize winged, depart from all the lands of political appeal in the Arab and Muslim world Islam. by emphasizing the issue most likely to enhance his popular following in the Arab In the 1998 ABC interview, bin Ladin World, the Palestinian struggle. He also tried to reiterated the inclusion of American civilians as capture the hearts of the Muslim world by targets for the jihad. He stated, “We do not raising new issues such as Kashmir. differentiate between those dressed in military In his al-Jazeera statement of October 7, bin uniforms and civilians. They are all Ladin’s first mention of political issues was to targets.”(41) If the American “people do not accuse, “U.S. arrogance and Jewish wish to be harmed inside their very own persecution” of humiliating the “entire nation” countries, they should seek to elect of Islam and committing the most “heinous governments that are truly representative of actions and atrocities” of “perpetrated murders, them that can protect their interests.”(42) Bin torture, and displacement.” While these were Ladin continued, “Any American who pays not new accusations, bin Ladin referred to the taxes to his government is our target because he killing of the Palestinian boy Muhammad al- is helping the American war machine against Durrah before any mention of such previously the Muslim nation.”(43) emphasized issues as those of U.S. soldiers in Bin Ladin justified what the West called Saudi Arabia and military actions against Iraq. “terror” and the killing of civilians as As before, though, bin Ladin was permissible since the victims of such actions demanding that Muslims choose between are not true victims. “Terrorizing oppressors supporting al-Qa’ida—and thus taking the side and criminals and thieves and robbers is of God—and being both apostates and necessary for the safety of people and for the henchmen of the West, collaborators in the protection of their property.”(44) In 1998, he murdering of Muslims. By not allowing
60 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) Benjamin Orbach ambiguities, he defined al-Qa’ida as the some of al-Qa’ida’s other leaders. Appearing representative of Islam and America as with bin Ladin in the video statement were Dr. crusaders bent on a religious war. In his Ayman al-Zawahiri and Sleiman Abu Gheith. November 3 statement, bin Ladin demanded Al-Zawahiri was leader of Egyptian Islamic that all Muslims oppose the U.S. war on Jihad, the group responsible for the 1981 Afghanistan, saying his cause was assassination of Sadat, until 1998 when he “fundamentally religious...a question of faith.” signed the World Islamic Front’s fatwa for He called the attacks on Afghanistan, “the most Fighting Jews and Crusaders. This decision ferocious, serious, and violent Crusade split the group since many members objected to campaign against Islam ever since the message diverting from its original focus of making an was revealed to Mohammad.” He dismissed the Islamist revolution in Egypt.(46) After leaders of Islamic countries that supported the spending three years in an Egyptian prison, al- Western campaign as illegitimate Zawahiri left Egypt for Pakistan, the Sudan, representatives of their nations. and then Afghanistan and vowed to return “as a In the October 7 statement, bin Ladin only conqueror only.”(47) Due to his experience, al- twice raised the issue of foreign soldiers in Zawahiri is one al-Qa’ida’s ideological Saudi Arabia. The first time was more than authorities and a great influence on bin Ladin. halfway through the statement when he called He is associated with the 1995 bombing of the on these forces to leave the Arabian Peninsula Egyptian embassy in Pakistan, for which he or the land “will be set on fire under their feet.” was sentenced to death by an Egyptian court, He mentioned what previous statements called and the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa, the greatest American transgression a second for which a New York grand jury indicted him time in al-Qa’ida ’s summary of demands. in 1999. Abu Gheith, a former imam at a Considering its previous emphasis, American government-backed mosque in Kuwait, has a retreat from the Arabian Peninsula was more junior position in the organization as a remarkably only demanded after retreat from spokesperson. Afghanistan, cessation of aid to “the Jews in Two other important al-Qa’ida officials have Palestine,” and termination of sanctions on been Muhammad Atef, reportedly killed in Iraqis. The call to stop helping Hindus against November 2000 by U.S. bombs in Afghanistan, Muslims in Kashmir was the only issue that fell and Abu Zubaydah. Atef was a former Egyptian below it in the chronology of his statement. The police officer who, like al-Zawahiri, had roots mention of the issue of Kashmir was in Egyptian Islamic Jihad. He was al-Qa’ida’s significant, though, as it was prioritized among military commander in charge of recruiting and the core list of demands for the first time and training militants, and was suspected of was meant to drive the Pakistani street against involvement in the Somalia operations in the the Pakistani government. In addition, in bin early 1990s and the planning of the U.S. Ladin’s November 3 statement, he highlighted embassy bombings in Africa. Abu Zubaydah, claims of abuses inflicted upon Muslims in born in Saudi Arabia but of Palestinian origin, Bosnia, Chechnya, East Timor, the Philippines, is also involved in recruiting. He brought in the Sudan, and Somalia, a further indicator of Ahmad Ressam and played a role in the his effort to win popular appeal among proposed millennial bombings. A Jordanian Muslims far beyond the Arab world alone. court sentenced him to death in absentia in 2000.(48) AL-QA’IDA, ITS CHARACTER, Under this leadership, al-Qa’ida, which TACTICS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS means “the base,” is an umbrella organization In addition to further shifting the emphasis with an estimated 3000 to 5000 followers that of al-Qa’ida’s message, bin Ladin’s October 7 works in conjunction with Islamic Jihad and al-Jazeera statement familiarized the world with Gamaa Islamiya in Egypt, Harak ul-Ansar in
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Pakistan, and has contacts with the National attacks demonstrate, not all cells are so Islamic Front in the Sudan. The group’s unsophisticated. intention was to take mujahideen from around The absence of state sponsorship has its the world involved in local revolts and to direct benefits too, such as the organization’s them into an international battle seeking to flexibility and mobility. As Bruce Hoffman, create a single Islamist state. The organization author of Inside Terrorism, argues, this lack of began by mobilizing veterans from the war in specialized training gives the organization Afghanistan already familiar with guerrilla “enormous replicating ability.”(52) In fighting. Today, among other countries, al- commenting on the planned embassy bombing Qa’ida is active in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi in Paris, a French interior ministry official Arabia, Yemen, the Sudan, Uzbekistan, Egypt, acknowledged that detecting the terrorists Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the Palestinian would have been very difficult if they were territories, Algeria, Libya, Eritrea, Somalia, better trained since they are able to blend into Bosnia, Chechnya, Indonesia, the Philippines, Western societies. He explained, “These people Malaysia, Germany, Britain, and the United are pulled from our midst....They are almost States. Significantly, al-Qa’ida has crossed the impossible to detect. If they get a little more Sunni-Shiite divide in that it also has contact sophistication and training, we could all be in with the Lebanese group, Hizballah.(49) more trouble.”(53) Al-Qa’ida’s status as a non-state-sponsored In planning and staging the September 11 terrorist organization creates both operational attacks, al-Qa’ida’s leadership showed difficulties in the areas of financial and tactical remarkable intelligence and flexibility in using operations and advantages in their choice of their enemies’ assets and openness against targets and missions. Without direct state aid, them. Al-Qa’ida terrorists have taken advantage al-Qa’ida raises money through three main of the political asylum system to gain a safe sources: bin Ladin’s own wealth and haven where they can raise money and create businesses; donations from mosques, schools, operational cells. Militants understood how to and charities; and collection of protection enter Western countries to the extent that more money.(50) In the early 1990s, bin Ladin than half of the September 11 perpetrators established several construction and farming passed through Britain before exploiting the businesses in Khartoum that provide income for disarray surrounding the U.S. visa system.(54) al-Qa’ida, as well as a cover to attain weapons Furthermore, with ample funding, they took and to conceal operatives. Yet, without state advantage of U.S. educational opportunities, funding, al-Qa’ida is susceptible to potential learned to fly airplanes in professional schools, money problems; a freezing of private and lived American lifestyles in normal businesses’ assets; and direct military attacks American communities, and communicated from states. with each other through coded Internet In addition to these considerations, al-Qa’ida messages. misses out on several tactical benefits of state Another benefit to not being sponsored by a sponsorship such as intelligence, international state is that al-Qa’ida does not have a documents, communications equipment, permanent central command center, which weapons, and specialized field training. This makes direct attacks on the organization more lack of specialized training makes the al-Qa’ida difficult. Organizational mobility also makes group more susceptible to infiltration, capture, the group less vulnerable to being turned over and failure. For example, with the proposed to outside authorities. Perhaps most beneficial, bombing of the U.S. embassy in Paris, plotters non-affiliation with a state avoids any made basic mistakes such as buying all of the implication that the group is mercenary and chemicals needed for the bomb at the same makes its religious and communal bonds place.(51) However, as the September 11 stronger. Cell members are tied to each other
62 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) Benjamin Orbach through a common belief and goal that that he had never met bin Ladin, heard him transcend national and ethnic boundaries. speak, or was even sure what he looked Yet al-Qa’ida’s propaganda, training, and like.(59) Individual cells seem to have a great ideology give the group a reach beyond its own deal of autonomy in choosing their targets and ranks. There is a misperception that bin Ladin organizing their planning. Operatives are taught and al-Qa’ida are tactically behind every not only how to choose and destroy targets but terrorist attack connected to radical Islam. In also how to dress, behave, and support reality, the role and tactics of al-Qa’ida are themselves financially. For example, Ahmad complicated since they are so multi-faceted. Al- Ressam, the Algerian who was caught crossing Qa’ida adjusts its role to the situation by acting the U.S.-Canadian border to stage attacks, told in a variety of manners that include training, authorities that he was supposed to support funding, and organizing attacks. But both bin himself through bank robberies and to select his Ladin and al-Qa’ida also act consciously to own target. encourage others to carry out operations on By giving religious sanction for attacks, al- their own by providing inspiration and Qa’ida seeks to spread jihad beyond its own ideological justification. ranks. Though bin Ladin, as a non-cleric, has One of bin Ladin’s methods of supporting no authority to issue a fatwa, he authorizes both his own and other forces launching attacks killing for God’s cause, offering the reward of is the provision of training camps and paradise. In a 1998 interview with Time, bin guesthouses in Afghanistan, the Sudan, Yemen, Ladin stated, “Our job is to instigate, and by the and Pakistan for mujahideen. Within these grace of God, we did that.”(60) An example of camps, mujahideen are trained to forge travel this tactic is the 1995 car-bombing incident in documents, use covert communication Riyadh. Before their execution, four techniques (such as encryption), and to handle perpetrators of the bombing cited the influence and operate small arms and explosives.(55) of bin Ladin’s communiqués (in a forced They are also indoctrinated to hate the West confession) lending some credence to the and to engage in jihad as they intensively study theory that bin Ladin may not tactically have Islam and are shown videotapes to persuade planned the attack, but did influence the action them of the existence of a Western war against through his words.(61) Muslims.(56) In the same interview with Time, bin Ladin Al-Qa’ida’s ties to the 1993 World Trade explained that the United States needed to Center bombing are an example of bin Ladin’s realize that “thousands of millions of Muslims connection to terror in this supportive capacity. are angry” and would respond with a Investigators believed that Ramzi Ahmed proportionate reaction. Bin Ladin’s perceived Yousef received financial support from bin ability to sanction killing and to inspire action Ladin and was sheltered in an al-Qa’ida coupled with the financial means to guesthouse in Pakistan prior to his arrest.(57) In communicate his message are the factors that addition, Ahmad Ajaj, who was convicted of make him so dangerous. The danger that he the bombing, was in possession of an al-Qa’ida represents is only further compounded by his manual that included information on how to popularity in the Arab and Muslim world for make bombs, conduct psychological warfare, standing up to America and corrupt Arab and recruit new members.(58) As far as actually regimes. Bin Ladin justifies actions against planning the attack though, bin Ladin did not such regimes, like the attempted assassination appear to be directly involved. The of Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, as organization’s role was one of support. proper since they are aimed at destroying a This is not a rare situation. For example, in tyrant who is an unbeliever. Bin Ladin 1999, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, one of the explained that actions against such regimes not Tanzania embassy bombers, told FBI agents adhering to Sharia are praiseworthy. They are
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“directed at the tyrants and the aggressors and of opportunity available every other month to the enemies of Allah, the tyrants, the traitors attack the U.S. naval vessel. The details and who commit acts of treason against their own planning involved with the September 11 countries and their own faith and their own attacks ranging from how the perpetrators prophet and their own nation.”(62) entered the country, to their flight training, to Bin Ladin’s point, when taken from his their surveillance of airport security, to their perspective, is one that has been repeated coordination of flights, are all remarkable. throughout history. Most recently in the Middle Part of this detailed planning can be East, Khalid Istanbuli and Yigal Amir used attributed to the Islamist militants’ goal of an such arguments to explain the assassinations of Islamic state ruled by Sharia coupled with their Egyptian President Sadat in 1981 and Israeli concept of the lengthy time it will take to reach Prime Minister Rabin in 1995 respectively. In such a goal. Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida do not De Officiis, Cicero explained that despite there expect immediate results. They plan to wage being “no greater crime than to murder a their struggle over generations. Al-Qa’ida’s fellowman,” assassinating a tyrant is “the concept of time gives it an advantage over noblest of all noble deeds.”(63) Supporting this counter-terror efforts. The United States and its position, a passage from Vindiciae contra allies perceive the terror problem as averting Tyrannos, explains: disaster today and tomorrow. Al-Qa’ida’s ideology looks at developments and actions It is then lawful for Israel to resist the within the timeframe of a battle that will only king, who would overthrow the law of end once the other side is defeated, and where God and abolish His church; and not all of their own casualties receive the ultimate only so, but also they ought to know reward of paradise. When law enforcement that in neglecting to perform his duty, officials avert an attack, it is only a slight they make themselves culpable of the setback for al-Qa’ida. The organization only same crime, and shall bear the like needs to be successful a small percentage of the punishment with their king.(64) time to achieve the effect they seek. Something that might change this With some substitution of proper names and timeframe, though, is al-Qa’ida’s attempt since phrases, the preceding passage could be used to 1993 to acquire weapons of mass destruction, explain bin Ladin’s doctrine, perceived according to the Federal Grand Jury indictment obligations, and justification for al-Qa’ida’s of bin Ladin. Bin Ladin called the acquisition actions against Arab regimes allegedly led by of such weapons the “carrying out of a unbelievers. duty.”(65) The group contacted Iraqi agents, In addition to supporting actions through among others, in an attempt to get a ready- finances, training, and religious sanction, al- made nuclear device as well as the materials Qa’ida is involved in the direct planning of and technology to construct their own nuclear some operations. Despite the presence of many weapon. The U.S. government thought that bin amateur warriors, al-Qa’ida cells and militant Ladin was a major investor in the al-Shifa Islamist terrorists in general, reflect an pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum that was extraordinary amount of patience, planning, and bombed by the United States in 1998 following intelligence in their successful operations such the east Africa embassy bombings. The plant as the 1998 embassy bombings, the bombing of was believed to be an al-Qa’ida production site the USS Cole, and the September 11 attacks. for a key component of VX nerve gas. The U.S. The embassy bombings were planned years in government believes that al-Qa’ida might try to advance and involved a scale model create “dirty nukes,” conventional weapons manufactured in an Afghan camp. The Cole encased in radioactive substance that when bombers took advantage of a four-hour window
64 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) Benjamin Orbach exploded kill people by radiation attempt of Egyptian president Mubarak and the poisoning.(66) 1995 bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan that was conducted by Egyptian Al-Qa’ida’s Ambiguous Resume Islamic Jihad.(71) Until September 11, 2000, Because of the multi-faceted tactics of al- the most prominent al-Qa’ida attack was the Qa’ida, U.S. officials seem to have difficulty August 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and pinning down bin Ladin’s exact involvement in Tanzania that killed more than 250 people and the anti-U.S. terror incidents of the last decade. injured more than 5500. The bombings Likewise, while bin Ladin is quick to commend occurred on the eighth anniversary of the terrorist acts against the United States, he United Nations’ sanctions on Iraq. The main avoids taking responsibility. For instance, in the evidence linking bin Ladin to the attacks are an case of the 1995 Riyadh car bombing that killed intercepted mobile phone conversation between five Americans, bin Ladin praised the act, but two of bin Ladin’s deputies and the testimony denied involvement. While he has not taken of Ali Mohamed, a former bin Ladin aide.(72) outright responsibility for the September 11 It seems as if al-Qa’ida attempted several attacks, bin Ladin provided religious missions to usher in the 2000 New Year as justification for them indirectly through quoting well. In December 1999, eleven Jordanians and the founder of Islam: “The destruction of the two others trained in explosives in an al-Qa’ida earth is more tolerable to God than killing a camp were arrested in Amman for planning believer without cause.” Bin Ladin applies this terrorist attacks on Christian tourist sites.(73) In statement as God favoring destruction of the Kuwait, a man with ties to al-Qa’ida was earth instead of the western infidel killing arrested for planning to bomb American and Muslims. Kuwaiti targets. The Kuwaiti police eventually Other examples of praise, but not claim, are uncovered that he was in possession of 300 drawn from the Khobar bombing and a plan to pounds of explosives and a large number of assassinate President Clinton in Manila. Bin detonators.(74) Ladin referred to the Khobar bombing as a “great act in which I missed the honor of THE MYTH participating.”(67)As for his connection to Wali The United States and the international Khan, arrested for his plan to assassinate media have helped to transform bin Ladin into President Clinton, bin Ladin refused to something of a myth, a hero and popular man in comment on whether Khan worked for him. Yet the Islamic and Arab World. Yet despite some he did say, “We are all together in this; we all direct involvements, many of the ties between work for Allah.”(68) Bin Ladin’s reticence bin Ladin and the militant Islamist terror of the could be explained by his belief that his target 1990s were indirect. To some extent, bin Ladin audience, God, knows who committed the is the figurehead for the ideology of militant actions while other audiences are unimportant. Islamism rather than “the spider at the center of However, there are several incidents for a worldwide web plotting to attack American which bin Ladin has either claimed interests.”(75) responsibility or that were credibly linked to al- Still, after putting all myths aside, the threat Qa’ida, such as the attempt to kill U.S. soldiers that al-Qa’ida and bin Ladin pose is as real as in route to Somalia in December 1992.(69) the September 11 attacks. If bin Ladin was Also in Somalia, al-Qa’ida took credit for arrested or killed, al-Qa’ida would certainly providing training and help to Somalis that feel the effects of the loss of his leadership, his attacked U.S. soldiers and killed eighteen in financial backing, and his cult of personality. Mogadishu at the beginning of October Yet the West’s problem with al-Qa’ida, its 1993.(70) Al-Qa’ida is also linked to the distinct terrorist groups, and its cells would not previously mentioned 1995 assassination disappear entirely. Al-Qa’ida supports these
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) 65 Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida: Origins and Doctrines allied groups but does not control them. Each 2. Shahar, Yael. "Osama bin Ladin: Marketing has its own distinct agenda that fits into al- Terrorism," ICT, August 22, 1998. Qa’ida’s grander view of an Islamic struggle
66 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) Benjamin Orbach
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2001) 67 Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida: Origins and Doctrines
63. The Terrorism Reader: A Historical Anthology, edited by Walter Laqueur, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978, p. 16. 64. Ibid., p. 26. 65. Leader, "Search for WMD." 66. "Bin Ladin Claims to have Nuclear Weapons," ICT, November 10, 2001.
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