MEI Policy Focus 2016-18 A Resilient Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan Middle East Institute Policy Focus Series August 2016 Although al-Qaeda has suffered severe blows in recent years, it has managed to remain entrenched in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and is poised to strengthen its position and expand its activities in the region. The withdrawal of the bulk of international combat forces and the Afghan military’s limited capabilities have given al-Qaeda the opportunity to regain its safe havens lost since 2001. The staying power of al-Qaeda is rooted in its ability to draw from and coordinate with allied local groups embedded in multiple networks on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. Through increased collaboration with the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and other militant groups, al-Qaeda has been able to capitalize on the deteriorating security situation to grow its infrastructure and bring its strategic focus back to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Key Points ♦ Al-Qaeda’s leadership is working more closely with the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan in setting strategy and orchestrating attacks ♦ One of al-Qaeda’s key victories in Pakistan was its ability to reframe the jihad in Pakistan as one that is both local and global ♦ Al-Qaeda has acted as a mediator and unifier among Pakistan’s myriad militant groups ♦ Although the number of al-Qaeda Core members has remained stable at fewer than 300 since 2010, by working together with local allies, the forces committed to al- Qaeda’s strategy or reliant on its networks number the many thousands ♦ Denying al-Qaeda the alliances that are the key to its longevity and effectiveness will be critical to marginalizing and ultimately defeating the group Lauren McNally Lauren McNally is a Introduction research assistant in the Center for Pakistan s described by U.S. defense officials, Studies at the Middle East al-Qaeda Core—the central leader- Institute. She is a graduate A student at Georgetown ship and fighters located in Afghanistan University and holds and Pakistan—is on the rebound, and said a B.A. in International to be in 2016 “very active” and a “big threat” Affairs from the George not only to Afghanistan but to the region Washington University. She previously worked as a whole.1 Al-Qaeda’s presence and influ- at the U.S. Department ence is reportedly greater than Western in- of State and the Institute for the Study of War where telligence officials had previously thought she has written on insurgent groups and U.S. defense and is growing. Its leadership is working policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. more closely with the Taliban in Pakistan Marvin G. Weinbaum and Afghanistan in setting strategy and or- Marvin G. Weinbaum chestrating attacks. Evidence suggests that is professor emeritus of al-Qaeda is rebuilding roots on its home political science at the University of Illinois at turf and is intent on spearheading those Is- Urbana-Champaign, lamic forces challenging regimes across the and served as analyst region and beyond. for Pakistan and Afghanistan in the U.S. Over recent years, al-Qaeda has appeared, Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence at times, to have faded into irrelevance. By and Research from 1999 2009, U.S. military intelligence assessed that to 2003. He is currently there were only around 300 al-Qaeda fight- a scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute in ers left in Pakistan and only 100 fighters still Washington DC. in Afghanistan.2 The following year, Mi- chael Leiter, the director of the U.S. Nation- al Counterterrorism Center, determined former affiliate of al-Qaeda, appeared to be that al-Qaeda Core was “weaker today than overtaking its parent organization in sever- it has been at any time since 2001.”3 Many al regions within Afghanistan and Pakistan. of its top leadership, most notably, Kha- Despite apparent setbacks, al-Qaeda Core lid Sheikh Mohammed, Mohammad Atef, has shown resilience in both Afghani- Ilyas Kashmiri, and, of course, Osama bin stan and Pakistan. By 2012, the departing Laden had been captured or killed in raids commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, or drone strikes. Al-Qaeda’s branches in the General John Allen, argued that al-Qae- Middle East and North Africa appeared to da had “re-emerged” inside Afghanistan surpass al-Qaeda Core in terms of leader- through raising funds and recruitment, ship, lethality, and the level of threat to the and is continuing to fight U.S. troops.4 In U.S. homeland. Recently, the Islamic State, a 2014, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahi- A Resilient al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan 1 ri established a new affiliate—al-Qaeda in Al-Qaeda Core Roots the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)—for the purpose of carrying out attacks through- in the Region out South Asia. But it was not until a year later when U.S. forces destroyed a major The seeds of what would become al-Qae- al-Qaeda training camp in Kandahar—the da in Afghanistan were laid during the war largest al-Qaeda training camp discovered against the Soviet Union. The jihad drew in Afghanistan since 2001—that the group nearly 35,000 foreign combatants from 43 appeared clearly on the rebound. different countries, mostly in the Middle East.5 In the course of training and cooper- Even after suffering major blows, al-Qaeda ating against the Soviets, foreign and local Core has been able to ensure survival by militants formed ideological, strategic, and retaining its status and influence with local tactical connections. This cooperation be- allies. These relationships go back decades tween mujahideen groups, mainly from the and have helped to cement ties to militant rural Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pa- groups operating on both sides of the bor- kistan, and interaction with globally mind- der. The deteriorating security situation in ed Islamist thinking was key to al-Qaeda’s Afghanistan, coupled with the organiza- establishment and growth. The Palestinian tion’s long history and comprehensive un- teacher Abdullah Azzam, who led the Arab derstanding of the region, has also given Services Bureau that coordinated foreign al-Qaeda an edge in its efforts to reclaim its jihadist fighters and international fund- position and expand its activities in the re- ing in Peshawar, inspired scores of radical gion. Muslims across the Middle East to join the Afghan mujahideen. Azzam’s “Even after suffering major teachings connected the battles fought by militants in their home blows, al-Qaeda Core has been countries to the Afghan jihad in order to unite a diverse array of able to ensure survival by jihadists.6 Azzam’s ideology and students, including Osama bin retaining its status and influence Laden, would eventually form the with local allies.” cornerstone of al-Qaeda’s ideolo- gy and formation in 1988.7 During the anti-Soviet jihad, mujahideen groups that had ties to Arab Islamist groups from the early 1960s set up reception com- mittees to house and train new fighters and 2 McNally & Weinbaum encouraged them to join local mu- “The porous border between jahideen militias.8 For instance, in Pakistan’s Federally Admin- Afghanistan and Pakistan istered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Afghanistan’s southeastern Loya allowed al-Qaeda Core to Paktika region, a group led by Jala- luddin Haqqani facilitated local operate in both countries.” and foreign fighters in gathering, sources and connections in exchange for training, and planning attacks in Afghan- a platform from which it could launch at- istan. Haqqani and his cohorts had an es- tacks. Even Mullah Omar’s decision not to tablished operational network of fighters hand bin Laden over to the United States and supporters with financial ties to Arab after September 11, 2001 was not an indica- states, and this early outreach made them tion of Omar’s support for the attacks, but ideal and willing hosts for Arabs fighting in a reflection of the interdependence of their the Afghan jihad. Even after the Soviet de- organizations and Omar’s reluctance to vi- parture from Afghanistan, the relationship olate the cultural and religious custom of between Arab militants and groups like protecting one’s guests. Haqqani’s only grew.9 Taliban ties to al-Qaeda were crucial to the By 1996, Osama bin Laden himself returned Taliban’s growth as an insurgency after its to eastern Afghanistan and formed close re- routing from Afghanistan during the U.S. lations with the Taliban leader Mullah Mo- invasion of October-November 2001. Tali- hammad Omar shortly after the movement ban fighters, along with those from al-Qae- captured Kabul.10 The power vacuum left da Core, found refuge across the border in behind by the Soviets had allowed security Pakistan. Also finding sanctuary were fight- to completely deteriorate in Afghanistan. It ers from the East Turkistan Islamic Move- also afforded the Taliban the opportunity ment (ETIM), the Islamic Movement of to consolidate territorial control, first in the Uzbekistan (I.M.U.) and the Islamic Jihad southern and eastern provinces and then Union (I.J.U.). Together with the Afghan across nearly all the rest of the country. Taliban and al-Qaeda, these and other for- While the Taliban and al-Qaeda had their eign groups would also soon contribute to differences in priorities and ideology, Mul- the emergence of a Pakistani Taliban insur- lah Omar saw bin Laden as “an important gency that would by 2007 become known connector to the wider Muslim world.”11 as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (T.T.P.).12 From its early days, the Taliban and al-Qae- The porous border between Afghanistan da’s relationship was mostly transactional, and Pakistan allowed al-Qaeda Core to op- with al-Qaeda providing a network of re- erate in both countries.