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MEI Policy Focus 2016-18

A Resilient Al-Qaeda in and

Middle East Institute Policy Focus Series

August 2016 Although al-Qaeda has suffered severe blows in recent years, it has managed to remain entrenched in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and is poised to strengthen its position and expand its activities in the . The withdrawal of the bulk of international combat forces and the military’s limited capabilities have given al-Qaeda the opportunity to regain its safe havens lost since 2001. The staying power of al-Qaeda is rooted in its ability to draw from and coordinate with allied local groups embedded in multiple networks on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. Through increased collaboration with the , the , and other militant groups, al-Qaeda has been able to capitalize on the deteriorating security situation to grow its infrastructure and bring its strategic focus back to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Key Points

♦♦ Al-Qaeda’s leadership is working more closely with the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan in setting strategy and orchestrating attacks

♦♦ One of al-Qaeda’s key victories in Pakistan was its ability to reframe the in Pakistan as one that is both local and global

♦♦ Al-Qaeda has acted as a mediator and unifier among Pakistan’s myriad militant groups

♦♦ Although the number of al-Qaeda Core members has remained stable at fewer than 300 since 2010, by working together with local allies, the forces committed to al- Qaeda’s strategy or reliant on its networks number the many thousands

♦♦ Denying al-Qaeda the alliances that are the key to its longevity and effectiveness will be critical to marginalizing and ultimately defeating the group Lauren McNally Lauren McNally is a Introduction research assistant in the Center for Pakistan s described by U.S. defense officials, Studies at the al-Qaeda Core—the central leader- Institute. She is a graduate A student at Georgetown ship and fighters located in Afghanistan University and holds and Pakistan—is on the rebound, and said a B.A. in International to be in 2016 “very active” and a “big threat” Affairs from the George not only to Afghanistan but to the region Washington University. She previously worked as a whole.1 Al-Qaeda’s presence and influ- at the U.S. Department ence is reportedly greater than Western in- of State and the Institute for the Study of War where telligence officials had previously thought she has written on insurgent groups and U.S. defense and is growing. Its leadership is working policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. more closely with the Taliban in Pakistan Marvin G. Weinbaum and Afghanistan in setting strategy and or- Marvin G. Weinbaum chestrating attacks. Evidence suggests that is professor emeritus of al-Qaeda is rebuilding roots on its home political science at the University of Illinois at turf and is intent on spearheading those Is- Urbana-Champaign, lamic forces challenging regimes across the and served as analyst region and beyond. for Pakistan and Afghanistan in the U.S. Over recent years, al-Qaeda has appeared, Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence at times, to have faded into irrelevance. By and Research from 1999 2009, U.S. military intelligence assessed that to 2003. He is currently there were only around 300 al-Qaeda fight- a scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute in ers left in Pakistan and only 100 fighters still Washington DC. in Afghanistan.2 The following year, Mi- chael Leiter, the director of the U.S. Nation- al Counterterrorism Center, determined former affiliate of al-Qaeda, appeared to be that al-Qaeda Core was “weaker today than overtaking its parent organization in sever- it has been at any time since 2001.”3 Many al within Afghanistan and Pakistan. of its top leadership, most notably, Kha- Despite apparent setbacks, al-Qaeda Core lid Mohammed, Mohammad Atef, has shown resilience in both Afghani- , and, of course, Osama bin stan and Pakistan. By 2012, the departing Laden had been captured or killed in raids commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, or drone strikes. Al-Qaeda’s branches in the General John Allen, argued that al-Qae- Middle East and North appeared to da had “re-emerged” inside Afghanistan surpass al-Qaeda Core in terms of leader- through raising funds and recruitment, ship, lethality, and the level of threat to the and is continuing to fight U.S. troops.4 In U.S. homeland. Recently, the , a 2014, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahi-

A Resilient al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan 1 ri established a new affiliate—al-Qaeda in Al-Qaeda Core Roots the (AQIS)—for the purpose of carrying out attacks through- in the Region out South . But it was not until a year later when U.S. forces destroyed a major The seeds of what would become al-Qae- al-Qaeda training camp in —the da in Afghanistan were laid during the war largest al-Qaeda training camp discovered against the . The jihad drew in Afghanistan since 2001—that the group nearly 35,000 foreign combatants from 43 appeared clearly on the rebound. different countries, mostly in the Middle East.5 In the course of training and cooper- Even after suffering major blows, al-Qaeda ating against the Soviets, foreign and local Core has been able to ensure survival by militants formed ideological, strategic, and retaining its status and influence with local tactical connections. This cooperation be- allies. These relationships go back decades tween groups, mainly from the and have helped to cement ties to militant rural Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pa- groups operating on both sides of the bor- kistan, and interaction with globally mind- der. The deteriorating security situation in ed Islamist thinking was key to al-Qaeda’s Afghanistan, coupled with the organiza- establishment and growth. The Palestinian tion’s long history and comprehensive un- teacher Abdullah Azzam, who led the Arab derstanding of the region, has also given Services Bureau that coordinated foreign al-Qaeda an edge in its efforts to reclaim its jihadist fighters and international fund- position and expand its activities in the re- ing in , inspired scores of radical gion. across the Middle East to join the Afghan mujahideen. Azzam’s “Even after suffering major teachings connected the battles fought by militants in their home blows, al-Qaeda Core has been countries to the Afghan jihad in order to unite a diverse array of able to ensure survival by jihadists.6 Azzam’s ideology and students, including Osama bin retaining its status and influence Laden, would eventually form the with local allies.” cornerstone of al-Qaeda’s ideolo- gy and formation in 1988.7

During the anti-Soviet jihad, mujahideen groups that had ties to Arab Islamist groups from the early 1960s set up reception com- mittees to house and train new fighters and

2 McNally & Weinbaum encouraged them to join local mu- “The porous border between jahideen militias.8 For instance, in Pakistan’s Federally Admin- Afghanistan and Pakistan istered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Afghanistan’s southeastern Loya allowed al-Qaeda Core to Paktika region, a group led by Jala- luddin Haqqani facilitated local operate in both countries.” and foreign fighters in gathering, sources and connections in exchange for training, and planning attacks in Afghan- a platform from which it could launch at- istan. Haqqani and his cohorts had an es- tacks. Even Omar’s decision not to tablished operational network of fighters hand bin Laden over to the and supporters with financial ties to Arab after September 11, 2001 was not an indica- states, and this early outreach made them tion of Omar’s support for the attacks, but ideal and willing hosts for Arabs fighting in a reflection of the interdependence of their the Afghan jihad. Even after the Soviet de- organizations and Omar’s reluctance to vi- parture from Afghanistan, the relationship olate the cultural and religious custom of between Arab militants and groups like protecting one’s guests. Haqqani’s only grew.9 Taliban ties to al-Qaeda were crucial to the By 1996, himself returned Taliban’s growth as an insurgency after its to eastern Afghanistan and formed close re- routing from Afghanistan during the U.S. lations with the Taliban leader Mullah Mo- invasion of October-November 2001. Tali- hammad Omar shortly after the movement ban fighters, along with those from al-Qae- captured .10 The power vacuum left da Core, found refuge across the border in behind by the Soviets had allowed security Pakistan. Also finding sanctuary were fight- to completely deteriorate in Afghanistan. It ers from the East Turkistan Islamic Move- also afforded the Taliban the opportunity ment (ETIM), the Islamic Movement of to consolidate territorial control, first in the Uzbekistan (I.M.U.) and the Islamic Jihad southern and eastern provinces and then Union (I.J.U.). Together with the Afghan across nearly all the rest of the country. Taliban and al-Qaeda, these and other for- While the Taliban and al-Qaeda had their eign groups would also soon contribute to differences in priorities and ideology, Mul- the emergence of a Pakistani Taliban insur- lah Omar saw bin Laden as “an important gency that would by 2007 become known connector to the wider Muslim world.”11 as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (T.T.P.).12

From its early days, the Taliban and al-Qae- The porous border between Afghanistan da’s relationship was mostly transactional, and Pakistan allowed al-Qaeda Core to op- with al-Qaeda providing a network of re- erate in both countries. Al-Qaeda would

A Resilient al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan 3 use Pakistan in the way its fighters did regional allied governments. In particular, during the 1980s, as an operational safe ha- al-Qaeda fighters have been involved in ven from which it could plan international planning and carrying out suicide attacks, as well as regional terrorist attacks, partic- developing improved explosive devices, ularly in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda fighters and helping conduct operations against found sanctuaries in Afghanistan’s eastern high-value targets. Al-Qaeda has also run provinces like Kunar and Nuristan, and Pa- a number of training camps and provided kistan’s North and South . The financial resources for groups. It has addi- staying power of al-Qaeda became rooted tionally played a role in establishing and in its ability to draw from and coordinate coordinating militant groups’ propaganda with allied groups embedded in multiple efforts.14

Al-Qaeda has suffered severe “Despite these gains against the blows in recent years, especially organization, the United States owing to the increased intensity of the U.S.’s drone campaign in and its partners have fallen far Pakistan’s tribal areas beginning in 2009. The killing of bin Laden short of being able to expel al- in 2011 aside, the death and arrest of several mid- and senior-level Qaeda entirely from the region.” al-Qaeda Core leaders in Paki- networks on both sides of the border. Its key stan disrupted al-Qaeda’s com- affiliates include the Afghan and Pakistani munication and finances and somewhat Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Lash- curtailed its ability to facilitate insurgent at- kar-e-Taiba (LeT)—a jihadi organization tacks. In Afghanistan, it may have dimmed active in Indian Kashmir and Afghanistan. al-Qaeda’s appeal, affecting its recruiting Al-Qaeda core members have also formed power. But despite these gains against the important ties at the tribal levels, including organization, the United States and its part- among Mehsud sub-tribes in the T.T.P., Za- ners have fallen far short of being able to dran sub-tribes of the Haqqani Network, expel al-Qaeda entirely from the region. and the Salarzai and other sub-tribes in eastern Afghanistan.13 The Strategic Evolution Al-Qaeda has been able to provide many of al-Qaeda Core types of assistance to these allied groups in exchange for sanctuary. It established a Since launching its military intervention number of to coordinate strategy, in Afghanistan in 2001, the United States operations, and tactics against the West and has struggled to define al-Qaeda as it has

4 McNally & Weinbaum evolved beyond the region. tivities up to a year in order to ensure the Despite its involvement in attacks against organization’s survival.17 After the death of Western targets prior to 2001, al-Qaeda only Osama bin Laden, leaders similarly warned formally began to shift from its hierarchi- their fighters that the organization’s surviv- cal structure into one comprised of several al would mean “taking precautions, work- formal affiliates across the world after the ing in total , and making sure of all start of the war. After the bulk of al-Qae- means to do damage to the enemy.”18 da in South Asia was driven into Pakistan, al-Qaeda formalized affiliates in Saudi Ara- The durability of al-Qaeda owes much to bia and Yemen, , the , and So- its ability to retain its strategic presence malia. As U.S. and NATO forces degraded in the border area between Afghanistan the South Asia Core group, the organization began to adopt an in- “Al-Qaeda likely decentralized creasingly decentralized structure. This allowed for some of al-Qae- its organization and leadership da’s formal branches, especially in Yemen, to exceed the Core in their structure for survival reasons.” lethality and take over some Core leadership positions based outside of South Asia. By 2010, bin Laden declared that all and Pakistan. Only nominal attempts have regional al-Qaeda affiliates would have to been made by Pakistan to dislodge al-Qae- consult with “al-Qaeda Central” in Pakistan da from its strongholds. Along with oth- before carrying out operations, possibly as er elements at war with the Afghan state, an indication that the Core was losing con- al-Qaeda fighters proved able to move with trol of the periphery.15 near impunity throughout Pakistan’s tribal region and across the border. Al-Qaeda’s A 2014 RAND report assesses that al-Qae- only serious fear on Pakistani soil has been da likely decentralized its organization and its losses from U.S. drone strikes. A short leadership structure for survival reasons. time before his death in 2011, bin Laden During a meeting in in 2002, al-Qaeda reportedly ordered as a means to avoid the leaders recognized that the loss of key lead- U.S. drone campaign in North and South ers following the U.S. invasion of Afghan- Waziristan that elements of al-Qaeda relo- istan had made it necessary to abandon cate back into Afghanistan. While most of the organization’s hierarchical structure the Core leadership may have continued to in order to protect its existence.16 In 2010, reside in Pakistan, with the decrease in the Zawahiri ordered al-Qaeda operatives to number of Western troops after the surge in disperse into small groups outside of its 2009-12, al-Qaeda is thought to have grown traditional sanctuaries and cease most ac- its infrastructure in Afghanistan.19

A Resilient al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan 5 At the same time, al-Qaeda Core became sectarian strife and the conflicts in Afghan- more involved in providing strategic and istan and Kashmir.21 These alliances pro- operational support to Pakistan-based affil- vided al-Qaeda more maneuverability and iates. Al-Qaeda Core leaders, commanders, strengthened its strategic and tactical sup- and facilitators established networks out- port in the region. It also allowed al-Qae- side of their border region safe havens to da to replenish some of the Core Arab major Pakistani cities including Faisalabad, leaders killed, captured, or driven away by , and . In forging links air strikes with local militant command- with the Pakistani Taliban, al-Qaeda also ers. Furthermore, al-Qaeda gained a large contributed to attempted assassinations of boost in support and recruitment efforts then-Pakistani President after the Pakistani army’s heavy-handed and the overall discrediting of the govern- actions in routing Islamic extremists from ment. Stephen Tankel has referred to this Islamabad’s Red in 2007. Following as the “Pakistanization” of the Taliban, and the incident, Osama bin Laden released a al-Qaeda has given special attention to car- statement regretting al-Qaeda’s “failure to rying out attacks against the Pakistani state prioritize jihad in Pakistan.”22 as a way to bolster ties amongst its Pakistani allies.20 Several military campaigns by Pakistan in the last several years have focused on an- Al-Qaeda has also acted as a mediator and ti-state groups. In the most recent Opera- unifier among Pakistan’s myriad militant tion Zarb-e-Azb, launched in June 2014, groups. According to a West Point report, Pakistani military sources have repeated- one of its key victories in Pakistan was its ly claimed to clear T.T.P. as well as foreign ability to “re-frame the jihad in Pakistan as militant groups and al-Qaeda from FATA. one that is both local and global,” thereby Many of these fighters, however, received uniting a conglomerate of militant groups advanced warning from Pakistani intel- previously more narrowly involved with ligence and simply crossed over into Af- ghanistan’s northern and eastern provinces.23 From there they are well “Al-Qaeda has given special positioned to cross back into Paki- attention to carrying out stan and launch attacks. The withdrawal of the bulk of inter- attacks against the Pakistani national combat forces and the Af- state as a way to bolster ties ghan military’s limited capabilities have undeniably given al-Qaeda the amongst its Pakistani allies.” opportunity to regain its safe ha- vens lost in 2001. But while al-Qaeda

6 McNally & Weinbaum Core’s attention remains focused “The number of al-Qaeda on facilitating and supporting ji- had in Afghanistan, in September Core members has remained 2014, Zawahiri announced the creation of AQIS. He stated that stable at fewer than 300 since it had taken more than two years “to gather the mujahedeen in the 2010.” Indian subcontinent into a single hailing from countries like Bangladesh.26 entity” and stressed that the group would The creation of AQIS additionally serves be focused on nations like Myanmar, Ban- Zawahiri’s attempts to promote the al-Qae- gladesh, and parts of India and the Kashmir da brand against an advancing rival in the 24 region. Islamic State, which is competing with Overall, this newest affiliate’s attacks have al-Qaeda for jihadist leadership in the re- been limited. Its first major operation was gion as well as across the Islamic world. the September 2014 high-profile attempt to hijack a Pakistani naval frigate in the port Al-Qaeda Alliances in of Karachi. Several assassinations of pop- ular secular figures in Bangladesh, as well South Asia as training camps discovered in Afghani- stan, have ties to AQIS. Its members have Al-Qaeda’s strategy in South Asia since become a principle target of U.S. drone 2001 has relied extensively on the local strikes in the tribal belt. AQIS has report- groups with whom it shares safe havens edly regrouped in southern Pakistan where, and collaborates for attacks. These are es- through alliances with LeT and T.T.P., it has pecially important as al-Qaeda numbers found fertile ground for new recruitment dropped significantly after 2001, and more in Karachi.25 so since al-Qaeda’s expansion outside of the region. Anne Stenersen at the Norwegian The creation of AQIS seems mostly de- Defense Research Establishment previous- signed as part of al-Qaeda’s plans to bring ly assessed that the number of al-Qaeda its strategic focus back to Afghanistan and Core members has remained stable at fewer Pakistan. It is also most likely part of an ef- than 300 since 2010.27 Local groups, there- fort by al-Qaeda Core leadership to unite a fore, have not only been key to al-Qaeda’s South Asian jihad by organizing its regional staying power in the region, but also drive allies under one affiliate. This is supported al-Qaeda’s influence in the region. by the fact that AQIS leadership is mostly comprised of long-time commanders in Pakistan and Afghanistan, with very few

A Resilient al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan 7 While al-Qaeda’s relationship with the Af- acceptance of these groups operating in Af- ghan Taliban has always been extensive, ghanistan as guests makes them a valued despite two decades of cooperation and a ally in return. Al-Qaeda’s leadership contin- shared vision of jihad in Afghanistan, their ues to recognize the leader of the Taliban as affinity can also be overemphasized. The al-Mumineen, or Commander of the Taliban and al-Qaeda remain distinct in Faithful, and was quick to announce their their membership, agendas, and ideologies. ongoing support for Taliban leader Mullah In particular, the Taliban has adopted goals after the announcement of that focus on national identity and the re- longtime leader Mullah Omar’s death in July jection of the Western-backed Kabul gov- 2015.29 Following the U.S. drone strike that ernment, and it has shown little interest in killed Mansour ten months later, al-Qaeda leader Zawahiri pledged allegiance to his successor Mullah Haibatul- “Al-Qaeda’s ability to raise lah Akhundzada and announced his organization’s renewed partnership funds for the Taliban has with the Taliban.30 Al-Qaeda lead- become a less influential part ers continue to consult with Taliban leadership based in Pakistan, and of the relationship.” some field commanders in Afghan- istan are “dual-hatted” leaders in al-Qaeda’s vision of global jihad against the both the Taliban and al-Qaeda, who serve West. Al-Qaeda’s strategy in South Asia also to strengthen the strategic and operational promotes sectarian violence and mass-ca- relationship between the groups.31 Al-Qae- sualty attacks against Muslim civilians, da’s ideology has also begun to resonate something the Taliban fears could alien- with some Taliban commanders, especially ate the population from which it recruits. younger ones who do not have the person- A lingering, yet strong, sentiment for many al history of fighting with the mujahideen Taliban is that, by inviting U.S. interven- against the Soviets, but were raised in refu- tion in 2001, al-Qaeda’s actions on 9/11 had gee camps and in Pakistan.32 spoiled the Taliban’s opportunity to defeat their Afghan enemies and consolidate pow- Although al-Qaeda donors continue to pro- er in Afghanistan.28 vide or direct funds to the Taliban, mone- tary ties between al-Qaeda and the Taliban Al-Qaeda has appreciated the Taliban’s have changed in recent years. Analysts con- willingness to provide safe haven to both tend that al-Qaeda’s ability to raise funds its Core members as well as its foreign af- for the Taliban has become a less influential filiates, such as I.M.U., and to support some part of the relationship. Most Taliban field of their operational networks. The Taliban’s commanders can increasingly handle their

8 McNally & Weinbaum monetary needs through the drug trade, with al-Qaeda, as well as affiliated Pakistani taxation in Taliban-controlled areas, and militants, are described as “deeply integrat- partnerships with crime syndicates. ed and interdependent.”36

While al-Qaeda maintains important links The Haqqani Network also holds a special with the Taliban’s , its connec- position as somewhat of an intermediary tions with other militant groups, including between the Afghan Taliban and al-Qae- the Haqqani Network and the T.T.P., have da. After the death of Mullah Omar and created additional opportunities for ex- during Mullah Mansour’s struggle to se- plicit cooperation. Al-Qaeda and various cure his leadership, Sirajuddin was asked to insurgent groups share communication take on the position of the second deputy and transportation routes, coordinate at- commander of the Taliban.37 U.S. military tacks, and even utilize the same explosive and suicide-bomber “The Haqqani Network also networks.33 They provide al-Qae- da safe haven and allow al-Qaeda holds a special position as to conduct attacks from their con- trolled territory in Pakistan. The somewhat of an intermediary Long War Journal asserts that al- lying with these groups has been between the Afghan Taliban key in giving al-Qaeda “strategic and al-Qaeda.” depth” throughout the region.34 officials assert that Sirajuddin has assumed Al-Qaeda’s history of working together an active role in the Taliban, and that he with the Haqqani Network and its leader- “increasingly runs the day-to-day military ship makes for a lethal alliance. Operational operations for the Taliban, and . . . is like- and tactical cooperation has increased the ly involved in appointing shadow gover- ability of the Haqqani Network to carry out n or s .” 38 Even with the death of Mansour, sophisticated attacks in Kabul and against Sirajuddin continues to have responsibility Western military targets. Similarly, accord- for the Taliban’s military operations. His ing to documents found in bin Laden’s Ab- influence among both Taliban top leader- botabad compound, al-Qaeda was able to ship and commanders on the ground in infiltrate and attack U.S. and NATO forces Afghanistan’s south and north could foster in Bagram and Kabul through operations stronger ties with al-Qaeda and assist in planned together with , creating new spaces for al-Qaeda to expand the Haqqani Network’s present leader, and its influence. his commanders.35 In another study from West Point, the Haqqani Network’s ties

A Resilient al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan 9 Al-Qaeda also maintains a strong relation- ghanistan, where al-Qaeda has used them ship with the Pakistani Taliban (T.T.P.), to bolster the firepower of the Afghan Tal- having played an instrumental role in the iban. T.T.P.’s formation in 2007. Al-Qaeda is said to have provided “motivation, strategy, mil- Other militant groups on both sides of the itant training, and finances to organize and border continue to contribute to al-Qaeda’s launch the T.T.P.” In exchange, T.T.P. fighters goals in South Asia. For instance, Pakistan’s staged attacks in both Pakistan and Afghan- Harakat ul-Mujahedeen, which has con- istan and worked to “cultivate [al-Qaeda’s] ducted operations against Indian troops local support and acceptance.”39 As al-Qae- and civilians in Kashmir, maintains train- ing camps in eastern Afghanistan provinces like Kunar and Nuristan “Lashkar-e-Taiba has proven that welcome al-Qaeda fighters.43 to be the strongest ideological The , a Uighur jihadist group, has also advertised ally of al-Qaeda in the region.” camps in this region since 2014.44 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Moham- da became more involved with militant mad, and a number of others in the groups in Pakistan focusing on domestic region all have some degree of al-Qaeda , these bonds deepened. Many Pa- ties by virtue of operating in the same space kistani Taliban leaders even appear along- and within the same networks. 40 side al-Qaeda in propaganda videos. The One of these groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), T.T.P. has openly collaborated with al-Qae- has a particularly strong relationship with da for operations in Afghanistan, includ- al-Qaeda, with some reports predicting ing most infamously, the attack in 2009 on that LeT could become “the next al-Qae- CIA’s Camp Chapman near the Pakistani d a .” 45 Al-Qaeda has utilized LeT safehouses 41 border. while in Pakistan, and LeT has proven to be Al-Qaeda has been able to create local al- the strongest ideological ally of al-Qaeda 46 liances based not only on cooperation in in the region. LeT has also been among staging attacks but also through the inter- the groups working with al-Qaeda to car- marriages and business relationships it has ry out operations in Afghanistan. LeT has forged with these groups.42 When pressure become known for “technological sophisti- from the Pakistani army against the T.T.P. cation, [broad] global recruiting and fund- increased, in the form of greater attacks on raising network, its close ties to protectors strongholds in North Waziristan beginning within the Pakistani government, and the in mid-2014, al-Qaeda was instrumental in fact that it is still a less high-profile target relocating many of T.T.P. fighters into Af- of Western intelligence,” all of which afford

10 McNally & Weinbaum the group an advantage over nationally-fo- and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda Core as a regional cused groups in the region.47 One Pentagon threat has grown as Afghanistan’s security official warned that LeT is poised to “shift has deteriorated. The Taliban’s territorial operational focus to the Indian Subconti- gains following the international drawdown nent in the next one to three years” as coa- of troops have presented new opportunities lition forces continue to draw down in Af- for al-Qaeda. Additionally, the Pakistani ar- ghanistan.48 LeT could capitalize on its ties my’s operation in Zarb-e-Azb has pushed to al-Qaeda, as well as the unity of regional many al-Qaeda allied groups, sympathizers, jihadist groups under AQIS, to meet these and foreign militant groups into Afghani- goals. stan. U.S. officials indicate that the presence

Altogether, these groups brought together or bolstered by al-Qae- “The Taliban’s territorial gains da’s influence and established net- following the international works have worsened the security situation in both Afghanistan and drawdown of troops have Pakistan. Despite al-Qaeda’s limit- ed numbers, by working together presented new opportunities with local allies, the forces com- mitted to al-Qaeda’s strategy or for al-Qaeda. ” reliant on its networks number in of these al-Qaeda-linked groups in Afghan- the many thousands. The history of coop- istan could “present a bit of an accelerant eration and mutual assistance among these for the Taliban [by providing] capabilities groups makes them a formidable threat to and skills.”49 the region. Their alliances have facilitated al-Qaeda’s survival in the region and will Dedicated al-Qaeda Core members have continue to be instrumental in al-Qaeda’s occupied well-established strongholds in strategy for expansion. eastern provinces like Kunar and Nuristan, as well as those further south in Zabul and Al-Qaeda in Ghazni. Other al-Qaeda militants uprooted by Operation Zarb-e-Azb have relocated to Afghanistan and traditional al-Qaeda safe havens in , Paktia, and Paktika provinces, as well as Pakistan: Beyond 2016 northern provinces like Badakhshan and .50 Afghan and U.S. forces have also Al-Qaeda has remained entrenched in the conducted operations against al-Qaeda region and, despite setbacks since 2001, is in Logar province, and a camp in Paktika poised to strengthen in both Afghanistan province provided security forces the in-

A Resilient al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan 11 telligence to uncover the larger camps in be critical to achieving al-Qaeda’s margin- Kandahar and found in alization and then defeat. This will require late 2015.51 Prior to the discovery of these greater resolution, particularly by Pakistan, camps, al-Qaeda members were thought to give no quarter to any of those groups to have little, if any, presence in these ar- with which al-Qaeda has a mutually benefi- eas.52 The southern camp covered at least cial relationship. Culling militant networks 30 square miles and held around 150 mil- and denying their leaderships safe havens in itants, an alarming harbinger of al-Qaeda’s both Pakistan and Afghanistan will prevent current ambitions for the region. al-Qaeda Core and AQIS from conducting operations and realizing their strate- “Destroying al-Qaeda Core in gic vision for a united jihad. Destroy- ing al-Qaeda Core in Afghanistan Afghanistan and Pakistan will and Pakistan will not be enough to dismantle the organization interna- not be enough to dismantle the tionally but is essential to removing the region’s most important enabler organization internationally.” of insurgency. Greater cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan Al-Qaeda is therefore in a position to regain and continued U.S. and international en- some lost ground and influence in Afghan- gagement in the region will also be required istan by exploiting security gaps and ex- to prevent the emergence of a bolder, more panding the operations of AQIS. Although formidable al-Qaeda. this threat is nothing new, al-Qaeda’s ex- pansion could still have dramatic effects on the region, from creating a more ideological and radicalized insurgency to discouraging groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan from pursuing negotiations with their respective governments.

Although the region is not about to suc- cumb to these threats, security in both Af- ghanistan and Pakistan will remain a chal- lenge. Continued targeting of al-Qaeda militarily will need to figure prominently in any successful counterinsurgency. Deny- ing al-Qaeda the alliances that are the key to its longevity and effectiveness will also

12 McNally & Weinbaum Endnotes

1. Nick Paton, “Al-Qaeda ‘Very Active’ in Afghanistan: U.S. 16. Seth G. Jones, “A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Commander,” CNN, April 13, 2016. Qa`ida and Other Salafi Jihadists,” RAND National De- fense Research Institute, 2014. 2. Joshua Partlow, “In Afghanistan, Taliban Leaving al-Qae- d a B e h i n d ,” , November 11, 2009. 17. Jones, “Al-Qaeda’s Persistent Sanctuary.”

3. David E. Sanger and Mark Mazzetti, “New Estimate of 18. Jones, “A Persistent Threat.” Strength of al-Qaeda Is Offered,”, June 30, 2010. 19. Bill Roggio, “US Airstrike Kills 15 Pakistani Taliban Fighters in Eastern Afghanistan,” The Long War Journal, 4. “After 11 Years of War, al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is Small- September 11, 2015. er but Trying to Mount a Comeback,” Fox News, October 22, 2012. 20. Stephen Tankel, “Going Native: The Pakistanization of Al-Qaeda,” War on the Rocks, October 22, 2013. 5. , Taliban: Militant , Oil and Funda- mentalism in , Yale University Press, 2000, 21. Don Rassler, “Al-Qa`ida’s Pakistan Strategy,” CTC Senti- 130. nel, June 15, 2009.

6. Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, “Separating 22. Ibid. the Taliban from al-Qaeda: The Core of Success in Af- ghanistan,” Center on International Cooperation, Febru- 23. Qadir Habib, Ron Synovitz, Frud Bezhan, and Michael ary 2011. Scollon, “Afghanistan’s Northern Flash Points,” Radio Free /Radio Liberty, 2015; Farhan Zahid, “The Successes 7. Hussain Haqqani, “Afghanistan’s Islamist Groups,” Hud- and Failures of Pakistan’s Operation Zarb-e Azb,” James- son Institute, May 23, 2007. town Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 13, Iss. 14, July 10, 2015.

8. Ibid. 24. Ellen Barry, “Al-Qaeda Opens New Branch on Indian Subcontinent,” The New York Times, September 4, 2014. 9. Don Rassler and Vahid Brown, “The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa`ida,” Combating Terrorism Center, 25. Tim Craig, “An Offshoot of al-Qaeda is Regrouping in July 14, 2011. Pakistan,” The Washington Post, February 12, 2016.

10. Andrew Wander, “A History of Terror: Al-Qaeda 1988- 26. Anurag Chandran, “Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subconti- 2008,” , July 12, 2008. nent: Almost Forgotten,” AEI Critical Threats Project, September 3, 2015. 11. Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, “Separating the Tali- ban and al-Qaeda.” 27. Lauren Carroll, “Retired General Says al-Qaida has Grown ‘fourfold’ in last 5 years,” Politifact, February 1, 12. Raza , “The Death Knell For Foreign Fighters in Pa- 2015. kistan?” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 7, Iss. 8, August 2014. 28. Partlow, “In Afghanistan, Taliban Leaving al-Qaeda Be- 13. Seth G. Jones, “Al-Qaeda’s Persistent Sanctuary,” ARI Real h i n d .” Instituto Elcano, April 13, 2011. 29. Bill Roggio and Thomas Joscelyn, “New Taliban Emir Ac- 14. Ibid. cepts al Qaeda’s Oath of Allegiance,” The Long War Jour- nal, August 14, 2015. 15. Ty McCormick, “Al-Qaeda Core: A Short History,” For- eign Policy, March 17, 2014.

A Resilient al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan 13 30. “Al-Qaeda Leader Pledges Allegiance to New Taliban 45. Jeremy Kahn, “The Next al-Qaeda?” Newsweek, February Leader,” , June 11, 2016. 25, 2010.

31. Bill Roggio, “Afghan Military Claims Dual-hatted Taliban 46. Ashley J. Tellis, “The Menace That Is Lashkar-e-Taiba,” and al Qaeda Leader Killed in ISAF Airstrike,” The Long Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March War Journal, August 22, 2013. 2012.

32. Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, “Separating the Tali- 47. Kahn, “The Next al-Qaeda?” ban and al-Qaeda.” 48. “Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent,” Global Security, 33. Partlow, “In Afghanistan, Taliban Leaving al-Qaeda Be- 2016. h i n d .” 49. “Al-Qaeda Said To Boost Taliban Fight Against Afghan 34. Thomas Joscelyn, “al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Paki- Government,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 19, stan: An Enduring Threat,” The Long War Journal, May 2016. 20, 2014. 50. Barbara Sude, “Assessing Al-Qa`ida Central’s Resilience,” 35. Bill Roggio and Thomas Joscelyn, “Osama bin Laden’s CTC Sentinel, September 11, 2015. Files: ‘Very Strong Military Activity in Afghanistan’,” The Long War Journal, February 27, 2015. 51. Jessica Donati and Habib Khan Totakhil, “Twelve Die in Coalition Raid in Afghanistan,” , 36. Rassler and Brown, “The Haqqani Nexus.” April 16, 2016.

37. “Haqqanis Helped New Taliban Chief Earn Loyalty of 52. Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, “As U.S. Focuses on Top Dissidents,” Pakistan Today, April 11, 2016. ISIS and the Taliban, al-Qaeda Re-emerges,” The New York Times, December 29, 2015. 38. Mujib Mashal, “Haqqanis Steering Deadlier Taliban in Afghanistan, Officials Say,” The New York Times, May 7, 2016.

39. Khan, “The Death Knell for Foreign Fighters in Paki- stan?”

40. Tankel, “Going Native.”

41. Daniel Nasaw, “Taliban Kills CIA Agents at US Outpost in Afghanistan,” The Guardian, December 31, 2009.

42. Barrett et al, “The al-Qaeda-Taliban Nexus.”

43. Bill Roggio, “Harakat-ul-Mujahideen ‘Operates Terrorist Training Camps in Eastern Afghanistan’,” The Long War Journal, August 8, 2014.

44. Bill Roggio and Thomas Joscelyn, “US Military Strikes Large al Qaeda Training Camps in Southern Afghani- s t a n ,” The Long War Journal, October 13, 2015.

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