Naval War College Review Volume 69 Article 16 Number 2 Spring

2016 Success and Failure in Limited War: Information & Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf & Iraq Wars Spencer D. Bakich

Derrill T. Goldizen

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Recommended Citation Bakich, Spencer D. and Goldizen, Derrill T. (2016) "Success and Failure in Limited War: Information & Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf & Iraq Wars," Naval War College Review: Vol. 69 : No. 2 , Article 16. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/16

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Readers should note that doing so the highest levels of government. For the requires us to maintain both a sufficient purposes of his theory, Bakich char- number of uniformed armed forces acterizes limited wars as those fought personnel and a treasury sufficient to at a high level of intensity for limited fund both military operations involving aims but whose outcomes “are of a soldiers conducting extended combat considerable consequence for the states operations anywhere in the world and involved and for the broader interna- the significant expense of hiring private tional system.” Furthermore, restraint military contractors to perform the sup- is necessary to avoid escalation—a port services necessary to enable them. tendency of limited wars. Not surpris- This economic model, while currently ingly, Bakich focuses his analysis on feasible and tenable for the United States four preeminent case studies from the as a wealthy nation, may not work for “American century”: the Korean War; another nation with more-constrained the Vietnam War; the Persian Gulf War resources. In the future, while the (Operation DESERT STORM); and the “demand” may be there and the “sup- Iraq war (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM). ply” of contractors may still exist, if The book’s first two chapters are largely a nation does not have the financial theoretical. Bakich points out how estab- resources to pay for those contracted lished approaches such as “rationalistic services, this model might not work. strategic choice theory” and the “foreign Outsourcing Security is a valuable policy decision making (FPDM) school” read for military and civilian de- cannot fully explain how information fense professionals. Stanley applies influences strategy, or its outcome, a thoughtful analysis to what many in war. He argues that organizational may have thought they understood, theory does not capture the true nature and his work brings both depth of relationships between strategic and academic merit to the topic. leaders and national security organiza- tions. As Bakich writes, “A gap remains NEAL H. BRALLEY in our understanding of the sources of strategic success in [limited] war.” To bridge this gap, Bakich confidently posits his “information institutions” Success and Failure in Limited War: Information approach. Simply put, it is the pattern & Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf of information flow between those at & Iraq Wars, by Spencer D. Bakich. Chicago: the apex of power and their national Univ. of Chicago Press, 2014. 344 pages. $35 security organizations that predisposes (paperback). states to success or failure in limited war. This groundbreaking treatise by Dr. The information institutions approach Spencer Bakich, visiting lecturer in suggests that top decision makers served political science at the University by an information-rich and densely of Richmond, endeavors to explain networked national security appara- America’s mixed success with limited tus should have a better grasp of the war since 1950 by way of a new theo- strategic environment and experience retical approach to analyzing policy- greater military-diplomatic coordination strategy formulation and execution at in planning and execution, significantly

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enhancing the effectiveness of their Interestingly, Bakich’s emphasis on insti- limited-war strategies. Bakich carefully tutional as opposed to organizational re- explains the methodology used to test lationships in ascertaining the pertinent his theory and introduces two direct information flows reveals the often- competitors: organizational culture disproportionate influence of key theory and democratic civil-military re- individuals in the decision-making lations theory. Key propositions on stra- process. In the Korean War, MacArthur’s tegic performance are also tabulated to near stranglehold on strategic intel- test each of the three theories against the ligence available to top policy makers empirical data (the four case studies). was abetted by John Allison (in charge In the next four chapters, Bakich of the Department of State’s Office convincingly demonstrates how only of Northeast Asian Affairs) arguing the information institutions approach for American intervention north of correctly predicts (or explains) both the thirty-eighth parallel, against the the military and diplomatic strategic advice of State’s own Policy Planning outcomes in all four limited-war cases, Staff—with disastrous results. In the with the competing theories falling short Persian Gulf War, President George H. in one way or another. For example, W. Bush’s personal, “hands-on” ap- in the Persian Gulf War, defeating proach to information gathering, down the Iraqi army without fracturing the to the analyst and desk-officer level, international coalition defined strate- was tempered by National Security gic success for the United States. The Adviser Brent Scowcroft’s and his deputy information institutions approach alone Robert Gates’s deft management of the correctly anticipates military and diplo- interagency process. These and other matic success in the Persian Gulf War. anecdotes will keep the reader engaged Organizational culture theory expects and enthusiastic about the book. both military and diplomatic failure With over eight hundred endnotes (given the extant organizational culture gleaned from more than four hundred characterized by a military-dominant authoritative sources, this is first and conception of war and a Jominian norm foremost a scholarly work. Those in of civil-military relations), whereas the international relations community democratic civil-military relations seeking to understand the puzzle of theory forecasts military success but America’s recent strategic performance diplomatic failure (given divergent in limited wars will find this information military and diplomatic strategic prefer- institutions approach a worthy adjunct ences). The book’s final chapter nicely to the more established theories. Those encapsulates the results of the aforemen- who read purely for pleasure will enjoy tioned analyses and their significance the four case studies, each offering a for theory and policy. One finishes the unique take on the various policies and book persuaded that the information strategies crafted and the decisions made institutions approach offers a more at the highest levels of government. In satisfactory explanation for America’s short, the book has much to offer, to mixed military and diplomatic results the serious reader and dilettante alike. in limited war than do the alternatives. DERRILL T. GOLDIZEN

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