Iraq's Military Forces: 1988-1993
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CSIS_______________________________ Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 Iraq’s Military Forces: 1988-1993 Anthony H. Cordesman CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment September, 1994 2 Note This report is provided for historial reference purposes. For current reporting see the CSIS Net Assessment Series Volume on Iran under CSIS Publications Table of Contents IRAQ’S MILITARY FORCES: 1988-1993............................................................................................1 I. STRATEGY, MILITARY EXPENDITURES, AND ARMS TRANSFERS ......................................4 THE INTERNAL POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE GULF WAR AND THE CEASE FIRE ....................................5 Post-war Shifts Within Iraq's Power Structure ......................................................................................6 The Post-war Role of Iraq's Intelligence and Internal Security Services..............................................11 IRAQ'S CRISIS WITH THE KURDS...........................................................................................................14 IRAQ'S CRISIS WITH ITS SHI'ITES...........................................................................................................29 THE STRUGGLE TO ELIMINATE IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.......................................39 CONTINUING CONFRONTATION WITH THE WEST................................................................................41 IRAQI MILITARY EXPENDITURES ..........................................................................................................69 IRAQI ARMS IMPORTS ...........................................................................................................................71 IRAQI EFFORTS TO SMUGGLE ARMS AND PARTS AND REBUILD ITS IRAQI MILITARY INDUSTRIES SINCE THE GULF WAR...........................................................................................................................72 IRAQ, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, AND TERRORISM......................................................................74 II. IRAQI LAND FORCES...................................................................................................................77 IRAQI LAND FORCES BEFORE THE GULF WAR.....................................................................................77 THE IRAQI ARMY DURING THE GULF WAR .........................................................................................79 RESHAPING IRAQI LAND FORCES AFTER THE GULF WAR...................................................................83 THE PRESENT STRENGTH OF THE IRAQI ARMY ...................................................................................85 CURRENT MAJOR EQUIPMENT HOLDINGS ...........................................................................................87 CURRENT LIMITS ON THE CAPABILITIES OF THE IRAQI ARMY ...........................................................89 THE IRAQI REPUBLICAN GUARDS AND SPECIAL REPUBLICAN GUARDS.............................................91 THE WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES OF THE IRAQI ARMY .....................................................................93 III. THE IRAQI AIR FORCE ..............................................................................................................96 3 THE BUILD-UP OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE BEFORE THE GULF WAR ....................................................96 IRAQ'S LAND BASED AIR DEFENSES BEFORE THE GULF WAR..........................................................103 IRAQI AIR FORCE WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES DURING THE GULF WAR .......................................105 THE RECOVERY OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE AFTER THE GULF WAR .................................................109 THE RECOVERY OF IRAQI GROUND BASED AIR DEFENSES AFTER THE GULF WAR........................110 THE WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE ..............................................................111 IV. THE IRAQI NAVY.......................................................................................................................115 THE IRAQI NAVY DURING THE GULF WAR ........................................................................................115 THE WAR FIGHTING CAPABILITIES OF THE IRAQI NAVY...................................................................117 V. ANTI-REGIME MILITARY FORCES.........................................................................................120 ANTI-REGIME SHI'ITES ........................................................................................................................123 THE KURDISH RESISTANCE.................................................................................................................125 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OPPOSITION MILITARY FORCES .................................................................126 VI. IRAQ AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION .................................................................149 THE IMPACT OF THE U.N. EFFORT SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE...............................................................149 IRAQ'S MISSILE WEAPONS ..................................................................................................................151 Iraq's "Super Guns"..........................................................................................................................156 Iraq's Missile Activity During the Gulf War......................................................................................158 Iraq's Missile Activity After the Gulf War .........................................................................................162 IRAQI CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS............................................................................................166 Iraq and Chemical Weapons during the Gulf War.............................................................................170 Iraq's Current Chemical Weapons Capabilities ................................................................................173 IRAQI BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.............................................................................................................176 IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFORTS .................................................................................................183 Iraq's Nuclear Efforts After 1988......................................................................................................186 The Future of Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Effort....................................................................................198 THE WAR FIGHTING IMPACT OF IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ...................................200 VII. DEALING WITH THE THREAT FROM IRAQ ......................................................................204 4 I. Strategy, Military Expenditures, and Arms Transfers1 Iran may now be the rising military power in the Gulf, but Iraq's present regime is more of a threat in terms of aggressiveness and risk taking. As long as Saddam Hussein and the present Ba'ath elite is in power, Iraq is almost certain to be revanchist and aggressive in character. This may not lead to overt Iraqi use of military forces against other states, or to large scale conflicts, but it is almost certain to lead to constant Iraqi tests of Western resolve and growing Iraqi efforts to intimidate the southern Gulf states. While Iraq's character may change under a future regime, this is uncertain. There are moderate and democratic Iraqi opposition movements, but they have little power or internal influence in Iraq. Iraq's politics are highly nationalistic and violent in character, and they are the politics of small competing Sunni power elites and clan groupings. Even if Saddam falls, his most likely successor is another small autocratic elite. The military remains the second most powerful element in Iraq, and seems likely to be the only real rival to some new Sunni "extended family". A new elite may be somewhat more pragmatic in character, and turn inwards to deal with the problems posed by Iraq's present economic crisis, the Kurds, and the Shi'ites. Even a more pragmatic regime, however, is likely to perceive itself as surrounded by enemies, and to maintain a high level of military spending. It will seek weapons of mass destruction as long as Iran or any other state in the region possesses them -- probably including Israel Further, any new Iraqi regime must deal with the threat posed by ethnic and sectarian conflict, and with the fact that Iraq's strategic position is exposed in many ways. It is likely to see the growing military capabilities of Iran and Turkey as a threat, and to see the West and southern Gulf states as at least potentially hostile. It is unlikely to trust Iran, and Iraq has a 1,448 kilometer land boundary with Iran. It is likely to feel it must compete with its Gulf neighbors for a share of oil revenues, and with Iran in developing weapons of mass destruction. The issue of Kuwait is also unlikely to vanish, even if a new regime recognizes the new Iraqi-Kuwaiti boundary. The issue of reparations may poison Iraqi-Kuwait relations for years, and memories will be slow to die. Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf now consists of a 58 kilometer coastline on relatively shallow Gulf waters. Its only major port on the Gulf is Basra, which can only be reached via the Shatt al-Arab -- a river whose waters Iraq shares with Iran. Due to a U.N.-sponsored border demarcation, Iraq has lost much of its only naval 5 base at Umm Qasr, and even if it builds