The Advent of Jointness During the Gulf
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As seen from back seat of Fighter Squadron 41 F-14A Tomcat aircraft, pilot brings aircraft in for arrested landing on flight deck of USS Theodore Roosevelt during Operation Desert Storm (DOD/Parsons) t has been three decades since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols The Advent of I Department of Defense Reorganiza- tion Act of 1986, a piece of legislation that changed how the Department of Jointness During the Defense (DOD) functions and how the military conducts operations. By adopting the concept now known as Gulf War “jointness,” it restricted the Services to an administrative and organizational role as force providers, while combatant A 25-Year Retrospective commanders held operational author- ity with a chain of command leading By Christopher G. Marquis, Denton Dye, and Ross S. Kinkead directly to the Secretary of Defense and the President.1 The intent of the legisla- tion could be compared to that of the Constitution supplanting the Articles of Confederation, which drew the rela- tively independent states into a more closely centralized political body. Major Christopher G. Marquis, USAF, is an Instructor in the Joint Warfighting Department at the Air Less than 5 years after its passage, Command and Staff College. Lieutenant Colonel Denton Dye, USA, is a Member of the Interoperability Goldwater-Nichols encountered its first and Standardization Team at North Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters, Supreme Allied big test when Saddam Hussein’s forces Command Transformation. Major Ross S. Kinkead, USA, is a Member of the Directorate for Intelligence at the Joint Intelligence Center, U.S. European Command, following his most recent assignment as the invaded Kuwait in August 1990. In Executive Assistant to the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff J2. response, a U.S.-led coalition reacted 76 Recall / The Advent of Jointness During the Gulf War JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 with a buildup of forces in Saudi Arabia This article examines the concerns On October 14, 1983, rivalry within and an offensive that drove the Iraqis Goldwater-Nichols was meant to address the Marxist People’s Revolutionary out of Kuwait—the Gulf War. Its success and demonstrates that the United States Government of Grenada resulted in a seemed a vindication for Goldwater- and its coalition partners would have militant coup and the execution of the Nichols specifically and joint operations achieved victory in the Gulf War even country’s leader, Prime Minister Maurice more generally. General H. Norman without the legislation. What follows is an Bishop. The resulting chaos threatened Schwarzkopf, USA, the commander in explanation of the historic context lead- the safety of more than 650 American chief of U.S. Central Command, an- ing to Goldwater-Nichols, its application medical students on the island.6 This led swered to Secretary of Defense Richard in Operation Just Cause (1989), and an to the U.S. launch of Operation Urgent Cheney through the Chairman of the abridged overview of Operations Desert Fury on October 25. The deployed force Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Shield and Desert Storm. The balance of for this mission consisted largely of a Powell. Lieutenant General Charles the article deals with the varying opinions joint Army and Marine ground force, Horner, USAF, who held the newly of jointness in the Gulf War. It provides supported by special operations, naval, established position of Joint Forces Air an analysis summarizing the ideas of the and air assets. The mission resulted in the Component Commander (JFACC), was authors and delivers recommendations to successful rescue of 720 U.S. and foreign in control of the air war. military leadership. Above all, jointness citizens and the restoration of popular With the hindsight of a quarter- must be continually developed in order to government on the island at a cost of 135 century since the conflict, the verdict on maintain its effectiveness. U.S. casualties.7 jointness in the Gulf War is now more Although generally viewed as a suc- nuanced. In part, this is due to the fact Operations Eagle Claw cess by military leaders, Urgent Fury was that the U.S. military failed to replicate and Urgent Fury marred by many of the same issues that the spectacular success of Operation On November 4, 1979, militant follow- plagued Eagle Claw. There were fail- Desert Storm in subsequent engage- ers of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ures of communication and equipment ments.2 Also, the Services had not all overran the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, shortfalls, as Army units were unable embraced jointness without reservations. taking 66 American citizens hostage. to coordinate air support with naval as- The Marine Corps seemed the most When diplomatic negotiations proved sets. Assault plans were not coordinated skeptical of the benefits of jointness, and fruitless, DOD planned a raid to liber- between Services prior to combat opera- their limited interoperability with other ate the hostages with a joint task force tions, leaving units largely unaware of Services during the Gulf War appeared to (JTF) comprised of personnel from four what adjacent unit objectives were and reinforce their doubts. of the military Services. In April 1980, how they fit into the overall scheme of Jointness clearly was not the decisive the JTF attempted its rescue operation, maneuver. These shortcomings resulted factor in the coalition victory in the codenamed Eagle Claw. The result was in fratricide and the inadvertent bombing Gulf War, although it was likely a posi- a complete disaster, culminating in a of noncombatants.8 The complications tive contributing factor. The superiority fatal collision between a U.S. helicopter suffered in Iran and Grenada eventually of the coalition forces over Iraqi forces and supporting C-130. No hostages led Congress to pass Goldwater-Nichols, was so comprehensive that it alone was were rescued, and eight members of triggering the largest reorganization since sufficient to achieve the mission objec- the JTF were killed. Additional losses the formation of DOD in 1947.9 tives. The coalition was better equipped, included aircraft, equipment, and secret better trained, and better led than the documents.3 Passage of Goldwater-Nichols Iraqis. The coalition benefited from wide- In May 1980, a special commis- The year prior to Urgent Fury, Chair- spread international support, especially sion chartered by the Joint Chiefs of man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General regional support, and focused objectives. Staff examined the operation’s failure. David C. Jones told the House Armed Moreover, jointness was not fully realized The review’s chairman, Admiral J.L. Services Committee, “The system is during the operation. In some cases, it Holloway III, USN (Ret.), identified broken. I have tried to reform it from was improperly applied. U.S. forces are the “major issues” that ultimately led to the inside, but I cannot. Congress is much closer to realizing the full pos- the operation’s demise.4 These included going to have to mandate necessary sibilities of jointness today, after several separate training between the units prior reforms.”10 He stressed the need for years of major combat operations and to the mission, a muddled command and “an organization which will allow us counterinsurgencies in the Middle East. control hierarchy, and problems with to develop the proper strategy, neces- The concept of globally integrated opera- equipment interoperability.5 Congress sary planning, and the full warfighting tions, introduced by then–Chairman of failed to act decisively on the findings of capability.”11 To accomplish these goals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin the Holloway Commission, but events in Congress sought the following changes: Dempsey in 2012, may further help in the Caribbean a few years later would fur- clarifying the military chain of the development of jointness as a con- ther the argument for legislative reform. • command from operational com- tinuous state of military operations. JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 Marquis, Dye, and Kinkead 77 manders through the Secretary of The operation, codenamed Just Nations’ backing to oppose Saddam’s Defense to the President Cause, began on December 20 and forces. On August 6, King Fahd of Saudi • giving Service chiefs responsibility would be the largest military undertaking Arabia consented to allow coalition for training and equipping forces, since Vietnam. The campaign comprised troops to deploy into his nation.23 while making clear that they were a joint force of over 20,000 personnel Eighteen nations provided ground not in the chain of command for and 300 aircraft deployed from both the forces to the effort. The United States military operations United States and Panama to strike 27 alone deployed 500,000 troops and • elevating the Chairman of the Joint different locations simultaneously.16 The 2,000 tanks, with the British in second Chiefs of Staff relative to other results from the operation in Panama place, providing 35,000 troops and 210 Service chiefs by making him the appeared to be generally positive. The tanks.24 On paper, the Iraqi military was a principal military advisor to the military accomplished its objectives formidable opponent. Its army consisted President, creating a Vice Chairman within a few days.17 Clear lines of author- of about one million troops. Coalition position, and specifying that the ity and command were established early analysts estimated that 43 Iraqi divisions, Joint Staff worked for the Chairman through a JTF headquarters.18 The