The Advent of Jointness During the Gulf
As seen from back seat of Fighter Squadron 41 F-14A Tomcat aircraft, pilot brings aircraft in for arrested landing on flight deck of USS Theodore Roosevelt during Operation Desert Storm (DOD/Parsons)
t has been three decades since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols The Advent of I Department of Defense Reorganiza- tion Act of 1986, a piece of legislation that changed how the Department of Jointness During the Defense (DOD) functions and how the military conducts operations. By adopting the concept now known as Gulf War “jointness,” it restricted the Services to an administrative and organizational role as force providers, while combatant A 25-Year Retrospective commanders held operational author- ity with a chain of command leading By Christopher G. Marquis, Denton Dye, and Ross S. Kinkead directly to the Secretary of Defense and the President.1 The intent of the legisla- tion could be compared to that of the Constitution supplanting the Articles of Confederation, which drew the rela- tively independent states into a more closely centralized political body. Major Christopher G. Marquis, USAF, is an Instructor in the Joint Warfighting Department at the Air Less than 5 years after its passage, Command and Staff College. Lieutenant Colonel Denton Dye, USA, is a Member of the Interoperability Goldwater-Nichols encountered its first and Standardization Team at North Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters, Supreme Allied big test when Saddam Hussein’s forces Command Transformation. Major Ross S. Kinkead, USA, is a Member of the Directorate for Intelligence at the Joint Intelligence Center, U.S. European Command, following his most recent assignment as the invaded Kuwait in August 1990. In Executive Assistant to the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff J2. response, a U.S.-led coalition reacted
76 Recall / The Advent of Jointness During the Gulf War JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 with a buildup of forces in Saudi Arabia This article examines the concerns On October 14, 1983, rivalry within and an offensive that drove the Iraqis Goldwater-Nichols was meant to address the Marxist People’s Revolutionary out of Kuwait—the Gulf War. Its success and demonstrates that the United States Government of Grenada resulted in a seemed a vindication for Goldwater- and its coalition partners would have militant coup and the execution of the Nichols specifically and joint operations achieved victory in the Gulf War even country’s leader, Prime Minister Maurice more generally. General H. Norman without the legislation. What follows is an Bishop. The resulting chaos threatened Schwarzkopf, USA, the commander in explanation of the historic context lead- the safety of more than 650 American chief of U.S. Central Command, an- ing to Goldwater-Nichols, its application medical students on the island.6 This led swered to Secretary of Defense Richard in Operation Just Cause (1989), and an to the U.S. launch of Operation Urgent Cheney through the Chairman of the abridged overview of Operations Desert Fury on October 25. The deployed force Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Shield and Desert Storm. The balance of for this mission consisted largely of a Powell. Lieutenant General Charles the article deals with the varying opinions joint Army and Marine ground force, Horner, USAF, who held the newly of jointness in the Gulf War. It provides supported by special operations, naval, established position of Joint Forces Air an analysis summarizing the ideas of the and air assets. The mission resulted in the Component Commander (JFACC), was authors and delivers recommendations to successful rescue of 720 U.S. and foreign in control of the air war. military leadership. Above all, jointness citizens and the restoration of popular With the hindsight of a quarter- must be continually developed in order to government on the island at a cost of 135 century since the conflict, the verdict on maintain its effectiveness. U.S. casualties.7 jointness in the Gulf War is now more Although generally viewed as a suc- nuanced. In part, this is due to the fact Operations Eagle Claw cess by military leaders, Urgent Fury was that the U.S. military failed to replicate and Urgent Fury marred by many of the same issues that the spectacular success of Operation On November 4, 1979, militant follow- plagued Eagle Claw. There were fail- Desert Storm in subsequent engage- ers of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ures of communication and equipment ments.2 Also, the Services had not all overran the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, shortfalls, as Army units were unable embraced jointness without reservations. taking 66 American citizens hostage. to coordinate air support with naval as- The Marine Corps seemed the most When diplomatic negotiations proved sets. Assault plans were not coordinated skeptical of the benefits of jointness, and fruitless, DOD planned a raid to liber- between Services prior to combat opera- their limited interoperability with other ate the hostages with a joint task force tions, leaving units largely unaware of Services during the Gulf War appeared to (JTF) comprised of personnel from four what adjacent unit objectives were and reinforce their doubts. of the military Services. In April 1980, how they fit into the overall scheme of Jointness clearly was not the decisive the JTF attempted its rescue operation, maneuver. These shortcomings resulted factor in the coalition victory in the codenamed Eagle Claw. The result was in fratricide and the inadvertent bombing Gulf War, although it was likely a posi- a complete disaster, culminating in a of noncombatants.8 The complications tive contributing factor. The superiority fatal collision between a U.S. helicopter suffered in Iran and Grenada eventually of the coalition forces over Iraqi forces and supporting C-130. No hostages led Congress to pass Goldwater-Nichols, was so comprehensive that it alone was were rescued, and eight members of triggering the largest reorganization since sufficient to achieve the mission objec- the JTF were killed. Additional losses the formation of DOD in 1947.9 tives. The coalition was better equipped, included aircraft, equipment, and secret better trained, and better led than the documents.3 Passage of Goldwater-Nichols Iraqis. The coalition benefited from wide- In May 1980, a special commis- The year prior to Urgent Fury, Chair- spread international support, especially sion chartered by the Joint Chiefs of man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General regional support, and focused objectives. Staff examined the operation’s failure. David C. Jones told the House Armed Moreover, jointness was not fully realized The review’s chairman, Admiral J.L. Services Committee, “The system is during the operation. In some cases, it Holloway III, USN (Ret.), identified broken. I have tried to reform it from was improperly applied. U.S. forces are the “major issues” that ultimately led to the inside, but I cannot. Congress is much closer to realizing the full pos- the operation’s demise.4 These included going to have to mandate necessary sibilities of jointness today, after several separate training between the units prior reforms.”10 He stressed the need for years of major combat operations and to the mission, a muddled command and “an organization which will allow us counterinsurgencies in the Middle East. control hierarchy, and problems with to develop the proper strategy, neces- The concept of globally integrated opera- equipment interoperability.5 Congress sary planning, and the full warfighting tions, introduced by then–Chairman of failed to act decisively on the findings of capability.”11 To accomplish these goals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin the Holloway Commission, but events in Congress sought the following changes: Dempsey in 2012, may further help in the Caribbean a few years later would fur- clarifying the military chain of the development of jointness as a con- ther the argument for legislative reform. •• command from operational com- tinuous state of military operations.
JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 Marquis, Dye, and Kinkead 77 manders through the Secretary of The operation, codenamed Just Nations’ backing to oppose Saddam’s Defense to the President Cause, began on December 20 and forces. On August 6, King Fahd of Saudi •• giving Service chiefs responsibility would be the largest military undertaking Arabia consented to allow coalition for training and equipping forces, since Vietnam. The campaign comprised troops to deploy into his nation.23 while making clear that they were a joint force of over 20,000 personnel Eighteen nations provided ground not in the chain of command for and 300 aircraft deployed from both the forces to the effort. The United States military operations United States and Panama to strike 27 alone deployed 500,000 troops and •• elevating the Chairman of the Joint different locations simultaneously.16 The 2,000 tanks, with the British in second Chiefs of Staff relative to other results from the operation in Panama place, providing 35,000 troops and 210 Service chiefs by making him the appeared to be generally positive. The tanks.24 On paper, the Iraqi military was a principal military advisor to the military accomplished its objectives formidable opponent. Its army consisted President, creating a Vice Chairman within a few days.17 Clear lines of author- of about one million troops. Coalition position, and specifying that the ity and command were established early analysts estimated that 43 Iraqi divisions, Joint Staff worked for the Chairman through a JTF headquarters.18 The Joint including 12 armor, were in the Kuwaiti •• requiring military personnel enter- Staff kept policymakers informed and theater of operations, although only 4 ing strategic leadership roles to provided latitude for lower headquarters. of these divisions were from the elite have experience working with their Joint rehearsals and appropriate training Republican Guard.25 Even though the counterparts from other Services (so- by the Services were also credited with coalition held the airpower advantage called joint credit) the success.19 with a maximum strength of 1,820 com- •• creating mechanisms for military Ser- It appeared that Goldwater-Nichols bat aircraft,26 the Iraqi air force appeared vices to collaborate when developing had passed its initial test. However, the ready to challenge air superiority with capability requirements and acquisi- Just Cause operation was short lived and about 750 combat aircraft, the sixth larg- tion programs, and reducing redun- small scale. Operations lasted only a few est air force in the world, and a vast air dant procurement programs through days, and only about 4 percent of the par- defense system.27 the establishment of the Office of ticipating U.S. troops would be deployed General Schwarzkopf used his author- the Under Secretary of Defense for in the Gulf War, so few concrete lessons ity to organize forces as he saw fit. He Acquisition.12 were drawn from it. There would be a made the decision to organize air com- much greater challenge the following ponents under one functional command. These reforms met with staunch summer, when Iraqi forces marched into He then named Lieutenant General resistance from within the Pentagon. the small nation of Kuwait. Horner, commander of U.S. Central Air However, by late 1986, the experiences Force, as the JFACC “to provide central- of Eagle Claw and Urgent Fury had Operations Desert Shield ized planning, decentralized execution, shifted political opinion decisively toward and Desert Storm and the integration of both service and the need for legislation. Congress voted In the early morning hours of August 2, allied air capabilities.”28 In contrast, he overwhelmingly for Goldwater-Nichols, 1990, three Iraqi divisions crossed the did not appoint a separate Joint Force with only four Members of both houses border into Kuwait. The small Kuwaiti Land Component Commander. voting in opposition.13 army and navy provided courageous Operation Desert Storm, also known Operation Just Cause but futile resistance against the superior as the Gulf War, began at 1:30 a.m. on invading force. Kuwait’s ruler, Sheikh January 17, when U.S. Navy ships in Congress would not have to wait long Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah, fled to Saudi the Persian Gulf and Red Sea launched before its reorganization efforts were Arabia. By August 4, Iraqi troops had Tomahawk cruise missiles toward put to the test. In 1989, tensions in completed their conquest and were Baghdad. Throughout Iraq on that first Panama began to rise as the actions of lining up on the Saudi-Kuwaiti border.20 night, coalition helicopters and fixed- General Manuel Noriega’s government Most officials in the U.S. Government wing aircraft struck key targets to cripple became increasingly provocative. The were surprised by Iraq’s action. Although air defenses and disable communica- situation reached a boiling point on Iraqi officials had made threatening tions.29 Tomahawks and F-117s scored December 15, when Panama’s National charges against Kuwait in the months a number of hits in Baghdad, shutting Assembly declared a state of war with leading up to the invasion, U.S. officials down the electrical system and knocking the United States and a Marine lieuten- had assumed it was merely a bluff. 21 out CNN’s live telecast.30 ant was killed by Noriega’s forces at a Having realized this assumption was a The Iraqi air force and air defenses roadblock in Panama City.14 As a result, mistake, President Bush decided to act proved no match for the sudden on- President George H.W. Bush activated and made his determination clear to his slaught. Coalition forces achieved air a contingency plan to secure American administration and the public.22 American superiority within a week, forcing Iraqi interests in Panama and remove Noriega and British leaders began to gather an pilots to attempt to hide their planes, from power.15 international coalition with the United place them next to residential buildings
78 Recall / The Advent of Jointness During the Gulf War JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 Airman, front, of 68th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (AES), Norton Air Force Base, Airman, right, of 118th AES, Tennessee Air National Guard, and Airman, left, of 137th AES receive mission briefing during Operation Desert Storm (U.S. Air Force/Kimberly Yearyean)
or landmarks, or fly them to Iran for pro- the Kuwaiti border, engaging a mecha- Desert Storm “raised the execution of tection.31 Moreover, Iraqi responses were nized infantry division and armored joint warfare to an unprecedented level disjointed and ineffective. They launched division of Saddam’s elite Republican of competence.”40 Scud missiles at Saudi Arabia to cause Guard.36 All the attacks succeeded spec- James Locher, a former staffer on the terror and at Israel to draw it into the tacularly, and by February 26, Kuwaiti Senate Committee on Armed Services, conflict and thus wreck the coalition, but forces were able to march into Kuwait observed the widespread approval of the these efforts ultimately failed.32 Similarly, City as part of an army of liberation.37 operational chain of command estab- a desperate Iraqi assault at Khafji in late The Iraqi forces had been reduced to a lished by the legislation. He considered January was repulsed.33 disorganized mob attempting to retreat the recognition of its success to be “uni- The coalition launched its ground back to their homeland. The next day, the versal.” According to Locher, William offensive at 3:00 a.m. on February 24 coalition declared a ceasefire. Kuwait was Perry, Secretary of Defense in the Bill with a three-pronged attack. In the liberated. The Gulf War was won.38 Clinton administration, remarked to east, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force the committee, “All commentaries and advanced into southeast Kuwait, sup- Positive Reactions to after-action reports on [Desert Shield/ ported by the multinational Joint Forces Jointness in Desert Storm Desert Storm] attribute the success of Command–East.34 In the west, XVIII Many viewed the overwhelming success the operation to the fundamental struc- Corps, including the 101st Airborne of the Gulf War as a vindication of tural changes in the chain of command Division and 24th Infantry Division, Goldwater-Nichols and a clear sign of brought about by Goldwater-Nichols.”41 along with the French Daguet 6th Light the benefits of joint warfighting. Harry Katherine Boo, writing for the Armored Division, maneuvered north be- G. Summers, in On Strategy II, stated Washington Monthly, proclaimed that fore swinging east toward Highway 8, to that the legislation was “long overdue” the effects of Goldwater-Nichols were the rear of Iraqi forces in Kuwait.35 In the and credited it with attaining unity of “gloriously apparent” in the Gulf War center, U.S. VII Corps and the British 1st effort in the operation.39 Robert H. victory.42 She placed upon the Services Armored Division drove into Iraq near Scales, in Certain Victory, wrote of how much of the blame for the then-recent
JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 Marquis, Dye, and Kinkead 79 chain of military disasters, such as the development, along with a “revolution” operations inefficiency for inefficiency. helicopter crash during Operation in training and doctrine from the 1970s.48 Aspects of both Somalia and Bosnia come Eagle Claw, the Beirut Marine barracks As these opinions make clear, the changes to mind.”52 The failure to replicate the bombing, and the friendly fire incidents brought about by Goldwater-Nichols overwhelming success of Desert Storm during Operation Urgent Fury.43 “By were not universally recognized as the key suggests that jointness is not by itself a elevating international safety over service to victory in Desert Storm. decisive factor. If it were, we might expect politics,” Boo wrote, “Congress helped every operation to turn out with a similar the military win the Gulf War—a fact Skeptical Reactions to the degree of success. crucial to recognize now, not for the Impact of Jointness Furthermore, even if the Services rec- sake of praising Congress, but for the Some researchers went even further, ognized the Gulf War as a “joint” victory, cause of broader military reform.”44 By arguing that Desert Storm was actually they took different lessons from the con- her reasoning, Goldwater-Nichols was a poor example of jointness. Michael R. flict and emerged with different opinions an antidote for the follies of the Services’ Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, in The of jointness. Some viewed it as a zero- control of operations. Generals’ War, addressed this point: sum game, with one Service benefiting at another’s expense. Bruce Watson and Other Factors in the The campaign was “joint” more in name his team exemplified this idea in Military Gulf War Victory than in fact. Each service fought its own Lessons from the Gulf War, when they To many observers, however, the leg- war, concentrating on its own piece of the declared the Air Force “prevailed,” while islation was a minor factor in the coali- conflict with a single-minded intensity, the Marines afloat were “reduced to pos- tion victory. Dominic Caraccilo, writing and the commanders in Washington and ing a threat that was never realized.”53 for Army Magazine in 2015, made Riyadh failed to fully harmonize the war no mention of jointness in his article plans. In this sense, the Gulf War shows that Jointness and Airpower and instead credited the success of the there is much to be done if the American For many, the Gulf War was a vindica- mission to the fact that the goals were armed forces are to operate in a truly coor- tion not of joint warfare, but of the “well-defined, resourced, and limited dinated and integrated manner.49 strategic use of airpower. Within the to driving the Iraqis out of Kuwait Air Force, the Gulf War was seen as and defending the Kingdom of Saudi Weitz, writing in 2004, largely agreed the culmination of many of the previ- Arabia.”45 Richard Weitz of the Insti- with this opinion. He elaborated on how ously unfulfilled promises of airpower tute for Foreign Policy Analysis noted the Services, in the lead-up to Desert advocates. For those who shared this the Gulf War was “over-determined” Storm, each focused on its own war plans, perspective, the success of the operation and that “so many factors favored an rather than collaborating jointly. The would usher in an era in which the air allied victory” that a change in any Special Planning Group, working on the domain would be the most prominent. single factor, jointness presumably air plan, was known as the “Black Hole.” Price T. Bingham, then an Air Force included, would not have affected the The ground campaign was devised by lieutenant colonel, expressed an opinion ultimate result.46 the “Jedi Knights,” many of whom widely held within that Service when he Don D. Chipman, a retired mili- were Army graduates of the U.S. Army wrote, “Campaign success now depends tary professor from the faculty at Air School of Advanced Military Studies. on superiority in the air more than it University’s Squadron Officer College, The Marines seemed to lack easy access does on surface superiority.”54 According acknowledged the positive effect of joint to either group and were left to generate to Bingham, existing joint doctrine was doctrine on the success of the Gulf War their own plan.50 outdated and needed to be brought into but compiled it with other elements, Even Katherine Boo conceded the alignment with Air Force doctrine.55 including the use of modern technology imperfect application of jointness in the Perhaps of all the Services, the Air such as precision-guided munitions and Gulf War, documenting the important Force most favorably embraced the stealth technology, training, and strong detail that Navy communication systems potential of joint operations. Air Force leadership, particularly in the person of were not able to receive messages over doctrine defines the Airmen’s Perspective General Schwarzkopf. “Yet, even with secure modems from Riyadh. This neces- as including a belief in the centralized all of these factors,” Chipman observed, sitated the physical transfer of the air control of airpower by Airmen.56 Since “ultimately the final victory depended on tasking order to the Navy Service com- 1947, fixed-wing air assets had been the proper application of airpower.”47 ponent commander aboard his aircraft distributed between the Air Force, Navy, General Fred Franks, who com- carrier in the Persian Gulf or Red Sea and Marines. The innovation of the manded VII Corps during Desert Storm, each day.51 position of JFACC, used in Desert Storm and his co-author Gregory Fontenot Mackubin T. Owens, writing in 1996, under the control of Lieutenant General concluded in a recent article in Army made a key point when he noted that Horner, at long last brought many of Magazine that the key to the victory in “there have been several operations in the these assets under the tactical control of the Gulf War lay with improved leadership Goldwater-Nichols era that match earlier one Airman.
80 Recall / The Advent of Jointness During the Gulf War JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 Air-to-air view of two U.S. Air Force F-15C Eagle fighter aircraft of 33rd Tactical Fighter Wing, Eglin Air Force Base, and Royal Saudi air force F-5E Tiger II fighter aircraft during mission in support of Operation Desert Storm (U.S. Air Force/Chris Putman)
However, this championing of both late changes to the air tasking order and tive and inevitable. The point is that the airpower and jointness was not necessarily listing preferred targets as secondary in Services must see jointness as a normal shared by the other Services. According the hope of increasing the likelihood for state of operations, not a special condi- to Weitz, Navy aviators believed the joint approval.60 tion to be used only during wartime. air campaign limited their involvement. It should come as no surprise that the Also, jointness is not a cure-all for the Both the Navy and Marine Corps were Marines were the most reluctant to buy multitude of problems that emerge in skeptical of the doctrinal legitimacy of the into the joint warfighting concept. The the conduct of war. In fact, the learning JFACC concept.57 The communication Marines had, and retain, a reputation curve of the Services operating together systems aboard Navy aircraft were in- for independence and self-sufficiency in can create its own short-term problems. compatible with the secure systems of the land and air operations. Their symbiotic The ultimate benefit of achieving unity Airborne Warning and Control System, relationship with the Navy was in place of effort necessitates the Services work which limited the Navy’s ability to con- centuries before Goldwater-Nichols. through these challenges. duct missions over Kuwait and Iraq.58 They were thus less likely to embrace a Jointness requires continuous in- There were plenty of disputes between concept that would potentially disrupt teroperability among the Services. The Army and Air Force personnel regard- this composition. As a case in point, spe- idea that the U.S. military would fight as ing target selection. The mutual distrust cial conditions regarding the deployment a joint team, then separate into its Service manifested itself with the Army disputing of Marine air assets have been incorpo- corners in peacetime, mutes the long- many of the claimed strikes and damage rated into joint doctrine.61 term benefits of joint operations. Now assessments of the Air Force pilots.59 that our military has waged major combat Perhaps the most serious disagree- Jointness for the Long Term and counterinsurgency operations for 15 ments were between the Air Force and This article is not a criticism of the years in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is adopt- Marines. The Marines, distrustful of idea of jointness. The current nature ing a more realistic, workable method of the joint air tasking cycle process that of war, in both tempo and scope, and operating jointly. selected targets and assigned sorties, the limited resources now available for In 2014, William Odom and admittedly gamed the system by offering national defense make jointness impera- Christopher Hayes stated, “Today the
JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 Marquis, Dye, and Kinkead 81 Oil wells burn out of control after set ablaze by retreating Iraqi forces during Operation Desert Storm (DOD) separate military Services that make up Dempsey’s goal was for the Services to work properly, it must be a continuous America’s Armed Forces work together become “pervasively interoperable,” with state, not merely a temporary condition more often than at any time in the the result being that Servicemembers for the Services to participate in dur- Nation’s history. Their success over the throughout the military would see them- ing contingencies. While Desert Storm last decade of war has cemented the selves as part of a joint force.65 obscured its impact on mission success, power of ‘jointness’ in accomplishing D.H. McCauley of the Joint Forces 15 years of continuous joint operations military objectives.”62 It is only through Staff College concurred with General have provided a more sober perspective. time, and continuous operations, that a Dempsey’s advocacy of globally inte- Globally integrated operations are a prac- truly joint force can take form. Fittingly, grated operations. The dynamic nature tical attempt to apply jointness to modern “perseverance” is a joint principle of war.63 of the modern international environment warfare. General Martin Dempsey offered demanded a change in force posture: a viable solution to these issues with Conclusion the introduction of globally integrated Given the Chairman’s new operating Jointness was not the decisive factor operations in the Capstone Concept for concept of globally integrated operations, in the coalition’s victory over Saddam Joint Operations in September 2012. The the military will transform from a conven- Hussein’s Iraqi forces in the Gulf War. idea was to require “a globally postured tionally focused and capital-intensive (for There were several factors to the victory, Joint Force to quickly combine capa- example, costly weapons systems such as the including superior technology, leader- bilities with itself and mission partners F-35) force to one oriented on small, adapt- ship, international support, plentiful across domains, echelons, geographic able, globally deployable units that require resources, and limited objectives. It is boundaries, and organizational af- well-trained, experienced counterinsur- more accurate to say jointness was a filiations.”64 Among the implications gency forces and military police.66 positive contributing factor. of globally integrated operations are a Goldwater-Nichols was an attempt to professional military education focus on Although it took over two decades correct the failings of coordination and mission command and jointness. General to recognize, if jointness is going to synchronization between the Services
82 Recall / The Advent of Jointness During the Gulf War JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 4 40 and to allow the combatant command- James L. Holloway, Rescue Mission Report Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1980), (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff ers to conduct operations as they best 56. of the United States Army, 1993), 370. saw fit without undue interference from 5 McInnis, 3. 41 James R. Locher III, “Taking Stock of multiple commands. Its simplification 6 Sharon Tosi Lacey, “Grenada 1983: Small Goldwater-Nichols,” Joint Force Quarterly 34 of the operational chain of command is Island, Big Lessons: A Three-day Cold War (July 2003), 36–37, brackets in source docu- perhaps its most highly valued and endur- Clash in the Caribbean Had Far-Reaching Im- ment. pacts on American Joint Operation,” Military 42 Boo, 32. ing contribution. It is less clear how well History (2013), 46–48. 43 Ibid., 33–35. it accomplished its other goals by the 7 Ronald H. Cole, “Grenada, Panama, and 44 Ibid., 33. time of the Gulf War. The Service chiefs Haiti: Joint Operational Reform,” Joint Force 45 Dominic J. Caraccilo, “Desert War had to tolerate their new role as advisors Quarterly 20 (Autumn–Winter 1998/1999), Taught Lessons in How Superpower Uses subordinate to the Chairman of the Joint 59. Force,” Army Magazine 65, no. 7 (2015), 45. 8 Lacey, 52. 46 Richard Weitz, “Jointness and Desert Chiefs of Staff, and the Services had to 9 Ibid., 53. Storm: A Retrospective,” Defense and Security accept their restriction to administrative 10 James R. Locher III, “Has It Worked?” Analysis 20, no. 2 (2004), 133. and organization functions, but inter- Naval War College Review 54, no. 4 (2001), 47 Don D. Chipman, “Desert Storm and the Service rivalry persisted. It appeared that 101. Triumph of Joint Warfare Planning,” Air Power the Services saw jointness as a wartime 11 McInnis, 6. History 52, no. 1 (2005), 54. 12 Ibid., 8. 48 Fred Franks and Gregory Fontenot, condition, while peacetime would remain 13 Katherine Boo, “How Congress Won the “Decisive U.S. Response Was Both End of an Service-centered. The problem with this War in the Gulf,” Washington Monthly 23, no. Era, Birth of a New One,” Army Magazine 65, notion was that the Services would have 10 (October 1991), 35. no. 7 (2015), 43. to learn to be joint again each time a new 14 Richard Fournier, “A Just Cause in 49 Gordon and Trainor, xiv. conflict arose. Panama,” Veterans of Foreign Wars Magazine 1 50 Weitz, 146. (2015), 23. 51 Boo, 36. It was not until the continuous joint 15 James H. Embrey, “Operation Just 52 Owens, 52–53. operations of the war on terror com- Cause: Concepts for Shaping Future Rapid 53 Watson, 218. pelled the Services to work together on a Decisive Operations,” in Transformation Con- 54 Price T. Bingham, “Air Power in Desert regular basis that the concept of jointness cepts for National Security in the 21st Century, Storm and the Need for Doctrinal Change,” started to become fully realized. General ed. Williamson Murray (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Airpower Journal 5, no. 4 (1991), 33. Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 202. 55 Ibid. Dempsey’s concept of globally integrated 16 Ibid., 198, 205. 56 LeMay Center for Doctrine, “Airmen’s operations is poised to continue this de- 17 Ibid., 223. Perspective,” available at
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