WARFARE DEVELOPMENT for Major Joint Operations and Collective Defence

Knowledge of principles of war must be tempered by a sense of change, and applied with a flexibility of mind.

Michael Howard The Causes of Wars and Other Essays

10 The Three Swords Magazine 33/2018 ON THE COVER WARFARE DEVELOPMENT For Major Joint Operations and Collective Defence

by Colonel Neil Wright British Army Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) Exercises, Training and Innovation Directorate, Joint Warfare Centre

The Joint Warfare Centre is far from simply being a training centre and the importance of our role in Warfare Development is, arguably, greater than ever as we refocus NATO's agenda for experimentation, interoperability and doctrine development against Collective Defence and Article 5 scenarios.

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The Three Swords Magazine 33/2018 11 JOINT WARFARE DEVELOPMENT

ABOVE: A modified screenshot from JAVELIN (JTLS) showing red and blue forces. A Computer-Assisted Exercise (CAX) is a type of synthetic exercise where forces are generated, moved and managed in a simulated joint environment. CAX enables NATO Transformation to challenge and enhance capabilities, increase interoperability, save resources and reduce risk. Right: NATO Space-based early warning capability. The early detection is communicated to Ballistic Missile Defence Command Centres within a minute or two of the missile launch. Integration of Space in exercises started in 2016 with TRIDENT JUNCTURE. Graphics by NATO

e live in in- more public roles, not to mention highligh ting 2017 (hereafter abbreviated to JAVELIN) in the teresting times, contentious normative, ethical and legal con- autumn of last year, a vast Major Joint O pera- perhaps the most siderations. So, these are indeed interesting tion3 Command Post Exercise, involving, for consequential for times calling for broad-minded approaches to the first time in more than two decades, all European security Warfare Deve lopment. And this is what staff in levels of the NATO Command Structure and since the end of the the JWC are attending to. a considerable proportion of the NATO Force Cold War. As NATO puts its weight behind as- Whilst the JWC delivers higher com- Structure, we have a very rich seam to mine. surance, deterrence and Collective Defence, mand and staff collective training for 3- and This article draws upon that recent experience W 2 so our work here at the Joint Warfare Centre 4-star NATO headquarters, it also leverages and our continuous adaptation since the 2014 (JWC) has adjusted from Crisis Management a huge dividend in research and development. Wales Summit, which identified the need to and Cooperative Security back to the chal- Although our training exercises are the most restore the Alliance’s ability to warfight at scale lenges of facing a large and capable opponent. conspicuous aspect of what we do, it is our role against a near-peer adversary. We find ourselves addressing once familiar in joint and combined Warfare Development aspects of major combat operations, like how that offers an enduring dividend to the Alliance. Lessons learned/identified to integrate joint actions to overcome layered As the diagram on the next page demonstrates, for warfare development defences,1 anti-submarine warfare, operating training and Warfare Development are inex- in contested airspace, massing logistics, speed tricably linked. So, the JWC is far from simply Identifying the right areas for Warfare of assembly, freedom of movement, deception, being a training centre and the importance of Deve lopment in the contemporary environ- concealment and emissions control, to name our role in Warfare Development is, arguably, ment requires judgement. As the historian but a few old faithfuls that deserve attention. greater than ever as we refocus NATO’s agenda Michael Howard notes, differences brought Newer considerations have surfaced, such for experimentation, interoperability and doc- by social and technological changes can be as the extent to which military commanders trine development against Collective Defence immense, even in the short term, and an un- should wage “information war” to counter an and Article 5 scenarios. intelligent study can easily lead to inappropri- adversary’s narrative, thrusting leaders into far Having completed TRIDENT JAVELIN ate conclusions deducted from oversimplified

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Whilst the JWC level and be circumspect in drawing the right Section of Allied Joint Doctrine for Conduct lessons into our development work.5 In such of Operations.6 Another example would be les- delivers higher dynamic times it is important, therefore, to sons from JAVELIN, highlighting the require- build from a solid foundation. That founda- ment for multiple Theatre Logistic Bases due command and staff tion is NATO Doctrine and, as Commander to challenging geography and the size of the collective training for JWC, Major General Andrzej Reudowicz puts Joint Operational Area (JOA).7 It is here that it, our role is to act as a “guardian of NATO observations from training have been drawn 3- and 4-star NATO Doctrine and standards”. For it is our doctrine into revised doctrine for operational planning headquarters, it also that cod ifies what is known. and execution; lessons identified, codified through doctrine to become lessons learned. leverages a huge NATO Military Doctrine: And it is right to be doing this work at dividend in research Fundamental principles by which the pace, for change is not unique to NATO; think military forces guide their actions in about the quantum development in doctrine and development. support of objectives. It is authoritative, and capabilities in the Russian military in re- but requires judgement in application. cent years under their dynamic chief, General Valery Gerasimov.8 Our efforts will be marked generalisations. So, “knowledge of principles and matched. of war must be tempered by a sense of change Indeed, as our own Doctrine Branch and The JWC staff have enjoyed the privilege and applied with a flexibility of mind.”4 Carl Training Teams know, doctrine development of being part of Warfare Development played von Clausewitz described this evolution in never stands still. By stress testing NATO’s out through JAVELIN. We have learned much warfare as “chameleon-like in character, be- body of functional and thematic doctrine in from observing and contributing to the con- cause it changes its colour in some degree in our exercises, the JWC can offer significant cepts and doctrine, not to mention witnessing each particular case.” To that end, we must insights to the drafting and updating of Alli- three levels of command take it from drills and accept that change is constant and a critical ance doctrine; one recent example being our process to an expression of operational art. factor to any analysis of the joint operational authorship of the Battlespace Management Here, we have seen Gene ralship in action. Com-

BELOW: The unique training infrastructure at the Joint Warfare Centre that connects "Training" to "Warfare Development".

JOINT WARFARE CENTRE The JWC provides NATO's training focal point for full spectrum joint operational level warfare

LESSONS DOCTRINE LEARNED

• Continuous support • Joint Task Force to the review of NATO's (JTF) Handbook Allied Joint Publications and their validation • JWC Operational Staff Handbook • Collection of Lessons Identified (through exercises)

• Building Integrity EXPERIMENTS TRAINING CONCEPTS • Strategic Foresight Analysis • Weapons of • Space Support to • Framework for Mass Destruction NATO Operations • Anti-Access/Area Denial Future Alliance • Operations Logistics • Strategic • NATO Urbanization Project Operations Chain Management Communications

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General Salvatore Farina, Commander JFC Brunssum and the simulated Article 5 mission "Operation Unified Resolve". During JAVELIN, the Command and Control elements of the NATO Response Force 2018 Force Package were tested in a complex Article 5 scenario that deliberately incorporated the most demanding challenges the Alliance might face. Photo by JWC PAO

Lieutenant General Darryl A. Williams, Commander NATO Allied Land Command, during CoG analysis at JWC. Photo by JWC PAO menting upon the scale and accomplishment ity through conventional and unconventional threat. We now have a great opportunity to de- of the exercise, Lead Senior Mentor, Ge neral means. Moreover, the actions of Winter’s OP- velop this further in preparation for TRIDENT (Ret.) Karl-Heinz Lather stated: “From the Se- FOR in JAVELIN were those of a peer enemy JUNCTURE 2018 through collaborative work nior Mentors’ perspective, Trident Javelin who gave as good as he got, using all levers of with Partners, including the Baltic Defence 17 has, without doubt, been a success. It has power; military, para-military, social, political College who have depth in this area.11 stretched and stressed Training Audiences and and economic.10 Their assertive military ac- the JWC to improve conceptual understanding tions were centred upon achieving rapid for- Enduring relevance of of Major Joint Operations.” eign policy outcomes and their application of JWC’s “Big Rocks” The Article 5 JAVELIN scenario and “information warfare” was not constrained by story lines, worked by Messrs Derksen, Strina, Western ideas of ethical norm or international The JWC’s six “Big Rocks”, elaborated below, Mientus and Ball and their teams, offered all convention. So, JAVELIN certainly focused the have been well received throughout the NATO PMESII9 challenges of a determined adver- mind of the Joint Force Command (JFC) and military community and their significance en- sary willing to exploit deception and ambigu- its components in conceptualising the peer dorsed by Training Audiences.12 Fresh thinking has been given to their enduring relevance as we pivot towards Collective Defence, Article 5, and the challenges of the information battlespace. Our analysis suggests the “Big Rocks” remain relevant, albeit requiring different emphasis, as the character of warfare evolves to new geopolitical circumstances.

1/ Information Management

Depending upon whose account you sub- scribed to, the “Revolution in Military Af- fairs” should by now have provided a utopian view of short, high-tech wars, well-ordered Maj. Gen. Reudowicz and Maj. Gen. Andis battlefields, complete situational awareness Dilāns holding a signing ceremony for the and a seamless decision-action loop. Alas, the "Letter of Intent on Cooperation" between JWC and Baltic Defence College, 17 August human condition in peace and war is not so 2017. Photo by Baltic Defence College. ►►►

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Training Audience's Combined Joint Reporting from the frontline: Operations Centre inside the JWC World News Today (WNT) Bunker. Photo by JWC PAO television simulated newscast. Photo by JWC PAO

neatly addressed in the Information Age. The expect to receive it. All commanders should time and space sits at the heart of our exer- reality is one of “wicked” complex and un- spend a bit of quality time with their IM and cises, particularly when confronted with the structured problems and imperfect informa- CIS people in order to better appreciate and complexity of fire support coordination mea- tion with which to make decisions. Even where address their information priorities. sures or the layered defences presented by the information is available, it is sometimes diffi- JAVELIN Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) cult to separate the wood from the trees. 2/ Battlespace Management challenges. The contested airspace and A2/AD Whilst the “fog of war” for Napoleon bastions in JAVELIN were beyond the abil- and von Clausewitz was due to a lack of infor- This links closely to challenges of volume of ity of any single component to fix and called mation, now there is way too much and our information and staff capacity to process it. for novel joint cooperation between air, land, capacity is finite. Acknowledging the limits of By definition, Joint Warfare is a collaborative maritime and Special Forces, not to mention capacity, it is for joint commanders to identify endeavour that benefits from high degrees of Space and Cyber.17 and ruthlessly prioritise their Information Ex- orchestration. As JAVELIN proved, the larger change Requirements (IER).13 If, once upon a and more complex the endeavour, the greater 3/ Civil-Military Integration time, this essential role was delegated to a tech- the challenge; a JOA encompassing tens of nical guy to fill in the IER detail, this cannot thousands of soldiers, thousands of air sorties Since conflict is shaped by political, econo mic be valid in the Information Age—Information and dozens of warships, not to mention com- and social factors, so we must integrate a Management (IM) is command sport and an es- plex civil and information overlays, becomes a constantly expanding roll call of participants sential prerequisite for operational art. We must huge challenge for any joint operational com- throughout planning and execution of joint not forget that IER and CIS14 planning for exer- mander and staff. The tyranny of distance, and operations. Yet civil-military cooperation has cise is planning for war. It is a real-time opera- therefore apportionment, was a real opera- taken a different hue in the context of major tional planning activity involving the JFC, the tional dilemma for commanders in JAVELIN; conflict and Article 5, and sometimes opera- components, the Communications Agency15 air sorties could not be flexed or re-tasked over tional planning teams need to be reminded and others, and deserves close attention. the vast JOA in the way that they have been on that they are no longer attending to Capacity Moreover, commanders and staff should operations in recent years. Building and Security Sector Reform, à la Af- give similar scrutiny and analysis to classifica- If there is to be any relief to such dilem- ghanistan. Now the cooperation is more about tion and accessibility of information. These mas it begins well before the troops, planes and established governmental and civic bodies— too are sometimes erroneously viewed as “ex- ships are anywhere near the battlespace. For it with strong, long established notions of sover- ercise-only requirements”, but this denies the starts with a full and thorough Operational eignty and ownership. central importance and real-time criticality of Plan Development16 where a relentless pursuit The balance has, arguably, shifted from command information. Plan in haste—repent of simplicity must be front and centre in the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), In- at leisure might be an appropriate maxim for planning effort, in order to de-conflict actions ternational Organizations (IOs) and the like. This those who fail to give enough attention to what in the battlespace. The sequence by which joint is a very different take on the Comprehensive their information requirement is and how they actions are coordinated and synchronised in Approach from recent campaigning and HQs

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have sometimes been required to adjust their Total Defence Concept: Tor Honningsvåg, Senior approach quickly. So, whilst a great deal has Advisor, Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB), during an interview with JWC Public Affairs. been learned through the years of Crisis Man- JAVELIN exercised the Norwegian Joint Headquarters' agement and Cooperative Security, care must interaction with civil government organizations that contribute to Norway's Total Defence Concept in order be taken to draw only the right aspects of that to increase the Norwegian Armed Forces' ability to experience into the new operational paradigm. conduct high-intensity NATO Article 5 operations. For instance, Collective Defence requires DSB's overall task is maintaining a complete overview of various risks and vulnerability in general. The Total a huge effort to mobilise quickly, then move and Defence Concept comprises society's support for the sustain forces. The requirement outstrips the ca- Norwegian Armed Forces as well as Armed Forces' support of civil society. Photo by JWC PAO pacity of the military alone and depends upon a civil-military logistic structure and enabling capabilities. Senior commanders and military analysts continue to highlight the requirement to remove civil bureaucracy between NATO ! states and improve mobility on intra-European routes. Similarly, liberated space is required to More than 75% of Host Nation Support to be handed over to civil administration—the NATO operations is provided by civilian actors or by means of civilian infrastructure. complexity of this “relief in place” cannot be underestimated, particularly where terrain, airspace or territorial waters have been cleared of conventional forces, yet asymmetric threats persist. It is too late to be thinking about this aspect of Command and Control (C2) once tactics. Get C2 right, putting the right people is absolutely critical to effective C2. Interest- boots are on the ground. into it, and anything is possible.”18 ingly, a recent NATO C2 Centre of Excellence In a speech to the International Insti- The JWC exercises are starting to re- paper has added considerable emphasis to this tute for Strategic Studies, General Sir David ally stress Host Nation C2 dilemmas through requirement to describe who is responsible to Richards offered a clear sense of the priority planning phases and are revealing important whom, for what in relation to civil-military co- he gives to C2 in the Information Age: “For themes in areas of civil administration and law operation in the era of Total Defence.19 some years, I have been paraphrasing that during the transition from peace through the JAVELIN saw the integration of forces great American General Omar Bradley who spectrum of conflict. Knowing who the key between Host Nations and NATO with nine emphasised that professionals should place lo- civilian interlocutors are—those “right people” separate nations in play. Norway’s Total De- gistics before tactics. My version is that profes- that General Richards describes—and ensur- fence Concept allowed complex aspects of Al- sionals first and foremost sort out Command ing clear understanding of modus operandi for liance command, control and coordination, and Control, followed by logistics, followed by any particular nation’s Total Defence Concept not to mention cost of conflict analysis to be considered. This work breaks new ground in doctrine development, and, whilst JAVELIN took great strides, operational dilemmas will now be refined further for JUNCTURE 2018 to challenge processes with Host Nation resil- ience structures, including state of order and national law on transition. This is a theme to be developed with Joint headquarters during the Academic Study phase of exercise preparation.

4/ StratCom and the Information Environment

This year’s SACT Strategic Foresight Analysis Report is revealing, particularly in Human and Technology themes.20 The report describes Logistics and sustainability: areas of conceptual understanding moving Offloading vehicles from a cargo ship in support of so quickly that time horizons become almost BRILLIANT JUMP 2016. Photo meaningless; the rapidly changing informa- by Edouard Bocquet, NATO tion environment and human communication Operational level logistics (Page 22) ►►►

16 The Three Swords Magazine 33/2018 JOINT WARFARE DEVELOPMENT

BELOW: Simulated television newscasts highlight the prominent role of information warfare in the conflict.R ight: A simulated press conference, (TRIDENT JAGUAR 2015). Photos by JWC PAO

The Information Environment: The physical, virtual and cognitive space in which information is collected, processed, perceived, disseminated and acted upon. It consists of individuals, organizations and information systems as well as the information itself. Annex B to MC 0422/4

is, probably, where evolution is most stark. As quarters and components in a particularly coherently, rather than add them as an after- Hope Carr’s excellent article in our last jour- challen ging way. It was enlightening to see how thought, has gained real traction. This dimen- nal (Issue No. 32, Pages 34-38) highlighted, forces adjusted to the environment, develop- sion must be at the forefront of operational the dawn of the information battlespace has ing tools and procedures to effect behavioural planning and calls for a mind-set shift and also resulted in commanders being drawn inexora- change favourable to the Alliance; for instance, an organisational switch—most likely felt in bly into areas of public diplomacy, which were via social media with their “#PuttingTheRe- terms of battle rhythm. So, as we now bridge previously the domain of statesmen and politi- cord Straight” campaign. Our thinking is mov- from JAVELIN 2017 to JUNCTURE 2018, it cians. Not to participate is no longer an option; ing at pace and the JWC Information Environ- is encouraging to note that JFC Naples has re- the “Battle of Narratives” is so dynamic and ment Working Group is advancing in concert quested additional focus be placed upon Soft fundamental to theories of victory and defeat. with HQ SACT to address this complexity and Targeting for their exercise in Autumn 2018. Former SACEUR, General Philip Breedlove heighten awareness of non-lethal means; Sun stated: “Battles will be fought on the ground, Tzu’s notion of “warfare as analogous to per- 5/ Battle Rhythm in the air, and at sea; but the next war will be suasion and a battle for hearts and minds."22 won in the information battlespace.”21 Our drive to ensure that Training Au- If by rhythm we mean a pattern of recurring Human communication is challenging diences incorporate information activities motion in the HQ, then it must also depend at the best of times. It takes huge intellectual effort to stay ahead, delivering a proactive and assertive Strategic Communications (Strat- "Not to engage is no Com) narrative, rather than simply reacting longer an option." Joint press conference with to events. Think about the complexity of mes- the Commanders of saging at the strategic, operational and tacti- the Polish, French and the U.S. detachments cal le vels. Think about how communications during Exercise PUMA might be refined and nuanced for domestic 2015. Photo by Edouard and international audiences, whilst ensuring Bocquet, NATO consistency and avoiding contradiction. Think about the vast array of communication chan- nels and how each and every one is viewed by different demographics and segments of a population, and one begins to appreciate the challenge to be confronted. JAVELIN allowed this dynamic, fast moving aspect of modern military affairs to impact the Joint Force Head-

The Three Swords Magazine 33/2018 17 JOINT WARFARE DEVELOPMENT

The author, Colonel Wright, during 6/ Joint Targeting an EXCON map room briefing with General Farina and Lieutenant General Rune Jakobsen, Commander The importance of timely, accurate and intel- Norwegian Joint Headquarters, in ligent targeting has been borne out in recent attendance. Photo by JWC PAO exercises, particularly where we have accentu- ated the grey areas between conventional and asymmetric threats and the requirement to co- ordinate and synchronise both lethal and non- lethal actions. Military professionals sometimes seem most comfortable at the kine tic end of the targeting spectrum. Perhaps this is because the principles of fire and movement are drilled into every new recruit from the outset of their military career and are therefore instinctive. What is less intuitive is the integration of information into the fires and manoeu- vre mix. Yet, at the risk of stating the obvious, in the current Information Age this must become our foremost preoccupation. So, we are consciously addressing fires planning to encourage appropriate balance upon a sense of timing, flow and cadence. adversary. If we really are all about decision su- between lethal-focused and non-lethal capa- Whilst the former is about routine and “going periority and moving at the speed of relevance bilities, ensuring that the latter is not simply through the motion”, it is those latter aspects through Boyd’s Cycle of Observe, Orient, De- added as an afterthought towards the end of of timing, pace and tempo in battle rhythm cide, and Act, then adjustable battle rhythm the targeting process. We are tracking some that support campaign synchronisation. For must be practiced.23 This is as much about exciting transformational thinking by Multi- it is a flexible, adjustable rhythm that enables command culture, adaptability and the man- national Capability Development Campaign the “kingfisher moment” in operational art, re- ner by which (traditionally) the Chief of Staff (MNCDC) into Integration of Lethal and warding the intuition of our very best generals: works up the team through Battle Staff Train- Non-Lethal Actions (ILNA).24 This seeks to “Nine-tenths of tactics are certain, and taught ing and the like; what Lawrence described as establish a doctrine-based process for integ- in books: but the irrational tenth is like the “thought practicing the stroke”. ra ting lethal and non-lethal actions up front in kingfisher flashing across the pool, and that is the test of generals. It can only be ensured by Major General Andrzej Reudowicz (right) instinct, sharpened by thought practicing the with Rear Admiral (Ret.) Chris Snow at JFC stroke so often that at crisis it is as natural as a Brunssum. Photo by JFC Brunssum PAO reflex.” [T.E. Lawrence]. In exercises, we see the deliberate cycle of command and staff activities intended to syn- chronize current and future operations. These are the boards and working groups that coor- dinate activity according to different planning horizons and require a gearing mechanism to connect and synchronise them. Yet it is only the most agile headquarters that can gear shift in an accelerated environment and flex capacity of the staff across J3, J3/5 and J5 activities, depen ding upon changing events and priorities. If the planning and assessment staff can adapt to a faster cycle, then they will allow that “kingfisher moment” of operational art in their commander, to exploit the fleeting opportunity. A set period Joint Coordination Cycle of, say, seven days, might limit the agility of the HQ and offer insufficient tempo to outpace an

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Vulnerabilities Information

Infrastructure Integration of Weaknesses Political lethal and non- lethal actions: Key Nodes Centres of Gravity Multinational Military Capability Links Strenghts Social Development Campaign. Graphics Economic by ACT/slightly Relationships modified for publication. Focused on desired outcomes

We are consciously thority, in order to deal with the quantity, highlighted other areas in relation to states of scale and speed of demands such as they were emergency, conflict and war across Host Na- addressing on JAVELIN. Agility is particularly critical to tions and concomitant impact upon the con- the exploitation of time sensitive and dynamic duct of operations in the sovereign territory fires planning targeting opportunities. Moreover, these chal- of NATO states. The stressing of the defence to encourage lenges of volume and scale also apply to the industrial base and other forms of support, in- tasking of surveillance and reconnaissance cluding ci vil transportation, communications appropriate balance assets in order to conduct Battle Damage As- and energy infrastructure provided valuable between lethal sessment. There is little point in targeting if no stimulus, as did linkages with Norway’s Total capacity exists to assess outcomes; a require- Defence Concept at national, regional and lo- focused and non- ment sometimes overlooked. cal levels. This plays directly into the level of ambition set for JUNCTURE 2018, as will fur- lethal capabilities. Emerging themes in the ther work relating to risk appetite and thresh- context of Collective Defence olds in terms of casualties, platforms and ma- the operational design and planning process. teriel in Article 5 operations. The aim is to enable commanders to engage an It is reassuring to note that so many of our ob- adversary using a multi-domain approach to servations from training ultimately coalesce Know the enemy, solve the sort of complex operational problems around a relatively small number of themes; know yourself faced now days; and not just use the “hammer those hardy perennials we call our “Big Rocks”. to crack the nut”. That said, we cannot afford to stand still and Given that the practical part of our exercises Moreover, the exploitation of lethal bat- must constantly review their relevance as we starts with Strategic and Operational Planning, tlefield actions to accelerate non-lethal informa- continue to evolve. With echoes of Bradley’s and culminates with execution of the Opera- tion effects and vice versa (Sun Tzu’s hearts and emphasis on logistics before tactics,25 there are tional Plan, the JWC staff are uniquely placed minds) requires careful and detailed thinking. new logistical and legal dimensions that war- to assess coherence and consistency through Appreciation of intended and unintended con- rant increased prominence as we adjust from all stages of the planning process. Perhaps the sequences is where operational art comes into expeditionary campaigning to opera ting with- most obvious assessment of consistency in play if military commanders are to wage “infor- in territory of NATO Member States. joint force planning is revealed through the mation war” to counter an adversary’s narrative, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges (the CoG analysis. It is all too easy for the thread not to mention protect vulnerabilities within outgoing Commander U.S. Army in Europe) of continuity to become stretched or severed, their own Centre of Gravity (CoG). captures the legal and logistical pressures resulting in incoherent planning against the It is also worth noting that the sheer evocatively: “NATO forces should be able to wrong campaign end-state. CoG analysis is scale and tempo of major combat operations move as fast in Europe as a Polish truck with a one of the best indicators of this. So, time spent across a vast JOA might deny the luxury of load of apples on the way to Lisbon.”26 in analysis is never wasted, particularly in re- centralised targeting processes, such as we General Hodges’ campaign to highlight lation to well considered CoG analysis, which have known on operations in recent years. It the lack of a “Military Schengen” has done really is a foundation for any plan. Doctrine is becoming clear that fresh thinking may be a huge amount to unlock bureaucratic pa- describes the detailed consideration a Joint required with regard to delegations and au- ralysis in legal and logistical areas. JAVELIN Force Commander must give to analysing both

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The Three Swords Magazine 33/2018 19 JOINT WARFARE DEVELOPMENT

ABOVE: JAVELIN (left) and the Scenario Wargame in preparation of TRIDENT JUNCTURE 2018 (learn more about the Wargame on Page 77). Photos by JWC PAO his own, and enemy CoG: Characteristics, ca- given to enemy CoG, at the expense of consid- To the work ahead pabilities, or localities from which a... military eration of own critical strengths and vulner- force... derives its freedom of action, physical abilities. And yet the need to protect the CoG of This article only really scratches the surface of strength, or will to fight.27 friendly forces against, for instance, the tit-for- Warfare Development and innovation in the A CoG can sometimes unlock a cam- tat playground manipulations of “fake news” JWC. With more time and space, it might have paign end-state and is worthy of close personal has never been more prescient. If not checked, been possible to expand on the importance of engagement by the Joint Force Commander. The such propaganda can drive a barb to the heart exercise setting and scenario work, helping commander must decide who, or what, has cen- of morale, resolve and cohesion. This is about to conceptualise Major Joint Operations and tral importance within the context of the cam- protecting the force, the mission and even the Collective Defence. As one recent visitor put it, paign, thus allowing him to allocate resources, political state. In the information environment “scenario opens the door to interoperability”.28 either to protect the CoG of his own force or to tactical actions have strategic consequences In that sense, the new Occasus scenario for attack that of his opponent. Perhaps it was ever and the “flash to bang” is measured in minutes JUNCTURE 2018 represents a quantum step thus, but CoG at the operational level seems to rat her than hours. We must know our vulner- forward in exercising Collective Defence and frequently focus upon intangibles relating to the abilities and ruthlessly protect them. The simu- our plans to build scenario material in TOP- battle of wills and narratives. This could be to do lated information environment on JAVELIN FAS are genuinely transformational.29 with the ubiquity and all-encompassing nature was relentless and unforgiving, just as in real Moreover, this article has touched of the information environment and social me- world, and stretched every sinew of the Joint do ctrine development work only fleetingly in dia phenomenon. Amongst Training Audien ces Force Commander, who responded positively the context of Battlespace Management and the greater weight of analysis often seems to be to this reality of modern day campaigning. Logistics, but doctrine imbues everything. As

Capabilities: NATO's future structures must be robust enough The way ahead: The unveiling of to cope with the requirements of a major all-out conflict. Royal the logo of upcoming Brussels 2018 Air Force A400M lands at Lielvarde Air Base (Latvia) to support Summit, which will be held on 11 RAMSTEIN DUST II. Photo by Miks Uzans, NATO. and 12 July 2018. Photo by NATO

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we were reminded on JAVELIN, it is our key state of Russia's Armed Forces", 16 November 2017 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, appointed as to communication and interoperability. Dis- NATO's first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (www.romesquared.eu). cussion without definition is pointless and (SACEUR), 19 December 1950. Photo by NATO 9 PMESII: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infra- wit hout prescriptive method we risk cross structure and Information. purpose communication and confusion. And 10 Although Lt Cols Derksen, Mientus and Winter, Sqn Ldr whilst this article has covered some of the work Ball and Lt Cdr Strina are singled out here, there was a in the so-called information environment, vast staff effort behind them from all Branches and the there is much else going on in our Concepts deployed Training Teams; all deserve special credit. and Capability Integration area, not least in the 11 See Baltic Defence College and Potomac Foundation Space and Cyber Domains, and enhancing the "Baltic Security Net Assessment", 1 October 2017. sophistication of Operations Assessment to as- 12 JWC's "Big Rocks", described in our Operational sist commanders in making evidence-based Staff Handbook, are: Information Management; decisions. These might be topics for future ar- Battlespace Management; Civil-Military Integration; ticles in this journal; suffice it to say there is Strategic Communications (organisation and mes- much work to be done in the months ahead, it saging); Battle Rhythm and Joint Targeting. feels relevant, real and very much to the point 13 AJP 6, Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication of NATO’s current effort. and Information Systems elaborates requirements So, Europe may well have entered what clearly. analysts view as a dangerous new phase. The 14 Communication and Information Systems. fast-changing geopolitical landscape makes for 15 NATO Communications and Information Agency and interesting work in Warfare Development and NATO CIS Group. a fascinating time to be serving here in NATO’s 16 Phase IV of NATO Crisis Response Planning; Warfare Centre. We have a unique and privi- deve lopment of the CONOPS and OPLAN. leged purview of Generalship, and the higher 17 See the article by Capt (US-N) Bill Perkins (JAPCC), command and staff within NATO. We see the also in this edition of the journal. most talented commanders and staff opera ting 18 General Sir David Richards, "Future Conflict and in challenging and stressful conditions. It The PLAN is Its Prevention: People and the Information Age". A would be impossible not to be humbled and nothing, but speech to IISS on 18 January 2010. impressed by this. Yet the privilege comes PLANNING is 19 NATO Command and Control Centre of Excellence with responsibility, which is to offer valid ob- Seminar Review 2017, page 52 "Considerations in servations from training back into Warfare indispensable. the Re-establishment of Total Defence". Deve lopment. It behoves us all to reflect upon General Dwight D. 20 Strategic Foresight Analysis 2017 Report, Supreme this, the raison d’etre of training and warfare in Eisenhower Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), dated 4 NATO. That linkage must be self-evident and October 2017. plays to the very heart of multi-nationality, 21 General Philip M Breedlove during a visit to the JWC interdependence and interoperability. We are on 29 September 2014. limited only by our own imagination!  22 Steven Combs, "Sun Tzu and the Art of War: The Rhetoric of Parsimony". Quarterly Journal of Speech 3: 276–94, August 2000. 3 Requiring Joint Force Command Brunssum to con- 23 "Science, Strategy and War", The Strategic Theory of Recommended Reading duct a Washington Treaty Article 5 operation to de- John Boyd", December 2006, Routledge. fend and restore territorial integrity of NATO member 24 The US-led Multinational Capability Development * NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis, 2017 Report states in the most challenging security environment. Campaign (2017-2018), Integration of Lethal and Non- www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/ doclibrary/171004_sfa_2017_report_hr.pdf 4 Michael Howard, "The Causes of Wars" (London: lethal Actions (ILNA). See www.act.nato.int/mcdc Unwin, 1983): 208-217. 25 Op. cit. 5 See Oxford University Changing Character of War 26 Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, Commander US Programme: www.ccw.ox.ac.uk/research Army in Europe, "The Achilles Heel of NATO", Reu- END NOTES: 6 AJP-3. ters, 17 November 2017. 7 To be included in updating Allied Joint Doctrine for 27 AJP–5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning. 1 A2/AD or Anti-Access/Area Denial. Deployment of Forces (AJP 3-13). 2013, P 2-32. 2 Including Academic Packages, Key Leader Training, 8 Stephen R Covington, "The Culture of Strategic 28 Brigadier General John Healy, Director ECJ7, US support to Operational Planning, advice to Battle Thought Behind Russia's Modern Approaches to War- European Command (EUCOM). Staff Training and Computer-Assisted Command Post fare" Harvard Kennedy Belfer Centre, October 2016, 29 TOPFAS is NATO's operational planning tool: Tool for Exercises (CAX/CPX). and, Romeo Squared "General Gerasimov describes Operational Planning Facility Area Service.

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