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WARFARE DEVELOPMENT for Major Joint Operations and Collective Defence

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WARFARE DEVELOPMENT for Major Joint Operations and Collective Defence KNOWLEDGE OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR MUST BE TEMPERED BY A SENSE OF CHANGE, AND APPLIED WITH A FLEXIBILITY OF MIND. Michael Howard The Causes of Wars and Other Essays 10 The Three Swords Magazine 33/2018 ON THE COVER WARFARE DEVELOPMENT FOR MajOR JOINT OpERatIONS AND COllECTIVE DEFENCE by COLONEL NEIL WRIGHT British Army Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) Exercises, Training and Innovation Directorate, Joint Warfare Centre The Joint Warfare Centre is far from simply being a training centre and the importance of our role in Warfare Development is, arguably, greater than ever as we refocus NATO's agenda for experimentation, interoperability and doctrine development against Collective Defence and Article 5 scenarios. ►►► The Three Swords Magazine 33/2018 11 JOINT WARFARE DEVELOPMENT ABOVE: A modified screenshot from JAVELIN (JTLS) showing red and blue forces. A Computer-Assisted Exercise (CAX) is a type of synthetic exercise where forces are generated, moved and managed in a simulated joint environment. CAX enables NATO Transformation to challenge and enhance capabilities, increase interoperability, save resources and reduce risk. RIGHT: NATO Space-based early warning capability. The early detection is communicated to Ballistic Missile Defence Command Centres within a minute or two of the missile launch. Integration of Space in exercises started in 2016 with TRIDENT JUNCTURE. Graphics by NATO E LIVE IN in- more public roles, not to mention highligh ting 2017 (hereafter abbreviated to JAVELIN) in the teresting times, contentious normative, ethical and legal con- autumn of last year, a vast Major Joint O pera- perhaps the most siderations. So, these are indeed interesting tion3 Command Post Exercise, involving, for consequential for times calling for broad-minded approaches to the first time in more than two decades, all European security Warfare Deve lopment. And this is what staff in levels of the NATO Command Structure and since the end of the the JWC are attending to. a considerable proportion of the NATO Force Cold War. As NATO puts its weight behind as- Whilst the JWC delivers higher com- Structure, we have a very rich seam to mine. surance, deterrence and Collective Defence, mand and staff collective training for 3- and This article draws upon that recent experience W 2 so our work here at the Joint Warfare Centre 4-star NATO headquarters, it also leverages and our continuous adaptation since the 2014 (JWC) has adjusted from Crisis Management a huge dividend in research and development. Wales Summit, which identified the need to and Cooperative Security back to the chal- Although our training exercises are the most restore the Alliance’s ability to warfight at scale lenges of facing a large and capable opponent. conspicuous aspect of what we do, it is our role against a near-peer adversary. We find ourselves addressing once familiar in joint and combined Warfare Development aspects of major combat operations, like how that offers an enduring dividend to the Alliance. Lessons learned/identified to integrate joint actions to overcome layered As the diagram on the next page demonstrates, for warfare development defences,1 anti-submarine warfare, operating training and Warfare Development are inex- in contested airspace, massing logistics, speed tricably linked. So, the JWC is far from simply Identifying the right areas for Warfare of assembly, freedom of movement, deception, being a training centre and the importance of Deve lopment in the contemporary environ- concealment and emissions control, to name our role in Warfare Development is, arguably, ment requires judgement. As the historian but a few old faithfuls that deserve attention. greater than ever as we refocus NATO’s agenda Michael Howard notes, differences brought Newer considerations have surfaced, such for experimentation, interoperability and doc- by social and technological changes can be as the extent to which military commanders trine development against Collective Defence immense, even in the short term, and an un- should wage “information war” to counter an and Article 5 scenarios. intelligent study can easily lead to inappropri- adversary’s narrative, thrusting leaders into far Having completed TRIDENT JAVELIN ate conclusions deducted from oversimplified ►►► 12 The Three Swords Magazine 33/2018 JOINT WARFARE DEVELOPMENT Whilst the JWC level and be circumspect in drawing the right Section of Allied Joint Doctrine for Conduct lessons into our development work.5 In such of Operations.6 Another example would be les- delivers higher dynamic times it is important, therefore, to sons from JAVELIN, highlighting the require- build from a solid foundation. That founda- ment for multiple Theatre Logistic Bases due command and staff tion is NATO Doctrine and, as Commander to challenging geography and the size of the collective training for JWC, Major General Andrzej Reudowicz puts Joint Operational Area (JOA).7 It is here that it, our role is to act as a “guardian of NATO observations from training have been drawn 3- and 4-star NATO Doctrine and standards”. For it is our doctrine into revised doctrine for operational planning headquarters, it also that cod ifies what is known. and execution; lessons identified, codified through doctrine to become lessons learned. leverages a huge NATO Military Doctrine: And it is right to be doing this work at dividend in research Fundamental principles by which the pace, for change is not unique to NATO; think military forces guide their actions in about the quantum development in doctrine and development. support of objectives. It is authoritative, and capabilities in the Russian military in re- but requires judgement in application. cent years under their dynamic chief, General Valery Gerasimov.8 Our efforts will be marked generalisations. So, “knowledge of principles and matched. of war must be tempered by a sense of change Indeed, as our own Doctrine Branch and The JWC staff have enjoyed the privilege and applied with a flexibility of mind.”4 Carl Training Teams know, doctrine development of being part of Warfare Development played von Clausewitz described this evolution in never stands still. By stress testing NATO’s out through JAVELIN. We have learned much warfare as “chameleon-like in character, be- body of functional and thematic doctrine in from observing and contributing to the con- cause it changes its colour in some degree in our exercises, the JWC can offer significant cepts and doctrine, not to mention witnessing each particular case.” To that end, we must insights to the drafting and updating of Alli- three levels of command take it from drills and accept that change is constant and a critical ance doctrine; one recent example being our process to an expression of operational art. factor to any analysis of the joint operational authorship of the Battlespace Management Here, we have seen Gene ralship in action. Com- BELOW: The unique training infrastructure at the Joint Warfare Centre that connects "Training" to "Warfare Development". JOINT WARFARE CENTRE The JWC provides NATO's training focal point for full spectrum joint operational level warfare LESSONS DOCTRINE LEARNED • Continuous support • Joint Task Force to the review of NATO's (JTF) Handbook Allied Joint Publications and their validation • JWC Operational Staff Handbook • Collection of Lessons Identified (through exercises) • Building Integrity EXPERIMENTS TRAINING CONCEPTS • Strategic Foresight Analysis • Weapons of • Space Support to • Framework for Mass Destruction NATO Operations • Anti-Access/Area Denial Future Alliance • Operations Logistics • Strategic • NATO Urbanization Project Operations Chain Management Communications ►►► The Three Swords Magazine 33/2018 13 JOINT WARFARE DEVELOPMENT General Salvatore Farina, Commander JFC Brunssum and the simulated Article 5 mission "Operation Unified Resolve". During JAVELIN, the Command and Control elements of the NATO Response Force 2018 Force Package were tested in a complex Article 5 scenario that deliberately incorporated the most demanding challenges the Alliance might face. Photo by JWC PAO Lieutenant General Darryl A. Williams, Commander NATO Allied Land Command, during CoG analysis at JWC. Photo by JWC PAO menting upon the scale and accomplishment ity through conventional and unconventional threat. We now have a great opportunity to de- of the exercise, Lead Senior Mentor, Ge neral means. Moreover, the actions of Winter’s OP- velop this further in preparation for TRIDENT (Ret.) Karl-Heinz Lather stated: “From the Se- FOR in JAVELIN were those of a peer enemy JUNCTURE 2018 through collaborative work nior Mentors’ perspective, TRIdeNT JaveLIN who gave as good as he got, using all levers of with Partners, including the Baltic Defence 17 has, without doubt, been a success. It has power; military, para-military, social, political College who have depth in this area.11 stretched and stressed Training Audiences and and economic.10 Their assertive military ac- the JWC to improve conceptual understanding tions were centred upon achieving rapid for- Enduring relevance of of Major Joint Operations.” eign policy outcomes and their application of JWC’s “Big Rocks” The Article 5 JAVELIN scenario and “information warfare” was not constrained by story lines, worked by Messrs Derksen, Strina, Western ideas of ethical norm or international The JWC’s six “Big Rocks”, elaborated below, Mientus and Ball and their teams, offered all convention. So, JAVELIN certainly focused the have been well received throughout the NATO PMESII9 challenges
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