PARLAMENT EWROPEW
2004 2009
Dokument ta' sessjoni
FINALI A6-0150/2006
27.4.2006
RAPPORT
dwar il-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja u l-immaniġġjar finanzjarju sod (2004/2099(ACI))
Kumitat għall-Baġit
Rapporteur: Reimer Böge
MT 1/132MT PR_ACI_art120
WERREJ
Page
PROPOSTA GĦAL DEĊIŻJONI TAL-PARLAMENT EWROPEW...... 4
ANNESS: FTEHIMA INTERISTITUZZJONALI BEJN IL-PARLAMENT EWROPEW, IL- KUNSILL U L-KUMMISSJONI DWAR DIXXIPLINA GĦAL BAĠIT U AMMINISTRAZZJONI FINANZJARJA TAJBA...... 9
NOTA SPJEGATTIVA ...... 29
ANNESSI GĦAN-NOTA SPJEGATTIVA ...... 39
DOKUMENT TA' ĦIDMA NRU 1 DWAR IL-FTEHIMA INTERISTITUZZJONALI DWAR ID- DIXXIPLINA BAĠITARJA U T-TITJIB TAL-PROĊEDURA BAĠITARJA ...... 40
DOKUMENT TA' ĦIDMA NRU 2 DWAR IL-PROPOSTI ĠODDA TAL-KUMMISSJONI DWAR IL-PROSPETTIVA FINANZJARJA 2007-2013: L-EWWEL KUMMENTI ...... 47
DOKUMENT TA' ĦIDMA NRU 3 DWAR PUNTI EWLENIN TAL-PE GĦAN-NEGOZJATI MAL- KUNSILL IBBAŻATI FUQ IL-POŻIZZJONI TA' NEGOZJATI TAL-PARLAMENT EWROPEW TAT-8 TA' ĠUNJU 2005 ...... 59
DOKUMENT TA' ĦIDMA NRU 4 DWAR L-EWWEL REAZZJONI GĦALL-VERŻJONI RIVEDUTA TAL-FTEHIMA INTERISTITUZZJONALI PROPOSTA MILL-KUMMISSJONI FL-1 TA' FRAR 2006 ...... 68
DOKUMENT TA' ĦIDMA NRU 5 DWAR IL-FTEHIMA INTERISTITUZZJONALI DWAR IMMANIĠJAR FINANZJARJU SOD, RIFORMI TAQSIMA III - KUMMENTI TAR- RAPPORTEUR DWAR ID-DOKUMENT TA' ĦIDMA COM(2006)75 ...... 73
DOKUMENT TA' ĦIDMA NRU 6 DWAR STRUMENTI FINANZJARJI ĠODDA - L-IRWOL TAL- GRUPP TAL-BANK EWROPEW GĦALL-INVESTIMENT ...... 78
DOKUMENT TA' ĦIDMA NRU 7 DWAR IL-FTEHIMA INTERISTITUZZJONALI DWAR ID- DIXXIPLINA BAĠITARJA U L-IMMANIĠJAR FINANZJARJU SOD...... 84
OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GĦALL-AFFARJIET BARRANIN...... 104
OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GĦALL-IŻVILUPP ...... 107
OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GĦALL-AFFARJIET BARRANIN...... 109
OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GĦALL-IŻVILUPP REĠJONALI ...... 113
OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GĦALL-BIEDJA U L-IŻVILUPP RURALI...... 116 OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GĦAS-SAJD ...... 121
OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GĦALL-KULTURA U L-EDUKAZZJONI...... 124
OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GĦAL-LIBERTAJIET ĊIVILI, IL-ĠUSTIZZJA U L-INTERN ...... 129
PROĊEDURA ...... 132
MT 3/132MT PROPOSTA GĦAL DEĊIŻJONI TAL-PARLAMENT EWROPEW dwar il-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja u l-immaniġġjar finanzjarju sod (2004/2099(ACI))
Il-Parlament Ewropew,
– wara li kkunsidra t-Trattat KE, b'mod partikulari l-Artikolu 272 tiegħu,
– wara li kkunsidra l-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali tas-6 ta' Mejju 1999 bejn il-Parlament Ewropew, il-Kunsill u l-Kummissjoni dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja u t-titjib tal-proċedura baġitarja1, u b'mod partikolari l-punt 26 tagħha,
– wara li kkunsidra r-riżoluzzjoni tiegħu tat-8 ta' Ġunju 2005 dwar l-Isfidi tal-Politika u l- Mezzi Baġitarji ta' l-Unjoni mkabbra 2007-20132,
– wara li kkunsidra r-riżoluzzjoni tiegħu ta' l-1 ta' Diċembru 2005 dwar il-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja u t-titjib tal-proċedura baġitarja3
– wara li kkunsidra r-riżoluzzjoni tiegħu tat-18 ta' Jannar 2006 dwar il-pożizzjoni tal-Kunsill Ewropew dwar il-Prospettiva Finanzjarja u t-tiġdid tal-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali 2007- 20134
– wara li kkunsidra d-dokument ta' ħidma tal-Kummissjoni: Proposta għat-tiġdid tal-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja u t-titjib tal-proċedura baġitarja (COM(2004)0498),
– wara li kkunsidra d-dokument ta' ħidma tal-Kummissjoni: Kontribuzzjoni għan-negozjati Interistituzzjonali dwar il-proposta għat-tiġdid tal-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja u t-titjib tal-proċedura baġitarja (COM(2006)0075),
– wara li kkunsidra d-dokument ta' ħidma tal-Kummissjoni: Proposta riveduta għat-tiġdid tal-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja u t-titjib tal- proċedura baġitarja (COM(2006)0036),
– wara li kkunsidra l-Komunikazzjonijiet tas-26 ta' Frar 2004 mill-Kummissjoni lill-Kunsill u lill-Parlament Ewropew bit-titolu "Nibnu l-ġejjieni tagħna flimkien: L-Isfidi tal-Politika u l-Mezzi Baġitarji ta' l-Unjoni mkabbra 2007-2013" (COM(2004)0101) u dik ta' l-14 ta' Lulju 2004 bit-titolu "Prospettivi Finanzjarji 2007-2013" (COM(2004)0487), u d- dokument ta' ħidma tal-Kummissjoni tat-12 ta' April 2005 bit-titolu "Emendi tekniċi għall- proposta tal-Kummissjoni għal qafas finanzjarju plurijennali 2007-2013"
1 ĠU C 172, 18.6.1999, p. 1. Ftehima kif ġiet emendata bid-Deċiżjoni 2005/708/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill (ĠU L 269, 14.10.2005, p. 24). 2 Testi Adottati, 8.6.2005, P6_TA-PROV(2005)0224. 3 Testi Adottati, 1.12.2005, P6_TA(2005)0453. 4 Testi Adottati, 18.1.2006, P6_TA(2006)0010. (SEC(2005)0494),
– wara li kkunsidra d-dikjarazzjoni konġunta dwar il-linji gwida għall-proposti leġiżlattivi rigward il-qafas finanzjarju plurijennali 2007-2013 li sar ftehim dwaru fit-18 ta' Ottubru 2005,
– wara li kkunsidra l-konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill Ewropew tal-15-16 ta' Diċembru 2005 (CADREFIN 268),
– wara li kkunsidra t-trijologi tat-23 ta' Jannar 2006, tal-21 ta' Frar 2006, tal-21 ta' Marzu 2006 u ta' l-4 ta' April 2006,
– wara li kkunsidra r-rapport tal-Kumitat għall-Baġit u l-opinjonijiet tal-Kumitat għall- Affarjiet Barranin, il-Kumitat għall-Iżvilupp, il-Kumitat għall-Kontroll Baġitarju, il- Kumitat għall-Iżvilupp Reġjonali, il-Kumitat għall-Biedja u l-Iżvilupp Rurali, il-Kumitat għas-Sajd, il-Kumitat għall-Kultura u l-Edukazzjoni u l-Kumitat għal-Libertajiet Ċivili, il- Ġustizzja u l-Intern (A6-0150/2006),
A. billi, skond il-punt 26 tal-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali tas-6 ta' Mejju 1999, il-Kummissjoni bdiet il-proċess biex tipprepara l-Prospettiva Finanzjarja ġdida u l-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali ġdida billi ppreżentat proposti fl-10 ta' Frar u fl-14 ta' Lulju 2004,
B. billi, wara li l-Parlament adotta l-pożizzjoni tiegħu għan-negozjati fit-8 ta' Ġunju 2005 u wara li ntlaħqet ftehima mill-Istati Membri f'Diċembru 2005, il-Kummissjoni ppreżentat proposta riveduta għall-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali ġdida u dokumenti tekniċi dwar l-impatt tal-konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill Ewropew, u b'hekk ippermettiet li n-negozjati setgħu jibdew fuq bażi ġusta,
C. billi l-Parlament kien determinat li jikseb qafas finanzjarju plurijennali sostenibbli li jirrifletti mezzi adegwati għar-rekwiżiti tal-politika għas-snin li ġejjin u strumenti xierqa u riformi li jtejbu l-implimentazzjoni,
D. billi l-implimentazzjoni tal-programmi plurijennali sa l-ammont kollu tagħhom tiddependi minn konklużjoni f'waqtha b'mod preċiż tal-Ftehima Interistitzzjonali u tal-Perspettiva Finanzjarja,
E. billi l-Parlament kien l-unika istituzzjoni li żviluppa strateġija ġenerali u li wettaq analiżi sħiħa u profonda tal-ħtiġijiet sabiex jidentifika l-prijoritajiet politiċi mqabbla mat-trattament tal-Kunsill ibbażat fuq limiti massimi u persentaġġi,
1. Ifakkar li, għall-ewwel darba minn kemm ilha teżisti l-Prospettiva Finananzjarja, il- Parlament iddelibera għal aktar minn tmien xhur fi ħdan kumitat temporanju li twaqqaf għal dan il-għan u adotta pożizzjoni ta' negozjati komprensiva bbażata fuq tliet pilastri bil-għan li:
- iqabbel il-prijoritajiet politiċi u l-ħtiġijiet finanzjarji;
MT 5/132MT - jimmodernizza l-istruttura baġitarja;
- itejjeb il-kwalià ta' l-implimentazzjoni tal-baġit ta' l-UE;
2. Ifakkar li hu m'aċċettax il-kunklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill Ewropew ta' Diċembru 2005 fil-forma attwali tagħhom, billi ma jipprovdux mezzi kwantitattivi u kwalitattivi lill-UE biex taffaċċja l-sfidi tal-ġejjieni, u talab lill-Kunsill sabiex jikseb mandat reali biex jinnegozja mal- Parlament;
3. Ifakkar fid-diżappunt tiegħu dwar il-mod kif intlaħaq il-ftehim fl-Unjoni Ewropea, billi interessi nazzjonali individwali saru l-punt ewlieni tan-negozjati, minflok l-għanijiet komuni Ewropej;
4. Jirrimarka li bosta drabi hu wera r-rieda tiegħu biex jidħol f'negozjati kostruttivi mal- Kunsill fuq bażi ta' pożizzjonijiet rispettivi bil-għan li jintlaħaq ftehim ibbażat fuq titjib kwantitattiv u kwalitattiv aċċettabbli fi żmien realistiku;
5. Iqis li l-ftehima li ntlaħqet mit-tliet istituzzjonijiet fl-4 ta' April 2006 kienet l-uniku kompromess possibbli li seta' jikseb il-Parlament, fi ħdan in-negozjati, għal Baġit plurijeannali bil-għan li jiggarantixxi l-kontinwità tal-leġiżlazzjoni ta' l-UE, li jassigura mmaniġġjar finanzjarju sod tal-fondi ta' l-UE u li jżomm is-setgħat leġiżlattivi u baġitarji fil-perjodu ta' żmien li jmiss;
6. Jilqa' l-ftehim milħuq, b'mod partikulari l-progress miksub fi ħdan it-tliet pilastri tal- pożizzjoni ta' negozjati tiegħu: It-tqabbil tal-prijoritajiet politiċi u l-ħtiġijiet finanzjarji permezz ta':
- żieda ta' 4 biljun EUR għal politiki li qabel dwarhom il-Kunsill Ewropew ta' Diċembru 2005, biex jiġu allokati direttament fil-programmi taħt it-titoli 1a, 1b, 2, 3b u 4,
- żieda sostanzjali fir-riservi ta' l-EIB ta' EUR 2.5 biljun li l-Istati Membri għandhom jagħmlu disponibbli fi ħdan skema ġdida ta' ko-finanzjament bejn l- EIB u l-Baġit ta' l-UE bil-għan li tissaħħaħ l-influenza tal-baġit ta' l-UE fl- oqsma ta' Riċerka u Żvilupp, netwerks tranż-Ewropej u SMEs sa total ta' EUR 60 biljun,
- l-iffinanzjar ta' ħtiġijiet mhux programmati bħar-Riżerva ta' l-Għajnuna ta' Emerġenza (EUR 1.5 biljun) u l-Fond ta' Solidarjetà ta' l-UE (sa EUR 7 biljun) barra mill-qafas finanzjarju, permezz ta' riżorsi supplimentari mitluba mill-Istati Membri f'każ ta' bżonn,
- l-iffinanzjar tal-Fond Ewropew ta' l-Aġġustament għall-Globalizzazzjoni (sa EUR 3.5 biljun) billi jerġgħu jiġu wżati approprjazzjonijiet li ġew ikkanċellati, barra mill-qafas finanzjarju;
It-titjib ta' l-istruttura baġitarja permezz ta' aktar flessibilità billi:
- jinżamm ammont totali ta' EUR 1.4 biljun għall-flessibilità matul il-perjodu, iffinanzjat, f'każ li jiġi wżat, permezz ta' riżorsi supplimentari li jintalbu minn Stati Membri, bil-possibilità li l-ammont annwali (EUR 200 miljun) jiġi trasferit, f'każ li ma jiġix użat, għas-sentejn ta' wara u possibilità ġdida sabiex jintuża l- Istrument għall-istess ħtiġijiet għal aktar minn sena,
- il-Parlament li jkun elett ġdid ikollu l-possibilità jevalwa l-operat tal-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali u l-Prospettiva Finanzjarja sa l-aħħar ta' l-2009 fuq il-bażi ta' rapport li l-Kummissjoni unilateralment impenjat ruħha li tippreżenta, akkumpanjat bi proposti fejn meħtieġ;
It-titjib tal-kwalità ta' l-implimentazzjoni tal-fondi ta' l-UE u ż-żamma tal- prerogattivi tal-Parlament permezz ta':
- l-inklużjoni ta' prinċipji ta' proporzjonalità u proċeduri li huma faċli jintużaw fir- Regolament Finanzjarju rivedut, ir-responsabbiltà ta' l-Istati Membri f'attivitajiet ta' mmaniġġjar komuni biex jinkiseb kontroll intern aħjar tal-fondi ta' l-UE, in- neċessità li jiġi introdott mekkaniżmu ta' kofinanzjament ma' l-EIB biex isaħħaħ l-influenza ta' politiki ta' l-UE, l-involviment tal-Parlament fl-ipprogrammar finanzjarju u fl-iffinanzjar ta' aġenziji ġodda mingħajr preġudizzju għall- programmi operattivi,
- parteċipazzjoni sħiħa tal-Parlament fir-reviżjoni wiesgħa, parteċipazzjoni ikbar tal-Parlament fil-proċess tad-deċiżjonijiet ta' CFSP u skrutinju aktar demokratiku f'azzjonijiet esterni;
7. Huwa madankollu konxju mill-fatt li għad hemm numru ta' żbilanċi li għadhom mhux solvuti fir-riżultat tan-negozjati; iqis li dawn l-iżbilanċi għandhom jiġu indirizzati fir- reviżjoni ta' l-2008-2009 u, fejn huwa possibbli, matu il-proċeduri baġitarji annwali; jirrimarka li b'mod partikulari s-sistema ta' riżorsi proprji kif ukoll il-qasam ta' l-infiq għandhom bżonn li jiġu riformati b'mod urġenti sabiex tiġi evitata l-istess esperjenza qarsa ta' negozjar nazzjonali għall-prospettiva finanzjarja li jmiss;
8. ifakkar li l-pożizzjoni tiegħu, kif stipulata fir-riżoluzzjoni msemmija qabel tat-8 ta' Ġunju 2005, tibqa' l-objettiv li jiggarantixxi l-aħjar livell ta' fondi u aktar riformi sabiex jintlaħqu l-ambizzjonijiet ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea;
MT 7/132MT 9. Jistenna li r-riformi stipulati fil-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali li jmiss ikollhom effett mgħaġġel fuq l-implimentazzjoni kwalitattiva tal-Baġit, inkluż it-tnaqqis tal-piż amministrattiv, kif ukoll impatt viżibbli għaċ-ċittadini Ewropej billi l-aċċess għall-fondi ta' l-UE isir aktar faċli;
10. Jaċċetta l-implikazzjonijiet baġitarji u finanzjarji tal-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali ġdida;
11. Jenfasizza li l-opinjonijiet tal-kumitati speċjalizzati taw appoġġ utli matul in-negozjati; jikkunsidra li t-IIA kif maqbul jindirizza l-parti l-kbira tat-talbiet tal-kumitati speċjalizzati f'termini kwalitattivi u/jew kwantitattivi;
12. Jagħti istruzzjonijiet lill-President tiegħu sabiex jgħaddi din id-deċiżjoni lill-Kunsill u lill- Kummissjoni għall-informazzjoni. ANNESS: FTEHIMA INTERISTITUZZJONALI BEJN IL-PARLAMENT EWROPEW, IL- KUNSILL U L-KUMMISSJONI DWAR DIXXIPLINA GĦAL BAĠIT U AMMINISTRAZZJONI FINANZJARJA TAJBA
IL-PARLAMENT EWROPEW, IL-KUNSILL TA’ L-UNJONI EWROPEA U L-KUMMISSJONI TAL-KOMUNITAJIET EWROPEJ,
MINN HAWN ‘IL QUDDIEM IMSEJĦA L-ISTITUZZJONIJIET,
FTIEHMU KIF ĠEJ:
1. L-għan ta’ dan il-Ftehim huwa li tkun implimentata d-dixxiplina tal-baġit u biex jitjieb it-tħaddim tal-proċedura annwali tal-baġit u l-kooperazzjoni bejn l-istituzzjonijiet fuq materji marbuta mal-baġit kif ukoll sabiex tkun żgurata amministrazzjoni finanzjarja tajba. 2. Id-dixxiplina tal-baġit taħt dan il-Ftehim tkopri n-nefqa kollha. Din torbot lill-istituzzjonijiet kollha sakemm dan il-Ftehim jibqa’ fis-seħħ. 3. Dan il-Ftehim ma jibdilx is-setgħat tal-baġit rispettivi ta’ l-istituzzjonijiet, kif stabbilit fit-Trattati. Fejn issir referenza għal dan il-Punt fit-test preżenti, il-Kunsill għandu jaġixxi b’maġġoranza kkwalifikata waqt li l-Parlament b’maġġoranza tal-membri tiegħu u bi tlieta minn kull ħames voti mitfugħa, skond ir-regoli tal-votazzjoni stabbiliti fil-ħames sub-paragrafu ta’ l-Artikolu 272(9) tat-Trattat li jwaqqaf il- Komunità Ewropea (minn hawn ’il quddiem imsejjaħ it-'Trattat KE’). 4. Jekk isseħħ reviżjoni tat-Trattat b'implikazzjonijiet dwar il-baġit waqt il-qafas finanzjarju multiannwali 2007-2013, (minn hawn ‘il quddiem imsejjaħ il-qafas finanzjarju), l-aġġustamenti meħtieġa jsiru skond din. 5. Kwalunkwe emenda f’dan il-Ftehim teħtieġ il-kunsens ta’ l-istituzzjonijiet kollha. Kull tibdil fil-qafas finanzjarju għandu jsir skond il-proċeduri stabbiliti għal dak il-għan f’dan il-Ftehim. 6. Dan il-Ftehim fih tliet partijiet: – Parti I fiha definizzjoni u dispożizzjonijiet ta’ implimentazzjoni għall-qafas finanzjarju u tapplika għall-perijodu kollu ta’ dak il-qafas finanzjarju. – Parti II tittratta dwar it-titjib fil-kollaborazzjoni interistituzzjonali matul il-proċedura tal-baġit. - Parti III fiha dispożizzjonijiet marbuta ma’ l-amministrazzjoni finanzjarja tajba tal-finanzi ta’ l-UE. 7. Kull meta l-Kummissjoni tqisha meħtieġa u kull meta tippreżenta proposta għal qafas finanzjarju ġdid skond il-punt 30, din għandha tippreżenta rapport dwar l-applikazzjoni ta’ dan il-Ftehim. Dan għandu jkun akkumpanjat fejn meħtieġ minn proposta bl-emendi. 8. Dan il-Ftehim jidħol fis-seħħ fl-1 ta' Jannar 2007u jissostitwixxi: – il-Ftehim Interistituzzjonali tas-6 ta’ Mejju 1999 bejn il-Parlament Ewropew, il-Kunsill u l- Kummissjoni dwar id-dixxiplina tal-baġit u t-titjib fil-proċedura tal-baġit5, – il-Ftehim Interistituzzjonali tas-7 ta’ Novembru 2002 bejn il-Parlament Ewropew, il-Kunsill u l- Kummissjoni dwar l-iffinanzjar tal-Fond tas-Solidarjetà ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea li jissupplimenta l- Ftehim Interistituzzjonali tas-6 ta’ Mejju 1999 dwar id-dixxiplina tal-baġit u t-titjib fil-proċedura tal- baġit.6
PARTI I – IL-QAFAS FINANZJARJU:
5 ĠU C 172, 18.6.1999, p. 1. 6 ĠU C 283, 20.11.2002, p. 1.
MT 9/132MT DEFINIZZJONI U DISPOŻIZZJONIJIET TA’ IMPLIMENTAZZJONI A. Il-Kontenut u l-kamp t’applikazzjoni tal-qafas finanzjarju
9. Il-qafas finanzjarju hu stabbilit fl-Anness I. Dan isawwar il-qafas ta’ referenza għad-dixxiplina tal- baġit interistituzzjonali. 10. Il-qafas finanzjarju huwa maħsub li jiżgura li, fit-terminu medju, in-nefqa ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea, maqsuma skond kategoriji wiesgħa, tiżviluppa b’mod ordnat u fil-limiti tar-riżorsi proprji. 11. Il-qafas finanzjarju jistabbilixxi ,għal kull waħda mis-snin 2017 sa 2013 u għal kull intestatura jew sotto-intestatura, ammonti ta’ nefqa f’termini ta’ approprjazzjonijiet għall-impenji. B’mod ġenerali, it-totali annwali tan-nefqa huma murija wkoll f’termini kemm ta’ approprjazzjonijiet għall- impenjikif ukoll ta’ approprjazzjonijiet’ għall-ħlas. Dawn l-ammonti kollha huma mfissra fi prezzijiet ta’ l-2004. Il-qafas finanzjarju ma jqisx il-punti tal-baġit ffinanzjati minn dħul assenjat fis-sens ta’ l-Artikolu 18 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju tal-25 ta’ Ġunju 2002 li japplika għall-baġit ġenerali tal-Komunitajiet Ewropej7, minn hawn ’il quddiem imsejjaħ ir-'Regolament Finanzjarju'. Informazzjoni marbuta ma’ operazzjonijiet li m’humiex inklużi fil-baġit ġenerali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea u l-iżvilupp antiċipat ta’ kategoriji varji tar-riżorsi tal-Komunità huma stabbiliti, b’indikazzjoni, f’tabelli separati. Din l-informazzjoni se tkun aġġornata annwalment meta jsir l-aġġustament tekniku fil- qafas finanzjarju. 12. L-istituzzjonijiet jagħrfu li kull wieħed mill-ammonti assoluti murija fil-qafas finanzjarju jirrappreżenta livell annwali fuq in-nefqa taħt l-baġit ġenerali ta’ l-UnjoniEwropea. Bla ħsara għal kwalunkwe tibdil f’dawk il-limiti massimi ffissati skond id-dispożizzjonijiet ta’ dan il-Ftehim, l- istitutuzzjonijiet qegħdin jimpenjaw irwieħhom li jużaw is-setgħat rispettivi tagħhom b’tali mod li jikkonformaw mad-diversi limiti massimi ffissati ta’ infiq annwali matul kull proċedura tal-baġit u meta jkunu qed jiġi implimentat l-il-baġit għas-sena kkonċernata. 13. Billi jaqblu dwar il-Ftehim preżenti, iż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit jaqblu li jaċċettaw ir- rati ta’ żieda għan-nefqa mhix obbligatorja ġejja mill-baġits ffissati fil-limiti massimi stabbiliti bil-qafas finanzjarju għat-tul kollu tiegħu. Ħlief għas-sub-intestatura 1B ‘Koeżjoni għat-Tkabbir Ekonomiku u għall-Impjiegi’ tal-qafas finanzjarju, sabiex ikun hemm amministrazzjoni finanzjarja tajba, l-istituzzjonijiet għandhom jiżguraw kemm jista’ jkun matul il-proċedura tal-baġit u waqt l-adozzjoni tal-baġit li jibqa’ jkun hemm marġini biżżejjed taħt il-limiti massimi ffissati għad-diversi intestaturi. 14. L-ebda att adottat mill-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill taħt il-proċedura tal-ko-deċiżjoni u l-ebda att li jkun ġie adottat mill-Kunsill li jħalli li jinqabżu l-approprjazzjonijiet disponibbli fil-baġit jew fl- allokazzjonijiet disponibbli fil-qafas finanzjarju skond il-Punt 12 ma jista’ jiġi implimentat f’termini finanzjarji qabel ma l-baġit jkunu ġew emendati u, jekk meħtieġ, qabel ma l-qafas finanzjarju jkun ġie rivedut kif suppost skond il-proċedura relevanti għal kull wieħed minn dawn il-każijiet. 15. Għal kull sena koperta bil-qafas finanzjarju, l-approprjazzjonijiet totali għall-ħlas meħtieġ, wara l- aġġustament annwali u wara li jkunu tqiesu kull aġġustament jew reviżjoni oħra, m’għandhomx ikunu tali li jipproduċu rata ta’ sejħiet lura għar-riżorsi proprji li tkun tiżboq il-limitu massimu ffissat għar-riżorsi proprji. Jekk ikun hemm il-ħtieġa, iż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit għandhom jiddeċiedu, skond il- Punt 3, li jbaxxu l-limiti massimi ffissati fil-qafas finanzjarju biex tkun żgurata l-konformità mal-limitu massimu ffissat għar-riżorsi proprji.
7 ĠU L 248, 16.9.2002, p. 1. B. Aġġustamenti annwali tal-qafas finanzjarju
Aġġustamenti tekniċi
16. Kull sena l-Kummissjoni, filwaqt li taġixxi qabel il-proċedura tal-baġit għas-sena n+1, tagħmel l- aġġustamenti tekniċi li ġejjin fil-qafas finanzjarju: (a) rivalutazzjoni, skond il-prezzijiet tas-sena n+1, tal-limiti massimi u tal-figuri ġenerali għall- approprjazzjonijiet għall-impenji kif ukoll għal dawk ta’ l-infiq; (b) kalkolu tal-marġini disponibbli taħt il-limitu massimu tar-riżorsi proprji. Il-Kummissjoni twettaq dawk l-aġġustamenti tekniċi fuq il-bażi ta’ deflatur fiss ta’ 2% kull sena. Ir-riżultati ta’ dawk l-aġġustamenti tekniċi u l-previżjonijiet ekonomiċi li fuqhom huma msejsa se jkunu kkomunikati liż-żewġ dirgħajni ta’ l-awtorità -tal-baġit. Mhu se jsiru l-ebda aġġustamenti tekniċi oħra fir-rigward tas-sena kkonċernata, jew matul is-sena jew bħala korrezzjonijiet ex-post matul is-snin ta’ wara.
17. Fl-aġġustament tekniku tagħha għas-sena 2011, jekk ikun stabbilit li l-GDP akkumulat ta’ kwalunkwe wieħed mill-Istati Membri għas-snin 2007-2009 ikun varja b’aktar minn +/- 5 % mill-GDP akkumulat stmat waqt it-tfassil ta’ dan il-Ftehim , il-Kummissjoni taġġusta l-ammonti allokati minn fondi li jappoġġjaw il-koeżjoni għal l-Istat Membru kkonċernat f’dak il-perjodu. L-effett nett totali, kemm jekk pożittiv jew negattiv ta’ dawk l-aġġustamenti ma jistax jaqbeż EUR 3 biljun. Jekk l-effett nett ikun pożittiv, ir-riżorsi addizzjonali totali għandhom ikunu limitati għal-livell ta’ nfiq anqas kontra l-limiti massimi għas-sub-intestatura 1B għas-snin 2007-2010. L-aġġustamenti meħtieġa jinfirxu fi proporzjonijiet ugwali tul is-snin 2011-2013 u l-limiti massimi korrispondenti jkunu modifikati skond dawn. Aġġustamenti marbuta ma’ l-implimentazzjoni
18. Meta jiġu avżati ż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit dwar l-aġgġustamenti tekniċi għall-qafas finanzjarju, il-Kummissjoni se tippreżenta kwalunkwe proposti għall-aġġustamenti għall- approprjazzjonijiet totali għall-ħlas, li hi tkun tqis bħala meħtieġa, fid-dawl ta’ l-implimentazzjoni, biex tkun żgurata progressjoni ordnata fejn għandhom x’jaqsmu l-approprjazzjonijiet għall-impenji. Il-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill se jieħdu deċiżjonijiet dwar dawkl il-proposti qabel l-1 ta’ Mejju tas- sena n, skond il-Punt 3.
MT 11/132MT L-aġġornament tal-previżjoni għall-approprjazzjonijiet ta’ l-infiq wara l-2013
19. Fl-2010, il-Kummissjoni se taġġorna l-previżjonijiet għall-approprijazzjonjijiet tal-ħlas wara l- 2013. Dak l-aġġornament se jqis l-implimentazzjoni reali ta’ l-approprjazzjonijiet tal-baġit għall- impenji u l-approprjazzjonijiet għall-ħlas, kif ukoll il-previżjonijiet ta’ l-implimentazzjoni. Din se tqis ukoll ir-regoli definiti biex ikun żgurat li l-approprjazzjonijiet għall-ħlas jiżviluppaw b’mod ordnat meta mqabbla ma’ l-approprjazzjonijiet għall-impenji u l-previżjonijiet tat-tkabbir tad-Dħul Gross Nazzjonali (GNI) ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea.
L-aġġustamenti marbuta ma’ dejn nazzjonali eċċessiv
20. Fil-każ tat-tneħħija ta' sospensjoni ta' l-impenji ta' l-baġit li jirrigwardaw il-Fond ta' Koeżjoni fil- kuntest ta proċedura ta' defiċit governattiv eċċessiv, il-Kunsill, fuq proposta mill-Kummissjoni u b'konformità ma’ l-att bażiku relevanti,, jiddeċiedi dwar trasferiment ta’ impenji sospiżi għas-snin ta’ wara. L-impenji sospiżi tas-sena n ma jistgħux jerġgħu jidħlu fil-baġit ta’ wara s-sena n+2. Reviżjoni tal-qafas finanzjarju 21. B’żjieda ma’ l-aġġustamenti tekniċi regolari u l-aġġustamenti li hemm skond il-kundizzjonijiet ta’ l-implimentazzjoni, il-qafas finanzjarju jista’ jiġi rivedut skond il-limitu massimu ffissat għar-riżorsi proprji, fuq proposta mill-Kummissjoni, f’każ li jkun hemm ċirkustanzi mhux mistennija. 22. Bħala regola ġenerali, kwalunkwe proposta għar-reviżjoni taħt il-punt 21 għandha tiġi ppreżentata u adottata qabel il-bidu tal-proċedura tal-baġit għal dik is-sena jew għall-ewwel waħda mis-snin ikkonċernati. Kwalunkwe deċiżjoni biex ikun rivedut il-qafas finanzjarju sa mhux aktar minn 0,03 % tal-GNI tal- Unjoni Ewropeafil-marġini għal nefqa mhux prevista, għandha tittieħed b’mod konġunt miż-żewġ dirgħajni ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit li taġixxi skond il-Punt 3. Kull reviżjoni tal-qafas finanzjarju ’l fuq minn 0,03 % tal-GNI ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea li jkun fil-marġini għal infiq mhux previst għandha ssir b’mod konġunt miż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità ta’ l-baġit, bil- Kunsill jaġixxi b’mod unanimu. 23. Bla preġudizzju għall-Punt 40, l-istituzzjonijiet se jistħarrġu l-iskop għall-allokazzjoni mill-ġdid tan-nefqa bejn il-programmi koperti mill-intestatura kkonċernata bir-reviżjoni, b’referenza speċjali għal kwalunkwe nuqqas ta’ użu mistenni ta’ l-approprjazzjonijiet. L-għan għandu jkun li ammont sostanzjali, f’termini assoluti u bħala persentaġġ tan-nefqa l-ġdida ppjanata, għandu jkun stabbilit fi ħdan il-limitu massimu eżistenti għall-intestatura. L-istituzzjonijiet se jeżaminaw l-iskop għall-ibbilanċjar ta’ kwalunkwe żieda fil-limiti massimi ffissati għal intestatura waħda billi jitnaqqas il-limitu massimu ta’ oħra. Kwalunkwe reviżjoni ta’ neqfa obbligatorja fil-qafas finanzjarju ma tistax twassal għal tnaqqis fl- ammont disponibbli għan-nefqa mhux obbligatorja. Kwalunkwe reviżjoni għandha żżomm relazzjoni xierqa bejn l-impenji u l-ħlas. D. Il-Konsegwenzi tan-nuqqas ta’ deċiżjoni konġunta fuq l-aġġustament jew ir-reviżjoni tal- qafas finanzjarju
24. Jekk ill-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill ma jaslux ghal ftehim dwar kwalunkwe aġġustament jew reviżjoni fil-qafas finanzjarju propost mill-Kummissjoni, l-ammonti stabbiliti qabel għandhom, wara l- aġġustament tekniku annwali, ikomplu jgħoddu bħhala l-limiti massimi tan-nefqa għas-sena in kwistjoni. E. Ir-Riżerva ta’ l-Għajnuna ta’ Emerġenza
25. L-għan tar-Riżerva ta’ l-Għajnuna ta’ Emerġenza huwa li jkun hemmi tweġiba mill-ewwel għal ħtiġiet ta’ għajnuna speċifika lil pajjiżi terżi wara li jkunu seħħew ġrajjiet mhux mistennija u meta l- baġit ikun kienu diġà ġie stabbilit; l-ewwel u qabel kollox din għandha tingħata għal ħidmiet umanitarji, iżda wkoll għall-immanġġijar ta’ kriżijiet ċivili u għall-protezzjoni fejn iċ-ċirkustanzi jkunu jeħtieġu hekk. L-ammont annwali tar-Riżerva għandu jkun iffissat għal EUR 221 miljun għall- perijodu kollu tal-qafas finanzjarju, fi prezzijiet kostanti. iI-Riżerva tiddaħħal bħala dispożizzjoni fil-baġit ġenerali tal-Unjoni Ewropea. L-approprjazzjonijiet għall-impenji korrispondenti se jiddaħħlu fil-baġit, jekk meħtieġ, ‘il fuq mill-limiti massimi stabbiliti fl- Anness 1. Meta l-Kummissjoni tqis li r-Riżerva teħtieġ li tintuża, din għandha tippreżenta liż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit proposta għat-trasferiment mir-riżerva għal-linji korrispondenti tal-baġit . Qabel kull proposta mill-Kummissjoni għal trasferiment mir-Riżerva , madankollu, għandu jsir stħarriġ dwar l-iskop għall-allokazzjoni mill-ġdid ta’ l-approprjazzjonijiet. Fl-istess waqt li din tippreżenta l-proposti tagħha għat-trasferiment, il-Kummissjoni se tagħti bidu għal proċedura ta’ trijalogu, jekk ikun meħtieġ f’għamla simplifikata, biex ikun żgurat il-ftehim taż- żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit fuq il-ħtieġa li tintuża r-riżerva kif ukoll fuq l-ammont meħtieġ. It- trasferimenti ser isiru skond l-Artikolu 26 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju. F. Il-Fond ta’ Solidarjetà ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea
26. Il-Fond ta’ Solidarjetà ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea hu intiż sabiex ikun hemm għajnuna finanzjarja mill- ewwel fil-każ ta’ diżastri kbar li jseħħu fit-territorju ta’ Stat Membru jew pajjiż kandidat, kif deskritt fl- att bażiku relevanti. Għandu jkun hemm limitu massimu ffissat fuq l-ammont annwali disponibbli għall-Fond; ta’ EUR 1 biljun (prezzijiet kurrenti). Fl-1 ta’ Ottubru ta’ kull sena, mill-inqas kwart mill- ammont annwali għandu jibqa’ disponibbli biex ikun jista’ jkopri ħtiġiet li jsiru sa tmiem dik is-sena. Il-parti ta’ l-ammont annwali li mhix imdaħħla fl-baġit ma tistax titmexxa għas-snin ta’ wara. F’każijiet eċċezzjonali u jekk ir-riżorsi finanzjarji disponibbli fil-Fond fis-sena meta jkun seħħ id- diżastru, kif msemmija fl-att bażiku relevanti, ma jkunux biżżejjed sabiex ikopru l-ammont ta' assistenza meqjus bħala neċessarju mill-awtorità tal-baġit, il-Kummissjoni tista' tipproponi li d- differenza tkun iffinanzjata mill-ammonti annwali disponibbli tas-sena ta' wara. L-ammont annwali tal-Fond li jkun stmat kull sena ma jistax jeċċedi 1 EUR biljun taħt kwalunkwe ċirkustanza. Meta l-kundizzjonijiet biex ikun jista’ jiġi mobilizzat il-Fond , kif stabbilit fl-att bażiku relevanti, jintlaħqu, il-Kummissjoni għandha tagħmel proposta biex dan ikun jista’ jiġi mħaddem. Fejn ikun hemm raġuni għall-allokazzjoni mill-ġdid ta’ approprjazzjonijiet taħt l-intestatura li tkun teħtieġ nefqa addizzjonali, il-Kummissjoni għandha tqis dan meta tagħmel il-proposta meħtieġa, skond ir- Regolament Finanzjarju , permezz ta’l-istrument xieraq tal-baġit. Id-deċiżjoni biex jitħaddem il-Fond għandha tittieħed b’mod konġunt miż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit skond il-Punt 3. L-approprjazzjonijiet ta’ impenji korrispondenti se jiddaħħlu fil-baġit, jekk ikun meħtieġ, ‘il fuq mill- ammonti massim ta’ l-intestaturi relevanti stabbiliti fl-Anness 1. Fl-istess waqt li din tippreżenta l-proposta tagħha għal deċiżjoni biex jitħaddem il-Fond, il- Kummissjoni se tagħti bidu għal proċedura ta’ trijalogu, jekk meħtieġ f’għamla simplifikata, biex ikun żgurat il-ftehim bejn iż-żewġdirgħajni ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit dwar il-ħtieġa li jintuża l-Fond u dwar l- ammont meħtieġ. G. Strument ta’ Flessibbiltà
27. L-Istrument ta’ Flessibbiltà b’limitu massimu annwali ta’ EUR 200 miljun (prezzijiet kurrenti) hu maħsub biex ikun hemm l-iffinanzjar, għal sena finanzjarja partikolari u sa l-ammont indikat, ta’ nefqa identifikata b’mod ċar li ma setgħetx tkun iffinanzjata fil-limiti massimi disponibbli għal intestatura waħda jew aktar. Il-parti ta’ l-ammont annwali li ma tintużax tista’ tiġi trasferita ‘l quddiem sas-sena n+2. Jekk l- Istrument ta’ Flessibbiltà ikun mobilizzat, kwalunkwe trasferimenti ‘l quddiem jittieħdu l-ewwel, f’ordni ta’ żmien. Il-parti ta’ l-ammont annwali mis-sena n li ma tintużax fis-sena n+2 taqa’. Il-Kummissjoni se tagħmel proposta għall-użu ta’ l-Istrument ta’ Flessibbiltà ta’ flessibbiltà wara li din tkun stħarrġet il-possibbiltajiet kollha biex l-approprjazzjonijiet ikunu allokati mill-ġdid taħt l-
MT 13/132MT intestatura li tkun teħtieġ nefqa addizzjonali. Il-proposta tkun tirrigwarda l-prinċipju ta’ l-utilizzazzjoni ta’ l-istrument u tidentifika l-bżonnijiet li għandhom ikunu koperti u l-ammont. Il-proposta tista’ tiġi ppreżentata, għal kwalunkwe sena finanzjarja partikolari, matul il-proċedura tatal-baġit. Il-proposta tal-Kummissjoni se tiddaħħal fl- abbozz preliminari tal-baġit jew inkella tkun akkumpanjata, skond ir-Regolament Finanzjarju, mill- istrument tal-baġit li jkun xieraq. Id-deċiżjoni li jitħaddem l-Istrument ta’ Flessibbiltà se tittieħed b’mod konġunt miż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit skond il-Punt 3. Jintlaħaq ftehim permezz tal-proċedura ta’ konċiljazzjoni li hemm fl-Anness II, Parti C H. Fond Ewropew ta’ Aġġustament għall-Globalizzazzjoni
28. Il-Fond Ewropew ta’ Aġġustament għall-Globalizzazzjoni hu intiż sabiex jipprovdi appoġġ addizzjonali għal ħaddiema li jbatu l-konsegwenzi ta' tibdil strutturali ewlieni fix-xejriet tal-kummerċ dinji, sabiex jassistihom fl-integrazzjoni tagħhom mill-ġdid fis-suq tax-xogħol. Il-Fond m’għandux jaqbeż l-ammont massimu annwali ta’ EUR 500 miljun (prezzijiet kurrenti) li jistgħu jittieħdu minn kwalunkwe marġini eżistenti taħt l-ammont massimu ta’ nefqa globali tas-sena ta’ qabel, u/jew minn approprjazzjonijiet ta’ impenn kanċellati mis-sentejn ta’ qabel, esklużi dawk marbuta ma’ l-intestatura 1B tal-qafas finanzjarju. L-approprjazzjonijiet se jiddaħħlu fil-baġit ġenerali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea bħala dispożizzjoni permezz tal-proċedura normali tal-baġit hekk kif il-Kummissjoni tkun identifikat il-marġini suffiċjenti u/jew tkun ħassret l-impenji, skond it-tieni paragrafu. Meta l-kundizzjonijiet biex ikun jista’ jiġi mobilizzat il-Fond , kif stabbilit fl-att bażiku relevanti, jintlaħqu, il-Kummissjoni għandha tagħmel proposta biex jitħaddem. Id-deċiżjoni biex jitħaddem il- Fond għandha tittieħed b’mod konġunt miż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit skond il-Punt 3. Fl-istess waqt li din tippreżenta l-proposti tagħha għal deċiżjoni biex jitħaddem il-Fond, il- Kummissjoni għandha tagħti bidu għal proċedura ta’ trijalogu, jekk ikun meħtieġ f’għamla simplifikata, biex ikun żgurat il-ftehim taż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit fuq il-ħtieġa li jintuża l- Fond u fuq l-ammont meħtieġ. It-trasferimenti marbuta mal-Fond ser isiru skond l-Artikolu 24(4) tar-Regolament Finanzjarju. L-approprjazzjonijiet għall-impenji korrispondenti se jiddaħħlu fil-baġit taħt l-intestatura relevanti, jekk meħtieġ ‘il fuq mill-ammonti massimi kif stabbiliti fl-Anness 1. I. L-Aġġustament tal-qafas finanzjarju biex jilqa’ għat-tkabbir
29. Fejn Stati Membri ġodda jidħlu fl-Unjoni Ewropea matul il-perijodu kopert mill-qafas finanzjarju, il-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill, li jaġixxu fuq proposta mill-Kummissjoni u skond il-Punt 3, għandhom jaġġustaw b’mod konġunt il-qafas finanzjarju biex jitqiesu l-kriterji tan-nefqa li jkunu ġejjin mill-konklużjonijiet tan-negozjati għall-adeżjoni J. It-tul ta’ żmien tal-qafas finanzjarju u l-konsegwenzi tan-nuqqas ta’qafas finanzjarju
30. Qabel l-1 ta’ Lulju 2011, il-Kummissjoni se tippreżenta proposti għal qafas finanzjarju ġdid ta’ terminu medju. Jekk iż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit ma jaqblux fuq qafas finanzjarju ġdid, u sakemm il- qafas finanzjarju eżistenti ma jintemmx espressament minn waħda mill-istituzzjonjijiet, il-limiti massimi għall-aħħar sena koperti mill-qafas finanzjarju eżistenti għandhom jiġu ffissati skond il- Punt 16. Dan sabiex il-limiti massimi ita’ l-2013 ikunu jistgħu jinżammu fi prezzijiet kostanti. Fejn Stati Membri ġodda jidħlu fl-Unjoni Ewropea wara l-2013, u jekk jitqies bħala meħtieġ, il-qafas finanzjarju estiż għandu jiġi aġġustat biex jitqiesu r-riżultati tan-negozjati ta’l-adeżjoni. PARTI II – IT-TITJIB TAL-KOLLABORAZZJONI INTERISTITUZZJONALI MATUL IL- PROĊEDURA TA L-BAĠIT
A. Il-Proċedura tal-kollaborazzjoni interistituzzjonali
31. L-istituzzjonijiet jaqblu li jistabbilixxu proċedura għall-kollaborazzjoni interistituzzjonali f’materji li għandhom x’jaqsmu ma’ l-baġit. Id-dettalji ta’ din il-kollaborazzjoni huma stabbiliti fl-Anness II;. B. It-Twaqqif tal-Baġit 32. Ta’ kull sena l-Kummissjoni se tippreżenta abbozz preliminari tal-baġit li jkun juri l-ħtiġiet ta’ l- iffinanzjar attwali tal-Komunità. Dan se jqis: – (a) previżjonijiet dwar il-Fondi Strutturali pprovduti mill-Istati Membri, – (b) il-kapaċità li l-approprjazzjonijiet jintużaw, waqt li jsir sforz li tinżamm relazzjoni stretta bejn l- approprjazzjonijiet għall-impenji u dawk għal-ħlas, – (c) il-possibbiltajiet biex jingħata bidu għal politika ġdida permezz ta’ proġetti pilota u/jew azzjonijiet ġodda ta’ tħejjija jew azzjonijiet multiannwali kontinwi li jkunu waslu biex jintemmu, wara li jkun valutat jekk ikunx possibbli li jkun jsir att bażiku, fit-tifsira ta’ l-Artikolu 49 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju (tifsira ta’ att bażiku, ħtieġa ta’ att bażiku għall-implimentazzjoni u eċċezzjonijiet), – (d) il-ħtieġa li jkun żgurat li kull bidla fin-nefqa li relatata mas-sena ta’ qabel tkun skond il-limiti tad- dixxiplina ta’ l-baġit. L-abbozz preliminari tal-baġit se jkun akkumpanjat minn Dikjarazzjonijiet ta’ Ħidma bħalma huwa t- tagħrif meħtieġ taħt l-Artikolu 27(3) u l-Artikolu 33(2)(d) tar-Regolament Finanzjarju (għanijiet, indikaturi u tagħrif ta’ valutazzjoni). 33. L-istituzzjonijiet, kemm jista’ jkun, se jevitaw milli jdaħħlu fil-baġit punti li jinvolvu ammonti mhux sinifikanti i ta’ nefqa fuq l-operat. Iż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit jimpenjaw ruħhom li jqisu l-valutazzjoni tal-possibbiltajiet ta’ l- implimentzzjoni tal-baġit mill–Kummissjoni baġit fl-abbozzi preliminari tagħha u in konnessjoni ma’ l- implimentazzjoni tal-baġit kurrenti. Qabel ma jsir it-tieni qari tal-Kunsill, il-Kummissjoni tibgħat ittra lill-President tal-Kumitat tal-baġit tal- Parlament Ewropew, b’kopja lid-driegħ l-ieħor ta’ l-awtorità ta’ l-baġit, Ii fiha jkun hemm il-kummenti tagħha fuq kif se jitwettqu l-emendi għall-abbozz tal-baġit adottati mill-Parlament Ewropew fl-ewwel qari. Iż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit se jqisu dawn il-kummenti fil-kuntest tal-proċedura ta’ konċiljazzjoni li hemm fl-Anness II,Parti C. Fl-interess ta’ amministrazzjoni finanzjarja tajba u minħabba l-effett ta’ tibdil kbir fin-nomenklatura tal-baġit, fit-titoli u l-kapitoli li jittrattaw ir-responsabbiltajiet ta’ rappurtar fit-tmexxija tad-dipartimenti tal-Kummissjoni, iż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit jimpenjaw ruħhom li jiddiskutu mal- Kummissjoni kwalunkwe tibdil kbir bħal dan matul il-proċedura ta’ konċiljazzjoni. C. Il-Klassifikazzjoni tan-nefqa
MT 15/132MT 34. L-istituzzjonijiet iqisu n-nefqa obbligatorjabħala nefqa li tirrizulta neċessarjament lmit-Trattati jew inkella mill-atti konsegwenti għalihom.. 35. L-abbozz preliminari tal-baġit għandu jinkludi proposta għall-klassifikazzjoni ta’ kull punt ġdid li jkun hemm fil-baġit u ta’ kull punt tal-baġit li jkollu bażi legali emendata. Jekk dawn ma jaċċettawx il-klassifikazzjoni proposta fl-abbozz preliminari ta’ l-baġit, il-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill se jeżaminaw il-klassifikazzjoni tal-punt tal-baġit kkonċernat fuq il-bażi ta’ l- Anness III. . Dan ifittxu li jaslu ghal ftehim permezz tal-proċedura ta’ konċiljazzjoni pprovduta fl- Anness II, Parti C. D. Ir-rata massima ta’ żieda għan-nefqa mhux obbligatorja fin-nuqqas ta’ qafas finanzjarju
36. Bla ħsara għall-ewwel paragrafu tal-punt 13, l-istituzzjonijiet jaqblu fuq id-dispożizzjonijiet li ġejjin: (a) il-marġini awtonomu tal-Parlament Ewropew ta’ manuvra għall-għanijiet tar-raba’ sotto-paragrafu ta’ l-Artikolu 272(9) tat-Trattat tal-KE – li għandu jkun in-nofs tar-rata massima – għandu japplika mit-twaqqif ta’ l-abbozz tal-baġit mill-Kunsill fl-ewwel qari, inklużi kwalunkwe ittri ta’ emenda. L-ogħla rata għandha titħares f’rabta -mal-baġit annwali, inkluż baġit ta’ emenda. Bla preġudizzju għall-istabbiliment ta’ rata ġdida, kull porzjon tar-rata massima li ma jkunx intuża għandu jibqa’ disponibbli biex jintuża, u jkun jista’ jintuża, meta jkunu tqiesu l-abbozzi ta’ emenda; (b) bla preġudizzju għall-paragrafu (a), jekk matul il-proċedura tal-baġit jkun jidher li t-tlestija tal- proċedura tista’ tkun teħtieġ ftehim biex tkun stabbilita rata ġdida ta’ żieda għan-nefqa mhux obbligatorja biex tkun tapplika għall-approprjazzjonijiet għall-ħlas u/jew rata ġdida biex tkun tapplika għall-approprjazzjonijiet għall-impenji (ir-rata ta’ l-aħħar tista’ tkun fuq livell differenti minn dik ta’ l- ewwel), l-istituzzjonijiet għandhom jaħdmu biex jinkiseb ftehim bejn iż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit permezz tal-proċedura ta’ konċiljazzjoni prevista fl-Anness II, Parti C. E. L-Inkorporazzjoni ta’ dispożizzjonijiet finanzjarji f’atti leġislattivi
37. Kull atti leġislattiv li jkun jikkonċerna programm multiannwali adottat taħt il-proċedura ta’ ko- deċiżjoni għandu dispożizzjoni li fiha l-awtorità leġislattiva tistabbilixxi l-pakkett finanzjarju għall- programm. Dak l-ammont jikkostitwixxi r-referenza primarja għall-awtorità tal-baġit matul il-proċedura annwali ta’ l-baġit. L-awtorità tal-baġit u l-Kummissjoni, fit-tfassil ta’ l-abbozz preliminari tagħha -tal-baġit, jimpenjaw ruħhom li ma jmorrux lil hinn b’aktar minn 5 % minn dak l-ammont għat-tul sħiħ tal-programm in kwistjoni, sakemm ma jkunx hemm ċirkustanzi ġodda, oġġettivi, u ta’ perijodu twil u li għalihom jingħataw raġunijiet espliċiti u preċiżi, waqt li jitqiesu wkoll ir-riżultati miksuba mill-implimentazzjoni tal-programm, l-aktar fuq il-bażi ta’ valutazzjonijiet. Kwalunkwe żieda li tirriżulta minn tali varjazzjoni għandha tibqa’ fil-limitu massimu eżistenti għall-intestatura in kwistjoni, mingħajr preġudizzju għall- użu ta’ strumenti previsti f’dan il-Ftehim. Dan il-punt ma japplikax għall-approprjazzjonijiet tal-koeżjoni adottati taħt il-proċedura tal-ko- deċiżjoni u li jkunu ġgew allokati minn qabel mill-Istati Membri, li jinkludu pakkett finanzjarju għall- perijodu totali tal-programm. 38. L-atti leġislattivi dwar il-programmi multiannwali li ma jkunux suġġetti għall-proċedura ta’ ko- deċiżjoni m’għandhomx jinkludu 'ammont li jitqies meħtieġ'. Jekk il-Kunsill ikun jixtieq jinkludi referenza finanzjarja, din għandha titqies bħala waħda li qed turi r- rieda ta’ l-awtorità leġislattiva u m’għandhiex tolqot is-setgħat ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit kif mfissra fit- Trattat KE. Din id-dispożizjoni tissemma fl-iatti kollha li jinkludu t-tali referenza finanzjarja. . Jekk l-ammont ikkonċernat kien is-suġġett ta’ ftehim skond il-proċedura ta’ konċiljazzjoni pprovduta fid-Dikjarazzjoni Konġunta tal-Parlament Ewropew, il-Kunsill u l-Kummissjoni ta’ l-4 ta’ Marzu 19758, dan għandu jitqies bħala ammont ta’ referenza fis-senstal-Punt 37 ta’ dan il-Ftehim.
8 ĠU C 89, 22.4.1975. 39. F’termini finanzjarji, id-dikjarazzjoni finanzjarja li hemm fl-Artikolu 28 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju tirrifletti l-għanijiet tal-programm propost u tinkludi skeda li tkopri l-perijodu tal-programm. Tiġi riveduta, fejn ikun meħtieġ, meta l-abbozz preliminari tal-baġit jitfassal, b’kont meħed tal-livell ta’ implimentazzjoni tal-programm. Id-dikjarazzjoni riveduta tingħata lill-awtorità dwar il-baġit meta jiġi preżentat l-abbozz preliminari tal-baġit j u wara li l-baġit ikun adottai. 40. Fil-limiti tar-rati massimi żieda għan-nefqa mhux obbligatorja speċifikata fl-ewwel paragrafu tal- punt 13, iż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit jjimpenjaw ruħhom li jirrispettaw l-allokazzjonijiet ta’ l-approprjazzjonijiet għall-impenji previsti fl-atti bażiċirelevanti għall-operati strutturali, l-iżvilupp rurali u l-Fond Ewropew għas-Sajd. F. Nefqa relatata mal-ftehim tas-sajd
41. L-istituzzjonijiet jaqblu li jiffinanzjaw in-nefqa fuq il-ftehim tas-sajd skond l-arranġamenti stabbiliti fl-Anness IV. G. L-Iffinanzjar tal-politika komuni estera u tas-sigurtà (PESK)
42. Għan-nefqa tal-PESK addebitata għall-baġit ġenerali tal-Komunutajiet Ewropej skond l-Artikolu 28 tat-Trattat ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea, l-istituzzjonijiet għandhom jaħdmu, fil-proċedura ta’ konċiljazzjoni prevista fl-Anness II, Parti C u fuq il-bażi ta’ l-abbozz preliminari tal-baġit stabbilit mill- Kummissjoni, biex kull sena jinkisebftehim dwar l-ammont tan-nefqa ta’ l-operat li għandu jiġi addebitat lill-baġit tal-Komunità kif ukoll fuq id-distribuzzjoni ta’ dan l-ammont bejn l-artikoli tal- kapitolu tal-baġit tal-PESK suġġerit fir-raba’ paragrafu ta’ dan il-Punt. Fin-nuqqas ta’ ftehim, huwa mifhum li l-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill se jdaħħlu fil-baġit l-ammont inkluż fil-baġit ta’ qabel jew l- ammont propost fl-abbozz preliminari tal-baġit, liema minn dawn ikun l-aktar baxx. L-ammont totali tan-nefqa operattiva tal-PESK tiddaħħal kollha f’kapitolu wieħed tal-baġit (PESK) u jiġi distribwit bejn l-artikoli ta’ dak il-kapitolu kif suġġerit fir-raba’ paragrafu ta’ dan il-Punt. Dak l- ammont għandu jkopri l-bżonnijiet reali prevedibblii, evalwati fil-qafas tat-twaqqif ta’ abbozz preliminari tal-baġit, fuq il-bażi ta’ tbassir imfassal kull sena mill-Kunsill, u marġini raġjonevoli għal azzjonijiet mhux imbassra. Mhu se jiddaħħlu l-ebda ammonti f’riżerva. Kull artikolu jkopri strumenti li kienu diġà ġew adottati, strumentii li huma previsti iżda li għadhom ma ġewx adottati u kull strument futur – i.e. mhix previst – li għandu jiġi adottat mill-Kunsill waqt is-sena finanzjarja kkonċernata. Billi, taħt ir-Regolament Finanzjarju, il-Kummissjoni għandha l-awtorità, PESK, li tittrasferixxi approprjazzjonijiet b’mod awtonomu bejn l-artikoli f’kapitlu wieħed tal-PESK l-fil-baġit, tkun żgurata l-flessibbiltà meqjusa bħala meħtieġa għall-implimentazzjoni mgħaġġla ta’ azzjonijiet tal-PESK. . Fil- każ li l-ammont tal-kapitlu tal-baġit tal-PESK matul is-sena finanzjarja ma jkunx biżżejjed biex ikopri l-ispejjeż meħtieġa, il-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill għandhom ifittxu soluzzjoni b’mod urġenti , fuq proposta mill-Kummissjoni, waqt li jitqies il-Punt 25. Fil-kapitolu tal-baġit tal-PESK, l-artikoli li fihom għandhom jiddaħħlu –l-azzjonijiet tal-PESK jistgħu jaqrawfuq il-linji li ġejjin: – operazzjonijiet ta’ l-immaniġġjar i ta’ kriżijiet, prevenzjoni ta’ kunflitt, riżoluzzjoni u stabilizzazzjoni, sorveljanza u implimentazzjoni ta’ proċessi ta’ paċi u ta’ sigurtà,
– in-non-proliferazzjoni u d-diżarm,
– miżuri ta’ emerġenza,
– miżuri ta’ tħejjija u segwitu,
– Rappreżentanti Speċjali ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea
MT 17/132MT L-istituzzjonijiet jaqblu li mill-inqas EUR 1 740 miljun jkunu disponibbli għall-PESK matul il-perjodu 2007-2013 u li l-ammont għal miżuri mdaħħla taħt l-artikolu msemmi fit-tielet inċiż ma jeċċediex l- 20% ta’ l-ammont globali tal-kapitolu tal-baġit tal-PESK. 43. Kull sena, il-Presidenza tal-Kunsill tikkonsulta l-Parlament Ewropew dwar dokument tal-Kunsill li jħares ‘il quddiem, u li jkun trażmess sal-15 ta’ Ġunju għas-sena in kwistjoni, li jistabbilixxi l-aspetti ewlenin u l-għażliet bażiċi tal-PESK, inklużi l-implikazzjonijiet finanzjarji għall-baġit ġenerali ta’ l- Unjoni Ewropea u evalwazzjoni tal-miżuri mnedija fis-sena n-1. Barra minn hekk, il-Presidenza tal- Kunsill iżżomm il-Parlament infurmat billi tagħmel laqgħat ta' konsultazzjoni konġunta mill-anqas ħames darbiet fis-sena, fil-qafas tad-djalogu politiku regolari dwar il-PESK, li dwarhom ikun hemm qbil mhux aktar tard mill-laqgħa ta’ konċiljazzjonili għandha sseħħ qabel it-tieni qari tal-Kunsill. Il- parteċipazzjoni f’dawn il-laqgħat għandha tkun kif ġej: - il-Parlament Ewropew: il-bureaux taż-żewġ Kumitati konċernati - il-Kunsill: l-Ambaxxatur (President tal-Kumitat ta’ Politika u Sigurtà) Il-Kummissjoni se tkun assoċjata u se tieħu sehem f’dawn il-laqgħat. Kull meta tadotta deċiżjoni fil-qasam tal-PESK li tinvolvi nefqa, il-Kunsill għandu jibgħat lill- Parlament Ewropew, minnufih u f’kull każ mhux aktar minn ħamest ijiem wara d-deċiżjoni finali, stima ta’ l-infiq previst ('dikjarazzjoni finanzjarja'), b’mod partikolari dak li għandu x’jaqsam mal- limitu ta’ żmien, il-personell impjegati, l-użu tal-bini u infrastruttura oħra, faċilitajiet ta’ trasport, rekwiżiti ta’ taħriġ u arranġamenti ta’ sigurtà. Kull tliet xhur il-Kummissjoni għandha tgħarraf lill-awtorità tal-baġit dwar l-implimentazzjoni ta’ l- azzjonijiet tal-PESK u dwar il-previżjonijiet finanzjarji għall-perijodu li jkun għad fadal minn dik is- sena. PARTI III – AMMINISTRAZZJONI FINANZJARJA TAJBA TAL-FONDI TA’ L-UE A. Biex ikun żgurat kontroll intern effettiv u integrat tal-fondi tal-Komunità 44. L-istituzzjonijiet jaqblu dwar l-importanza li jissaħħaħ il-kontroll intern mingħajr ma jiżdied il-piż amministrattiv li għalih is-simplifikazzjoni tal-leġiżlazzjoni bażilari hi prerekwiżit. F’dan il-kuntest, tingħata priorità lill-amministrazzjoni finanzjarja tajba bl-għan ta' Dikjarazzjoni ta' Assigurazzjoni pożittiva (DAS) għal fondi taħt tmexxija kondiviża. Jistgħu jiġu stabbiliti dispożizzjonijiet skond il- każ, kif xieraq, fl-atti leġiżlattivi bażiċi konċernati. Bħala parti mir-responsabbiltajiet imkabbra tagħhom għal fondi strutturali u skond il-ħtiġijiet kostituzzjonali nazzjonali, l-awtoritajiet ta’ verifika relevanti fl-Istati Membri għandhom jipproduċu evalwazzjoni dwar il-konformità tas-sistemi ta’ amministrazzjonia u kontroll mar-regolamenti tal-Komunità. L-Istati Membri għalhekk jimpenjaw irwieħhom li jipproduċu sommarju annwali fil-livell nazzjonali xieraq tal-verifiki u dikjarazzjonijiet disponibbli. B. Regolament Finanzjarju 45. L-istituzzjonijiet jaqblu li dan il-Ftehim u l-baġit ikunu implimentati fil-kuntest ta’ amministrazzjoni finanzjarja tajba bbażata fuq il-prinċipji ta’ ekonomija, effiċjenza, effikaċja, protezzjoni ta’ interessi finanzjarji, proporzjonalità ta’ nefqiet amministrattivi, u proċeduri li jirrispettaw l-utent. L- Istituzzjonijiet għandhom jieħdu miżuri, partikolarment fir-Regolament Finanzjarju, li għandhom ikunu adottati wara l-proċedura ta’ konċiljazzjoni stabbilita mid-Dikjarazzjoni Konġunta tal-Parlament Ewropew, tal-Kunsill u tal-Kummissjoni, ta’ l-4 ta’ Marzu 1975, fl-ispirtu li ppermetta ftehim fl-2002. C. Programmar Finanzjarju 46. Il-Kummissjoni se tressaq darbtejn fis-sena, l-ewwel darba f’Mejju/Ġunju (flimkien mad- dokumenti li jakkompanjaw l-abbozz preliminari ta’ l-baġit) u t-tieni darba f’Diċembru/Jannar (wara l- adozzjoni ta' l-baġit), programmar finanzjarju komplet għall-Intestaturi 1A, 2 (għall-ambjent u s-sajd), 3A, 3B u 4 tal-qafas finanzjarju. Dan id-dokument, strutturat bl-intestatura, b’oqsma ta’ politika u l- linja tal-baġit għandu jidentifika : a. il-leġiżlazzjoni fis-seħħ bid-distinzjoni bejn programmi multiannwali u azzjonijiet annwali: – għal programmi multiannwali l-Kummissjoni għandha tindika l-proċedura li taħtha kienu adottati (ko-deċiżjoni u konsultazzjoni), it-tul tagħhom, l-ammonti ta’ referenza, is-sehem allokat għan-nefqa amministrattiva;
– għal azzjonijiet annwali (proġetti pilota, azzjonijiet ta’ tħejjija, Aġenziji) u azzjonijiet iffinanzjati taħt il-prerogattivi tal-Kummissjoni, il-Kummissjoni għandha tipprovdi baġit multiannwali u (għal proġetti pilota u azzjonijiet ta’ tħejjija) il-marġini mħollija taħt il-limiti massimi awtorizzati ffissatifil-Parti D ta’ l-Anness II ; b. leġiżlazzjoni pendenti: proposti kurrenti tal-Kummissjoni referenzjati mill-linja tal-baġit (livell inferjuri), kapitolu u qasam ta’ politika. Għandu jinstab mekkaniżmu sabiex ikunu aġġornati t-tabelli kull darba li tkun adottata proposta ġdida sabiex ikunu evalwati l- konsegwenzi finanzjarji. 2. Il-Kummissjoni għandha tikkunsidra modi ta’ riferiment reċiproku bejn il-programmar finanzjarju u l-programmar leġiżlattiv sabiex tipprovdi previżjonijiet aktar preċiżi u affidabbli Għal kull proposta leġiżlattiva, il-Kummissjoni għandha tindika jekk hix inkluża fl- ipprogrammar għal Mejju-Diċembru jew le. L-awtorità dwar l-baġit għandha tkun partikolarment mgħarrfa dwar: a. l-atti leġiżlattivi ġodda kollha adottati imma mhux inklużi fid-dokument ta’ Mejju-Diċembru (bl-ammonti korrispondenti); b. il-leġiżlazzjoni pendenti kollha ppreżentata imma mhux inkluża fid-dokument ta’ Mejju- Diċembru (bl-ammonti korrispondenti); c. leġiżlazzjoni prevista fil-programm ta’ xogħol leġiżlattiv annwali tal-Kummissjoni bl- indikazzjoni ta’ azzjonijiet li tendenzjalment ikollhom impatt finanzjarju (iva/le). Kull meta jkun meħtieġ il-Kummissjoni għandha tindika l-ipprogrammar mill-ġdid implikat minn
MT 19/132MT proposti legiżlattivi ġodda Fuq il-bażi tad-data pprovduta mill-Kummissjoni, għandu jsir rendikont f’kull trialogu, kif previst f’dan il-ftehim. . D. Aġenziji u skejjel Ewropej 47. Meta tfassal il-proposta tagħha għall-ħolqien ta’ kwalunkwe aġenzija ġdid, il-Kummissjoni se tevalwa l-implikazzjonijiet tal-baġit għall-intestatura ta’ nfiq konċernata. Fuq il-bażi ta’ dik l- informazzjoni u mingħajr preġudizzju għall-proċeduri leġiżlattivi li jirregolaw it-twaqqif ta’ l-aġenzija , iż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità dwar il-baġit jimpenjaw irwieħhom, fil-qafas ta’ kooperazzjoni dwar il- baġit, li jilħqu ftehim f’waqtu dwar l-iffinanzjar ta’ l-aġenzija . Għandha tkun applikata proċedura simili meta jkun maħsub il-ħolqien ta’ skola Ewropea ġdida. E. Aġġustament ta’ Fondi Strutturali, Fond ta’ Koeżjoni, Żvilupp Rurali u l-Fond Ewropew għas-Sajd fid-dawl taċ-ċirkustanzi ta’ l-implimentazzjoni tagħhom 48. Fil-każ ta’ l-adozzjoni wara l-1 ta’ Jannar 2007 ta’ regoli jew programmi ġodda li jirregolaw il- Fondi Strutturali, il-Fond ta’ Koeżjoni, l-iżvilupp Rurali u l-Fond Ewropew għas-Sajd, iż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità dwar l-baġit jimpenjaw irwieħhom li jawtorizzaw, fuq proposta mill- Kummissjoni, it-trasferiment għas-snin sussegwenti, fl-eċċessii tal-limiti massimi ta’ nfiq korrispondenti, ta’ allokazzjonijiet mhux użati fl-2007. Il-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill għandhom jieħdu deċiżjonijiet dwar il-proposti tal-Kummissjoni dwar it-trasferiment ta’ allokazzjonijiet mhux użati għas-sena 2007 qabel l-1 ta’ Mejju 2008, skond il- Punt 3. . F. Strumenti finanzjarji ġodda 49. L-istituzzjonijiet jaqblu li l-introduzzjoni ta’ mekkaniżmi ta’ ko-finanzjament hi meħtieġa sabiex issaħħaħ l-effett ta’ stimolu tal-baġit ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea billi jiżdied l-inċentiv għall-iffinanzjar. Jaqblu li jinkoraġġixxu l-iżvilupp ta’ strumenti finanzjali multiannwali xierqa li jaħdmu bħala katalisti għal investituri privati u pubbliċi. Meta tippreżenta l-abbozz preliminari ta’ l-baġit, il-Kummissjoni għandha tirrapporta lill-awtorità dwar l-baġit dwar l-attivitajiet iffinanzjati mill-Bank Ewropew għall-Investiment, il-Fond Ewropew għall- Investime,t u l-Bank Ewropew ghar-Rikostruzzjoni u l-Iżvilupp sabiex jappoġġaw investiment fir- riċerka u l-iżvilupp, netwerks tranż-Ewropej u intrapriżi żgħar u ta’ daqs medju. ANNESS I
IL-QAFAS FINANZJARJU 2007-2013
(Miljuni ta' EUR - prezzijiet ta' l-2004) Total APPROPRJAZZJONIJIET GĦALL-IMPENJI 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007-2013 1. Tkabbir Ekonomiku Sostenibbli 51 267 52 415 53 616 54 294 55 368 56 876 58 303 382 139 1a Kompetittività għat-tkabbir ekonomiku u l-impjiegi 8 404 9 097 9 754 10 434 11 295 12 153 12 961 74 098 1b Koeżjoni għat-tkabbir ekonomiku u l-impjiegi 42 863 43 318 43 862 43 860 44 073 44 723 45 342 308 041 2. Preservazzjoni u Ġestjoni tar-Riżorsi Naturali 54 985 54 322 53 666 53 035 52 400 51 775 51 161 371 344 li minnhom: nefqa relatata mas-suq u ħlasijiet diretti 43 120 42 697 42 279 41 864 41 453 41 047 40 645 293 105 3. Ċittadinanza, libertà, sigurtà u ġustizzja 1 199 1 258 1 380 1 503 1 645 1 797 1 988 10 770 3a Libertà, sigurtà u ġustizzja 600 690 790 910 1 050 1 200 1 390 6 630 3b Ċittadinanza 599 568 590 593 595 597 598 4 140 4. L-UE bħala attur globali 6 199 6 469 6 739 7 009 7 339 7 679 8 029 49 463 5. Amministrazzjoni (1) 6 633 6 818 6 973 7 111 7 255 7 400 7 610 49 800 6. Kumpensi 419 191 190 800 TOTAL TA' APPROPRJAZZJONIJIET GĦALL-IMPENJI 12 0702 12 1473 12 2564 122 952 124 007 125 527 127 091 864 316 bħala perċentwal tad-DGN 1,10% 1,08% 1,07% 1,04% 1,03% 1,02% 1,01% 1,048%
TOTAL TA' APPROPRJAZZJONIJIET GĦALL-ĦLAS 116 650 119 620 111 990 118 280 115 860 119 410 118 970 820 780 bħala perċentwal tad-DGN 1,06% 1,06% 0,97% 1,00% 0,96% 0,97% 0,94% 1,00% Marġni disponibbli 0,18% 0,18% 0,27% 0,24% 0,28% 0,27% 0,30% 0,24% Limitu tar-Riżorsi Proprji bħala perċentwal tad-DGN 1,24% 1,24% 1,24% 1,24% 1,24% 1,24% 1,24% 1,24%
(1) In-nefqa fuq il-pensjonijiet inkluża taħt il-limitu għal din l-intestatura hija kkalkulata netta mill-kontribuzzjonijiet lejn l-iskema rilevanti, fil-limitu ta' € 500 miljun fi prezzijiet ta' l-2004 għall-perjodu 2007-2013.
MT 21 Error! Unknown document property name.MT ANNESS II
KOLLABORAZZJONI INTERISTITUZZJONALI FIL-QASAM TAL-BAĠIT
Parti A. Wara l-aġġustament tekniku tal-qafas finanzjarju għas-sena finanzjarja li ġejja, waqt li titqies l-Istrateġija ta’ Politika Annwali ppreżentata mill-Kummissjoni u qabel id-deċiżjoni tagħha fuq l-abbozz preliminari tal-baġit, għandha tinżamm laqgħa ta’ trijalogu biex ikunu diskussi l-prijoritajiet possibbli għall-baġit għal dik is-sena. Għandhom jitqiesu wkoll is- setgħat ta’ l-istituzzjonijiet kif ukoll lill-iżvilupp previst dwar il-ħtiġiet għas-sena finanzjarja li ġejja u għal dawk ta’ wara koperti bil-qafas finanzjarju. Għandha tingħata attenzjoni wkoll lill-elementi l-ġodda li ħarġu wara t-twaqqif tal-qafas finanzjarju tal-bidu lil hawn u li x’aktarx ikollhom impatt finanzjarju sostanzjali fit-tul fuq il-baġit ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea. Parti B. Dwar in-nefqa obbligatorja, il-Kummissjoni, fil-preżentazzjoni ta’ l-abbozz preliminari tal- baġit tagħha, għandha tidentifika: (a) l-approprjazzjonijiet marbuta ma’ leġislazzjoni ġdida jew ippjanata; (b) approprjazzjonijiet li jkunu ġejjin mill-applikazzjoni ta’ leġislazzjoni eżistenti meta jkun ġie adottat l-baġit ta’ qabel. Il-Kummissjoni se tagħmel stima għaqlija ta’ l-implikazzjonijiet finanzjarji ta’ l-obbligi tal- Komunità bbażati fuq ir-regoli. Jekk ikun meħtieġ, din se taġġorna l-istima tagħha matul il- proċedura tal-baġit stess. Din se tipprovdi lill-awtorità tal-baġit bir-raġunijiet iġġustifikati kollha li din tista’ tkun teħtieġ. Jekk tkun tqisu neċessarju, il-Kummissjoni tista’ tippreżenta liż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit ittra ta’ emenda ad hoc biex taġġorna l-figuri li fuqhom hi bbażata l-istima tan-nefqa agrikola fl-abbozz preliminari tal-baġit u/jew biex tikkoreġi, fuq il-bażi tat-tagħrif l-aktar reċenti li jkun disponibbli dwar il-ftehim tas-sajd li jkunu fis-seħħ fl-1 ta’ Jannar tas-sena finanzjarja kkonċernata, l-ammonti u tqassim tagħhom bejn l-approprjazzjonijiet mdaħħla fil- punti ta’ l-operat għall-ftehim internazzjonali tas-sajd u dawk imdaħħla fir-riżerva. Dik l-ittra ta’ emenda għandha tintbagħat lill-awtorità tal-baġit qabel l-aħħar ta’ Ottubru. Jekk din tiġi ppreżentata lill-Kunsill f’inqas minn xahar qabel l-ewwel qari tal-Parlament Ewropew, il-Kunsill għandu bħala regola jqis l-ittra ta’ emenda ad hoc meta l-abbozz tal- baġit jkun se jgħaddi għat-tieni qari. Bħala konsegwenza, qabel ma l-Kunsill jgħaddi għat-tieni qari tal-baġit, iż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit għandhom jippruvaw jissodisfaw l-kundizzjonijiet meħtieġa għall-ittra ta’ emenda li għandha tiġi adottata f’qari wieħed minn kull waħda mill-istituzzjonijiet ikkonċernati.. Parti C. 1. Proċedura ta’ konċiljazzjoni qed tiġi stabbilita għall-infiq kollu. 2. L-għan tal-proċedura ta’ konċiljazzjoni huwa sabiex: (a) jitkomplew id-diskussjonijiet dwar ix-xejra ġenerali tan-nefqa u, f’dan il-qafas, fuq il-linji ġenerali tal-baġit għas-sena ta’ wara, fid-dawl ta’ l-abbozz preliminari tal-baġit tal- Kummissjoni; (b) jiżgura ftehim bejn iż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit dwar: – l-approprjazzjonijiet imsemmija fil-Punt B (a) u B (b), inklużi dawk proposti fl-ittra ta’ emenda ad hoc imsemmija f’ dik il-Parti, – l-ammonti li għandhom jiddaħħlu fl-baġit għan-nefqa mhux obbligatorja, skond il-punt 40 ta’ dan il-Ftehim, u – b’mod partikolari, materji li għalihom qed issir referenza għal din il-proċedura f’dan il- Ftehim. 3. Il-proċedura se tibda b’laqgħa ta’ trijalogu li għandha tinżamm f’waqtha biex l- istituzzjonijiet ikunu jistgħu jilħqu ftehim sa mhux aktar tard mid-data magħżula mill-Kunsill biex ikun stabbilit l-abbozz tal-baġit tiegħu. Se jkun hemm konċiljazzjoni fuq ir-riżultati ta’ dan it-trijalogu bejn il-Kunsill u delegazzjoni tal-Parlament Ewropew, bil-Kummissjoni wkoll tieħu sehem. Sakemm ma jiġix deċiż mod ieħor matul it-trijalogu, il-laqgħa ta’ konċiljazzjoni għandha tinżamm waqt il-laqgħa tradizzjonali bejn l-istess parteċipanti fid-data magħżula mill-Kunsill biex jiġi stabbilit l-abbozz tal-baġit. 4. Jekk ikun meħtieġ, tista’ tinżamm laqgħa ta’ trialogu qabel l-ewwel qari tal-Parlament Ewropew wara proposta bil-miktub mill-Kummissjoni jew talba bil-miktub mill-President tal- Kumitat dwar il-Baġit tal-Parlament Ewropew jew il-President tal-Kunsill (Baġit). Id-deċiżjoni dwar jekk isirx it-trialogu tittieħed permezz ta’ qbil bejn l-istituzzjonijiet wara l-adozzjoni ta’ l- abbozz tal-baġit tal-Kunsill u qabel il-vot dwar l-emendi waqt l-ewwel qari mill-Kumitat tal- Parlament Ewropew dwar il-baġit.
5. L-istituzzjonijiet ser ikomplu l-konċiljazzjoni wara l-ewwel qari tal-baġit minn kull waħda miż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità dwar il-baġit sabiex ikun żgurat ftehim dwar nefqa obbligatorja u mhux obbligatorja u, b’mod partikolari, sabiex tkun diskussa l-ittra ta’ emenda ad hoc imsemmija fil-Parti B. Issir laqgħa ta’ trialogu għal dan l-għan wara l-ewwel qari tal-Parlament Ewropew. Ir-riżultati tat-trialogu jkunu diskussi fit-tieni laqgħa ta’ konċiljazzjoni li tinżamm f’jum it-tieni qari tal-Kunsill. Jekk meħtieġ, l-istituzzjonijiet ikomplu d-diskussjonijiet tagħhom dwar in-nefqa mhix obbligatorja wara t-tieni qari tal-Kunsill. 6. F’dawk il-laqgħat ta’ trialogu, id-delegazzjonijiet ta’ l-istituzzjonijiet jitmexxew mill- President tal-Kunsill (Baġit), il-President tal-Kumitat tal-Parlament Ewropew dwar l-Baġit u l- Membru tal-Kummissjoni responsabbli għall-baġit. 7. Kull driegħ ta’ l-awtorità dwar il-baġit jieħu kwalunkwe pass meħtieġ sabiex jiżgura li r- riżultati li jistgħu jkunu assigurati fil-proċess ta’ konċiljazzjoni jkunu rispettati matul il- proċedura kollha tal-baġit . Parti D. Sabiex il-Kummissjoni tkun tista’ tagħmel evalwazzjoni f’waqtha dwar l-implimentabbilta’ ta’ l-emendi previsti mill-awtorità tal-baġit, li joħolqu azzjonijiet ġodda ta’ tħejjija/proġetti pilota jew itawlu dawk eżistenti, iż-żewġ dirgħajn ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit se jgħarrfu lill-Kummissjoni sa nofs Ġunju dwar l-intenzjonijiet tagħhom għar-rigward. Dan biex l-ewwel diskussjoni tkun diġà tista’ ssir fil-laqgħa ta’ konċiljazzjoni ta’ l-ewwel qari tal-Kunsill. Il-passi li jmiss tal- proċedura ta’ konċiljazzjoni u li huma previsti fil-Parti C għandhom jgħoddu wkoll, kif ukoll id-dispożizzjonijiet fuq l-implimentabbilta’ msemmija fil-Punt 36 ta’ dan il-ftehim. Aktar minn hekk, l-istituzzjonijiet jaqblu li jillimitaw l-ammont totali ta’ l-approprjazzjonijiet għall-iskemi pilota għal EUR 40 miljun fi kwalunkwe sena ta’ baġit. Huma jaqblu wkoll li jillimitaw fi kwalunkwe sena tal-baġit l-ammont totali ta’ l-approprjazzjonijiet għall-azzjonijiet
MT 23 Error! Unknown document property name. ġodda ta’ tħejjija għal EUR 50 miljun , waqt li jillimitaw għal EUR 100 miljun l-ammont totali ta’ approprjazzjonijiet li bħalissa huma impenjati għall-azzjonijiet tat-tħejjija. ANNESS III
KLASSIFIKAZZJONI TAN-NEFQA L- Tkabbir sostenibbli intestatura 1. Nefqa mhux 1A Kompetittività għat-tkabbir u l-impjiegi obbligatorja (NCE) 1B Koeżjoni għat-tkabbir u l-impjiegi NCE L- Preservazzjoni u tmexxija ta’ riżorsi naturali NCE intestatura 2. Ħlief: Nefqa tal-politika agrikola komuni li tirrigwarda miżuri tas-suq u Nefqa għajnuniet diretti, inklużi miżuri għas-suq fis-sajd u ftehim dwar is- obbligatorja sajd konklużi ma’ partijiet terzi (CE) L- Ċittadinanza, ħelsien, sigurtà u ġustizzja NCE intestatura 3. 3A Ħelsien, Sigurtà u Ġustizzja NCE 3B Ċittadinanza NCE L- L-UE bħala attriċi globali NCE intestatura 4. Ħlief: Nefqa li tirriżulta minn ftehim internazzjonali li l-Unjoni Ewropea CE tikkonkludi ma’ partijiet terzi. Kontribuzzjonijiet għal organizzazzjonijiet jew istituzzjonijiet CE internazzjonali Kontribuzzjonijiet li jipprovdu l-fond dwar il-garanzija għas-self CE L- Amministrazzjoni NCE intestatura 5. Ħlief: Pensjonijiet u għotjiet għat-tluq CE Għotjiet u kontribuzzjonijiet varji fit-tmiem tas-servizz CE Spejjeż legali CE Ħsarat CE L- Kumpensi CE intestatura 6.
MT 25 Error! Unknown document property name. ANNESS IV
L-IFFINANZJAR TAN-NEFQA LI TKUN ĠEJJA MILL-FTEHIM TAS-SAJD
Parti A. In-nefqa marbuta mal-ftehim tas-sajd qed tkun iffinanzjata minn żewġ punti li għandhom x’jaqsmu mal-qasam tal-politika tas-sajd (b’referenza għall-ħidma bbażata fuq in-nomenklatura tal-baġit): (a) ftehim internazzjonali tas-sajd (11 03 01); (b) kontribuzzjonijiet lil organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali (11 03 02). L-ammonti kollha relatati ma’ ftehim u protokolli li huma fis-seħħ fl-1 ta’ Jannar tas-sena in kwistjoni se jiddaħħlu taħt l-intestatura 11 03 01. L-ammonti marbuta mal-ftehim kollha ġodda jew li jiġġeddu li jidħlu fis-seħħ wara l-1 ta’ Jannar tas-sena in kwistjoni se jiġu assenjati lill-intestatura 40 02 41 02 – Riżervi/Approprjazzjonijiet differenzjati (nefqa obbligatorja). Parti B. Fil-proċedura ta’ konċiljazzjoni pprovduta fl-Anness II, Parti C, il-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill se jfittxu li jintlaħaq ftehim fuq l-ammont li għandu jiddaħħal fl- intestaturi tal-baġit u fir-riżerva fuq il-bażi tal-proposta magħmula mill-Kummissjoni. Parti C. Il-Kummissjoni timpenja ruħha li żżomm lill-Parlament Ewropew mgħarraf regolarment dwar it-tħejjija u l-andament tan-negozjati, inklużi l-implikazzjonijiet ta’ l-baġit. Matul il-proċess leġislattiv marbut mal-ftehim tas-sajd, l-istituzzjonijiet jimpenjaw ruħhom li jagħmlu kull sforz biex jiżguraw li l-proċeduri kollha jitwettqu malajr kemm jista’ jkun. Jekk l-approprjazzjonijiet marbuta mal-ftehim tas-sajd (inkluża r-riżerva) ma jkunux suffiċjenti, il-Kummissjoni għandha tipprovdi lill-awtorità tal-baġit bit-tagħrif meħtieġ għal skambju ta’ ideat fl-għamla ta’ trijalogu, possibbilment issimplifikat, fuq il-kawżi tas- sitwazzjoni, u fuq il-miżuri li jistgħu jiġu adottati taħt proċeduri stabbiliti. Fejn ikun meħtieġ, il-Kummissjoni se tipproponi miżuri xierqa. Kull tliet xhur il-Kummissjoni għandha tippreżenta lill-awtorità tal-baġit tagħrif dettaljat dwar l-implimentazzjoni tal-ftehim li jkun hemm fis-seħħ u dwar il-previżjonijiet finanzjarji għall- bqija tas-sena. DIKJARAZZJONIJIET
1. Dikjarazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni dwar l-evalwazzjoni ta’ l-operat tal-Ftehim Interistituzzjonali B’rabta mal-Punt 7 tal-Ftehim Interistituzzjonali, il-Kummissjoni għandha tħejji rapport dwar l- operat tal-Ftehim Interistituzzjonalisa tmiem l-2009 akkumpanjat, jekk meħtieġ, minn proposti relevanti. 2. Dikjarazzjoni dwar Punt 27 tal-Ftehim Interistituzzjonali Fil-qafas tal-proċedura annwali tal-baġit, il-Kummissjoni se tgħarraf lill-Awtorità dwar il-Baġit dwar l-ammont disponibbli għall-Istrument ta’ Flessibbiltà imsemmi lfil-Punt 27 tal-Ftehim Interistituzzjonali. Kwalunkwe deċiżjoni sabiex ikun mobilizzat l-Istrument ta’ Flessibbiltà għal ammont li jeċċedi EUR 200 miljun tkun timplika deċiżjoni ta’ trasferiment ‘il quddiem. 3. Dikjarazzjoni dwar Reviżjoni tal-qafas finanzjarju 1. Skond il-konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill Ewropew, il-Kummissjoni ġiet mistiedna sabiex twettaq reviżjoni wiesgħa u sħiħa li tkopri l-aspetti kollha ta’ l-infiq ta’ l-UE, inkluża l-Politika Agrikola Komuni, u tar-riżorsi, inkluż it-tnaqqis mogħti lir-Renju Unit, u biex tirrapporta fl-2008/9. Dik ir- reviżjoni għandha tkun akkumpanjata minn evalwazzjoni ta’ l-operat tal-Ftehim Interistituzzjonali. Il-Parlament Ewropew ser ikun assoċjat mar-reviżjoni fl-istadji kollha tal- proċedura a abbażi tad-dispożizzjonijiet li ġejjin: – waqt il-fażi ta' eżaminar wara l-preżentazzjoni tar-reviżjoni mill-Kummissjoni, ikun żgurat li jsiru d-diskussjonijiet xierqa mal-Parlament Ewropew abbażi ta’ djalogu politiku normali bejn l-istituzzjonijiet u li l-pożizzjonijiet tal-Parlament Ewropew jitqiesu kif xieraq;
– skond il-konklużjonijiet tiegħu ta' Diċembru 2005, il-Kunsill Ewropew "jista' jieħu deċiżjonijiet dwar is-suġġetti kollha koperti mir-reviżjoni". Il-Parlament Ewropew ikun parti minn kull pass formali ta' segwitu skond il-proċeduri relevanti u b'rispett sħiħ għad-drittijiet stabbiliti. 2. Il-Kummissjoni timpenja ruħha, bħala parti mill-proċess ta’ konsultazzjoni u riflessjoni li jwassal għat-twaqqif tar-reviżjoni, li taħdem fuq l-iskambju fil-fond ta’ perspettivi li se twettaq mal-Parlament Ewropew meta janalizzaw is-sitwazzjoni. Il-Kummissjoni tinnota wkoll l- intenzjoni tal-Parlament Ewropew li jsejjaħ konferenza li tkun tinvolvi lill-Parlament Ewropew u l-parlamenti nazzjonali sabiex tirrevedi s-sistema ta’ riżorsi proprji. Tikkunsidra r-riżultat ta’ tali konferenza bħala kontribuzzjoni fil-qafas ta’ dak il-proċess ta’ konsultazzjoni. Hu mifhum li l- proposti tal-Kummissjoni jittressqu kompletament taħt ir-responsabbiltà tagħha. 4. Dikjarazzjoni dwar skrutinju demokratiku u koerenza ta’ azzjonijiet esterni Il-Parlament Ewropew, il-Kunsill u l-Kummissjoni jagħrfu l-ħtieġa ta’ razzjonalizzazzjoni ta’ l- strumenti varji għal azzjonijiet esterni. Jaqblu li t-tali razzjonalizzazzjoni ta’ l-istrumenti, filwaqt li ssaħħaħ il-koerenza u l-kapaċità ta’ rispons ta’ l-azzjoni ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea, m’għandhiex taffettwa l-poteri la ta’ l-awtorità leġiżlattiva – notevolment fil-kontroll politiku tagħha ta’ għażliet strateġiċi – jew ta’ l-awtorità dwar l-baġit. It-test tar-regolamenti relevanti għandu jirrifletti dawk il-prinċipji u jinkludi, fejn xieraq, il-kontenut ta’ politika neċessarja u tqassima indikattiva ta’ riżorsi u , fejn meħtieġ, klawsola ta’ reviżjoni bl-għan li tkun evalwata l- implimentazzjoni tar-regolament, wara tliet snin, l-aktar tard. Taħt l-istrumenti bażiċi leġislattivi adottati bil-proċedura ta’ ko-deċiżjoni, il-Kummissjoni sistematikament tinforma u tikkonsulta mal-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill billi tibgħat abbozzi ta’ aġġornamenti strateġiċi tematiċi u aġġornamenti strateġiċi dwar pajjiżi u reġjuni. Fejn il-Kunsill jiddeċiedi fuq it-tranżizzjoni ta’ kandidati potenzjali għal kandidati ta’ qabel l- adeżjoni waqt il-perjodu kopert mill-Ftehim Interistituzzjonali, il-Kummissjoni se tirrevedi u tikkomunika lill-Parlament Ewropew u lill-Kunsill qafas multiannwali indikattiv skond l-Artikolu
MT 27 Error! Unknown document property name. 4 tar-Regolament li jistabbilixxi Strument għall-Assistenza Pre-Adeżjoni (Instrument for Pre- Accession Assistance - IPA) sabiex iqisu l-ħtiġijiet ta’ nfiq li jirriżultaw minn tali tranżizzjoni. Il-Kummissjoni se tipprovdi, fl-abbozz preliminari tal-baġit, nomenklatura li tiżgura l- prerogattivi ta’ l-awtorità tal-baġit fuq azzjonijiet esterni. 5. Dikjarazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni dwar l-iskrutinju demokratiku u l-koerenza ta’ azzjonijiet esterni Il-Kummissjoni timpenja ruħha li tidħol fi djalogu regolari mal-Parlament Ewropew dwar il- kontenut ta’ l-abbozzi tal-aġġornamenti strateġiċi tematiċi u aġġornamenti strateġiċi dwar pajjiżi u reġjuni u sabiex tqis kif xieraq il-pożizzjoni tal-Parlament Ewropew meta timplimenta l- istrateġiji. Dak id-djalogu se jinkludi diskussjoni dwar it-tranżizzjoni ta’ kandidati potenzjali għal status ta’ qabel l-adeżjoni waqt il-perjodu kopert mill-Ftehim Interistituzzjonali. 6. Dikjarazzjoni dwar ir-reviżjoni tar-Regolament Finanzjarju Fil-qafas tar-reviżjoni tar-Regolament Finanzjarju l-Istituzzjonijiet jimpenjaw irwieħhom sabiex itejbu l-implimentazzjoni ta' l-baġit u jtejbu l-viżibilità u l-benefiċċju ta' l-iffinanzjar komunitarju lejn iċ-ċittadini mingħajr ma jqiegħdu in kwistjoni l-progress miksub fir-recasting ta' l-2002 tar- Regolament Finanzjarju. Ifittxu wkoll, kemm jista’ jkun, waqt l-istadju finali tan-negozjati dwar ir-reviżjoni tar-Regolament Finanzjarju u r-Regoli Implimentattivi tiegħu, il-bilanċ adegwat bejn il-protezzjoni ta’ l-interessi finanzjarji, il-prinċipju tal-proporzjonalità tan-nefqa amministrattiva, u proċeduri li jirrispettaw l-utent. Ir-reviżjoni tar-Regolament Finanzjarju tkun adottata fuq il-bażi ta’ proposta modifikata mill- Kummissjoni wara l-proċedura ta’ konċiljazzjoni stabbilita bid-Dikjarazzjoni Konġunta tal- Parlament Ewropew, il-Kunsill u l-Kummissjoni ta’ l-4 ta’ Marzu 1975, fl-ispirtu li ppermetta l- ftehim milħuq fl-2002. Ifittxu wkoll koperazzjoni interistituzzjonali mill-qrib u kostruttiva għall- adozzjoni b’ħeffa tar-Regoli Implimentattivi sabiex ikunu simplifikati l-proċeduri ta’ ffinanzjar filwaqt li tkun żgurata livell għoli ta’ protezzjoni qawwija ta’ l-interessi finanzjarji tal-Komunita’. Il-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill huma impenjati bis-sħiħ sabiex jikkonkludu n-negozjati dwar ir-Regolament Finanzjarju sabiex jippermettu d-dħul tiegħu fis-seħħ, jekk ikun possibbli, fl-1 ta’ Jannar 2007. 7. Dikjarazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni dwar ir-reviżjoni tar-Regolament Finanzjarju Fil-qafas tar-reviżjoni tar-Regolament Finanzjarju, il-Kummissjoni timpenja ruħha: – li tinforma lill-Parlament Ewropew u lill-Kunsill jekk fi proposta għal att legali, hi tqis meħtieġ li titlaq mid-dispożizzjonijiet tar-Regolament Finanzjarju, u li tistqarr ir- raġunijiet speċifiċi għal dan;
– li tiżgura li jsiru evalwazzjonijiet regolari dwar l-impatt leġiżlattiv, filwaqt li jitqiesu l- prinċipji ta’ sussidjarjetà u proporzjonalità, dwar proposti leġiżlattivi importanti u kwalunkwe emendi sostantivi fihom. 8. Dikjarazzjoni dwar strumenti finanzjarji ġodda Il-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill jistiednu lill-Kummissjoni u lill-Bank Ewropew ta’ l- Investiment (EIB), fl-isferi ta’ kompetenza rispettivi tagħhom, sabiex iressqu proposti: skond il-konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill Ewropew f’Diċembru ta’ l-2005, biex iżżid il-kapaċità ta’ l-EIB fis-self u l-garanziji għal riċerka u żvilupp sa EUR 10 biljun fil-perjodu 2007- 2013, b’kontribuzzjoni ta’ l-EIB sa EUR 1 biljun minn riservi għall-iffinanzjar tat-tqassim tar-riskju (RSFF); li ssaħħaħ l-istrumenti favur Netwerks Trans-Ewropej (TENs) u Intrapriżi Żgħar u ta’ Daqs Medju sa ammont approssimattiv ta’ self u garanziji ta’ EUR 20 biljun u EUR 30 biljun, rispettivament, b'kontribuzzjoni ta' l-EIB sa EUR 0.5 biljun minn riservi (TENs) u sa EUR 1 biljun (Kompetittività u Innovazzjoni) rispettivament. 9. Dikjarazzjoni tal-Parlament Ewropew dwar il-modulazzjoni volontarja
PE 372.062v 28/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT Il-Parlament Ewropew jinnota l-konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill Ewropew ta’ Diċembru 2005 dwar il- modulazzjoni volontarja min-nefqa relatata mas-suq u ħlasijiet direttital-Politika Agrikola Komuni għal Żvilupp rurali sa massimu ta’ 20% u t-tnaqqis għan-nefqa relatata mas-suq. Meta jistabbilixxi l-modalitajiet ta’ din il-modulazzjoni ta’ l-atti legali relevanti, il-Parlament Ewropew għandu jevalwa l-vijabbiltà ta’ dawn id-dispożizzjonijiet skond il-prinċipji ta’ l-UE, bħal regoli ta’ kompetizzjoni u oħrajn; il-Parlament Ewropew bħalissa jirriserva l-pożizzjoni tiegħu dwar l-eżitu tal-proċedura. Jikkunsidra li jkun utli li tiġi eżaminata l-kwistjoni tal-ko- finanzjar ta’ l-agrikoltura fil-kuntest tar-reviżjoni ta’ l-2008/9. 10. Dikjarazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-modulazzjoni volontarja Il-Kummissjoni tinnota l-Punt 62 tal-konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill Ewropew ta’ Diċembru ta’ l-2005 li bihom l-Istati Membri jistgħu jittrasferixxu somom addizzjonali min-nefqa relatata mas-suq u ħlasijet diretti tal-Politika Agrikola Komuni għall-iŻvilupp Rurali sa massimu ta’ 20% ta’ l- ammonti li jakkumulawlhom minn nefqa relatata mas-suq u ħlasijiet diretti. Meta tistabbilixxi l-modalitajiet ta’ l-atti legali relevanti, il-Kummissjoni timpenja ruħha li tagħmel il-modulazzjoni volontarja possibbli filwaqt li tagħmel l-isforzi kollha sabiex tiżgura li mekkaniżmu bħal dan jirrifletti mill-aktar qrib possibbli r-regoli bażiċi tal-politika dwar l-iżvilupp rurali. 11. Dikjarazzjoni tal-Parlament Ewropew dwar Natura 2000 Il-Parlament Ewropew jesprimi t-tħassib tiegħu dwar il-konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill Ewropew ta’ Diċembru 2005 marbuta mat-tnaqqis tan-nefqa relatata mas-suq u ħlasijiet diretti tal- Politika Agrikola Komuni u l-konsegwenzi tagħha fuq il-ko-finanzjament ta' Natura 2000 mill-Komunità. Jistieden lill-Kummissjoni sabiex tevalwa l-konsegwenzi ta' dawn id-dispożizzjonijiet qabel ma tagħmel proposti ġodda. Jikkunsidra li għandha tingħata priorità xierqa lill-integrazzjoni ta’ Natura 2000 fil-Fondi Strutturali u Żvilupp Rurali. Bħala parti mill-awtorità leġiżlattiva, bħalissa tirriserva l-pożizzjoni tagħha dwar l-eżitu tal-proċedura. 12. Dikjarazzjoni tal-Parlament Ewropew fuq il-ko-finanzjament privat u l-VATgħall- koeżjoni għat-tkabbir u l-impjiegi Il-Parlament Ewropew jinnota l-konklużjoni tal-Kunsill Ewropew ta’ Diċembru 2005 dwar l- applikazzjoni tar-regolament ta’ diżimpenn awtomatiku N+3 fuq bażi tranżizzjonali; il- Parlament Ewropew jistieden lill-Kummissjoni, meta tistabbilixxi l-modalitajiet għall- applikazzjoni ta’ din ir-regola fl-atti legali relevanti, sabiex tiżgura regoli komuni għall-ko- finanzjament privat u l-VAT għall-koeżjoni għat-tkabbir ekonomiku u l-impjiegi. 13. Dikjarazzjoni tal-Parlament Ewropewdwar il-finanzjament taż-Żona ta’ Libertà, Sigurtà u Ġustizzja Il-Parlament Ewropew jikkunsidra li meta tippreżenta l-abbozz preliminari tal-baġit l- Kummissjoni għandha tagħti stima bir-reqqa ta’ l-attivitajiet ippjanati għal-Libertà, Sigurtà u Ġustizzja, u li l-iffinanzjar ta’ dawn l-attivitajiet għandu jkun diskuss fil-qafas tal-proċeduri previsti fl-Anness II tal-Ftehim Interistituzzjonali.
NOTA SPJEGATTIVA
24.4.2006
Before setting out the results of the negotiations between Parliament and Council on a new Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) and a multi-annual framework (MFF), the rapporteur would like to remind the main steps of the procedure which over the last two years have paved the way to the final agreement.
Apart from the outcome of the negotiations, he is convinced that the European Parliament's
MT 29 Error! Unknown document property name. working method and political determination have contributed to improving its credibility and strengthened its role in the inter-institutional context.
For the first time, the EP has adopted a negotiating position prior to Council's conclusions. It has set up a specific temporary committee where all committees and political groups were represented, which lead to a consensual vote of EP's position on 8 June 2005. The EP has set out a global three-pillar strategy matching political priorities and financial needs, modernising the budget structure and improving the quality of implementation of the EU budget. The EP had given the newly appointed Commission a chance to revise its initial proposals in view of reflecting more realistic and updated political priorities. The EP has clearly indicated on many occasions that it expects the Commission to play its role of "honest broker" between the Parliament and the Council and certainly contributed to rectifying the Commission's tendency to play in favour of the Council. The EP has formally rejected the Council conclusions in their current form because they did not provide the Union with the means to assume its responsibilities. The EP has insisted on negotiating the qualitative elements and the further development of the budget structure despite the Council's reluctance in order to secure the improvement of the quality of the implementation of the EU budget. The EP has opposed the Council's approach on ceilings and percentages and focussed on an approach based on programmes and has obtained that the additional amount be allocated to its priorities and directly to programmes.
Considering the difficulties encountered by the European Council in June and December 2005, the result at the end of the negotiations represents the maximum which could be obtained in the logic of reaching an agreement.
The rapporteur is fully aware that the new IIA and the financial framework do not fully meet all expectations and that unsolved shortcomings and weaknesses remain in certain areas.
However, the rapporteur considers it as fully justified to give a positive recommendation for the vote on the IIA and the MFF resulting from the agreement reached on 4 April 2006 between the Parliament, the Council and the Commission following intense negotiations which started in January and ended on 4 April 2006.
At the May 2006 plenary session, the European Parliament will vote on the renewal of the Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure (IIA) including the next multi-annual framework 2007-2013.
In accordance with the Rules of Procedure (article 120), two reports will be adopted:
- the report of the Committee on Budgets presented by Mr Böge with a recommendation on the budgetary content of the IIA
PE 372.062v 30/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT - the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs presented by Mr Sousa Pinto with a recommendation regarding the consistency of the IIA with the principles laid down in the EC Treaty.
Why this agreement can be approved? 12 reasons to say yes
1. It allows continuity of the EU legislative process: 90% of Community programmes are terminating at the end of 2006. The functioning of the programmes is guaranteed, even if the level of expenditure is far below the request of the Commission, in principle supported by the EP. The level agreed guarantees a moderate increase over the period for all the programmes with the exception of Agriculture, including Rural Development and Fisheries. 2. It represents a tangible achievement of enlargement by offering the first financial framework for 27 Member States for the coming seven years. It secures an orderly evolution of EU expenditure over a mid-term period. 3. It maintains a fair balance of powers between the Institutions and consolidates the principle of co-decision for budgetary matters. 4. It provides for realistic resources to allow the development of EU policies and foresees appropriate instruments to mobilise additional means if necessary. 5. It guarantees room for manoeuvre within the annual budgetary procedures. This was one of the aims of Parliament. The financial perspectives should not establish a rigid budget for seven years but leave the possibility each year to assess the functioning of the programmes, the financial margin to launch new initiatives, the possibility to respond to new challenges, the capacity to respond to humanitarian, natural and economic emergencies. Margins exist in all headings although their level is particularly low for heading 2 and heading 3b. 6. It ensures a review on the basis of the Commission's assessment of the current IIA in 2009 and a full involvement of Parliament in the wide-ranging mid-term review according to its established rights. 7. It contributes to answer EP's requests made in its position of 8 June 2005 for improving the quality of implementation of the budget (Financial Regulation, internal control, agencies, financial programming). 8. It introduces an active use of new financial instruments through co-financing with the EIB in the budget management of the Union. 9. It safeguards Parliament's budgetary and legislative prerogatives and strengthens the democratic scrutiny in external programmes and CFSP. 10. It guarantees support for emergencies events even if it will be financed mostly outside the financial framework (Emergency aid for third countries, Solidarity Fund and Globalisation Fund within the EU). There is no change in the legislation these emergencies will continue to be financed by the EU budget as now. 11. It guarantees flexibility: With the same mechanism of the current IIA reintroducing the possibility of carrying over the not used appropriations of the previous two years that the Commission had suppressed in its proposal (against a higher annual amount).
MT 31 Error! Unknown document property name. 12. It introduces legislative flexibility: It is one of the most relevant achievements of the new agreement. The EP can now play its role to determine more easily priorities between the different programs and the Commission should be ready to demonstrate the efficiency of each program; an amount in the legal act is no more a full guarantee but this mechanism will favour a better monitoring of the programmes.
What has been achieved?
The European Parliament's negotiating position of 8 June 2005 contained qualitative and quantitative elements including the strengthening of Parliament's prerogatives over the next generation of policies.
Concerning the quantitative aspects, the final result remains far behind the June resolution which, he wishes to recall, was a negotiating position and remains an objective. He is aware that the reductions made by the European Council on the Commission proposals have only been partially compensated.
At the end of the negotiations, the rapporteur considers that most qualitative elements are reflected in the new IIA and represent a real opportunity to improve the quality of EU spending and to create indirect positive effects and quantitative results. He is also aware that some weaknesses and shortcomings subsist in the formulations, but he is convinced that the new IIA is better than the current one without losing the existing "acquis".
It is worthwhile to remind that already in June 2005, the EP considered the Commission proposal as not realistic. Therefore, a reduction was made on the proposal. On the other side, the Commission proposal set the reference for the interinstitutional debate.
However, it was clear that after the decision of the European Council the margin for manoeuvre was very limited. Nonetheless, the result of the negotiations represents a success for Parliament.
Quantitative elements
Overall amount
After the agreement of 4 April last, the financial framework will pass from EUR 862 billion to 864.3 billion, while the net increase of the overall ceiling is EUR 4 billion.
PE 372.062v 32/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT Policies/activities which can be financed by the EU Budget over period 2007-2013 following the new IIA within outside within outside Financial perspectives Financial perspectives Financial perspectives Financial perspectives Before the Trialogue After the Trialogue maximum maximum all policies 860.0 Solidarity Fund 6.0 all policies 864.0 Solidarity Fund 6.0 emergency aid 1.5 Globalisation 3.5 emergency aid 0.0 Globalisation 3.5 pension 0.5 Flexibility 1.4 pension 0.0 Flexibility 1.4 emergency aid 1.5 pension 0.5 total 862 total 10.9 total 864 total 12.9
total max EU Budget 872.9 total max EU Budget 876.9 DIFFERENCE 4 Amounts outside the MFF will be financed through additional appropriations.
As indicated in the table above, this has been achieved by two operations:
The Emergency Aid Reserve (EUR 1.5 billion) in Heading 4 has been placed outside the financial framework. As is the case with the Solidarity Fund, the Emergency Aid Reserve outside the financial framework will not decrease its financing and operability. Once needs arise, the Commission will present the appropriate budgetary instrument (reallocation or supplementary appropriations and after the decision of the budgetary authority, the resources will be paid by the Member States. These amounts will be over and above the ceilings agreed in the Financial Perspective. In fact, these two instruments: the Solidarity Fund (within the EU) and the Emergency Aid Reserve (outside the EU) are entered into the budget with a p.m., but outside the financial framework, without reducing the operability of these instruments. The mobilisation of these Funds will be financed by additional money from the Member States. The rapporteur wishes to recall that this is consistent with the EP's negotiating position which placed these Funds outside the FP to create more space for the programmed activities.
Regarding administrative expenditure, the ceiling of Heading 5 has been reduced by EUR 500 million but the pensions paid by staff will be allocated directly to administrative expenditure - up to a compensating level of EUR 500 million. .
The rapporteur wishes to recall that the "footnote" solution for pensions had already been applied in 1999 for the current Financial Perspective. Moreover, he underlines that the outcome of the negotiations, which maintains a separate heading for administrative expenditure of all institutions (including the Commission's) is consistent with the EP's negotiating position. The overall reduction operated by the Council on heading 5 will concern all the institutions, while in the June resolution Parliament had reduced the Commission administrative expenditure by 10%.
Instruments financed outside the Financial Perspective
MT 33 Error! Unknown document property name. Emergency Aid Reserve: The annual amount is fixed at EUR 221 mio. (current prices), i.e. EUR 1.4 bn. over the period. EU Solidarity Fund: The annual amount is fixed at EUR 1 bn. (current prices), i.e. up to EUR 7 bn. over the period. Instrument of flexibility: It remains at the current level of EUR 200 mio. per year (current prices), i.e. EUR 1.4 bn. over the period, with the possibility to carry over the unused appropriations during two years (i.e. in case of non-utilization of the flexibility instrument during 2 years the amount will be EUR 600 mio.). European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: The annual amount may not exceed EUR 500 mio., i.e. EUR 3.5 bn. over the period. The creation of this Fund was proposed by the December Council conclusions to provide additional support to workers who suffer from the consequences of globalisation. It will be financed by the existing margins and/or cancelled appropriations from the previous two years excluding those related to heading 1B.
The rapporteur wishes to recall that all the above instruments were also placed outside the financial framework by the EP negotiating position.
Specific mechanism for the Agencies and European Schools
This is also a novelty of the next IIA with a direct impact on the ceilings. In its negotiating position, Parliament had asked for a binding ceiling for agencies in order to preserve the operational programmes within the policy areas. Despite Council's strong reluctance, a new procedure has been set up for new Agencies (point D of part III). This procedure foresees that prior to the creation of a new Agency an assessment is made by the Commission to evaluate how it can be financed. A specific agreement of the budgetary authority will be necessary to allow the financing. This procedure will avoid that Agencies are financed through reprogramming or by using the margins. A similar procedure applies to the creation of new European Schools within heading 5.
In other terms, it means that new Agencies (or new European Schools) need a specific decision of financing and they will not automatically be covered by the FP.
Pilot projects and Preparatory Actions
The annual ceiling for Pilot Projects is increased from EUR 32 mio. to EUR 40 mio.. The annual ceiling for Preparatory Actions is increased from EUR 75 mio. to EUR 100 mio., of which 50 mio. for new actions.
Co-financing with the European Investment Bank (EIB)
The mechanism set in place (point 49 and declaration) can be described as follows:
According to the principle of co-financing, both the EU budget and the EIB will be investing appropriations in the same activity.
PE 372.062v 34/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT As result of the trialogue, from the EIB side, a supplementary share will be invested in the co- financing scheme, EUR 1 billion for Research (FP 7), 1 billion for Competitiveness and Innovation (CIP) and 0.5 billion for TEN-T projects,. The shareholders have to confirm the decision (proposal by the Board of Directors to the Board of Governors composed of the Finance Ministers) to allocate an equivalent amount from the Bank’s reserves into these programmes.
The EU budget will contribute with an equivalent amount, as foreseen in the programmes.
The leverage effect which is expected at the end of the period from this co-financing is estimated to be on average 5 times for Research, 20 times for TEN-T projects and 15 times for CIP financial instruments, providing respectively approximate financing amounts of EUR 10 billion for Research, 20 billion for TEN-T projects and 30 billion for SMEs. These figures are objectives and not funding.
Qualitative elements
The title and the scope of the next IIA have been modified to reflect the introduction of EP's requests for qualitative reforms. The rapporteur stresses that much determination has been necessary to overcome Council's approach. Finally, it accepted to widen the scope of the IIA and to change is title into "Interinstitutional Agreement on Budgetary Discipline and Sound Financial Management".
The new IIA presents significant progress in this area.
Review
The European Council conclusions of December 2005 foresee a wide-ranging review of EU resources and expenditure before the end of 2009. There will be a newly elected Parliament in June 2009 and a new Commission which will take office in the same year.
The June resolution recalls that for democratic reasons, the newly elected Parliament and the newly appointed Commission should have a say on the next mid-term political priorities. Therefore, the EP delegation requested the right for Parliament to participate in the review.
Despite strong opposition from the Council, the outcome of the negotiations foresees:
the commitment of the Commission to present a report on the functioning of the IIA whenever it deems necessary, and at all events by the end of 2009 (article 7 and declaration); the assurance for the newly elected Parliament to be fully involved in the wide-ranging review according to its established rights.
The combination of the two elements will give the EP the possibility to be involved in the review. This represents a real progress for Parliament's prerogatives in the decision-making process of the multi-annual financial framework.
MT 35 Error! Unknown document property name. CFSP
A better participation of Parliament through a structured political dialog with Council and financial control for the CFSP action and expenditure (art. 42 and 43). These texts consolidate the progress made over the last years and set a framework with a specific procedure along the year and moreover ensure a forward looking reporting as requested by Parliament. Such meetings will be planned jointly between AFET/BUDG and the Presidencies, possibly for the all year. This procedure enhances Parliament's political involvement in and financial control over CFSP.
Freedom, Security and Justice
It is worthwhile to mention that the EP would have preferred to have a parallel procedure for the third pillar - Justice and Home Affairs – as for CSFP but the Council was not open to introduce a detailed procedure for this policy. However, at the same time Council and Commission accept a unilateral EP declaration to discuss this specific issue at each trialogue foreseen in the framework of ordinary budgetary cooperation (4 times a year). It will for the LIBE and BUDG committees to jointly ensure the establishment of such a procedure.
External relations
The progress in this sector has a particular relevance for the institutional role of the EP and the democratic scrutiny. It is necessary to clarify that the declarations need to be implemented in concrete terms in the legislative procedures and in the dialogue agreed between Commission and Parliament, and this should improve the quality of implementation.
The institutional novelty introduced in the IIA, through this two declarations are the following:
The Commission commits itself to introduce policy contents into the regulations and to undertake a review after 3years at the latest. Parliament will be consulted on the draft strategy documents and the Commission commits to take into account EP's opinion in the course of implementation.
The rapporteur is convinced that what has been achieved is a real institutional progress for a better democratic control over implementation. It will be up to the legislative committees to monitor the respect of such commitments but the budgetary procedure will offer to EP the concrete tools to evaluate whether they are respected.
Certification (internal control)
The text of point 44 (part III) is - even if far from what the European Parliament asked for in its 2003 discharge resolution (Mr Wynn) as well as in its 2004 discharge resolution (Mr
PE 372.062v 36/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT Mulder) - is nevertheless a decisive step forward towards ensuring sound financial management of EU funds.
It is well known that approximately 80% of the budget is implemented by the Member States. For the first time we now have a text in the Inter-Institutional Agreement which will open the door for underlining Member States' responsibility.
Having regard to the resistance from many Member States to have this text included in the Interinstitional Agreement, the rapporteur believes that the outcome is satisfactory. However, it is of great importance to continue the debate and discussion on the matter.
Financial Regulation
Council and Commission, at Parliament's request, have accepted to include in the IIA a reference to principles that should inspire the implementation of the budget: principles that should simplify the access to the EU funds for potential beneficiaries and respect the proportionality of administrative costs.. The new IIA establishes as well that Financial Regulation will be adopted following a conciliation procedure, foreseen by the joint declaration of March 1975 in the spirit which enabled the agreement in 2002.
The rapporteur considers that on the basis of art. 45 and the joint declaration the EP will have the possibility to improve and simplify the implementation of the budget.
Financial programming
The joint declaration of July 2000 is now integrated in the IIA (part III). It foresees a regular stocktaking at each trialogue (i.e. 4 times a year). It will allow the Committee on Budgets to follow-up with more accuracy the impact of the legislation in force, the pending legislation and the foreseen legislation on the various headings. It will also allow to develop useful tools to evaluate the compatibility of the financial envelopes with the ceilings of the next financial framework in view of preserving EP's political priorities.
Lessons of the past and objectives for the future
Like in every negotiation, there are leftovers. Therefore, in some areas of major concern for the EP, unilateral declarations have been adopted and will be full part of the IIA.
Some of them are the following:
Voluntary modulation (point 62 of the December conclusions) up to 20% from the first pillar of CAP to Rural development, which contradicts some basic principles and policies of the Union as well as the in-depth CAP reform of 2003. Two declarations will be attached to the IIA: one unilateral declaration where the Commission commits to ensure that the will not remain as close as possible to the current rules and one by the EP reserving its position at legislative level and in the context of the review.
MT 37 Error! Unknown document property name. Natura 2000, the objectives of which are put in danger by the reduced amounts for Rural Development. Parliament's unilateral declaration also reserves the EP's position at legislative level with the view to compensate the damaging effect. Private co-financing and VAT: The unilateral declaration by Parliament which will be attached to the IIA aims to compensate the effect of the December European Council conclusions (points 57 and 58). The rapporteur is willing to stick to the June resolution by considering that provisions such as the eligibility of VAT, of co-financing or the N+3 rule should remain transitional. For those aspects which have found no solutions as well as for the shortages still existing in many policies, the rapporteur considers that they could be improved in the context of the legislative procedures which will be finalised in the course of the year 2006 (most of them are co-decisions). The 2007 budgetary procedure can also offer possibilities for adjustments or fine-tuning and finally the assessment of the functioning of the IIA in the context of the 2009 review will offer to the Parliament appropriate means to propose amendments.
The final result lags behind the EP's own position of June, although mainly for the quantitative aspects. It does not fully repair either the "damaging effects" of the reductions operated by the European Council in December 2005. It brings no direct solutions to some specific requests expressed by the sectoral committees during the different rapporteurs' meetings.
However, the rapporteur considers that the global result of the negotiations in qualitative and quantitative terms is a success. Further improvements must be aimed at in the context of the review in 2009.
PE 372.062v 38/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT ANNESSI GĦAN-NOTA SPJEGATTIVA
MT 39 Error! Unknown document property name. DOKUMENT TA' ĦIDMA NRU 1 DWAR IL-FTEHIMA INTERISTITUZZJONALI DWAR ID-DIXXIPLINA BAĠITARJA U T-TITJIB TAL-PROĊEDURA BAĠITARJA
17.11.2005
I. The relation between budget and legislation
Some Background
1. The Treaty itself contains the elements of conflict which opposed the European Parliament and the Council over the years 1975-1982 when the legislative powers belonged exclusively to Council, while the budgetary powers were shared between Council and Parliament.
2. As long as the Council - as sole legislator - exerted the budgetary power alone (until 1975), there was a 'concentration' on one institution of the two powers, which avoided significant conflicts. When acceding to more budgetary power, the Parliament developed the principle that the Budget should represent on its own a sufficient basis to execute the appropriations entered into it. On the basis of the 1975 Treaty, it started to create new budgetary lines which in many cases developed into major actions over consecutive annual budgets.
3. During the 1980's the Council developed the practice to enter into the legislative acts it adopted maximum amounts for the corresponding spending.1 The Parliament argued that such a practice contributed to reduce its budgetary power on non-compulsory expenditure entrusted to it by the Treaty. The joint declaration of 30 June 1982 aimed to find a compromise to overcome such confrontation:
"In order that the full importance of the budget procedure may be preserved, the fixing of maximum amounts by regulation must be avoided."2
At the same time, the Parliament, the Council and the Commission acknowledge the necessity of a legal basis for "significant actions".
4. The implementation of these two points proved to be unsatisfactory.
"Maximum amounts" were replaced by "amounts deemed necessary" in the multi-annual programmes and systematically entered by the Council in all multi-annual programmes as ceilings, while there were considered purely 'indicative' by the Parliament and increased or reduced in the annual budgets according to its priorities. Concerning the aspect of legal basis, the definition of "significant action" as opposed to "specific action" created confusion in the annual budgets.
1 The Single European Act (1986) promoted the first European policies which lead to the multiplication of multi-annual programmes in the field of research. The first framework programme is mentioned in art. 166 of the Single European Act (1986) and education (COMETT programme 1987-1989) 2 OJ C 194 , 28.07.1982 p. 1-3
PE 372.062v 40/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT 5. With the introduction of the co-decision procedure by the Amsterdam Treaty (May 1999) and the new balance of legislative competences between European Parliament and Council, the problem "amounts deemed necessary" was formalised in the Joint Declaration of 1995 on the Incorporation of Financial Provisions in legislative acts. In 1999, this declaration, with a few modifications, was included in the current Inter- institutional Agreement (IIA) of 6 May 1999 (articles 33 and 34)1.
6. The Court ruling of 12 May 19982 imposes the necessity for all budget lines entered in the budget to have a legal basis; it recalls the link between budget and legislation. In its conclusions, the Court confirms the independence of the legislative and budgetary procedures and at the same time strengthens the link between the two although neither of the two should impose to the other.
7. The Nice Treaty, which entered into force on in February 2003, has increased the scope of co-decision in several areas (freedom, justice and security, and external actions). Over the next period, there will be additional programmes with multi-annual envelopes.
8. The Constitutional Treaty for Europe, initially due to enter into force in November 2006, incorporates the Financial Perspective into the Treaty (article I.55 and III.402), graving in stone the multi-annual character of EU spending.
State of Play
9. In accordance with article 26 of the Inter-institutional Agreement of 6 May 1999, the Commission presented fresh proposals for a new medium-term financial perspective in February 2004, followed by the related legislative proposals. It should be recalled that most of the Community multi-annual programmes terminate at the end of 2006, which implies that 90% of the legislation with financial implications has to be renewed in the context of the new financial perspective. Legislative proposals have already been adopted by the Commission and submitted to the European Parliament and the Council for examination.
10. On 8 June 2005, the European Parliament adopted a negotiating position based on the report of the Temporary Committee on Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the Enlarged Union 2007-2013 (Böge report), in which it sets up its proposal for the global level of expenditure and its political priorities. On 16-17 June 2005, the European Council did not succeed in agreeing on a common position based on the Luxembourg presidency compromise. The sectoral committees have started to examine the legislative proposals. At this stage 17 have already been adopted.
11. In order to facilitate the conclusion of the legislative authority on the new programmes and until an agreement is reached on the Financial Perspective, actions have been taken on the procedure at institutional level. At the trialogue of 18 October, the institutions have agreed on a joint declaration "Guidelines for legislative proposals related to the 2007-2013
1 OJ C172 of 18.06.1999, page 1 2 UK/Commission C-106/96
MT 41 Error! Unknown document property name. multi-annual financial framework". It allows the EP and Council to proceed to the legislative work pending an agreement on the IIA for the period 2007-2013 as follows:
The EP and Council therefore undertake as follows:
12. the EP will take forward its consideration of individual programmes and, endeavour to complete its first reading;
13. the Council will endeavour to reach partial political agreement on the proposal excluding the budget figures and articles related to financial provisions
14. the two Institutions on the basis of their respective position will start, where appropriate, preliminary discussions on the legislative proposals, with the exception of the articles relating to the budget, financial statements, and other financial provisions in view of reaching a common understanding;
15. after agreement on the IIA, the EP and Council, on the basis of proposals from the Commission, will agree on the individual legislative proposals, including their financial envelopes, pending before the EP and Council and proceed to their final adoption. 16. At its meeting of 27 October, the European Council took note of the "Five proposals to relaunch negotiations". At the General Affairs Council of 7 November, the Presidency presented a document where it considers that the last compromise presented by the Luxembourg Presidency "continues to enjoy widespread support towards the agreement in December", although three key issues have to be deepened:
- the structure of EU spending, namely an earmarking from headings 1b and 2, a Globalisation Fund and heading 2
- modernising the budget notably setting up a timetable and scope for review
- own resources: proposals should be based on the principle of fair treatment of Member States of comparable levels of prosperity.
17. On 15 November, the Presidency foresees to make a new proposal including a table with figures in view of a discussion in Coreper and at the 21 November General Affairs Council.
On 15/16 December, the Financial Perspective will be on the agenda of the European Council for a possible decision.
18. At EP level, the Conference of Presidents decided on 29 September that financial matters related to the legislative procedures "should be based on, and be compatible with, the figures and guidelines set out in the European Parliament's resolution on Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the enlarged Union 2007-2013 (adopted on 8 June 2005)".
PE 372.062v 42/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT 19. On 20 October 2005, the President of the Commission sent a letter to the President of the European Parliament, the President-in-Office of the Council and to the Heads of State setting out "some ideas to help launch the final phase of negotiations".
II. Legislation in absence of a Financial Perspective
Back to the Treaty
20. The EU budget has developed within a multi-annual framework since 1988. Part I of the Inter-institutional Agreement contains the table on Financial Perspective which is soft law compared to the EC Treaty (primary law). In absence of FP/IIA, the provisions of the Treaty (articles 270-273) apply with regard to the budgetary procedure.
21. The absence of a Financial Perspective will occur if no agreement can be found either within Council or between EP and Council. There can be no Financial Perspective without EP's agreement. The rapporteur wishes to stress that no agreement between EP and Council on figures will be possible until there is an agreement on the IIA.
22. The present FP/IIA are in force until the end of 2006. Article 26 of the IIA1 provides for the prolongation of the existing Financial Perspective (see below) unless it is denounced by one of the parties:
Estimation of the evolution of expenditures under art. 26 IIA (commitment appropriations)
EU-GNI at 2004 prices 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 % estimation tot. budget over GNI 1.07% 1.05% 1.02% 1.00% 0.98% 0.95% 0.93% (with CE) Non-compulsory expenditure 72 611 72 334 72 075 71 832 71 608 71 400 71 211 (NCE)
23. According to article 26:
a. the use of this automatic mechanism over the years leads to a reduction of the NCE,
b. the structure of the current FP is not adequate to highlight the priorities identified by the Commission and shared by the Parliament (i.e. Lisbon strategy),
1 Before 1 July 2005, the Commission will present proposals for a new medium-term financial perspective. Should the two arms of the budgetary authority fail to agree on a new financial perspective and unless the existing financial perspective is expressly denounced by one of the parties to this Agreement, the ceilings for the last year covered by the existing financial perspective will be adjusted in accordance with paragraph 15 by applying to these amounts the average rate of increase observed over the preceding period, excluding any adjustments made to take account of enlargement of the Union. This rate of increase may not, however, exceed the rate of growth of Community GNP for the year concerned.
MT 43 Error! Unknown document property name. c. EP cannot use the appropriations of heading 7 (pre-accession),
d. the starting point for the prolongation - FP for the year 2006 – is based on EU 25 while the FP for 2007 onwards will be for EU 27.
The rapporteur considers that this alternative is not acceptable as such unless the Council can indicate its openness to find ad hoc solutions to overcome the problems mentioned above.
24. In respect of the procedure set down by the Treaty (art. 272), the non-compulsory expenditure (NCE) is established:
– by Parliament within the Maximum Rate of Increase (MRI) of non compulsory expenditure1, established on an annual basis by the Commission according to macro-economic data.
– by Parliament and Council that can jointly fix a new MRI to finance the budget.
25. The Treaty scenarios based on an estimated MRI would be a more favourable option for the EP than the strict application of article 26 of the IIA.
Estimation of the evolution of expenditures under art. 272 TUE (commitment appropriations)2
EUR mio. in 2004 prices 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 % estimation tot. budget over GNI 1.11% 1.11% 1.10% 1.08% 1.07% 1.06% 1.05% (with CE) total NCE MRI+ BG/RO 73 732 75 104 76 473 82 797 84 273 85 822 87 399 (commitments) total NCE 65 145 66 357 67 567 73 236 74 541 75 911 77 306 (payments)
26. As provided by the Financial Regulation, the EU Budget can only be implemented on an existing legal basis, apart from some exceptions.3 Should the legislative authority (Council or EP and Council) include a certain amount in the legal basis, the budgetary authority should endeavour not to depart from this decision, unless there are justified reasons. In practical terms the respect of the multi-annual envelopes has a limited effect in the annual budget (only the last year of implementation of a programme). In fact, the budgetary authority can adjust the share of the envelope over the period, according to the annual priorities.
1 According to article 272,9 of the EC Treaty, the MRI results from the trend, in terms of volume of the gross national product within the Community, the average variation in the budgets of the Member States, and the trend of the costs of living during the preceding financial year. 2 Based on Commission estimation of MRI and expenditure for Bulgaria and Romania over MRI 3 Pilot projects and preparatory actions according to article 49 of the Financial Regulation
PE 372.062v 44/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT Multi-annual programmes and annual budgets
27. As set out above, legislation and budget have over the past 20 years progressively developed under a dependent multi-annual context. In his working document N° 4 presented to the Temporary Committee on Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the enlarged Union 2007-20131, the rapporteur had already pointed out the consequences for legislation should no agreement on the financial Perspectives 2007-2013 be reached (point 19): He noted that the multi-annual programming foreseen by the Commission would be possible, but with indicative amounts fixed by the legislative authority and confirmed in the annual budgetary procedure.
28. The rapporteur is fully aware of the advantages obtained by Parliament over the last years through the budgetary cooperation setup in the IIA. However, in case that by mid-2006 (in reality by April 2006 when the Commission needs to prepare the preliminary draft budget for 2007) no agreement is reached on the next Financial Perspective, the rapporteur believes that new ways of institutional co-operation should be found to guarantee the functioning of the EU, the respect of legislation, and EP's political priorities.
29. The rapporteur considers that the financing of multi-annual programmes is not contradictory to annual budgets, provided that the annual envelopes fit within the MRI. This margin could be used in total (3.6% increase per year) for all programmes or it could be used on a more selective basis, according to Parliament's priorities. Currently, the MRI could be exceeded with Council's agreement to adjust the needs at the end of the period of programming if necessary or for unforeseen needs (e.g. CFSP, Tsunami).
30. In each annual budgetary decision, Parliament could guarantee the financing of multi- annual programmes within the MRI and identify the legislative programmes, new legislation, unforeseen events, to be financed by increasing the MRI. An agreement between the Parliament and Council to fix a new MRI is necessary to finance such activities.
31. In a less restricted way, the procedure under art. 272 does not differ too much from the budgetary procedure under the IIA. The legislative authority can continue to include a financial reference in the multi-annual programmes, as long as this annual increase can be financed within the annual MRI there is no problem.
32. The automatic application of the MRI over seven years on the basis of a 3.6% increase per year would guarantee roughly 25% of increase over the period. As an example, research is supposed to increase by 300% in the Commission (and European Parliament) proposals for the period 2007-2013 while Progress increases by 5%, civic participation by 80% respectively.
33. In the event that the legislative authority decides an increase that could be difficult to finance within the MRI (i.e. Research + 300 % in the Commission proposal, CFSP) or to
1 PE 349.852 - DT\547939
MT 45 Error! Unknown document property name. establish a target of expenditure (i.e. Structural Funds), the budgetary authority should agree on a procedure to finance those actions with a new MRI. This possibility could be limited to the last year (or last two years) of application of such programmes.
34. It should not be underestimated that the amount of MRI is established every year on various parameters and is therefore variable.
35. The rapporteur considers that even within article 272 procedure, Parliament could guarantee the financing of all policies (Structural Funds, competitiveness (Lisbon) citizenship, external actions etc.) either within the MRI or through a specific agreement with Council fixing a new MRI. Programmes with fixed amounts would be unalterable while the ones with indicative amounts could be increased or reduced on the basis of political priorities.
III. Conclusions
Although the institutions will certainly make all efforts to find an agreement on the next Financial Perspective and Inter-institutional Agreement, the possibility of an absence of FP/IIA should be envisaged and the consequences mainly for legislation, anticipated.
The Treaty provisions (article 272) are more favourable for the European Parliament than the option of prolonging the FP/IIA (article 26).
Annual budgets and multi-annual programmes are not contradictory.
Even under the Treaty provisions, a progressive increase based on the limit of the MRI can be ensured for Community legislation and room exists for financing EU legislation.
In the absence of agreement on the FP/IIA, Parliament and Council, in their double responsibility as legislative and budgetary authorities, could find ad hoc solutions to finance some specific programmes and to "Ring Fence" major policies.
PE 372.062v 46/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT DOKUMENT TA' ĦIDMA NRU 2 DWAR IL-PROPOSTI ĠODDA TAL- KUMMISSJONI DWAR IL-PROSPETTIVA FINANZJARJA 2007-2013: L-EWWEL KUMMENTI
18.11.2005
Introduction
In view of the discussions at the informal summit at Hampton Court (27 October), President Barroso sent a letter dated 20 October to President Borrell, Mr Blair and the Heads of State and Government with "some proposals to help the final phase of negotiations" on the next Financial Perspective 2007-2013. The fact that this letter was sent to Mr Borrell in his capacity of President of the European Parliament confirms the acknowledgement of Parliament's role in this inter- institutional process. President Barroso also presented his ideas before the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament at its meeting of 20 October.
Since last June, the failure of the European Council to reach an agreement has been a major concern within the Commission. Following the vote of the European Parliament of 8 June, the Commission's initial proposals dated February 2004 seem far beyond reality in terms of contents and timing. Commission's desire for reaching an agreement under the UK Presidency is explicitly stressed in the letter: The possibility of no agreement before March/April 2006 under the Austrian Presidency could endanger the next generation of Community programmes (90% of EU legislation with financial consequences is expiring at the end of 2006), and render more efficient the preparation of PDB for 2007. For the same reason, the Commission asked for the joint declaration "Guidelines for legislative proposals related to the 2007-2013 multi-annual financial framework", in order to accelerate, where possible, the legislative procedure.
The Commission's 'ideas' focus on five topics1:
Increasing resources for growth and jobs Meeting the challenge of globalisation: a shock absorber Consolidating the current agricultural reforms Modernising the budget: a roadmap for review Increasing democratic scrutiny and coherence of our external action
The Commission's proposals could be interpreted as taking some distance from the "Prodi package" with a more realistic approach. Some limitative aspects could be interpreted as a positive move towards the EP's negotiating position (Böge report), to which a reference is made in the second paragraph of the introduction.
However, the rapporteur notes that the Commission is not ready to take on board neither Parliament's qualitative nor quantitative requests.
1 RAPID MEMO/05/386 from 20 October 2005; http://europa.eu.int/rapid/
MT 47 Error! Unknown document property name. As a general comment even if most of the points have been stressed in the EP resolution, the insistence on the absolute necessity to reach an agreement in December (even at low cost) is probably overstated. President Borrell and the rapporteur Mr. Böge have often expressed the idea that from a budgetary point of view, the Treaty will guarantee the adoption of annual budgets, an agreement in the European Council is not sufficient to reach an agreement with Parliament, no Financial Perspective/Inter-institutional Agreement will be in place without EP agreement, and that no agreement on figures will occur without an agreement on the IIA.
The intention of the letter to improve elements accompanying the financial framework points in the direction of Parliament's negotiation position. However, those ideas are trailing behind Parliament's requests, including those to improve the quality of the expenditure.
At its meeting of 7 November, the General Affairs Council examined President Barroso's 'ideas'. The general approach of most delegations was rather sceptical. Another meeting was foreseen for 16 November.
I. Increasing Resources for growth and jobs1
1. Commission proposal
"The Union’s core priority is growth and jobs.
Cohesion policy must promote economic modernisation and create growth and jobs. A new approach is needed to the way these policies boost growth.
. A specific earmarking of funds from cohesion spending would reinforce the drive for growth and jobs. The first step is to identify and ring fence the investment provided under cohesion policy for competitiveness, in particular through research and innovation, human capital, business services, major European infrastructures, improvement of energy efficiency and renewable energies.
. This contribution should increase in line with the acceleration of the Lisbon strategy. Each Member State should set a target to increase the proportion of cohesion spending devoted directly to competitiveness. This target should be set by Member States above an average minimum of 60% of total cohesion spending.
. In the run-up to the Spring European Council each year, Member States would report on this spending to the Council and the European Parliament, as an integral part of the reporting mechanisms to comply with the agreed objectives for growth and jobs.
1 the full text of the five "ideas" is reproduced in this document and can be found under RAPID MEMO/05/386 from 20 October 2005; http://europa.eu.int/rapid/
PE 372.062v 48/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT . A similar mechanism would be established in respect of rural development.
The result of this earmarking would be to increase the share of spending linked to the new Lisbon strategy to at least a third of the EU budget."
2. European Parliament's negotiating position
Paragraph 15, 21 and 52 of the Böge resolution read as follows:
15. [...] underlines the importance of cohesion policy in achieving the Lisbon goals and helping to bridge the gap between the different territories of the European Union; insists that all resources allocated to cohesion policy should be spent for this purpose;
21. Considers that the restructuring of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) needs to be accompanied by a substantial increase in rural development funds to address the problems of employment and competitiveness in rural areas, in particular in the new Member States; [...] is of the opinion that the Commission's proposal for the budget of the new Rural Development Fund is extremely tight and therefore constitutes an absolute minimum;
52. Remains concerned that previous innovation and competitiveness programmes have failed to deliver the necessary link between fundamental and applied research and industrial innovation partly due to the fact that the financial resources were rather limited; believes that the support of the European public is indispensable for realising the Lisbon goals; considers that the Commission should propose a simplification of its financial procedures with a view to facilitating the implementation of research policy; considers that financial instruments need to be rethought in a more fine-tuned, targeted way and that the establishment of an ambitious programme for competitiveness and innovation endowed with adequate financial resources is vital for supporting a "prosperity" oriented industrial policy, notably for SMEs, that would successfully capitalise on research through industrial applications, such as technology transfer from universities and research centres into industrial application; [...]
3. Rapporteur's Comments
The Lisbon Strategy has been emphasised and mainly research, innovation and infrastructures. An earmarking of 60% of the overall envelope dedicated to the Cohesion Policy (Heading 1b) would be reserved for competitiveness actions and mainly research but also infrastructure, motorways and airports. Currently about 50% of the funding is already allocated to structural linked to competitiveness.
It is not clear whether all the instruments of the new cohesion policy: convergence, regional competitiveness and employment, European territorial cooperation and the Cohesion Fund, would be concerned or only some of them.
This idea goes in the direction expressed by EP to reinforce the support for the Lisbon strategy. The rapporteur underlines the need to extend the EIB facilities for encouraging growth and competitiveness as clearly stressed in the EP's negotiating position (para.50, last
MT 49 Error! Unknown document property name. indent) Moreover, this idea has been taken up by President Chirac in his statement before the informal Council of 28 October 2005.
However, the proposal raises some questions: Can it be considered as a substantive change or only as a "window dressing" initiative? Will this measure be compulsory? Will there be a mechanism to suspend the aid to Member States which do not respect this target? How can the economic efficiency of this measure be guaranteed?
The same mechanism should apply to Rural Development with a target percentage of 30% earmarking. This would not be in contradiction to EP's negotiating position, which is in favour of increasing Rural Development, although without earmarking (see para. 21 above):
II. Meeting the challenge of globalisation: a shock absorber
1. Commission Proposal
"A Globalisation Adjustment Fund would offer a European response to help those adjusting to the consequences of globalisation: a sign of solidarity for the many who benefit from openness to the few who face the sudden shock of losing their job. It would provide a swift answer to one-off, clearly defined problems resulting from restructuring. No new bureaucracy is needed: existing instruments and networks could be used, but access to extra resources is necessary.
The Fund would cover training, relocation of workers, outplacement: the costs of action to help find a new job. Clear criteria on the nature of the crisis and the scale of the eligible costs will be set out. Not all restructuring would qualify: this would be a crisis mechanism to be used only to address significant economic and social shocks related to globalisation. It should only intervene if a threshold is reached, defined in terms of the proportion of workers hit by redundancy in the sector and the region concerned, and the local jobless rate. To be cost-effective, this instrument will be delivered through existing Structural Fund instruments and using the same rules.
This resource would lie outside the financial framework (as already the case for the EU Solidarity Fund) and would be mobilised only when needed. Needless to say, the decision on whether to use this option would rest with Parliament and Council."
2. European Parliament's negotiating position
The European Parliament's resolution (see par. 46 in annex) foresees different kinds of flexibilities to cover different needs (Reserve for Competitiveness, Reserve for Cohesion, Emergency Aid Reserve, Solidarity Reserve, Reserve for Loans Guarantee and Flexibility Reserve). All of them are to be mobilised after decision by EP and Council and are to be financed, when necessary, outside the ceiling of the Financial Perspective by an increase in funding and based on budgetary discipline (see par. 45 in Annex).
3. Rapporteur's Comments
PE 372.062v 50/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT The new proposal by the Commission is apparently replacing the initial Growth Adjustment Fund which was to be financed from unused appropriations and has given another scope to the new instrument.
The rapporteur can share the objective expressed by the Commission to provide for a flexibility mechanism, although he disagrees with the limitation to one heading (1b). The European Parliament will certainly not accept an Inter-institutional Agreement with a flexibility mechanism reduced to one heading, especially if combined with a restrictive financial framework.
III. Consolidating the current agricultural reforms
1. Commission Proposal
"In 2002, an agreement was reached on a budget for the Common Agricultural Policy until 2013, going hand in hand with a fundamental reform of agricultural policy, which is still being implemented and spread to the full range of sectors. This agreement should be fully respected.
One of the key reforms was to introduce more dynamism into agricultural spending by shifting funds from direct aids for farmers to rural development. Increasing the pace of these shifts by 1 per cent a year from 2009 would release extra funds to have a direct impact on growth and jobs in rural communities. It would also boost the funding for the Union’s innovative conservation network, NATURA 2000."
2. European Parliament's negotiating position
The EP negotiating position is also very clear concerning the respect of the 2002 agreement. It can be reminded that the EP resolution has proposed the possibility to cover the cost for agriculture for Bulgaria and Romania within the so called "Brussels ceiling". Par. 49, 1st indent reads as follows:
49. [...]; is concerned that, in the absence of political and financial agreement, the funding of market-related measures and direct payments for Bulgaria and Romania above the ceiling agreed by the Council in 2002 for EU-25 remains in doubt, and proposes therefore that, in order to guarantee the level of support set by the decision of the European Council of October 2002, the possibility of a phasing-in process of compulsory co-financing should be initiated within EU-15 if the needs exceed the forecasts;
This proposal is not contradictory with EP's negotiating position in favour of ring-fencing the funding for Natura 2000. Par. 22 reads as follows:
22. [...] insists in this context on a legally binding mechanism which guarantees proper implementation and EU funding for Natura 2000 at the level of the EU's estimated contribution to the envisaged overall amount, which is approximately EUR 6.1 billion for the EU-25 per year; insists that an amount of EUR 21 billion for Natura 2000 should therefore be earmarked ("ring-fenced") in the Financial Perspective within the respective areas; calls for the funding of measures to
MT 51 Error! Unknown document property name. implement Natura 2000 under Heading 2 of the Financial Perspective; calls for the funding of Natura 2000 activities and management which cannot be financed by other instruments within the Life+ programme; calls on the Commission in this context to examine the possible integration of Natura 2000 in other funds;
3. Rapporteur's Comments
The acceleration of the modulation (shift between market measures and income support and rural development), even if it will have a limited effect on financial terms, will increase the part of co-financing of agriculture but at the same time it will reduce the direct support to farmers. The rapporteur agrees on the fact that the Lisbon strategy should not be limited to heading 1a and 1b. However, he considers that, as stressed in the EP's negotiating position, without additional co-financing, the Commission's proposal would imply a reduction of revenue for the EU farmers.
This measure appears to be a stealth method of reneging on the 2002 agreement.
IV. Modernising the budget: a roadmap for review
1. Commission proposal
"There is a broad consensus on the need for a fundamental review of the EU budget. This will take time, but it also needs to be carefully planned: the European Council should set out the precise parameters and the timetable for this review.
There is already a built-in agenda of sectoral reviews pre-programmed for the coming years: for the operation of the CAP in 2008, and for the Lisbon strategy in the same year. But a more over-arching review is also needed. The Union should commit itself to carrying out a comprehensive review of all aspects of the organisation of the EU budget – expenditure, revenue and structure – with a view to ensuring that the budget is equipped to respond to the challenges of the future. The review would be launched by a White Paper on modernisation of spending and revenue to be put forward by the Commission early in 2009."
2. European Parliament's negotiating position
Several reviews are foreseen during the period for agriculture, for Lisbon. The Commission considers that a global review should take place in two phases and without involving the Member States:
a. early 2009: presentation of a White Paper followed by a debate in the institutions (EP and Council) b. 2010-2013: Second phase for implementation under the mandates of a newly elected European Parliament and newly appointed Commission.
PE 372.062v 52/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT This proposal does not contradict the European Parliament's negotiating position.
Par. 33 reads as follows:
33. Notes that the Commission has proposed a financial framework of 7 years' duration; reiterates, for reasons of democratic responsibility and accountability, its position in favour of a parallelism between the duration of the Financial Perspective and the five-year mandates of the European Parliament and of the Commission, and recalls that the Constitution provides for a duration for the future MFF of a minimum of five years, which would allow for co-ordination with the terms of office of the Commission and of the European Parliament; points out that the duration of the legislative proposals could remain independent from the timeframe of the Financial Perspective
3. Rapporteur's Comments
The rapporteur underlines that such a proposal which would allow the new Commission to propose some adjustments in the White Paper and the newly elected Parliament to have a say on the current Financial Perspective would have no effect on the Financial Perspective.
The proposed review is an ineffective tool to be able to re-orient or adjust the FP if necessary. EP would prefer a genuine revision clause or a shorter period.
At the same time this proposal will reduce the credibility of the Financial Perspective after 2010. This could therefore open a reflection, coherent with par. 33 of the EP resolution, on the possibility to shorten the period of FP even if part of the legislation could be adopted until 2013 and by way of example, with specific provisions for agricultural cohesion and research.
V. Increasing democratic scrutiny and coherence of our external action
1. Commission Proposal
"In the past weeks the Union has made a series of bold commitments to promote the Millennium Development Goals. These commitments have a price and we have decided to pay the bill. Now it will be for the Union to deliver. The level discussed in the European Council are not sufficient to meet these commitments. On the other hand, it cannot be envisaged to withdraw our commitments, or delay their implementation, especially regarding the poorest countries.
The split in EU spending between mainstream budget spending and the European Development Fund (EDF) is detrimental to the coherence of the EU external action. 'Budgetisation' of the EDF remains the best option. If this proves impossible, a step towards it would be to integrate the EDF into the traditional mechanisms for external spending, while retaining a separate repartition key during a transitional period. Such a compromise would require that appropriate provisions would guarantee the European Parliament’s rights in this area.
MT 53 Error! Unknown document property name. In order to preserve the proper role of the European Parliament in the simplification and enhanced effectiveness of the Union’s external action, a specific inter-institutional agreement should be agreed to ensure a proper role for Parliament in policy definition for external spending"
2. European Parliament's negotiating position
Concerning EDF, the European Parliament's position is in favour of 'budgetisation' but not to the detriment of other (including new) policies. Para. 49 reads:
49 [...] recalls that the European Parliament has strongly supported the integration of the EDF into the general budget on the basis of the principle of the unity of the budget and for reasons of transparency, but observes that, in financial terms, the budgetisation should not jeopardise other policies; [...]
The Commission seems to support EP's position for more money and greater EP involvement, as requested by EP in par. 28 and 30. The rapporteur has often mentioned that the link between the two should be a strong point for the negotiations.
28. Insists on a level of funding for external actions sufficient to enable the EU to become a real "global partner" in the world and to provide it with the means for its political ambitions and its international commitments; [...]
30. Calls for coherence between the provisions of proposed legislative instruments and the likely forthcoming provisions of the Constitution, enhancing in all cases effective democratic participation of the European Parliament in decision- making, including the adoption and revision of multi-annual strategic frameworks; points to the particular need for greater participation of the European Parliament in decisions on CFSP actions, especially where these have budgetary implications; in this regard, considers it indispensable to develop further the current practices for information and consultation of Parliament in the context of CFSP; considers that allocation of funding should fall under the "normal" EU budget and thus under the discharge authority of the EP;
3. Rapporteur's Comments
The shortage of appropriations of the Council's last compromise is put in evidence. The EDF should be budgetised: some instruments giving more power (control) to the EP on implementation will be proposed for the Inter-institutional Agreement.
Parliament has emphasised that the reduction of the number of instruments for external actions from 38 to 4 combined with the non-entry into force of the Constitution, which would extend EP's powers in this area, is not acceptable. The rapporteur has often raised the need for a sort of call-back clause and an Inter-institutional Agreement to make the new presentation of external instruments acceptable for EP. The negotiating position could be: 'more money, more power'.
Conclusions
PE 372.062v 54/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT The Commission proposals could be considered as a positive move towards the European Parliament's negotiating position on a limitative number of aspects, notably, the need for flexibility, for revision and for ensuring EP's rights over external programmes, although they still trail behind that of the EP.
They are not taking into account the different flexibility reserves for covering unforeseen needs nor of the qualitative conditions proposed by Parliament (par. 46 and 50, see annex) such as the Financial Regulation, simplification of administrative burden, certification by Member States, simplification of the new instruments of financing and co-financing. The rapporteur recalls that these elements are a non-negotiable part of the overall agreement on the Financial Perspective/Inter-institutional Agreement.
The rapporteur regrets that until now it has been impossible to open the negotiations on figures and the provisions of the IIA which will certainly not facilitate the agreement with the European Parliament. Both the Commission and the Council should be aware that there can be no agreement on the next FP/IIA without agreement with the European Parliament, and that EP agreement will be conditional on its agreement on the IIA, which should take on board qualitative elements as well.
The rapporteur already mentioned that the Commission could propose a revised version of the IIA to facilitate the negotiations.
MT 55 Error! Unknown document property name. ANNESS
European Parliament resolution on Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the enlarged Union 2007- 2013 (2004/2209(INI)) of 8 June 20051
45. Stresses that the principle of creating reserves for flexibility is a non-negotiable part of the overall agreement on the financial framework; considers that the level of flexibility should be closely linked to the global ceiling of the financial framework and that the amounts devoted to unforeseen needs should:
- be placed outside the financial framework, - be mobilised pursuant to a Commission proposal by a decision of the budgetary authority, - be financed: through re-programming within the headings, through the redeployment of unused appropriations within and across headings, through new appropriations in the event that the first two means are insufficient;
Asks that in the event of new appropriations, the funds should be called from Members States only after the decision has been taken, reducing to an absolute minimum the burden for taxpayers; proposes that the budgetary authority should agree on a simplified procedure to speed up the implementation of each decision;
46. Considers that this overall flexibility should represent 0.03% of GNI (in line with point 20 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 May 1999) and should be used for attainment of the following objectives:
- Reserve for competitiveness (up to a maximum of EUR 7 billion): new instrument replacing the Growth Adjustment Fund, proposed by the Commission, to be mobilised to boost growth and competitiveness and to allow the Union to react to economic changes;
- Reserve for cohesion (up to a maximum of EUR 3 billion): new instrument aiming to develop a mechanism to be mobilised to react to economic shocks and abrupt changes in EU regions and Member States eligible under Heading 1b) even through the reprogramming of unused appropriations;
- Reserve: Emergency Aid (up to a maximum of EUR 1.5 billion): existing instrument to be placed outside the Financial Perspective;
- Reserve: Solidarity Fund (up to a maximum of EUR 6.2 billion) existing instrument that is already outside the Financial Perspective and that the Commission proposes to budget under the ceiling;
- Reserve for loans guarantee (up to a maximum of EUR 3.0 billion): part of this reserve existed under Heading 4; the principle should be extended to guarantee the financing of transport and infrastructure projects; this instrument should be placed outside the Financial Perspective;
- Reserve for flexibility (up to a maximum of EUR 3.5 billion): existing instrument already placed outside the Financial Perspective and with an increased amount of EUR 500 million;
1 P6_TA(2005)0224 from 8 June 2005
PE 372.062v 56/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT 50. Believes that the negotiations should not only focus on percentages and figures but should also introduce other elements such as the principles of equity and gradualness which are fundamental to the EU, with a view to striking a balance which can meet the expectations of both Member States and citizens; calls on the Commission and the Council to consider these elements as sine qua non conditions for reaching an agreement with the European Parliament; states in this regard that it:
- Aspects linked to the Constitution:
is determined to reject any legal commitment which would have a negative binding effect once the Constitution is in force; therefore urges the Council and the Commission to conclude a gentleman's agreement to safeguard the legislative powers of Parliament and to introduce a revision clause for legislative acts for which the procedure will change with the entry into force of the Constitution, increasing the role of the European Parliament; urges the Commission and the Council to agree on such a commitment in the next Interinstitutional Agreement,
- Financial Regulation:
is convinced that the principles of sound management contained in the Financial Regulation and its implementing rules need to be reviewed to facilitate implementation and accelerate repayments (or reimbursements) to Member States; urges the Commission and the Council to agree on a recasting of the provisions which must facilitate implementation and simplify procedures,
- Administrative Burden:
stresses that the Commission should take action to simplify and improve the effectiveness of administrative management with regard to the implementation of Community programmes for its own services, Member States and final beneficiaries, especially as regards small scale projects; considers that a thorough analysis of the effectiveness of the administrative management of Community legislation should be made on each of these four levels, thus identifying the possibilities for increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of administrative costs; proposes that this analysis should apply globally to the whole budget;
- Certification by Member States:
considers that the European Parliament, as part of the budgetary authority, has a responsibility to optimise the implementation of funding allocated by the Member States to the EU budget; is determined to improve the implementation of the programmes to be financed under the next financial framework; urges the Member States to provide a certification of their financial commitments for all policies run under shared competencies through a formal ex-ante disclosure swatement and an annual ex-post declaration of assurance, made by the Member States' highest political and managing authority (Finance Minister); in consequence, asks the Commission to introduce the appropriate mechanisms to suspend payments in the event of non-compliance with this request; is not ready to propose any significant increases in funding to programmes without guarantees by the Member States that they will commit the appropriations; considers the acceptance of the concept of "disclosure statements" to be a condition for the European Parliament's consent to a new Interinstitutional Agreement on the Financial Perspective;
- Own resources and correction mechanism:
endorses the conclusions of the European Council of December 2004 that the negotiations on the European Union's expenditure must be seen in an overall context including the question of own resources, the correction mechanism and the examination of a possible simplification of the system; calls for a revision of the own resources system which leads in the short term to a fairer distribution of net burdens and establishes, before the end of the next Financial Perspective, an independent EU funding system; proposes that the work of preparing such a new system should be conferred on an interparliamentary conference, involving the European
MT 57 Error! Unknown document property name. Parliament and the national parliaments, in keeping with the spirit of the protocol to the Constitution on the role of the national parliaments,
- Financial instruments and co-financing
asks the Commission to make proposals to accompany the implementation of all common policies with new financial instruments and co-financing mechanisms; these instruments should address market failures and act as catalysts for private investors; budget optimisation and a high leverage effect should be key objectives, to be achieved, in particular, by SME guarantee instruments, but also by targeted venture capital support, including to business angels networks and technology transfer;
PE 372.062v 58/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT DOKUMENT TA' ĦIDMA NRU 3 DWAR PUNTI EWLENIN TAL-PE GĦAN- NEGOZJATI MAL-KUNSILL IBBAŻATI FUQ IL-POŻIZZJONI TA' NEGOZJATI TAL-PARLAMENT EWROPEW TAT-8 TA' ĠUNJU 2005
24.1.2006
At the European Council of 15-16 December 2005, the European Council finally reached an agreement on the next Financial Perspective.
Para. 7 of the conclusions of the European Council of 15-16 December 2005 reads as follows:
"Building on the institutional dialogue to date, the European Council calls on the Council, on the basis of a common position and subject to acceptable terms being attainable, to reach agreement with the European Parliament and Commission on a new IIA reflecting the outcome of these conclusions. In this context, the European Council takes note that the Commission will make concrete proposals in order to increase the flexibility of the financial framework."
On 18 January 2006, the European Parliament adopted a resolution, of which the following points summarise the spirit for the negotiations:
"Rejects the European Council’s conclusions in their current form, because they do not guarantee an EU budget which will enhance prosperity, competitiveness, solidarity, cohesion and security in the future, in compliance with policies already decided by the Council itself; …"
"Underlines the importance it attaches to a higher degree of flexibility;"
"Is willing to enter into constructive negotiations with the Council on the basis of respective positions provided the Austrian Presidency is entrusted with a real negotiating mandate; is determined to defend the quantitative, structural and qualitative elements of its negotiating position and to enhance the European dimension of agricultural, internal and external policies;"
On 18 January 2006 also, President Borrell, President Barroso and Chancellor Schüssel officially opened the negotiations between the three institutions. The first trialogue took place on 23 January.
At his preliminary stage, the rapporteur has found it useful outline the major issues of EP's negotiating position (Part I), as well as present a list of key points for the new Interinstitutional Agreement (Part II).
Part I: A negotiating position based on three pillars
1. Matching political priorities and financial needs The political priorities jointly defined by the institutions for the period of the next financial
MT 59 Error! Unknown document property name. framework 2007-2013 must be sufficiently financed. The policies dedicated to fostering growth, employment and competitiveness (Lisbon agenda, research and development, lifelong learning), internal security and citizenship and the policies allowing the Union to comply with its international role (ENPI, IPA, DCECI) are as important as those ensuring cohesion and reflecting the solidarity between the Member states. These policies stand for prosperity, solidarity and security and reflect the modernisation of the EU-budget.
2. Improving the budget structure through more flexibility a. Ensuring the Union's capacity to react to new needs and challenges in a fast developing world It is of utmost importance to establish an effective multi-annual flexibility mechanism allowing the Union to mobilise additional funds, provided that this is decided jointly by the Council and the Parliament. Such a mechanism must be financed outside the financial framework and be applicable to different purposes e.g. as a reaction to economic developments, disasters and crises inside and outside the EU, or new unforeseen external responsibilities. The tighter the financial framework, the greater the need to equip the Union with such tools.
b. Introducing new financial instruments Funding incentives should be increased through EIB-EIF facilities for TEN's. The introduction of new or the variation of existing co-financing mechanisms should be envisaged to fine-tune the balance between Member states and to gain some additional margin of manoeuvre in the budget.
c. Setting up an effective framework for a revision It must be ensured that any revision or review mechanism for the period 2007-2013 is based on a positive, binding decision of both arms of the budgetary authority with effect to this period. Such a mechanism must contain a general clause of withdrawal for both institutions. Without a binding mechanism, the duration of the financial framework must end in 2011.
3. Improving the quality of implementation of the budget, the access to Community programmes and democratic decision making a. Better execution of EU-programmes and the EU-budget Without access to the Community programmes and a more userfriendly execution of the budget, the Union will not reach the people and many policies will not have the expected effects. Iċ-ċavetta għal aċċess iktar faċli għal programmi tal-Komunità u twettiq tal-baġit b'mod iktar sempliċi hija r-riforma tar-Regolament Finanzjarju, il-gwida ta' kif jitmexxew il-programmi u l-baġit ta' l-Unjoni. A full conciliation procedure and a calendar for the revision of the Financial Regulation must be established.
b. Ensuring a democratic decision making in the external programmes The new generation of programmes in the external policies now consists of 6 instead of more than 40 multi-annual programmes, of which many were co-decided by the Council and the Parliament. The Parliament insists on being fully involved in the legislative process both in the framework regulation and in the multi-annual indicative framework (MIF). The involvement of the Parliament in the adoption of strategy papers and multi-annual
PE 372.062v 60/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT indicative programmes including a call back right for the Parliament should be subject to an inter-institutional agreement .
c. Strengthening the responsibility of Member States 80% of the budget is spent by the Member States. The EP as discharge authority demands that the national/local authorities "certify" the management of Community funds. A procedure and a timetable to improve the modalities of certification by Member States for the implementation of policies run under shared competence (declaration of assurance) has to be defined.
Part II: Key points for the Interinstitutional Agreement
In its resolution of 1 December 2005, the European Parliament:
"Invites the Commission to submit a formal revised proposal of the Interinstitutional Agreement which would incorporate its proposals on reserves and flexibility and other qualitative points..."
The Commission will present a revised version of the IIA on 1 February 2006. The list of points below aims to facilitate the Commission to identify the priorities and requests of the Parliament.
1. Flexibility
EP negotiating position
46. Considers that this overall flexibility should represent 0.03% of GNI (in line with point 20 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 May 1999) and should be used for attainment of the following objectives:
- Reserve for competitiveness (up to a maximum of EUR 7 billion): new instrument replacing the Growth Adjustment Fund, proposed by the Commission, to be mobilised to boost growth and competitiveness and to allow the Union to react to economic changes;
- Reserve for cohesion (up to a maximum of EUR 3 billion): new instrument aiming to develop a mechanism to be mobilised to react to economic shocks and abrupt changes in EU regions and Member States eligible under Heading 1b) even through the reprogramming of unused appropriations;
- Reserve: Emergency Aid (up to a maximum of EUR 1.5 billion): existing instrument to be placed outside the Financial Perspective;
- Reserve: Solidarity Fund (up to a maximum of EUR 6.2 billion) existing instrument that is already outside the Financial Perspective and that the Commission proposes to budget under the ceiling;
- Reserve for loans guarantee (up to a maximum of EUR 3.0 billion): part of this reserve existed under Heading 4; the principle should be extended to guarantee the financing of transport and infrastructure projects; this instrument should be placed outside the Financial Perspective;
- Reserve for flexibility (up to a maximum of EUR 3.5 billion): existing instrument already placed outside the Financial Perspective and with an increased
MT 61 Error! Unknown document property name. amount of EUR 500 million;
Rapporteur's proposal
The creation of reserves for flexibility should be an integral part of the overall Interinstitutional Agreement.. The reserves for flexibility are placed outside the financial framework. The global amount for flexibility should represent up to 0.03% of EU cumulated GNI over a seven years period
The different flexibility reserves are created as follows:
. reserve for competitiveness: up to a maximum of EUR 7 billion under heading 1a); . reserve for cohesion: up to a maximum of EUR 3 billion under heading 1b); . reserve for the Solidarity Fund up to a maximum of EUR 6.2 billion under heading 3; . reserve for emergency aid: up to a maximum of EUR 1.5 billion under heading 4; . reserve for loans guarantee: up to a maximum of EUR 3 billion under heading 4.
In addition to those reserves, a non allocated reserve for flexibility up to a maximum of EUR 3.5 billion is created for non-programmed actions and unforeseen events.
The decision to mobilise a reserve for flexibility will be taken jointly by the two arms of the budgetary authority.
2. Financial Regulation
EP negotiating position
50. […]- Financial Regulation: is convinced that the principles of sound management contained in the Financial Regulation and its implementing rules need to be reviewed to facilitate implementation and accelerate repayments (or reimbursements) to Member States; urges the Commission and the Council to agree on a recasting of the provisions which must facilitate implementation and simplify procedures,
Rapporteur's proposal
The Interinstitutional Agreement is used as a mean to secure the conciliation procedure and to guarantee a number of key elements with the aim of facilitating the implementation of the Budget.
Council should agree to proceed according to the conciliation procedure foreseen by the joint 1975 declaration already used for the 2002 revision in order to involve the two arms of the budgetary authority on an equal footing.
PE 372.062v 62/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT 3. Certification by Member States
EP negotiating position
50. […]
- Certification by Member States:
considers that the European Parliament, as part of the budgetary authority, has a responsibility to optimise the implementation of funding allocated by the Member States to the EU budget; is determined to improve the implementation of the programmes to be financed under the next financial framework; urges the Member States to provide a certification of their financial commitments for all policies run under shared competencies through a formal ex-ante disclosure statement and an annual ex-post declaration of assurance, made by the Member States' highest political and managing authority (Finance Minister); in consequence, asks the Commission to introduce the appropriate mechanisms to suspend payments in the event of non-compliance with this request; is not ready to propose any significant increases in funding to programmes without guarantees by the Member States that they will commit the appropriations; considers the acceptance of the concept of "disclosure statements" to be a condition for the European Parliament's consent to a new Interinstitutional Agreement on the Financial Perspective;
Rapporteur's proposal
The Interinstitutional Agreement is used as a mean to secure the procedure and the timetable.
The Commission has presented an action plan (COM(2006)009) which could be a step in the right direction. Members States should identify the national bodies to be responsible and accountable for national declarations of funds from the EU budget spent for policies run under shared competences.
MT 63 Error! Unknown document property name. 4. New financial instruments
EP negotiating position
50. […]
- Financial instruments and co-financing
asks the Commission to make proposals to accompany the implementation of all common policies with new financial instruments and co-financing mechanisms; these instruments should address market failures and act as catalysts for private investors; budget optimisation and a high leverage effect should be key objectives, to be achieved, in particular, by SME guarantee instruments, but also by targeted venture capital support, including to business angels networks and technology transfer;
Rapporteur's proposal
The institutions agree to encourage all types of financial instruments acting as catalysts for public and private investors. The Commission should make appropriate proposals, in line with point 11 of the conclusions.
EIB loans represent in general about one third of actual investments by catalysing other resources of the public and private sector. The EIB financial support combined with EU budget in areas such as competitiveness, SMEs, TENs or Research and Innovation could create an important leverage effect by boosting investments.
5. Review clause
EP negotiating position
33. […] - Duration
Points out that the duration of the legislative proposals could remain independent from the timeframe of the Financial Perspective; therefore requests its delegation negotiating the Interinstitutional Agreement to insist that the future Interinstitutional Agreement include provisions guaranteeing a longer (up to 7 years) duration for multi-annual programmes, compared to the duration of the future financial perspective, in particular for major policies such as agricultural policy, structural and cohesion policy and research;
Rapporteur's proposal
The IIA, including the annex (table on Financial Perspective) should be subject to a revision clause to make the necessary adjustment in a fast developing environment and to redeploy the spending priorities if needed.
On a mid-term basis, the Commission undertake a full, wide-ranging review covering all aspects of the Financial Perspective, own resources and expenditure with a clearly defined
PE 372.062v 64/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT role for the European Parliament, as indicated by the European Council.
6. Reforming the system of own resources
EP negotiating position
50. […]
- Own resources and correction mechanism:
endorses the conclusions of the European Council of December 2004 that the negotiations on the European Union's expenditure must be seen in an overall context including the question of own resources, the correction mechanism and the examination of a possible simplification of the system; calls for a revision of the own resources system which leads in the short term to a fairer distribution of net burdens and establishes, before the end of the next Financial Perspective, an independent EU funding system; proposes that the work of preparing such a new system should be conferred on an interparliamentary conference, involving the European Parliament and the national parliaments, in keeping with the spirit of the protocol to the Constitution on the role of the national parliaments,
Rapporteur's proposal
The European Union should have a transparent and independent own resources system to replace the existing one. The preparatory work for setting up such a system should be conferred to a conference involving the European Parliament and the national parliaments.
7. Aġenziji
EP negotiating position
39. […]
- Agencies:
Calls for an approach similar to that requested for the Commission's administrative expenditure, based on the establishment of a binding ceiling for the agencies, outside the Financial Perspective table, which can be increased only by a decision of the budgetary authority using all means offered by the future interinstitutional agreement; intends by these means to improve control and transparency over the agencies without adverse effects on the programmes;
Rapporteur's proposal
A binding ceiling should be created for the agencies under each heading concerned as a reference outside the table of the financial framework to ringfence the agencies and the Community programmes. In this way, the increase of funds for the agencies (expansion or creation of new agencies) will not reduce operational programmes.
MT 65 Error! Unknown document property name. 8. Spiża amministrattiva
EP negotiating position
38. Is willing to maintain a structure which facilitates control by the budgetary authority over the Commission's administrative expenditure and is therefore against the proposal to remove this expenditure from Heading 5; considers nevertheless that the Activity-Based Budgeting (ABB) system introduced for the budgetary nomenclature should be preserved and further developed; is therefore in favour of leaving the Commission's administrative expenditure within each policy area but of establishing a binding ceiling outside the Financial Perspective table, with the possibility for this ceiling to be increased only by a decision of the budgetary authority, using any means offered by the future Interinstitutional Agreement; stresses that budgetary rigour should be upheld by all the EU institutions;
Rapporteur's proposal
Administrative expenditure should be maintained in heading 5. A specific heading for all administrative expenditure is created for reasons of transparency, but the ABB approach should be maintained.
9. Democratic scrutiny and EP's legislative powers
EP negotiating position
30. […]
- External Programmes:
Calls for coherence between the provisions of proposed legislative instruments and the likely forthcoming provisions of the Constitutional Treaty, enhancing in all cases effective democratic participation of the European Parliament in decision-making, including the adoption and revision of multi-annual strategic framework
Rapporteur's proposal
The restructuring of the external instruments should not reduce the European Parliament's prerogatives notably on the establishment of a multi-annual indicative framework (MIF) and the strategy papers.
EP's legislative powers should not be jeopardised by pre-allocated funds under cohesion.
A new procedure (trialogues twice a year) is established to ensure that the European Parliament is involved in setting up priorities and appropriate resources in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
PE 372.062v 66/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT 10. EDF
EP negotiating position
49. - European Development Fund (EDF):
recalls that the European Parliament has strongly supported the integration of the EDF into the general budget on the basis of the principle of the unity of the budget and for reasons of transparency, but observes that, in financial terms, the budgetisation should not jeopardise other policies; underlines therefore that the budgetisation is only acceptable if the overall ceiling of the financial framework brings additional resources into the general budget; points out that the appropriations budgeted should be ring-fenced to avoid any negative effect on the ACP countries; stresses that the principle of partnership with the ACP countries must be respected when the EDF is integrated into the general budget,
Rapporteur's proposal
The budgetisation of the European Development Fund could be an element of the negotiations. The ceiling of the financial framework should be adjusted accordingly.
11. Consolidation of budgetary discipline
Rapporteur's proposal
The renewal of the Interinstitutional Agreement should maintain all existing provisions on budgetary discipline such as the procedure on CFSP and the joint agreement on financial programming.
MT 67 Error! Unknown document property name. DOKUMENT TA' ĦIDMA NRU 4 DWAR L-EWWEL REAZZJONI GĦALL- VERŻJONI RIVEDUTA TAL-FTEHIMA INTERISTITUZZJONALI PROPOSTA MILL- KUMMISSJONI FL-1 TA' FRAR 2006
2.2.2006
INTRODUCTION
Following the request made by the European Parliament in its resolution voted on 1 December 2005, the Commission has adopted a revised version of the Interinstitutional Agreement on 1 February 2006. This document was accompanied by a letter from President Barroso to President Borrell and to Chancellor Schüssel.
With a view to facilitating the negotiations on the Interinstitutional Agreement, the rapporteur in his working document no 31, has presented 11 key points reflecting the Parliament's political priorities based on its negotiating position. In the same document, the rapporteur has also recalled that the European Parliament's priorities for the next FP-IIA are both of a quantitative and qualitative nature. The 'key points' for the IIA are of fundamental importance in terms of the global agreement the European Parliament wants to achieve.
These points are only a part of the European Parliament's requests. The European Parliament will have other amendments on the text of the agreement. The rapporteur is mindful that the whole Interinstitutional Agreement is a complement of the Financial Perspective. The more the financial framework is limited the more the European Parliament must insist on effectiveness of the procedures and contents of the IIA. The approach that the parts of the IIA which are not changed would be automatically accepted, will not be supported by the European Parliament.
Out of 11 key points relating to major quantitative and qualitative elements, the revised draft IIA2 has taken on board only two of them in partial form:
flexibility: the annual amount of which is increased from 200 to 700 million per year over the period and a broader scope covering unforeseen needs but also multi-annual requirements (4,9 billion over the period). This amount is far from what the European Parliament had proposed. No mention is made regarding facilitation of the heavy mobilisation procedure. Such flexibility instruments will not enable to implement systematically underfinanced programmes.
the Solidarity Fund (up to 1 billion per year) has been taken out of the financial framework. The Globalisation Fund (up to 500 million per year) which is a request from the Council also remains outside.
1 PE 367.953v01-00 2 COM(2006)0036
PE 372.062v 68/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT Concerning the other 'key points', they are not reflected in the revised version of the IIA. Most of them are mentioned in the letter referred to in the opening paragraph with a rather weak formulation and no clear commitment by the Commission in favour of Parliament's requests or prerogatives compared to Council's priorities.
This also applies to the review clause which will take the form of a White Paper to be presented by the Commission in 2008-2009 covering all aspects of EU spending and resources. No mention is made of the European Parliament's role in the decision of extension, modification or confirmation of the provisions in place. Furthermore no mention is made of a binding roadmap.
In this regard, the rapporteur considers that the Commission revised proposal cannot serve as the basis for fair negotiations between the European Parliament and Council. The rapporteur is of the opinion that the Commission did not show sufficient leadership concerning the IIA.
Mindful of the need to avoid any delay in the preparatory work for the negotiations, the rapporteur gives indications on how, in his opinion, the 'key points' should be treated in the IIA to reflect the European Parliament's priorities. A full revised version of the IIA, covering all points, will be presented as a second step on time for the next trialogue.
1. Flexibility
The Institutions acknowledge that flexibility mechanisms are necessary to face unforeseen needs and unexpected crises during the next financial period, as well as to finance non- programmed actions. The creation of reserves for flexibility is an integral part of the overall Interinstitutional Agreement. The reserves for flexibility are placed outside the financial framework. The global amount for flexibility should represent up to 0.03% of EU cumulated GNI over a seven years period.
Should the need for financing an unforeseen event or a new initiative occur, the Commission will indicate whether it is feasible for either a re-programming within the headings, or to redeploy unused appropriations within and across all headings. In case the first two possibilities prove to be insufficient the Commission will propose to call new appropriations, through the mobilization of the reserve for flexibility.
The different flexibility reserves are created as follows:
reserve for competitiveness: up to a maximum of EUR 7 billion under heading 1a); reserve for cohesion: up to a maximum of EUR 3 billion under heading 1b); reserve for the Solidarity Fund up to a maximum of EUR 6.2 billion under heading 3; reserve for emergency aid: up to a maximum of EUR 1.5 billion under heading 4; reserve for loans guarantee: up to a maximum of EUR 3 billion under heading 4.
In addition to those reserves, a non allocated reserve for flexibility up to a maximum of EUR 3.5 billion is created for non-programmed actions and unforeseen events.
MT 69 Error! Unknown document property name. The Commission will make the proposal for the mobilisation of the flexibility reserves after it has examined the following possibilities:
- re-programming within the heading concerned - redeployment of unused appropriations within and across headings - new appropriations if the first two possibilities are insufficient
In case of a mobilization of the Flexibility Instrument below an amount of 200 million per annum and in case of non agreement of the two arms of the budgetary authority, the Council may, acting by qualified majority, decide on compulsory expenditures and the European Parliament on non compulsory expenditure, following the procedures defined in Art. 272 of the Treaty.
2. Financial Regulation
The Institutions acknowledge the responsibility to ensure a better implementation of the Budget and to improve the visibility and the benefit of EU funding towards the citizens without putting in question the progress achieved in the last recasting. They undertake a deep review of the regulations in force1, both the principles and their implementing rules, in view of simplifying the procedures and facilitating the implementation of the Budget.
The Institutions agree on the aforementioned elements in the IIA and agree to proceed with further legislative procedure, according to a real conciliation procedure which puts the two arms of the budgetary authority on an equal footing.
3. Certification by Member States
Before September 2006 the Commission will present the list of the national bodies that could be entrusted to give a certification on behalf of the Member States on the European funds spent for policies run under shared competences.
Before December 2006 the Court of Auditors will give an opinion on the national bodies indicated by the Commission.
The European Parliament and the Council will give their opinion on the Commission list by April 2007.
On the basis of the different opinions, the budgetary authority will define, in concert with the Commission and the Court of Auditors, the procedure to be followed by Member States to give certification of the accounts to the Commission and to the Court of Auditors.
4. New financial instruments
1 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom), N° 1605/2005, OJ L 248, 16.9.2002, page 1.
PE 372.062v 70/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT The Institutions agree that the introduction of co-financing mechanisms is necessary to reinforce the leverage effect of the EU budget by increasing the funding incentive. They agree to encourage all types of financial instruments acting as catalysts for public and private investors. On this basis the Commission should make appropriate proposals.
EIB risk capital will be increased up to EUR 10 billion over the period 2007-2013. The Commission will report back to the budgetary authority about the activities financed by the EIB-EIF to support investments related to EU programmes (mainly TENs, Research and SMEs).
5. Review clause
The present agreement, including the annex (with the table on Financial Perspective) is subject to a revision clause to make the necessary adjustment in a fast developing environment and to redeploy the spending priorities if needed.
By the end of 2008, the Commission takes the firm commitment to undertake a full, wide- ranging review covering all aspects of the Financial Perspective, own resources and expenditure with a clearly defined role for the European Parliament.
An ad hoc working group composed by representatives of the budgetary authority is created to keep the Budgetary Authority informed of the progress achieved in this review and where appropriate to get its opinion, a progress report should be presented to the Budgetary Authority every year before the July Conciliation.
Both arms of the budgetary authority should decide on the confirmation, modification or rejection of the review and of the IIA at the latest by March 2010.
6. Reforming the system of own resources
The Institutions acknowledge the need to give the European Union transparent and independent own resources to replace the existing system. They agree that the preparatory work for setting up such a system should be conferred to a conference involving the European Parliament and the national parliaments. The conference should deliver orientations in view of Commission proposals to be presented by the end of 2008.
7. Aġenziji
The Institutions agree to create binding ceilings for the agencies outside the table of the financial framework for reasons of transparency between the agencies and the Community programmes. The ceilings of the specific heading can only be modified by a decision of the budgetary authority through the provisions set up by article xx of the IIA (flexibility).
8. Spiża amministrattiva
MT 71 Error! Unknown document property name. The Institutions agree to maintain a specific heading for all administrative expenditure for reasons of transparency. The Commission will make appropriate proposals for a binding ceiling which preserves the system of Activity Based Budgeting.
9. Democratic scrutiny and coherence of external actions
The Institutions acknowledge the need for a rationalisation of the various instruments for external actions. However they agree that such a rationalisation of instruments and concentration of programmes for management facilities should not reduce the powers of the legislative authority. Proċedura speċifika tiġi mwaqqfa biex tiżgura d-drittijiet tal-Parlament fuq il-qafas plurijennali indikattiv u fuq id-dokumenti ta' strateġija permezz ta' konsultazzjoni minn qabel tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill mill-Kummissjoni (l-iskadenzi għad iridu jiġu definiti) li timpenja ruħha li tirtira l-proposta jekk waħda mill-istituzzjonijiet li għandha l- awtorità baġitarja titlob hekk.
The Institutions recognize that the restructuring of the external instruments should not reduce the European Parliament's prerogatives notably on the establishment of a multi-annual indicative framework (MIF) and the strategy papers.
10. EDF
The European Development Fund, as a result of the negotiations, is budgetised. The ceiling of the financial framework is adjusted accordingly.
11. Other issues on budgetary discipline
All the existing provisions on budgetary discipline (CFSP, financial programming) are maintained.
PE 372.062v 72/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT DOKUMENT TA' ĦIDMA NRU 5 DWAR IL-FTEHIMA INTERISTITUZZJONALI DWAR IMMANIĠJAR FINANZJARJU SOD, RIFORMI TAQSIMA III - KUMMENTI TAR-RAPPORTEUR DWAR ID-DOKUMENT TA' ĦIDMA COM(2006)75
20.2.2006
General remarks
1. The letter of 1 February sent by President Barroso to the President of the European Parliament and to the President of the European Council which accompanied the Commission revised proposal of the Interinstitutional Agreement had raised a common feeling of disappointment and discontent among the Members of the Committee on Budgets at its meeting of 2 February.
2. The reason lies in the weakness of the Commission’s commitment towards the European Parliament’s requests. The manner in which these requests have been considered is not reflected in the Interinstitutional Agreement itself and the endorsement of the European Council conclusions on the other hand.
3. Following high level contacts, the Commission has apparently overcome some internal resistance and has adopted on 14 February, by written procedure, a working document "Contribution to the interinstitutional negotiations on the Proposal for renewal of the Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure" (COM(2006)75 final). This additional document aims to communicate in a more formal way the issues contained in the letter from President Barroso and it can also facilitate the negotiations.
4. The rapporteur welcomes the Commission's change of attitude as an acceptance of a broader agenda and as a legitimation of its approach towards the European Parliament. It indicates that: - the Commission is willing to adjust its institutional role by finally putting Parliament’s requests on a more equal footing with those of the Council; - Parliament’s requests were reasonable and justified since they have been endorsed by the College.
5. The rapporteur believes that the negotiations on the FP-IIA which will enter into an active phase with the second trialogue of 21 February, can now take place on a fair basis. It is up to the Council to take into account the main components of the negotiations on the IIA which are: - EP’s negotiating position of 8 June 2005 - Council’s common position of 15-16 December 2005 - Commission revised proposal of the IIA of 1 February and Commission working document on Contributions to the negotiations of 14 February - Fiches 941 and 952.
1 "Indicative breakdown of expenditure within individual headings and sub-headings, based on the European Council conclusions of December 2005"
MT 73 Error! Unknown document property name. 6. As recalled in his working document n° 3, Parliament’s negotiating position is composed of three pillars: - matching political priorities and financial needs - improving the structure and the flexibility of the budgets - improving the quality of implementation through reforms to preserve the rights of the European Parliament.
7. According to the rapporteur, these main elements are “communicating channels” for the negotiations. The tighter the global ceiling will be, the more flexibility that will be required; the less flexibility proposed, the simpler the mobilisation procedure should be;
8. The European Parliament's requests for reforms should be an integral part of the IIA and therefore, the future IIA should have a broader dimension than the current one. This is reflected in the title proposed by the rapporteur "Interinstitutional Agreement on sound financial management" and in the structure of the third part of the IIA should be dedicated to reform.
9. The rapporteur invites the Commission and the Council to consider that the next IIA should convey a message of modernisation to the European citizens and tax payers and not only elements of budgetary discipline aiming to reassure the governments and satisfy the European institutions. It should also enable the EU to respond to the new challenges the EU will face over the coming period through better allocation of funding for political priorities, more appropriate tools and better implementation as well as reduction of the administrative burden.
Specific comments on the key points
10. The rapporteur is of the opinion that the contents of the Commission’s last document reflects in principle Parliament's main points for reforms as indicated in his working documents n° 3 and 4. He draws attention to the fact that they should become a full part of the IIA.
1. Financial Instruments
Commission proposed text on the Financial Instrument
The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission agree that the introduction of co-financing mechanisms is necessary to reinforce the leverage effect of the EU budget by increasing the funding incentive. They agree to encourage all types of financial instruments acting as catalysts for public and private investors. The objective is to increase up to EUR 10 billion the EIB's capacity for research and development loans in the period 2007-2013. Moreover, the instruments in favour of Trans-European Networks, and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises are to be reinforced. The Commission will make proposals, accordingly and will report back to the budgetary authority about the activities financed by the EIB, the EIF and the EBRD (relevant in the case of new Member States) to support investment in all those areas.
2 "Impact of the financial framework foreseen by the European Council for 2007-2013"
PE 372.062v 74/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT Rapporteur's comments
The Commission has endorsed the principle of modernisation of the Budget through co- financing by the EIB- EIF of activities related to the Lisbon strategy.
The reporting mechanism proposed by the Commission should be detailed in timing and content; it should provide a clear evaluation of the leverage effects in the areas pertaining to the negotiations. This mechanism should allow the Parliament to evaluate - once or twice per year - how EIB-EIF activities can complement a reduced ceiling for heading 1a.
The formal proposals should be made before the end of the year 2006.
2. Financial Regulation
Commission proposed text on the Financial Regulation
The institutions have a shared responsibility for the review of the Financial Regulation to improve implementation of the budget and increase the visibility and the benefit of EU funding towards the citizens without putting into question the progress achieved in the 2002 recasting. As in 2002, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission agree that the review of the Financial Regulation is completed successfully through a real conciliation procedure, on the basis of its modified proposal, which forges effective consensus between the European Parliament and Council. They also seek close and constructive inter-institutional cooperation for the swift conclusion of the Implementing Rules in order to simplify procedures for funding whilst ensuring a high protection of the Union's financial interests. Il-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill huma impenjati bi sħiħ li jikkonkludu n-negozjati dwar ir- Regolament Finanzjarju fi żmien xieraq biex ikun jista' jidħol fis-seħħ fl-1 ta' Jannar 2007.
Rapporteur's comments
This point still falls short of Parliament's expectations.
No time constraint is indicated and the role of European Parliament in the procedure has to be clarified. What if Council does not agree on the procedure and keeps to its minimalist approach?
The proposal is a constructive step since the Commission confirms its proposal for a real conciliation procedure and proposes a concrete calendar. The rapporteur draws attention to the need to incorporate some important issues related to the Financial Regulation and better management of the EU budget in the new IIA; such as the precendence of the Financial Regulation in other legal acts, the establishment of a interinstitutional working group which will prepare and accompany the midterm review and revision of the Financial Regulation; the submission of consolidated version of legislative acts with each revision of a legislative act and regular impact assessments.
3. Certification by Member States
MT 75 Error! Unknown document property name. Commission proposed text on the Certification by Member states on ensuring effective and integrated internal control of Community Funds
The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission agree on the importance of strengthening internal control without adding to the administrative burden for which the simplification of the underlying legislation is a prerequisite. In this context, priority will be given to managerial accountability under shared management in the form of national declarations. Member States will designate the bodies to be responsible for declarations before September 2006.
Rapporteur's comments
The rapporteur welcomes the support for a concrete roadmap. However the current proposal is limited to “managerial accountability” with no request for political commitment.
Commission proposed text on the democratic scrutiny and coherence of external actions
The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission acknowledge the need for a rationalisation of the various instruments for external actions. They agree that such a rationalisation of instruments, while enhancing the coherence and the responsiveness of the EU action, should not reduce the powers of either the legislative authority or the budgetary authority. The text of the relevant regulations should reflect these principles and, where appropriate, include the necessary policy content and an indicative breakdown of resources.
Rapporteur's comments
The rapporteur notices that the Commission agrees on the principle to secure Parliament’s legislative powers. However the text remains too vague concerning the procedures to be put in place.
5. Aġenziji
Commission proposed text on Agencies
Before taking any decision on the creation of a new agency, the Commission will assess the budgetary implications for the expenditure heading concerned. On the basis of this information, the two arms of the Budgetary Authority commit themselves in the framework of budgetary cooperation to come to an agreement on the financing of the concerned agency before the underlying legal base comes into force.
Rapporteur's comments
The text takes into account the problem raised by Parliament, especially concerning prior consulation of the EP for the financing of new agencies . Unfortunately the text does not yet indicate a more binding mechanism to prevent decisions without financing provisions agreed by the two arms of the budgetary authority. The rapporteur also welcomes that the Commission has finally identified the cost of the existing agencies over the next period.
PE 372.062v 76/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT 6. Own Resources
Commission proposed text on Own Resources
In the context of the future revision of the own resources system, the institutions take note of the European Parliament intention to organise a conference of representatives of the European Parliament and the national parliaments.
Rapporteur's comments
The text remains too weak and lacks ambition .The link between the outcome of the Parliamentary Conference and the Commission’s future proposals is missing.
7. Financial programming
Commission proposed text on Financial Programming
The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission acknowledge the importance of financial programming and maintain the agreement reached on this subject during the conciliation of 16 July 2004. In particular Financial programming has to be updated by the Commission twice a year and considered, if necessary, at each trilogue meeting provided by the Interinstitutional Agreement of ….
Rapporteur’s comments
The text goes in the right direction but should clarify the Commission’s commitment to comply with all aspects of the declaration like the financial compatibility between the new proposals and the financial programming, the recourse to flexibility if necessary and the stocktaking of the financial consequences of the new legislative proposals.
8. Other points
- Flexibility : This point is treated in part I of the IIA. - Review clause : This point is treated in part I of the IIA. - Administrative expenditure: This point becomes useless since EP and Council rejected the Commission initial proposal. - EDF: This point is treated in the part on figures. - CFSP: This point is treated in part II of the IIA, where the Commission has already agreed to include the results reached at the Conciliation of 24 November 2005, concerning the level of representation of the Council (Ambassadors level) at the information meeting on CFSP.
MT 77 Error! Unknown document property name. DOKUMENT TA' ĦIDMA NRU 6 DWAR STRUMENTI FINANZJARJI ĠODDA - L- IRWOL TAL-GRUPP TAL-BANK EWROPEW GĦALL-INVESTIMENT
6.3.2006
1. Context
The president of the EIB (European Investment Bank) Mr Philippe Maystadt and the Chief Executive of the EIF (European Investment Fund) Mr Francis Carpenter have been invited to attend the meeting of the Committee on Budgets of Monday, 6 March 2006 to present the possible contributions of EIB-EIF to the EU budget over the next financial perspective1.
In its resolution on Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the enlarged Union 2007-20132, the European Parliament states the following with regard to the financial instruments and co-financing:
"asks the Commission to make proposals to accompany the implementation of all common policies with new financial instruments and co-financing mechanisms; these instruments should address market failures and act as catalysts for private investors; budget optimisation and a high leverage effect should be key objectives, to be achieved, in particular, by SME guarantee instruments, but also by targeted venture capital support, including to business angels networks and technology transfer";
The Competitiveness Council of 28/29 November 2005 indicated the following concerning the further allocation of the EIB´s surpluses:
"the Community will improve their (R&D promoters) access to debt finance through the RSFF3 by providing a grant to the EIB. The Community grant shall be used by the EIB, which will be a risk sharing partner, to contribute to the provisioning and capital allocation for loan and guarantee financing from its own resources. There will be no liability for the budget (..) this mechanism will enable the EIB to increase the amount of financing for European RTD actions (such as joint technology initiatives, large projects-including Eureka projects, and new research infrastructures) to help overcome market deficiencies.".
Subsequently, the European Council's conclusions of 15/16 December 2005 states the following4:
"The European Council invites the Commission in cooperation with the European Investment Bank to examine the possibility of strengthening their support for Research and Development by up to a maximum of € 10 billion through a
1 see also the background note from the Budgetary Support Service 2 Par. 50, 2004/2209(INI), P6_TA(2005)0224, adopted on 8 June 2005 3 RSFF - Risk Sharing Finance Facility 4 Par. 11, CADREFIN 268, Council of the European Union, 19 December 2005
PE 372.062v 78/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT financing facility with risk-sharing components to foster additional investment in European research and development, particularly by the private sector".
EIB financial support combined with EU budget in areas such as competitiveness, SMEs, TENs or research and innovation is expected to create an important leverage effect at two levels:
First, on the basis of each euro from the EU budget (provision), a multiple of loans and other financial products can be developed by the EIB with a multiplication factor of between 2 and 20, depending on the degree of risk and the type of instrument of the investment concerned. Second, by catalysing other resources of the public and private sector, EIB loans in general represent about one third of the actual investments.
At the informal summit of Hampton Court, the figure of EUR 30 billion to be invested for Research and Development had been mentioned. At the November Competitiveness Council, RSFF has been approved on the basis of EUR 1 billion from the EU 7th FP budget1. The scheme envisaged is the following:
Budget provision for the Risk Sharing Finance Facilities (RSFF): 2 billion of which 1 billion from EU budget (7th framework programme) 1 billion from the EIB reserves= Hampton Court proposal Those 2 bn provisions, through the leverage effect allow for loans of 5 bn x 2 = 10 bn (8 to 12 bn of loans, depending on risk).
These 10 billion in loans would allow for (approximately) 30 billion of investments.
Provisions Loans Investment RSFF 1 5 15 Hampton Court 2 10 30
These figures are realistic figures within the current parameters of the EIB. Beyond these figures, two problems are faced: the limits imposed by the statutes of the Bank and also the absorption capacity of the market.2
1 The Commission has embodied the RSFF scheme in art. 53 of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the rules for the participation of undertakings, research centres and universities in actions under the Seventh EC Framework Programme and for the dissemination of research results (2007-2013) - COM(2005)705 of 23.12.2005. 2 Under the Statute, the Bank may have maximum loans outstanding equivalent to two and half times its capital. Apparently the EIB is not favourable to lower the budget contribution to these combined instruments and programmes (critical mass). A reduced amount could go again the concepts of EIB's instruments and possibly loose the leverage effect of scarce budget resources towards the EIB borrowing and lending capacities.
MT 79 Error! Unknown document property name. 2. EU budget contributions and EIB own resources: areas of complementarity
The EIB group (European Investment Bank and European Investment Fund) is strongly committed to providing sustained support for (i) the Lisbon Strategy, (2) the Action for Growth Initiative for TENs and (3) the development of SMEs, in the form of long-term EIB loans as well as of venture capital and guarantees from the EIF. Three new financial instruments1 are being proposed to reinforce this sustained support by combining EU budget resources with EIB reserves to leverage private capital funds from the market.
2.1 R&D, Innovation and Competitiveness
The Bank sees research investment as very important, especially taking into account the fact that Europe spends considerably less on R&D than the United States or Japan. The EIB's contribution to the Lisbon agenda is embodied in its Innovation 2010 Initiative (i2i) programme. Until now (2000-2005), the EIB signatures under the i2i programme amounted to ca. EUR 35 billion of which EUR 10.7 billion in 2005.The Bank could increase the current i2i target amount until 2010 of EUR 50 billion to EUR 65 billion and up to EUR 100 billion by 2013.
2.1.1 RSFF (Risk Sharing Finance Facility)
The Competitiveness Council approved RSFF in favour of reinforcing higher risk operations, to be provisioned by up to EUR 1 billion from the EU Budget and a matching amount by EIB own reserves. The Bank is ready to mobilize an amount equivalent to the EU budget allocation; however until now, there is no multi-annual commitment of budgetary funds to the RSFF scheme in the Commission’s proposal. The EIB has made it clear that such a multi- annual commitment was a condition sine qua non for its intervention to be operationally feasible. In such case, and only in such case, EIB could even help alleviating the budget constraint of the earlier years by front-loading its own participation.
2.1.2 SFF (Structured Finance Facility)
Based on previous experience the Bank could set up a Structured Finance Facility (SFF) with its own funds (EUR 500 million) to support riskier operations, within the Innovation Initiative (i2i). in the area of R&D.
2.2 SMEs
The Bank has long experience with SMEs financing in joint actions with the European Commission. The EIB/EIF representatives could confirm that an EIF capital increase of 50% from EUR 2 to 3 billion is being prepared to support the developments in favour of SMEs.
2.2.1 CIP Financial Instrument (Competitiveness and Innovation Programme)
1 RSFF, CIP Financial Instrument, EU Loan Guarantee Instrument for TENs
PE 372.062v 80/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT CIP is a successor to MAP, the EU's support scheme for SMEs. The December 2005 European Council's decision on the financial perspectives does not include specific provision guaranteeing the CIP budget, notably the initial proposals of EUR 1 billion for the financial instruments to be administered under mandate by EIF. A funding of EUR 1 billion would represent the critical mass to ensure a successful implementation of the programme and allow EIF to leverage at least EUR 15 billion of guarantees and venture capital in favour of SMEs, especially high growth and technology driven ones. The extension of CIP to the financing technology transfer activities (eg: pre-seed and seed) is also being envisaged to bridge the gap between research and industry.
2.2.2 JEREMIE (Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises)
JEREMIE is a joint initiative between Commission and the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund in order to promote increased access to finance through ERDF funding, for the development of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in the regions of the EU. Member States and programming authorities will thus have the option to use part of their structural funds to leverage financial instruments for SMEs through financial engineering. No specific budgetary decision is required for JEREMIE.
2.2.3 SME Finance Facility
In April 1999, the European Commission launch the SME Finance Facility for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises operating in the EU Accession countries of central and eastern Europe. The SME Finance Facility, which is channelled through the EBRD, the EIB and CEB/KfW1, provides capital to SMEs through loans to local banks, leasing companies and investments in private equity funds.2
2.3 Large-scale infrastructure investment
Since December 2003 within the Action for Growth initiative, a new impetus has been given to TENs financing by EIB under the name of TEN Finance Facility (TIF). The Bank is proposing to increase the current lending target of TIF from EUR 50 billion until 2010 to EUR 75 billion until 2013.
2.3.1 EU Loan Guarantee Instrument for TENs
A new joint proposal has been made by the Commission and EIB for a Community limited guarantee instrument for TEN-Transport projects. This scheme targets a very specific requirement, limited in time, to allow the development of Priority Pilot Projects (PPP) schemes for TEN-Transport projects. An amount of probably 500 mio EUR would be allocated from the TENs envelope and topped up with a similar amount from the EIB's own reserves making a total of 1 billion EUR. Such a scheme would permit a significant leverage effect and would mobilise up to 20 times (i.e. some 20 billion EUR) in the form of long-term senior bank loans.
1 CEB/KfW : Council of Europe Development Bank/ Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 2 The facility is currently operational in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey. The financial intermediaries in the candidate countries participating in this programme must be committed to develop SME operation as a significant part of their business.
MT 81 Error! Unknown document property name. 2.3.2 JASPERS (Joint Assistance in Supporting Projects in European Regions)
JASPERS is a partnership between the Commission (DG REGIO), the EIB and the EBRD for a technical assistance facility that stands at the disposal of the beneficiary Member States at no cost to them. The implementation and financing of the corresponding projects could generate a significant contribution to economic and social cohesion, notably in the new Member States. No EU budget decision is required for JASPERS.
2.3.3. Galileo joint undertaking (GJU)
The EIB is involved in the advisory work for the Galileo joint undertaking. The EIB could be interested to play a more active role.
3. Rapporteur's observations
In the context of the negotiations on the next financial perspective and the possible contribution of EIB-EIF funds to the EU budget, the rapporteur wishes to make the following:
a) Financial instruments as full part of the Interinstitutional Agreement
As mentioned in his working documents n° 3, 4 and 5, the rapporteur proposes to include this new type of co-financing into the next IIA. In its working document COM(2006) 75 final "Contribution to the interinstitutional negotiations on the Proposal for renewal of the Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure", the Commission has taken on board the European Parliament's requests as follows:
The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission agree that the introduction of co-financing mechanisms is necessary to reinforce the leverage effect of the EU budget by increasing the funding incentive. They agree to encourage all types of financial instruments acting as catalysts for public and private investors. The objective is to increase up to EUR 10 billion the EIB's capacity for research and development loans in the period 2007-2013. Moreover, the instruments in favour of Trans-European Networks, and Small and Medium- sized Enterprises are to be reinforced. The Commission will make proposals, accordingly and will report back to the budgetary authority about the activities financed by the EIB, the EIF and the EBRD (relevant in the case of new Member States) to support investment in all those areas. The Commission has endorsed the principle of modernisation of the Budget through co- financing by the EIB- EIF of activities related to the Lisbon strategy.
The reporting mechanism proposed by the Commission should be detailed in timing and content; it should provide a clear evaluation of the leverage effects in the areas pertaining to the negotiations. This mechanism should allow the Parliament to evaluate - once or twice per year - how EIB-EIF activities can complement a reduced ceiling for heading 1a.
The formal proposals should be made before the end of the year 2006.
b) Complementarity
PE 372.062v 82/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT Since the EIB-EIF support is based on a combined effect of EIB and EU funding, could the EIB-EIF representatives explain what would be the consequences in terms of EIB loans and leverage effect of a reduction of the share of the EU budget under the different mechanisms (R&D, CIP, TENs), based on the Council's cuts.
EIB funding and EU resources should not be substitutable but complementary. The additionality of EIB funding with appropriations of EU budget should represent a way to maximise the support of the EU economy. The leverage effect should be quantifiable and visible for the citizens. The combinations of EIB-EIF support and EU funding could ensure better discipline in the selection of worthwhile projects. In a context of good cooperation between the Institutions, the EIB-EIF financial mechanisms combined with EU funding should be transparent. c) Possibility for the Union to meet the Lisbon objectives
The rapporteur is of the opinion that the development of new financial instruments could contribute to achieving the Lisbon goals, especially if the ceiling of heading 1a would be reduced. Is the Committee ready to support the European Council conclusions through the mobilisation of EUR 1 billion from the envelope of the 7th Framework Programme on R&D? Is the Committee ready to ask for further proposals of loans for other programmes such as TENs, SMEs and/or CIP? If so what would be the amount necessary to attain a useful critical mass under those programmes? d) Short term incentive grants
On the basis of the "Jeremie" programme the EIB should indicate what facilities it could offer to provide for short term incentive grants with a rapid leverage effect in view of a possible adjustment in the context of the mid-term review.
MT 83 Error! Unknown document property name. DOKUMENT TA' ĦIDMA NRU 7 DWAR IL-FTEHIMA INTERISTITUZZJONALI DWAR ID-DIXXIPLINA BAĠITARJA U L-IMMANIĠJAR FINANZJARJU SOD
21.3.2006
1. Background
Fir-riżoluzzjoni tiegħu ta' l-1 ta' Diċembru 2005, il-Parlament Ewropew talab lill- Kummissjoni biex tressaq proposta riveduta tal-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali. Fil-15-16 ta' Diċembru 2005, il-Kunsill Ewropew laħaq ftehima politika dwar il-Perspettiva Finanzjarja 2007-2013.
Fir-riżoluzzjoni tiegħu tat-18 ta' Jannar 2006, il-Parlament Ewropew adotta l-pożizzjoni tiegħu dwar il-ftehima tal-Kunsill Ewropew u rrifjuta l-proposta attwali.
Fl-1 ta' Frar 2006, il-Kummissjoni adottat proposta riveduta għat-tiġdid tal-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali1.
Fid-dokumenti ta' ħidma tiegħu nri 3, 4 u 5, ir-rapporteur ressaq l-opinjonijiet tiegħu dwar kif l-elementi kwalitattivi tal-pożizzjoni tal-Parlament għan-negozjati tat-8 ta' Ġunju 2005 għandhom ikunu riflessi fil-laqgħa ta' l-IIA li jmiss.
Fil-15 ta' Frar, il-Kummissjoni ressqet dokument ta' ħidma "Kontribuzzjoni għan-negozjati interistituzzjonali dwar il-proposta għat-tiġdid tal-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali dwar id- dixxiplina baġitarja u t-titjib tal-proċedura baġitarja"2 fuq il-bażi tat-talbiet tal-Parlament Ewropew.
Kif mistenni, u wara numru ta' laqgħat li saru f'livell istituzzjonali u tekniku, ir-rapporteur jippreżenta minn hawn 'il quddiem il-proposti tiegħu għall-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali tal-futur dwar il-Maniġment Finanzjarju Sod. L-iskop tal-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali għandu jkun aġġornat u mwessa'. Għandu jinkludi Parti III ġdida li tagħmel enfasi fuq riformi kwalitattivi bil-għan li tittejjeb l-implimentazzjoni tal-baġit ta' l-UE.
Il-proposti huma bbażati kemm fuq - il-verżjoni riveduta tal-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali, kif ukoll - the working document "Contribution to the interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal for renewal of the Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure"2
Il-proposti fihom - test ta' spjega għal kull artikolu modifikat/miżjud - test possibbli għall-IIA nnifsu.
1 COM(2006) 36 final 2 COM(2006)0102
PE 372.062v 84/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT Ftehima Interistituzzjonali dwar il-Maniġment Finanzjarju Sod
L-I Parti Id-dixxiplina Baġitarja, definizzjoni u l-implimentazzjoni ta' dispożizzjonijiet It-II Parti Interinstitutional cooperation It-III Parti It-titjib tal-kwalità ta' l-implimentazzjoni tal-Baġit u tar-riformi korrispondenti
2. Aspetti Ġenerali
Titlu tal-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali
Sabiex jitwessa' l-iskop ta' l-IIA, biex jiġi aġġornat il-kontenut tiegħu u biex jittejjeb il-mod kif jintlaqa', qed tiġi proposta bidla fit-titlu:
Test possibbli
"Ftehima Interistituzzjonali dwar il-Maniġment Finanzjarju Sod".
Art. 1 - Għan tal-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali
Jista' jkun ta' siwi li tiżdied referenza għad-dħul fis-seħħ possibbli tal-Kostituzzjoni matul il- perjodu finanzjarju li jmiss, liema referenza tista' tbiddel ir-regoli kollha tal-qafas finanzjarju u tal-proċedura baġitarja annwali.
Article 1a (new) - New structure of the IIA
Test possibbli
"In the event the Constitutional Treaty will enter into force during the period covered by the financial framework established in the present Interinstitutional Agreement, the Institutions will call for a special conciliation in order to allow a fast transition from the present financial framework to the legal system foreseen in articles I-55 and III-402 of the Constitution, in full respect of the respective rights conferred by these articles to each Institution."
3. L-I PARTI: Dixxiplina baġitarja
Art. 3 - Setgħat u maġġoranzi baġitarji
Żewġ problemi li jikkonċernaw il-maġġoranzi għandhom ikunu indirizzati fin-negozjati.
Ir-regola ġenerali fl-IIA tipprevedi li d-deċiżjonijiet baġitarji kollha għandhom jittieħdu bil- maġġoranza prevista fl-artikolu 272 tat-Trattat (maġġoranza kwalifikata fil-Kunsill u fil-PE).
MT 85 Error! Unknown document property name. a) Minkejja d-dispożizzjonijiet tal-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali, l-Istati Membri għandhom regola interna li jieħdu deċiżjonijiet bl-unanimità għal dawn id-deċiżjonijiet, li għalihom l-IIA jipprevedi maġġoranza kwalifikata.
b) Artikolu 23 ta' l-IIA jagħmel eċċezzjoni speċifika fir-regola ġenerali għall-unanimità fil- Kunsill fir-rigward ta' deċiżjonijiet li jaqbżu iż-0.03%. L-eċċezzjoni ta' art. 23 għandha titħassar.
Hemm bżonn li dawn il-punti jitqajmu f'livell politiku.
Art. 3a (ġdid) - Setgħat u maġġoranzi baġitarji - proċedura ġdida
Jista' jkun propost artikolu ġdid biex tkun introdotta "proċedura eħfef" taħt limitu indikat [i.e. xx miljun] marbut mal-livell ta' l-ammont mitlub. Din il-proċedura għandha ssegwi l-mudell definit fit-Trattat (u fir-Regolament Finanzjarju għat-trasferimenti) ibbażata fuq il- klassifikazzjoni tan-nefqa (art. 272), li l-Kunsill jiddeċiedi dwar is-CE (nefqa obbligatorja) u l-Parlament dwar l-NCE (nefqa mhux obbligatorja). Din il-"proċedura eħfef" għandha tapplika għall-proċeduri kollha previsti fl-IIA (i.e. ir-Reviżjoni, il-Flessibilità, il- Globalizzazzjoni, is-Solidarjetà, l-Għajnuna ta' Emerġenza u l-Garanziji) meta l-ammont mitlub huwa anqas minn ċertu limitu, li jrid jiġi definit aktar 'il quddiem għal kull proċedura.
Test possibbli
"F'każ li jkun neċessarju li tkun applikata waħda mill-proċeduri previsti fl-art. 24 u fl-art. 26 sa 29, u hekk li ma jinqabżux l-ammonti indikati f'kull artikolu hawn taħt, jekk iż-żewġ fergħat ta' l-Awtorità Baġitarja ma jirnexxilhomx jiftehmu, il-Kunsill jista', permezz tal-maġġoranza kwalifikata, jiddeċiedi dwar in-nefqa li neċessarjament tirriżulta minn dan it-Trattat jew minn atti adottati skond it-Trattat. Il-Parlament Ewropew jista' jiddeċiedi dwar in-nefqa mhux obbligatorja, skond il-proċeduri definiti fl-art. 272 tat-Trattat."
Art. 12 - Contents and scope of the financial framework (automatic acceptance of the Maximum Rate of Increase)
L-aċċettazzjoni awtomatika ta' l-MRI hija ċentrali biex jitħarsu l-IIA u l-FP. Fil-passat il- Kunsill hedded li ma jirrispettax dan l-artkolu i.e. li jirrifjuta baġit li jirrispetta l-limti massimi iżda li jaqbeż l-MRI statistiku.
Kull Istituzzjoni jista' jkollha d-dritt li ma timplimentax dan l-artikolu iżda l-konsegwenzi jridu jkunu ċari: f'dan il-każ il-ftehima tiġi sospiża u għandu japplika l-art. 272.
Test possibbli
"F'każ li fergħa ta' l-Awtorità Baġitarja ma taqbilx ma' MRI li jirriżultaw mill-vot dwar l- abbozz ta' baġit, li jirrispettaw il-limiti massimi f'anness 1, il-validità ta' l-IIA u l-FP jiġu sospiżi, għandha tapplika l-proċedura prevista f'art. 272 tat-Trattat tal-KE.
PE 372.062v 86/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT Art.17 - Aġġustamenti konnessi ma' l-implimentazzjoni
Kienet teżisti proċedura simili fil-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali ta' l-1992-1999, fejn l- aġġustament, konness ma' l-implimentazzjoni, għandu jwassal għall-possibilità li jkunu modifikati l-limiti massimi annwali għal matul il-perjodu, f'impenn u pagamenti, mingħajr ma jinbidel l-ammont totali.
Test possibbli
"Qabel l-aħħar ta' Marzu l-Kummissjoni se tippreżenta l-implimentazzjoni tal-programmi kodeċiżi kollha (art. 38 bħala referenza) u tevalwa r-raġunijiet għal nuqqas ta' implimentazzjonijiet. Il-Kummissjoni se tipproponi lill-Awtorità Baġitarja, jekk ikun xieraq, il-possibilità li jkun modifikat il-profil tan-nefqa tal-programm, inkluż l-effett eventwali fuq il- limiti massimi."
Art. 20 a (ġdid) - Marġni għall-proċedura annwali
Peress li l-perspettiva finanzjarja hija tant ristretta, u x'aktarx li l-marġni kollha jew il-biċċa l- kbira tagħhom, jiġu assorbiti mill-programmi ta' kodeċiżjonijiet, hemm riskju kbir li l-marġni għall-proċedura annwali jkun limitat ħafna/ineżistenti. Dan jista' jostakola l-kompetenzi tal- Parlament Ewropew fil-proċedura annwali dwar il-programmi annwali, l-attivitajiet taħt l- awtonomija tal-Kummissjoni u l-abilità tiegħu li jiżgura li l-pakketti finanzjarji għal proġetti pilota u azzjonijiet preparatorji jkunu rispettati.
Il-Parlament Ewropew għandu jipproponi li jiġu garantiti marġni biżżejjed.
Test possibbli
"Kull sena, meta tippreżenta l-PDB, il-Kummissjoni timpenja ruħha li tirrispetta l-ammont annwali previst mir-rendikont finanzjarju ta' kull programm kodeċiż u li tħalli marġni biżżejjed taħt l-intestaturi kollha ta' perspettivi finanzjarji biex tippermetti l-evoluzzjoni normali tal-proċedura baġitarja. Kieku l-Kummissjoni kellha tqis li l-marġni li tħalla m'huwiex biżżejjed biex jippermetti l-proċedura annwali, għandha tagħmel proposta biex timmobilizza l-istrument ta' flessibilità."
Art. 21a (ġdid) - Bilanċ minn snin ta' qabel
Il-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali għandha tipprevedi mekkaniżmu ġdid biex jiffinanzja attivitajiet li m'humiex koperti mill-perspettivi finanzjarji u li jippermetti li approprjazzjonijiet minn snin ta' qabel li ma ntefqux (impenji u pagamenti) jiġu inklużi fil-baġit. X'aktarx li mekkaniżmu bħal dan jeħtieġ modifikazzjoni tar-Regolament Finanzjarju
Bħalissa approprjazzjonijiet għal pagamenti mhux użati minn sena N-1 jiġu inlużi mad-dħul tal-baġit tas-sena N permezz ta' Baġit ta' Emenda għall-ħabta ta' Mejju, u jnaqqsu proporzjonalment il-kontribuzzjonijiet mill-Istati Membri.
MT 87 Error! Unknown document property name. Il-mekkaniżmu ġdid għandu jipprevedi l-ħolqien ta' linja tal-baġit ad hoc "bilanċ tas-snin ta' qabel" fil-parti tan-nefqa tal-Baġit, minbarra l-Qafas Finanzjarju. Wara l-għeluq finali tal- kontijiet tas-sena N-1, parti mill-approprjazzjonijiet li jirriżultaw mill-bilanċ tas-sena ta' qabel, għandhom jiġu inklużi, mal-Baġit ta' Emenda, fil-linja tal-baġit speċifika tas-sena N, kemm bħala impenji u bħala pagamenti.
Approprjazzjonijiet li jiġu inklużi f'din il-linja tal-baġit jistgħu jkunu trasferiti għal kwalunkwe linja tal-baġit permezz ta' trasferiment, jekk marġni huwa disponibbli taħt il- limitu massimu ta' l-intestatura relevanti, jew, jekk mhux hekk, permezz ta' waħda mill- proċeduri l-oħra previsti fl-IIA.
Kull meta huwa neċessarju li jkunu mobilizzati riżorsi supplementari għal kwalunkwe proċeduri speċifiċi previsti fl-IIA (i.e. ir-Reviżjoni, il-Flessibilità, il-Globalizzazzjoni, is- Solidarjetà, l-Għajnuna ta' Emerġenza, is-Self u l-Garanziji) il-Kummissjoni għandha tipproponi li l-finanzjament ikun provdut Mir-rijallokazzjoni ta' approprjazzjonijiet fl-intestaturi jew bejniethom; L-użu ta' approprjazzjonijiet mil-linja speċifika tal-baġit "bilanċ tas-snin ta' qabel"; Ir-riżorsi supplementari mitluba mill-Istati Membri.
Id-deċiżjoni dwar l-iffinanzjar għandha tittieħed mill-awtorità baġitarja.
Il-Kummissjoni tista' tipproponi lill-Awtorità Baġitarja l-użu ta' l-approprjazzjonijiet inklużi fil-linja tal-baġit speċifika "bilanċ tas-snin ta' qabel". L-awtorità baġitarja tista' tieħu deċiżjoni wara l-konċiljazzjoni f'Lulju.
Test possibbli
"Appropriations which have not been used at the end of the financial year may be carried over and decommitments may be made available again, up to a maximum of xx billion to the following two years, this amount will be entered in a specific budget line, over and above the relevant amount as laid down in Annex I. This amount can be used only when transferred to an operational budget line according to the procedures of art. 24 of Financial Regulation or the specific procedures foreseen in art. 24 and art. 26 to 29 of the present IIA."
Art. 22 - Reviżjoni tal-qafas finanzjarju: l-użu tar-reviżjoni
Dan l-artikolu għandu jiċċara ċ-ċirkustanzi li fihom għandha tapplika r-reviżjoni aktar milli l- użu ta' l-Istrument ta' Flessibilità: Biex jinbidlu l-limiti massimi mingħajr ma jkunu assenjati għal xi politika speċifika Biex jinbidlu l-limiti massimi għal politika speċifika meta l-modifikazzjoni m'hijiex itwal minn [tliet] snin; Meta hemm modifikazzjoni għall-istruttura tal-Perspettiva Finanzjarja - eż. iż-żieda ta' intestatura.
Kull fergħa ta' l-awtorità baġitarja tista' ssaqsi lill-Kummissjoni biex tibda proċedura għal reviżjoni, fuq il-bażi jew tal-preżentazzjoni ta' l-APS, jew wara l-PDB.
PE 372.062v 88/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT Test possibbli
"Minbarra l-aġġustamenti tekniċi regolari, l-aġġustamenti skond il-kundizzjonijiet ta' implimentazzjoni, il-mobilizzazzjoni ta' l-istrument ta' flessibilità, il-qafas finanzjarju jista' jiġi rivedut skond il-limitu massimu ta' riżorsi proprji, wara proposta mill-Kummissjoni, fil- każ ta' modifikazzjoni tal-limiti massimi, jekk m'huwiex allokat għal politika speċifika jew, jekk allokat għal politika meta l-modifikazzjoni taqbeż [tliet] snin jew fil-każ ta' żieda ta' intestatura ġdida."
Art. 23 - Reviżjoni tal-qafas finanzjarju: maġġoranza
Kif indikat f'Punt 3 u f'Punt 3a (ġdid), żewġ maġġoranzi biss għandhom ikunu ammissibbli: il-maġġoranza ta' art. 272 u l-proċedura bbażata fuq il-kompetenza ta' kull Istituzzjoni bbażata fuq il-klassifikazzjoni tan-nefqa (Punt 3 a (ġdid)). Peress li r-reviżjoni timplika bidla aktar sostanzjali fil-qafas finanzjarju (i.e. politika ġdida jew anki intestatura ġdida) jidher xieraq li jiġu introdotti żewġ modifikazzjonijiet għal dan l-artikolu: waħda biex tbiddel il-limitu ta' fuq tad-deċiżjoni tar-riżorsi proprji (1.31% GNI għal impenji u 1.24% għal pagamenti) u oħra biex tnaqqas ir-referenza għall-unanimità.
Test possibbli
"Kwalunkwe deċiżjoni biex jiġi rivedut il-qafas finanzjarju fil-marġni stabbilit mid-deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill dwar ir-riżorsi proprji (...... ) tittieħed b'mod konġunt miż-żewġ fergħat ta' l-awtorità baġitarja li taġixxi skond Punt 3."
Art. 24 - Reviżjoni tal-qafas finanzjarju
Kull meta jkun neċessarju li tiġi applikata din il-proċedura, il-Kummissjoni għandha tipproponi li l-finanzjament jiġi minn wieħed jew aktar mill-elementi li ġejjin: L-allokazzjoni mill-ġdid ta' approprjazzjonijiet fl-intestaturi jew bejniethom; L-użu ta' approprjazzjonijiet mil-linja speċifika tal-baġit "bilanċ tas-snin ta' qabel"; Ir-riżorsi supplementari mitluba mill-Istati Membri.
Id-deċiżjoni dwar l-iffinanzjar għandha tittieħed mill-awtorità baġitarja skond il-maġġoranzi baġitarji kif definiti f'artikolu 3, sakemm l-ammont huwa anqas minn [xxx miljun] f'liema każ tapplika l-"proċedura eħfef", art. 3.000000 a (ġdid).
Test possibbli
"Without prejudice of Point 41, when a decision to proceed to the revision of the financial framework, in line with art. 22, has been taken by the Budgetary Authority the institutions will examine, in the following order:
l-iskop għar-rijallokazzjoni tan-nefqa bejn il-programmi ħlief, minbarra każijiet eċċezzjonali, dawk li hemm referenza għalihom f'art. 39 tal-ftehima preżenti, koperti mill- intestatura kkonċernata mir-reviżjoni; l-ammont li se jintuża mil-linja tal-baġit speċifika "bilanċ tas-sena ta' qabel";
MT 89 Error! Unknown document property name. iż-żieda tal-limitu massimu ta' l-intestatura kkonċernata u konsegwentement tar-riżorsi supplimentari mitluba, ladarba l-ammont jiġi inkluż fil-baġit. L-istituzzjonijiet iqisu jekk hemmx skop li jikkumpensaw għal dan billi jiżdied il-limitu massimu għal intestatura u jonqos il-limitu massimu għal oħra.
The objective should be that a significant amount, in absolute terms and as a percentage of the new expenditure planned, should be within the existing ceiling for the heading. F'każ li l-awtorità baġitarja ma jirnexxilhiex tiftiehem dwar il-finanzjament, u sa ammont ta' [xx miljun] id-deċiżjoni tittieħed skond il-proċedura indikata f'Art. 3 a."
Art. 26 - Riżerva ta' l-Għajnuna ta' Emerġenza
The emergency aid reserve should be outside h.4 and the financial framework, as indicated by the European Parliament in its resolution of 8 June 2005. To finance a reserve outside the Financial Perspective, as in the case of the Solidarity Fund, the normal procedure would be either a transfer from unused appropriations or through an Amending Budget. Il-Kummissjoni se topponi dan bil-qawwa għaliex tqis li dan inaqqas il-ħeffa ta' l-abilità ta' l-UE li tirreaġixxi.
Kull meta jkun neċessarju li tiġi applikata din il-proċedura, il-Kummissjoni għandha tipproponi li l-finanzjament jiġi minn wieħed jew aktar mill-elementi li ġejjin: L-allokazzjoni mill-ġdid ta' approprjazzjonijiet fl-intestaturi jew bejniethom; L-użu ta' approprjazzjonijiet mil-linja speċifika tal-baġit "bilanċ tas-snin ta' qabel"; Ir-riżorsi supplementari mitluba mill-Istati Membri.
Id-deċiżjoni dwar l-iffinanzjar għandha tittieħed mill-awtorità baġitarja skond il-maġġoranzi baġitarji kif definiti f'artikolu 3, sakemm l-ammont huwa anqas minn [xxx miljun] f'liema każ tapplika l-"proċedura eħfef", art. 3.000000 a (ġdid).
Test possibbli
"L-approprjazzjonijiet ta' impenn korrispondenti għall-Għajnuna ta' Emerġenza għandhom jiġu inklużi fil-baġit taħt l-intestatura rilevanti, apparti l-ammont rilevanti, kif stipulat f'Anness I. L-għan tar-riżerva ta' l-għajnuna ta' emerġenza huwa li tipprovdi reazzjoni malajr għall-bżonnijiet ta' għajnuna speċifika ta' pajjiżi li m'humiex membri wara ġrajjiet li ma setgħux ikunu previsti meta l-baġit kien stabbilit, l-ewwel u qabel kollox għal operazzjonijiet umanitarji, iżda wkoll għall-immaniġġjar u l-protezzjoni ta' kriżijiet ċivili meta ċ-ċirkustanzi jeħtieġu hekk. L-ammont annwali tagħha huwa ffissat għal 221 miljun euro għall-perjodu kollu tal-qafas finanzjarju, fi prezzijiet kostanti.
Meta l-Kummissjoni tqis li hemm bżonn li tintuża din ir-riżerva, il-Kummissjoni tippreżenta proposta biex dan l-ammont jiġi inkluż fil-linja tal-baġit xierqa. The Budgetary Authority will examine, in the following order:
l-iskop għar-rijallokazzjoni tan-nefqa bejn il-programmi ħlief, minbarra każijiet eċċezzjonali, dawk li hemm referenza għalihom f'art. 39 tal-ftehima preżenti, koperti mill-intestatura kkonċernata mir-reviżjoni; l-ammont li se jintuża mil-linja tal-baġit speċifika "bilanċ tas-sena ta' qabel";
PE 372.062v 90/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT riżorsi supplementari mitluba sakemm l-ammont jiġi inkluż fil-baġit. L-istituzzjonijiet iqisu jekk hemmx skop li jikkumpensaw għal dan billi jiżdied il-limitu massimu għal intestatura u jonqos il-limitu massimu għal oħra.
F'każ li l-awtorità baġitarja ma jirnexxilhiex tiftiehem dwar il-finanzjament, u sa ammont ta' [xx miljun] id-deċiżjoni tittieħed skond il-proċedura indikata f'Art. 3 a."
Art. 27 Fond ta' Solidarjetà ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea
Kull meta jkun neċessarju li tiġi applikata din il-proċedura, il-Kummissjoni għandha tipproponi li l-finanzjament jiġi minn wieħed jew aktar mill-elementi li ġejjin: L-allokazzjoni mill-ġdid ta' approprjazzjonijiet fl-intestaturi jew bejniethom; L-użu ta' approprjazzjonijiet mil-linja speċifika tal-baġit "bilanċ tas-snin ta' qabel"; Ir-riżorsi supplementari mitluba mill-Istati Membri.
Id-deċiżjoni dwar l-iffinanzjar għandha tittieħed mill-awtorità baġitarja skond il-maġġoranzi baġitarji kif definiti f'artikolu 3, sakemm l-ammont huwa anqas minn [xxx miljun] f'liema każ tapplika l-"proċedura eħfef", art. 3.000000 a (ġdid).
Test possibbli
"Il-Fond ta' Solidarjetà ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea huwa maħsub biex jippermetti għajnuna finanzjarja mgħaġġla fil-każ li jseħħu diżastri kbar fit-territorju ta’ Stat Membru jew ta’ pajjiż kandidat, kif definit fl-Att bażiku rilevanti. Il-limitu massimu jkun ta’ biljun euro fuq l- ammont annwali disponibbli għall-Fond ta’ Solidarjetà. Fl-1 ta’ Ottubru ta’ kull sena, mill- inqas kwart mill-ammont annwali jibqa’ disponibbli biex ikun jista’ jkopri ħtiġiet li jinqalgħu sa tmiem dik is-sena. Il-parti ta’ l-ammont annwali li ma tiġix inkluża fil-baġit ma tistax tintuża fis-snin li ġejjin. F'każijiet eċċezzjonali, u jekk ir-riżorsi finanzjarji li jibqgħu u li jkunu disponibbli fil-Fond fis-sena li fiha seħħ id-diżastru, kif definit fl-att bażiku rilevanti, ma jkunux biżżejjed biex ikopru l-ammont ta' assistenza meqjusa neċessarja mill-awtorità baġitarja, il-Kummissjoni tista' tipproponi li d-differenza tkun iffinanzjata permezz tal-Fond tas-sena ta' wara. L-ammont annwali tal-Fond ibbaġitjat kull sena ma jistax jaqbeż il-biljun euro f'kwalunkwe ċirkustanza. Meta l-kundizzjonijiet għall-mobilizzazzjoni tal-Fond ta' Solidarjetà, kif stipulati fl-att bażiku rilevanti jkunu issodisfati, il-Kummissjoni tagħmel proposta biex il-Fond jista' jintuża. Id- deċiżjoni biex jintuża l-Istrument ta' Solidarjetà tittieħed flimkien miż-żewġ fergħat ta' l- awtorità baġitarja. L-approprjazzjonijiet ta' impenji korrispondenti għandhom jiġu inklużi fil- baġit apparti l-intestaturi rilevanti fil-qafas finanzjarju kif stipulat f'Anness I. Meta tkun ittieħdet deċiżjoni biex tibda l-mobilizzazzjoni ta' strument bħal dan, l-istituzzjonijiet jeżaminaw, fl-ordni li ġejja: l-iskop għar-rijallokazzjoni tan-nefqa bejn il-programmi ħlief, minbarra każijiet eċċezzjonali, dawk li hemm referenza għalihom f'art. 39 tal-ftehima preżenti, koperti mill- intestatura kkonċernata mir-reviżjoni; l-ammont li se jintuża mil-linja tal-baġit speċifika "bilanċ tas-sena ta' qabel"; riżorsi supplementari mitluba sakemm l-ammont jiġi inkluż fil-baġit. L-istituzzjonijiet iqisu jekk hemmx skop li jikkumpensaw għal dan billi jiżdied il-limitu massimu għal
MT 91 Error! Unknown document property name. intestatura u jonqos il-limitu massimu għal oħra.
F'każ li l-awtorità baġitarja ma jirnexxilhiex tiftiehem dwar il-finanzjament, u sa ammont ta' [xx miljun] id-deċiżjoni tittieħed skond il-proċedura indikata f'Art. 3 a."
Art.28 - Strument ta' Flessibilità
Il-kundizzjonijiet li fihom tista' tintuża l-flessibilità għandhom ikunu ċċarati. L-Istrument ta' Flessibilità għandu jkun mobilizzat għal: ħtiġiet speċifiċi perjodu massimu ta' [tliet snin].
Inkella għandha tapplika r-reviżjoni, kif definita fl-ex art.24.
Kull meta jkun neċessarju li tiġi applikata din il-proċedura, il-Kummissjoni għandha tipproponi li l-finanzjament jiġi minn wieħed jew aktar mill-elementi li ġejjin:
L-allokazzjoni mill-ġdid ta' approprjazzjonijiet fl-intestaturi jew bejniethom; L-użu ta' approprjazzjonijiet mil-linja speċifika tal-baġit "bilanċ tas-snin ta' qabel"; Ir-riżorsi supplementari mitluba mill-Istati Membri.
Id-deċiżjoni dwar l-iffinanzjar għandha tittieħed mill-awtorità baġitarja skond il-maġġoranzi baġitarji kif definiti f'artikolu 3, sakemm l-ammont huwa anqas minn [xxx miljun] f'liema każ tapplika l-"proċedura eħfef", art. 3a (ġdid).
Test possibbli
"Meta tkun ittieħdet deċiżjoni mill-Awtorità Baġitarja biex ikun mobilizzat Strument bħal dan, l-istituzzjonijiet jeżaminaw, fl-ordni li ġejja:
l-iskop għar-rijallokazzjoni tan-nefqa bejn il-programmi ħlief, minbarra każijiet eċċezzjonali, dawk li hemm referenza għalihom f'art. 39 tal-ftehima preżenti, koperti mill-intestatura kkonċernata mir-reviżjoni; l-ammont li se jintuża mil-linja tal-baġit speċifika "bilanċ tas-sena ta' qabel"; riżorsi supplementari mitluba sakemm l-ammont jiġi inkluż fil-baġit. L-istituzzjonijiet iqisu jekk hemmx lok li jikkumpensaw għal dan billi jiżdied il-limitu massimu għal intestatura u jonqos il-limitu massimu għal oħra.
L-objettiv għandu jkun li ammont sostanzjali, f’termini assoluti u bħala persentaġġ tan-nefqa l-ġdida ppjanata, għandu jkun stabbilit fi ħdan il-limitu eżistenti għall-intestatura.
F'każ li l-awtorità baġitarja ma jirnexxilhiex tiftiehem dwar il-finanzjament, u sa ammont ta' [xx miljun] id-deċiżjoni tittieħed skond il-proċedura indikata f'Art. 3 a."
Art. 29 - Fond Ewropew ta' l-Aġġustament għall-Globalizzazzjoni
PE 372.062v 92/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT Il-Fond għall-Globalizzazzjoni ma jagħmilx parti mill-qasam finanzjarju u huwa ffinanzjat mill-marġni disponibbli fuq medda ta' sentejn.
Kull meta jkun neċessarju li tiġi applikata din il-proċedura, il-Kummissjoni għandha tipproponi li l-finanzjament jiġi minn wieħed jew aktar mill-elementi li ġejjin: L-allokazzjoni mill-ġdid ta' approprjazzjonijiet fl-intestaturi jew bejniethom; L-użu ta' approprjazzjonijiet mil-linja speċifika tal-baġit "bilanċ tas-snin ta' qabel"; Ir-riżorsi supplementari mitluba mill-Istati Membri;
Id-deċiżjoni dwar l-iffinanzjar għandha tittieħed mill-awtorità baġitarja skond il-maġġoranzi baġitarji kif definiti f'artikolu 3, sakemm l-ammont huwa anqas minn [xxx miljun] f'liema każ tapplika l-"proċedura eħfef", art. 3.000000 a (ġdid).
Test possibbli
"Il-Fond Ewropew ta’ l-Aġġustament għall-Globalizzazzjoni hu intiż sabiex jipprovdi aktar appoġġ għal ħaddiema li jsofru mill-konsegwenzi ta’ tibdil strutturali ewlieni fix-xejriet tal- kummerċ dinji, sabiex jassistihom fl-integrazzjoni tagħhom mill-ġdid fis-suq tax-xogħol. Il-Fond ma jistax jaqbeż ammont annwali massimu ta' 500 miljun euro. Meta jeżistu l- kundizzjonijiet għall-mobilizzazzjoni tal-Fond Ewropew ta' l-Aġġustament għall- Globalizzazzjoni, kif stipulati fl-att bażiku rilevanti, il-Kummissjoni tagħmel proposta biex il- Fond jista' jintuża. Id-deċiżjoni biex jintuża l-Fond Ewropew ta' l-Aġġustament għall- Globalizzazzjoni tittieħed flimkien miż-żewġ fergħat ta' l-awtorità baġitarja. L-approprjazzjonijiet ta’ impenn korrispondenti għandhom jiddaħħlu fil-baġit skond l- intestatura rilevanti, jekk neċessarju apparti l-ammont rilevanti kif stabbilit f'Anness I. Meta tkun ittieħdet deċiżjoni mill-Awtorità Baġitarja biex ikun mobilizzat dan l-istrument, l- istituzzjonijiet jeżaminaw, fl-ordni li ġejja: l-iskop għar-rijallokazzjoni tan-nefqa bejn il-programmi ħlief, minbarra każijiet eċċezzjonali, dawk li hemm referenza għalihom f'art. 39 tal-ftehima preżenti, koperti mill-intestatura kkonċernata mir-reviżjoni; l-ammont li se jintuża mil-linja tal-baġit speċifika "bilanċ tas-sena ta' qabel"; iż-żieda tal-limitu massimu ta' l-intestatura kkonċernata u konsegwentement tar-riżorsi supplimentari mitluba, ladarba l-ammont jiġi inkluż fil-baġit. L-istituzzjonijiet iqisu jekk hemmx skop li jikkumpensaw għal dan billi jiżdied il-limitu massimu għal intestatura u jonqos il-limitu massimu għal oħra.
F'każ li l-awtorità baġitarja ma jirnexxilhiex tiftiehem dwar il-finanzjament, u sa ammont ta' [xx miljun] id-deċiżjoni tittieħed skond il-proċedura indikata f'Art. 3 a."
Art. 31 - Tul ta' żmien
A financial framework of seven years may partially jeopardise the competences of the next Parliament and the next Commission.
At the same time the agreed amounts of the multi-annual programmes must be protected.
This article should as an option, allow for an ad hoc procedure to assess the functioning of
MT 93 Error! Unknown document property name. the current agreement and the financial framework and to preserve the EP's prerogatives for confirming the prolongation/modification/rejection of the current FP/IIA.
Test possibbli
"The newly elected Parliament can decide to confirm, to modify or to terminate the current IIA and the financial framework while ensuring the financial envelopes for the multi-annual programmes as a guaranteed minimum."
4. PARTI II: Interinstitutional cooperation
Artikolu 40 - Referenza għall-ipprogrammar finanzjarju (Parti III)
F'dan l-artikolu għandu jkun hemm referenza għall-konsegwenzi finanzjarji ta' l- ipprogrammar finanzjarju u għar-rikors għal flessibilità jekk ikun neċessarju, skond id- dikjarazzjoni konġunta ta' Lulju 2000 dwar l-ipprogrammar finanzjarju.
Test possibbli
"Ir-rapporti finanzjarji tal-programmi jistgħu wkoll jiġu riveduti fil-kuntest ta' tqabbil bejn l- ipprogrammar leġiżlattiv u dak finanzjarju fl-aġġornament bijennali tal-leġiżlazzjoni fis-seħħ, il-leġiżlazzjoni pendenti u l-leġiżlazzjoni futura, inkluż ukoll permezz tar-rikors ta' l- istrument li għalih hemm dispożizzjoni fl-IIA kurrenti taħt l-Artikoli 21a, 24 u 28 tagħha u jekk jinstab li l-limiti massimi jkunu insuffiċjenti."
Artikolu 43 u 44 (ġdid) - L-iffinanzjar tal-Politikà barranija u ta' sigurtà komuni (CFSP)
Id-dispożizzjoni għandha tirrifletti l-ftehimiet tas-snin reċenti bejn l-istituzzjonijiet.
Test possibbli
43. "Għan-nefqa tas-CFSP mħallsa mill-baġit ġenerali tal-Komunitajiet Ewropej skond l- Artikolu 28 tat-Trattat dwar l-Unjoni Ewropea, l-istituzzjonijiet għandhom jippruvaw, fil- proċedura ta' konċiljazzjoni li għaliha hemm dispożizzjoni fl-Anness II u fuq il-bażi ta' l- abbozz preliminari tal-baġit imfassal mill-Kummissjoni, jiżguraw li jkun hemm ftehim kull sena dwar l-ammont tan-nefqa ta' l-operat li għandu jiġi mħallas mill-baġit tal-Komunità u dwar id-distribuzzjoni ta' dan l-ammont bejn l-Artikoli tal-Kapitolu tal-baġit tas-CFSP. Fin- nuqqas ta’ ftehim, hu mifhum li l-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill ser idaħħlu fil-baġit l- ammont li kien hemm fil-baġit ta’ qabel jew l-ammont propost fl-abbozz preliminari tal-baġit, skond liema minn dawn ikun aktar baxx. L-ammont sħiħ tan-nefqa ta' l-operat tas-CFSP ser ikun inkluż kollu kemm hu f'Kapitolu wieħed tal-baġit (CFSP). Dan l-ammont għandu jkopri l-ħtiġijiet reali previsti u marġni
PE 372.062v 94/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT raġonevoli għal attività imprevista. Kull Artikolu jkopri Azzjonijiet Konġunti u Deċiżjonijiet tal-Kunsill li jimplimentaw azzjonijiet konġunti diġà adottati, miżuri li huma previsti iżda li għadhom ma ġewx adottati u kull attività futura – i.e. mhix prevista – li għandha tiġi adottata mill-Kunsill waqt is-sena finanzjarja kkonċernata. Minħabba li, taħt ir-Regolament Finanzjarju, il-Kummissjoni għandha l-awtorità, fil-qafas ta’ azzjoni tas-CFSP, li tittrasferixxi approprjazzjonijiet b’mod awtonomu bejn artikoli f’kapitolu wieħed tal-baġit, i.e. l-allokazzjoni tas-CFSP, il-flessibilità meqjusa neċessarja għal implimentazzjoni mgħaġġla ta’ azzjonijiet tas-CFSP għandha tiġi żgurata kif meħtieġ. Fil-każ li l-ammont tal-baġit tas-CFSP matul is-sena finanzjarja ma jkunux biżżejjed biex ikopri l-ispejjeż neċessarji, il-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill għandhom ifittxu soluzzjoni kemm jista' jkun malajr, fuq proposta mill-Kummissjoni.
Il-Parlament Ewropew, il-Kunsill u l-Kummissjoni jaqblu li l-ammont għal azzjonijiet meħudin skond l-artikolu 'miżuri ta' emerġenza' ma jistax jaqbeż 20% ta' l-ammont sħiħ tal- kapitolu tal-baġit tas-CFSP."
44. "Each year, the Council establishes a forward looking document setting out the main aspects and basic choises of the common foreign and security policy, including financial implications for the General Budget n+1 of the European Union and a document evaluating the measures launched during the year n-1. The Council Presidency will consult the European Parliament on these Council documents. They will be transmitted to Parliament before 15th June for the year in question. Barra dan, skond il-ftehima milħuqa fil-laqgħa ta' konċiljazzjoni fl-24 ta' Novembru 2003, il- Presidenza tal-Kunsill, fil-livell politiku ta' Ambaxxatriċi, u ż-żewġ Presidenzi l-ġodda għandhom jagħtu informazzjoni fil-kuntest tad-djalogu maż-żewġ kumitati responabbli tal- Parlament dwar kwistjonijiet u għażliet tas-CFSP li jkunu ġejjin u twissija kmieni dwar Azzjonijiet Konġunti tas-CFSP li jista' jkollhom implikazzjoni finanzjarja importanti billi jagħmlu laqgħat ta' konsultazzjoni konġunti mill-inqas ħames darbiet fis-sena li għandhom jiġu miftiehma fl-ewwel trijalogu tas-sena, skond id-dispożizzjoni fl-Anness II mal- Presidenza tal-Kunsill għal dik is-sena. Il-Kummissjoni tkun assoċjata u tieħu sehem f’dawn il-laqgħat. Kull meta din tadotta deċiżjoni fil-qasam tas-CFSP li tinvolvi nefqa, il-Kunsill għandu jibgħat, immedjatament f'kull każ, u mhux iktar tard minn ħamest ijiem ta' xogħol wara d- deċiżjoni finali, lill-Parlament Ewropew stima ta' l-infiq previst ('dikjarazzjoni finanzjarja'), b'mod partikolari ta' dak li għandu x'jaqsam ma' limitu ta' żmien, ma' l-istaff impjegat, ma' l- użu tal-bini u infrastruttura oħra, mal-faċilitajiet tat-trasport, mal-ħtiġijiet għat-taħriġ u ma' l-arranġamenti ta' sigurtà. Darba kull tliet xhur, il-Kummissjoni għandha tinforma lill-awtorità baġitarja dwar l- implimentazzjoni ta’ l-azzjonijiet tas-CFSP u dwar il-previżjonijiet finanzjarji għall-perjodu li jkun għad fadal għal dik is-sena."
Artikolu 44 a (ġdid) - L-iffinanzjar tal-Qasam tal-Libertà, is-Sigurtà u l-Ġustizzja
Għandha titfassal proċedura ġdida biex tiggarantixxi d-drittijiet tal-Parlament fit-teħid tad- deċiżjonijiet f'dan il-qasam permezz ta' djalogu strutturat li jista' jsir waqt il-laqgħa ta' konċiljazzjoni ta' Lulju.
Test possibbli
MT 95 Error! Unknown document property name. "Għan-nefqa fuq il-Libertà, is-Sigurtà u l-Ġustizzja mħallsa mill-baġit ġenerali tal- Komunitajiet Ewropej, skond l-Artikolu xx tat-Trattat dwar l-Unjoni Ewropea, l- Istituzzjonijiet għandhom jippruvaw jiżguraw, fil-proċedura ta' Konċiljazzjoni li għaliha hemm dispożizzjoni fl-Anness II u fuq il-bażi ta' l-Abbozz Preliminari tal-Baġit imwaqqaf mill-Kummissjoni, li jkun hemm ftehima kull sena dwar riżorsi finanzjarji addizzjonali jew dwar l-allokazzjoni mill-ġdid ta' riżorsi skond prijoritajiet ġodda, permezz ta' djalogu strtturat fi stadju bikri tal-proċedura annwali."
Anness II - Kollaborazzjoni interistituzzjonali fis-settur baġitarju (integrazzjoni mill- ġdid fil-par.)
After point C, Proċedura ġdida għal-Libertà, is-Sigurtà u l-Ġustizzja: Dan l-anness għandu jinkorpora wkoll referenza għall-proċedura relatata mad-djalogu strutturat li tfassal il-prijoritajiet għan-nefqa relatata mal-qasam tal-Libertà, is-Sigurtà u l-Ġustizzja.
Taħt punt D, Implimentabilità: Dwar l-evalwazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni dwar l-implimentabilità ta' l- emenda prevista mill-awtorità baġitarja, u b'mod partikolari l-PP u l-PA, l-iskadenza prevista (nofs Ġunju) għandha tiġi aġġustata għall-kalendarju tal-PE (nofs Settembru).
The annual ceilings for PP/PA were currently foreseen for EU-15 and have never been updated since 1999. They should therefore be adjusted to an enlarged Union EU- 25/27.
Limiti massimi għall-PP/PA: Il-Kummissjoni neħħiet l-Artikoli 36 u 37 ta' qabel minħabba li huma koperti mill-Artikolu 49 tar-Regolament Finanzjarju u introduċiet il-limiti massimi l-ġodda taħt Anness II punt D ta' l-IIA riveduta. Il-Kummissjoni aġġustat il-limiti tal-prezzijiet ta' l-1999 sa l-2004 u għal żieda ta' 10% biex taħseb għat-tkabbir.
Test possibbli
"Barra dan, it-tliet istituzzjonijiet jaqblu li jillimitaw l-ammont totali ta' approprjazzjonijiet għal skemi pilota għal € 40 miljun [minflok 38] f'kull sena tal-baġit. Huma jaqblu wkoll li jillimitaw għal € 50 miljun [minflok 36] l-ammont totali ta' approprjazzjonijiet għal azzjonijiet preparatorji ġodda f'kull sena tal-baġit, u għal € 100 miljun [minflok 90] l-ammont totali ta' l-approprjazzjonijiet attwalment impenjati għal azzjonijiet preparatorji."
PE 372.062v 96/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT 5. PARTI III (ġdida): Titjib fil-kwalità ta' l-implimentazzjoni tal-Baġit u fir-riformi korrispondenti
Artikoli ġodda li għandhom jiġu integrati:
Artikolu 45 (ġdid) - Regolament Finanzjarju
Purpose Mingħajr aċċess għall-programmi tal-Komunità u mingħajr twettiq iktar faċli tal-baġit, l- Unjoni mhix ser tilħaq lill-poplu u ħafna politiki ma jkollhomx l-effetti mixtieqa. Iċ-ċavetta għal aċċess iktar faċli għal programmi tal-Komunità u twettiq tal-baġit b'mod iktar sempliċi hija r-riforma tar-Regolament Finanzjarju, il-gwida ta' kif jitmexxew il-programmi u l-baġit ta' l-Unjoni. L-għan komuni għar-riforma tar-Regolament Finanzjarju għandu jkun għal regoli u proċeduri iktar sempliċi u iktar mgħaġġla, iktar trasparenti u ta' min joqgħod fuqhom, kif ukoll iktar effiċjenti f'sens ta' nfiq.
Procedure Għandha tiġi miftiehma proċedura ta' konċiljazzjoni reali bbażata fuq id-dikjarazzjoni konġunta ta' l-1975 u diġà użata għar-reviżjoni ta' l-2002 biex tinvolvi bl-istess mod liż-żewġt istituzzjonijiet li għandhom l-awtorità baġitarja. L-istituzzjonijiet ifittxu wkoll koperazzjoni interistituzzjonali mill-qrib u kostruttiva għall- konklużjoni fil-pront tar-Regoli ta' Implimentazzjoni biex ikunu ssimplifikati l-proċeduri għal finanzjament, filwaqt li tiżgura protezzjoni għolja ta' l-interessi finanzjarji ta' l-Unjoni. Il-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill huma impenjati bi sħiħ li jikkonkludu n-negozjati dwar ir- Regolament Finanzjarju fi żmien xieraq biex ikun jista' jidħol fis-seħħ fl-1 ta' Jannar 2007.
Kontenut Il-prinċipji, il-modifikazzjonijiet u/jew il-kjarifikazzjonijiet li ġejjin dwar kwistjonijiet relatati mar-Regolament Finanzjarju għandhom jiġu inkorporati fil-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali l-ġdida bil-ħsieb li jiżguraw li l-baġit jiġi implimentat b'iktar effiċjenza, b'inqas burokrazija u b'iktar trasparenza u b'mod li jkun eqreb lejn iċ-ċittadin:
Making reference to Article 5 of the EC Treaty (proportionality principle), which, at all times, must govern administrative action concerning budget implementation (Cost for administration of grants/contracts must be proportionate to value of grant/contract) (Ads. 28, 46, 86, 116 to the report on the revision of the Financial Regulation hereinafter "FinReg"). Commitment of the institutions to expressly indicate any derogation from or exception to the Financial Regulation, giving reasons when it proposes derogations from or exceptions to the Financial Regulation(Ad. 29 FinReg); Laying down a right for Parliament to be involved - during a programme's seven-year duration - in decision-taking on particularly important tendering procedures identified by Parliament's relevant portfolio committee (‘droit de regard formalisé’). Provisions have to be made for a timely evaluation and review of programmes which ensure that, in due time before the end of the term, alterations to the programme can be made, if necessary ('Diligent Monitoring'). After a programme has been implemented,
MT 97 Error! Unknown document property name. a report must be submitted, in particular on the number of applications accepted and rejected, grant recipients, application processing time and any obstacles to carrying out procedures (Ads. 76, 107 FinReg). Evalwazzjoni regolari ta' l-impatt leġiżlattiv, li tinkludi eżami tas-sussidjarjetà kif ukoll, f'kull ħin, verifikazzjoni ta' alternattivi. Abbozz ta' leġiżlazzjoni li temenda għandu dejjem ikun ippreżentat flimkien ma' verżjoni kkonsolidata u ma' dikjarazzjoni tar-raġunijiet għal kull emenda proposta. (Not expressly provided for in FinReg but considered a sheer necessity while working on its provisions). the establishment of an interinstitutional working group which will prepare and accompany the midterm review and revision of the Financial Regulation
Test possibbli
"The provisions of the Financial Regulation are an important instrument for the quality of the budget implementation and should ensure the access to the Community programmes and a more user friendly execution of the budget. Kull riforma għandha l-għan li toħloq regoli u proċeduri iktar sempliċi u mgħaġġla, iktar trasparenti u ta' min joqgħod fuqhom, kif ukoll iktar effiċjenti f'sens ta' nfiq.
L-istituzzjonijiet jimpenjaw ruħhom - to find the right balance between the protection of financial interests and the and the resulting administrative cost, taking into account the principle of proportionality; - to expressly indicate any derogation from or exception to the Financial Regulation, giving reasons when it proposes derogations from or exceptions to the Financial Regulation; - biex jinħoloq grupp ta' ħidma interistituzzjonali li għandu jipprepara u jakkompanja l- analiżi regolari (kull tliet snin) u reviżjoni ġenerali tar-Regolament Finanzjarju fil-futur.
Il-Kummissjoni tiżgura li - flimkien ma' abbozz ta' leġiżlazzjoni li temenda tingħata verżjoni kkonsolidata ta' l-att leġiżlattiv u stqarrija tar-raġunijiet għal kull emenda proposta; - issir evalwazzjoni regolari ta' l-impatt leġiżlattiv, li tinkludi eżami tas-sussidjarjetà; - ir-Rapporti annwali dwar l-attività skond id-DGs ippreżentati lill-awtorità baġitarja jinkludu informazzjoni sintetika fuq is-sejħiet għall-offerti u r-riżultati tagħhom."
"Dikjarazzjoni: Fi ħdan il-qafas ta' l-analiżi tar-Regolament Finanzjarju l-Istituzzjonijiet jimpenjaw ruħhom li jtejbu l-implimentazzjoni tal-baġit u li jagħmlu l-finanzjament ta' l-UE iktar evidenti għaċ- ċittadini u jżidu l-benefiċċju tiegħu għalihom mingħajr ma jqiegħdu f'dubju l-progress milħuq fit-tibdil ta' l-2002. As in 2002, the review of the Financial Regulation will be adopted on the basis of a modified proposal from the Commission and following a real conciliation procedure1 aimed at achieving effective consensus between the European Parliament and Council. Huma jfittxu wkoll koperazzjoni interistituzzjonali mill-qrib u kostruttiva għall-
1 Cf. Dikjarazzjoni Konġunta tal-Parlament Ewropew, tal-Kunsill u tal-Kummissjoni ta' l-4 ta' Marzu 1975 (ĠU Nru. C 89 tat-22.04.1975, p. 1).
PE 372.062v 98/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT konklużjoni fil-pront tar-Regoli ta' Implimentazzjoni biex ikunu ssimplifikati l-proċeduri għall-finanzjament filwaqt li tiżgura protezzjoni qawwija ta' l-interessi finanzjarji ta' l- Unjoni. Il-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill huma impenjati bis-sħiħ biex jikkonkludu n- negozjati dwar ir-Regolament Finanzjarju biex ikun jista' jidħol fis-seħħ fl-1 ta' Jannar 2007.
The institutions recognize the importance of the joint standardisation service for forms and procedures regarding similar grants, Database for the notification of applicants, Information and advice for applicants, Need for legal certainty and indication of legal remedies; Liability: Clearer distinction between intentional harm and mistakes, Safeguarding the rights of Parliament (e.g. transfers), a ‘droit de regard formalisé’ and commit themselves to find common solutions in the context of the legislative procedure on the Financial Regulation."
Artikolu 46 (ġdid) - Ċertifikazzjoni mill-Istati Membri
Test possibbli
"In view of safeguarding internal control in the Member States and the European Commission without adding to the administrative burden for which the simplification of the underlying legislation is a prerequisite, priority is given to managerial accountability at appropriate Member State level, whereby the information is confirmed or guaranteed, under shared management. Dispożizzjonijiet adattati għal dan l-għan huma stipulati fir-regolament finanzjarju. (l-Artikolu xx)."
Artikolu 47 (ġdid) - Strumenti finanzjarji ġodda
Test possibbli
A. Dwar l-istrumenti
"L-introduzzjoni ta' mekkaniżmi ta' kofinanzjament hi neċessarja biex issaħħaħ l-influwenza tal-baġit billi żżid l-inċentiva għall-finanzjament. It-tipi kollha ta' strumenti finanzjarji li huma katalisti għall-pubbliku u għall-investituri privati huma inkoraġġiti. Bħala konsegwenza, il-Kummissjoni, f'koperazzjoni ma' l-EIB, tagħmel proposti:
- skond il-konkulżjonijiet tal-Kunsill Ewropew f'Diċembru 2005, biex il-kapaċità għas- self ta' l-EIB għar-riċerka u l-iżvilupp jiżdied b'sa EUR 10 biljuni fil-perjodu 2007- 2013 - biex il-kapaċità ta' l-EIB għan-Netwerks Madwar l-Ewropa u għall-Intrapriżi Zgħar u ta' Daqs Medju jiżdied sa EUR xx biljun."
B. Dwar rapporti
"Il-Kummissjoni, meta tippreżenta l-PDB, għandha tirrapporta lura lill-Awtorità Baġitarja dwar l-attivitajiet ffinanzjati mill-EIB, mill-EIF u mill-EBRD biex tgħin l-investiment fl-oqsma kollha msemmija taħt A hawn fuq."
MT 99 Error! Unknown document property name. Artikolu 48 (ġdid) - Klawsola għar-Reviżjonijiet
Erba' objettivi għandhom jiżdiedu biex jitjieb dan l-Artikolu:
li l-Parlament Ewropew jassoċja ruħu mal-ħidma tal-Kummissjoni u li jinħoloq grupp ta' ħidma fuq livell interistituzzjonali; li jiġi definit aħjar l-objettiv tar-Riżorsi Proprji, inkluża l-idea li tissejjaħ konferenza mal-Parlamenti Nazzjonali u mal-Parlament Ewropew; li tkun aċċettata l-analiżi wiesgħa tal-Kummissjoni, inkluża n-nefqa fuq l-agrikoltura bil-possibilità li jkun introdott il-kofinanzjament; li tkun inkluża evalwazzjoni ta' l-analiżi, b'votazzjoni mill-PE biex tkun ikkonfermata l-ftehima kurrenti.
Test possibbli
Qabel l-aħħar ta' l-2008 l-Kummissjoni tippreżenta analiżi wiesgħa lill-Parlament Ewropew u lill-Kunsill, li tinkludi l-proposti korrispondenti tal-Kummissjoni, li tkopru l-aspetti kollha tan-nefqa u tar-riżorsi ta' l-UE, kif ukoll evalwazzjoni ta' kif qed taħdem il-ftehima preżenti, bil-ħsieb li jkun żgurat li l-baġit ikun attrezzat biex jilqa' għall-isfidi tal-futur.
Each arm of the budgetary authority can take a decision, by March 2010 on the Commission proposal, including on the continuation/modification/rejection of the current IIA.
Għandu jinħoloq grupp ta' ħidma ad hoc, fil-bidu ta' l-2007, magħmul mir-rappreżentanti ta' l-awtorità baġitarja biex iżomm lill-Awtorità Baġitarja infurmata bil-progress milħuq f'din l- analiżi, u fejn ikun xieraq li tittieħed l-opinjoni tiegħu, għandu jiġi ppreżentat rapport fuq il- progress lill-Awtorità Baġitarja kull sena qabel il-Konċiljazzjoni ta' Lulju.
Dwar ir-Riżorsi Proprji, konxja mill-irwol tal-Gvernijiet u tal-Parlamenti Nazzjonali, fil-bidu ta' l-2007 tissejjaħ konferenza mar-rappreżentanti tal-Gvernijiet u tal-Parlamenti Nazzjonali. Il-konlużjonijiet ta' din il-konferenza jiġu kkunsidrati mill-Kummissjoni fil-White Paper tagħha."
Artikolu 49 (ġdid) - Riforma fis-sistema tar-riżorsi proprji
Test possibbli
"Minħabba l-ħtieġa li l-Unjoni Ewropea tingħata riżorsi proprji trasparenti u indipendenti biex jieħdu post is-sistema preżenti, jaqblu li l-ħidma preparatorja biex titwaqqaf tali sistema għandha tingħata lil konferenza li tinvolvi l-Parlament Ewropew u l-parlamenti nazzjonali. Il- konferenza tagħti orjentazzjonijiet fid-dawl tal-proposti tal-Kummissjoni li għandhom jiġu ppreżentati sa l-aħħar ta' l-2008."
PE 372.062v 100/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT Artikolu 50 (ġdid) - Aġenziji
Test possibbli
"Jinħoloq limitu massimu li jorbot għall-aġenziji l-ġodda futuri biex jiġi evitat tnaqqis fil- programmi ta' ħidma u fil-programmi tal-Komunità. Il-limiti massimi ta' l-intestatura speċifika jistgħu biss jiġu modifikati minn deċiżjoni ta' l-awtorità baġitarja. Meta tkun ittieħdet deċiżjoni mill-Awtorità Baġitarja biex tiġi ffinanzjata Aġenzija ġdida jew biex tiżdied l-approprjazzjoni għal waħda eżistenti, l-istituzzjonijiet għandhom jeżaminaw, skond l-ordni li ġej: il-possibilità li l-infiq jiġi rijallokat bejn il-programmi ħlief, minbarra każijiet eċċezzjonali, dawk li hemm referenza għalihom f'Art. 39 tal-ftehima preżenti, koperti mill-intestatura kkonċernata mir-reviżjoni; l-ammont li ser jintuża mil-linja speċifika tal-baġit "bilanċ tas-sena ta' qabel" iż-żieda tal-limitu massimu ta' l-intestatura kkonċernata u konsegwentement tar-riżorsi supplimentari mitluba, ladarba l-ammont jiġi inkluż fil-baġit. L-istituzzjonijiet jistgħu jeżaminaw il-possibilità li jikkumpensaw għaż-żieda fil-limitu massimu għal intestatura waħda billi jnaqqsu l-limitu massimu għal oħra. F'każ li l-awtorità baġitarja ma jirnexxilhiex tiftiehem dwar il-finanzjament, u sa ammont ta' [xx miljun] id-deċiżjoni tittieħed skond il-proċedura indikata f'Art. 3 a."
Artikolu 51 (ġdid) - Skejjel Ewropej
Test possibbli
"Jinħoloq limitu massimu li jorbot għall-Iskejjel Ewropej. Jekk l-ammont ta' l-Iskola Ewropea jkun insuffiċjenti, il-limiti massimi jistgħu jiġu modifikati biss minn deċiżjoni ta' l-awtorità baġitarja. Meta tkun ittieħdet deċiżjoni mill-Awtorità Baġitarja biex tiffinanzja Skola ġdida jew biex iżżid l-approprjazzjoni għal waħda eżistenti, l-istituzzjonijiet għandhom jeżaminaw, skond l-ordni li ġej: il-possibilità li l-infiq jiġi rijallokat bejn il-programmi ħlief, minbarra każijiet eċċezzjonali, dawk li hemm referenza għalihom f'Art. 39 tal-ftehima preżenti, koperti mill-intestatura kkonċernata mir-reviżjoni; l-ammont li ser jintuża mil-linja speċifika tal-baġit "bilanċ tas-sena ta' qabel" iż-żieda tal-limitu massimu ta' l-intestatura kkonċernata u konsegwentement tar-riżorsi supplimentari mitluba, ladarba l-ammont jiġi inkluż fil-baġit. L-istituzzjonijiet jistgħu jeżaminaw il-possibilità li jikkumpensaw għaż-żieda fil-limitu massimu għal intestatura waħda billi jnaqqsu l-limitu massimu għal oħra. F'każ li l-awtorità baġitarja ma jirnexxilhiex tiftiehem dwar il-finanzjament, u sa ammont ta' [xx miljun] id-deċiżjoni tittieħed skond il-proċedura indikata f'Art. 3 a."
Artikolu 52 (ġdid) - Skrutinju demokratiku u koerenza ta' attivitajiet esterni
MT 101 Error! Unknown document property name. Test possibbli
"The need for a rationalisation of instruments for external actions and concentration of programmes for management facilities should not reduce the powers of the legislative authority or the Budgetary Authority. The Institutions therefore agree to establish a procedure granting Parliament and Council political control over the strategic choices which, under the regulations establishing the new external assistance instruments, will be delegated to the Commission. This procedure shall allow Parliament and Council to object to draft measures entailing such strategic choices and to request that the Commission either withdraws them or modifies them. The current budgetary provisions concerning the transition of potential candidates to pre- accession candidates, owing to the significant budgetary implication will apply also with regard to the new multi-annual financial framework as laid down in the joint declaration accompanying the adjustment and revision of the financial perspective for the enlargement of ten new Member states (A5-117/2003, 09.04.2003; A6-153/2005, par. 29/30). The Commission will provide in the PDB a nomenclature which allows better transparency over thematic and geographical areas."
Artikolu 53 (ġdid) - Programmazzjoni finanzjarja
Test possibbli
"1. Il-Kummissjoni tissottometti darbtejn fis-sena, l-ewwel darba f'Mejju/Ġunju (flimkien mad-dokumenti li jakkumpanjaw il-PDB) u t-tieni darba f'Diċembru/Jannar (wara l- adozzjoni tal-Baġit), programmar finanzjarju sħiħ għall-Intestaturi 1A, 2 (għall- ambjent u għas-sajd), 3 u 4 tal-Qafas Finanzjarju 2007-2013. Dan id-dokument, imqassam skond l-intestatura, il-qasam tal-politika u l-linja tal-baġit għandu jidentifika żewġ fażijiet:
a. leġiżlazzjoni fis-seħħ b'distinzjoni bejn programmi plurijennali u attivitajiet annwali: għal programmi plurijennali l-Kummissjoni għandha tindika l-proċedura li taħtha kienu adottati (COD u CNS), it-tul ta' żmien tagħhom, l-ammonti konċernati, is-sehem allokat għan-nefqa amministrattiva; għal attivitajiet annwali (PP-PA, Aġenziji) u attivitajiet iffinanzjati skond il-prerogattivi tal- Kummissjoni, għandha tipprovdi estimi plurijennali u (għall-PP-PA), il-marġni li jibqgħu taħt il-limiti awtorizzati previsti mill-IIA (EUR [38] miljun għall-PP u EUR [90] miljun għall-PA);
b. leġiżlazzjoni pendenti: proposti pendenti tal-Kummissjoni b'referenza għall-linja tal- baġit (livell aktar baxx), skond il-Kapitolu u skond il-qasam tal-politikà. Għandu jinstab mekkaniżmu biex it-tabelli jkunu aġġornati kull darba li tkun adottata proposta ġdida biex ikunu evalwati l-konsegwenzi finanzjarji.
PE 372.062v 102/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT 2. Il-Kummissjoni għandha tikkunsidra metodi ta' referenza bejn il-programmazzjoni finanzjarja l-programmazzjoni leġiżlattiva tagħha biex tipprovdi previżjonijiet iktar preċiżi u ta' min joqgħod fuqhom. Għal kull proposta leġiżlattiva, il-Kummissjoni għandha tindika jekk din hix inkluża jew le fil-programmazzjoni ta' Mejju-Diċembru. L-Awtorità Baġitarja għandha tkun partikolarment infurmata dwar: a. l-atti leġiżlattivi l-ġodda kollha adottati iżda mhux inklużi fid-dokument ta' Mejju-Diċ (bl-ammonti korrispondenti); b. il-leġiżlazzjoni pendenti kollha ppreżentata iżda mhux inkluża fid-dokument ta' Mejju- Diċ (bl-ammonti korrispondenti);"
Article 54 (new) - Creation of a special reserve for cohesion
Test possibbli
"Non obstante the provisions of article 16, a special reserve for cohesion is created with unused appropriations of sub-heading 1b for the years 2007-2009 to re-allocate them in 2010. The corresponding commitment appropriations shall be entered in the budget under the relevant heading, if necessary over and above the relevant amount as laid down in Annex I. The Commission will present a proposal for the re-allocation of the funds made available, the decision will be taken jointly by Council and Parliament."
Artikolu 55 - Self u garanziji
Ir-riserva għas-Self u Garanziji għandha titqiegħed barra l-qafas finanzjarju. Il-mekkaniżmu tad-dispożizzjonijiet jista' jaħdem anki jekk il-fondi jitqiegħdu barra l-qafas finanzjarju.
Kull meta jkun neċessarju li tiġi applikata din il-proċedura, il-Kummissjoni għandha tipproponi li l-finanzjament jiġi minn wieħed jew aktar mill-elementi li ġejjin:
L-allokazzjoni mill-ġdid ta' approprjazzjonijiet fl-intestaturi jew bejniethom; L-użu ta' approprjazzjonijiet mil-linja speċifika tal-baġit "bilanċ tas-snin ta' qabel"; Ir-riżorsi supplementari mitluba mill-Istati Membri;
Id-deċiżjoni dwar il-finanzjament għandha tittieħed mill-Awtorità Baġitarja skond il- maġġoranzi baġitarji fl-Artikolu 3, ħlief jekk l-ammont huwa anqas minn [xxx miljun] f'liema każ tapplika l-"proċedura eħfef", Art. 3 a (ġdid).
MT 103 Error! Unknown document property name. 22.3.2006
OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GĦALL-AFFARJIET BARRANIN
for the Committee on Budgets
on the Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and sound financial management (2004/2099(ACI))
Draftsman: Karl von Wogau
SUGGESTIONS
The Committee on Foreign Affairs calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:
1. Is of the opinion that a new Financial Framework should guarantee the critical financial mass and achieve a steady progression in the allocation of resources for external assistance, commensurate with the growing challenges and with the increased expectations with respect to the Union’s role;
2. Reaffirms the need for more targeted use of EU funds in the external assistance area, as outlined in its resolution on Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of 8 June 2005, and invites the Council to come up with a similar prioritisation of EU spending, rather than applying linear cuts to all EU instruments;
3. Rejects the drastic cut which would be inflicted on research in the field of security if the ceilings agreed by the Heads of State and Government were applied; confirms its determination, even in a tight financial context, to allocate adequate resources to this critical research area and to ensure that Galileo, a high-tech programme of strategic importance for both the economy and the security of the European Union, is properly funded;
4. Opposes the European Council’s request that at least 90% of the EU external assistance be classified as official development aid; considers that binding targets of this nature could impair the Union’s capacity to provide the right mix of policies with regard to partner countries, and in particular to respect its commitments to countries either torn by conflict or engaged in post-conflict management;
Texts Adopted, P6_TA(2005)0224.
PE 372.062v 104/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT 5. Regards as crucial the establishment of well-endowed flexibility instruments to cover unforeseen needs, including those of a multi-annual character; is convinced that this must be matched by a simplified, less cumbersome procedure for the mobilisation of such instruments; considers however that this cannot be a substitute for adequate ordinary budgetary allocations and that the establishment of these instruments should be accompanied by a commitment to use the mid-term review of the Financial Framework to budget adequately for such unforeseen expenditure;
6. Regrets attempts to apply procedures of an intergovernmental nature in the allocation and management of funds for CFSP actions under the EU budget;
7. Expects the future Interinstitutional Agreement to provide for the unrestricted participation of Parliament in the annual CFSP review; stresses in this connection the need to consult Parliament in advance on aspects and choices;
8. Emphasises the increasing interdependence between civilian and military components of EU operations and the recognised need for comprehensive planning of CFSP/ESDP activities; would therefore welcome, in the context of the above information and consultation arrangements, the opportunity of clarifying the scope and nature of the different sources of financing;
9. Takes the view that the new Interinstitutional Agreement should provide for the Community budget funding of joint costs incurred by all ESDP operations; in the interests of transparency urges that the Interinstitutional Agreement contains at the very least a mandatory provision concerning a posteriori notification of security policy funding mechanisms not included in the Community budget;
10. Warns the Council that the substantial increase in CFSP spending advocated by the Heads of State cannot be reconciled with the tight expenditure ceilings they have put forward; therefore urges the Member States to develop greater complementarity and synergy between Community instruments - notably the new Instrument for Stability - and CFSP activities, since this would allow the Union to respond more adequately to the increasing financial needs for crisis management and non-proliferation measures;
11. Calls on Parliament to ensure the efficient and effective implementation of the various CFSP measures by appointing, through its committee responsible (the Committee on Foreign Affairs), standing rapporteurs to monitor those measures and the implementation of the relevant articles under the CFSP budget heading.
MT 105 Error! Unknown document property name. PROĊEDURA
Titolu Il-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja u l- immaniġġjar finanzjarju sod Numru tal-proċedura 2004/2099(ACI) Kumitat responsabbli BUDG Kumitat mitlub jagħti opinjoni AFET 27.10.2005 Data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja Koperazzjoni iktar mill-qrib Le Rapporteur (*): Karl von Wogau Data tal-ħatra 21.9.2004 Eżami fil-kumitat 22.2.2006 20.3.2006 Data ta' meta ġew adottati s- 21.3.2006 suġġerimenti Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali favur: 43 kontra: 2 astensjonijiet: 0 Membri preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali Angelika Beer, Panagiotis Beglitis, André Brie, Elmar Brok, Philip Claeys, Véronique De Keyser, Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos, Ana Maria Gomes, Alfred Gomolka, Richard Howitt, Jana Hybášková, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Michał Tomasz Kamiński, Helmut Kuhne, Vytautas Landsbergis, Emilio Menéndez del Valle, Francisco José Millán Mon, Pasqualina Napoletano, Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne, Raimon Obiols i Germà, Cem Özdemir, Justas Vincas Paleckis, Alojz Peterle, João de Deus Pinheiro, Mirosław Mariusz Piotrowski, Hubert Pirker, Paweł Bartłomiej Piskorski, Libor Rouček, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, Jacek Emil Saryusz-Wolski, György Schöpflin, Gitte Seeberg, Marek Maciej Siwiec, István Szent-Iványi, Konrad Szymański, Charles Tannock, Ari Vatanen, Karl von Wogau, Luis Yañez-Barnuevo García, Josef Zieleniec Sostitut(i) preżenti għall-votazzjoni Irena Belohorská, Alexandra Dobolyi, Árpád Duka-Zólyomi, Patrick finali Gaubert, Jaromír Kohlíček, Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis, Miguel Angel Martínez Martínez, Tatjana Ždanoka Sostituti(i) (skond l-Artikolu 178(2)) preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali
PE 372.062v 106/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT 24.4.2006
OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GĦALL-IŻVILUPP for the Committee on Budgets on the Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and sound financial management (2004/2099(ACI))
Draftswoman: Glenys Kinnock
SUGGESTIONS
The Committee on Development calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:
1. Rejects the 20.4% cut made by the European Council of December 2005 to the level of funding proposed by the Commission for Heading 4 for the period 2007-2013, as this will not provide sufficient resources for the Community to fulfil its role as "a global player"; considers that a more realistic level of funding is indispensable, not only to respond to repeated criticisms that the Community "punches below its weight" in external policies but also, most importantly, to ensure that a meaningful effort can be made towards the eradication of poverty in developing countries along the lines set out in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); stresses, particularly, that the allocation for development actions must be commensurate with commitments made by Member States to increase their levels of Official Development Assistance towards the United Nations target of 0.7% of Gross National Income by 2015.
2. Welcomes the establishment of new external policy priorities giving greater emphasis to the regions neighbouring the Community and providing the means to re-establish stability in situations of political turmoil; stresses, however, that these new priorities should not detract from the importance of fulfilling commitments made on the MDGs and giving priority to the poorest countries and the poorest communities within countries.
3. Gives its full support to the recommendation of the European Council of December 2005 that "the Union should aim to ensure over the period 2007-2012 that at least 90% of its overall external assistance be counted as official development assistance according to the present DAC definition".
4. Agrees with the principle of simplification of the legislative environment, but insists that nothing in the Interinstitutional Agreement should prejudge the outcome of current or forthcoming negotiations on its legislative work, including the legislative architecture for Heading 4 and the relative merits of including policy details and financial allocations within legislation as currently proposed.
MT 107 Error! Unknown document property name. 5. Draws attention to the repeated use of the Flexibility Instrument to fund unforeseen needs in Heading 4 during the period 2000-2006 and calls for a sufficient unallocated margin to be preserved under the Heading 4 ceiling to make provision for similar needs likely to arise in the future; calls, in that regard, for adequate facilities for flexibility to be applied to the whole Financial Perspective to make provision for the possible additional funding for Heading 4 if the need arises.
6. Highlights the need for sufficient funding to be provided for adequate compensation of ACP countries signatories to the Sugar Protocol to the Cotonou Agreement which face serious economic and social consequences following the reform of the EU Sugar Regime, and calls for an allocation to be ring-fenced from the Heading 4 margin for this purpose.
PE 372.062v 108/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT PROĊEDURA
Titolu Il-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja u l- immaniġġjar finanzjarju sod Numru tal-proċedura 2004/2099(ACI) Kumitat responsabbli BUDG Kumitat(i) mitlub(a) jagħti/u opinjoni DEVE Data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja 27.10.2005 Koperazzjoni iktar mill-qrib – Data tat- tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja Rapporteur Glenys Kinnock Data tal-ħatra 25.1.2006 'Rapporteur' ta' opinjoni preċedenti Eżami fil-kumitat 20.2.2006 Data ta' l-adozzjoni 24.4.2006 Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali +: 13 –: 0 0: 0 Membri preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali Margrete Auken, Margrietus van den Berg, Koenraad Dillen, Michael Gahler, Filip Andrzej Kaczmarek, Miguel Angel Martínez Martínez, Luisa Morgantini, Horst Posdorf, Frithjof Schmidt, Feleknas Uca Sostitut(i) preżenti għall-votazzjoni Linda McAvan, Zbigniew Zaleski, Gabriele Zimmer finali Sostituti(i) (skond l-Artikolu 178(2)) preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali Kummenti (informazzjoni disponibbli b'lingwa waħda biss)
5.10.2005
OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GĦALL-AFFARJIET BARRANIN
for the Committee on Budgets
on the Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and sound financial management (2004/2099(ACI))
MT 109 Error! Unknown document property name. Draftsman: Jan Mulder
GENERAL COMMENTS
According to its competence for the control of the implementation of the budget, the Committee's proposals are restricted to suggestions concerning proper control of the implementation of the budget.
The solid financial framework aimed at by the Commission's proposal must build on solid financial control mechanisms. In this regard Parliament, in its resolution on the 2003 Commission discharge and the Commission in its proposal on a roadmap to an integrated control framework have proposed mechanisms to provide the Commission with reasonable assurance that Member States' control systems are in place and functioning. Without prejudice and in addition to the negotiations launched in July 2005, the amendments aim at ensuring that this process is taken into account in the Interinstitutional Agreement for the next financial perspectives.
CONCLUSIONS
The Committee on Budgetary Control calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following amendments in its report:
Text proposed by the Commission Amendments by Parliament
Emenda 1 Part II, point B, article 31, paragraph 2 a (new)
The preliminary draft budget will also be accompanied by the annual ex-post declaration of assurance presented by the highest political and managing authority of each Member State (Finance Minister), stating that appropriate controls allowed for reasonable assurance concerning the legality and regularity of operations implementing expenditure, in particular, in the areas of shared management.
Emenda 2 Part II, point, B, article 32, paragraph 1 a (new)
Moreover, the two arms of the budgetary
PE 372.062v 110/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT authority undertake to consider the efforts made or further required to be made by the Member States in cooperation with the Commission in developing and implementing effective control systems, covering both revenue and expenditure, with a view to ensuring sound financial management. To this end, the two arms of the budgetary authority discuss, in the context of the conciliation procedure provided for in Annex II, the formal ex- ante disclosure statement made by the highest political and managing authority of each Member State (Finance Minister) providing assurance that efficient and effective controls for the implementation of the EU budget are in place or, if necessary, indicating concrete remedial action, in particular in the areas of shared management.
Emenda 3 Annex II, point C, article 2, point (a)
(a) continue discussions on the general trend (a) continue discussions on the general trend of expenditure and, in this framework, on of expenditure and, in this framework, on the broad lines of the budget for the coming the broad lines of the budget for the coming year in the light of the Commission's year in the light of the Commission's preliminary draft budget; preliminary draft budget. These discussions will cover the declaration of assurance and the disclosure statement made by the highest political and managing authority (Finance Minister) of each Member State in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 of this Agreement;
MT 111 Error! Unknown document property name. PROĊEDURA
Titolu Il-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja u l- immaniġġjar finanzjarju sod Numru tal-proċedura 2004/2099(ACI) Kumitat responsabbli BUDG Kumitat mitlub jagħti opinjoni CONT
Data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja Koperazzjoni iktar mill-qrib Le Rapporteur Jan Mulder Data tal-ħatra 22.9.2004 Eżami fil-kumitat 12.9.2005 Data ta' meta ġew adottati s- 3.10.2005 suġġerimenti Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali favur: 18 kontra: 0 astensjonijiet: 0 Membri preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali Simon Busuttil, Mogens N.J. Camre, Paulo Casaca, Szabolcs Fazakas, Christofer Fjellner, Ingeborg Gräßle, Umberto Guidoni, Ona Juknevičienė, Jan Mulder, José Javier Pomés Ruiz, Bart Staes, Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Jeffrey Titford, Kyösti Tapio Virrankoski, Terence Wynn Sostitut(i) preżenti għall-votazzjoni Joel Hasse Ferreira, Edit Herczog, Bill Newton Dunn, Esko Seppänen finali Sostituti(i) (skond l-Artikolu 178(2)) preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali
PE 372.062v 112/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT 23.3.2006
OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GĦALL-IŻVILUPP REĠJONALI for the Committee on Budgets on the Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and sound financial management (2004/2099(ACI)
Draftswoman: Constanze Angela Krehl
SUGGESTIONS
The Committee on Regional Development calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:
1. Welcomes the fact that the European Council reached agreement on the Financial Perspective 2007-2013, but deplores the fact that the projected resources are insufficient to meet the needs of the Union, and of regional development especially, over the period concerned; points out that Parliament had called for 0.41% of Union GNI to be allocated to cohesion but the European Council cut that percentage to the significantly lower figure of 0.37%;
2. Considers in particular that the budgets allocated under heading 1b are manifestly insufficient and therefore requires that the credits concerned be re-established at the level proposed by Parliament in its resolution on Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the enlarged Union 2007-20131; regrets, in particular, the substantial reduction in resources for the "European Territorial Cooperation Objective", which have been cut by almost 50% of the amount stipulated in the original Commission proposal.; stresses that this objective has a clear European added value, since it promotes cooperation among Member States and regional authorities; asks, therefore, for the allocation of substantial additional funding for this objective; notes also the disproportionate reduction in the budget allocated to the competitiveness objective;
3. Deplores the fact that the December 2005 European Council failed to provide full compensation for the ‘statistical effect’ regions, which will consequently have to endure 20% cuts starting immediately in 2007 and continuing in stages until 2013;
4. Notes that the Council's proposal for the financial perspective affects the draft legislation at present before Parliament and reminds Council that changes to that legislation can only
1 Texts Adopted, P6_TA(2005)0224.
MT 113 Error! Unknown document property name. be made under the rules of co-decision;
5. Criticises in this connection the proposal put forward in the financial negotiations to apply various standards for calculating the participation by EU funds and for the eligibility of VAT for funding; calls for the extension of private co-financing and the eligibility of VAT for funding to all Member States;
6. Welcomes the creation of a Globalisation Adjustment Fund, which should help workers in the Union’s regions affected by delocalisation and globalisation;
7. Welcomes the fact that the flexibility reserves, and in particular the reserve for cohesion and the solidarity reserve, are placed outside the financial framework and understands from this that their implementation should have no effect on the sums reserved for the Structural Funds;
8. Requires that the mechanisms and procedures for calling on these reserves be adapted to existing structures to ensure their speedy, unbureaucratic and effective use;
9. In application of the principle of recycling and notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 16 of the draft interinstitutional agreement, requires that a special reserve be created for cohesion with appropriations from sub-heading 1bwhich have been decommitted due to the N+2 or N+3 rule . The corresponding commitment appropriations should be entered in the budget under the relevant heading, if necessary over and above the relevant amount as laid down in Annex I to the interinstitutional agreement. Further asks the Commission to present a proposal for the re-allocation of the funds made available, the decision to be taken jointly by the Council and Parliament;
10. Maintains that the negotiations under way on the interinstitutional agreement must ensure full compliance with the spending target for the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, whereby implementation of the Funds will be guaranteed and no margin left under heading 1b;
11. Points to the evident will of all Member States to commence planning their programmes for the next programming period without delay;
12. Emphasises the need for the two arms of the budgetary authority to rapidly agree on the multi-annual framework 2007-2013, thus permitting Member States to plan their programmes and avoid undue delay in commencing them; furthermore, draws attention to the need to avoid the delays in implementation experienced at the beginning of the current programming period;
13. Points out that the financial perspective is not an end in itself, but a means of pursuing what should be a far-sighted and ambitious European policy.
PE 372.062v 114/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT PROĊEDURA
Titolu Il-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja u l- immaniġġjar finanzjarju sod Numru tal-proċedura 2004/2099(ACI) Kumitat responsabbli BUDG Kumitat(i) mitlub(a) jagħti/u opinjoni REGI Data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja 27.10.2005 Koperazzjoni iktar mill-qrib – Data tat- tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja Rapporteur Constanze Angela Krehl Data tal-ħatra 6.10.2004 'Rapporteur' ta' opinjoni preċedenti Eżami fil-kumitat 31.1.2006 23.2.2006 Data ta' l-adozzjoni 21.3.2006 Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali +: 40 –: 2 0: 1 Membri preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali Alfonso Andria, Stavros Arnaoutakis, Elspeth Attwooll, Jean Marie Beaupuy, Rolf Berend, Jana Bobošíková, Graham Booth, Bairbre de Brún, Giovanni Claudio Fava, Hanna Foltyn-Kubicka, Iratxe García Pérez, Eugenijus Gentvilas, Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg, Ambroise Guellec, Gábor Harangozó, Konstantinos Hatzidakis, Mieczysław Edmund Janowski, Gisela Kallenbach, Tunne Kelam, Miloš Koterec, Constanze Angela Krehl, Jamila Madeira, Sérgio Marques, Miroslav Mikolášik, Francesco Musotto, Jan Olbrycht, Markus Pieper, Francisca Pleguezuelos Aguilar, Alyn Smith, Grażyna Staniszewska, Margie Sudre, Kyriacos Triantaphyllides, Oldřich Vlasák Sostitut(i) preżenti għall-votazzjoni Thijs Berman, Brigitte Douay, Den Dover, Jillian Evans, Emanuel finali Jardim Fernandes, Louis Grech, László Surján, Thomas Ulmer, Manfred Weber Sostituti(i) (skond l-Artikolu 178(2)) María Esther Herranz García preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali Kummenti (informazzjoni disponibbli ... b'lingwa waħda biss)
MT 115 Error! Unknown document property name. 23.2.2006
OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GĦALL-BIEDJA U L-IŻVILUPP RURALI
for the Committee on Budgets
on the Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and sound financial management (2004/2099(ACI))
Draftswoman: Bernadette Bourzai
SHORT JUSTIFICATION
Since 1988, the financial framework (or financial perspective) has translated the Union’s political priorities into financial terms and set limits on EU expenditure over a fixed period.
In practice, however, Parliament, the Council and the Commission must conclude an interinstitutional agreement (IIA) on discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure that defines the multiannual financial framework and its implementing provisions (Part I) as well as the rules relating to the improvement of interinstitutional collaboration in general and to more specific areas such as the classification of expenditure, legal bases etc. (Part II).
The IIA provides clarity, continuity and flexibility. However, while the IIA enhances interinstitutional collaboration with trialogues and conciliation meetings, the annual budgetary procedure remains overly cumbersome and formalistic.
Agriculture expenditure in the annual budgetary procedure
- Each year, before the first reading of the European Parliament, the Commission sends the budgetary authority a letter amending the preliminary draft budget for agriculture.
This letter takes account of the latest decisions relating to the common agricultural policy and the most recent crop estimates, in view of the fact that agricultural expenditure, which is compulsory, is closely linked to the specific market situation, to the effective exchange rate between the euro and the dollar and to the pace of payments made by the Member States.
This means that the role of Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, which works on the basis of the figures in the draft preliminary budget, is neutralised in advance.
PE 372.062v 116/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT - The final decision on compulsory expenditure, which mainly consists of support to farmers, is made by the Council.
Although the responsibilities of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development relate to a considerable proportion of the Community budget (43 % of the budget in 2005 and 45 % in 2006), the action it can take in the budgetary procedure, particularly as regards compulsory expenditure, is often limited because it does not take part in the negotiations between the Council and Parliament, who have to wait for the letter of amendment before agreement is reached.
There needs to be a rethink of the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure, particularly following the latest CAP reform.
In practice, a great deal of market expenditure becomes direct aid which is assimilated into structural expenditure and which could, as such, be classified as non-compulsory expenditure. Furthermore, in view of the progressive importance of rural development expenditure, which by its nature is multiannual and therefore programmable, discussions on the classification of agriculture expenditure in general could be reopened.
The 2007-2013 financial framework. The proposal by the December 2005 European Council
The expenditure allocated under the first pillar of the CAP has already been fixed for 2007-2013 on account of the decision by the 2002 Brussels European Council that the amount earmarked for agriculture for 2006 under Agenda 2000 would be maintained until 2013. The expenditure ceiling is to rise by 1 % per year.
The proposal by the December 2005 European Council on the new financial framework adheres to this agreement but also takes into account, within this ceiling, the anticipated requirements of Romania and Bulgaria. Furthermore, the amounts proposed for financing rural development policy are insufficient and run the risk of compromising the double objective of the 2002 reform. Indeed, with aid no longer being linked to production, the implementation of actions financed by rural development was supposed to provide for a certain amount of reconversion as well as the maintenance of farmers’ income levels.
SUGGESTIONS
The Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:
1. Recommends that its Committee on Budgets consider a new timetable for the different stages of the annual budget negotiations so as to allow the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development a genuine opportunity to give its opinion on the draft agriculture budget and to react following publication of the Commission’s letter amending agriculture expenditure;
2. Emphasises the need for greater transparency in budgetary conciliation;
MT 117 Error! Unknown document property name. 3. Proposes that a European Parliament delegation for budgetary conciliation be set up that would be representative of the budget share of the different European policies and which would, therefore, systematically include the draftsman of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development;
4. Calls on the Commission to provide, as a minimum, specific information for the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the clearance of accounts in order to improve the Committee’s right to scrutiny, as regards not only agricultural expenditure but also the reimbursement of unused amounts to the Member States;
5. Approves of the idea of reallocation flexibility in order that, for example, unused appropriations under heading 2 may remain available under heading 2 without a revision of the financial framework; further calls for the resources released from export subsidies as a result of commitments under the WTO Agreement to be re-designated for rural development;
6. Recalls that the ceilings for the common agricultural policy (CAP) were fixed until 2013 by the 2002 reform and that the changes agreed as a result of the mid-term review clause proposed by the last European Council (point 80 of the agreement) can lead to redistributions and reforms within the agriculture budget but cannot have any impact on total CAP expenditure in the Community budget until 2013;
7. Considers that the European Council’s proposal to reduce the amount allocated to rural development by some EUR 20 000 million is unacceptable since it conflicts with one of the principal objectives of the September 2003 reform of the CAP, which was to reinforce the second pillar; considers that this is particularly true in the EU 15, which face a reduction of 35 % in funding for rural development;
8. Rejects, therefore, the agreement reached by the Heads of State and Government of the European Union on the Rural Development strand since the funding available will obstruct the financing of actions launched in the past as well as that of new eligible measures, especially those stemming from implementation of the Natura 2000 network;
9. Considers that financing the Natura 2000 network with a reduced allocation for the second pillar of the CAP could give rise to injustices, owing to the impossibility of compensating all farmers for the loss in income occasioned by satisfying the environmental requirements inherent in that network;
10. Is concerned that the frontloading of spending on rural development at the beginning of the financial period 2007-2013 does not reflect the usual expenditure profile at Member State level, where the traditional pattern is to spend more towards the end of the period;
11. Is also concerned that lower spending levels proposed for the end of the period 2007-2013 will make it more difficult to negotiate a new financial package for 2013 onwards, at which point an enhanced rural development package may be required;
12. Requests that the initial annual profile of rural development funds of guarantee origin be restored;
PE 372.062v 118/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT 13. Rejects the possibility available to the Member States of transferring up to 20 % in supplementary modulation to rural development programmes as this constitutes a first step towards renationalising the CAP and causes unacceptable harm to the Community market; considers further that this supplementary modulation endangers the proper financing of the first pillar and the continuing economic viability of many agricultural holdings;
14. Emphasises that in any event the option available to Member States to transfer up to a maximum of 20 % of the amounts they receive for market expenditure and direct payments for financing rural development programmes is technically impossible since market expenditure is not allocated in national envelopes and is by definition fluctuating;
15. Regrets that the voluntary modulation of 20 % proposed by the Council to fund rural development would not be required to meet the same rules in terms of national cofinancing or to respect the minimum spending axis set out in Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the European Agriculture Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) for rural development;
16. Considers that including the costs of implementing the CAP in Bulgaria and Romania (EUR 8 billion) in the envelope for income support and agricultural market support intended for 25 Member States and the application of supplementary modulation will lead to a very noticeable reduction in direct aid, raising concerns of a very early application of financial discipline and, as a result, insecurity for farmers;
17. Is concerned that the Commission's proposal on the Financial Perspectives 2007-2013 does not contain the appropriations needed to cover direct payments in new Member States as set out in Annex VIIIa of Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003; calls on the Commission and the Council to fulfil the Copenhagen Agreement and their financial obligations towards the new Member States;
18. Calls on the Commission to explain how the financial discipline appropriate to the CAP as defined in Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 should link up with the implementing provisions for the new financial framework as laid down in this interinstitutional agreement.
MT 119 Error! Unknown document property name. PROĊEDURA
Titolu Il-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja u l- immaniġġjar finanzjarju sod Numru tal-proċedura 2004/2099(ACI) Kumitat responsabbli BUDG Kumitat(i) mitlub(a) jagħti/u opinjoni AGRI Data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja 27.10.2005 Koperazzjoni iktar mill-qrib – Data tat- -- tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja Rapporteur Bernadette Bourzai Data tal-ħatra 5.10.2004 'Rapporteur' ta' opinjoni preċedenti -- Eżami fil-kumitat 25.1.2006 21.2.2006 Data ta' l-adozzjoni 21.2.2006 Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali +: 35 –: 1 0: -- Membri preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali Marie-Hélène Aubert, Peter Baco, Katerina Batzeli, Thijs Berman, Niels Busk, Luis Manuel Capoulas Santos, Giuseppe Castiglione, Joseph Daul, Albert Deß, Michl Ebner, Carmen Fraga Estévez, Duarte Freitas, Jean-Claude Fruteau, Ioannis Gklavakis, Lutz Goepel, Friedrich-Wilhelm Graefe zu Baringdorf, María Esther Herranz García, Elisabeth Jeggle, Heinz Kindermann, Stéphane Le Foll, Albert Jan Maat, Diamanto Manolakou, Rosa Miguélez Ramos, Neil Parish, María Isabel Salinas García, Agnes Schierhuber, Willem Schuth, Czesław Adam Siekierski, Marc Tarabella, Jeffrey Titford, Kyösti Virrankoski, Janusz Wojciechowski, Andrzej Tomasz Zapałowski Sostitut(i) preżenti għall-votazzjoni Bernadette Bourzai, Markus Pieper, Zdzisław Zbigniew Podkański finali Sostituti(i) (skond l-Artikolu 178(2)) -- preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali Kummenti (informazzjoni disponibbli -- b'lingwa waħda biss)
PE 372.062v 120/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT 19.4.2006
OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GĦAS-SAJD for the Committee on Budgets on the Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and sound financial management (2004/2099(ACI))
Draftswoman: Rosa Miguélez Ramos
SUGGESTIONS
The Committee on Fisheries calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:
1. Deplores the fact that the projected resources decided upon by the European Council in December 2005 are insufficient to meet the needs of the fisheries sector at a time of continued crisis in the fishing industry, characterised by smaller catches, lower income and increased costs, particularly for fuel;
2. Stresses that the allocation earmarked for the European Fisheries Fund (EFF) by the European Council in its December 2005 agreement is clearly insufficient to carry out the Community's fisheries structural policy, since it represents a 22% cut by comparison with the figures approved in the European Parliament's resolution of 8 June 2005 on Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the enlarged Union 2007-20131;
3. Shares the Commission's deep concern at the lack of resources for regions outside the 'Convergence' objective, most of which are seriously affected by the general crisis in the fishing industry;
4. Demands that the credits concerned be reinstated at the level proposed by Parliament in its abovementioned resolution of 8 June 2005;
5. Rejects any further suggestion that credits for the EFF should be restored at the cost of the second instrument; demands that Member States whose territory includes regions eligible under the different objectives (convergence and non-convergence) should be given greater flexibility in the management of their EFF envelope, by allowing them to
1 Texts adopted, P6_TA(2005)0224.
MT 121 Error! Unknown document property name. transfer appropriations, within a limit of 5% of the total budget for the Member State concerned, between their convergence and non-convergence regions, so as to permit EFF resources to be targeted at those areas most in need of support;
6. Expresses its concern, moreover, at the lack of resources planned for the second instrument and insists that adequate funding be available in order to implement in full all the non-structural elements of the CFP, such as conservation, control, governance and international aspects;
7. Notes that some of the Council's conclusions on the financial perspectives relate to the rules and mechanisms for delivering assistance under the Structural Funds and are subject to co-decision or the assent of the European Parliament; demands, for the sake of ensuring consistency and coherence between the Funds, that any changes finally agreed between Parliament and Council be also applied to the EFF;
8. Calls, in particular, for the elimination of any double standards both between Member States and between the Funds with regard to the Community contribution;
PE 372.062v 122/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT PROĊEDURA
Titolu Il-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja u l- immaniġġjar finanzjarju sod Numru tal-proċedura 2004/2099(ACI) Kumitat responsabbli BUDG Kumitat(i) mitlub(a) jagħti/u opinjoni PECH Data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja 27.10.2005 Koperazzjoni iktar mill-qrib – Data tat- tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja Rapporteur Rosa Miguélez Ramos Data tal-ħatra 15.2.2006 'Rapporteur' ta' opinjoni preċedenti Eżami fil-kumitat 22.2.2006 21.3.2006 Data ta' l-adozzjoni 19.4.2006 Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali + Unanimament :
Membri preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali James Hugh Allister, Stavros Arnaoutakis, Elspeth Attwooll, Marie- Hélène Aubert, Iles Braghetto, Luis Manuel Capoulas Santos, Carlos Carnero González, David Casa, Paulo Casaca, Zdzisław Kazimierz Chmielewski, Carmen Fraga Estévez, Ioannis Gklavakis, Alfred Gomolka, Ian Hudghton, Heinz Kindermann, Henrik Dam Kristensen, Albert Jan Maat, Willy Meyer Pleite, Rosa Miguélez Ramos, Philippe Morillon, Seán Ó Neachtain, Bernard Poignant, Struan Stevenson, Margie Sudre Sostitut(i) preżenti għall-votazzjoni Chris Davies, Duarte Freitas finali Sostituti(i) (skond l-Artikolu 178(2)) Carlos Carnero González, Salvador Garriga Polledo, Eugenijus preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali Gentvilas Kummenti (informazzjoni disponibbli ... b'lingwa waħda biss)
MT 123 Error! Unknown document property name. 21.3.2006
OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GĦALL-KULTURA U L-EDUKAZZJONI
for the Committee on Budgets
on the Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and sound financial management (2004/2099(ACI))
Draftswoman: Ruth Hieronymi
SUGGESTIONS
The Committee on Culture and Education calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:
1. Recalls the importance of promoting active EU policies in the fields of education, training, media, youth, culture and active citizenship to the creation of a stronger political identity for the Union and as a clear added value of the Union for its citizens;
2. Recalls the importance of these policies to fulfilling the goals of the Lisbon strategy and the related social, economic and key political challenges to be faced in the coming years; stresses that the next financial perspective must state adquate means for tackling these challenges;
3. Stresses the importance of agreeing expenditure ceilings in line with the priorities and programme structures defined during the co-decision procedures for the programmes Lifelong Learning, Media, Youth and Culture, which have already reached an advanced stage; asserts that such progress is undermined by budget cuts, which pose serious risks to the effectiveness, role, operation and implementation of the programmes;
4. Welcomes the Commission's proposal to increase the leverage effect of EU funds by improving synergies between the EU budget and the European Investment Bank; emphasises the link between education and training projects and research funding as well as the need to achieve financial synergies extending to educational, cultural, audiovisual, institutional and territorially integrated systems facilitating research and innovation activities;
5. Recalls the significant increases agreed by Parliament and Council for several budget lines in the 2006 budget relating to education, training and youth;
PE 372.062v 124/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT 6. Notes the immediate absorption and the very high execution rate of EU funding in the areas of education, media, youth, culture (such areas presenting "real value for money");
Heading 1a
7. Emphasises that, under the proposal made by the European Council of 15 and 16 December 2005, spending on Lifelong Learning (under heading 1a) would be restored to 2006 levels only in 2009;
8. Notes that the impact on the Erasmus programme will imply a reduction in student mobility grants from 170 000 in 2006 to 140 000 annually for the coming years, and the loss of a number of important measures such as grants for non-teaching staff, long-term teacher mobility and special mobility for joint masters;
9. Notes that the number of beneficiaries of the Leonardo programme will drop from 50 000 in 2006 to 36 000 annually for the coming years and that within the Comenius programme the number of beneficiary pupils involved in partnerships will decrease from the target of 4 million to 2 million; stresses also that a number of measures targeting adult learners (Grundtvig) and supporting multilingualism will be discontinued;
Heading 3b
10. Recalls that, while the partial political agreement reached with the Council after Parliament's first reading of the proposal in the Youth in Action programme shows that the institutions are on the way to reaching an important agreement ensuring the programme an effective structure and effective operation, the envelope proposed by the Council for heading 3b would imply a reduction in youth exchanges and projects of 22%;
11. Stresses that the important step of reaching a partial political agreement with the Council on the proposal for the Media programme should not be undermined by reduced funding for the programme; asserts that this would undermine the programme's strategic contribution - via its digitisation processes - to the strengthening of the audiovisual sector and the information society, as well as its smooth operation at a time when its success is steadily growing and being recognised by stakeholders; emphasises that a reduction in funding would mean less overall investment in the European audiovisual industry, in particular in new and future Member States and in countries with limited audiovisual production capacity; recalls that nine out ten European films distributed outside their country of production received support from the Media programme and the fact that requests for support from Media have increased by 120% in the last five years;
12. Stresses that, while the partial political agreement reached with the Council after Parliament's first reading of the proposal in the Culture 2007 programme is an adequate starting point for an EU policy capable of responding to the needs of different social and economic sectors, which are at the core of European identity, richness and diversity, the budget proposal of the Council would mean a decrease in the number of projects supported by Culture 2007 from 148 to 100;
13. Stresses the importance of the programme Citizens for Europe, which is aimed not only at fostering various activities at the level of civil society, involving citizens, associations and local authorities, but also at supporting memorials to victims of totalitarian regimes of the past century, an essential contribution to keeping alive the memory of the tragedies
MT 125 Error! Unknown document property name. which inspired European integration as a project of peace and stability; stresses that the Council's proposal might reduce the level of support to only 800 of the planned 1.300 town twinning projects;
14. Stresses the importance of defining, in a transparent way, adequate margins within heading 3b for innovative actions.
PE 372.062v 126/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
The negotiations on the renewed Inter-institutional Agreement on budgetary discipline are under going. These should offer the European Parliament the opportunity to reaffirm its prerogatives as the budgetary authority and as one of the co-legislating institutions.
The Culture Committee has already taken a firm position through its opinion1.
The Council on 15-16 December 2005 found an agreement on ceilings for expenditure, which differ consistently with the position taken by the European Parliament with its resolution2. The co-decision procedure on Lifelong Learning, Media, Youth in Action, Culture and Citizens for Europe programmes is therefore now at stake.
In this respect, it is crucial to call upon the Council to explain to citizens the consequences of its choices on budgetary priorities for the years to come.
1 PE 350226, 1.2.2005 2 PE 368.274, B6-0049/2006
MT 127 Error! Unknown document property name. PROĊEDURA
Titolu Il-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja u l- immaniġġjar finanzjarju sod Numru tal-proċedura 2006/0036(ACI) Kumitat responsabbli BUDG Kumitat(i) mitlub(a) jagħti/u opinjoni CULT Data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja 27.10.2006 Koperazzjoni iktar mill-qrib – Data tat- tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja Rapporteur Ruth Hieronymi Data tal-ħatra 23.1.2006 'Rapporteur' ta' opinjoni preċedenti Eżami fil-kumitat 23.2.2006 Data ta' l-adozzjoni 21.3.2006 Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali +: 26 –: 1 0: 0 Membri preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali Maria Badia I Cutchet,Christopher Beazley, Ivo Belet, Giovanni Berlinguer, Guy Bono, Marie-Hélène Descamps, Claire Gibault, Vasco Graça Moura, Lissy Gröner, Luis Herrero-Tejedor, Ruth Hieronymi, Manolis Mavrommatis, Marianne Mikko, Ljudmila Podkański Christa Prets, Karin Resetarits, Nikolaos Sifunakis, Hannu Takkula, Helga Trüpel, Henri Weber, Thomas Wise Sostitut(i) preżenti għall-votazzjoni Gyula Hegyi, Mario Mauro, Jaroslav Zvěřina finali Sostituti(i) (skond l-Artikolu 178(2)) preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali Kummenti (informazzjoni disponibbli ... b'lingwa waħda biss)
PE 372.062v 128/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT 24.2.2006
OPINJONI TAL-KUMITAT GĦAL-LIBERTAJIET ĊIVILI, IL-ĠUSTIZZJA U L- INTERN
Tal-Kumitat għall-Baġits on the Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and sound financial management (2004/2099(ACI))
Draftsman: Gérard Deprez
SUGGESTIONS
The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:
Financial framework 2007 to 2013
1. Stresses that no further additional tasks, foreseen or unforeseen, can be financed from subheading 3A 'Freedom, Security and Justice'; emphasises that, for any additional tasks, an increase in appropriations or, where appropriate, use of flexibility reserves must be considered;
2. Proposes to examine whether certain existing reserves might be removed from the table of the financial framework, for example the reserve for emergency measures in the event of a mass influx of refugees (budget line 18 03 04), which has so far never been used;
Structure of the new multiannual financial framework and agencies
3. Welcomes the Member States' support for the creation of a specific, autonomous sub- heading under heading 3 of the financial perspective for the area of freedom, security and justice, as requested by Parliament1;
4. Supports the request to create binding ceilings for the agencies outside the table of the financial framework; requests, however, that the ceiling take account, firstly, of the fact
1 at point 36 of its resolution of 8 June 2005 on Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the enlarged Union 2007-2013 (Texts Adopted, P6_TA(2005)0224).
MT 129 Error! Unknown document property name. that certain agencies are new and must be allowed to grow, secondly, that there might be objective needs for the creation of new agencies, thirdly, Parliament's request, which was included in the Constitutional text, to finance Europol from the EU budget;
5. Proposes the launch of an independent and objective assessment of the European added value of all agencies; is of the opinion that agencies passing this assessment and which fulfil an essential task for the EU for which they have the political support of Parliament should also receive the necessary financial resources from Parliament; proposes to invite the agencies to communicate to Parliament their medium-term strategy for the period up to 2013, together with a financial statement;
Ftehima interistituzzjonali dwar id-dixxiplina tal-baġit u t-titjib tal-proċedura tal-baġit
6. Calls on the Commission to present, in the documents accompanying the PDB, specific justifications for the expenditure related to the area of freedom, security and justice; proposes that Parliament and Council should, in a trialogue before Council's first reading, find agreement on the actions and their financing for the following year, or, in the absence of agreement, that a second trialogue be organised before Council's second reading;
7. Proposes the removal from the text of the interinstitutional agreement of the commitment to 'avoid entering items in the budget carrying insignificant amounts of expenditure on operations', because, for political reasons, the institutions often choose to do so;
8. Objects to the Commission's proposal that both arms of the budgetary authority should inform the Commission by mid-June of their intentions as regards pilot projects and preparatory actions because Parliament, as one arm of the budgetary authority, can only decide its position once the deadline for budget amendments has passed;
9. Insists on the inclusion of a binding review clause with a clearly defined role for the European Parliament in order to be able to deal with the new political environment that might arise once a new Commission and Parliament are in place; considers the Commission's current proposal on the review to be insufficient;
10. Strongly supports the calls to request certification of the accounts from Member States;
Transitory measures
11. Doubts that all financial programmes will be adopted and ready for implementation by 1 January 2007; requests the Commission to prepare transitory measures which might include the provisional extension of current programmes.
PE 372.062v 130/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT PROĊEDURA
Titolu Il-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja u l- immaniġġjar finanzjarju sod Numru tal-proċedura 2004/2099(ACI) Kumitat responsabbli BUDG Kumitat mitlub jagħti opinjoni LIBE 27.10.2005 Data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja Koperazzjoni iktar mill-qrib Rapporteur għal opinjoni: Gérard Deprez Data tal-ħatra 25.10.2004 Eżami fil-kumitat 19.1.2005 Data ta' meta ġew adottati s- 22.2.2006 suġġerimenti Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali favur: 47 kontra: 0 astensjonijiet: 0 Membri preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali Alexander Nuno Alvaro, Roberta Angelilli, Edit Bauer, Mihael Brejc, Kathalijne Maria Buitenweg, Michael Cashman, Giusto Catania, Jean- Marie Cavada, Charlotte Cederschiöld, Carlos Coelho, Fausto Correia, Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra, Rosa Díez González, Antoine Duquesne, Kinga Gál, Patrick Gaubert, Elly de Groen-Kouwenhoven, Lilli Gruber, Adeline Hazan, Lívia Járóka, Timothy Kirkhope, Ewa Klamt, Barbara Kudrycka, Stavros Lambrinidis, Romano Maria La Russa, Henrik Lax, Sarah Ludford, Jaime Mayor Oreja, Claude Moraes, Hartmut Nassauer, Martine Roure, Inger Segelström, Ioannis Varvitsiotis, Manfred Weber, Stefano Zappalà, Tatjana Ždanoka Sostitut(i) preżenti għall-votazzjoni Panayiotis Demetriou, Gérard Deprez, Camiel Eurlings, Evelyne finali Gebhardt, Ignasi Guardans Cambó, Sophia in 't Veld, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Bill Newton Dunn, Herbert Reul, Marie-Line Reynaud, Kyriacos Triantaphyllides Sostituti(i) (skond l-Artikolu 178(2)) Emine Bozkurt preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali
MT 131 Error! Unknown document property name. PROĊEDURA
Titolu Il-Ftehima Interistituzzjonali dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja u l- immaniġġjar finanzjarju sod Numru tal-proċedura 2004/2099(ACI) Kumitat responsabbli BUDG Data tat-tħabbir fis-seduta plenarja 27.10.2005 Rapporteur(s) Reimer Böge 20.9.2004 Data tal-ħatra Rapporteur(s) preċedenti Eżami fil-kumitat 24.4.2006 Data ta' l-adozzjoni 24.4.2006 Riżultat tal-votazzjoni finali + 21 - 3 0 Membri preżenti għall-votazzjoni finali Reimer Böge, Simon Busuttil, Paulo Casaca, Gérard Deprez, Valdis Dombrovskis, Brigitte Douay, Salvador Garriga Polledo, Neena Gill, Catherine Guy-Quint, Silvana Koch-Mehrin, Janusz Lewandowski, Vladimír Maňka, Mario Mauro, Jan Mulder, Gérard Onesta, Wojciech Roszkowski, Nina Škottová, László Surján, Ralf Walter Sostitut(i) preżenti għall-votazzjoni Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg, Hans-Peter Martin, José Albino finali Silva Peneda, Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Peter Šťastný
Data tat-tressiq 27.4.2006 Kummenti (informazzjoni disponibbli ... b'lingwa waħda biss)
PE 372.062v 132/132 RR\613398MT.doc MT