Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces and Its

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JOINT DOCTRINE OF INDIAN ARMED FORCES AND ITS HINDUTVA INTERLACE (An Analysis of Hindutva-inspired Notions and Strategies of the JDIAF and Repercussions for Regional Security)

Shakaib Rafique*

Abstract Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces, unveiled in 2017, is the all-encompassing strategic design that outlines the core philosophy, concepts, principles, and ideals that are being pursued by the Indian Armed Forces for the attainment of India’s strategic objectives. This paper employs a constructivist theoretical approach to assess the Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces’ connection with Hindutva beliefs and ideals as well as its reflection of India’s incumbent government’s strategic objectives of Hindu revivalism and expansionist ambitions, while formally shedding off its decades-old garb of so-called secularism. Through the analysis of Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces’ core ideas and concepts, this paper examines the Indian Armed Forces’ institutional choice of this doctrine to pursue Hindutva ideals coupled with its likely implications in terms of regional instability and insecurity.

Keywords: Communalism, Credible Deterrence, Hindutva, False Flag Operations, Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces.

Introduction nder the leadership of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has undergone U an unprecedented transformation. While India’s decades-old façade of secularism has been demolished, the country is set on becoming a ‘Hindu Rashtra’ in its true essence.1 Hindu communalism has been a legacy of both the Indian National Congress (INC)2 and Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) for long. The manner in which it has been actively pursued by the latter through venomous intrusion into every state organ of India including inter alia, judiciary3 and armed forces4, is unprecedented in character.5 The influence of Hindutva6 and communal tendencies in the Indian Armed Forces is not a new phenomenon.7 However, recently, these aspects have taken a more institutional shape. The most recent attempt, in this regard, has been the Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces (JDIAF) – 2017.

*Shakaib Rafique is a Pakistani Diplomat and a PhD Scholar at the National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest, Romania.

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This paper, therefore, assesses various elements of JDIAF by tracing their linkages with different Hindutva ideational inspirations. Through a constructivist approach, the paper evaluates how the Hindutva-inspired ideals, perceptions, and beliefs guide JDIAF and the manner in which this doctrine epitomizes India’s aggressive posturing towards the region and beyond, based on the social construction of its adversaries as well as Hindutva-inspired parameters of exclusion, self-victimization, and external scapegoating.

Constructivist Approach towards the Understanding of Army Doctrine Before delving deeper into JDIAF, it would be useful to assess ‘Army Doctrine’ per se. In the words of John Spencer, an Army Doctrine is intended to connote the “fundamental principles by which military forces or elements, thereof, guide their actions in support of national objectives.”8 He adds that an Army Doctrine represents “a body of thought on how Armed Forces intend to operate as part of a joint force and a statement of how the Army intends to fight.”9

Normally, for the Armed Forces being hidebound bureaucratic organizations, changing a Military or Army Doctrine is not a commonplace phenomenon.10 It becomes, especially, uncharacteristic when an Army Doctrine gets changed during peacetime.11 An Army Doctrine acts as a response to national strategy. Accordingly, when the strategic objectives of a country change, the Army Doctrine also changes.12 It is normally argued that a doctrinal change occurs when it is determined that military power as a means for a specific strategy must reorient itself to achieve the new objectives. 13 An Army Doctrine, therefore, represents “an institutional choice between competitive ideas.”14

The important motivating factors for an Army Doctrine are the ideals, beliefs, and perceptions shaping a country’s strategic objectives. Therefore, for comprehending the logic behind the development or change of an Army Doctrine, it is pivotal to comprehend the ideas and beliefs at the political level that lead to such change or development. As an Army Doctrine aims to create peculiar character traits in the members of a military organization,15 understanding its constitutive political ideals and beliefs becomes crucial. In essence, every army doctrine constructs and conceptualizes its adversaries (others) or allies (a manifestation of self) based on its embedded political views, beliefs, and ideals.

It is owing to the above aspects that the constructivist theoretical approach appears most suitable for deciphering an Army Doctrine. This approach concerns itself with the meanings given to actions by the actors as well as the pattern and framework of their mutual interaction.16 As per constructivists, ideational factors influence the perceptions of policymakers.17 By interpreting these ideals and belief-system, one can comprehend the logic under which an Army Doctrine operates and the strategic objectives it strives to achieve. In the following lines, the same approach is applied to decode the ideological orientation of JDIAF. While doing so, the main question, this

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paper addresses, remains how Hindutva ideology and ideals are embedded in the JDIAF and what possible implications could this have for regional security.

Theorizing the Concept of Hindutva At this stage, it is also important to theorize the concept of Hindutva itself. Hindutva is a political project whose proponents aim at turning India into a Hindu nation without any ethical considerations.18 Hindutva is employed as a synonym to cultural nationalism in India19 and heavily influenced by the ideology of primordialism, Nazism, Fascism, and exclusive ethnic nationalism.20 Protagonists of Hindutva employ it as the foundation of Hindu identity21 and base it on the notions of political sociology coupled with xenophobic racism.22

Hindutva is closely associated with the notion of populism and ontological insecurity. Populism, viewed as a binary doctrine,23 constructs a certain segment of a larger community as the people who constitute the only legitimate totality24 in that community. As for ontological insecurity, it emerges when the identity of those ‘pure people’ is under question.25 For removing this insecurity, the tendency is to securitize these people by creating a stable identity.26 For Hindutva, the Hindu nation forms the ‘pure people’, who have the legitimate right to occupy India. For Hindutva-inspired Indian foreign and security policies under Modi government, Hinduism becomes coextensive with India’s territory27 and for responding to the external threats; uniform Hindu identity is accordingly considered to be the panacea.28 As Hindutva considers Hindu identity to be the only possible stable identity for addressing India’s ontological insecurity, this feature has penetrated India’s foreign and security policies and doctrines, such as JDIAF.

Conceptualizing the Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces (JDIAF) JDIAF traces its conceptual origin from the US Doctrine of Armed Forces.29 It serves as the bedrock for synergized functioning of the three services of Indian Armed Forces,30 and is based on a continental view of threats approach,31 addressing a full spectrum of military conflict situation ranging from nuclear to counterinsurgency dynamics of possible conflictual situations.32 Under its continental view of threat approach,33 JDIAF essentially focuses on China and Pakistan.34 JDIAF also graduates from defensive to offensive approach and presumes India’s greater global role. Accordingly, JDIAF envisions an expeditionary overseas operational approach35 for the Indian Armed Forces. Indian analysts argue that through the above-mentioned doctrine, the conflicts would be determined through coercive diplomacy as well as punitive disruption and destruction.36 This provides further credence to claims of India’s expansionary ambitions.

JDIAF relies on different Hindutva-inspired ideological principles for identifying the national values of India. This contradicts India’s secular sloganeering and nullifies its claims of maintaining apolitical armed forces.37 JDIAF envisions a

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conducive external security environment38 and aims at safeguarding India’s existing and emerging strategic, political, economic, and military goals 39 in consonance with the country’s national aim, enunciated as one of India’s key national interests.40 This circuitous formulation implies active intervention abroad by the Indian Armed Forces in order to fulfill India’s global ambitions. JDIAF has also expanded the threshold of Indian national security objectives by openly vouching for the militarization of space and intensifying the nuclear arms race in the region by graduating from credible minimum deterrence to credible deterrence.41 It has indicated that in the future, India is likely to fulfill its global ambitions through a coercive military instrument.42

Hindutva Roots of JDIAF JDIAF is a poorly worded document, based on certain plagiarized notions and concepts.43 In order to Indianize JDIAF, its authors have relied heavily on Hindutva philosophy and religious interpretations. Its concepts and war strategies are largely based on Hindutva fanatic ideals, thus, reflecting the standard operating procedures for a Hindutva-inspired Army. An interesting feature of JDIAF is that its various warfare strategies and doctrinal philosophies are imported from ‘Arthshastra’ by Kautilya, mentor of the founder of Mauryan Empire, Chandragupta Maurya (322–293 BCE).44 It may be highlighted that modern-day Hindutva stalwarts eulogize Kautilya and want his tenets to be incorporated into the Hindutva model of governance called ‘RamRajya’.45

The core theme of JDIAF is founded on self-aggrandizement and essentially targets Pakistan and China. These features are typical of the Hindutva mindset, which proffers animosity with the neighbors. As evidence, one may resort to Kautilya’s Arthshastra, where Kutayuddha (devious warfare) is the preferred form of warfare for self-aggrandizement, while neighbors are always assumed to be hostile. 46 A manifestation of this devious warfare can be traced to India’s False Flag Operation in Pulwama in February 2019,47 which was used as justification by India to attempt intrusion into Pakistani territory (Balakot) as part of its grand hegemonic designs, only to be foiled by Pakistan’s counter-response in the form of Operation Swift Retort.48

The very first element of JDIAF which strikes the reader is the ‘Code of Warrior’ drawn from ‘Bhagwad Gita’, a prominent Hindu scripture. Bhagwad Gita is based on a dialogue prior to Kruskshetra War that Arjuna, a heroic character in Mahabharata (a Sanskrit epic of ancient India), had with his charioteer Krishna. Interestingly, the renowned Hindutva protagonist and granddaddy of Hindutvavadis,49 Bal Gangadhar Tilak had invoked Bhagwad Gita to call Hindus to arms50 against the British and Muslims.51 Use of Bhagwad Gita under JDIAF, therefore, reflects JDIAF’s Hindutva tilt. The manner in which Bhagwad Gita is taken to infuse the warrior spirit within the Indian Armed Forces is another indication of the Hindutva inspiration that JDIAF intends to instill into its soldiers.

In its first section, JDIAF defines several core strategic concepts and their interpretations. Under this portion, for instance, JDIAF identifies what constitutes national values.52 Ironically, despite being a so-called secular country, JDIAF defines national values as “enduring beliefs reflected in the ideals of (Indian) society”. It further

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argues that these national values are based on religious, moral, and ideological principles of India.53 Under a Hindutva-inspired government and army, incorporation of religious and ideological principles clearly carries Hindutva-inspired connotations.

Under the section on “National Aim”, JDIAF envisions conducive external and internal security environments for unhindered and so-called inclusive socio-economic development of India.54 To begin with, usage of the phrase “creation of conducive external security environment” is a broad concept including the essence of violence and aggression against presumed adversaries for its prevalence. It is, incidentally, considered a higher law by Hindutva stalwart Bal Gangadhar Tilak. Although, certain Indian scholars, such as Abhijnan Rej and Shashank Joshi attempt to suggest that JDIAF is guided by so-called strategic restraint due to its excessive use of the notion of deterrence, this argument appears self-defeating as JDIAF identifies conflicts as politically determined (implying Hindutva inspired) resulting in the likelihood of escalation initiated by India for creating a conducive external environment that addresses India’s ontological security concerns.55

JDIAF has brought a paradigm shift in Indian nuclear doctrine by graduating it from credible minimum deterrence to credible deterrence.56 The hint at revising India’s nuclear policy was given during the Indian General Elections campaign-2014 by BJP.57 Thus far, India’s so-called “No First-use Policy” and “Credible Minimum Deterrence” had been the two crucial elements of its nuclear doctrine. While India’s no-first-use policy is essentially a hoax,58 the prospects of India doing away with credible minimum deterrence have also remained under discussion for quite some time now.59 JDIAF has finally clarified India’s real intentions on this account and reflected India’s aggressive posturing in the region. India’s National Security Advisor and well-known Hindutva fundamentalist Ajit Doval60 had once underlined the need for India to turn into a “Hard Power”.61 This desire is now well reflected in the change of India’s nuclear doctrine through a shift to the notion of credible deterrence. This shift reflects Modi’s pursuit of a muscular security policy that finds its ideological roots in Hindutva.62

Another distinguishing feature of India’s Joint Doctrine is the summarization of one of the core values of the country’s constitution as “to safeguard India’s existing and emerging strategic, political, economic, and military goals in consonance with the national aim.”63 This concept implies that for safeguarding India’s emerging strategic, political, economic, and military goals, the Indian Army can be deployed aggressively against any other country. One can compare this element with Kautilya’s prominent tenet that “a wise ruler should observe that form of policy which enables him to work for the progress of his state and at the same time, to harass similar aims of his enemy.”64

As for the characterization of the Indian Armed Forces, JDIAF has termed them as being coercive in nature.65 This aspect is a pure reflection of Kautilya’s forms of state policy.66 If it is compared with Kautilya’s philosophy, some striking similarities can be traced. For instance, as per Kautilya, the policy of Vigraha (war) should be pursued, if one is stronger than one’s enemy.67 According to Kautilya, the policy of Yana (marching) may be pursued, if one is strong as compared to one’s adversary. This hints at the

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likelihood that India would pursue aggressive military options against its perceived weaker neighbors in the coming years.

JDIAF expresses concern over the presence and role of external powers in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).68 This reflects Hindutva’s vision of ‘Akhand Bharat’, where the Indian Ocean is envisioned to be a reference point for a greater Indian Union in the future.69 Another manifestation of this vision is the renewed conceptualization of India’s external security paradigm in JDIAF, where the security of Indian diaspora, resources, and establishments abroad has been taken to be of interest to the Indian Armed Forces. Even Indian diaspora, spread across the littoral states of the IOR, is taken as the raison d'être for Indian interference in the IOR. This signifies that India could be positioning itself to launch aggressive wars against any country in the region in the name of its so-called concerns regarding the security of diaspora.70

JDIAF has defined external threats and challenges in a manner that is typical of the Hindutva psyche of internalization, repression, and external scapegoating.71 It may be noted that Hindutva psyche originates the element of a perceived aggressor being located outside the boundaries of India. Against this perceived aggressor, the notion of “use of violence” is employed. As a result, conflict and violence are considered pivotal for the growth of Hindu civilization.72 One can deduct from the thematic orientation of JDIAF that for external scapegoating, India has employed it to China and Pakistan. Furthermore, the use of violence emerges as a normal strategy for India against these two countries.

JDIAF has enunciated several operations during conventional warfare. Surprisingly, aggression lies at the core of these identified operations. While the offensive operations, aimed at seizing the initiative from the enemy,73 are one type of operation premised on aggression, the ‘offensive defense’ (as enunciated by Ajit Doval74) is indeed camouflaged under the notion of pro-active defense75 despite being another aggressive operational tactic. This embedded feature of aggression traces its roots from Kautilya’s treatise, where peace is only considered an option for the weak and offense (or aggression) is the preferred military option.76

Another striking feature of the Indian Joint Doctrine is the enunciation of its “Low-intensity Conflict” operations under the category of sub-conventional warfare.77 JDIAF has reflected the so-called ‘Counter Proxy War’78 under this category. While the term ‘counter’ reflects the Hindutva psyche of victimhood played through external scapegoating, the idea implies the use of raids (including through spies, etc.) for creating unrest in neighboring countries. The use of terms “intelligence” and “assets” as tools for doing so are self-explanatory on this account. This technique is close to Kautilya’s categorization of “Sreni” (trained mercenaries), Mitra (troops loaned for a campaign by an ally), and Gudapurusha (secret service), which are to be used in low- intensity conflicts against the enemy.79 Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval’s double-squeeze doctrine, which involves the “use of terrorism and support for terrorist groups, such as Daesh and TTP, etc.”,80 are now officially accommodated in the Hindutva-inspired JDIAF. His doctrine also gives no value to moral principles, which is in line with Kautilya’s philosophy that keeps national interests above moral values.

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In its concepts of military power application, JDIAF alludes to the exploitation of space for military purposes. It may be highlighted that the Outer Space Treaty (1967), to which India is a Party, prohibits weaponization of outer space, moon, and other celestial bodies.81 However, India violates its treaty obligations under Hindutva-inspired JDIAF. The clue of this aspect can again be taken from Kautilya’s philosophy. As per Kautilya, in terms of fulfilling treaty obligations, one should drag one’s feet to delay it while waiting for an opportunity to overthrow the enemy.82 This implies that in pursuing the cause of overpowering the enemy, India would continue to violate or drag its feet in terms of the Outer Space Treaty obligations through the weaponization of outer space.

Implications of JDIAF for the Regional Stability Fomenting Instability in Pakistan With the unveiling of JDIAF and the expanse of its operations and functions, the likelihood of India mending its relations with Pakistan appears a bleaker proposition. The history of Pakistan-India relations is already replete with India’s repeated aggressive posturing coupled with the support of insurgence and terrorist activities against Pakistan. After JDIAF, these elements are likely to be more intensely employed by India to foment instability in Pakistan, especially, by using Afghanistan’s soil. India also attempts to scuttle peace efforts in Afghanistan that assign Pakistan a prominent role in the region.

In terms of devious warfare, India’s False Flag Operation in Pulwama (February 2019) manifests as to how India is likely to continue attempting intrusion into Pakistan on baseless grounds and with the ultimate objective of attempting to establish its regional hegemony. Pakistan’s mature and effective response in the form of ‘Operation Swift Retort’ at the same time manifests as to how a counter-hegemonic State’s reaction challenges the traditional concepts of the security dilemma. It may be stated at this stage that the essential premise of JDIAF is ideational in character; India is unlikely to get deterred from continuing to attempt such misadventures at least in the foreseeable future. Any permanent change in such misadventures would require a paradigm shift in which India perceives itself as a State. Unfortunately, owing to its artificial construct as a State, India has always socially constructed its “self” in contradistinction to “others”, i.e., India’s so-called ontological security complex is denial-based and for such States, ending a conflictual situation is not essentially an aim.83 Therefore, India would likely continue with this approach of fomenting regional instability as a means towards justifying its existence.

Embattled Relations with China While India is unlikely to pursue any open military adventurism against China, owing to its economic and defense weaknesses vis-à-vis China, it would strengthen its alliance with anti-China global actors and attempt to portray and present itself as a counterweight of China. India is likely to partner with China’s adversaries in and beyond the region in an attempt to contain China’s expanding regional and global

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influence. India may also use propaganda and other means of hybrid warfare, such as social media, etc., to demonize the image of China worldwide. In the coming years, India may continue to get politically entangled with China in other neighboring countries, while at the same time attempt to keep fueling troubles in Tibet. The recent stand-off between India and China in the Ladakh region as a result of India’s provocations and attempts to change the status quo in that area, in violation of bilateral agreements between the two countries, can be easily interpreted in light of India’s Hindutva-inspired JDIAF techniques of devious warfare.

Implications for Stability in Indian Ocean Region JDIAF could have serious implications for security and stability in the entire IOR. India’s pronouncements of SAGAR Strategy-2015 84 and Maritime Capabilities Perspectives Plan, whereby, Indian Navy intends to have a 200-ship fleet by the year 2027,85 could be seen from the same perspective. JDIAF’s pronouncements that Indian Navy is mandated to “ensure the use of the seas for India’s legitimate sovereign purposes, whilst concurrently guarding against inimical use of the sea by others”86 indicates that India aspires to dominate the entire IOR and considers the use of it by any other as hostile. This reflects that India may not be deterred from attempting to undertake disruptive activities in the Indian Ocean for establishing its hegemony. This could have serious implications for global trade and Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC).

Nuclear Arms Race With the introduction of the concept of ‘credible deterrence’ rather than ‘credible minimum deterrence’, India has already flamed up a nuclear arms race in the region. In specific, for countries, such as Pakistan and China, this is a warning signal and they will be constrained to gear themselves up against any such emerging nuclear threats from India.

Marginalization of Religious and Ethnic Minorities in Indian Armed Forces JDIAF’s Hindutva-based orientation, ideals, and philosophy manifest that religious and ethnic minorities of India have no role to play in terms of JDIAF’s conceptualization of the Indian Armed Forces, which has transmuted into a Hindutva inspired military force. This aspect of continued marginalization of minorities, especially, from the Indian Armed Forces, is likely to cause their estrangement and fuel domestic unrest within India. The comments by Indian Chief of Defence, General Bipin Rawat, on the demonstrations following the passage of the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act-2019 (CAA)87 reflect how Hindutva-inspired Indian military leadership is taking sides with the right-wing Hindutva-guided Indian government while getting involved in Indian politics.

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False Flag Operations and Support of Terrorism As India continues to pursue an aggressive and offensive military strategy in the region, it is likely to continue pursuing its national objectives through the conduct of False Flag Operations and support of terrorism in the region. India is likely to play ‘external scapegoating’ tactics and continues to blame its neighboring countries for all its own-planned False Flag Operations conducted by its intelligence agencies within its boundaries. As part of its defined strategies under JDIAF, India is also likely to continue using proxies including terrorist entities for fueling instability in its neighborhood. These means of sub-conventional warfare adopted by India are likely to have serious implications for regional peace, stability, and economic development.

Use of Afghanistan as a Proxy Based on Kautilya’s notion of “enemy’s enemy as a friend”, India is likely to continue attempting to use Afghanistan as a proxy state against Pakistan. India is also likely to continue employing its proxies and assets including terrorist entities, such as Daesh and TTP, etc., to attempt fueling instability in Pakistan. India is, therefore, likely to continue acting as an external spoiler for the ongoing intra-Afghan negotiations. This approach may seriously threaten peace prospects in Afghanistan.

Militarization of Space India has officially declared its intentions to militarize the space through JDIAF. As a result of this move, other countries in the region are likely to witness the Outer Space Treaty being openly violated by India. While India’s flagrant violation of international treaty obligations is not new, the weaponization of outer space by India in violation of the Outer Space Treaty may expand the spectrum of conflict at the regional and global scale.

Conclusion This paper has focused on deciphering the linkage between Hindutva philosophy and JDIAF, which serves as the combined doctrine for the Indian Armed Forces. The paper, while tracing the roots of the increasing Hindutva influence on Indian polity and its various institutions, also establishes that the Indian Armed Forces have been set on a course of becoming an army of Hindu Rashtra guided by Hindutva ideals and philosophy. It concludes that JDIAF has been developed on Hindutva core principles of aggrandizement, expansionism, hegemonic tendencies, exclusion, ethnic and communal bias as well as the use of violence against neighboring countries.

JDIAF includes a number of notions borrowed from Kautilya’s Arthshastra to reinterpret and indigenize different military concepts. It works on the Hindutva ideal working towards ‘Akhand Bharat’ and, for that purpose, envisions the entire IOR as its area of influence. For achieving the objective of becoming a regional hegemon, JDIAF sets aside moral or ethical considerations and goes to the extent of suggesting strategies that are premised on fueling instability and chaos in India’s neighborhood. While

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presenting India as a victim of aggression and scapegoating “others”, i.e., neighboring countries, JDIAF has specifically targeted China and Pakistan. It is against these two countries that India’s strategies of fomenting internal instability including the use of foreign proxies are directed. It is further argued that based on its Hindutva inspiration, India has brought about a paradigm shift in its nuclear doctrine as well as in terms of the militarization of space in an aggressive manner, resulting in serious threats to regional peace and stability.

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Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces and Its Hindutva Interlace 27

38 Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence of India, “Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces, 2017”, under “Bharatshakti website”, https://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_ Forces.pdf (accessed 11 February 2019). 39 Ibid 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence of India, “Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces, 2017”, under “Bharatshakti website”, https://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_ Forces.pdf (accessed 11 February 2019). 43 Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Press Release “Indian Armed Forces Joint Doctrine 2017: A Critical Appraisal, 28 February 2018”, under IPRI website, http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/prrelease56.pdf (accessed 12 February 2019). 44 A. Walter Dorn, Raj Balkaran, Seth Feldman, Stephen Gucciardi, “The Justifications for War and Peace in World Religions: Part II: Extracts, Summaries and Comparisons of Scriptures of Religions of Indic Origin (Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism and Sikhism)”, under “ Walterdorn.net”, http://walterdorn.net/pdf/ForceInWorldReligions- Scriptures_PartII_IndicReligions_Dorn-Balkaran-Feldman-Gucciardi_DRDC-Report_AsPublished_CR-2010-34_12Jan2011.pdf (accessed 12 February 2019). 45 Ashwath Kannan, “Savarkar, Swamy and Hindutva, 2017”, under “PGURUS website”, https://www.pgurus.com/ savarkar- swamy-and-hindutva/ (accessed 13 February 2019). 46 Col Harjeet Singh, “The Kautilya Arthaśāstra A Military Perspective, 2013”, under ‘Maneskshaw Paper”, http://www.claws.in/images/publication_pdf/1381380497MP-38%20inside.pdf (accessed 16 February 2019). 47 Haris Bilal Malik, “Post-Pulwama False Flag Operation: Prediction and Reality, 2019”, under “modern diplomacy official website”, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2019/04/18/post-pulwama-false-flag-operation-prediction-and-reality/ (accessed 25 December 2019). 48 Staff Report, “PAF to remember Feb 27 as ‘Operation Swift Retort’, 2019”, under “Pakistan Today official website”, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/05/01/paf-to-remember-february-27-as-operation-swift-retort/ (accessed 25 December 2019). 49 Gaurav Somwanshi, “Tilak, the granddaddy of all Hindutvavadis, 2015”, under “Round Table India Website”, http://roundtableindia.co.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8181:tilak-the-granddaddy-of-all- hindutvavadis&catid=119:feature&Itemid=132 (accessed 12 February 2019). 50 A. Walter Dorn, Raj Balkaran, Seth Feldman, Stephen Gucciardi, “The Justifications for War and Peace in World Religions: Part II: Extracts, Summaries and Comparisons of Scriptures of Religions of Indic Origin (Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism and Sikhism)”, under “ Walterdorn.net”, http://walterdorn.net/pdf/ForceInWorldReligions- Scriptures_PartII_IndicReligions_Dorn-Balkaran-Feldman-Gucciardi_DRDC-Report_AsPublished_CR-2010-34_12Jan2011.pdf (accessed 12 February 2019). 51 Dr. J. Kuruvachira, “Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s Rationalisation of Violence through the Interpretation of the Gita”, under “Don Bosco website”, http://donboscoindia.com/english/resourcedownload.php?pno=1&secid=246 (accessed 13 February 2019). 52 Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence of India, “Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces, 2017”, under “Bharatshakti website”, https://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_ Forces.pdf (accessed 11 February 2019). 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Abhijnan Rej & Shashank Joshi, “India’s Joint Doctrine: A lost opportunity”, under ORF online website, https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ORF_Occasional_Paper_Joint_Doctrine.pdf (accessed 11 February 2019). 56 Ibid. 57 Jason Burke, “Indian election alarm as BJP raises prospect of nuclear weapons rethink, 2014”, under “The Guardian website”, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/07/indian-election-bjp-manifesto-nuclear-weapons (accessed 16 February 2019). 58 Ibid. 59 Rajesh Rajagopalan, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine Debate, 2016”, under “Carnegie Endowment for International Peace”, https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-s-nuclear-doctrine-debate-pub-63950 (accessed 16 February 2019). 60 Sultan M Hali, “Pakistan Army’s ‘Grand National Narrative’, 2018”, under “Pakistan Today website”, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/10/18/pakistan-armys-grand-national-narrative/ (accessed 16 February 2019). 61 “India needs strong govt for next 10 years; cannot go for unstable coalitions, says NSA Ajit Doval, 2018”, under “ Hindustan Times”, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-needs-strong-govt-for-next-10-years-cannot-go-for-unstable- coalitions-says-nsa-ajit-doval/story-vtzkRVzK4ezZumGqrzmGzM.html (accessed 16 February 2019). 62 Sumit Ganguly, “Hindu Nationalism and the Foreign Policy of India’s Bharatiya Janata Party, 2015”, 2014-15 Paper Series, No. 02, Washington, Transatlantic Academy. 63 Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence of India, “Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces, 2017”, under “Bharatshakti website”, https://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_ Forces.pdf (accessed 11 February 2019). 64 Col Harjeet Singh, “The Kautilya Arthaśāstra A Military Perspective, 2013”, under ‘Maneskshaw Paper”, http://www.claws.in/images/publication_pdf/1381380497MP-38%20inside.pdf (accessed 16 February 2019). 65 Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence of India, “Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces, 2017”, under “Bharatshakti website”, https://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_ Forces.pdf (accessed 11 February 2019). 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence of India, “Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces, 2017”, under “Bharatshakti website”, https://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_ Forces.pdf (accessed 11 February 2019).

Margalla Papers-2020 (Issue-II) [16-28]

28 Shakaib Rafique

69 Siraj Qureshi, “RSS leader Indresh pitches idea for EU-like union of Indian Ocean countries, 2019”, under “India Today official website”, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/rss-leader-indresh-eu-like-union-indian-ocean-countries-1604858-2019-09- 30 (accessed 25 December 2019). 70 Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence of India, “Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces, 2017”, under “Bharatshakti website”, https://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_ Forces.pdf (accessed 11 February 2019). 71 Ramya Chandrasekaran, “Hindutva Movement: Burkean Examination Of Violence As Retributive Justice, 2012”, under “North Dakota State University website”, https://library.ndsu.edu/ir/bitstream/handle/10365/ 26670/Hindutva%20Movement%20Burkean%20Examination%20of%20Violence%20as%20Retributive%20Justice.pdf?sequen ce=1 (accessed 16 February 2019). 72 Ibid. 73 Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence of India, “Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces, 2017”, under “Bharatshakti website”, https://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_ Forces.pdf (accessed 11 February 2019). 74 Glenn George, “India's aggressive approach at border is the brainchild of NSA Ajit Doval, 2018”, under “The Economic Times”, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indias-aggressive-approach-at-border-is-the-brainchild-of-nsa-ajit- doval/articleshow/54599228.cms?from=mdr (accessed 23 November 2019). 75 Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence of India, “Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces, 2017”, under “Bharatshakti website”, https://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_Forces.pdf (accessed 11 February 2019). 76 Vinay Vittal, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra: A Timeless Grand Strategy”, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 2011. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Col Harjeet Singh, “The Kautilya Arthaśāstra: A Military Perspective, 2013”, under ‘Maneskshaw Paper”, http://www.claws.in/images/publication_pdf/1381380497MP-38%20inside.pdf (accessed 16 February 2019). 80 Air Cmdre Jamal Hussain, “Ajit Kumar Doval – An Indian jackal or a wily old fox? 2017”, under “Global Village Space website”, https://www.globalvillagespace.com/ajit-kumar-doval-an-indian-jackal-or-a-wily-old-fox/ (accessed 16 February 2019). 81 UN General Assembly Resolution 2222 (XXI). Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967 available at http://ask.un.org/faq/14438. 82 Col Harjeet Singh, “The Kautilya Arthaśāstra: A Military Perspective, 2013”, under ‘Maneskshaw Paper”, http://www.claws.in/images/publication_pdf/1381380497MP-38%20inside.pdf (accessed 16 February 2019). 83 Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological security in world politics: State identity and the security dilemma, 2006”, in European Journal of International Relations, 12(3), pp 341-370,459. 84 Balakrishna Pisupati, “Redefining SAGAR in Indian Ocean, 2015”, under “The Hindu official website”, https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/energy-and-environment/redefining-sagar-in-indian-ocean/article7248385.ece (accessed 26 December 2019). 85 PTI, “Indian Navy aiming at 200-ship fleet by 2027, 2018”, under “The Economic Times official website”, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indian-navy-aiming-at-200-ship-fleet-by-2027/articleshow/48072917. cms?from=mdr (accessed 25 December 2019). 86 Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence of India, “Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces, 2017”, under “Bharatshakti website”, https://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_ Forces.pdf (accessed 11 February 2019). 87 HT Correspondent, “Army chief sparks controversy with remarks on civilian protest, 2019”, under “Hindustan Times (HT) official website”, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/army-chief-sparks-controversy-with-remarks-on-civilian- protest/story-LMdrZ7m2hbOBGgrAnCvK6H.html (accessed 28 December 2019).

Margalla Papers-2020 (Issue-II) [16-28]