India's Military Diplomacy

India’s Military Diplomacy DHRUVA JAISHANKAR Dhruva Jaishankar is a Transatlantic Fellow with the Asia Program of the German Marshall Fund in Washington DC. In April 2016, he will be joining the Brookings Institution India Center in New Delhi as a Fellow for Foreign Policy. t is undeniable that the nature of military force in international affairs has changed in the seven decades since India’s Independence. It has been almost 45 years since India fought a major conventional war, and events since – including the experience of India’s counter-insurgency in Sri Lanka, its development of Inuclear weapons, and changing commercial, political, and social relations between India and its neighbours – have further decreased the prospect of large-scale conflict. However, the structure and preparedness of the Indian armed forces has not fully adapted to these changing circumstances. One development that has gone relatively unnoticed is the greater frequency and visibility – and consequently greater importance – of activities that can be considered military diplomacy. This is natural in peacetime, and in an international environment in which India has few true adversaries and many partners. Although there is no universal definition of what constitutes military diplomacy or defence diplomacy, it can be thought of as any military activity with an expressly diplomatic purpose; in other words, activities where the primary objective is to promote goodwill towards India in other countries. India has leveraged military diplomacy in its external relations almost since Independence, by virtue of its inheriting a large, professional military force from the British Raj, by its size, and by its projection of itself as a leader of the post-colonial world. But the increasing demand and appeal of military diplomacy in recent years will require devoting considerably greater resources, manpower, and equipment towards several kinds of activities. These include foreign officer training and education, high-visibility military visits abroad, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) efforts outside India. More than resources, improved military diplomacy will require much closer cooperation between the services, between India’s military and civilian leadership, and between the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of External Affairs. What is Military Diplomacy? There is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes military diplomacy or defence diplomacy. By its broadest definition, almost every externally-oriented military activity can be considered military diplomacy, as it would constitute an extension of international policy. Military force is, as the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz famously noted, “a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”1 18 India’s Military Diplomacy However, many military activities have more specific, or supplementary, functions, and are therefore not simply diplomatic. Most military operations Most military that have ultimately diplomatic purposes – including coercive force, peace operations that have keeping operations, and evacuation and rescue operations – are meant to 2 ultimately diplomatic achieve specific tactical and operational objectives. During official contacts between two or more countries’ militaries, such as staff talks and military purposes – including exercises, the purpose is often to improve interoperability and coordination, coercive force, peace and not simply increase goodwill.3 And military assistance – including sales and technology transfers – contributes not just to interoperability and keeping operations, diplomacy, but can serve expressly commercial objectives.4 and evacuation and A narrower definition – military activities whose sole purpose is diplomatic rescue operations – – leaves a much more specific set of actions as items that constitute military are meant to achieve diplomacy. These include (i) the education and training of foreign officers specific tactical and cadets, (ii) military visits with significant public exposure (such as port calls by naval vessels or the military’s participation in parades), and (iii) and operational humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in foreign countries. objectives. The historical record shows that while India’s efforts have been admirable, certain steps can still be taken to purposefully improve India’s abilities in each of these domains. Officer Training and Education Having inherited the armed forces from the British Raj, India had at Independence among the most advanced professional military training and education centres in the developing world. The Army Staff College was in Quetta at Independence, and so transferred to Pakistan. Indian facilities shifted after 1947 to Wellington Cantonment in what is now Tamil Nadu. In 1958, a National Defence College was approved by the Cabinet Defence Committee and it opened its doors in 1960. In the 1970s, the College of Combat (later renamed the Army War College) was established at Mhow in Madhya Pradesh, and the Institute of Defence Management (which became the College of Defence Management) was set up in Secunderabad. In addition to training Indian officers, India’s military academies and staff colleges took students from other armed forces, advancing diplomatic efforts by fostering cooperation and goodwill with military officers from other countries. At Wellington, the intake of foreign students began in 1950, with seven students from Britain, Burma, the United States, Australia, and Canada. These expanded in the 1950s to a large number of students from other Non-Aligned and newly independent countries, such as Indonesia, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Nigeria (including future Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Muhammadu Buhari). Despite India’s close relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, it was not until 1988 that a Russian officer attended the course at Wellington.5 Meanwhile, the NDC produced future chiefs of the army, air force, or navy of Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Australia, and Kenya, as well as future heads of state or government of Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Ghana, among many other distinguished foreign alumni. 19 Defence Primer: India at 75 High Visibility Military Visits In 2015, an Indian While officer education and training targets individuals in other countries’ militaries, some of whom rise to prominent positions in their armed forces, naval flotilla from the other forms of military diplomacy have the ability to have a broader impact, Western Fleet visited reaching public audiences. These include military activities, such as exercises, Oman, the United on foreign soil. Although both bilateral and multilateral military exercises are seen as a key element of military diplomacy, they serve a number of purposes, Arab Emirates, and including enhancing interoperability and are a means of training.6 By contrast, Qatar. The same high visibility efforts such as the Indian armed forces’ participation in military parades and port visits by Indian naval vessels serve expressly diplomatic year, Indian vessels 7 functions, as do activities such as the International Fleet Review. A recent also docked in ports example of India’s contribution to a high-visibility diplomatic effort abroad was an Army contingent’s participation in the Victory Day parade in Moscow across Southeast in May 2015, which marked an effort at showing solidarity with the host Asia and the Western country and was a public demonstration of India’s military capabilities.8 Pacific, including Port visits serve a similar function, and they have now become a prominent in the Philippines, feature of the Indian Navy’s activities and international profile. In 2015, Singapore, and an Indian naval flotilla from the Western Fleet visited Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. The same year, Indian vessels also docked in ports Australia, leading across Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, including in the Philippines, to favourable Singapore, and Australia, leading to favourable media coverage and recognition of deepening goodwill among the host countries.9 These efforts constitute a media coverage continuation of a trend that began in the early 2000s, when the Indian Navy and recognition of began to make regular visits to both the Asia Pacific and to West Asia and the deepening goodwill Gulf, and marks a significant departure from an earlier period when Indian naval vessels rarely ventured outside the Indian Ocean.10 among the host Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief countries. Another area of military diplomacy at which India has demonstrated greater capabilities in recent years is in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in other countries. The focus to date has been on evacuating members of the Indian diaspora, as in Lebanon (Operation Sukoon), Libya (Operation Safe Homecoming), or Yemen (Operation Raahat).11 These operations have also occasionally extended to securing the citizens of other countries (primarily India’s neighbours), which has contributed to diplomatic goodwill and has been a means of showcasing Indian leadership.12 But while the Indian armed forces have a solid track record of disaster relief operations on Indian soil, and of evacuating Indian nationals, it has also contributed to disaster relief efforts independent of these considerations: military diplomacy in its purest form. Recent examples include India’s role in the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, including to Indonesia and Sri Lanka, and assistance following

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