Defence Primer 2018
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DEFENCE PRIMER An Indian Military in Transformation? EDITORS PUSHAN DAS & HARSH V. PANT DEFENCE PRIMER An Indian Military in Transformation? EDITED BY PUSHAN DAS & HARSH V. PANT © 2018 BY OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION ISBN: 978-81-86818-21-3 Copy editing: Udita Chaturvedi Designed by: Simijaisondesigns Printed by: Vinset Advertising CONTENTS CHINA’s MilitARY RISE AND THE INDIAN CHALLENGE 4 Harsh V. Pant & Pushan Das The Chinese People’s Liberation Army in Transition: Implications for 16 Indian Defence Richard A. Bitzinger Achieving India’s Military Goals in an Era of Transition 26 Lt. Gen. S L Narasimhan (Retd.) Closing the Gap: A Doctrinal & Capability Appraisal of the IAF & 35 the PLAAF AVM Arjun Subramaniam (Retd.) Indian Vasuki vs Chinese Dragon: Towards a Future-Ready 44 Indian Seapower RADM Sudarshan Shrikhande (Retd.) Indian Military in Transformation - Combat Potential and Military 55 Capabilities Vis – a – Vis China Brig. Arun Sahgal (Retd.) Managing Comprehensive Competition with China: Insights from 72 Multi-Domain Battle Arzan Tarapore Virtual Domains and Real Threats: Chinese Military Capacities in 83 New Frontiers of Warfare Elsa B. Kania Nuclear Weapons and Sino-Indian Security Relations 92 S. Paul Kapur and Diana Wueger 1 CHINA’S MILITARY RISE AND THE INDIAN CHALLENGE HARSH V. PANT & PUSHAN DAS he 19th Congress of Chinese on domestic gains and achievements, was also Communist Party (CCP), arguably a manifesto for China where he attempted the most significant political event to integrate both normative and ideational in China, marked the emergence of components, which he summed as ‘Chinese TChinese President Xi Jinping as an undisputed Dream’, and the hard power to realise the leader of China who asserted his authority goals he has set out for China. China’s military and leadership in the party to the extent that modernisation and reforms are intrinsic to its he has become the first CCP leader to have goals of expanding its political and economic his contribution attached to his name when footprint across the globe, presenting a strategic Congress unanimously approved incorporation challenge to India. of Xi’s ideological contribution into the Party Constitution as ‘Xi Jinping’s Thought on At the heart of Xi’s vision for China’s future was Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New a two-stage plan he has put forward to achieve Era’. China’s second centennial goal of becoming a “fully developed nation” by 2049—the 100th The content and the tenor of the address anniversary of the founding of the People’s reaffirmed emphatically that China will continue Republic. The first stage—from 2020 to to be more assertive in advancing its interest with 2035—aims at domestic transformation by an integrated ‘soft and hard power approach’. As realising the ‘socialist modernisation’. The Xi charted for China a roadmap for the future, socialist modernisation, he has reiterated he did so by contextualising China’s global would be modelled on socialism with Chinese standing at a time when America seems to have characteristics. The second stage—from 2035 to become more inward looking and the global 2045—aims for a more global agenda to become balance of power is undergoing a dramatic “a global leader in terms of comprehensive transition. His address, though largely focussed national power and international influence”. This 4 / China’s Military Rise and the Indian Challenge two-pronged vision, that sums up broadly as the international rules and norms and existing ‘Chinese Dream’, was packaged as a panacea to security arrangement when it adversely affected all the Chinese problems, a remedy which can be its interest. China’s rejection of the United exported by him to other parts of the world. Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) tribunal’s ruling in the South China A critical feature of his address was the centrality Sea was an excellent example of a belligerent of the role of CCP in its overall political China flouting international norms to suit its system. He asserted that “the defining feature interest. This selective approval of international of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the norms by China suggested that Beijing would leadership of the Communist Party of China; respect the present order only to the extent that the greatest strength of the system of socialism it suits its interests and would further re-order it with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of that could satisfy its goal. the Communist Party of China; the Party is the highest force for political leadership”. In other China’s military modernisation was a significant words, he hinted that there will be no substantial highlight of Xi’s address to the Congress as was political reforms and the nature of one-party the employment of hard power with the aim to political system will be more or less retained. realise domestic ideological goals initially, and then to further export it globally. Xi’s emphasis China’s disapproval for ‘western models of on Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) liberal democracy’ is not new and Xi’s address and the military might, in his entire speech, attested the disapproval. What was significant unambiguously conveyed the significant role he was the conscious attempt made by Xi to export attributed to the Chinese military. He announced what could be termed as the ‘Chinese model that the PLA’s focus will be on realisation of governance’ to other developing countries. of the ‘Chinese Dream’ for which it must Moreover, it “offers Chinese wisdom and a develop “a new military strategy under the new Chinese approach to solving the problems situation” while national defence and military facing mankind”. The fact that China was not modernisation will be promoted. Xi assured just confronting the ‘West’ on its own but now that “by the end of the first stage in 2035, was ready to provide the ‘Chinese alternative’ modernisation of our national defence and our came out emphatically from the address. This forces will be basically completed”; and by the was a prominent ideational angle of China’s time the second stage comes to a full, China will ‘international ambitions’. be “fully transformed into a first-tier force”. This ambitious build up plan is undoubtedly intended Though Xi had attempted to project himself as to make China a full military power, observing a responsible leader and China as a responsible directly that the “military is built to fight” and global by power participating in various multi- that it should concentrate on “winning wars”. lateral forums, China under Xi has displayed periodic proclivity in confronting the established Defence Primer / 5 of being a ‘great power neighbour’ because The Geopolitics of China’s of its geography as well as the existence of Militaristic Rise territorial buffer zones. China’s march towards China’s rise has supported a decade of sustained being a great power and the ongoing transition growth in Asia, but also placed unprecedented of power in Asia has punctured that sense of stress on the global balance of power and relative security—unlike other great powers security order. Beijing’s modernisation of the of the past New Delhi has encountered, PLA over the past two decades, coupled with China impinges directly on India’s geopolitical its attempt to change the status quo in Asia’s landscape in multiple ways. The rise of China strategic fault lines, has brought China to the has only exacerbated its intensity. forefront of any discussion on India’s ability to defend itself and its interests. First, the Sino-Indian border dispute continues to fester.1 India-China border dispute is not only Notwithstanding its intentions, China’s rapid the largest territorial dispute in Asia but is also rise and its growing military profile has suddenly one of longest running conflicts in the history transformed the threat matrix for India. China’s of Post-World War II Asian politics.2 The two economic transformation has given it the nations sharing a 2520-mile-long border are capability to emerge as a major military power. embroiled in a contest for over 47,000 sq mile In 2017, Beijing’s total defence budget for the of Himalayan territory. In October 1962, they year was $152 billion, up from $146 billion the fought a war across the Himalayan frontier in previous year, an increase of 7 per cent. And this which India was comprehensively defeated. But is when vital elements of the Chinese military even after 50 years of the border war, India and build-up, including cyber warfare and space China have not been able to amicably resolve capabilities (as well as foreign procurement) the dispute. Negotiations on the border dispute were not included in the announced budget. The did begin in 1981 at vice-ministerial level and bulk of the increased defence spending will go a total of eight rounds of bilateral meetings to the Chinese Navy, Air Force and the Second took place until 1987. In 1988, a Joint Working Artillery Corps, which runs the strategic nuclear Group (JWG) was constituted to expedite the forces. resolution of the conflict. By 2003, the JWG had met 14 times. In 2003, special representatives This unprecedented military rise of China has were appointed by the two governments “to created a unique geopolitical situation for India. explore from the political perspective of the For the first time in its independent history, overall bilateral relationship the framework of a the emergence of a great military power at its boundary dispute”. Fifteen rounds of talks have immediate frontiers now appears imminent. taken place between the special representatives Both during the times of British India and the so far. If, on one hand, there is an increasing Cold War, India remained relatively insulated feeling in India that negotiations have dragged from the security and foreign policy challenges for too long, frequent and strident Chinese 6 / China’s Military Rise and the Indian Challenge claims about the Line of Actual Control in that footprint is likely to increase much larger.5 India’s Northern sector of Ladakh and its Meanwhile, America’s relative decline and North East have become a norm rather than an the prospective withdrawal of forces from exception.