South Asia's Nuclear Challenges: Interlocking Views from India
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SOUTH ASIA’S NUCLEAR CHALLENGES Interlocking Views from India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States lora saalman and petr topychkanov STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute. GOVERNING BOARD Ambassador Jan Eliasson, Chair (Sweden) Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia) Espen Barth Eide (Norway) Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) Dr Radha Kumar (India) Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra (Algeria) Dr Patricia Lewis (Ireland/United Kingdom) Dr Jessica Tuchman Mathews (United States) DIRECTOR Dan Smith (United Kingdom) SOUTH ASIA’S NUCLEAR CHALLENGES Interlocking Views from India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States lora saalman and petr topychkanov April 2021 Contents Acknowledgements iv Summary v Abbreviations vii 1. Introduction 1 2. India 3 Views on nuclear posture in South Asia 3 Views on nuclear escalation in South Asia 4 Box 2.1. Indian interviewees 4 3. Pakistan 7 Views on nuclear posture in South Asia 7 Views on nuclear escalation in South Asia 8 Box 3.1. Pakistani interviewees 8 4. China 10 Views on nuclear posture in South Asia 10 Views on nuclear escalation in South Asia 11 Box 4.1. Chinese interviewees 11 5. Russia 14 Views on nuclear posture in South Asia 14 Views on nuclear escalation in South Asia 16 Box 5.1. Russian interviewees 15 6. The United States 18 Views on nuclear posture in South Asia 18 Views on nuclear escalation in South Asia 19 Box 6.1. United States interviewees 19 7. Conclusions 22 China and India 22 China and the United States 22 India and the United States 23 India and Pakistan 23 Pakistan, Russia and the United States 24 Appendix A. Nuclear postures featured during interviews 25 Appendix B. Strategic technologies featured during interviews 27 Appendix C. Escalatory events featured during interviews 29 Acknowledgements This publication was prepared in the framework of the project Assessing Nuclear Deterrence Risks and Challenges in South Asia. We would like to express our sincere gratitude to the German Federal Foreign Office for its generous financial support of the project. We are indebted to the experts who participated in the research interviews in 2020 and a workshop on 8–9 December 2020 and agreed to share their insights. The contents of this publication reflect the findings of the authors and the views expressed by the interviewees; they should not be taken to reflect the views of SIPRI or the German Federal Foreign Office. We are also grateful to our SIPRI colleagues Dr Sibylle Bauer, Shannon Kile, Dr Lucie Béraud-Sudreau and Dr Jingdong Yuan and the anonymous external reviewer for their comprehensive and constructive comments on the draft. We are also thankful to the SIPRI Editorial Department for its invaluable work in editing the text and preparing it for publication. Lora Saalman and Petr Topychkanov Summary This study provides an overview of views on nuclear postures and escalation affecting South Asia, based on 119 interviews conducted in 2020, without attribution, with mili- tary, nuclear, political and regional experts from India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States. These discussions revealed a number of interlocking points that offer building blocks for both official and non-official engagement on such issues as no first use (NFU), lowered nuclear thresholds, conventional and nuclear entanglement, escalate to de-escalate, and emerging technology development. On China and India, there was a prevailing view among experts from both countries that they shared the same stance on NFU, and that nuclear escalation between the two was not only unlikely but also unthinkable. While stabilizing in the context of tensions at the China–India border, the assumption that both parties are operating from the same starting point merits greater examination—in relation not just to NFU but also to a range of nuclear postures from de-mating to targeting. Assumptions of ‘postural parity’ may bring stability in the short term but could contribute to misunderstanding and mis-signalling in the longer term. On China and the USA, experts from each tended to see the other country as playing a larger and more destabilizing role in South Asia. Chinese experts focused on past US weapon sales to the region, the Indian–US nuclear deal, the US Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which have had a strong focus on China as well as India. US experts cited China’s conventional and nuclear weapons outreach to Pakistan, military training, and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This different focus and pattern of engagement led some US experts to express concern that the region could break into two camps, with the USA and India on one side and China and Pakistan on the other. On India and the USA, there was a shared view among experts from both countries that the Chinese entanglement of conventional and nuclear platforms and command and control could filter into Pakistan’s posture and planning. Despite this commonality, there were limited avenues for nuclear discussion between the two countries. US experts cited the difficulty of engaging Indian interlocutors on nuclear issues, particularly at the official level. Meanwhile, in India there was a tendency to regard US assessments as projections that did not reflect India’s reality, such as with US discussions of India’s potential shift towards counterforce doctrine. On India and Pakistan, while experts from both countries focused on how the other has engaged in lowering the nuclear threshold, there was a mutual interest in how Chinese–US competition in emerging technologies may have cascade effects that shape South Asia’s deterrence landscape. Both Indian and Pakistani experts expressed concerns over how such technologies as hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy may change the deterrence landscape, particularly in terms of surveillance, command and control, and even shorter reaction times. On Pakistan, Russia and the USA, Chinese experts’ discussion of parallels between Pakistan and Russia on escalate to de-escalate coincided with US experts’ mention of the US use of a similar concept in extended deterrence and the fielding of low-yield nuclear weapons. Their respective analyses revealed that experts’ discussion of third countries and re-evaluation of their own countries’ nuclear posture may bridge some of the gaps in understanding that are often entrenched in traditional Russia–USA and India–Pakistan dyadic interactions. Overall, these findings illustrate the need for greater, and more comprehensive, engagement that features flexible bilateral, trilateral and multilateral groupings of India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the USA when discussing targeted aspects of nuclear dynamics in South Asia. Doing so would allow for greater transparency and dynamism when engaging on sensitive posture and escalation trends. This in turn would encourage experts to look beyond India–Pakistan dyadic strategic relations in South Asia to explore the broader dynamics and linkages shaping nuclear stability in the region and beyond. Abbreviations AI Artificial intelligence ALCM Air-launched cruise missile ASAT Anti-satellite BMD Ballistic missile defence BRI Belt and Road Initiative HGV Hypersonic glide vehicle IRBM Intermediate-range ballistic missile LOC Line of Control MIRVs Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles MRBM Medium-range ballistic missile NFU No first use NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non- Proliferation Treaty) PLA People’s Liberation Army (of China) SLBM Submarine-launched ballistic missile SSBN Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine USCENTCOM United States Central Command USPACOM United States Pacific Command WMD Weapons of mass destruction 1. Introduction Over the past two decades, a series of escalatory events have taken place in South Asia under what some have dubbed the ‘nuclear shadow’—in which countries possessing nuclear weapons conduct low-intensity military operations against each other over disputed territories.1 These included the India–Pakistan tensions following attacks on the Indian Parliament in 2001, on Mumbai in 2008, on Uri in 2016, and on Pulwama and Balakot in 2019, as well as the China–India tensions over the Depsang incursion, the 2017 Doklam stand-off and the 2020 Galwan River Valley skirmishes.2 While each case has elicited debate, less attention has been given to the role of nuclear weapons, or lack thereof, in these various stand-offs. From one perspective, even when not actively engaged, nuclear postures and technologies are seen as looming in the back- ground and limiting events from spiralling out of control. From another, they are seen as potential triggers for accidents or further escalation, particularly when deployed at a tactical level. To better explore the postures and technologies that lie behind escalation under the nuclear shadow, the authors conducted a series of 119 not-for-attribution interviews between May and August 2020 with military, nuclear, political and regional experts from India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States on nuclear postures and escalation affecting South Asia. The interviews