The China–India Water Dispute

As the upper riparian, China wields The China–India significant advantage over India. It Water Dispute withheld hydrological data from In- dia during the Doklam standoff de- 6 The Potential for spite an existing hydrological data- sharing agreement between them. In Escalation November 2020, China announced Dr. Selina Ho plans for hydropower construction on the section of the Brahmaputra clos- est to India, triggering strong re- sponses from the Indian side. Of greatest concern to India are reports of Chinese plans to build a mega-dam just before the Brahmaputra enters India. News of these plans came at a time when relations between China and India are at a low point, with troops facing off at the Galwan Val- ley. There were also reports that in the aftermath of the border clashes, China has blocked the flow of the he conflation of the China–India Galwan River, which crosses from water dispute with larger territo- the disputed Chinese-administered T rial and political disputes exacer- Aksai Chin region into Ladakh re- bates water as a source of conflict be- gion in India. Indian pundits have tween them. The waters of the Hima- accused China of “weaponizing” wa- layas are an invaluable resource for ter and using water for political and the two countries as rapid economic strategic leverage over India. They development and population growth believe that China could cut off water stress their water supplies. Among or raise the water levels to flood In- the rivers that cross their disputed dia should a military conflict break border, the Brahmaputra River/Yar- out between them. lung Tsangpo is the most significant The water dispute between China water resource they share. Originat- and India is further compounded by ing from Tibet, the Brahmaputra the fact that institutionalized cooper- crosses the border into Arunachal ation between the two sides is low, Pradesh, which is occupied by India consisting only of an expert-level but claimed by China as Southern Ti- body and a series of memorandums bet. Indo-Pacific Perspectives │ 24 Ho on hydrological data-sharing. There issue. In fact, “the most obvious re- is no water-sharing agreement or a source that is prone to securitization joint river commission for managing is transboundary water.”1 Despite their shared river resources. The dif- these characteristics of water that ficulties in managing their shared lends itself to securitization, both the waters, the intertwining of the bor- Chinese and Indian government have der and water disputes, and the wa- worked to desecuritize their water ter scarcity problems they both face dispute. Desecuritization is defined have led to predictions of “water as the “moving of issues off the ‘secu- wars” between them. Despite these rity agenda’ and back into the realm dire predictions, however, armed con- of public political discourse and ‘nor- flict has not broken out over water. mal’ political dispute and accommo- Even when relations are at a nadir, dation.”2 Rhetoric, discourses, and the water dispute did not completely narratives are used to neutralize or become embroiled with the border reduce the security implications of an dispute even if it did add to the ten- issue to lower tensions with another sions. Why have China and India country. managed to keep their water dispute from escalating into violent conflict? The Chinese government has used What are the conditions under which assuaging rhetoric to reduce percep- the status quo could change leading tions of its dams as a threat. An oft- to armed conflict over water? repeated rhetoric is that the dams are “run-of-the river,” meaning that Desecuritizing the Water Dispute they are not capable of storing or di- verting large bodies of water. This A key strategy both governments assuaging rhetoric is most clearly ob- have used to prevent their water dis- served during the spring of 2010, fol- pute from boiling over is to desecurit- lowing an official Chinese announce- ize it. That both sides have desecurit- ment that China is building the ized their water dispute is a bit of a Zangmu Dam on the Yarlung puzzle. Almost all the disputes be- Tsangpo. During a China–India stra- tween them, including the border dis- tegic dialogue, Chinese Vice-Foreign pute, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama is- Minister Zhang Zhijun assured the sue, are painted as existential Indian delegation that the project threats and accepted as such by both “was not a project designed to divert sides. Disputes over water are prone water” and would not affect “the wel- to securitization because water con- fare and availability of water of the cerns basic human rights and sur- population in the lower reaches of vival and is therefore an existential the Brahmaputra.”3 The Chinese Indo-Pacific Perspective │25 The China–India Water Dispute applied desecuritizing rhetoric even explanation is that India would not when the two armies were facing off want to provoke China, the more at Doklam. In response to Indian rev- powerful state that dealt it a humili- elations that India had not received ating defeat in 1962. However, these hydrological data from China during accounts do not explain why desecu- the standoff, the Chinese government ritization only took place for the wa- avoided linking the data disruption ter dispute but not the other disputes to the Doklam standoff, instead offer- between them. I have argued else- ing a technical explanation that the where that desecuritizaton of the wa- monitoring stations were being reno- ter dispute is not only the result of vated. Similarly, the Indian govern- these material reasons but because of ment has sought to downplay the a set of ideas among the epistemic threats posed by Chinese dams. In communities in both countries that response to the news that China was values and prioritizes collaboration constructing the Zangmu Dam, the on water resources and reducing the Minister of External Affairs said in a perceptions of the water dispute as a statement, “We have ascertained threat.5 from our own sources that this is a run-of-the river hydro-electric pro- What Can Lead to Escalation? ject, which does not store water and Nevertheless, the position that will not adversely impact down- both governments have taken to stream areas in India. Therefore, I desecuritize their water dispute can believe there is no cause for alarm. I change. There are already indica- would like to share with you the fact tions from the overall increase in ten- that a large proportion of the catch- sions between the two countries in ment of the Brahmaputra is within the past few years that keeping a lid Indian territory.”4 on the water dispute has become The two countries have cause to harder. Water disputes are never desecuritize their water conflict. about water resources alone. The wa- Lowering tensions with each other ter dispute between the two coun- will allow both sides to focus on eco- tries is linked with larger political is- nomic growth and development. For sues and the border conflict. In the China, it is aimed at stabilizing its limited incidents of water wars in southern periphery, expanding bilat- history, water had acted as a catalyst eral trade and investment with In- or was used as a pretext for war be- dia, and reducing India’s motivations tween countries whose overall rela- for aligning with the United States. tions had deteriorated to the point of On the Indian side, a possible hostility.6 The Doklam crisis and the Indo-Pacific Perspectives │26 Ho armed clashes in the Galwan Valley and the muscular foreign policies of resulting in deaths and causalities on both President Xi Jinping and Prime both sides point to the rapidly deteri- Minister Narendra Modi. The Indo- orating relations between them. Pacific strategy, the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, In- Overall relations between the two dia’s activities in Southeast Asia, and countries have soured considerably China’s increasing presence in the in the past few years. Apart from Indian Ocean and South Asia have border issues, China’s blocking of In- expanded the arena for engagement dia’s ascension to the Nuclear Suppli- and competition between the two ers Group in 2016, which denied In- sides. Their interests are competing dia recognition of its rising status, and overlapping, intensifying the ri- and refusal to name the leader of the valry between them. The COVID-19 Pakistan-based group Jaish-e-Mo- pandemic and the race between the hammed, Masood Azhar, as a terror- two sides to provide vaccines for de- ist in the United Nations, did not go veloping countries have further wors- down well with the Indians. China ened the rivalry and hostility be- has also displayed insensitivity to In- tween the two countries. Increasing dian concerns with initiatives such as competition between them and recent the China-Pakistan Economic Corri- border clashes do not augur well for dor. India has been suspicious of the management of their water dis- China’s Belt and Road Initiative. On pute. The efforts of the two govern- its part, India has acted in ways ments to desecuritize the water dis- deemed provocative by the Chinese, pute and to prevent overall deterio- including the former’s decision to rating relations from spilling over send in troops to Doklam to block into the water dispute is increasingly Chinese construction there as well as untenable. ■ India’s road construction in the Gal- wan River Valley. Dr. Selina Ho Dr. Ho is Assistant Professor in International Af- Even more critically, Chinese fairs at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. She is the author threat assessment of India has gone of Thirsty Cities: Social Contracts and Public Goods up because of India’s growing strate- Provision in China and India (Cambridge Univer- gic relations with the United States, sity Press, 2019) and co-author of Rivers of Iron: Railroads and Chinese Power in Southeast Asia Japan, and Australia.

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