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Sino-Indian Border Dispute: Explained in Constructivist Paradigm

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Sino-Indian Border Dispute: Explained in Constructivist Paradigm No. 112 July 2020 Sino-Indian Border Dispute: Explained in Constructivist Paradigm Reena Bhatiya Research Assistant, Institute of Chinese Studies [email protected] Abstract The intractable Sino-India border dispute has been persistently affecting the India-China bilateral relations. The latest skirmishes at the Galwan valley testify that. While several attempts have been made to comprehend as well as resolve the dispute, it becomes pertinent to examine the trajectories, and go beyond a limited approach. This paper therefore analyzes the border dispute and patterns of incursions, standoffs, within a constructivist prescriptive framework. By comparing and critically analyzing the scholarly works on the dispute in the last decade through a constructivist paradigmatic optic together with an update of more recent developments at the border, this paper will contribute to the existing literature by giving a much ignored theoretical direction to the discussion on Sino-India border dispute. Keywords: Borderlands, Incursions, Norms, Border-Conflicts, Paradigm The ICS is an interdisciplinary research institution, which has a leadership role in the promotion of Chinese and East Asian Studies in India. The ICS Analysis aims to encourage debate and provide informed and balanced inputs for policy formulation and is based on extensive research and interactions with a wide community of scholars, experts, diplomats and military personnel in India and abroad. Decades have elapsed since the border war in seems clear that keeping the border issue persistently alive is a part of Chinese Strategy 1962, the Sikkim skirmishes in 1967, the to outcompete India in the regional and global Sumdorong Chu valley skirmish in 1987, to the power matrix. recent Doklam standoff in 2017, and the current Galway valley incident. So far 1025 Chinese intent seems to have succeeded minor transgressions have occurred along the slightly which is to prevent India from LAC between 2016-2020. 1 These include 37 carrying out any new construction incursions between 2006 and 2011, by Chinese beyond the confluence of the Shyok- forces along the 350-km border that Galwan River. Uttarakhand shares with China.2 Further, in the eastern sector two incidents occurred in 2007 in the Thagla Ridge area of Arunachal Pradesh Recently, the incidents at Galwan Valley and and Sikkim. The incident of 2003 was in the nearby areas were due to China’s discomfort Asafila area of Arunachal Pradesh. It coincided about India’s military and administrative build with former Prime Minister Atal Bihari up in Ladakh over the years. All these above Vajpayee’s visit to Beijing in June. 3 In 2013 incidents raise several important questions on seven incidents were reported in the Western the Tcontourshe direct of and the indirect Asian Centurydamage whichinflicted seems Sector, six among which took place along the to be pillaredby the pandemicby China. affects As Ladakh Chinese constitutes Ladakh-Tibet Autonomous region boundary. the politicalwestern andsector economic of the interests Line inof the Actual These were in the areas of Siri Jap, Chumar, Control (LAC) severalregion. spots along the border- Counsel, and in Demchok. The remaining one Galwan Valley, Depsang Plains, and Hot occurred in the Daulet Beg Oldi sector in the Spring- have been sites of standoffs since Aksai Chin region.4 Moreover, as Lt. Gen. SL. April-May in the light of Chinese incursions. Narasimhan, member, National Security As per the latest news reports, both sides have Advisory Board explains that ‘the fact of the agreed to what has been termed as a ‘buffer matter is some kind of planning has gone zone’, which would be an area where neither through before these multiple face-offs’, it side carries out any construction or patrolling activity and would differ from location to 1economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defense/1025- chinese transgressions-reported-from-2016-to-2018- location. Although, no specific time has been government-data/articleshow/72262114.cms?from=mdr. (Accessed on 14 June 2020). agreed upon regarding how long the buffer zone will exist. It is being exercised as a 2 The Times of India. April 16, 2012. ‘37 incursions of Chinese forces reported in Uttarakhand: CM’. (accessed confidence-building measure for restoration of on 14 June 2020) 3 The Hindu. July 25, 2003. ‘Arunachal Pradesh not part the status quo as of early April. Nevertheless, of India’. (Accessed on 14 June 2020). 4 https://internewscast.com/india-china-border-dispute-a- the Chinese intent seems to have succeeded conflict-years-in-the-making/. (accessed on 14 June 2020) slightly which is to prevent India from carrying 2 INSTITUTE OF CHINESE STUDIES, DELHI ● JUL 2020 out any new construction beyond the these boundary lines did not lie in their being confluence of the Shyok-Galwan River. It is ‘true’ or the claim being ‘real’ but in their against this backdrop that one needs to situate being shared by a process of political selection the contending views regarding India-China’s and then reified in respective countries competitive power projections at the border. If (Karackattu, 2017). The creation of knowledge, one looks at the prolific literature around this beliefs, and norms in each country’s decision- topic, it has almost been within the realist or making process evolved to alter the meaning neo-realist tradition of international relations and construction of the material reality of the either explicitly or implicitly. C.V. boundary (Adler, 1997). Constructivists also Ranganathan looks at the rivalry through the think that the early disputes that marred Sino- prism of changing geopolitical situations while Indian relations created a perception of mistrust suggesting India for a multilateral architecture and hostility. This perception was kept alive in the South Asia region (2015). Srikanth and reinforced by the periodical crisis arising Kondapalli yields a persuasive insight into out of their many unresolved disputes (ibid). It India’s engagement with China on multiple got extended by their inescapable geographical fronts to prevent any change in the proximity and near-simultaneous emergence as configuration of power in the region (ibid). a rising power. Further, according to the constructivist point of Constructivism takes a sociological, view, international relations are shaped not just rather than ‘strategic interaction’ view of by material forces such as power and wealth, international relations. but also by inter-subjective factors, including ideas, norms, history, culture, and identity. As it is also well said that, in the realist Constructivism takes a sociological, rather than conception of security, threats are external and ‘strategic interaction’ view of international military-based, and the actors are rational relations. The interest and identities of states unitary states. Borders are strategic lines to be are not pre-ordained, or a given, but emerges militarily defended or breached. State survival and changes through a process of mutual is based on the deterrent function of borders interactions and socialization. Constructivists The direct and indirect damage inflicted against military incursions by other states. have challenged the uncritical acceptance of by the pandemic affects Chinese political (Andreas 2003:81). the balance of power system posited by realist and economic interests in the region. and neo-realist scholars as the basis of Asian On the contrary, the constructivists offer a regional order by giving greater play to the rebuttal to this dominant view. They consider possibility of change and transformation driven that the political importance of the selection of by socialization (Acharya, 2007). INSTITUTE OF CHINESE STUDIES, DELHI ● JUL 2020 3 While the aforementioned views are important China have been perceived in this decade. insights given by constructivists, they do not Next, the article investigates the potential help provide any prescriptive framework for benefits of territorial expansion by China in the the Sino-India border dispute. To examine the eastern sector by analyzing news articles and trajectories, and go beyond a limited approach reports. Potential benefits here mean the to understand the border dispute and patterns of strategic advantages of territorial expansion by incursions and standoffs, this paper gives a China in the eastern sector of the McMahon constructivist prescriptive framework. By line. comparing and critically analyzing the scholarly works on the dispute in the last Sino-India Border Dispute: Late 20th decade through a constructivist paradigmatic Century optic together with an update of more recent developments at the border, this paper will The scenario of the Sino-India border dispute contribute to the existing literature by giving a can be traced back to the British territorial much-ignored theoretical direction to the policies for the subcontinent. One such discussion. example is the border demarcation between India and China, faced with many disputes even till today. The border is divided into Sino-India border dispute can be traced eastern, middle and western sector wherein back to the British territorial policies for disputes exist in each one. In the eastern sector, the subcontinent. the line is disputed because China declined to sign the agreement declaring the Shimla Convention and the tripartite arrangement illegal on the grounds that the local The primary argument of this study unfolds as government could not be a party to it. 5 follows. The first section of the paper
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