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Home , Colombian peace process, Crisis in Venezuela

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comment

Colombia’s Peace and ’s Turmoil WP

An Emerging Regional Crisis Landscape in South America S Günther Maihold

Despite concerted political efforts to isolate the Colombian peace process from Vene- zuela’s internal unrest, the signs suggest coalescence and tectonic strife in the region. There are justified concerns that the increasingly interconnected constellation of pre- carious peace in and growing in Venezuela could generate new dynamics of violence. The two Andean neighbours are so closely connected by ideological confrontation, border disputes, illegal violent actors, migration flows, the narcotics trade and economic exchange that the individual problems become almost indistinguishable – both within and between the two countries. The bottom line is that the political and economic crisis in Venezuela is eroding efforts to consolidate peace efforts in Colombia. Avoiding lasting harm will require the two states to pursue integrated solutions supported by the international community.

Colombia and Venezuela are closely bound tween the governments are on ice. Grounds together by the ongoing Colombian peace exist for concern that the crisis in Vene- process. served as a guarantor at zuela could spill over into Colombia and the talks that in November 2016 – further complicate or even endanger the after more than five years – produced a peace still young peace process there: the situa- agreement between the Colombian govern- tion on the shared border remains tense ment under President while the burden of provisioning and ac- and the leadership of the FARC guerrilla commodating Venezuelan migrants in group. Nevertheless, relations between the Colombia is growing. The upcoming elec- two countries have been dogged by a succes- tions – parliamentary in March 2018 and sion of conflicts. Now a new stage of escala- presidential in May – are already affecting tion looms in the context of the political cri- Colombian politics. The national reconcilia- sis in Venezuela; the legitimacy of the Vene- tion process is at risk, as the election cam- zuelan constituent assembly is contested, paign sharpens the polarisation between and the presidential and parliamentary supporters and opponents of the peace elections it arranged are challenged (see p. 5). settlement. Mutual recriminations and threats strain The Colombian government is also under the relationship, and bilateral contacts be- pressure from the to tackle

Prof. Dr. Günther Maihold is Deputy Director of SWP SWP Comment 12 March 2018

1 coca production, which is rising again. The mate that between 150 and 800 former transit routes for cocaine exports to the US fighters have quit the organisation to pur- and European markets lead through Vene- sue criminal activities on their own ac- zuela, where they further corrupt the power count. One obvious field of activity is drug structures. Parts of Venezuela’s military cultivation and trade. The area used for this apparatus and political elites are known in Colombia grew by 52 percent between to be involved in the drug trade and are 2015 and 2016. According to calculations subject to investigations and blacklisting by the Office on Drugs and by the US authorities. In Colombia in turn, Crime (UNODC) the country’s cocaine pro- criminal post-conflict structures (compris- duction probably increased by 34 percent. ing former FARC fighters and rearmed para- Against this pressure, the government’s militaries) supply incentives to continue National Comprehensive Program for the participating in the drug trade. This does Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS) is impo- lasting harm to the Colombian peace pro- tent. It seeks to convert 100,000 hectares cess, cementing existing violent conditions from coca production to legal crops, but in the border region and beyond. has to date achieved only 5 percent of that target. Coca farmers and Venezuelan migrants are blamed for unrest and road Colombia’s Fragile Peace blockades, especially in the border region Since the Colombian peace agreement with Venezuela (Catatumbo/Cúcuta). came into effect the FARC guerrilla fighters The Colombian government is not only have been successfully disarmed and demo- under pressure to implement the peace pro- bilised, and the peace process has entered a cess more dynamically to avoid disappoint- new phase. The next stage is the (re-)integra- ing high expectations; in fact material tion of almost seven thousand fighters into living conditions have worsened and many society. As such, “territorial peace” becomes fundamental promises made in the peace the central dimension of state action. Far- agreement remain unfulfilled. One of the reaching processes of local reconciliation central problems is the slowness of action and development forums need to be set by government and parliament, with delays in motion, in order to enable peaceful co- in passing the necessary existence on the basis of transitional jus- legislation (Justicia Especial para la Paz) tice, acknowledgement of guilt, amnesty and appointing judges to administer it. processes and political participation. The Administrative capacities for developing UN is supporting this new phase through a state presence in regions formerly con- a new verification mission mandated by trolled by the guerrillas are also lacking, the Security Council. The first UN mission, and funding options for integrating deployed after the peace agreement, com- displaced persons and former fighters are pleted its work of monitoring the disarma- limited. The latter would require economic ment of the FARC slightly behind schedule development, infrastructure investment on 25 September 2017. and projects promoting legal agriculture But progress on the economic, social and and founding small businesses. The lack of political reintegration of demobilised fight- such opportunities calls into question the ers is slow, and enforcement of security sustainability of the demobilisation, and guarantees is patchy. Assassinations disrupt in turn increases the danger of ex-fighters the process: in 2017 more than 75 social drifting into crime. This not least also weak- and ethnic minority leaders and representa- ens the already precarious public support tives of groups were murdered. for the peace process. Attacks on former FARC fighters endanger The “fast track” for expedited adoption the trust required for their successful re- of numerous laws associated with the peace integration into society. Observers also esti- agreement ended in November 2017. Now

SWP Comment 12 March 2018

2 the legislative process is subjugated to the 55 percent have already left the designated logic of the election campaign. Of the 24 transition zones because of the lack of state central legislative initiatives that were sup- provision for reintegration and training, posed to be realised under the fast-track looking to make their own way instead. rule, only ten succeeded. The political re- form to reorganise electoral constituencies in the former FARC regions failed com- Peace Talks with ELN Stalled pletely. With President Santos’s governing The Colombian government’s cease-fire coalition disbanded for the election cam- with the – still armed and active – ELN paign, many of the pending bills associated guerrilla group expired on 9 January 2018. with the peace agreement are likely to be Talks in the Ecuadorian capital Quito aim- put on ice. And even the legislation that has ing to extend the agreement were suspended been adopted still has to be approved by the after ELN fighters attacked demobilised Supreme Court, further delaying the point FARC members, police stations and mem- where it comes into effect. So now institu- bers of the security organs. tional and political calculations override It is currently hard to imagine a success- the peace goals of the Santos government. ful peace process with the ELN occurring The latter remains in office for another before President Santos steps down. The seven months, which is likely to be a diffi- ELN is a much more difficult counterpart cult time in view of the expected realign- than the FARC, with a decentralised organi- ment of political forces. sational structure requiring protracted in- The election campaign itself plays a ternal coordinating processes. At the same part in eroding the consensus for the peace time the Colombian armed forces have settlement, with an ideological controversy stepped up their operations against the ELN, over “Castro-” inflaming passions: degrading what little trust did exist. Nor Parts of the conservative opposition stoke does the government want to expose itself fears that “Venezuelan conditions” associated during the election campaign to accusa- with socio-economic decline and political tions that it is taking an overly conciliatory turmoil in the neighbouring country could stance. The ELN also operates in regions infect Colombia when the FARC enters the bordering Venezuela, where it further in- electoral arena. The spectres they invoke flames an already complex situation: Colom- include material shortages, abolition of pri- bia’s borders see a superposition of crimi- vate property, persecution of political oppo- nal activities, guerrilla operations and mas- nents and subversion of the armed forces. sive migratory movements. To that extent Venezuela’s crisis is directly implicated in the internal conflicts in Co- lombia, where it exacerbates polarisation Migration Pressure and Border Security over the legitimacy and provisions of the The problematic situation at the Colom- peace agreement. This can be expected to bian-Venezuelan border is a central ele- lead to a situation where internal political ment of the new crisis landscape in the priorities shape the political and legal inter- northern Andes. Many have pretation of the agreement, and the peace sought respite from the humanitarian process loses transformative thrust and crisis by emigrating to Colombia and Brazil. becomes sidelined. The FARC is already Massive migration movements that have complaining (not without reason) that the been set in motion – above all towards government’s lateness in implementing Colombia – that threaten peaceful co- particular elements is significantly skewing existence. Here the historical situation is the internal logic of the agreement. This reversed: during the post-1970 oil boom applies not least to the integration of de- many sought a better life in mobilised fighters. According to the UN, Venezuela.

SWP Comment 12 March 2018

3 According to the Colombian government prevent conflicts at the border spiralling more than 600,000 persons from Venezuela out of control. immigrated in the past eighteen months, not counting Colombian returnees. Complete economic collapse would lead to a dramatic Consequences for Economic Development increase in the numbers. Altogether 1.2 mil- Multiple sensitivities and interdependen- lion Venezuelans are believed to have relo- cies make the relationship between Colom- cated to Colombia for economic or political bia and Venezuela a political management reasons. Providing for this influx presents conundrum. Confrontation can easily mar increasing logistical and social problems the bilateral relationship where internal in a difficult post-conflict context, and anti- difficulties are projected on the respective Venezuelan reactions have been reported. neighbour. Before President Hugo Chávez The migration creates turmoil at the initiated the era of restrictive economic 2,200-kilometre border between the two policies in 2009 Venezuela was Colombia’s countries, where violent incidents have al- second-largest trading partner (after the ready been reported. Economic crises have United States), supplying industrial prod- repeatedly led to closure of the six official ucts and increasingly also basic foodstuffs. border crossings, most recently in August In 2007 17 percent of Colombia’s foreign 2016. Colombia is now committing more trade was with Venezuela; by 2016 the troops to the border region, but with 288 figure had fallen to just 0.5 percent. Trade informal crossing points, the border must is hampered by the Venezuelan govern- be regarded as porous. The region is char- ment’s three different official dollar ex- acterised by legal and illegal trade, indig- change rates, in addition to the black mar- enous groups whose territories straddle the ket rate. Many Colombian firms – most border, and shared ecological challenges. recently the airline – have ceased The issue of border security is of central operating in Venezuela after suffering importance, and is complicated by the massive dollar conversion losses. breadth of problems that come together in Growing asymmetries between the two the region: massive migration flows, drug countries hamper economic development. transit routes, ELN hideouts and growing Venezuela operates a planned economy; smuggling between the two countries. Colombia has free-market competition Especially during election campaigns, with open markets. Given the differences the question of border management gets between the economic systems, imbalances instrumentalised to domestic ends. The are inevitable, with massive price differ- interests of guerrilla groups, resurgent ences for strategic goods generating im- paramilitaries and criminal organisations mediate demand across the border. This are multifariously interwoven with formal applies to state-subsidised vehicle fuel in and informal entities at the border and Venezuela, which attracts Colombian pur- within the border region, including control chasers. Conversely dramatic shortages of instances on both sides, military forces and food and medicines in Venezuela generate state-sponsored Venezuelan gangs. Pressure enormous local border traffic with Colom- of migration generates its own conflict con- bia, placing great strains on Colombian stellations, as well as expanding the oppor- healthcare infrastructure and distribution tunities offered by the black economy. With systems in communities close to the borders. no prospect of a joint border policy, the The trade in fuel, livestock, food, gold problem threatens to spiral out of control. and people is increasingly organised A deliberate or accidental provocation by through illicit channels and smuggling. It the border police or the military can easily is believed that goods worth US$1 million escalate. There is an urgent need for recip- cross the border unrecorded on a daily rocal crisis intervention mechanisms to basis. New paramilitaries, ELN fighters and

SWP Comment 12 March 2018

4 Chavist collectives compete for control of General Manuel Quevedo’s recent the border, which also represents one of appointment as president of the PDVSA the most important transit routes for the underlines the strength of the military’s international cocaine trade. Incursions grip on the levers of power. The armed by Venezuelan armed forces are a regular forces also control the distribution sys- occurrence, seeking to counter the im- tems for food and medicines. The growing pression that Venezuelan society is haem- “militarisation” of the post-Chavist system orrhaging through emigration and eco- reveals how President Maduro is seeking to nomic decline. preserve his power via the security organs. These at the same time become the cen- tral pillars of the state-run economic and Venezuela’s Protracted Crisis social programmes. With the decline of the No other state in currently national production apparatus the country suffers such a multitude of overlapping becomes increasingly dependent on exter- crises as Venezuela. The state is on the verge nal lenders and states like China, of bankruptcy, the population experienc- and India. Buying up worthless debt secures ing a humanitarian crisis, and the politi- them influence over Venezuela’s resources cal situation characterised by an openly sector and shares of the country’s oil reserves. authoritarian centralisation of power. Presi- Maduro is always inventing new tricks to dent Nicolás Maduro recently announced stabilise the economy and improve the sup- that opposition parties that boycotted the ply situation. These include the announced December 2017 local elections will be ex- introduction of the resource-backed crypto- cluded from the presidential election on currency “”, which is the first digital 20 May 2018. state currency. The crypto-Petro is to be Venezuela is heavily dependent on its oil closely tied to the oil price, and guaranteed industry, with oil exports accounting for 96 by Venezuela’s enormous oil and gas reserves percent of foreign exchange revenues. Low as well as its gold and diamond deposits. oil prices have created a massive crisis in The white paper on its introduction states state finances. Apparently the country now that the Petro will be used for investment, intends to “restructure” its debt, worsening savings and international financial trans- its international credit ratings and bringing fers, and serve all citizens to pay taxes and it ever closer to default. The IMF put Vene- state services. It is hoped that tying the cur- zuelan at 2,400 percent in 2017, rency to the oil price will reduce inflation- with the economy shrinking by 12 percent. ary pressure and achieve greater independ- Foreign debt amounts to $120 billion, with ence from the US dollar. After US$735 a large proportion due in the coming ten million were raised in the first days of the years. The loans taken out by the state oil Petro pre-sale, Maduro has announced that company PDVSA are especially relevant, he will launch the Petro Gold as an addi- because its extensive oil reserves serve to tional crypo-currency in order to capture backstop the state budget. Production infra- further international funds. structure is deteriorating rapidly due to The one-month pre-sale period began on lack of investment. Whereas at the end of 20 February 2018. Caracas hopes this will the 1990s Venezuela was still producing supply an injection of fresh capital and 3.2 million barrels per day, the figure serve to stabilise the national economy. It is had fallen to just 1.9 million by October planned to issue 100 million Petros, backed 2017. Even if Venezuela is still the United by 100 million barrels of the country’s oil States’ third-largest oil supplier, with 7 reserves, in order to raise $5.9 billion. As percent market share, the corresponding such, the Petro could potentially rebuild dollar revenues no longer cover its import the country’s access to the international needs. financial markets. But there must be doubts

SWP Comment 12 March 2018

5 as to whether it can really succeed in in- regime that prefers to play for time rather sulating Venezuela from the international than enter into serious negotiations. Nor oil market, which remains tied to the US has it received much help from the infor- dollar. Domestic disruption could easily mal of fourteen American send the Petro into a downward spiral, if states, whose latest meeting in Santiago de access to the guaranteed oil were called unanimously rejected the early presi- into question. The parliament, which dential election in Venezuela, asserting that Maduro has frozen out, has already called it would “lack legitimacy and credibility”. the Petro “unconstitutional contraction While some of the Venezuelan opposition of debt” because it lacks parliamentary parties wanted to negotiate with the gov- approval. So the new funding instrument ernment about election modalities, others is in no way immune to the political crisis. refused due to the failure of guarantees. The common position for a boycott of the elections has been undermined by one op- The Weakness of the Opposition position leader, who announced his can- On 30 July 2017 Venezuela elected a con- didacy at the last moment. This means the stituent assembly, granting President chances of united front remain small and Maduro an instrument to enforce his in- the centrifugal forces are only likely to be terests. After the opposition-dominated accelerated by the government’s tactical National Assembly was suspended, all state manoeuvring. Maduro denounces the op- institutions are now subordinated to the position in nationalist declarations, accus- new organ. Through a tactical combination ing it of being externally controlled from of repression and negotiation Maduro has Washington and Bogotá. The Trump Ad- succeeded in wearing down the opposition ministration’s sanctions and Colombia’s and neutralising its pressure on the regime. rejection of his government allow Maduro The opposition alliance Mesa de Unidad to present himself as the defender of Democrática (MUD) is significantly weakened, national sovereignty. after Maduro successfully played its leaders against each other. While the opposition was still able to organise massive protests Options in a Region of Crisis in mid-2017, today it is largely toothless. The constellation of problems within and The reason for this is not least that civil between Colombia and Venezuela is extreme- society has largely withdrawn from politi- ly complex, with multiple overlapping and cal life. Ordinary people no longer believe interlocking conflicts. Navigating this land- they can improve their situation by taking scape of crisis requires efforts at the national to the streets. As such the opposition par- and regional level. Positive impulses from ties have lost both their institutional base Latin America are not to be expected, as and their social roots. Instead they rely the existing regional crisis management increasingly strongly on the international mechanisms – such as the Union of South community to press for their demands in American Nations (UNASUR) – have largely talks with the government (most recently fallen into abeyance, while the Lima group in the Dominican Republic). Four points are restricts itself to joint declarations. The central: recognition of the humanitarian international community is called upon. crisis by the government, reinstatement of It is already active in the region through the National Assembly; agreement on a de- its engagement in Colombia’s peace pro- pendable electoral calendar; and release of cess as well as (fruitless) mediation efforts the 300 political prisoners. in Venezuela. Integrated solutions are The government has shown no sign of needed, encompassing the national, bi- granting any of these demands. The oppo- national and regional dimensions of the sition finds itself facing an intransigent conflict.

SWP Comment 12 March 2018

6 First of all the ideological fixation of ject to prosecution demonstrates the kind Colombia’s domestic politics needs to be of persecution oppositionists can continue overcome. Currently every political turn to expect. At the same time the government in Venezuela finds immediate resonance is relying on a rising oil price expanding its in Colombia’s overheated election atmos- financial leeway. In Colombia the signs are phere, to the detriment of the bilateral that the election will be won by forces cam- relationship. Unless the obsession with the paigning on criticism of the peace agreement “bad” neighbour can be laid aside, there is and a policy of distancing from Venezuela. little chance of reining in the repercussions The already fragile peace process could thus of relentless authoritarianism in Venezuela become even more solidly bogged down, on the Colombian peace process. Numerous especially as no sustained civil society pres- bilateral problems are on the table and sure for implementation can be expected. need to be dealt with. Above all the border It is incumbent upon the international region needs to be pacified: this is where community to prevent the various crises old and new conflict constellations overlap, and tensions in Colombian-Venezuelan rela- © Stiftung Wissenschaft und with the greatest risk of various forms of tions from spiralling. Most urgently needed Politik, 2018 violence flaring up. Investment in infra- is the establishment of a humanitarian cor- All rights reserved structure is needed to create economic in- ridor in Venezuela to address the shortages This Comment reflects centives for reintegration of former FARC of food and medicines. Given that President the author’s views. fighters. Otherwise there is a danger of Maduro has to date rejected such a meas- The online version of them switching to the ELN forces or to ure, the idea of using the funds to aid Vene- this publication contains functioning links to other criminal and paramilitary groups operating zuelan citizens who have fled to Colombia SWP texts and other relevant in the border region. Regional reconcilia- could be considered – even if this would in sources. tion forums and development committees the short term create additional incentives SWP Comments are subject need to quickly begin (and complete) their for migration. to internal peer review, fact- work in order to guarantee conditions The United States and the European checking and copy-editing. For further information on under which economic dynamism can Union have imposed sanctions on Vene- our quality control pro- emerge in hitherto marginalised regions. zuela, designed to increase the costs the cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- Drug transit through Venezuela must also Maduro government incurs for its course. berlin.org/en/about-swp/ be stopped; it opens up access to massive This applies to the country’s access to the quality-management-for-swp- publications/ resources and fuels political conflicts. This international finance markets, but also to is a task above all for the Colombia security personal resources that representatives of SWP organs; no support can be expected from the regime have generally parked abroad. Stiftung Wissenschaft und the Venezuelan side, where parts of the But punishment is only one side of the coin. Politik armed forces are themselves involved in There also needs to be an incentive, a prom- German Institute for International and the drug trade. ise that costs will fall if the country returns Security Affairs The elections scheduled for 2018 in both to democratic rule. On the way there a tran- Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 countries currently offer little prospect of sition plan needs to be drawn up – with the 10719 Berlin lasting impulses for a transformation of the participation of the opposition – that con- Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 confrontative relationship. In the event of tains elements of an economic adjustment www.swp-berlin.org electoral fraud occurring again, Venezuela’s policy and also provides for the various [email protected] weak opposition will be able to achieve little powers of the country to function in an ISSN 1861-1761 in the country’s centrally controlled insti- orderly manner again. Questions of national tutions. Even if the international community and international prosecution are of cen- Translation by Meredith Dale refuses to recognise the result the regime tral importance for members of the Maduro (English version of in Caracas is likely to be able to maintain regime, and will need to be clarified. This SWP-Aktuell 13/2018) its grip on power, regardless of the precari- could offer the starting point to sensibly ous living conditions of large sections of interlink the different levels of crisis and the population. A new decree that declares tackle the Venezuelan-Colombian crisis political criticism to be a “hate crime” sub- landscape in an integrated manner.

SWP Comment 12 March 2018

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