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Castro-Communist Insurgency in Venezuela. A Pik C;I ,IM K9t ammmFORt SCURITY CASTRO-COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN VENEZUELA A Study of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Operations and Techniques in Venezuela, 1960 - 1964 SECTION I - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS SECTION II - DISCUSSION 19T71 U1~ TLhl1 Georgetown Research Project Atlantic Research Corporation ) Alexandria, Virginia 1 " • i.. ,i p,'ap. -d Reproauced by the CLEARINGHOUSE le*~e' c I information Springfield Va. 22151~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~1' '00-'S:-e~!c& & A,) SECTION I SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS iV 'I SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS I. EVOLUTION OF THE CASTRO- COMMUNIST INSURGENCY 1. The Insurgency Background 2. The First Insurgent Attempt at Rapid Victory 3. A Communist Proposal for Protracted War 4. The Second Insurgent Attempt at Rapid Victory 5. The Insurgent Shift to Protracted War II. INSURGENT ORGANIZATION, WEAPONS, AND SUPPLY SYSTEMS 6: The Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) 7. Insurgent Weaponry 8. Insurgent Supply Systems III. URBAN AND URBAN-RURAL INSURGENCY AND COUNTER- INSURGENCY OPERATIONS 9. Urban Insurgency 10. Motorized Urban-Rural Insurgency 11. Urban and Urban-Rural Counterinsurgency IV. GUERRILLA AND ANTI-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS 12. The Falc6n Guerrilla Base Area 13. The El Charal Guerrillas 14. Military Anti-Guerrilla Operations V. PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS I :! 1. EVOLUTION OF THE CASTRO-COMMUNIST INSURGENCY 1. The Insurgency Background. Castro-Communist insurgency in Venezuela is the work of the Venezuelan Communist Party (est. 30-40,000 membership) and a smaller Castroite organization, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). The insurgents draw the bulk of their following from Caracas and other large cities. They operate in a physical setting that contains mountain regions suitable for guerrilla activity. Venezuelan society is characterized by serious socio-economic problems on which the insurgents can capitalize: notably a high rate of unemployment and mass poverty i an oil-rich nation. The political history of Venlezuela is largely one of dictatorships and numerous civilian and military insurgencies. Venezuela ousted its most recent dictaLor in January 1958 and passed under the rule of democratic governments which have improved the socio-economic condition of broad sectors of the national society, sain- tained a high degree of civil liberty, and kept up good relations with the professional military. The insurgency in Venezuela is thus a contest be- tween a Castro-Communist minority and a Latin American democracy which, in the words of President Romulo Betancourt, is seeking to demonstrate "that even while defending itself, democracy can grow and expand to meet the needs and aspirations of the people." 2. The First Insurgent Attempt at Rapid Victory. Castro- Communist insurgency in Venezuela opened in October-November 1960 with riots in Caracas and a futile call for a revolutionary general strike against the Betancourt Government. Failure of these initiatives led the insurgents to evolve a five-stage plan for "rapid victory" which envisaged a Castro- Communk-t akeover of Venezuela about the end of 1962. The plan called for the insurgency to be waged mainly in the cities, especially Caracas, where victory would be won through a combination of street violence, terrorism, and uprisings by military garrisons won over to the Castro- Communist cause. Rural guerrilla warfare was also to be employed, but i4 only in a way which strongly suggests that the insurgents planned to use the guerrillas as a strategic diversion. Cuba supported implementation of the "rapid victory" plan with .inancial assistance and by training several hundred young Venezuelans in guc tilla warfare and terrorism. Stages I, I1 and III of the insurgent plan went into operation in 1961 and involved a "softening up" period of riots and terrurist actions in Caracas and other cities. Stage IV was implemented early in 1962 when guerrilla bands, consisting mainly of students, were sent into eight mountain regions of the country. The essay into guerrilla warfare was a crushing failure: 143 guerrillas were captured and seven killed, Only sniall bands in the Falc6n and El Charal mountains of western Venezuelk survived the general guerrilla disaster. All hope of "rapid victory" by the end of 1962 vanished when the support garnered by the insurgents among the Venezuelan military was wasted in uncoordinated and fruitless uprisings by the Marine garrisons at Carupano (May 1962) anI Puerto Cabello (June 1962). 3. A Communist Proposal for Protracted War. After the insurgent defeats of early 1962, a member of the Venezuelan Communist Party recom- mended a new insurgency strategy of protracted rural guerrilla war in a document that contained severe criticisms of the earlier attempt at "rapid victory." The anonymous critic confirmed that the insurgent F had expected to win victory through urban Insurgehcy violence and military garrison revolts alone. He claimed that, in consequence, the insurgents had never really answered for themselves the qiestion: "For what purpose do we have guerrilla fronts ?" He criticized the ladk of centralized political and military direction in the insurgent effort, the "abominable choice" of guerrilla personnel, the "stupid terrorism" of some urban Insurgent actions, and the "adventurism" which prompted the Caruipano and Puerto Cabello garrison revolts. The Communist critic urged the insurgents to abandon thoughts of "rapid victory" and to concentrate on guerrilla warfare. Ile acknowledged that the urban insurgency effort had developed to such an extent that, in this is - Afth it respect, the Venezuelan insurgents had improved on the revolutionary tech- niques employed by "he Castro forces in Cuba. But ne warned the insurgents not to overestimate the urban insurgents or to forget that they could only be an auxiliary to the rural guerrillas "even though, in the beginning, the exploits of the urban guerrillas may s ometimes appear more spectacular and brilliant." 4. The Second Insurgent Attempt at Rapid Victory. The Venezuelan insurgents rejected the proposal for protracted war and, In late 1962, under- took a second attempt at "rapid victory." The strategy called for the main rebel energies to be centered on a campaign of urban and urban-based in- surgency violence that would aim at one or both of two objectives: (a) under- mine public confidence in the Betancourt Government and thereby Induce a military or civilian revolt against it; (b) prevent or disrupt the elections of December 1963 that would choose a new Venezuelan President. The insurgents cons idered that success in either objective would plunge the country into a crisis out of which Castro-Communism would emerge victorious. In keeping with the emphasis on urban insurgency in the new strategy, no new rural guerrilla fronts were established, but the surviving guerrilla bands in Falcon and El Charal were reinforced and encouraged into action. The second insurgent strategy for "rapid victory" was con- ceived of, and implemented, as a two-stage effort. For more than a year, from late Summer 1962 into Autumn 1963, the insurgents attempted to bring down the Betancourt Government by a sustained campaign of urban and urban-rural terrorism which included'more than 1,000 acts of robbery, arson, sabotage, street violence, and sniping. Caracas bore the main brunt of the attack. The terrorism initially induced what President Betancourt described as "a dangerous pert-)d in which stunned surprise produced a kind of public paralysis," but ultimately aroused public resentment, and failed to stimulate the military or civilian revolt for which the insurgents hoped. The second stage of the insurgent strategy called for disruption of the December 1963 elections with an even greater outburst of terrorist tii violence, coupled with civil war in Caracas with the aid of mortars, bazookas, recoilless rifles, and other weapons smuggled in from Cuba. The attempt at civil war was frustrated when the government discovered the Cuban arms on an ocean beach. The attempt to wreck the elections led to a stunning insur- gent defeat when millions of Venezuelan citizens braved terrorist threats of death and went to the polls. Rauil Leoni was elected to succeed President Betancourt. 5. The Insurgent Shift to Protracted War. Insurgency violence in Venezuela dropped off to the near vanishing point for several months after the December 1963 elections. One faction in the Castroite Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) withdrew from the insurgency fight. Another MIR faction agreed with the Venezuelan Communist Party in Spring 1964 to resume the insurgency as a protracted war In which primary emphasis would be placed upon rural guerrilla warfare, secondary emphasis on t1rban insur- gency. The Venezuelan Government charged that Cuba sent in $1,000,000 during 1964 to aid the new insurgent effort. Relaxations in government security precautions asslisd, the opening of a guerrilla training camp in the "El Bachiller" mountains so,.tIeast of Caracas and the sending of reinforcements to the Falcon and El Charal guerrillas. The Venezuelan Army destroyed the "El Bachiller" camp in July-August 1964, It was actively engaged against the Falcon and El Charal guerrillas in the closing months of 1964. Urban insurgency violence in Venezuela during 1964 was relatively minor. It appeared that the main Castro-Communist hopes of future victory were pinned to the:success and expansion of the rural guerrilla effort. iv II II. INSURGENT ORGANIZATION, WEAPONS, AND LOGISTICS 6. The Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). The or-
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