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VENEZUELA Situational Update and 2019 Outlook Briefing Note – 28 March 2019

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VENEZUELA Situational Update and 2019 Outlook Briefing Note – 28 March 2019 VENEZUELA Situational update and 2019 outlook Briefing note – 28 March 2019 The socioeconomic crisis in Venezuela continued to deteriorate throughout 2018, leading to further collapse of See map on page 8 services, deterioration of health facilities, food security, and nutrition among the population, and one of the biggest mass displacements in South America’s history. In December 2018, inflation stood at 2,500,000%, and this is expected to keep increasing. Food availability is hampered by import restrictions, and price increases reduce access to food, medicine and other basic goods. The economic crisis is exacerbated by the deepening political crisis. This is characterised by the erosion of democratic institutions and growing civil discontent. The standoff between the government and the opposition is exacerbating the risk of armed confrontation, and the likelihood of international intervention seems increasingly likely. Anticipated scope and scale Key figures Humanitarian constraints Inside Venezuela, inflation is expected to keep spiralling, 5.3 million The Venezuelan government largely denies leading to increased poverty, deterioration of living the scale of humanitarian needs and restricts Venezuelan refugees by the end of 2019 conditions, increased food and medicine shortages, more access for international humanitarian deaths caused by the failure of the health system, and organisations, and blocked the entry of US paralysis of commerce, and education. There is a risk that 283,880% increase humanitarian aid in February 2019. internal tensions and growing pressure from international of the price of a food basket in 2018 stakeholders could lead to armed confrontation, and growing discontent amongst the population that is increasingly likely Limitations 70% of hospitals reporting The exact number of people in need, and sectoral needs inside to trigger large-scale civil unrest. There is no indication that power outages & lack of drinking water Venezuela are largely unknown. Epidemiological information is also the influx of Venezuelans will slow down in the near future, lacking due to the collapse of health capabilities and surveillance and the number of refugees from Venezuela is expected to systems at the national level. reach 5.3 million by the end of 2019. Neighbouring countries’ 7,523 casualties capacities and basic services are likely to be further strained. from police and military violence in 2018 Any questions? Please contact our senior analyst, Jude Sweeney: [email protected] ACAPS Briefing Note: Venezuela Crisis impact and at least 4 deaths along Venezuela’s borders with Colombia and Brazil (Caracas Chronicles 24/02/2019, Al Jazeera 25/02/2019, BBC 25/02/2019). The deepening political and socio-economic crisis in Venezuela has led to the collapse of In the beginning of March 2019, Venezuela experienced a major nation-wide power and services, deterioration of humanitarian conditions within the country, and one of the communications outage, impacting scarce food supplies, water pumps, and endangering biggest mass displacements in the history of South America. Due to a significant drop in hospital patients, with some 21 casualties reported. Many schools, public offices, and national oil production (54% since 1998), and international prices since 2016, Venezuela businesses were closed as a result. The power cut is likely to have been the result of is estimated to have lost 18% of its GDP in 2018, and accumulated 159% of its GDP in years of mismanagement and obsolescence of the electrical system. Maduro, however, public debt. Between 2014 and 2017, Venezuela had lost almost 39% of its economic blamed the outage on an ‘electromagnetic attack’ from the US. The blackout led to activity per capita, and hyperinflation stood at 2,500,000% at the end of 2018. In addition, another wave of protests, during which Maduro requested the help of colectivos (pro- price increases reduce access to food, medicine, and other basic goods, while the general government armed groups) to repress (InSight Crime 18/03/2019, Al Jazeera 12/03/2019, NPR availability of food is hampered by import restrictions (El Nacional 04/10/2018, IMF 10/2018, FAO 11/03/2019, The Guardian 11/03/2019: 13/03/2019). 16/01/2019, Harvard University 10/2018). Migration: Since 2015, the crisis has prompted over 2.7 million people to leave Venezuela, Presidential elections took place on 20 May 2018, four months before the scheduled date, out of which only about 1.4 million have regular status in the countries they fled to. The with parts of the opposition boycotting the vote (NYT 01/03/2018). With a 46% turnout number of Venezuelans abroad went from 700,000 to over 1,600,000 between 2015 and according to the election board, Maduro was declared president with 67.7% of the vote. 2017, and some 1.1 million more fled between 2017 and the beginning of 2019. The The opposition declared the turnout was in fact much lower, alleged further irregularities reasons for leaving are varied, and include political persecution and shortages of food, and did not recognise the results. Several countries indicated that they had not medicine, and other essential goods. Many are in need of international protection, and recognised the results, including the US and Latin American governments of the Lima since 2014, 408,500 Venezuelans have applied for asylum, including 248,000 in 2018 group (BBC 21/05/2018, The Guardian 21/05/2018). Protests in reaction to the socioeconomic alone. In 2014, just over 4,000 Venezuelans applied for asylum (UNHCR 03/2019, UNHCR situation persisted throughout the rest of 2018, while the opposition, despite experiencing 13/03/2018, IOM 24/04/2018). In 2018, migration outside Venezuela continued, with 5,000 strong internal divisions, intensified its calls for a transitional government. Neighbouring Venezuelans leaving the country on average every day (UNHCR 22/02/2019). According to a countries and international powers also called for a negotiated transition of power to find Gallup survey conducted in 2018, 36% of Venezuelans said they would like to leave a way out of the crisis (Crisis Group 23/11/2018)1. Venezuela permanently if they could, including a majority (51%) of Venezuelans aged 15 Latest developments: In January 2019, the opposition-controlled National Assembly to 29 (Gallup 29/01/2019). declared Maduro’s second term illegitimate, and, using a constitutional disposition, Needs vary depending on the country, but many Venezuelans in host countries are in designated its leader Juan Guaido, as interim president. He immediately declared his urgent need of food, nutrition, health, and WASH assistance. Protection assistance is also intention to put together a transition government and to organise a presidential election crucial, including legal help with documentation in order to access healthcare and in the next year. In the following days, he was recognised by about 50 states, including employment. Many Venezuelans remain in an irregular situation (due to lack of the United States, Brazil, Ecuador, and most Western European countries (Le Monde documentation, long waiting periods, high application fees, etc.), leaving them without Diplomatique 03/2019). Between 21 and 27 January, nation-wide protests against Maduro’s rights and access to services and vulnerable to exploitation and abuse (R4V 14/12/2018). regime were violently repressed by government forces (El Universal 28/01/2019). Health In the beginning of February, tensions at the border escalated when the US and Health infrastructure: According to the Encuentra Nacional de Hospital conducted Venezuelan opposition attempted to deliver aid across the borders separating Colombia, between 1 – 10 March 2018 and surveying some 40 hospitals across Venezuela, the Brazil and Venezuela, but were blocked by the Venezuelan security forces. Protests heath system continues to deteriorate. Service provision has been affected by the closure ensued, and were met with force from Venezuelan authorities, causing over 300 injuries of health facilities, deterioration of infrastructure, shortages of medicines, and protests 1 For more details on the origin of the current crisis, please check previous ACAPS special report 2 ACAPS Briefing Note: Venezuela from medical staff. Almost 70% of hospitals reported intermittent power outage and lack Food security and livelihoods: Since 2017, national food production has reduced by over of safe drinking water. 79% of public hospitals lack regular water supply in 2018, including 60%, and imports dropped by over 70%, leading to significant shortages of food and 25% that reported receiving no water at all (National Assembly Venezuela, Médicos por la Salud 2018, alarming levels of food insecurity across the country(CHE Health 09/2018, Provea 2017). CHE Health 09/2018). Food is distributed by the government following Maduro’s ‘Plan de la Patria’, initially Shortages of medicines and health supplies: Shortages of medicines and health supplies established by Hugo Chávez. The plan aims at strengthening food production and have been widely reported. 95% of medical supplies and equipment are imported, and distribution of food boxes through the CLAP (Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y when imports fell by 70% between 2012 and 2017, the medical sector was heavily Producción). Distribution, however, is conditioned by ownership of a ‘fatherland card’, affected. In 2018, health facilities reported lacking on average about 50% of medical introduced by Maduro as an instrument to control who has access to
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