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General Country of Origin Information Report Venezuela 2020

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General Country of Origin Information Report Venezuela 2020 General Country of Origin Information Report Venezuela 2020 Date June 2020 Page 1 of 112 General Country of Origin Information Report Venezuela 2020 | Publication details City The Hague Assembled by Country of Origin Information Reports Section (DAF/AB) Page 2 of 112 General Country of Origin Information Report Venezuela 2020 | Table of Contents Publication details ............................................................................................2 Table of Contents ............................................................................................3 Introduction ....................................................................................................5 1 Political and security situation .................................................................... 6 1.1 Political development and society ......................................................................6 1.1.1 The Maduro government ..................................................................................6 1.1.2 The current (political) balance of power ..............................................................8 1.2 The security situation .......................................................................................9 1.2.1 The security situation, focusing on certain areas in particular ................................9 1.3 Freedom of movement ................................................................................... 12 1.3.1 Travel restrictions .......................................................................................... 12 1.3.2 Exit checks (special lists and responsible authorities) ......................................... 13 1.3.3 Corruption of government officials in the context of departures from the country .. 14 1.4 Humanitarian situation ................................................................................... 14 1.4.1 Government programmes and programmes of national and international aid organisations ................................................................................................ 17 1.4.2 Instituto Venezolano de Seguros Sociales (IVSS) ............................................... 18 1.4.3 The CLAP programme .................................................................................... 19 1.5 The Plan Vuelta a la Patria programme ............................................................. 21 2 Identity, nationality and documents .......................................................... 22 2.1 Compulsory identification and documents ......................................................... 22 2.1.1 Compulsory identification ............................................................................... 22 2.1.2 From what age does this identification requirement apply? ................................. 22 2.1.3 To what extent is this identification requirement enforced? ................................. 22 2.1.4 Identity and travel documents......................................................................... 23 2.1.5 Procedure for applying for/renewing documents ................................................ 23 2.1.6 Current problems with obtaining a new passport ............................................... 25 2.1.7 The current method of extending a passport’s period of validity .......................... 25 2.1.8 Applications for documents abroad .................................................................. 26 2.1.9 Applications for a passport without a cédula de identidad abroad ......................... 26 2.1.10 Other indispensable and/or mandatory documents ............................................ 26 2.1.11 The issuing of passports to wanted persons ...................................................... 26 2.1.12 Corruption and forgeries ................................................................................. 27 2.2 Carnet de la Patria ......................................................................................... 28 2.3 Nationality .................................................................................................... 30 3 Human rights ............................................................................................. 31 3.1 Monitoring citizens ......................................................................................... 31 3.2 Opposition/dissidents ..................................................................................... 32 3.2.1 Main opposition parties .................................................................................. 32 3.2.2 Risk for opposition members ........................................................................... 34 3.3 Position of people of Arabic background in Venezuela ......................................... 37 3.4 Conscription objectors and deserters................................................................ 38 3.5 LGBTI .......................................................................................................... 42 3.6 (Unaccompanied) minors ................................................................................ 46 3.7 Human rights compliance and violations ........................................................... 48 3.7.1 Specific targets concerning human rights violations ........................................... 48 Page 3 of 112 3.7.2 Violations by target group and role of the so-called Act Against Hatred ................ 49 3.7.3 Human rights activists .................................................................................... 50 3.7.4 Journalism/freedom of the press ..................................................................... 51 3.7.5 Demonstrations: risk of arrest, imprisonment and/or persecution ........................ 54 3.8 Social media and telephony ............................................................................ 55 3.8.1 Handing over of social media passwords ........................................................... 58 3.8.2 Conviction of individuals based on social media content...................................... 58 3.8.3 Monitoring of content of mobile phone traffic (including text messages) ............... 59 3.9 Oversight and legal protection ......................................................................... 60 3.9.1 Possibilities for reporting a crime to the police ................................................... 60 3.9.2 Current state of the judicial process ................................................................. 63 3.9.3 Treatment of dissident judges and employees of the public prosecution service ..... 65 3.9.4 Conviction of civilians under military law .......................................................... 66 3.9.5 Access to a lawyer ......................................................................................... 67 3.10 The security apparatus ................................................................................... 67 3.10.1 Intelligence and security services (DGCIM, SEBIN, CESPPA) ............................... 67 3.10.2 The Policía Nacional Bolivariana (PNB), the Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas (CICPC), and the state and municipal police .................. 70 3.10.3 Fuerzas de Acciones Especiales (FAES) ............................................................. 71 3.10.4 Guardia Nacional Bolivariana (GNB) ................................................................. 73 3.10.5 Role and function of the Milicia Bolivariana de Venezuela army unit ..................... 74 3.11 Consejos comunales ...................................................................................... 76 3.12 Colectivos ..................................................................................................... 77 3.12.1 Principal pro-government colectivos ................................................................. 78 3.13 Irregular armed groups of guerrillas; paramilitaries; other criminal groups ........... 83 3.14 Arrests, custody and detentions ...................................................................... 89 3.14.1 Detention and prison conditions ...................................................................... 89 3.14.2 Prosecution of perpetrators/suspected perpetrators of abuse and torture .............. 92 3.14.3 Disappearances and kidnappings of opponents .................................................. 93 3.14.4 Extrajudicial executions and killings ................................................................. 93 4 Refugees and reception in the region ........................................................ 95 4.1 The refugee/migrant flow from Venezuela ........................................................ 95 4.2 Colombia ...................................................................................................... 96 4.3 Brazil ........................................................................................................... 98 4.4 Peru ............................................................................................................. 99 4.5 Ecuador ...................................................................................................... 100 4.6 Chile .......................................................................................................... 101 5 Repatriation ............................................................................................ 103 5.1 Problems with forcible or voluntary repatriation ............................................... 103 6 Appendices
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