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OAS Working Group to Address the Regional Crisis Caused by Venezuela’S Migrant and Refugee Flows

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OAS Working Group to Address the Regional Crisis Caused by Venezuela’S Migrant and Refugee Flows OAS Working Group to Address the Regional Crisis Caused by Venezuela’s Migrant and Refugee Flows Report June 2019 OAS Cataloging-in-Publication Data Organization of American States. Working Group to Address the Regional Crisis Caused by Venezuelan Migrant and Refugee Flows. Final Report of the OAS Working Group to Address the Venezuelan Migrant and Refugee Crisis in the Region. p. ; cm. (OAS. Official records ; OEA/Ser.D/XV.21) ISBN 978-0-8270-6915-2 1. Venezuela--Emigration and immigration. 2. America--Emigration and immigration. 3. Refugees-- America. 4. Refugees--Venezuela. I. Organization of American States. General Secretariat. II. Working Group to Address the Regional Crisis Caused by Venezuelan Migrant and Refugee Flows. III. Title. IV. Series. OEA/Ser.D/XV.21 WORKING GROUP: David Smolansky: Coordinator Gastão Toledo: Co-coordinator Dany Bahar: Independent Expert James Hollified: Independent Expert Luisa Marín: Research Manager WITH SUPPORT FROM: Marianella Herrera - Cuenca Irene Loreto VOLUNTEERS: Marisela Castillo Leticia Chacón Ernesto Romero Gianinna Romero This report is published thanks to the financial support of the Republic of Korea. © (2019) Organization of American States. All rights reserved under the International and Pan American Conventions. No portion of the content of this material may be reproduced or transmitted in any form, nor by any electronic or any other mean, totally or partially, without the express consent of the Organization. Editing, design and printing: Sigma Editores S.A.S - [email protected] Photographs: Freider Gandica, Natasha Quintana, Carlos Rivero, Barbara Uzcátegui and Esteban Vicuña. CONTENT Pag. Executive Summary .........................................................................................................................5 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................11 The Venezuelan migration flow .....................................................................................................15 Determinants of the migration and refugee crisis .........................................................................21 Humanitarian Crisis .................................................................................................................23 Health Crisis in Venezuela ..................................................................................................23 Food Insecurity in Venezuela .............................................................................................25 Human Rights violations .........................................................................................................28 Persecution and repression ................................................................................................28 Social Control .....................................................................................................................30 Generalized violence ...............................................................................................................32 Collapse of basic public services: water, electricity and gas ...................................................34 The economic collapse in Venezuela ......................................................................................35 Status of Venezuelans in Latin America and the Caribbean ..........................................................37 Refugee Status For Venezuelans ....................................................................................................45 Prima Facie Recognition of Venezuelan Refugees: A Practical Protection Response .............50 International Cooperation .............................................................................................................53 Financial Requirements ..........................................................................................................55 Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................61 Annex ...........................................................................................................................................61 Methodology ..........................................................................................................................69 OAS Working Group to Address the Regional Crisis Caused by Venezuela’s Migrant and Refugee Flows | 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The current crisis of Venezuelan migrants and refugees is unprecedented in the region. As of pub- lication (June 2019), at least 4 million Venezuelans have fled their country, representing over 13 percent of the country’s total population. Globally, only Syria, which has suffered from war for more than 8 years, surpasses Venezuela in the flow of migrants and refugees. The majority of Venezuelan migrants and refugees are in Colombia (1.3 million), Peru (768,100), Chile (288,200), Ecuador (263,000), Brazil (168,300), Argentina (130,000), Panama (94,400), Trini- dad and Tobago (40,000), Mexico (39,500), Guyana (36,400), Dominican Republic (28,500), Costa Rica (25,700), Uruguay (8,600) and Paraguay (5,000). In absolute terms, 4 nations, Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Ecuador, host more than 65 percent of the Venezuelans who have left their country. In Curaçao (26,000) and Aruba (16,000), Venezuelans represent 15 percent of the total population of each island, the highest in the region in relative terms. Despite not suffering from a war or a natural catastrophe, five thousand Venezuelans flee daily. The Working Group, through testimonies of Venezuelans who have been forcibly displaced, con- sultations with civil society, and information provided by the governments of recipient countries, concluded that the main determinants for the forced displacement are the humanitarian crisis, reflected in the shortage of food and medicines; the economic collapse, reflected in a hyperin- flation of 10,000,000 percent; the systematic and generalized violation of human rights, through persecution, repression, social control, and crimes against humanity; the repeated failures in the supply of basic services, such as electricity, water, and gas; and widespread violence with a homi- cide rate of 81 people per 100,000 inhabitants. All these determinants can also be considered as alterations of public order in the daily life of the Venezuelan citizen. In the absence of a political, economic, and social solution in the short term in Venezuela that allows access to food and medicine, reduction of crime rates, reinstatement of rule of law that guarantees full freedoms to citizens avoiding widespread persecution, and an improvement of the economy, the Working Group estimates that by the end of 2019 there could be between 5.3 and 5.7 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees and by the end of 2020 between 7.5 and 8.2 million. OAS Working Group to Address the Regional Crisis Caused by Venezuela’s Migrant and Refugee Flows | 7 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In view of this serious situation, the Working Group considers that Venezuelans should be grant- ed refugee status at the regional level, according to the Cartagena Declaration, which establishes that the definition of a refugee also includes people who fled their country because their lives, security, or freedom have been threatened by widespread violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive human rights violations, or other circumstances that have disturbed public -or der. Many of these reasons, we consider, formally apply to the current crisis in Venezuela. To walk thousands of kilometers across the continent to reach another country, as the “walkers” do, or to take a small boat or raft for long hours to reach an island in the Caribbean, as the “raf- ters” do, is powerful evidence of the desperation that exists to flee to satisfy basic needs, such as the right to food, and to avoid being a victim of generalized violence and disturbance of public order. Additionally, it showplaces the high economic vulnerability that prevents migrants and ref- ugees from making their journey using conventional transport routes, whose costs are beyond the reach of much of the Venezuelan populace. The Working Group praises efforts made by different countries in the region who have imple- mented various legal instruments to grant temporary protection to about 1.8 million Venezuelans who, with this condition, receive access to health, education and opportunities to enter the labor markets. However, about 2 million Venezuelans migrants in the region are in irregular status or at risk of being there soon. The increase of migratory restrictions on Venezuelans, far from solving the crisis, will aggravate it. Apart from the vulnerable conditions which the people of Venezuela are leaving, requesting a passport renewal or issuing a new one in that country is practically impossible because of the costs, corruption networks, the lack of material, and the widespread discrimination of the regime against those who do not agree with their ideas. The Working Group is aware of the infrastructure, services, and financial limitations of recipient countries. In fact, after the first semester of 2019 the United Nations has only been able to collect 21 percent (158 million dollars) of the total estimated in the Regional Response Plan for Venezu- elan Migrants and Refugees. The gap to complete the estimate is 579.5 million dollars, equivalent to 79 percent. When compared
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