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The Politics of Polarization: Legitimacy Crises, Left Political Mobilization, and Party System Divergence in South America

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The Politics of Polarization: Legitimacy Crises, Left Political Mobilization, and Party System Divergence in South America The Politics of Polarization: Legitimacy Crises, Left Political Mobilization, and Party System Divergence in South America By Samuel Paltiel Handlin A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Ruth Berins Collier, Co-chair Professor David Collier, Co-chair Professor Pradeep Chhibber Professor Jason Wittenberg Professor Peter Evans Fall 2011 The Politics of Polarization: Legitimacy Crises, Left Political Mobilization, and Party System Divergence in South America © 2011 by Samuel Paltiel Handlin Abstract The Politics of Polarization: Legitimacy Crises, Left Political Mobilization, and Party System Divergence in South America by Samuel Paltiel Handlin Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Ruth Berins Collier, Co-Chair Professor David Collier, Co-Chair The rise of the left across much of South America in the aftermath of market reforms catalyzed a major divergence in regional party systems. In some countries, polarizing party systems emerged, marked by conflictual patterns of contestation between major political parties and the politicization of class cleavages in party competition. In other countries, integrative party systems consolidated, characterized by largely consensual patterns of competition and class cleavages that remain unexpressed in party competition. This variation in party systems represents a critical macropolitical legacy to emerge from the tumultuous recent decades and offers fruitful ground for developing and testing theory regarding the causes of political and social polarization in the younger democracies of the highly unequal developing world. Examining the cases of Venezuela, Brazil, and Chile, this dissertation develops an argument that centers on the avoidance or occurrence of “legitimacy crises”: anti-systemic episodes involving protracted failures of governance and steep erosions of public confidence in state institutions. The presence or absence of legitimacy crisis decisively shaped factional contestation within the partisan left in each country, leading to party system divergence along two dimensions. Whether radical or moderate left coalitions consolidated entailed the establishment of conflictual or consensual patterns of contestation within party systems. Once in office, the radical and moderate left also pursued different strategies of political mobilization – mass-organizational in Venezuela and catchall in Brazil and Chile – that subsequently drove variation in the translation of class cleavages into party competition. The study relies on a variety of qualitative and quantitative data sources, including those gathered during 11 months of fieldwork in Venezuela, and utilizes both process-tracing and statistical methods (primarily genetic matching) to draw causal inferences. A concluding chapter shows that the argument can also explain variation in party systems in two other countries where the left has taken power (Bolivia and Uruguay), suggesting that the 1 framework in the study might provide a broader model of macropolitical divergence in the region during the last decades. 2 Contents List of Figures and Tables………………………………………………………….………….ii Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………………...…..…iii 1. The Left Turn and Party System Divergence in Latin America…………………...………1 Divergent Party System Outcomes………………………………………………........... Limitations of Extant Research……………………………………………………...….. The Argument…………………………………………..…………………………......... Research Design and Case Selection………………………………………………...…. Plan of the Study……………………………………………………………………...… 2. The Roots and Rise of a Factionalized Partisan Left, 1975-1990…………………...……22 Chile…………………………………………………………………………………….. Brazil…………………………………………………………………………...……….. Venezuela…………………………………………………………………………...…... Conclusion: Baseline Conditions………………………………………………...……... 3. Legitimacy Crises and Divergent Party System Trajectories……………...………...…...55 Legitimacy Crises and the Fates of Market Reform Successor Governments……...…... Chile………………………………………………………………………………...…... Brazil…………………………………………………………………………………..... Venezuela……………………………………………………………………………...... Conclusion: Alternative Hypotheses………………………………………………...….. 4. Venezuela: A Mass-Organizational Strategy by the Left………………....………...........85 Proclivity Toward the Mass-Organizational Strategy………….……………………….. Reform Period: The Mass-Organizational Strategy on a Limited Level……………...... Post-Reform Period: The Mass-Organizational Strategy on a Grand Scale.……............ Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………...…. 5. Chile and Brazil: Catchall Strategies by the Left…………….….…………………..…..122 Proclivity Toward the Catchall Strategy…………………………………...………….... The Left in Government: Catchall Strategies………………….….................................. Party-Organizational Linkages Compared.……………….……………………...……... Conclusion………………………………………………………………………...……. 6. Left Mobilizational Strategies and the Politicization of Class Cleavages…...…...……..144 Operational Choices: Conceptualization and Measurement…………………...……….. Class Cleavages in the Party Systems of Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela………...……… Mass-Organizational Versus Catchall Strategies and Class Cleavages…………...……. Data………………………………………………………………………………...…… Matching Analysis: Balance, Estimation, and Sensitivity Results………………..……. Alternative Hypotheses.………………………………………………...…………….… Conclusion………………………………………………………………...……………. 7. Comparative Perspectives and Final Observations………….…………………...….…..165 Widening the Comparative Lens: Bolivia and Uruguay……………………...………… Final Observations……………………………………………………...………………. References………………………………………………………………….……………..…182 i List of Figures 1.1: Causal Model of Party System Divergence……………………………………………...10 2.1: Common Tripartite Structure of the Partisan Left…………………………………….…23 2.2: Two Possible Resolutions of Factional Contestation…………………………………….49 3.1: Consolidation of the Moderate Coalition in Chile……………………………...………..63 3.2: Consolidation of the Moderate Coalition in Brazil……………………………...……….68 3.3: Consolidation of the Radical Coalition in Venezuela…………………………...……….79 4.1: Executive Authority in the Post-Reform Period.………………………………...…..…110 6.1: Expression of Class Cleavage in Party Systems, Aggregate Data…………………...…150 List of Tables 2.1: Parties and Factions Constituting the Tripartite Partisan Left.………………..………....50 2.2: Similarities in Structure and Balance of Power.………………………………………....52 2.3: Divergent Characteristics of Major Left Parties, Cutting Across Outcomes………….....53 3.1: Fates of Reform Successor Governments………………………..………………………56 3.2: Societal Preferences for Market Liberalism………………….………………………..…58 5.1: Participation in Community-Based Organizations…………………………………..…140 5.2: Shared-Member Linkages……………………………………………...…………….…141 6.1: Expression of Class Cleavages in Party Systems, Individual-Level Data……...………151 6.2: Mobilizational Strategies and Mechanisms for Partisan Advantage……………...……152 6.3: Means of Treatment and Control Groups After Matching…………………………...…156 6.4: Estimation Results……………………………………………………………………...157 6.5: Results of Sensitivity Analysis………………………………………………….…...…158 6.6: Estimation Results for Ancillary Outcome………………………………………......…159 6.7: Exclusion and Self-Exclusion on Political Grounds………………………………....…161 7.1: Scoring Key Variables for the Broader Case Universe…………………………………177 7.2: A Potential Refinement to the Argument……………………………………………….178 ii Acknowledgements One accrues many debts while writing a dissertation, which a brief acknowledgements page can hardly begin to summarize. Particular gratitude must be extended to the members of my dissertation committee, without whose encouragement and advice the project would never have been realized. Peter Evans was a source of inspiration and offered several critical suggestions that helped focus the project in its early stages. Jason Wittenberg joined the committee after my fieldwork and helped me refine my work in numerous ways, especially regarding how to make the quantitative and qualitative sides of the project better complement each other. Pradeep Chhibber provided a wealth of insight regarding parties and party systems, a ruthlessly pragmatic perspective on streamlining my argument, and a reliable source of good cheer and wry humor. As with most students of Latin American politics at Berkeley, my greatest thanks must be extended to David and Ruth Collier. David was amazingly supportive at every stage of my graduate career, from the selection of classes in my first semester to the end stages of finishing the dissertation. He not only taught me a great deal about methodology and Latin American politics but also showed me, both through explicit advice and implicitly through his own example, how to go about being a professional social scientist. Ruth Collier was a fabulous mentor who eventually became a good friend. She brought me into one of her projects early in my graduate school career, which turned into an extended collaboration that produced a co-edited and co-authored book. More importantly, Ruth provided indispensible guidance and support throughout the writing of this dissertation. Anybody who knows Ruth and her work will realize that her intellectual fingerprints can be found all over this study. What is less obvious is that her personal support and encouragement were absolutely critical to the project’s completion – it is
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