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White Paper on the Case of Leopoldo López Mendoza

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White Paper on the Case of Leopoldo López Mendoza White Paper On the Case of Leopoldo López Mendoza Citizen of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela Authored By: Jared Genser1 Perseus Strategies José Antonio Maes July 16, 2020 (updated) Original Published July 21, 2014 1 Jared Genser serves as international counsel to Leopoldo López. Jose Antonio Maes previously served as López’s domestic counsel. For further information in English, contact +1 202 466 3069 or [email protected]. For information in Spanish, contact Juan Carlos Gutierrez, López’s domestic counsel, +58 412 33 217 44 or [email protected]. Perseus Strategies would like to thank Elise Baranouski, Sara Birkenthal, Michael Cullen, Chris Fletcher, Reid Kurtz, Juan Pablo Miramontes, Asma Noray, Maddie Orcutt, Charles Orta, Samuel Ritholtz, Nicole Santiago, and Juancarlos Vargas for their support. 1 Table of Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................ 4 I. Biographical Information on Leopoldo López Mendoza .......................................................... 7 II. Background Context and Current Situation in Venezuela ....................................................... 12 A. Rise of Chavismo .................................................................................................................. 12 B. Protests in 2014 .................................................................................................................... 15 C. Worsening Economic and Humanitarian Crisis ................................................................... 20 D. Parliamentary Elections of 2015 and Subsequent Dismantling of Democratic Institutions ............................................................................................................................ 21 E. The Campaign for a Recall Referendum .............................................................................. 23 F. Constitutional Crisis and Protests in 2017 ............................................................................ 26 G. Further Power Consolidation Through Electoral Fraud ....................................................... 29 H. Challenges to Maduro’s Ongoing Usurpation of Power ...................................................... 33 I. Increasing Repression and Targeting of the Opposition ...................................................... 40 J. Mounting International Criticism ......................................................................................... 42 III. The Targeting and Trial of Leopoldo López ........................................................................... 48 A. Blame by Public Officials ..................................................................................................... 48 B. Charges and Arrest ............................................................................................................... 50 C. Conduct of the Trial .............................................................................................................. 55 D. 2015 Hunger Strike ............................................................................................................... 59 E. Judgment and Sentence ........................................................................................................ 60 F. Evolving Conditions of Imprisonment ................................................................................. 63 IV. Further Persecution of Leopoldo López and His Wife Lilian Tintori ..................................... 71 A. False Accusations and Disqualification to Exercise Political Rights Without Due Process of Law ..................................................................................................................... 71 B. Persecution of Lilian Tintori ................................................................................................. 71 V. Legal Analysis ......................................................................................................................... 73 A. The Detention Resulted from Leopoldo López’s Exercise of the Rights or Freedoms Guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Universal Declaration of Human Rights ............................................................................................... 73 1. The Venezuelan Government Arrested and Imprisoned Leopoldo López Because He Exercised His Right to Freedom of Expression .................................... 74 2. The Venezuelan Government Arrested and Imprisoned Leopoldo López Because He Exercised His Right to Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association ............................................................................................................... 79 3. The Venezuelan Government Arrested and Imprisoned Leopoldo López Because He Exercised His Right to Take Part in Public Affairs and Be Elected Without Unreasonable Restrictions ............................................................. 79 B. The Trial and Detention of Leopoldo López Failed to Respect International Norms Relating to the Right to a Fair Trial Guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ...................... 80 1. The Venezuelan Government Failed to Provide Leopoldo López an Independent and Impartial Judiciary ............................................................................................. 81 2 2. The Venezuelan Government Failed to Afford Leopoldo López the Presumption of Innocence ............................................................................................................. 83 3. The Venezuelan Government Failed to Provide Leopoldo López with the Right to Present His Defense .............................................................................................. 84 4. The Venezuelan Government Failed to Provide the Right to Attorney-Client Confidentiality .......................................................................................................... 85 C. The Extended Solitary Confinement of Leopoldo López Violates the Prohibition Against Torture .................................................................................................................................. 86 VI. Opinion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention ................................................ 88 VII. International Support ............................................................................................................ 90 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 104 Appendix I – Overview of Past Political Persecution Against Leopoldo López by Venezuelan Government: False Accusations and Disqualification to Exercise Political Rights Without Due Process of Law ................................................................................................................................ 105 Appendix II – Leopoldo López’s Speeches (January 23, 2014, February 12, 2014, February 16, 2014, and February 18, 2014; Opening Statement to Court, June 2, 2014) ............................. 113 Appendix III – Opeds in Washington Post, Huffington Post, Foreign Policy, New York Times, El País, Wall Street Journal, Miami Herald, La Prensa (Panama), and Profiles in Foreign Policy and The Atlantic. .................................................................................................................. 142 3 Executive Summary In the past decades, democracy and respect for human rights have expanded throughout Latin America. After the 1958 coup that displaced Marcos Pérez Jiménez, Venezuela became an example of a Latin American democracy. However, in the past eighteen years this has not held true, as successive rulers have eroded respect for human rights and the rule of law in Venezuela. The presidencies of Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) and Nicolás Maduro (2013–present) have been marked by violence, inflation, scarcity of goods, a lack of judicial independence and impartiality, and increasing persecution of journalists and political opponents. During his time in office, Chávez enacted a series of social and economic measures, including nationalization, social welfare programs, and opposition to neoliberal economics, aimed at improving quality of life for Venezuelans. Despite Chávez’s bold vision for the country, his presidency saw a dramatic concentration of power and disregard for human-rights protections, and his economic model proved unsustainable. Starting particularly in 2009, the Chávez government targeted a number of opposition leaders for criminal prosecution. In 2013, Maduro was elected President of Venezuela as Chávez’s successor. The Maduro government has increased its intimidation, censorship, and prosecution of its critics. Notably, in September 2013, Maduro withdrew from the American Convention on Human Rights, leaving Venezuelans without access to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Many of the challenges faced by Chávez, including violence, inflation, and shortages of goods, have intensified under Maduro. It was in this context that mass protests began in January 2014. These initially non-violent demonstrations led to violence when armed pro-Government gangs and colectivos that are loyal to Maduro got involved. Since the protests of 2014, there have been intermittent protests throughout the
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