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and Virtue: On Gassendi's Epicurean Defense1 Brooklyn College

Gassendi's views. It is Bernier's text that is translated into English in Three Discourses ofHappiness, Virtue and Liberty, a 1699 publication on moral philosophy that is attributed to Gassendi.6 To better comprehend the views of Gassendi as understood by seventeenth­ century Gassendists, in what follows, English translations of passages presenting Gassendi's view will, where possible, be.taken from Three Discourses on Happiness, Virtue and Liberty.? Likewise, English translations ofpassages from Gassendi'srepresentation ofEpicurus' view will be taken from Thomas Stanley's translation of Gassendi's Philosophiae Epicuri I Syntagma. 8 In the context of Gassendi's virtue , in which Gassendi, who was influenced in the development he defmes moral philosophy as "the art of doing well" ofhis moral theory by Epicurus,2 was, as was Epicurus, [TD, 2],9 Gassendi discusses the fundamental virtues a vegetarian. Gassendi argues, in his Philosophiae of temperance, fortitude, justice, and prudence, with Epicuri Syntagma,3 his reconstruction of Epicurus' happiness as the summum bonum. Vegetarianism is said theory, and in his Syntagma Philosophicum,4 presenting to be a requirement of sobriety, a virtue of temperance. his own ethics, that abstaining from flesh is a moral He explains: requirement, i.e., a requirement for "doing well."5 Further, Gassendi represents, as an Epicurean position, It is therefore an undeniable truth, that the view that rights and the obligations attendant upon happiness, or a life free from pain and misery, rights pertain only to those bound together by a social are such things as influence all our actions and contract, and, agreements with being infeasible, purposes to the obtaining of them. [TD, 1] we have no obligations which follow from their rights. Why and how, then, is vegetarianism a moral Following Epicurus, Gassendi identifies happiness requirement? In what follows, I will examine a with pleasure, and pleasure, he claims, is to be correctly Gassendist response to this question to ascertain how vegetarianism can be supported in the context of a Gassendist moral theory. Bernier's Abrege de la Philosophie de Gassendi (Lyons, 1684), which is an abridgement and translation into French of Gassendi's lengthy Latin Syntagma PHILOSOPHY Philosophicum, served to popularize Gassendi's views. Bernier provides a reasonably faithful rendition of

Spring !991 61 Vegetarianism and Virtue: On Gassendi's Epicurean Defense

analyzed as the "relief from" or "absence of' pain or Gassendi represents this as Epicurus' view: misery. [G, 2.415] Pain, from this viewpoint. is apriori undesirable and, in itself, bad. The good, as pleasure, To accustom ourselves to a simple diet brings is measured by the extent to which an action retains an and preserves health. For it is sumptuous absence of pain or relieves pain without producing feasting and variety of meats which [causes] additional pains. head-aches, rheums, gouts, fevers and other Gassendi's moral theory, then, can be said to involve diseases; not plain and simple food. (SPE, 917] the following principle, which I shall refer to as "the principle ofleastpain": "Living well" consists in doing Further, desiring the minimum required to maintain that which will be most effective in minimizing pain in one's health and well-being "renders us fearless of one's own body and . Though pleasure associated fortune" for: with excessive and sumptuous eating satisfies hunger, unlike moderate eating, it with itself pains, and [H]e, who is content with coarse food, as fruits hence, this action is not a good. Sobriety is essential to and salads, who is satisfied with bread and living well. water, who has confined his with these, In regard to diet, the following principle is required what can he fear from Fortune? For, who is to satisfy the principle ofleastpain: Act only on there so poor as to want these? Who so for that which is both natural and necessary. That which distressed that he cannot easily meet with is both natural and necessary, we are told, will relieve beans, pulse, herbs, fruits? As for water, what hunger and its associated pains without producing new need I mention it? [SPE, 918] pains; but a variety of discomforts follow from the consumption ofthat which is unnecessary or unnatural, A simple diet, simple in its substance and in its and, hence, these should be avoided. Further, Gassendi accessibility, contributes to a state of equilibrium of contends in support of his vegetarianism, the mind and body, which, if established, allows for consumption of flesh is neither natural nor necessary activities which are satisfying in themselves, such as for human beings. What he means by "necessary" and the experience of pure pleasures, e.g., of philosophy "natural" requires clarification. and of music, which are free of pain. That which is necessary, according to Gassendi, is To demonstrate that flesh is not necessary for the the minimum required, inquantity and effort. to maintain health of human beings, Gassendi concurs with the one's health and well-being. He argues (YD, 147ff.]: Epicurean claim that "the eating of flesh is less to be approved, as being rather prejudicial to health than 1. Very little is required to satisfy basic needs wholesome" [SPE, 918] because: and to maintain a healthy body, and these needs can be satisfied with little effort, and, [H]ealth is preserved by the same means hence, without pain. whereby it is recovered; but it is manifest that it is recovered by a thin diet and abstinence 2. Excesses, beyond what is physically necessary fromflesh. [SPE,918] . to maintain the body, can produce various sorts of pains, and such luxuries are often Ifhealth can be recovered, indeed is best recovered, by difficult to obtain. means ofa diet thatcontains no flesh, then, itis argued, health can also be preserved without eating flesh, so 3. Therefore the best way to avoid pain is to flesh foods are not necessary for human health. As avoid the desire for excesses and to be content such, eating flesh is an excess, and, like other excesses, with a little. it is an indulgence that can cause pain. Further, it is assumed that flesh foods are more difficult to obtain Being content with a little, he contends, is the most and to prepare than "fruits and salads," "bread and effective way to satisfy the principle of least pain; the water"; in desiring flesh, then, we become more subject way to avoid pain and suffering is not by striving to to the difficulties associated with seeking to obtain acquire more, but rather by desiring less. such foods.

Between the Species. 62 Spring 1991 Vegetarianism and Virtue: On Gassendi's Epicurean Defense

It might be objected that Gassendi's assumptions most necessary for the preservation of either are overhasty. Consider the following society of the an entire genus or for the preservation of isolated and unknown island Isla; encircled and cut individual animals. [G,2.701] off from the sea by huge rocky cliffs. On Isla the soil is such that no trees and no crops other than grass will From this viewpoint, what is moral and what is natural grow. How Isla came to be inhabited is not our . coincide, because God, as the designer of , is problem here, but on Isla there are, in fact, many the cause of the natural inclinations and aversions, and animals who eat the grass as well as others, including the pleasures and pains, which combine to constitute our humans, who prey on these. The human inhabitants of affections and to influence our actions. The natural is Isla find it easy to obtain flesh foods and to prepare that which is in accordance with the divine plan; doing these in simple ways, easier than their counterparts with a little is natural for human beings because a diet elsewhere find the obtaining of ingredients for and the of only that which is necessary for health is what, in preparation ofbread. Finally, they have found ithelpful, fact, in God's plan, is most conducive to human well­ when ill, to imbibe certain boiled meats or a clear meat being. Nothing natural to us, i.e., nothing necessary for broth. Gassendi's arguments for vegetarianism would our well-being, can cause us pain. Pain is God's means support the eating offlesh on Isla. Therefore, it would of guiding us to avoid that which is harmful to us, that seem, his arguments support not vegetarianism as such, which is not natural for humans beings in the divine butrather a spare and simply prepared diet ofwhatever design. As Such, acting so as to avoid pain is a moral nutritious foods are readily available. requirement, respecting God's will. Gassendi, though, would reject this result, because For Gassendi, then, the natural, in regard to diet, he would claim that the inhabitants ofour hypothetical includes all that humans can consume without ill island Isla are in a hardship situation that conflicts effect, in accordance with the divine plan. The with what is natural for human beings. He claims: necessary is a subclass of the natural, and consists in the minimum, chosen from what is natural to human The best and onlyremedy to pass our lives free beings, that is required to maintain human health. and void oftrouble, is to suitourselves to nature, Gassendi tells us that "Flesh seems to be no natural to desire nothing but what itrequires.... [ID, 18] food for human beings." [TD, 288] According to Gassendi, eating flesh is not necessary for human well­ and being, it is not a proper element in a minimal human diet, because it is not natural for human beings-it [A]ccording to our natural inclination, we violates the divine plan and hence can be detrimental must love these things and make them the end to human health and can cause pain. of that chief happiness, which consists in the In a letter to Van Helmont written in 1729, Gassendi acquisition of such things as are according to rejects Van Helmont's claim that meat is a natural food nature. [TD, 143-144] for human beings. He says:

Gassendi, unlike Epicurus, maintains that God's From the formation ofour teeth, it can be seen providence justifies our trust in the guidance of nature, that we are not prepared by nature to be flesh­ for God has artfully arranged his creation so that eating animals. To animals, such as lions, creatures naturally desire their own good, andare guided tigers, bears, dogs, cats, and others, which by their natural experience ofpleasure andpain in their nature prepared for this nourishment, she pursuit of that good. gave long, pointed, sharp, separated, unequal The whole ofGassendi's moral philosophy, in which teeth. On the contrary, to those that should the moral is identified with the natural, is unified by eat herbs and fruits, nature gave teeth that his account ofdivine providence. are short, wide, obtuse, contiguous and disposed in a single series, as one can notice The Designer ofNature...seasoned all actions in , cows, , deer and other with the spice of pleasure; and willed the creatures. Now the teeth of men are not like greatestpleasures for those future acts that are those of the former genus, but of this latter.

Spring 1991 63 Between the Species Vegetarianism and Virtue: On Gassendi's Epicurean De[ense

Therefore, it is probable nature wishes us to desire for self-preservation and a natural fear of death. be nourished not on meat as the prior, but on In this context, Gassendi objects to the Stoic view that fruits as the posterior. 10 death, and therefore suicide, is no evil. The fact that, as a fundamental inclination governing all other actions, Gassendi further maintains that flesh is too succulent "Nature furnishes all sorts of animals with a natural for our bodies, and eating flesh foods overburdens the love of life" [TD, 29] and a natural aversion to death stomach, impedes digestion, and causes illness. He provides evidence that preservation of one's life is a explains that meat must be digested wholly in the fundamental moral requirement Hence, from Gassendi's stomach rather than in the mouth; the body is over­ viewpoint, the defense or preservation ofone's life would whelmed by this substance. Nourishment by fruits does justify a needed violation of moral requirements of not produce this kind ofeffect. On the contrary, Gassendi sobriety, which are concerned with promoting one's own tells us, fruits are a light nourishment. As such, they do well-being. That is, that minimal diet which is necessary not overburden the stomach, they are easily digested, is, under normal circumstances a subclass of the natural, and they form a chyle sufficient for our nourishment. but, conditions may occur where that which is necessary That humans are by nature vegetarians is, for Gassendi, for survival, the fundamental consideration, departs evident in the physical structure of our teeth and in our from what is natural. That which is requisite for physiological reactions to what is eaten, and, in this, preservation of one's life outweighs what is natural and for Gassendi, God's will and guidance to us is clear. necessary for well-being, so, though the human Further, it is his view that what is natural and what is inhabitants of Isla may suffer discomforts and even risk moral coincide, and, therefore, it is imperative to act in illness by eating flesh, this is preferable to starvation. accordance with our nature, i.e. with God's will. It might be argued that Gassendi's providentialism Yet there can be a conflict ofvalues in obeying God's is questionable, and, without this presupposition, his will, and this is the case for the inhabitants of Isla. As arguments provide us, at best, with self-interested health religious Jews during the holocaust found it the lesser for vegetarianism, but not moral reasons. One ofevils to eat unkosher foods rather than starve, so too therefore might object that even if we were to grant the human beings on Isla, in effect, in a lifeboat that all flesh is detrimental to human health, itself a situation, are justified in eating flesh, but as a lesser of questionable assumption, vegetarianism would at best evils, for the sake of survival. be a matter of prudence, not a moral requirement To Gassendi explains: examine the force of this objection to Gassendi's account, we tum, in the following section, to Gassendi's [T]he f"rrst inclination thatNature has bestowed discussion of our moral obligations to others. on us is self-preservation; that we may preserve ourselves such as we ought to be; that II we are men made up of soul and body; and therefore according to our natural inclination, Moral obligations to others are the fundamental we must love these things, and make them the consideration in Gassendi's discussion of the virtue of end of that chief happiness which consists in justice. Gassendi attributes to Epicurus the view that the acquisition ofsuch things as are according obligations of justice rest upon a mutual contract and to Nature. [TD,143-144] so exclude relations between humans and animals. From this Epicurean viewpoint: and [T]here is no kind of right and injury, of just Every creature of whatsoever nature loves or unjustbetween the restofanimals, because itself, or any part of itself, or the use of that it was not possible to make any agreement part, or any of the things, which are according between them, that they should do no mischief to nature, and its slate and frame. [TD, 144] to one another: So there ought not to be between nations which could not or would not Gassendi argues at some length that human beings, make any such compact, to do no wrong one indeed all animals, have a natural and fundamental to another. [TD,319]

Between the Species 64 Spring 1991 Vegetarianism and Virtue: On Gassendi's Epicurean Defense

Gassendi also discusses moral obligations to others Further, we are told that it is: that fall under considerations of temperance. In discussing temperance, which encompasses virtues Incident to a weak, cowardly and savage related to the proper regulation of desires, Gassendi nature, to show cruelty to those who are considers actions which arise from the experience of overcome, nay, though they have given no other-interested affections. For example, he claims: particular provocation...[ID, 297]

It is human and natural to be afflicted with and those that suffer. [TD,300] forbids us to be cruel against the inno­ Gassendi notes: cent, who never did us any harm...[ID, 30]

[It is] strange to consider how great an Gratuitous cruelty to innocents, including animals, as affection we have for those whom we read of other wrongs of intemperance, is neither natural nor in history to have shown themselves very kind necessary. Itis unnatural because it violates the empathy and merciful, and how we abominate those or shared pain that is naturally raised in us by the who have been barbarous and cruel. [ID,298] apprehension ofpain experienced by others. According to Gassendi, divine providence guarantees that nothing The pleasure and pain of our natural affections, e.g., unnatural is necessary, and, consistently with this, he "the grief or concern that we have for another's maintains that killing animals is not necessary for calamity," [ID, 299] guides us towards the virtues of human well-being. It would seem that, for Gassendi, mercy, gentleness, and clemency. Divine providence the killing of an as of another human being is has so arranged human nature that, for us, there are pure justif18ble only as an act of self-defense. pleasures, which are never accompanied by pain, and He further explains of all sentient beings: stable pleasures, which as natural and necessary produce no pain or misery. Pure pleasures and stable pleasures Nature has made us all related and a kin, by are easy to obtain and never require causing pain to bringing us forth from the same principles and others. But, for Gassendi, are animals included among of the same elements. 'Tis Nature hath given these others towards whom our action is guided by a us a mutual affection and love, and for the natural empathy? Itwould seem so, since, in explaining same ends. 'Tis Nature hath established what the Epicurean view ofour moral obligations to animals, is right, just and equitable to its Law. 'TIs a he likens our relation to nonhuman animals to our greater evil to be the cause of wrong than to relation to humans outside of our society and its laws. suffer it Nature commands that our hands We are told: should be always ready to afford assistance. [ID, 370-371] You may perhaps here by the by ask why we kill those creatures..., which we have no Human beings become conscious ofa natural bond with reason to fear? I confess we may do this other creatures who are capable of suffering pain by sometimes through intemperance and cruelty, the regularexperience ofcompassion or empathy, which as by inhumanity and barbarity we often is raised naturally in apprehending the suffering of abuse such sometimes who are out of our innocent sentientbeings. The pain or suffering ofother society, and of whom 'tis not possible that sentient beings naturally raises in us the "griefor we should apprehend any danger of evil. concern that we have for another's calamity" [ID, 299], [TD,321] and with this, the reasoned condemnation of gratuitous cruelty. We come to view all sentient beings as a single Killing of animals that is not in self-defense is charac­ community. From this viewpoint, to do well, we ought terized as an offence "against temperance, or...[against] to treat all who are capable of suffering pain in its species, viz., such as sobriety, gentleness, or humanity accordance with the following revised principle of and a natural goodness." [TO, 321] least pain: "Living well" consists in doing that which

Spring 1991 65 Between the Species Vegetarianism and Virtue: On Gassendi's Epicurean Defense

will be most effective in minimizing physical or mental Every creature of whatsoever nature loves pain in oneself and in others. itself, or any part of itself, or the use of that We might draw from this an implicit endorsement of part, or any of the things, which are according a moral sense theory in which sympathy, or the pain to nature, and its state and frame. [TO,144] naturally experienced in apprehending the suffering of others, leads moral agents to apprehend that causing pain There is a moral requirement that moral agents act to in any sentient being is wrong. Animals, as capable of support their own natural desire for self-preservation. suffering pain, would be, from this viewpoint, regarded Therefore Gassendi would maintain of moral agents as moral subjects, to be treated in accordance with the that It is never wrong to defend one's life by legal principle of least pain. Once again we confront means where possible or by the most human means Gassendi's providentialism. God has so designed us available, where legal means have no force. that we naturally experience sympathy with the pain This position is consistent with the presumption of a of sentient creatures. This natural experience guides us moral requirement that moral agents respect the natural to refrain from cruelty towards all sentient creatures. desire that other creatures have for their own self­ However, it might be claimed that this does not preservation. From this viewpoint all killing that is provide grounds for vegetarianism. That is, ifan animal, avoidable, i.e., that is not necessary for the defense of or even a human being, is treated well and killed one's life, would be morally wrong. The eating of flesh painlessly, why is it morally wrong to eat that creature? is not necessary for human well-being and so is not We have not caused any pain to an individual capable required for the defense of human life. Therefore, the of suffering pain. killing of animals for food would be morally wrong. We might respond that Gassendi's view that Vegetarianism would be required not solely on the empathetic perception of others is natural led him to prudential grounds that it is better for human health. It regard the use ofanimals as food as unacceptable. That would be required for human beings because it is wrong is, though, from Gassendi's viewpoint, human beings for a moral agent to kill an innocent being that loves its are presently misled by the acquired custom of using own life. Itcan beargued that such action is, in Gassendi's animals as food, the sympathy experienced in relation terms,cruel, barbarous, inhumane, and therefore immoral to sentient beings can be said to naturally motivate moral as a violation of the virtue of temperance. agents, not misled by custom, to refrain from using Still, if I gratuitously damage my fme crystal pitcher animals as food. by smashing it with a hammer, this can be called Further, we can argue that this account does provide intemperate, as a failure of proper self-control, but not some basis for vegetarianism. Indeed, ifapainless death thereby immoral. Acts of intemperance are character cannot be assured, and if we accept the principle of failings, violations of requirements of self-control. least pain applied to the community of all individuals While an intemperate act may be seen as a failure to capable of suffering pain, along with the recognition fulfill a moral requirement, it does not constitute a that eating flesh is not necessary for human self­ failure to fulfIll a moral obligation in the strong sense. preservation, then, it would appear, that doing well under Moral wrong-doing in the strong sense, is, in Gassendi's these conditions would involve not eating flesh. terms, injustice. In what follows I will consider support Finally, the killing of animals is explicitly for vegetarianism from a Gassendist viewpoint, not on considered: grounds of temperance, as argued above, but rather on grounds of justice. You may perhaps here by the by ask why we Gassendi rejects the analyses of animal kill those creatures..., which we have no provided by his Cartesian and Aristotelian contem­ reason to fear? [TO,321] poraries.ll His analysis, to which we now turn, further supports the view that animals are moral subjects.12 The killing of an innocent being that loves its life and desires its own survival is regarded as gratuitous cruelty. As indicated in the previous section, it is Gassendi's view that all sentient beings love life and have a natural desire for their own survival. He says:

Between the Species 66 Spring 1991 Vegetarianism and Virtue: On Gassendi's Epicurean Defense

III whereas if any such machines bore a resemblance to our bodies or imitated our From Gassendi's viewpoint, animals are not moral actions as closely as possible for all practical agents. Only human beings have moral obligations purposes, we should still have two very certain because only human beings have the reflective means of recogniiing that they were not real capacities that are essential to understanding moral men. The frrst is that they could never use principles. But, I wish to claim, Gassendi's account is words, or put together other signs, as we do in consistent with the view that animals are moral subjects, order to declare our to others.... whose natural desire for life ought to be respected by Secondly,...they [act] ...not through under­ moral agents. standing, butonly from the disposition oftheir Gassendi's chief adversaries, Cartesians and organs... .it is for all practical purposes impos­ Aristotelians,13 rejected the view thatanimals are moral sible for a machine to have enough different subjects. Cartesians maintained that animals have no organs to make it act in all the contingencies moral statuS.14 Aristotelians, who viewed animals as of life in the way in which our reason makes property under the dominion of humans, objected to us act. [AT, VI, 56-57; C, 1.139-140] needless physical abuse of these sensitive creatures on grounds of benevolence but saw no problem with the According to Descartes, animals are seen to be irrational humane killing of animals for human use. Gassendi's because they cannot use speech and they cannot use departure from these adversaries in his analysis of the reason to freely choose how they will act. He underlines nature of animals supports a different view of our the importance of understanding the great difference obligations to animals.· In this final section, I will between the natures of animals and humans because consider this departure. failing to perceive this distinction can have moral Gassendi explicitly objects to Descartes' view that implications: animals cannot think,15 In the Discourse. Descartes presents the view that animals have no conscious ...after the error ofthose who deny God...there awareness: 16 is none that leads weak further from the straightpath ofvirtue than thatofimagining that This will not seem at all strange to those who the souls ofthe beasts are ofthe same nature as know how many kinds of automatons, or ours, and hence that after this present life we moving machines, the skill of man can have nothing to fear or hope for, any more than construct with the use of very few parts, in flies and ants... [AT, VI. 59-60; C, 1.14U comparison with the great multitude ofbones, muscles, nerves, arteries, veins and all the Gassendi, in his objections to Descartes' Meditations, other parts that are in the body of any animal. responds to Descartes' arguments. In response to the For they will regard this body as a machine claim that animals cannot speak, Gassendi argues: which, having been made by the hands of God, is incomparably better ordered than any You may say they do not speak. But although machine that can be devised by man, and they do not produce human speech (since of contains in itself movements more wonderful course they are not human beings), they still than those in any such machine. [AT, VI. produce their own form of speech, which they 55-56; C, 1.139] employ just as we do ours. You may say that even a delirious man can still string words Descartes argues, in support of this view: together to express his meaning, which even the wisest of the brutes cannot do. But surely you .. .if any such machine has the organs and are not being fair if you expect the brutes to outward shape of a or of some other employ human and are not prepared animal that lacks reason, we should have no to consider their own kind of language. But to means of knowing that they did not possess go into this would need a much longer entirely the same nature as these animals; discussion. [AT, VII, 271; C, 2.189]

Spring 1991 67 Between the Species Vegetarianism and Virtue: On Gassendi's Epicurean Defense

He says of freedom of choice in acting: However, animals experience sensations and, with this, pleasure and pain; they are capable of imagistic You may say that you are free and the soul has reasoning and of exercising will or choice. Hence, the power of preventing a man from both postulating a fundamental continuity among the whole fleeing and advancing. But the principle of community of animals, Gassendi suggests that the cognition does just this in the case of an difference between the cognitive powers ofhumans and animal: a dog, despite his fear of threats and other animals is "merely one of degree," not kind. blows may rush forward to grab a morsel it In addition, Gassendi objects to the Aristotelian has seen-and a man often does just the same analysis of animal cognition, presented in his time, for sort of thing! You may say that a dog barks example, by Suarez. Suarez argues: simply from impulse, and not, as happens when a man speaks, from choice. But in the ButAristotle clearly writes in the Politics VII, case of man, too, there are causes at work at the end of chapter thirteen, that man alone which may lead us to judgethat he speaks from has reason. Whereas in brute animals there is some impulse. What you attribute to choice no sign, or effect, in which they show the use occurs as a result of a stronger impulse, and of reason. Hence, they have neither proper indeed the brute, too, exercises choice, when speech, nor freedom in operating, but are led one impulse is greater than another. Indeed, I by natural .19 have seen a dog matching his barks to the sound of a trumpet, so as to imitate all the Suarez, like Gassendi, objects to the view that animals changes in the notes, whether sharp or flat, or experience no sense awareness. Speaking of those who slow or fast. And it managed to do this even "deny sensitivity to them," i.e., to animals, he states: when the tempo of the notes was arbitrarily "But truly, this opinion is intolerable, and a great and unexpectedly speeded up, or when the paradox...." [S, III.500]20 According to Suarez, animals notes where unexpectedly drawn out. [AT, VII, experience sensation, but they are incapable of 270; C, 2.188-9] reasoning or will. Animal activity is not the ·result of choice based upon ; it is the automatic response He adds, considering the use of reason: to a stimulus determined solely by "natural instinct." Gassendi explicitly objects to the view that animal You may say that brutes lack reason. Well, of behavior can be described as the effect of"blindinstinct" course they lack human reason, but they do Animal behavior, like human behavior, he claims, not lack their own kind of reason. So it does involves from one's experience or from one's not seem appropriate to call them 'aloga' associates, along with a rudimentary sort of reasoning. ['irrational'] except by comparison with us or From the natural experience ofpain, e.g., of hunger, and, with our kind ofreason; and in any case 'logos' in tum, of the pleasure involved in relieving such pains, orreason seems to be a general term, whichcan associations are formed by theimagination [or phantasy] be attributed to them no less than the cognitive which serve to direct future pursuit and avoidance faculty or internal sense. You may say that behavior. Gassendi says of instinct: animals do not employ rational argument But although they do not reason so perfectly or It is easy to understand from all this that what about as many subjects as man, they still reason, we call instinct is a certain motion which is not and the difference seems to be merely one of blind, but is in fact directed by the phantasy; degree. [AT, VII, 270-271; C, 2.189]17 and this, in part, by a simple apprehension of good or bad, principally when it is present, and, Gassendi, objecting to Descartes' view of animals, in part, also by reasoning, in so far as one maintains that animals have a capacity to think, though judges ofthe good or bad which should follow not all the powers of thought that human beings have. in the future and of which one has some sort He claims that animals cannot reflect on their own of presentiment. This motion, then, is the 1 mental awareness or formulate abstract ideas. g spontaneous use of the parts properly destined

Between the Species 68 Spring 1991 Vegetarianism and Virtue: On Gassendi's Epicurean Defense

to act with regard to this reasoning, as the use An animal loves its own life and learns, from its own of the feet to flee, that ofthe hom, tooth and the experience or from that of others, to fear and to avoid like to attack. ..[G, 2.415] those things that are likely to harm it It is from this viewpoint that Gassendi says that The pursuit and avoidance behavior ofanimals follows "Nature furnishes all sorts of animals with a natural from remembering "what has succeeded and what has love of life." [TD, 29] Animals think, and they direct not succeeded in order that they infer that they ought or their own actions in the light ofan interest in protecting ought not to perform a certain action." [G,2.415] This, and preserving their own lives and well-being. In this Gassendi contends, involves not inborn , but sense, animals as well as human beings have a natural learning from experience and a rudimentary sort of desire for self-preservation. reasoning, i.e., sense reasoning, which requires the use In his discussion ofjustice, Gassendi explains that of images. Further: one of the "chief offices or general duties of justice consist(s) in hurting or doing wrong to nobody," Instructed not only by their own observations [TO, 307] where "hurt" or "harm" is used to designate but also by teaching and examples, whether not simply pain but also any loss of something valued, from their parents or from certain others whose for example, of life, of limb, of a loved one, of actions they have seen and from whom the property. He notes that not all action that causes harm vestiges remain in the phantasy, they reason is moral wrong-doing, as, for example, where harm is about what they should do. [G, 2.415] done by accident or through ignorance. He distin­ guishes between an unjust action, which includes all Gassendi provides empirical evidence to support his that harms an innocent victim, and an action done hypothesis that the pursuit and avoidance behavior of unjustly, or moral wrong-doing, which Gassendi animals is based not upon "blind instinct," but rather designates by the term injury. upon imagistic or sense reasoning from what has been Injury involves the intent to harm. In addition, injury experienced or from what has been learned from others. is done against the will of the individual harmed: He cites examples to demonstrate that animals experience a desire for their own good and for the good ...because it is one thing to suffer an unjust of their offspring, and that they exercise imagistic act, or to receive a damage, and another to reasoning to achieve their ends. Hence, according to suffer an injury, a man may willingly suffer Gassendi, animals are not to be dismissed as wholly an unjust act but not suffer an injury. For that irrational, for they act on the basis of a rudimentary reason observes that we defme a man sort of reasoning and will. who does an injury: He who hurts, knowing Therefore, Gassendi argues that the avoidance to whom, in what manner, and how he hurts; behavior of animals is motivated by fear, raised by yet that is not sufficient, but we must add this reasoning from past to future experience, which leads particular. Against the will of him whom he to the awareness of a danger to life or limb. He claims hurts. [TO,334] that "most animals flee us because they have received some harm from us" [G, 2.415] and, in support of this Gassendi explains that though an individual can cause claim, citesreports that, in wilderness areas ofAmerica, himself damage, he cannot act unjustly or do wrong to animals, which have never been hunted by human himself, because he cannot truly injure or be unjust beings, have no fear of humans. Further, fear of a towards himself, i.e., he cannot harm himself against particular kind of creature cannot be instinctive: his own will. Further, "no injury can be done to him who consents and approves of it," unless that consent It may even be that the lamb wouldn't flee the is coerced by "some pretence," by "fair promises," wolf if it hadn't learned to flee with the others flattery, or the like. [TO, 335] and if it hadn't perceived the wolf coming at Since moral wrong-doing involves intentionally it with its mouth ajar. Moreover, the lamb causing harm to another individual against its will, to doesn't flee the wolf it knows nor the hare the morally wrong another, the victim must be capable of dog with whom it was raised. [G, 2.416] exercising will. From Gassendi's viewpoint, a rock

Spring 1991 69 Between the Species Vegetarianism and Virtue: On Gassendi's Epicurean Defense

or plant can be damaged butcannot be treated unjustly. ofthose things that naturally belong to them. That is. it for. since neither can exercise will. no action can be is morally wrong to infringe upon the power or taken against the will of either one. But. as discussed command over those things that naturally belong to any above. according to Gassendi. all animals do exercise individual. including animals. without sufficientreason. will. All desire to avoid harm and they act to preserve This line of reasoning further supports vegetarianism. their own lives and well-being. The will of an animal for. from this viewpoint, it would be morally wrong in intentionally directed to this end can be thwarted. As the strong sense. i.e.• on grounds ofjustice. to infringe such. an animal can be the victim ofinjustice or moral upon any individual's right to life. including animals. wrong-doing.21 unless this can be justified as an act of self-defense. Finally. we might note that Gassendi postulates As stated above. for Gassendi. nothing immoral is that harm to others is a wrong-doing of justice. natural to human beings. And consistent with because justice "consists in rendering to everyone Gassendi's claims. one might conclude, whether on that which belongs to him." [TO. 306] He contends grounds of temperance or justice: it is because killing that it is a requirement ofjustice that each individual creatures that love their own lives is morally wrong be given control over and free use of that which that God has so designed human beings that eating flesh belongs to him without constraint or interference. is unnatural to them. From this viewpoint, vegetar­ Such interference. when it is intentional and against ianism would bea moral requirement. one which divine the will of the recipient. is an injury and is unjust. providence.by ournatural empathy. ournatural structure Gassendi explains: and our natural pains. guides us to note.

This has given occasion to the lawyers to define justice. A constant and perpetual will or resolution to give or restore to everyone his right; that is to say. that which justly belongs to him. [TD. 307]

He adds "these words comprehend the function and the properact ofjustice": "To render to everyone his right." rro.308] A right from this viewpoint is a power to exercise one's will that ought to be recognized and respected. Gassendi equates "what belongs to everyone as his right" with "what authority. power. and command everyone has over anything." rro. 311] Intentional infringement upon or limitation of such authority or power. without sufficient reason. is the sort of harm that is characterized by Gassendi as an injury or moral wrong-doing. Gassendi refers to one's jurisdiction over Notes that which belongs to one by nature. including life and 1 I gratefully acknowledge that research for this paper "the natural faculties of sensation. of imagination. of was partially funded by a grant from the Research Founda­ appetite. of self-motion. of preserving and nourishing tion of the City University of New York. All translations oneself...... [TO. 2.798] as . He distin­ are my own unless otherwise noted. I have modernized guishes these animal rights from another sort ofrights. spelling and grammar in quotations from seventeenth­ e.g.• to property. which are distinctly human rights century English texts. because the acquiring ofthis sort ofauthority orpower requires a contractual agreement. This suggests that 2 Gassendi speaks of his indebtedness to Epicurus in Gassendi may have departed from the Epicurean view respect to the development of his own moral theory as early as 1624 [Exercitationum Paradoxicarum Adversus that animals have no rights. maintaining instead that Aristoteleos..., Book I (Grenoble. 1624). preface]. Some animals have rights to the unhampered use and control

Between the Species 70 Spring 1991 Vegetarianism and Virtue: On Gassendi's Epicurean Defense

selections from this work are translated into English by Craig Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); R. B. Brush (ed. & trans.), The Selected Works ofPierre Gassendi H. Kargon. Atomism in England from Hariot to Newton (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation. 1972). (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). esp. ch. 8. Margaret 1. Osler. considering the views of Descartes and Gassendi, 3 Gassendi's Epicurean Synragma was fIrst published as argues: ''In England, at least, Gassendi's views seem to have an appendix to his three volumeAnimadversions in Decimum prevailed...Gassendi·s mitigated skepticism and nominalist Librum Diogenis Laertii (Lyons: G. Barbier, 1649). It was ontology became characteristic of English Science as subsequently published separately (The Hague, 1659), then represented in the works of Boyle and Newton. John Locke together with Gassendi's lnstitutio Logica (London, 1660and took up Gassendi's views and elaborated them in his Essay 1668). See also, Thomas Stanley's 1660 English translation Concerning Human Understanding, which is markedby many of Gassendi's Epicurean Synragma, [T. Stanley, The History of Gassendi's arguments. and, in places, even his language." ofPhilosophy (London: Moseley and Dring. 1655-61). vol. 3, [Osler. "Providence and Divine Will in Gassendi's Views on pp. 849-935]; henceforth noted as SPE. For a detailed listing Scientific ," Journal ofthe History ofldeas (1983), of Gassendi's publicati~ see O. R. Bloch, La Philosophie vol. 44, p. 549]. See also the seventeenth-century work de Gassendi (The Hague: Martimis Nijhoff. 1971), by Wm. Charleton, Physiologica Epicuro-Gassendo­ pp. xxviii-xxx; and B. Rochot. Dictionary of Scientific Charltoniana: a Fabrick of Science Natural upon the Biography, article on Gassendi. Hypothesis ofAtoms, Founded by Epicurus, Repaired by Petrus Gassendus... (London, 1654). The Epicurean revival 4 For Gassendi's moral theory. see, in particular, the section in Britain is the subject ofT. F. Mayo's Epicurus in England on Ethic in his Synragma Philosophicum [Po Gassendi. Opera (1650-1725) (Dallas: The Southwest Press, 1934), and is also Omnia (Lyons, 1658), vol. 2]; henceforth noted as G. This is discussed in A. A. Long's Hellenistic Philosophy (Berkeley: the standard collection of Gassendi's Works. It is in six University ofCalifornia Press. 1986). ch. 6. volumes. The Synragma Philosophiae Epicuri is in volume 4. 8 For another seventeenth-century English translation of 5 LisaT. Sarasohn, "The Ethical and Political Philosophy the section on ethics of Gassendi's Philosophiae Epicuri of Pierre Gassendi," Journal of the History of Philosophy Synragma, seeWalter Charleton, Epicurus's Morals (London, (1982), vol. 20, pp. 239-260, responds to claims of modem 1656). Ofcourse, in the seventeenth century. many in Britain scholars [e.g., Bloch, La Philosophie de Gassendi (op. cit.), would have known these works not in English but in the pp. 376-377 and Rochot, "Gassendi: Le Philosophe" inPierre original Latin or French. Gassendi: Sa Vie et Son Oeuvre (Paris. 1955), p. 99] that Gassendi's ethics is not original or signifIcant, by.cogently 9 Gassendi dermed moral philosophy as "the art of acting arguing that Gassendi developed "his own profmmd ethical well and from virtue." [G. 2.659] and political system" [po 240]. 10 See Gassendi's Epistolae in his Opera Omnia, vol. 6, 6 P. Gassendi, Three Discourses ofHappiness, Virtue and p.20. Liberty Collectedfrom the Works ofthe Learn'd Gassendi by Monsieur Bernier (London. 1699); henceforth noted as TD. 11 An indication of the seventeenth-century concern with I am grateful to the Burke Library of the Union Theological and controversy over animal cognition is clear from the Seminary in the City of New York for allowing me to study following selection of seventeenth-century works: Chanet, their copy of this work, This work is attributed to Gassendi Pierre, De I'instinct et de la connoissance des animaux avec and represents his Latin text quite faithfully. I will attribute I'examen de ce que M. de La Chambre a escrit sur cette quotes from this work to Gassendi. However, it should be matiere. La Rochelle, 1646; Cyprian, Johann, Sensus et remembered that this is a direct translation. not ofGassendi's cognito in brutis adversus Antonium Le Grand, 1676; longer section on Ethics in his Synragma Philosophicum, Dannanson, Jean M., La Beste transformee en machine.. .que but of Bernier's abridgement and French translation of Ie systeTne de M. Descartes et son opinion touchant les bestes Gassendi's work. n'onr rien de dangereux.... 1668. [English translation. A Discourse... (London: Pitt, 1670)]; De La Chambre, Louis, 7 Gassendi was very influential in seventeenth-century "De la connoissance des betes," Les Caracteres des France and England. For evidence of the influence of his Passions..., 1645, vol 2; Traite de la connoissance des Epicurean moral theory, see, for example, E. & F. Michael, Animaux...• 1647; Dilly, Antoine. De l' arne des betes... "A Note on Gassendi in England," Notes and Queries (Lyons, 1676); Le Grand, Pere Antoine, Dissertatio de (September, 1990), pp. 297-299. For the influence of his carentia sensus et cognitionis in brutis (London, 1675); Epicurean physical theory, see, for example, Lynn Sumida Pardies. Pere Ignace Gaston, S.1., Discours de la connoissance Joy, Gassendi the Atomist, Advocate ofHistory in an Age of des bestes, 1672; Sennert, Daniel, De origine et natura

Spring 1991 71 Between the Species Vegetarianism and VirtUe: On Gassendi's Epicurean Defense

animarum in brutis (Frankfurt, 1638); Willis Thomas, Two boards by their four paws to vivisect them and see Discourses Concerning the Souls ofBrutes... (London, 1672). the circulationofthe bloodwhich was a greatsubject ofconversation." [N. Fontaine, Memoirespour servir 12 Gassendi's distinctive analysis is frequently overlooked a I' histoire de Port-Royal (1738), vol. 2, pp. 52-3; by contemporary commentators. See, for example, the translation by L. C. Rosenfield, op. cit., p. 54.] contrast of Descartes' modem view of animals as automata with the view of the seventeenth-untury Peripatetics by R. IS For Descartes' presentation of his view of animals as M. YOlmg ["Animal Soul," Encyclopedia ofPhiWsophy (New automata, see, for example, Descartes' discussion in his York: Macmillan, 1967), vol. I, pp. 122-127]: "Descartes's Discourse on Method [C. Adams & P. Tannery, eds., Oevres most formidable opponents in the seventeenth-untury were de Descartes (paris: 1897-1913), vol. 7, pp. 55-57; henceforth the Peripatetics...." The Gassendist view, a view similar in noted as AT; 1. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, many respects to the view later adoptedby Locke, is attributed translators, The Philosophical Writings ofDescartes (London: to Locke. Ball., in his interesting discussion in "Cartesian Cambridge University Press, 1985), vol. I, pp. 139-140; Doctrine and the Animal Soul" [Cartesian Studies (New York: henceforth noted as C.]. Columbia University Press, 1951), pp. 106-157] similarly speaks of the early seventeenth century opponents of 16 For Descartes, the complete distinctness of mind and automatism as "being in the main Scholastics" [po 110]; body, as a thinking and an extended substance respectively, Gassendi's arguments against automatism are not discussed. implies thatanimals, asextendedsubstances, havenoconscious The view that Descartes' view of mind, body and animals awareness. Descartes explicitly states that this means that was the modem view is presupposed in such articles as: 1. animals experienceneitherpleasurenor pain. See, for example, Jaynes, "The Problem ofAnimate Motionin the Seventeenth his response to Merseene, AT, m. 85,letter 192, June, 1640. Century," Journal of the History of Ideas (1970), vol. 31, pp. 219-234; E. S. Reed, "Descartes' Corporeal Ideas 17 See also, other arguments presented in support of Hypothesis and the OriginofScientific Psychology," Review his view of animal cognition in Gassendi's objections to ofMetaphysics (1982), vol. 35, pp. 731-752. L. C. Rosenfield Meditation n. [From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine (NewYork: Octagon Books, 1968)] presents a fairly broad perspective of 18 For further discussion ofGassendi 's arguments, see E. seventeenth-century views in her discussion of reactions to & F. Michael, "Two Early Modern of Mind: Descartes' analysis of animals as automata. Reflecting Substancevs. Thinking Substance,"Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy (1989), vol. 27, pp. 29-47. 13 We find in theses written for student disputations by professors ofthegraduatingclass in the Scottish Universities, 19 R. P. Francisci Suarez, Opera Omnia, De Anima, (L. a valuable source of information about developments, Vives: Paris, 1856ff.), vol. 3, p. 500; henceforth noted as concerns and influences in seventeenth-century philosophy. S. Suarez, an influential representative of Thomistic From the middle of the seventeenth century. these provide Aristote1ianism, discusses animal cognition in his De Anima, the consideration of three basic views, those of the which·was published posthumously in 1620. Aristotelians, the Cartesians and the Epicureans. These three views have, as chief proponents, Suarez, Descartes and, 20 Suarez does not identify any proponents of this popularizer of Epicurean views, Gassendi. position. The view that animals function as automata was held before Descartes by, for example, the Spanishphysician, 14Though Descartes himself was never accused of Gomez Pereira [Antoniana-Margarita, Medina del Campo, mistreating animals, many of his followers were associated 1554]. For disCussion of Pereira, see, for example: N. A. with callousness and cruelty towards animals by their Cortes, "Gomez Pereira y Luis de Mercado datos para su contemporaries. Fontaine, speaking of Descartes' followers biografia," Revue Hispanique (1914), vol. 31, pp. 2-29; E. atArnauld's Port-Royale-des-Champs, derides the attitude of Bullon y Fernandez, Les Precursores espanoles de Bacon y Cartesians towards animals: Descartes (Salamanca, 1905).

'They administered beatings to dogs with perfect 21 This Gassendist position is at variance with the indifference, and made fun of those who pitied the thoroughgoing contractarian account of justice which creatures as ifthey had felt pain. They said that the Gassendi attributes to Epicurus. There is no evidence that animals were clocks; that thecries theyemittedwhen Gassendi himself held the view that animals are members struck were only the noise of a little spring which of a moral community, or that he recognized moral patients had been touched, but that the whole body was that are not moral subjects, but these assumptions are con­ without . They nailed poor animals up on sistent with a Gassendist analysis of justice.

Between the Species 72 Spring 1991