Party System Institutionalisation in New Democracies of Latin America, Europe and Asia

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities

2015

Eduardo Olivares Concha

School of Social Sciences

Contents

List of Tables, Figures and Images ______9

Abstract ______13

Declaration ______15

Dedication ______19

Acknowledgments ______19

The Author ______21

List of Abbreviations ______23

Chapter One │ Introducing Party System Institutionalisation ______27

1.1 BACKGROUND ______27

1.2 KEY CONCEPTS FOR THE STUDY OF PARTY SYSTEM CONSOLIDATION ______30

1.2.1 PARTIES ______30

1.2.2 PARTY SYSTEMS ______31

1.2.3 COMPARING PARTY SYSTEMS ______31

1.2.4 INSTITUTIONALISATION OF PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS ______34

1.3 THEORY OF PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALISATION ______36

1.4 THE PROBLEM ______39

1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ______40

Chapter Two │ Theoretical Implications of PSI ______41

2.1 INTRODUCTION ______41

2.2 RATIONALE OF DIMENSIONS ______42

2.2.1 STABILITY ______42

2.2.2 PARTY ROOTS IN SOCIETY ______46

2.2.3 LEGITIMACY ______47

2.2.4 ORGANISATIONAL STRENGTH OF PARTIES ______48

2.3 OPERATIONALISING STABILITY ______49

2.3.1 PEDERSEN VOLATILITY INDEX______50

2.3.2 GLOBAL AND REGIONAL EVIDENCE ______51

2.4 INITIAL CHALLENGES IN THE PSI RESEARCH ______57

2.4.1 SEMI-AUTHORITARIANISM, SEMI-DEMOCRACIES ______58

2.4.2 MATURE DEMOCRACIES ______60

2.4.3 CORRELATION ______63

2.5 SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGES IN THE PSI RESEARCH ______64

2.5.1 ROLE OF CLEAVAGES ______66

2.5.2 CONTRIBUTION OF PERSONALISM ______72

2.5.3 RELEVANCE OF THE LEGITIMACY DIMENSION ______75

2.6 CONCLUSIONS ______79

Chapter Three │ Research Design ______81

3.1 INTRODUCTION ______81

3.2 KEY INDICATOR ______81

3.3 CASE SELECTION ______82

3.4 EVIDENCE TO TEST ______90

3.4.1 EVIDENCE FOR THE ROLE OF CLEAVAGES ______91

3.4.2 EVIDENCE FOR THE CONTRIBUTION OF PERSONALISM ______92

3.4.3 EVIDENCE FOR THE RELEVANCE OF LEGITIMACY______94

3.5 GENERAL DATA AND METHODS ______96

3.5.1 SURVEY DATA ______96

3.5.2 ELITE INTERVIEWS ______98

3.5.3 POPULATION INTERVIEWS ______104

3.6 CONCLUSIONS ______111

Chapter Four │ Hierarchical role of cleavages ______113

4.1 INTRODUCTION ______113

4.2 HIERARCHICAL DEBATE ______115

4.3 HYPOTHESES AND EXPECTATIONS ______121

4.4 DATA AND METHODS ______122

4.4.1 DATA ______123

4.4.2 METHODS ______129

4.5 REGRESSION RESULTS ______131

4.5.1 CLEAVAGE CONTRIBUTION ______131

4.5.2 CLEAVAGE CONTRIBUTION OVER TIME ______134

4.6 CLEAVAGE HIERARCHY FOR POLITICAL PRACTITIONERS ______138

4.6.1 IDEOLOGICAL CLEAVAGE ______139

4.6.2 ETHNIC CLEAVAGE ______147

4.6.3 REGIONAL CLEAVAGE ______149

4.7 CONCLUSIONS ______153

Chapter Five │ The Shining Side of Personalism ______157

5.1 INTRODUCTION ______157

5.2 FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS ______159

5.3 FOUR IDEAL TYPES OF PARTY LEADERSHIPS ______160

5.3.1 PROGRAMMATIC PARTIES ______161

5.3.2 AUTHORITY CLASSES ______162

5.3.3 ASSESSING POLITICAL PARTY (SYSTEM) LEADERSHIP ______163

5.4 HYPOTHESES AND EXPECTATIONS ______167

5.5 DATA AND METHODS ______169

5.5.1 ELITE INTERVIEWS ______169

5.5.2 NET LEADERSHIP DURATION ______169

5.5.3 EXPERT SURVEY ______170

5.6 PARTY LEADERSHIP TYPES IN ACTION ______170

5.6.1 SOPHISTICATED PARTY LEADERSHIPS ______170

5.6.2 BLURRED PARTY LEADERSHIPS ______173

5.6.3 EGOCENTRIC PARTY LEADERSHIP ______176

5.6.4 PROMISING PARTY LEADERSHIP ______179

5.7 PARTY LEADERSHIP DURATION ______184

5.8 PARTY LEADERSHIPS AND PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALISATION ______186

5.8.1 CLASSIFYING CASE STUDIES ______186

5.8.2 WIDER APPLICATION OF THE TYPOLOGY ______189

5.8.3 FURTHER REFLECTIONS ______191

5.9 CONCLUSIONS ______193

Chapter Six │ Can Party Systems Be Considered Legitimate? ______195

6.1 INTRODUCTION ______195

6.2 THE BOUNDARIES OF LEGITIMACY______197

6.2.1 INPUT- AND OUTPUT-ORIENTED LEGITIMACY ______198

6.2.2 LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRACY ______199

6.3 BY WHOM AND TO WHOM? ______201

6.3.1 LEGITIMATION BY THE ELITES ______201

6.3.2 LEGITIMATION BY THE CITIZENRY ______202

6.4 HYPOTHESES AND EXPECTATIONS ______204

6.5 DATA AND METHODS ______206

6.6 RESULTS ______209

6.6.1 POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND PARTY SYSTEM STABILITY ______210

6.6.2 ELITES’ LEGITIMATION OF ELECTIONS AND PARTIES ______213

6.6.3 CITIZENS’ LEGITIMATION OF ELECTIONS AND PARTIES ______215

6.7 CONCLUSIONS ______228

Chapter Seven │ General Conclusions ______231

7.1 INTRODUCTION ______231

7.1.1 THESIS REVIEW ______232

7.1.2 GENERALISING INFERENCES ______233

7.1.3 STRUCTURE OF CONCLUSIONS ______234

7.2 PATTERNS OF PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALISATION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES ______234

7.2.1 CLEAVAGES ARE RELEVANT VARIABLES ______235

7.2.2 THE OTHER SIDE OF PERSONALISM ______237

7.2.3 THE PROBLEMATIC LEGITIMACY ______238

7.3 FURTHER RESEARCH ______240

7.3.1 UNDER-INSTITUTIONALISATION ______240

7.3.2 DE-INSTITUTIONALISATION ______241

7.3.3 OTHER FACTORS ______243

7.4 FINAL REMARKS ______245

References ______247

Appendices ______289

A. Operationalisation ______289

A 1.1 ROOTS IN SOCIETY ______289

A 1.2 LEGITIMACY ______290

A 1.3 PARTY ORGANISATION ______291

B. ELITE INTERVIEWS ______299

B 1.1 QUESTIONNAIRE ______299

B 1.2 LIST OF CHILEAN ELITE INTERVIEWEES ______300

B 1.2 LIST OF ESTONIAN ELITE INTERVIEWEES ______301

B 1.2 LIST OF KOREAN ELITE INTERVIEWEES ______302

C. Population Interviews ______305

C 1.1 CHILE ______305

C 1.2 ESTONIA ______306

C 1.3 KOREA ______306

D. Regression Calculations and Results ______307

D 1. PCA PROCEDURE AND RESULTS ______307

D 2. OLS REGRESSIONS FOR SOCIAL CLASS ______313

D 3. OTHER PSEUDO R2 ______314

D 4. MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION: FULL MODELS RESULTS ______315

E. Party Leaderships ______329

E 1.1 LIST OF PARTY LEADERS PER COUNTRY ______329

E 2 DISTRIBUTION OF LEADERS OVER TIME ______331

Word Count = 80,765

List of Tables, Figures and Images

TABLES

TABLE 3.1. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THAT BELONG TO OECD ______85

TABLE 3.2. QUESTIONNAIRE (EXTRACT) ______99

TABLE 3.3. OUTLINE OF THE FIELDWORK ______100

TABLE 3.4. SUMMARY OF ELITE INTERVIEWS ______102

TABLE 3.5. POPULATION INTERVIEW ORIGINAL QUESTIONNAIRE ______105

TABLE 3.6. SAMPLING DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL POPULATION INTERVIEWEES ______108

TABLE 4.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ______127

TABLE 4.2. CLEAVAGES CONTRIBUTION TO CHILE PARTY VOTE CHOICE ______131

TABLE 4.3. CLEAVAGES CONTRIBUTION TO ESTONIA PARTY VOTE CHOICE ______131

TABLE 4.4. CLEAVAGES CONTRIBUTION TO KOREA PARTY VOTE CHOICE ______132

TABLE 4.5. MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION BRIEF RESULTS: CHILE. CHI-SQUARE VALUES ______134

TABLE 4.6. MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION BRIEF RESULTS: ESTONIA. CHI-SQUARE VALUES ______135

TABLE 4.7. MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION BRIEF RESULTS: KOREA. CHI-SQUARE VALUES ______135

TABLE 5.1. IDEAL TYPES OF PARTY LEADERSHIP ______164

TABLE 5.2. LEADERS NET DURATION AS % OF ALL LEADERSHIPS ______183

TABLE 5.3. IDEAL TYPES OF PARTY LEADERSHIP IN CASE STUDIES ______185

TABLE 6.1. DESCRIPTION OF SUBJECTS AND OBJECTS OF LEGITIMACY ______199

TABLE 6.2. AGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION INTERVIEWEES (%) ______206

TABLE 6.3. CLAIMS IN HYPOTHESES 6.2 ______208

TABLE 6.4. ELITE INTERVIEWS’ OUTCOMES ______212

TABLE 6.5. FREE ELECTIONS TO CHOOSE LEADERS ______213

TABLE 6.6. CONFIDENCE IN POLITICAL PARTIES ______215

TABLE 6.7. CAN POLITICAL PARTIES BE REPLACED? ______220

TABLE 6.8. POPULATION INTERVIEWS’ OUTCOMES: REPLACEABILITY OF PARTIES ______221

TABLE 6.9. PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL SYSTEM SINCE RECOVERY OF DEMOCRACY ______222

TABLE 6.10. POPULATION INTERVIEWS’ OUTCOMES: POLITICAL SYSTEM EVOLUTION ______224

TABLE B 1. ELITE INTERVIEWS’ STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE ______297

TABLE B 2. LIST OF CHILEAN ELITE INTERVIEWEES ______298

TABLE B 3. LIST OF ESTONIAN ELITE INTERVIEWEES ______299

TABLE B 4. LIST OF KOREAN ELITE INTERVIEWEES ______300

TABLE D 1.1. INITIAL VALUES OF VARIABLES FOR PCA ______306

TABLE D 1.2. PRESENCE OF QUESTIONS ABOUT VALUES ______307

TABLE D 1.3. CHILE 1990 ______308

TABLE D 1.4. CHILE 1996 ______308

TABLE D 1.5. CHILE 2005 ______308

TABLE D 1.6. CHILE 2011 ______309

TABLE D 1.7. ESTONIA 1996 ______309

TABLE D 1.8. ESTONIA 1999 ______309

TABLE D 1.9. ESTONIA 2011 ______310

TABLE D 1.10. KOREA 2005 ______310

TABLE D 1.11. KOREA 2010 ______310

TABLE D 2.1. OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS ______311

TABLE D 3.1. CHILE: MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION’S PSEUDO R2 ______312

TABLE D 3.2. ESTONIA: MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION’S PSEUDO R2 ______312

TABLE D 3.3. KOREA: MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION’S PSEUDO R2 ______312

TABLE D 4.1. CHILE 1990 PARTY IDENTIFICATION. MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES ______313

TABLE D 4.2. CHILE 1996 PARTY IDENTIFICATION. MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES ______314

TABLE D 4.3. CHILE 2000 PARTY IDENTIFICATION. MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES ______315

TABLE D 4.4. CHILE 2005 PARTY IDENTIFICATION. MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES ______316

TABLE D 4.5. CHILE 2011 PARTY IDENTIFICATION. MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES ______317

TABLE D 4.6. ESTONIA 1996 PARTY IDENTIFICATION. MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES ______318

TABLE D 4.7. ESTONIA 1999 PARTY IDENTIFICATION. MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES ______320

TABLE D 4.8. ESTONIA 2011 PARTY IDENTIFICATION. MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES ______322

TABLE D 4.9. KOREA 2005 PARTY IDENTIFICATION. MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES______324

TABLE D 4.10. KOREA 2010 PARTY IDENTIFICATION. MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES ______325

TABLE E 1. LIST OF PARTY LEADERS PER COUNTRY ______327

FIGURES

FIGURE 2.1. ELECTORAL VOLATILITY AND NUMBER OF ELECTIONS ______53

FIGURE 2.2. VARIABILITY OF ELECTORAL VOLATILITY BY LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT ______54

FIGURE 2.3. VARIABILITY OF ELECTORAL VOLATILITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FROM THREE REGIONS ____ 55

FIGURE 2.4. EXPECTED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLEAVAGES AND PSI ______71

FIGURE 2.5. MAINSTREAM VIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERSONALISM AND PSI ______73

FIGURE 2.6. HYPOTHESIS VIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERSONALISM AND PSI ______75

FIGURE 2.7. THEORETICAL FAMILY OF THE THEORY OF PSI ______78

FIGURE 2.8. REVIEWED THEORETICAL FAMILY OF THE THEORY OF PSI ______79

FIGURE 3.1. ELECTORAL VOLATILITY IN CASES FROM LATIN AMERICA, EUROPE AND ASIA ______87

FIGURE 3.2. LINEAR TRENDS OF THE THREE SELECTED CASES ______88

FIGURE 5.1. POSITION OF PARTIES IN SCALE BETWEEN PROGRAMMATIC CONTENT AND

AUTHORITY CLASS ______188

FIGURE 6.1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND ELECTORAL STABILITY ______209

FIGURE 6.2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND ELECTORAL STABILITY,

BY DEVELOPMENT ______210

FIGURE 6.3. AGREEMENT LEVEL OF HAVING FREE ELECTIONS TO CHOOSE LEADERS ______214

FIGURE 6.4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEGITIMACY OF PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM STABILITY ______217

FIGURE 6.5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEGITIMACY OF PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM STABILITY,

BY DEVELOPMENT ______218

FIGURE E 1. PARTIES IN CHILE AND NUMBER OF CHAIRMANSHIPS ______330

FIGURE E 2. PARTIES IN ESTONIA AND NUMBER OF CHAIRMANSHIPS ______331

FIGURE E 3. PARTIES IN KOREA AND NUMBER OF CHAIRMANSHIPS ______332

IMAGES

MAP 3.1. GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION INTERVIEWS ______106

FACSIMILE C 1. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR POPULATION IN CHILE (IN SPANISH) ______303

FACSIMILE C 2. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR POPULATION IN ESTONIA (IN ESTONIAN) ______304

FACSIMILE C 3. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR POPULATION IN KOREA (IN KOREAN) ______304

ABSTRACT

The University of Manchester

Eduardo Olivares Concha

PhD

Party System Institutionalisation in New Democracies of Latin America, Europe and Asia

2015

This thesis examines why party systems of some developing countries become deeper and more quickly stabilised than others. Drawing on the scholarship of party system institutionalisation in third wave democracies, the thesis argues that the field can be strengthened by looking to three factors that the current literature has taken for granted: the role of cleavages, the function of personalistic politics, and the requirement of legitimacy to assess party systems. This thesis addresses these issues and in so doing provides a novel view of how, when and why party systems in newer democracies from Latin America, Europe and Asia consolidate over time.

The research considers three case studies from three regions of the world, following the most similar approach method of comparison. One country per world region has been chosen for study in detail: Chile (Latin America), Estonia (Central and Eastern Europe) and South Korea (East and Southeast Asia). They all have party systems which have become more stable over time, but they exhibit different trajectories and speeds of consolidation.

The thesis uses a variety of methods. In order to infer the causes of different processes of institutionalisation from party systems’ own participants, more than 120 elite interviews were conducted in the three countries over 13 months. To evaluate the overall legitimacy of the stabilisation process, this works presents the results of almost 500 face-to-face interviews with randomly selected individuals from the population. Quantitative analyses based on secondary public opinion surveys are used to test implications and observations, and offer potential generalisations.

The findings suggests: 1) Where the ideological cleavage (left-right) is a strong determinant of party support the party system is more stable, and the stronger the ideological cleavage becomes over time, the more consolidated the party system is. Here, an ideological trauma can be at the core of the limitations of the left-right scope development. 2) Party systems with personalistic leaders can consolidate, contrary to the received wisdom, if charismatic figures build their parties around programmatic lines. And 3) legitimacy should not be regarded as a dimension for the Theory of Party System Institutionalisation, because it does not contribute in any way, positive or negative, to the stability of party systems. The thesis concludes that theories of party system institutionalisation should be reconsidered with respect to cleavages, personalism and legitimacy. In so doing, the growing literature on party system institutionalisation can benefit from a more comprehensive understanding of the complexities of party systems in new democracies from different regions of the world.

DECLARATION

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of any application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to three people. To Julian, my cute marshmallow and the best globetrotter in this wandering family. To Beatriz, my funny cotton bud and the best achievement of this doctorate. And to Marlies: you didn’t help me with any line of this thesis, but without you I couldn’t have written a single comma. Thank you for your endless patience and unconditional support. You three stabilise all the parties of my system. I love you all from here to Pluto and beyond.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am massively indebted to so many people, so much so that I could write an entire chapter of acknowledgments. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors, Jane Green and Hermann Schmitt, for their boundless support, energetic encouragement and their countless offerings of advice. Jane has been the perfect supervisor. She took me by hand to show me the do’s and don’ts of how to conduct academic research. I appreciate her intellectual rectitude and strictness, which were always accompanied by kindness and superhuman dedication. Herman’s mini-lectures about party systems, cleavages and much more were pivotal to correct so many misleading assumptions. I truly appreciate his career suggestions, his sincere friendliness and his warm guidance.

I express my deepest gratitude to the National Commission for Scientific and Technological Research (Conicyt), from the Government of Chile, for the Becas Chile scholarship that funded my studies and stay in Manchester.

The academic environment in Politics at the University of Manchester has been an inspiration. I most appreciated the debates with Yoram Gorlizki, Carl Death, Francesca Gains, Maria Sobolewska, Georg Picot and all the discussions we have had at the Democracy and Elections cluster. My Manchester life was vibrant with so many friends to whom I am thankful for sharing their dreams, projects, frustrations and mutual support. Giulia Sirigu, Fabi Mieres and Claudio Fuentes González (the Latin corner!), you were the strongest ring of power. I hold in high esteem the friendship and intellectual energy of the Erwin Hansen, Laura J. White, Martín Arboleda, Tom Maltby, Tom Loughran, Hugo Romero, Anita Morales, Patricio Troncoso,

Rabi’Ah Aminudin, Bolarinwa Adediran, Henrique T. Furtado, Joshua Shurley, all the members of the fantastic Collective Political Learning group and my dearest Chilean community.

I am also deeply thankful of so many scholars who have provided generous advice for my work and projects outside Manchester, in particular Scott Mainwaring (U. Notre Dame), Bruce Cumings (U. Chicago), Fernando Casal Bértoa (U. Nottingham) and Allen Hicken (U. Michigan).

I would like to thank all of the staff members in my department. They supplied the ability to transform difficulties into peanuts, especially Ann Cronley, who has been of great support from beginning to end. Also thanks to Val Leferma, my South African friend and everyday supporter.

I am grateful to all my students, because they helped me to refresh my own thoughts all the way to the finishing line of this PhD.

For this thesis I am particularly indebted to many people in different countries. I would like to start by thanking all of my interviewees for giving up their priceless time in contributing to the enhancement of this research. Without exception, I value their efforts to elucidate my countless doubts and to put me back on track when I fell by the wayside.

My first destination was Estonia and even before getting there I received substantial support. This research was supported by European Social Funds Doctoral Studies and the Internationalisation Programme DoRa, which allowed me to conduct the necessary fieldwork without the need for financial struggles. Vello Pettai, from the University of Tartu, was the first and greatest support I found to assist me with applying for the scholarship and for a position as PhD visitor scholar in the Institute of Government and Politics in the same university. From there I received helpful comments on preliminary chapter drafts and insights on Estonian politics from many high-quality researchers, especially by Vello Pettai, Piret Ehin and Mihkel Solvak. My special thanks go to Marge Muld and Kadri Orula from the University of Tartu (Tartu Ülikool). At the Riigikogu, my thanks go to Riho Kangur and Heleri Pent. I also appreciated the help of officers in the city councils of Tallinn and Tartu.

The second arrival was in Chile. Although I was home, I received generous support from Olga Ulianova, the director of the Institute of Advanced Studies (IDEA) at the University of Santiago. My thanks go to Alessandro Santoni, who made me re-think the ideological settings of Chilean politics. I would also like to thank Claudio Salinas (Congreso Nacional), María Esther Sandoval (Copiapó city council) and all the other public relations liaisons of interviewees.

The final fieldwork destination was Korea. I am greatly indebted to the financial support offered by the Korea Foundation for the 2013 Fellowship of Field Research. I am deeply appreciative of Won-taek Kang, director of the Korean Institute of Political Studies at the Seoul National University (Seouldae!), for accepting me as a visiting scholar. I met wonderful colleagues at Seouldae, especially Hye-lim You. In the Gukhoe, I am most appreciative of the wonderful help provided by Ina Kim, Hyun-tae You and Bo-min Kim. I am especially thankful to Jong-sung You, who opened the door for contacts in the National Assembly and beyond, and who oriented me in the world of Korean politics in San Diego and Seoul.

I also need to make a special thankyou to a group of people who contributed greatly to this research: in Estonia, Andri Frolov; in Chile, Paulina and Gonzalo Olivares, and in Korea, Bo-min Kim, Hye-lim You and Byung-ho Kwon. They all helped me in so many ways that I feel deeply thankful. My gratitude goes to Jamie Shau, Anita Morales, Erwin Hansen, Esteban Puentes and Janine Worthington, who gave me insightful comments and provided proof-reading throughout this journey.

This PhD thesis materialised whilst I was PhD researcher at the University of Manchester, but I would be forever guilty if I did not mention the origins of this dissertation. I want to thank the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IR/PS, now GPS), in the University of California, San Diego. In particular, I would like to express my warmest gratitude to those professors who unexpectedly lit the fire for this PhD: Matthew S. Shugart, Jong-sung You, Ellis Krauss, Richard Feinberg and Stephen Haggard. Finally, I thank my mentor Enrique Ramírez Capello, a great Chilean journalist, who in the last four years has showed me the power of the mind over the body.

THE AUTHOR

I hold a degree on Journalism from the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, and worked as specialist in economic news for 10 years in Chilean newspapers. In 2009, I was awarded the Becas Chile scholarship to complete the Master of Pacific International Affairs (MPIA) at the University of California, San Diego. In 2011, I was awarded a new Becas Chile scholarship, this time to pursue my PhD in Politics. Whilst in Manchester, I taught issues of comparative politics, politics of development and international politics to undergraduate students. Part of my research has been presented at APSA, PSA and ECPR, amongst other international conferences.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Chile

Acronym Name in English Name in original language DC Christian Democracy Democracia Cristiana PAIS Wide Socialist Left Party Partido Amplio de Izquierda Socialista PAR Regionalist Action Party Partido de Acción Regional PC Communist Party Partido Comunista PdS Party of the South Partido del Sur PH Humanist Party Partido Humanista PL Liberal Party / Chile First Partido Liberal / ChilePrimero PPD Party for Democracy Partido por la Democracia PR Radical Party Partido Radical PRI Regionalist Party of Independents Partido Regionalista de los Independientes PRO Progressive Party Partido Progresista PRSD Social Democratic Radical Party Partido Radical Social Demócrata PS Socialist Party Partido Socialista RN National Renewal Renovación Nacional UCC Center Center Union Unión de Centro Centro UCCP Progressive Center Center Union Unión de Centro Centro Progresista UDI Independent Democrat Union Unión Demócrata Independiente

Estonia

Acronym Name in English Name in original language EEE Estonian Entrepreneurs' Party Eesti Ettevõtjate Erakond EER Estonian Greens Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised EK Estonian Centre Party Eesti Keskerakond EK Estonian Home Eesti Kodu EKDE Christian Democratic Party Eesti Kristlik-Demokraatlik Erakond EKDL Christian Democratic Union Eesti Kristlik-Demokraatlik Liit EKRE Conservative People's Party Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond ELDP Liberal Democrat Party Eesti Liberaal-Demokraatlik Partei EME Estonian Rural Union Eesti Maaliit Erakond EMK Estonian Rural Center Party Eesti Maa Keskerakond EPL Estonian Pensioners' Union Eesti Pensionäride Liit ER Estonian Reform Party Eesti Reformierakond ER1 Green Party Erakond Eesti Rohelised ERE Estonian National Party Eesti Rahvuslik Erakond EREE Estonian National Progressive Party Eesti Rahvuslik Eduerakond ERJP Estonian National Ranger's Party Eesti Rahva Jäägerpartei ERKI Estonian National Coalition Party Eesti Rahvuslik Koonderakond Isamaa

ERL Estonian People's Union Eestimaa Rahvaliit ERP Estonian Royalists Eesti Rojalistlik Partei ERSP Estonian National Independence Party Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei ESDP Estonian Social Democratic Party Eesti Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Partei SDE Social Democratic Party Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond I Pro Patria Union Isamaaliit IRL Pro Patria Res Publica Union Erakond Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit KE Estonian Coalition Party Eesti Koonderakond KP Constitution Party Konstitutsioonierakond LEKE Southern Estonian Citizens' Party Lõuna-Eesti Kodanike Erakond P Right-Wingers Parempoolsed PEKP Northern Estonian Citizens' Party Põhja-Eesti Kodanike Partei RE People's Party Rahvaerakond RM People's Party Moderates Rahvapartei Mõõdukad RP Res Publica Res Publica VEE Russian Party in Estonia Vene Erakond Eestis W Republican Coalition Party Vabariiklaste Koonderakond

Korea

Name in original language Original name Acronym Name in English (romanised) (hangul) AUP Advancement Unification Party Seonjin Tongil dang 선진통일당 CKP Creative Korea Party Changjo Hanguk dang 창조한국당 DJP Democratic Justice Party Minju Jeongui dang 민주정의당 DLP Democratic Labour Party Minju Nodong dang 민주노동당 DP 1990 Democratic Party (1990) Minju dang 민주당 DP 1991 Democratic Party (1991) Minju dang 민주당 Democratic Party (2007)/Centrist DP 2007 Minju dang 민주당 Reformist Democratic Party DP 2008 Democratic Party (2008) Minju dang 민주당 DPP Democratic People's Party Gungmin dang 민주국민당 Democratic United Party /Democratic DUP Minju Tonghab Dang*/ 민주 통합 당 Party (2011) FHA Future Hope Alliance Miraehimang Yeondae 미래희망연대 Grand-national-people (Hangyore) HDP Hangyore minju dang 한겨레민주당 Democratic Party JP Justice Party/Progressive Justice Party Jeongeui dang 정의당 LFP Liberty Forward Party Jayu Seonjin dang 자유선진당 Millennium Democratic Sae Cheonnyeon Minju dang / 새 천년 민주당 / MDP Party/Democratic Party (2000) Minju dang 민주당 NCNP National Congress for New Politics Saejeongchi Gungminhoeui 새정치 궁민회의 NDP New United Democratic Party Sinmin dang 신민당 NDRP New Democratic Republican Party Sinminju Gonghwa dang 신민주공화당 New Frontier Party / Grand National 새누리당 NFP/GNP** Saenuri dang/Hanara dang Party /한나라당

NKDP New Korea Democratic Party Sinhan Minju dang 신한민주당 New Korea Party/Democratic Liberal Shin Hanguk dang / Minju Jayu 신한국당 NKP Party dang /민주자유당 NPAD New Politics Alliance for Democracy Saejeongchi Minju Yeonhap 새정치민주연합 NPP New Progressive Party Jinbo Sin dang 진보신당 PFP People's First Party Gungmin Jungsim dang 국민중심당 PPD Party for peace and democracy P'yonghwa Minju dang 평화민주당 PPR People's Party for Reform Yeongeoe seojeong ui 영어에서 정의 RDP Reunification Democratic Party Tongil Minju dang 통일민주당 U Uri Party Yeollin Uri Dang 열린 우리당 ULD United Liberal Democrats Jayu Minju Yonhap 자유 민주 연합 UNDP United New Democratic Party Daetonghap Minju Sin dang 대통합민주신당 UP United People's Party Tongil gukmin dang 통일국민당 UPP Unified Progressive Party Tonghap Jinbo dang 통합진보당 * Usually called only Minju dang by interviewees. ** Although Saenuri dang refers to NFP in English, interviewees interchanged the Korean Saenuri dang with the English acronym of GNP (GNP is the acronym of the Korean previous name of this party, Hanara dang)

CHAPTER ONE Party-system institutionalization is an important variable in comparing party INTRODUCING PARTY SYSTEM systems, and variance in institutionalization shapes the nature of democratic politics. NSTITUTIONALISATION I Scott Mainwaring 1999: 341

1.1 Background

Since the mid-1970s until the beginning of the 1990s, more than 30 countries entered into a democratisation process. Most of them were developing polities of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and East and Southeast Asia (Huntington 1991: 14-15). These three regions shared similar historical patterns, broadly speaking: most suffered from authoritarian regimes or foreign subjugation. At the same time, these regions witnessed impressive economic progress since the years of authoritarian rule or shortly after they began experiencing democracy. However, they differed in a key factor essential for democracies: their party systems. Whilst some party systems acquired stable patterns of competition a few years after democracy was inaugurated, others struggled with high levels of electoral volatility. This thesis’ overarching question precisely deals with what explains variation in the consolidation processes of party systems in third wave democracies.

The patterns of democratic development in third wave countries have been studied profusely, especially during the 1980s and 1990s, when the wave of democratisation occurred (e.g., Diamond et al. 1997, Fukuyama 1995, Linz and Stepan 1996, O'Donnell et al. 1986, Pridham and Vanhanen 1994, Remmer 1991). Relatively less attention was given to examine their party systems, despite the wide consensus amongst political scientists that the quality of democracy is strongly correlated with well-formed party systems. The exception was a volume on party systems edited by Mainwaring and Scully (1995), which focused on Latin America. The editors and authors proposed that party systems in developing democracies were born differently than in most mature democracies, and thus should be studied following a different set of

factors. That groundbreaking work opened the path for new scholarship on party system institutionalisation.1

The scholarship on democratisation and on party system institutionalisation, and their links, has expanded ever since. Missing from this burgeoning and important literature is the necessity of works that could explain why certain party systems were able to develop more quickly and deeper than others. To start with, there has been little discussion about the effective role of cleavages in the institutionalisation of novel party systems,2 despite the tremendous contribution of explanations of cleavages (Bartolini and Mair 1990, Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and their importance for our understanding of party systems elsewhere. In that sense, the literature has not paid enough attention to the relationship between newer party systems and cleavages. This thesis seeks to unpack the connection between these two prominent theories.

Likewise, scholars have taken for granted that personalism is an ever-present malaise that rots party systems’ pillars. Personalistic politics is immediately seen as a whole feature that should be located at the extreme opposite end of any well-functioning party system. But the literature might have overestimated the evils of personalism or overlooked its benefits for consolidating some party systems. This thesis addresses the idea that newer democracies are in a learning process, so features of their party system development, like personalism, should not necessarily follow the same pathway as in more mature democracies. In formative stages of party systems, personalistic figures can attract voters to create the first loyalty links with emerging parties. The mainstream literature has quite rightly pointed out the risk of marrying the charismatic figure with the fate of the party. There is, nonetheless, a more positive approach that involves the role of charismatic figures with the construction of programmatic party platforms that may transcend their own charisma. In young democracies, therefore, personalistic politics can play a fruitful role as programmatic builders.

Finally, the inspiration to take a fresh look at features of party systems in newer democracies comes from the theory of Party System Institutionalisation (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). This

1 This literature has assumed that in order for a party system to function, democracy should be the only game in town (Bruhn 1997, Lindberg 2007, Luna and Altman 2011, Mainwaring 1999, Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Moser 2001). There is also an emerging literature that relates well-institutionalised party systems with less democratic settings (Hicken and Kuhonta 2011, 2015b). 2 One exception is Casal Bértoa (2012, 2014) for post-communist countries.

thesis pays particular attention to the validity of the theory of PSI and critically analyses the appropriateness of its dimension of legitimacy. The question is whether legitimacy has any relevance to explain variations in party system consolidation. These three foci—the role of cleavages, personalism and legitimacy on party system consolidation—represent the core of this thesis.

The main research question invites a broader inquiry into the phenomenon of party system consolidation. Broader in this context would mean beyond area studies. There are excellent within-region studies of how well or badly institutionalised party systems are (e.g., Casal Bértoa 2011, Hicken and Kuhonta 2011, Lindberg 2007, Luna and Altman 2011, Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mainwaring 1999, Markowski 2000, Olson 1998, Rose and Munro 2003, Soós 2011, Tavits 2005). They have expanded our knowledge of the field. But there is still a need for a systematic account of why some party systems from different regions show more stability than others. Efforts in that direction have been modest, and are very rare.3 Given that the third wave of democratisation was indeed a global phenomenon, the lack of comprehensive international comparative studies of party system institutionalisation across regions is surprising. It is important to fill that gap. This thesis plays its part in comparing three countries from three different regions: Chile, Estonia and South Korea4 (Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and East and Southeast Asia, respectively), to account for cross-regional variation. Extensive fieldwork in those places provides rich data from political elites and the general population alike.

Methodologically, this thesis seeks to reject a dichotomous orthodoxy that splits research between qualitative and quantitative. Rather, the approach taken here draws on large N data and case studies as dynamic sources of evidence that require equally demanding systematic observations (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, Levy 2007, Ragin and Driscoll 1994). Social research deals with taking advantage of how different methods and techniques, when combined, enrich our understanding of reality. This methodological diversity allows for extracting general and specific conclusions, at the same time, from complex evidence (Tilly 1984).

3 As I will discuss later, some good exceptions of this lack of cross-regionalism can be found in Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) and Hicken and Kuhonta (2011). 4 “South Korea” will be called “Korea”. I will use “Korean” rather than “South Korean”.

This work has important theoretical and empirical implications. It deals with longstanding mainstream assumptions in political science (cleavages, personalism, legitimacy) that are revisited and, where appropriate, contested. Many of these assumptions are well rooted in the literature on Western European paradigms but their relevance for third wave democracies has not been previously tested. There is, then, an ongoing need for a re-think of current theories of party systems in light of new evidence from emerging democracies.

1.2 Key concepts for the study of party system consolidation

1.2.1 Parties

There is little controversy amongst scholars that parties are the most substantial engine required for democracies to work well (e.g., Dahl 1982, Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge 1994, Lipset 2000, Schattschneider 1942). They “are the central intermediate and intermediary structures between society and government” and the actors that mold the political society (Sartori, 1976: ix-x; emphasis in original). Parties are supposed to constitute the indispensable essence of a representative democracy, because they are expected to agglutinate issues and citizens’ demands into a programme that the electorate votes upon in elections. Otherwise the political scheme would be a cluttered, disorganised congregation of candidates and ideas, leading to noise and confusion. James Bryce, British Ambassador to the United States in the beginning of the past century, stated: “Parties are inevitable. […] They bring order out of the chaos of a multitude of voters” (1921: 119).

When talking about democracy, simply taken as the system where the majority governs and the rights of minorities are protected, parties play the crucial role of representing the will of the majority of the electorate (Duverger 1959, Lijphart 1999, Riker 1982) and, as Alexis de Tocqueville said—inspired by the American case—, political parties were the key institutions of civil society and a counter-measure against the tyranny of the majority (Tocqueville in Heffner 1956: 112, Lively 1962). Some scholars think that parties promote public policies for winning elections (Downs 1957: 28), whereas others think that parties win elections because they want to set public policies (Strøm 1990). Parties are collective groups that are mutually informed with citizens’ preferences, but which also shape the political landscape of a system due to their own cultural, economic, and social structure, as well as their ideological components (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Przeworski 1985, Sartori 1969).

1.2.2 Party systems

Political parties are the unit of analysis for several studies and theories, but this is different from studying party systems: a party system is another unit of analysis, albeit related (Casal Bértoa 2011, Ware 1996). Again, Sartori eliminates any potential confusion by clarifying that a party system is a) made up by parties (in plural form, thus excluding one-party states), and b) “the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition” (1976: 43-4, emphasis in original). Thus, a party system is more than its individual party components: it also includes the relationships between parties (Maor 1997), in terms of cooperation, collaboration and competition (Kitschelt et al 1999, Ware 1996). Party systems fall into a unique category that relates individual citizen preferences for a given party to an aggregate of citizens’ preferences, as well as relations with other preferences in the same system (Ware 1996). In addition, party systems relate to other aspects of the polity, such as party regulations, either in specific laws or in the constitution, if any (Randall and Svåsand 2002). The core of any party system is the competition for control of the executive (Mair 2006). As democracy is unimaginable without parties, it is inconceivable without party systems (Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998).

Not every country with parties would necessarily classify as having a party system. As mentioned, a party system should have at least two parties; otherwise it belongs in a different category, such as a party-state system (Mainwaring 1999, Sartori 1976). However, the minimum number of parties is a necessary but not sufficient condition. To be a party system, the scheme must be competitive, which means that if there are only two parties in that system, they should be in opposition to each other, although the opposition role should not be their only mode of operation (Ware 2009). Grzymała-Busse (2007: 11) posits the idea of “robust party competition”, that indicates a system in which the opposition is openly critical, clearly identifiable and capable of taking power. These criteria do not always have apparent and definitive cut-offs, but they are important for conceptualizing the boundaries of party systems.

1.2.3 Comparing party systems

Party systems can be compared in multiple ways. For example, they can be classified by their electoral system (Duverger 1959, International IDEA 2005: 6). It is even more common to classify party systems in relation to the number, size, polarisation, spatial position and relative functions of its parties (Blondel 1968, Downs 1957, Laakso and Taagepera 1976, Rokkan 1970, Sartori 1976, Ware 1996). Others have made more multidimensional categorisations,

identifying parties by their number and also by their internal cohesiveness (Dahl 1966); by number and left-right scheme (Gross and Sigelman 1984), or by classifying them as open or closed systems of competition (Mair 2002).

There are certainly more fine-grained classifications. Here I will mention in more detail two groundbreaking treatises about party systems that have influenced a large body of scholarship. One concerns social cleavages, and the other concerns party system classification in the number of parties and degrees of polarization.

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) proposed that important conflicts in society originated from divisive interests amongst the community members are eventually translated into the political sphere. They are the cleavages. These conflicts were informed by special interests (class, religion, ethnicity; urban and rural) which were translated into ideologies that identified particular sectors of the electorate. States began with relevant social organisations, like farmers associations, or the church, being key actors of the state formation itself. These organisations became parties, and engaged in the political representation of the abovementioned social conflicts. Thus, parties were born with an already substantive mass of support. Such cleavages remained throughout decades and allowed voters to strongly identify with parties. Then, the different types of party systems became more stable over time—or ‘freezing’, according to Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 3)

This grassroots origin still stands as a plausible explanation for why voters in Western Europe have remained close to the same parties many decades later. Party systems, according to the “freezing hypothesis”, did not substantially change over time. However, it is clear that this experience was not necessarily the same beyond Western Europe. In Latin America, for example, several scholars have found no consistent evidence supporting the idea of attitudinal or structural cleavages in most of the countries (e.g., Conaghan 1995, Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, Roberts 2002), with some exceptions such as Chile (Luna and Altman 2011). Nonetheless, it does not mean that there are no cleavages at all: there are some around indigenous movements (Yashar 2005) or labour-mobilizing actors (Roberts 2002), but they only have minor effects on the party system (Deegan-Krause 2007). In Southeast Asia the situation is similar. In Indonesia, cleavages structured around religion have been detected (Qodari 2005), but the results are not conclusive (Choi 2010). In Korea there is strong evidence of regional divides (Kang 2003), especially between two specific provinces (Yeongnam and Honam).

Despite their proximity to Western Europe, parties in post-communist regimes could not replicate a strong relationship with voters, since they were not founded following the same pattern as in the West. Although voters can certainly still manifest preferences along the left and right divide, the problem remains that many parties that claim to be in a particular position of the scale disappear, merge with others outside of that position, or form opportunistic coalitions to keep legislators in power (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003). Moreover, it is a fact that parties in developing countries do not achieve similar grassroots participation as those in developed countries: after the late 1990s the percentage of voters having party memberships in the new democracies of Eastern Europe was less than half that of West European countries (Webb and White 2007)—in spite of a general downwards trend in Western Europe.

Disconnections between electorates and political parties are not a phenomenon exclusive to developing countries. However, there is a significant difference. Whist in consolidated democracies the disconnection is seen as a process of partisan de-alignment (Dalton 1984), in consolidating democracies there were difficulties with the original alignment itself (Freire 2006)5.

A second influential piece of work regarding party system classification (Mainwaring 1999, Wolinetz 2004) comes from Sartori (1976). Sartori underpins the importance of the number of parties in a given system, distinguishing between two-party and multiparty systems, but he also asserts that the number of parties is not enough to explain variations between party systems. He then adds as a factor, the level of polarisation of the systems, dividing them up between four categories of democratic party systems: party dominant system (predominant type), two-party system, multipartism with a low level of polarisation (moderate pluralism), and multipartism with a high level of polarisation (polarised or extreme pluralism) (Sani and Sartori 1983, Sartori 1976). Mair (2002) asserts that moderate pluralism has become a more common feature amongst liberal democracies. Such differentiation allows parties to be positioned on a spatial range, usually a left-right scheme, separating them from each other. The theory works well for Western European democracies because their party systems are usually characterised by ideologically-based parties. The importance of this view is that in

5 Newer democracies of Western Europe experienced increasing partisan attachment (Schmitt and Holmberg 1998), though.

Western electoral democracies the quality of a democracy is determined by the level of issue- congruence between parties and the electorate, which is in turn related to the effectiveness of the level of polarisation (Schmitt and Freire 2012).

Most of these classifications make universal assumptions: that party systems can be well rooted in society due to cleavage distinctions; that parties are mostly programmatically- oriented rather than personalistic; that parties have well-known campaigning procedures and rules; and last but not least, that established parties tend to enjoy longevity. That set of assumptions does not properly take into account an important dimension: the degree of institutionalisation of party systems. This last criterion is of key importance in systems other than Western Europe (Mainwaring 1999). It does not mean that the previous assumptions for Western Europe do not apply at all to third wave democracies, but they are insufficient to analyse the whole picture.

A more comprehensive way to tackle questions concerning party systems is by looking at their levels of institutionalisation. In their seminal conceptualization of the institutionalisation of party systems in developing democracies, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) highlight that levels of institutionalisation depend on the patterns of party competition, the citizens’ attachments to parties, the organisational strength of parties, and the legitimisation of elections and parties. Their approach is both ambitious and helpful to understand party systems in newer democracies. But it has some flaws. This thesis will also seek to identify and analyse these flaws in depth.

1.2.4 Institutionalisation of parties and party systems

Huntington defines institutionalisation as “the process by which organisations and procedures acquire value and stability” (1968: 12). Institutionalisation is a process, not a final stage or a static one. This is an important distinction because it means that the concept of institutionalisation modifies the concept of system. While a system is seen as a relatively stable and regular structure, a process serves to contextualise such a setting within a scale or continuum. One country can have more than one party system over time. For instance, if a country had a long period of one-party rule or even no political parties at all (in both cases, an absence of party system, following Sartori 1976), a different party system emerges after this. Also, a country may have a hegemonic party in the context of semi-democracy, but still have other parties competing to defeat the hegemonic party; if these ‘other parties’ eventually

succeed, a new party system would emerge if the regime type becomes democratic. That country will have at least two party systems in its history, and both can be analysed separately.

Through this process, both structure and procedures in party systems work together, shaping their own characteristics and gaining identity. In order to be recognisable (what Huntington calls ‘value’), party systems cannot be sporadic or fluctuate too heavily—citizens would get confused about their electoral options. Institutionalisation implies that practices and organisations are well-established, commonly accepted and well-known (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 4). If not, the party system would be unstable and under-institutionalised.

Political party institutionalisation is not the same as party system institutionalisation (Randall and Svåsand 2002). The former focuses on individual characteristics of parties as organisations (e.g. Basedau and Stroh 2008, Gunther and Hopkin 2002, Janda 1980, Panebianco 1988). Party system institutionalisation is focused on the set of multiple interactions amongst parties, between parties and other elements of polities such as formal and informal rules (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Randall and Svåsand 2002, Ware 1996). Both party and party system institutionalisation might be correlated, but they may not be (Markowski 2000). It is possible to have well institutionalised individual parties but a weakly institutionalised party system (Randall and Svåsand 2002). For example, American parties appear weakly institutionalised in comparison to Western European parties (Bardi and Mair 2008), although both have strong party systems. At the same time, the Paraguayan party system is weak, but its oldest party (Colorado) is strong.

Parties work as ‘channelling’ (Sartori 1976) actors to represent social demands, organising interests and promoting issues and policies at the same time. Having stable patterns of competition gives the electorate (demand side) and parties (supply side) more predictable ways to interact with each other, ensuring that the interests of citizens are represented and that governance is effective. When stability is strengthened, parties can play a greater role in channelling voters’ demands. Without stable patterns of competition, such functions of parties are tampered or, even worse, may be replaced by populist movements or interest groups claiming a better representation of the popular will. Hence, the more institutionalised party systems are, the more likely they are to have programmatic political parties competing on policy-based proposals, which scholars argue is important for the consolidation of democracy (Jones 2007, Mainwaring 1999, Zucco forthcoming). Here, as important as having predictable

electoral outcomes, is the fact that political parties should have strong organisational norms and procedures. Parties with well-known and clear programmes are better for democracy because choices can be based on policy-based proposals in addition to factors such as personalistic leadership. Therefore, the more institutionalised a party system is, understood as a system where stability in inter-party competition is high and organisations are well structured and based on policy proposals, the more likely it is that a democracy will exhibit higher quality, as it might be measured by standard scales (e.g., Freedom in the World, Polity IV).

1.3 Theory of Party System Institutionalisation

In their seminal work, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) elaborated the building blocks of a theory of Party System Institutionalisation (PSI). Their theoretical proposal has been partially or fully applied in subsequent studies (e.g., Croissant and Völkel 2010, Hicken and Kuhonta 2011, 2015a, Kuenzi and Lambright 2005, Jones 2007, Lindberg 2007, Luna and Altman 2011, Mainwaring 1999, Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, Moser 2001, Payne 2006, Stockton 2001). The large scale and wide application of the theory responds to the necessity of scholars to interpret the development of party systems in younger democracies (or semi-democracies) from a viewpoint that the Western European tradition overlooked.

Mainwaring and Scully (1995) contend that traditional views about party systems, such as those based on Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Sartori (1976), do not adequately assess the kind of party systems that have emerged in developing countries. Their argument posits that developing countries, especially those that emerged within the third wave of democratisation (from 1974 to circa 1990, following Huntington 1991), witnessed a different type of party system development than that of Western democracies (Coppedge 1998, Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mainwaring 1999). Political organisations in these newly democratised countries sometimes began much later than the origin of their states, and usually they were originated by the state and elites. Thus, they contend that an analysis cannot be started to consider whether political parties adopted issues based on cleavages, because such cleavages, at least in the Western European format, were created before or at the same time as state formation. It does not mean that there are not developing countries with ideologically or social-based party system characteristics, but on the contrary, there is a myriad of political party systems,

some with parties in line with more traditional European-style features and still more with other settings. As Mainwaring (1999: 22) points out:

Most important approaches to party system formation—social cleavage and spatial— have emphasized how society structures party systems from below. Third-wave cases show that we must be more attentive to examining how the state and political elites have shaped party systems from above.

It is not unusual to have parties created only to compete for specific elections (Randall and Svåsand 2002), as frequently happened during the 1990s and/or 2000s in, for example, Ecuador, Lithuania, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, and South Korea. This also takes into account cases of re-labelled parties (because of merging and splitting, essentially). Western European party systems have also had these phenomena, but to a far lesser extent than in third wave countries. Such kind of distinctions shows not only that Western Europe and the US are much more institutionalised than their counterparts in the developing world, but also the variance of degrees of institutionalisation seems to be much higher amongst third wave democracies than amongst developed societies.

Considering these characteristics of party systems, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) propose four dimensions to examine degrees of institutionalisation. Taken together, these four dimensions aim to assess different characteristics that render systems more fluid or more consolidated.6 Their theoretical expectation is that the more institutionalised party systems are, the more likely their polities will achieve a higher quality of democracy.7

The four dimensions relate to:

Patterns of inter-party competition

The more regular the inter-party competition is, the more institutionalised the party system becomes. A highly institutionalised party system has established parties remaining on the

6 Sartori talks about ‘consolidated’ party systems (a different way to say ‘institutionalised’ systems) and non- systems (1976: 244-8). However, as Mainwaring and Torcal say (2006: 205), Sartori’s dichotomy is rigid and neglects important variance in cases (Mair 2006), and should be replaced by a continuum. 7 The institutionalisation of party systems plays a significant role in improving the quality of democracies in developing countries, according to a number of scholars (e.g., Bruhn 1997, Lindberg 2007, Luna and Altman 2011, Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mainwaring and Torcal 2005, Moser 2001).

scene for decades, with relatively low electoral volatility. A weakly institutionalised party system sees the frequent emergence of new parties, with some established parties suffering sudden declines.

Parties’ roots in society

When parties are based on strong ties with citizens, the socio-political linkage tends to be long- lasting. This high standard assumes that voters support a party over time based upon that party’s programmatic values. In inchoate systems, voters have trouble locating what the major parties stand for; citizens often change their party preferences and are less inclined to vote for party labels.

Legitimacy of governing channels

If voters and political elites grant legitimacy to elections and parties, the party system becomes more institutionalised. The behaviour of political elites is based on their expectations to win elections and eventually govern. In weakly institutionalised systems, political elites may undermine the role of elections, seeking other routes to access power and government.

Party organisation

If party organisations are strong and autonomous, political parties acquire value and independence of their own. Parties cannot be dominated by personalistic interests, but rather by a collective decision-making process inside the organisation. A greater level of institutionalisation on this dimension comes from having parties that are well-managed, well- structured internally, and well-able to finance their activities.

According to Mainwaring (1999), these four dimensions do not necessarily go together, but they usually do. Systems that are weakly-institutionalised are also dubbed as fluid, and a special feature that usually characterises them is that they are dominated by personalistic leaders (p. 27). Overall, this set of dimensions has internal coherence and logical interrelations, but, as will be discussed in the next chapter, some methodological flaws and debatable assumptions also exist.

1.4 The problem

Drawing from the theories of cleavages and polarisation, the scholarship on party systems mainly focused on how party systems of Western Europe and other developed countries have consolidated over a relatively long timespan. The vast literature on parties and party systems provided a rich starting point to assess how developing countries have evolved since they began their democratic regimes. A more recent stream of literature, though, claims that the formation and evolution of party systems in third wave democracies require a different understanding and, therefore, another approach. This viewpoint is heralded by the theory of Party System Institutionalisation (PSI). It considers that the dimensions of inter-party stability, social roots of parties, organisational strength of parties, and legitimacy of parties and elections, explain better the process of consolidation of party systems in emerging democracies.

This thesis is inspired by the theory of PSI in its pursuit to review the consolidation of party systems in newer democracies under a different lens. But the thesis has questions that the theory of PSI cannot answer as it is currently designed. On the other hand, the main theories based on mature democracies do not seem to cope with many of the puzzles of the consolidation process of party systems in emerging democracies. But this does not mean that the said theories have no answers at all. In this introductory chapter, I have clarified that the literature on party system consolidation is missing important links to enable an understanding of the complexities of developing countries’ party systems. In the first instance and considering that cleavages did not have time to develop in most of the emerging democracies, as the PSI theory claims, can the freezing hypothesis explain why some party systems stabilised in greater depth and more quickly than others? Interplay between both theories has not been conducted so far. Secondly, no theory has paid enough attention to the role that personalistic party leaders might have in paving the way towards the consolidation of a party system. Do charismatic leaders contribute to stabilise the systems, or are they always shakers of the system pillars in developing (and developed) countries? Finally, unlike the freezing hypothesis and other Western treatises, the theory of PSI gives relevance to legitimacy as a feature of strong party systems. Is it a characteristic that third wave countries should be concerned about, and why? These questions represent the field that this thesis seeks to explore and answer.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

This thesis will be structured around three core sections. In the first, consisting only of Chapter Two, the ideas of party system stability are depicted and analysed. It pursues a critical review of the most relevant literature in the field and proposes new insights. Particularly, the theory of PSI is scrutinised and constructively criticised. The aim of Chapter Two is to provide an analytical framework within which this thesis is embedded. It ends with three general hypotheses that will be subsequently set out in detail and tested in each of the empirical chapters.

The second section (Chapter Three) is the research design. The data come from survey studies, especially the World Values Surveys. Other data include expert survey data and an original collection of party leadership data from selected cases. Chapter Three also provides a detailed account of the elite interviews conducted in the three case study countries, as well as a general description of almost 500 population interviews that were conducted in the same countries.

The third section consists of the three empirical chapters. Chapter Four analyses how the general theory of party system stabilisation8 can work with the freezing theory of cleavages. It moves onto testing the role of cleavages for the consolidation processes of party systems, and in particular asks whether ideological orientation plays a major function in consolidation. Chapter Five tackles the nuances of personalistic politics. It asks whether personalism can favour the stability of party systems—and under which conditions—or if on the contrary it is always harmful. Chapter Six focuses on the dimension of legitimacy. It covers the dimension’s attributes and weighs if legitimacy contributes to the general validity of the theory.

Conclusions are offered in Chapter Seven. That chapter summarises the analyses and the results of preceding chapters, and shows how they contribute to the scholarship on party system institutionalisation. Ideas for future research, based on this thesis’ outcomes, but also on the literature that could not be covered in these pages, are also presented.

8 As it will be clear in the next chapter, institutionalisation and stabilisation render a similar meaning so they are used accordingly. I also use consolidation as a noun married to stabilisation.

CHAPTER TWO Curiosity, fascination, and indignation should guide the choice of a research topic. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF PSI Barbara Geddes 2003: 28

2.1 Introduction

Stability is an essential characteristic of an institutionalised party system (Holliday 2002, Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Panebianco 1988). Likewise, institutionalised party systems require citizens to choose their representatives based on long-standing programmatic platforms (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). Such programmes are usually issued by consolidated and well organised parties. Citizens recognise these parties and might feel close to them, so that both parties and citizens, who represent the demand and supply side of a competitive political system, can interact over time following predictable preferences (Holcombe and Gwartney 1989, Panebianco 1988, Ware 1996). All of these elements have been introduced to the scholarship on party systems and deserve a more careful examination. Amongst the resounding questions which are still prevalent within the literature emerge the following: Why are certain party systems in developing regions consolidated earlier than others? And what can explain different levels of institutionalisation? Therefore, this thesis focuses on the reasons behind different trajectories of party system consolidation in countries from the third wave of democratisation.

Huntington pioneered the idea of institutionalisation, broadly defined as the process of valuation and stabilisation of organisations and procedures, primarily applied to political parties (Hicken and Kuhonta 2015a: 4, Huntington 1968: 12). The theory of Party System Institutionalisation (PSI) by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) proposed the need for a new understanding of party politics in Latin America given the developing nature of its democracies. In general, they claimed, Latin America differed from the most studied ‘standard’ criteria of developed Western-style party systems. The same applies to other regions containing recently democratised countries, such as Central and Eastern Europe, East and Southeast Asia, and Africa. The scholarship on party system institutionalisation widened the scope of observation

for political phenomena in newer democracies, but still requires further critical assessments to strengthen its own theoretical validity and relevance.

This chapter deals with a critical review of the study of party systems, particularly on the theory of PSI, and then opens the discussion to look at ways of enhancement. The chapter assesses PSI as a paramount theory in the study of party system consolidation and articulates the substantive challenges to explain variations in PSI between newer democracies. In the following pages, this theory and its dimensions are depicted and analysed. Firstly, this thesis presents the theory of PSI as it is proposed in the literature. Furthermore, it highlights the main arguments and the rationale behind each of the PSI dimensions, inspired by the different works by Mainwaring and his co-authors. Based on the relevant scholarship, the use of a proxy indicator of party system stability (electoral volatility) is proposed. This indicator is subsequently applied to 80 countries in the world for the period 1945-2015. After that, the thesis constructively criticises some conceptual pitfalls of the theory. Finally, the discussion will consider the most substantive challenges of the literature, according to this thesis: What explains the variation of party system consolidation amongst third wave democracies. These latter challenges lead to the general hypotheses which will close the chapter.

2.2 Rationale of dimensions

The theory of PSI sustains that more institutionalised party systems are those that are able to stabilise their electoral outcomes, legitimise their elections, keep rooted links between citizens and parties, and evidence party organisational strength. Each dimension has several building blocks. Mainwaring (1999, 2015), Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) provide the conceptual basis for each of them. In attempting to contribute to the understanding of the categories of PSI, it is therefore relevant to outline a broader justification behind the original theoretical dimensions. Each dimension will now be described in further detail, strictly inspired by the rationale proposed by the aforementioned works.

2.2.1 Stability

The stabilisation of inter-party competition purports that electoral behaviour is broadly predictable in terms of the patterns of political choices. Voters choose between alternatives they can recognise as long-standing platforms, and parties can offer programmatic orientations that have short, medium and also long-term objectives. Without programmatic

content,9 the electorate would lack predictability, a quintessential component of stable political systems (Downs 1957, Mair 2001b). The idea of predictability assumes that accumulated experience allows voters to foresee expected outcomes of alternative governments; by implication, it creates the conditions for a minimal level of stability in the agenda of political parties. Predictability takes stability as a part of its own definition (something is predictable only when patterned situations happen), but goes beyond this in also giving way to the analysis of voter behaviour. Voters are the principals in any given competitive political system, because they are supposed to make the decision that enables parties to compete to form governments and take authoritative decisions for the whole of the citizenry.10 Hence, a system becomes predictable (and thus, stable) only when the electorate, and only the electorate, considers it predictable. If voters can predict the political party patterns of competition, same parties are able to make their own strategic decisions based on a stable voting environment. This patterned feedback between voters and parties is the ideal basis for a party system to become stable or unstable. Mair (2001b: 35) asserts that predictability “becomes a surrogate of structuration: the more predictable a party system is, the more it is a system as such, and hence the more institutionalised it has become”. Why does predictability matter? If political elites are not predictable, or they do not try to honour what they promise during campaign periods, trust in political parties decays, and institutions lose value. As a result, the pathway to instability, including the emergence of programmatically-diffused personalistic leaderships, 11 rises in detriment of a more programmatic orientation of party systems (Gunther and Diamond 2001, Weyland 1996).

What do stable patterns of party system competition mean? In a broad sense, patterned behaviour is a neutral concept: it only refers to systematic events that a given structure follows over time. The idea of ‘stable patterns’, in principle, only conveys that the system is not chaotic. For instance, a country that has low electoral volatility in an election T1, high in T2, again low in T3, and high in T4, shows a stable pattern of high fluctuation. That case may mean,

9 The adjective “programmatic” refers to the ideological content filling the identity of a party (e.g., Chaisty, Cheeseman and Power 2014, Mainwaring 1999). It should not be confused with “programmes” of any given political campaign (Sartori 1976: 120). 10 On the other hand, predictability can be seen at the same time as an ambitious conceptualisation, because it also may imply certain determinism: events will occur within preconceived limits. Determinism is not subscribed to the concept of predictability as used in this text, so it should not be read as such here. 11 The ‘personalistic’ leadership conceptualisation is regularly used in Latin American politics scholarship (e.g. Barr 2009, Mainwaring 1998a, Roberts 2007; Samuels 1999, Weyland 2003): leaders that bear with populism and clientelism. This issue is discussed in Chapter Six of this thesis.

on the supply side of the electoral competition, that political parties frequently change their programmatic offers, leaders or coalition partners. Highly fluctuating systems are more likely to lack programmatic predictability, because parties might prefer to propose event-oriented manifestos rather than longstanding platforms. In the same case, on the demand side of the political contest, if for some reason voters change their preferences very often, their preferences become fluid and feeble (Bartolini and Mair 1990, Rose and Mishler 2010, Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007). This kind of fluctuation is neither desirable for parties nor for voters, because they both lose the minimum necessary understanding to sustain a coherent and responsive political system. In summary, stable patterns of fluctuation do not fit into the idea of stable inter-party competition, because the latter needs enduring and well-known parties to exist. The only way to discern the fluctuation of party systems is by watching its trajectory over long periods of time. As a rule of thumb, two or even three consecutive elections do not seem sufficient enough to search for stability; thus, the minimum required for any assessment about stability should be set at least four consecutive elections.12 Party systems where new parties enter the electoral arena with instant success, or where important parties in one election disappear in the next or in two more elections, are not predictable. Stable patterns in party systems imply that voters tend to choose between broadly the same set of parties over time, so that the components of the system are expected to remain more or less constant.

Nonetheless, stability should not be confused with immobility. Immobile stability is by no means a desirable condition of party systems, because of the risk of political stagnation13 or, on the other extreme, democratic rupture (Almond 1956: 408). For instance, in 1958, after the so-called period of La Violencia (The Violence), between 1930 and 1953 in Colombia, the main rival parties agreed to share the government: one government for the Liberal Party, the next one for the Conservative Party, with mixed cabinet positions. Although the pact served as a kind of political armistice to avoid violence amongst followers of each party, it also impeded competition. Until the 1970s, real inter-party competition was absent in Colombia (Taylor 2009). Lebanon is another example: political religious elites from Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims decided to share top positions in a joint government to assure peace, but such

12 Same criterion has been applied by Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) and Mainwaring and Zoco (2007). 13 For example, in highly consolidated two-party systems the polarisation could disappear to such an extreme that both parties are undistinguishable one from another. As Alesina (1988) suggests, the repetition of inter-party competition in two-party systems can end up limiting the magnitude of policy platform fluctuations.

arrangements also involved a lack of competition (and also the absence of violence) between 1943 and 1975. Immobility or political deadlock is regarded as a typical problem that some consociational examples have (Lijphart 2002: 41). Consociational democracy refers to systems where governments practice power-sharing in deeply divided societies, typically along ethnic, religious, or ideological cleavages, to avoid violence or conflict (Lijphart 1969).14 Although power-sharing governments have a huge potential to become stable, because the main political elites are represented in the executive, it comes at the expense of competition. In that case, key political elites may prefer to affix their seats in government rather than put them at risk in elections. But as it has been defined here, party systems require competition. Therefore, even if relevant parties are rooted in a society, they do not constitute a party system unless they compete for power.

Finally, Mainwaring and others frame the debate about stability to the electoral part of a government cycle. That is to say, stability is not linked to the inter-electoral period. This distinction is of great importance, because the sole occurrence of free and fair elections is part of the classic procedural definition of democracy (Huntington 1991, Schumpeter 1943), but not of a more complex exploration of democracy that considers how a given system performs in between elections (Dahl 1982, Merkel 2004, Schmitter and Karl 1991). What follows is a certain relationship between the definition of a party system and the procedural definition of democracy: competitive elections partly assure the existence of that minimal conceptualisation of democracy. Then, the more stable that party system, the more stable the democratic regime. That minimal definition of democracy (Huntington 1991) can include regimes labelled as illiberal democracies (Zakaria 1997) or semi-democracies (Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez-Liñán 2001). The extent to which the quality of a democracy is better or worse depends on other elements, though, especially those that happen in between elections (Merkel 2004, Schmitter and Karl 1991, Schattschneider 1960: 141). These are usually linked to political and civil rights (Freedom House).

In summary, following Mainwaring and other authors with the theory of PSI, stable party systems are those that follow predictable patterns of modest electoral volatility. As such, this

14 There is a rich debate between Lijphart and Donald Horowitz in Reynolds (2002) about the appropriateness of the consociational conceptualisation and its desirability.

dimension only applies to systems where elections are free, fair and competitive. The latter also means that such systems have the minimum requisites to be democracies.

2.2.2 Party roots in society

For the theory of PSI (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mainwaring and Torcal 2006), the dimension concerning how rooted parties are in society supposes that party institutions create links with voters in a feedback loop. Parties are fed by preferences from society but also propose ideas and action to attract voters and shape the same society (Przeworski 1985, Sartori 1969). In principal-agent logic, voters are the principals asking agents (parties) to act on their behalf in the public realm (Holcombe and Gwartney 1989). The function of parties is not limited to representation, but also, and very importantly, to convey policies to be debated and to be potentially applied. Therefore, the stronger the bonds attaching parties to citizens, the more institutionalised the system becomes. According to this view, if citizens do not feel close to political parties, or if the latter are viewed as self-interest organisations in what Carothers (2006) calls the ‘standard lament’, the party system may lose rootedness (Mainwaring 1999).

Interpreting the works of Mainwaring, the loss of support may acquire two forms, that can be called loosely representative rootedness or incapable of representation rootedness. The category of loosely representative rootedness is matter of fact: people think that parties are no longer caring about their demands. It could be the case that longstanding political parties, from some point in time, began a process of de-connection from people’s demands.15 On the other hand, party system roots which are incapable of representation makes for a worse stage, because it implies that people feel so ‘at odds’ with any party that, no matter what they propose, the disaffection from parties is irreparable. It would indicate that the bond between parties and voters, required for the “democratic linkage” (Dalton, Farrell and McAllister 2011), is detached. At that level, party systems can be heading to what Mair called ‘the failing of parties’ (2005), after which something else may fulfil their functions (Lawson and Merkl 1988). If parties are not considered vehicles of representation, people may prefer other organisations such as interest groups, NGOs, unions, private clubs or even social movements as equally or more representative of their policy positions (Burstein and Linton 2002, Farrell and Schmitt- Beck 2008, Mulgan 1994). This process might be followed by the collapse of political parties,

15 See Mainwaring (2012) for an analysis of the collapse in the 1990s of the relatively institutionalised Venezuelan party system.

giving way to personalistic candidacies (e.g., Italy since 1992), and the likelihood that the political system may end up with a political breakdown leading to totalitarianism (Berman 1997).

In essence, then, the theory of PSI sustains that the attachments of parties to voters is a relevant characteristic of any institutionalised party system. Its importance derives from the fact that the more connected (rooted) the parties are with the (group of) society it embodies, represents and informs, then voters will be more stable on their own party preferences.

2.2.3 Legitimacy

According to Mainwaring and Scully, in institutionalised party systems the legitimacy of elections and parties is accorded by citizens and major political actors (1995: 5, 14). In their view, legitimacy means that party system practices are well-known and accepted by society. This dimension of the theory of PSI implies that if actors and procedures are not legitimised, the system then lacks social roots: parties may become cartelised in the way that they depend upon state resources to survive, and not upon attachment to voters (Katz and Mair 1995). In other words, as the literature on rational voting behaviour has discussed (Alesina 1988, Downs 1957, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974, Riker and Ordeshook 1968, Tullock 1968), people only vote and participate when their opinions are considered, but also when the people in question feel that their views are considered. If people think rightly or wrongly that their electoral choices are useless, they would not bother to cast a vote. That behaviour would affect the legitimacy of the system.

For Webb (2002a, 2002b), legitimacy problems may reveal a partisan erosion amongst voters that can result in a distortion in inter-party stable competition. Mainwaring (1999) asserts that the more legitimate parties are, the more likely they will be stable. Nonetheless, he indicates that such a relationship “is not tautological: one can empirically measure both legitimacy and stability, and the two need not go together.” (p. 35). The aforementioned stability/legitimacy relationship is neither graphically nor contextually presented for a cross-national sample,16 but it sets a relevant association that should require a careful examination.

16 Mainwaring highlights some data about trust in parties for some countries in Europe and Latin America (1999: 35- 36), but he does not show figures linking trust in parties and party system stability.

Legitimacy is, for the theory of PSI, an essential component. Legitimacy here means that as long as the party system is recognised and accepted by major and minor political actors, the said party system will then have the basis to become consolidated.

2.2.4 Organisational strength of parties

Following the theory of PSI, parties in any party system must enjoy autonomy from the state and become programmatically consistent in order to strengthen their own internal structures. Since parties are the principal organisations of representation and the channels through which a society constructs and conducts its political interests, the way they structure themselves and perform is of primary importance in any electoral setting (Kitschelt et al. 1999, Lipset 2000, Schattschneider 1942, Ware 1996).

Influenced by the theory of PSI, it is possible to depict at least four conditions of party strength. If parties work like closed clubs where decisions are taken informally (not following any established procedure), and therefore not responsible to anyone, then the organisation lacks accountability. If candidate recruitment and nomination are not set by internal elections, or at least well-known mechanisms, but by personal exchange of favours or obscure decisions then the organisation lacks internal formality. If policies and norms are ambiguous, un-enforced, and inexistent or just made at will by a leader or his/her coterie, then the party has no constitutional foundation. And, if the party changes its name permanently in a way that involves hierarchical structure change (i.e., party X has a certain type of leadership board in T1, and becomes party Z with a new type of leadership board in T2), then such organisations lack continuity. Parties should have certain levels of accountability, formality, constitutional foundation, and institutional continuity to work and create bonds with citizens (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000, Mair 1995, 2005, Panebianco 1988, Ware 1996), if not perfectly then at least efficiently.

The elements that each dimension invokes are related in one way or other to the level of party system institutionalisation, according to the theory of PSI. If indicators that make up dimensions are strong, and if they allow voters to act with higher degrees of predictability, then such systems will exhibit lower uncertainty and higher stability. It is implied, therefore, that stability continues to be the most distinctive feature of PSI.

In summary, for this theory, the necessity of having parties representing citizens’ interests is only one side of the story. What also matters for institutionalisation is to have parties that are well structured, internally coherent and clearly organised, who are not at the will of one person or his/her coterie, and who are known consistently by the citizenry.

2.3 Operationalising stability

One of the major challenges of the PSI theory is to find ways in which to measure degrees of institutionalisation. The stability of inter-party competition has become its most prominent indicator. I present this debate here for two reasons. Firstly, it helps understand how the literature operationalises its key outcome of interest (stability). Secondly, this thesis uses the operationalisation of stability to select cases and the resulting outcomes to be explained.

In their original work, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) recognise difficulties in attaining data to validate their assessments. Indeed, the problems of operationalising the theory of PSI are in part caused by the lack of standardised measurements of the elements that these dimensions are considered to consist of, or simply by lack of data. This is something that political scientists deal with regularly.17 Fortunately, since 1995 more survey data have been collected and used (Jones 2007, Luna and Altman 2011, Mainwaring 1999, Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, Payne 2006). To gauge the PSI dimensions, different measures have been applied18 and there are different operationalisation proposals.19

Inter-party competition can be assessed by determining electoral volatility outcomes over time for both developing and developed countries.20 Measuring electoral volatility in that way has been widely used as an appropriate method to understand the stability of party systems (e.g. Coppedge 1998, Cotta 1996, Ferree 2004, Kuenzi and Lambright 2005, Lewis 2000, Lewis

17 There are many publications looking at how methods and measurements play key roles in the way comparative studies are made. Some works that have stressed the importance of operationalisation range from studies on corruption (e.g., Lancaster and Montinola 2001), democracy (e.g., Bayer and Bernhard 2010, Hurwitz 1973) and organisations (e.g., Barrera and Haas 1969), amongst many others. 18 In a similar note, a recently published attempt by Luna (2014) suggests the need for a re-visit to the relevant importance of each dimension. In particular, he claims that the dimensions do not seem to correlate as expected, in part because they are reflecting different issues. Luna suggests to convey a new approach in which dimensions are treated with sufficiency and necessary criteria to explain PSI. 19 An in-depth discussion on how the other dimensions of the theory of PSI are operationalised, and ways to improve them, is presented in Appendix A. 20 For this thesis, a developed country would need to meet two criteria: to be industrialised (IMF) and to have been fully democratic for at least 25 years (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997).

2006,21 Roberts and Wibbels 1999, Rose and Munro 2003, Stockton 2001, Tavits 2005). In other words, according to how the literature has approached these issues, electoral volatility is the best proxy for the understanding of PSI. It is, therefore, the main indicator that this thesis will apply in subsequent chapters. In the next section the discussion will seek to explain why this indicator is best conceptualised and operationalised through the Pedersen index of volatility.

2.3.1 Pedersen Volatility index

The electoral volatility is one of the least controversial and more generally accepted operationalisations of institutionalisation. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) used the Pedersen Index of electoral volatility (Pedersen 1979) as the standard accepted measure of party system stability (e.g. Croissant and Völkel 2010, Lindberg 2007, Luna and Altman 2011, Jones 2007, Mainwaring 1999, Payne 2006, Robbins and Hunter 2012). The index shows the sum of the total gross changes in the share of votes (or seats) per party and per election, divided by 2.22 In some cases, like in Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Payne (2006), the results are considered for the Lower Chamber and for the Presidential elections.23 The index has been applied to several third wave democracy regions in the world: Latin America (Coppedge 1998, Luna and Altman 2011, Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Robbins and Hunter 2012, Roberts and Wibbels 1999), Eastern Europe (Casal Bértoa 2011, Cotta 1996, Lewis 2000, Rose and Munro 2003, Tavits 2005), Asia (Hicken and Kuhonta 2011, Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, Stockton 2001) and Africa (Ferree 2004, Kuenzi and Lambright 2005, Lindberg 2007, Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005).

There are questions about what the electoral volatility measures. Luna and Altman (2011) say that the Pedersen index does not measure what it is supposed to—voters’ preferences over time—but rather the parties’ reception of votes over time. They also draw attention to the fact that in Chile the index should evaluate the performance of pre-electoral coalitions rather than

21 Lewis (2006) focuses on the electoral stability of parties and on their longevity to construct the Index of Party Stabilization (IPS). It weighs differently on each election in which each party of a system participates, giving extra weight to the nearest elections in time perspective. 22 Consider an example. If party A grows from 10% to 40% (change of 30pp) of votes between one election and the other, party B goes from 30% down to 10% (20pp), party C falls from 50% to 30% (20pp), and party D grows from 10% to 20% (10pp), the total gross change is 30pp+20pp+20pp+10pp=80 percentage points. If we divide that figure by 2, the volatility index for that electoral period is 40%. Carreras, Morgenstern and Su (2013) classify party systems into three categories depending on their level of average volatility over time: low (volatility under 10), medium (values between 10 and 20) and high (values over 20). 23 They take a simple average of both elections, but do not explain the rationale behind that gross calculation.

parties. The latter, however, is of course not a problem with the index, but with how scholars use it. As for the former argument, voters’ preference is one thing and electoral result is another. The index measures actual aggregated voting behaviour (which is also a function of elements such as the electoral system) and not perceptions.

Webb (2002c) includes volatility as a dimension of party legitimacy. He states that electoral volatility in industrial countries has increased over time, with the notable exception of Spain (Holliday 2002) which was considered a recent example of transitional democracy (Webb, Farrell and Holliday 2002, Schmitt and Freire 2012). This implies that electoral volatility can acquire a curve shape similar to a U form for some newly democratised countries: in the beginning of democratic process, volatility is high, then it tends to decrease and remains low and stable for an extended period of time, but at some point it can begin to increase again. Therefore, it can be expected that for some recently democratised countries the volatility will show signs of decreasing patterns, whereas in time there might be increased figures. The overall implication is that emerging democracies are expected to be unstable after becoming democratic, but they might also enter a process of stabilisation afterwards.

It is now time to look at party system stability empirically. The literature says that instability is higher in emerging, rather than in consolidated democracies (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). It also says that the newer democracies of Central and Eastern Europe have, on average, more volatile party systems than in Latin America and Asia, and that Latin American and Asian party systems are more unstable than in Western advanced democracies (Hicken and Kuhonta 2015a: 10-11). It is noteworthy to consider that in each region there is a variation in levels of institutionalisation (e.g., Hicken and Kuhonta 2015b, Powell and Tucker 2014, Roberts 2014a).24 It suggests that party system consolidation requires more comparative research in order to understand cross-regional and cross-country differences.

2.3.2 Global and regional evidence

The previous pages consider that amongst the dimensions which constitute the theory of PSI, the stability of inter-party competition is the most relevant as it captures the predictability patterns of institutionalised party systems. The electoral volatility is the accepted proxy

24 Africa has also been a focus of recent research (Doorenspleet and Nijzink 2014, Ferree 2004, Kuenzi and Lambright 2005, Lindberg 2007, Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005, Riedl 2014, Sanches 2014), but a lack of comparable data has prevented me from systematically including these cases.

indicator to ascertain the stability of inter-party competition. The mainstream evidence shows that developing countries (in general from Latin America, post-communist Europe and East and Southeast Asia) are more unstable than industrial democracies. This is partly because the latter had more time to develop their party systems than the former. There is however a lack of more comprehensive and up to date data accounting for cross-country and cross-regional variation. It is important to evaluate to what extent the party system volatility is more prevalent amongst emerging democracies, in which regions, and to what extent. Is there any relationship between time and party system development? And to what extent do the developing regions have party systems less institutionalised than in industrial countries? Is there any difference between the developing regions? In the next section these questions are explored.

Figure 2.1 introduces an original dataset of electoral volatility including 80 countries with 872 observations spanning over 70 years. Of the countries, 26 are developed and 54 are developing, although the number of observations (electoral periods) are almost distributed half and half.25 For the developed polities, it includes all the elections for the Lower Chamber after the Second World War. Most of the developing countries of this dataset are newer democracies, including cases of elections from the late 1970s (e.g., Ecuador) and also from the late 1990s (e.g., Indonesia). This dataset (Mainwaring and Olivares Concha 2015) has been updated as recently as June 2015.26 The graph plots the consecutive number of elections and the electoral volatility.

25 On average, developed countries have twice as many electoral periods as developing polities. 26 This dataset is now being used by Scott Mainwaring (U. of Notre Dame) and Allen Hicken (U. of Michigan).

FIGURE 2.1 Electoral volatility and number of elections

Source: Mainwaring and Olivares Concha 2015. Same source applies to Figs. 2.2 and 2.3.

The linear slope of electoral volatility goes down as the number of elections increase (Fig. 2.1), although with an R2 < 0.1.27 Only after having 17 consecutive elections (a subset of the whole sample) countries tend to decrease their electoral volatility at a more evident pace. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude, drawing from this evidence, that there is an increase in the electoral volatility in countries that have had a long period of electoral experience; in other words, the idea that electoral volatility can follow a partial U-shaped form right after a long period of stability is not confirmed.

Another way to analyse the patterns of electoral stability is by focusing on dispersion. High levels of dispersion in the electoral volatility scores would indicate very fluctuant electoral behaviour in a country, which reveals very unstable degrees of inter-party competition. The

27 In Fig. 2.1, variables are not normally distributed. Nonetheless, results do not vary significantly if both variables are normalised (logged). In that case, R2 is lower than .04.

phenomenon of high levels of variability would show higher scores of the standard deviation28 of each country’s electoral volatility over time.

In general, countries with less electoral experience tend to have periods of low and high stability, whereas countries with greater electoral background are less fluctuant in their stability levels. Figure 2.2 shows the dispersion of electoral volatility outcomes for two categories: developed and developing countries. A quadratic slope is set for both in order to assess their variability patterns over a given number of consecutive elections.

FIGURE 2.2 Variability of electoral volatility by level of development

The variability of elections is different, depending on whether countries are developed or developing. Fig. 2.2 indicates that developed countries tend to reduce their volatility scores as more elections occur. Consideration to R2 of 28% provides a good fit of the negative slope

28 The standard deviation is the square root of the variance, which measures the distance between each data point and the average of the sub-sample. The square root is taken to standardise the results.

(regular dotted orange line) in the graph. On the contrary, developing countries show high variance—reflected in the low fitting of the slope (irregular dotted blue line).29

Given the focus of this thesis on developing countries, regional variations can show whether some developing world regions are more volatile than others. Its importance lies in the fact that if regions perform more or less homogeneously, but at different levels one relative to the other, then the research would focus on inter-regional variation. If, on the other hand, regions have a similar variance, then a cross-country comparison across regions would offer more variance for research on party system consolidation. Figure 2.3 shows the overall dispersion levels of developing countries from Latin America, Europe, and Asia.

FIGURE 2.3 Variability of electoral volatility in developing countries from three regions

According to Fig. 2.3, the three developing regions have similar levels of volatility dispersion. Latin America and Europe show cases at the top extreme of the spectrum, and again Latin America and Asia show cases at the bottom. In Europe, the median dispersion of 13.2 is relatively higher than in Latin America (10.6) and Asia (10.6). The highest standard deviation

29 The quadratic slope results in a better fit to the data than the linear slope. The quadratic R2 for developed countries is 27.5%, and for developing countries is 0.2%. Whereas the linear R2 for developed countries is 25%, and for developing countries is lower than 0.001.

case for Latin America is the Dominican Republic (σ=22.5).30 In Europe, Romania (σ=21.5) and Albania (σ=21.1) stand out as the highest outliers. In Asia, Thailand marks the highest score (σ=17).

Figs. 2.1, 22 and 2.3 clearly confirm that developing countries are, in general, systems with higher levels of electoral volatility and higher dispersion of that volatility. Their electoral volatility goes up and down more sharply than in developed countries. The assumption of notorious volatility differences between developing regions is not confirmed, though. All these electoral performance data have obvious implications for the analysis of party system institutionalisation: highly fluctuant inter-party competition may be related to a lack of long- term programmes and, similarly, may even tempt parties to change their values and proposals more frequently to cope with citizens’ instant demands. As a result, instability feeds back more instability.

Overall, this section proposes to use electoral volatility as the paramount proxy of the fluidity or solidity of party systems. The electoral volatility can be taken as fever-temperature for human beings: it is a symptom of something going wrong when it surpasses certain levels.31 Drawing from the scholarship, party systems regarded as highly institutionalised are not compatible with high levels of electoral instability over a prolonged period of time, and adversely, party systems regarded as weakly institutionalised are likely to be highly volatile.

The evidence provided here further highlights that the process of party system consolidation is particularly challenging for developing countries. In cases taken from Latin America, Europe and Asia there is a high dispersion of volatility: some party systems are highly volatile whilst others are more stable. The regional similarities in that regard require an inter-regional cross- country exploration—an approach currently unexplored in the literature of party system institutionalisation. Given the variation of cases in the three regions, which show countries at several levels of consolidation, there is a necessity to examine how and why differences occur. These challenges for developing countries require a focus on the speed and depth of their processes of institutionalisation, and a greater understanding of their variance and its causes.

30 Also Colombia and Costa Rica show high standard deviations (σ=14.7 and σ=15, respectively). Interestingly ,both countries have a high record of consecutive elections (up to 2014, 18 elections for Colombia and 17 elections for Costa Rica), so they are the ones that in high degree make the slope of Fig. 2.2 for developing countries going up rather than going down. 31 See Carreras, Morgenstern and Su (2013) for a classification (fn. 22). Also, see Schedler (1995).

Having described how PSI works and proposed the best way to operationalise stability with an early emphasis of its regional implications, it is time now to examine in greater depth and provide a critical assessment of the theoretical body of PSI. Although the theory of PSI, structured around the works of Mainwaring since 1995, has opened a rich field of research, there have been few efforts to bolster its strengths and constructively suggest enhancements to overcome its weaknesses. In the next two sections of this chapter, I will attempt to contribute to the theory of PSI in at least two different ways. Firstly, in section 2.4, I will look to address some initial challenges concerning conceptual and applicability shortcomings of the theory. Secondly, in section 2.5 the focus turns on three substantive challenges that the scholarship of party system institutionalisation has neglected, related to cleavages, personalism and legitimacy. They become relevant for understanding why certain party systems in developing countries consolidate quicker and in greater depth than others. The three aforementioned substantive challenges will form the research questions which will be theoretically and empirically examined within this thesis.

2.4 Initial challenges in the PSI research

The theory of PSI and its application has somehow fallen short of its possible use. Why would this theory only serve useful to explore party systems in full democracies? In no aspect of the theory does it preclude the analysis of less democratic regimes. Furthermore, why would the PSI not be useful to understand intriguing cases of party system change in established democracies? Indeed, there is no limit whatsoever to applying the theoretical principles to developed countries. And finally, why would the four dimensions of PSI need to positively correlate? Furthermore, party systems are multifaceted and, therefore, one dimension does not necessarily correlate with the others.

In order to identify what elements of the theory of PSI (Mainwaring 1999, 2015, Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mainwaring and Torcal 2006) would benefit from some re-examination, the three aforementioned issues are differentiated next. Firstly, the conceptual adequacy of party systems within democracies; secondly, the possibility to apply the theory of PSI to mature party systems, and thirdly, the assumption that the PSI dimensions should positively correlate. Suggestions are included, where appropriate, in an attempt to enhance the overall validity of

the theory of PSI and to build towards the theoretical and empirical questions tackled in this thesis.

2.4.1 Semi-authoritarianism, semi-democracies

Semi-authoritarian or semi-democratic regimes (Ottaway 2003) can have strongly institutionalised party systems. That happens because party system institutionalisation is not a concept which is married to democracy.32 Kreuzer and Pettai (2009: 269-70) suggest that democratic and even authoritarian regimes can share over-institutionalised settings of party systems. Hicken and Kuhonta (2011, 2015b) find that authoritarian historical legacies played an important role in institutionalising party systems in Asia. Regimes of all types can be institutionalised if they follow certain rules that make them predictable, even if they are at odds with fully democratised procedures. All that a party system needs to be classified as such is to have competitive and acceptable degrees of fair electoral competition.

The degree of competition, i.e. the freedom and fairness involved in that competition, is more a field for democratic theory than for party system theory, unless it revolves around party competition. Therefore, in countries such as Singapore (1965-present day), Mexico-under-the- PRI (1921-2000, especially between the 1950s and 1988) and Putin’s Russia, party systems exist. Their party systems can still be scrutinized through an institutionalisation lens. For instance, Mainwaring and Torcal (2006: 148-9) do include Mexico in their analysis. Mexico could be included because, albeit it was not fully democratic, its political system allowed competitive—though not necessarily fair—elections (Wallis 2003).33 Similar analyses of semi- authoritarian regimes or states with democratic failure episodes can also include Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Honduras, Mali, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Ukraine, Venezuela and Zambia.

In their recently edited volume, Hicken and Kuhonta (2015a) claim that in hegemonic party systems, party system institutionalisation can even be reinforced and solidified. In the same volume, Mainwaring (2015) provides further clarity to his original arguments and states that semi-democracy party systems can be analysed through the institutionalisation lens. He goes

32 “It is a mistake to conflate institutionalization with democracy,” Mainwaring has asserted (2015: 341). 33 Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) include countries rated 10 or above in the combined scores of Freedom House. A score of 5 still gives a country a ‘free’ status, but between 6 and 10 is only considered ‘partly free’. Mexico was considered partly free between 1973 and 2000.

on to state that what matters is a different classification, in which “competitive party systems” (either in democracies or semi-democracies) can institutionalise. In his view, in hegemonic party systems (within authoritarian regimes) the institutionalisation is not conceptually or measurably possible. A hegemonic party is defined as one party at the centre of power surrounded by second-class or minor parties that are formally allowed for competition (Mainwaring 2015, Sartori 1976). Mainwaring ultimately asks to measure PSI only in regimes that deem competitiveness to be a necessity to their party system, which goes in line with my prior assessment but contradicts Mainwaring as we will see.

The problem with the original theory of PSI is that it still seems to conflate party system type with political regime. Although they are usually related, they are conceptually different. Mainwaring (2015) works hard to persuade the reader that what matters for PSI is a classification between three types of party systems: competitive, hegemonic and party-state. It is an oxymoron to include the party-state system, though: Mainwaring himself and others (notably Sartori 1976) explicitly discard such a system as a “party system”.34 Following this view, the same should apply to the “hegemonic” type: if Mainwaring considers it as unsuitable for being analysed using the PSI indicators (2015: 332-3), then he should not include it as a party system. But as can be seen in Chapter One, Mainwaring does this for a reason. A party system requires a few conditions: more than one party, one of them in opposition; and the opposition should be known, be able to voice opinions and be capable of governing (Grzymała- Busse 2007). It does not need an alternation of power, because it does not require from the opposition any kind of success rate to eventually take power. 35 Following the initial classification of Mainwaring, but contrary to his conclusions, this means that even hegemonic systems are party systems as long as a minimum condition of fair and free elections36 is in place.37

34 See section 1.2.2 in Chapter One for the definition of ‘party system’. 35 Alternation of power is taken as an attribute of healthy democracies (Alvarez et al. 1996, Przeworski et al. 2000), but that debate would not be about party systems. 36 This implies that hegemonic party systems can exist in semi-democracies, and not necessarily in authoritarian regimes. 37 One piece of evidence that Mainwaring gives to support his exclusion of hegemonic systems as competitive party systems is the percentage of seats held by the largest party in Parliament (2015: 334-5). He says that in competitive systems, the seat share of the largest party is “generally lower” than in what he calls hegemonic systems. How can that explain that the figure in Malaysia (“hegemonic”), of 60%, is lower than in Japan (61.3%) and close to Taiwan (56.6%), the two latter ones which are considered “competitive”?

In summary, and contrary to what Mainwaring indicates, hegemonic party systems can exist in semi-democratic regimes, because free and fair elections and the presence of relevant opposition are constituent parts of semi-democracies. The efforts by Hicken and Kuhonta (2011, 2015b) to include Asian semi-democracies in an analysis of PSI are illustrative of a roadmap for further research in other semi-democratic countries, or semi-democratic periods in given countries, in Latin America (e.g., Peru under Fujimori, Brazil 1966-1985, current Venezuela), Europe (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Ukraine) and Africa.

2.4.2 Mature democracies

The general inspiration of the theory of PSI comes from the developing countries of Latin America (Diamond 1999, Mainwaring and Scully 1995). The PSI toolkit looks for factors that could explain the way the party systems of emerging democracies are consolidating—factors other than the ones usually used for assessing mature democracies. Nonetheless, even if this is true that developing countries have more difficulties to institutionalise their party systems, it does not mean that mature democracies are necessarily free of similar difficulties. As previously stated, PSI deals with democracies and semi-democracies alike. Thus, it can also be used to analyse mature democracies.

In following Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), a democracy is considered mature if it has had free and fair elections for at least 25 years, within a context of respect of civil liberties and political rights, as they are measured by well-known indexes.38 Developed democracies are said to be already institutionalised, whereas developing democracies in general still need to go through a process of party system consolidation. Young democracies such as Peru, Romania or the Dominican Republic have unstable party systems and regularly show new parties entering competition and old parties exiting or dropping their relevance in the electoral arena. On the other hand, scholars agree that mature democracies like the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, Germany, and Australia have stable party systems and longstanding political parties. Recently, though, the scholarship in advanced democracies has warned about the role of parties in terms of legitimacy, organisational strength and systemic functionality (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000, Webb 2002c). As Webb describes it, “it is undeniable that their [parties] popular standing has been weakened in most Western democracies” (2002c: 442). This would

38 Freedom in the World and Polity IV, for example.

pertain to the fact that having an ongoing, mature democracy does not mean that the party system is free of de-institutionalisation; vice versa, having a young democracy should not imply that the system is not institutionalised per se.

Amongst older democracies, trends of unstable electoral behaviour39 are found in India, Israel, Italy and Greece. In some of these democracies, personalistic leaderships have emerged alongside new parties linked to such leaders. For example, Italy is a mature democracy, but in the recent past it has witnessed the emergence of two parties (Forza Italia [Go Italy!] and Popolo della Libertà [The People of Freedom]) that have been the personalistic instruments of the former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. More recently, during the 2013 general elections, the Five Star Movement (MoVimento 5 Stelle), led by comedian Beppe Grillo, is another example of a popular, personalistic-based party. Meanwhile, Italy had well-known problems with civil rights (such as freedom of the press, which in this case is more related to a market controlled by Berlusconi than censorship of other forms of expression40) and corruption (Della Porta 2000).41 The Italian case shows that signs of de-institutionalisation can run alongside signs of the weakening of a democracy. It is not the only example. In India, the traditional Indian National Congress party, known as ‘the Congress’, and its closest rival Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP, alongside other minor but stable organisations in the left like the Communist Party of India, CPI, and Communist Party of India-Marxist, CPI(M), have seen an increase in roles played by state parties over the last years. The insufficient representation of national parties has allowed minor parties to gain support and enter government for a high price: the cabinet of the Indian government has been continuously enlarged to make room for new sectorial ministers from these minor parties. In the Indian case, democracy indicators remain stable, but the electoral system (Siwach 1987), the level of party organisation (Chhibber, Jensenius and Suryanayan 2012) and ethnic patronage (Chandra 2004) are credited with paving the way for the proliferation of parties. In Israel, the political party system scheme was sharply altered in 2005 when late Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided to split from the Likud in order to form Kadima—the largest party by number of seats, as per the 2009 elections. Kadima collapsed, and in 2012 Israeli politics witnessed the entrance of another new party, Yesh Atid, led by the

39 This refers to meaningful periods of instability. That is, electoral stability cannot refer to specific elections when one or another political force gets major successes or failures, but when this happens frequently in many elections. 40 Italy ranks 49th in the Press Freedom Index 2010 (Reporters Without Borders), alongside Burkina Faso. 41 According to the Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, by Transparency International, Italy ranks 67th in the world, lower than countries such as Rwanda.

journalist and TV figure Yair Lapid. In its first election (2013), Yesh Atid became the second largest party in the Knesset, underscoring the instability of the Israeli party system.42 In Greece, recent events following the deep economic crisis that began in 2008 show several changes in government and the emergence of political parties on the extremes of the right-left spectrum.

Although it would be less likely to see a complete disintegration of party systems in Western Europe, the maturity of a democracy by no means guarantees that it will maintain a fully consolidated party system. Mature party systems can change by means of party replacement, collapse (Mair 2000: 66-69) or broadly by detachment from society (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). On the other hand, Webb, Farrell and Holliday 2002, and especially Dalton, Farrell and McAllister 2011, offer a less pessimistic view of Western party systems. In general, both edited works point out that party systems are still the main channels of political recruitment and representation, adapting themselves (‘surviving’) to changing conditions of partisan disaffection. It does not follow from that previous view that parties, and therefore party systems, are not facing several challenges that can be harmful for their stability. One of them is, arguably, party system fragmentation (Best 2007, Stoll 2013), which accounts for the number of parties in a political system, and how votes are distributed amongst them. The entry of new parties—including right-wing populist parties and extreme left-wing organisations—, their sudden raise in support at the expense of old parties, and the erosion of the party-voter bonds, makes many commentators believe that the party systems may be weakening (Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg 2000, Ezrow, Tavits and Homola 2014, Poguntke and Scarrow 1996). Albeit that is always possible, as documented with some cases mentioned above, it is improbable that more established democracies weaken to the same average level of developing countries. That is, nonetheless, an important question to ask. This thesis is not devoted to study industrial countries, but the probability of party system de- institutionalisation in old Western democracies indicates that the research of mature party systems using the PSI toolkit is a pending task in the scholarship.

Overall, the PSI theory is especially useful in understanding the factors which allow emerging democracies to consolidate their party systems. But at the same time, and particularly in light of concerns about the strength of the party systems in Western democracies, this theory is

42 In the 2015 elections, Yesh Atid reduced its vote support by 40%.

also applicable to cases of longstanding and established party systems. After all, it is a bold statement to predict that a system is invulnerable to becoming weak.

2.4.3 Correlation

The dimensions of the theory of PSI are supposed to be complementary. As conceived, they point to different aspects of party system building, and then combined can be aggregated in a summative approach to indicate the level of institutionalisation of a party system (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). One can ask, however, if that summative approach is necessary, or even appropriate, given the multidimensional characteristics of the concepts.

Scott Mainwaring implies that the PSI dimensions are positively correlated. Mainwaring (1999) states that “these four dimensions of institutionalisation need not go together, but they almost always do.” (1999: 27). But Luna and Altman (2011) and Zucco (forthcoming) present the cases of Chile and Brazil, respectively, that one dimension can go up (for example, stability) while another declines (for example, party organisation). Mainwaring also says that limited co- variation between dimensions can occur, but confines that option only to theoretical probabilities: “Conceptually, a party system could be fairly institutionalised along one dimension but weakly institutionalised along another, but empirically this is the exception.” (Mainwaring 1999: 27). Recently, he has partially revised his previous assertion. Although he maintains that in competitive settings the four dimensions should positively correlate, he later adds that “there is not theoretical or empirical reason to always expect high correlations across the four dimensions. In some cases, a party system might be highly institutionalized on one dimension but less so on another” (Mainwaring 2015: 341, emphasis added). This acknowledgement reveals that the debate on correlation is alive and well.

What would happen if all dimensions, including their levels of change, are not correlated at all? Or even worse, what if there is some negative correlation amongst two or more variables? Mainwaring (1999) leaves room for cases where variables do not combine, at least as exceptions. This possibility might not be an exception, after all. In the first study that tackles this sensitive issue directly, Luna (2014) coincidently supports this thesis’ critical review of the correlation assumption of the original theory of PSI. In his recent article on Latin American party systems, Luna finds no relevant association between the dimensions of stability and party roots in society. Whilst in some cases the dimensions of party roots go up, stability goes

down. That empirical demonstration of a systematic failure of the correlation assumption sheds light on what the theory of PSI needs in order to strengthen its validity.

In essence, this discussion about correlation suggests that the theory of PSI does not need to assume high levels of linkages between its dimensions. Each dimension can be taken separately. When they are all considered together, the analysis gains come from the nuances that the combination can provide, and not necessarily from any summative value. Further research is required to tackle this premise.

The three initial challenges reviewed in this section point towards the possibility of moving the literature of PSI beyond the current scholarship limits. The scholarship in party system institutionalisation could expand if more semi-democratic countries are considered, if developed countries are examined, and if the multifaceted characteristics of party systems are explored without being constrained by a quest for correlation. I will now focus on the more substantive challenges of the theory of PSI: specifically how it can relate to other major mainstream assumptions in the literature of party and democratic systems. The important questions to follow are, in my view, major pending topics of the current research on party system consolidation in developing democracies.

2.5 Substantive challenges in the PSI research

The scholarship about party system institutionalisation has focused on the effects, processes and conditions for such an institutionalisation. It has not, however, delved into why party systems heading to institutionalisation do it at different paces and at diverging levels. The trajectory of party system institutionalisation in newer democracies posits as one of the least studied issues in this literature. It thus creates an opportunity to understand how, when, and under what conditions polities differ in their way of consolidating their party systems.

Three big issues can now be considered to advance the understanding of the scholarship on party systems. Firstly, the framework for analysis that the theory of PSI provides may neglect some important features advanced by the theory of freezing party systems based on cleavages. It means that an association between cleavages and party system institutionalisation needs a comprehensive exploration. I will devote a good deal of attention to that theoretical debate between PSI and cleavages, as it tackles two of the most relevant theoretical pieces about

party systems. Secondly, the literature on party politics has not explored in any great depth how charismatic leaders have moulded certain party systems, and to what extent personalism contributes in one way or another to the process of institutionalisation. For the latter, Mainwaring refers to systems with personalistic control of candidate selection as “the antithesis of an institutionalised system” (1999: 37). Finally, the previous discussion about the rationale behind the Party System Institutionalisation informs that each dimension may have an important contribution to the overall logic of the theory. There are doubts about the theoretical pertinence of the dimension about legitimacy, as it has been mentioned previously.

In consideration of what has been looked at so far in the literature, one might expect similar developments in the structure and achievements of party systems if certain conditions occur. For instance, following Mainwaring and Scully (1995), the better organised the parties, the more rooted in society the political organisations are, and the more stable the competition is, then the degree of institutionalisation of a party system will be greater. For Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Bartolini and Mair (1990), on the other hand, party systems are configured following cleavages that are present over the long-term, which also becomes apparent as stable patterns of inter-party competition.43 Thus, a general claim may state that where social divisions developed into political organisations, the party system became institutionalised; where social divisions did not forge strongly into parties, such democracies missed certain levels of party system consolidation.

The degree of stability of the party competition plays a major role in assessing the level of institutionalisation of a party system. All main theories on party systems consider in one way or another that stable patterns of inter-party competition provide the basic point of view to look at varying degrees of party system consolidation. Party systems appear to be in a state of fluidity when they show high levels of electoral volatility, and then consolidated when they show the inverse (Bielasiak 2002, Schedler 1995).44 Having set out this starting point, it can be expected that countries with more fluid party systems also have more diffused cleavages configuration and more personalistic ways of leadership than the more solid party systems.

43 For Sartori (1976), as well, it is important to have a party system working alongside a left-right spectrum that involves some degrees of polarisation. It implies that systems can be consolidated as long as they exist in an atmosphere of fair competition, regardless of its numeric configuration. 44 Some scholars stress other characteristics one should add to differentiate between fluidity and solidity, such as organisational strengths of parties (Mainwaring 1999), horizontal accountability of parties (O’Donnell 1991), or partisan longevity (Sitter 2002).

The confluence of these characteristics might not be accidental: the expectation of this dissertation which is based on the available scholarship is that cleavages configuration and personalism have a contribution towards the fluidity or solidity of party systems.

I will now outline the main gaps in the literature that this thesis looks to address. The claims refer to the role of cleavages and to the personalistic party leadership on the institutionalisation process of party systems. The implication of these questions is relevant to widen the focus and scope of the scholarship on party system institutionalisation. Giving consideration to the critical revision of the theory of PSI itself, one issue has repeatedly come to my attention: the relevance of the dimension of legitimacy for the validity of the PSI theory. Consequently, the third question of this thesis looks at whether legitimacy can be related to the study of party system consolidation. If the relationship is irrelevant, the main implication is that the theory of PSI should be reviewed and, consequently, the scholarly conclusions based on its dimension of legitimacy. All of these research questions lead to the overarching guiding question of this thesis, which seeks to explain why some party systems institutionalise more quickly and at greater depth than others. Furthermore, how can we explain the variation in party system institutionalisation? It is my conjecture that the three sub-questions in this thesis are necessary stepping stones to a deeper theoretical explanation and a more valid concept.

This chapter will introduce now three hypotheses. Their claims, however, will only be touched on briefly, as more in-depth hypotheses are discussed in each of the empirical chapters (Four, Five and Six) of this thesis.

2.5.1 Role of cleavages

Cleavages are one of the fundamental characteristics that have helped current consolidated democracies to become institutionalised. Following on from the proposal by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Western party systems became ‘frozen’ due to the consolidation of certain cleavages. Cleavages are critical conflicts originated in society, of which citizens become aware of, and that are eventually seeking representation in the political domain (Bartolini and Mair 1990, Deegan-Krause 2006). Furthermore, cleavages are a three-way concept: it is a division in

society, it is a group self-conscious of the division, and it is the political manifestation of the previous two combined.45

The PSI theory states that newer democracies did not have time to develop cleavages as was the case in older democracies (Mainwaring 1999: 41-54). The historical social attachments of cleavages, that provide stability to the political competition, were absent in most developing countries. Therefore, the theory of PSI claims its own explanatory superiority to look for other features of the consolidation of party systems in third wave democracies. Consequently, the PSI theorists overlook the freezing hypothesis, because it would not successfully explain how party systems are built in newer democracies.

Nonetheless, factors explaining party system institutionalisation cannot neglect the role of cleavages. Every society has issues that may result in conflicts. In some societies, such as those in Western Europe, said conflicts latch onto the political representation sphere. In most old democracies, then, these issues became institutionalised and eventually gave way to political parties. That was, in a nutshell, the process of cleavage formation. In this theoretical framework, political parties are the institutionalised structures that followed a social need for representation. Well-known Western traditional cleavages are socioeconomic (workers versus owners), religious (church versus secular states), spatial (centre versus periphery, sometimes also drawn along ethnic or cultural lines), and urban-rural (cities versus countryside). Newer issues can emerge as societies change.46 For instance, there were new environmental themes that allowed green parties to become strong forces in many countries (Franklin and Rüdig 1995). Furthermore, traditional cleavages can weaken (Dalton 2010, Inglehart 1984, Lane and Ersson 1997; for an opposing view, see Elff 2007).47 Overall, the consolidation or lack of consolidation of party systems relates to the extent that such social conflicts or interests are

45 The literature dealing with different conceptualisation of cleavages—let alone ‘political’ and ‘social’ cleavages—is vast and, overall, confusing (e.g., Casal Bértoa 2013, Deegan-Krause 2006, Zuckerman 1975). This footnote should then serve to stress that I mainly follow the broader definition proposed by Bartolini and Mair: ultimately, cleavages are “a form of closure of social relationships” (1990: 216). 46 Especially in the literature of the 1970s and 1980s of Western Europe, there was a much studied phenomenon of dealignment (traditional cleavages losing roots) and realignment (re-structuring of cleavages or new cleavages replacing the traditional ones) that in general asked for a historical revision of the classic Lipset and Rokkan theory (e.g., Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984). Bartolini and Mair (1990) went to the rescue of the seminal theory and somehow reinstalled the freezing hypothesis back. 47 See the debate about the ‘dying’ or ‘declining’ social class opened by Clark and Lipset (1991), heated up in 1993 by three works: Hout, Brooks and Manza; Pakulski (especially 282-4), and Clark, Lipset and Rempel.

channelled by political organisations;48 that is to say, to the extent at which cleavages crystallise. In other words, following Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) original proposition, cleavages ought to be present for a party system to pursue consolidation. When cleavages are weak or diffused, the consolidation of the party system may be unlikely.

Social class has been regarded as the most forceful cleavage49 (Bartolini and Mair 1990, Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Rose and Urwin 1970, Rose 1974). Originally, Lipset and Rokkan proposed that this cleavage is expressed in the voting for labour parties as opposed to bourgeois organisations. This typical socioeconomic division might not be exclusive of Western developed countries. For example, Gijsbeerts and Nieuwbeerta (2000) find that the relationship between class and economic attitudes is not much different in post-communist Europe than it is in Western Europe. In turn, Roberts (2002) suggests that in the subset of Latin American countries, social movements and labour-backed parties were stronger in the past.50 For Asian countries, there are no findings to suggest strong relationships between socio- economic issues and party preferences (Croissant 2002).

The religious divide also plays a central role amongst the cleavages described by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). In the formation of the Western party systems, the identification with certain religious beliefs (especially Christian denominations) contributed to the creation of religious parties. The secular discussion brought about a cleavage that distinguished at least two types of voters (Christian and Conservative, and the remainder of voters). Their links with the parties in either way allowed party systems to become stable over time, even in current mature democracies (Elff 2007).

The centre-periphery cleavage is also relevant for the study of social divides. This cleavage emerged as a consequence of the reaction to nation-state building in Europe. Those living on the periphery could have developed a regional orientation as an opposition to centralising forces (Flora, Kuhnle and Urwin 1999). Usually, this divide is characterised by ethnic or cultural

48 In addition, the role of traditional media and social media generates impacts on the organisation of parties, groups and leaders, due to new ways that the electorate looks at the political establishment. For instance, it has been analysed elsewhere the role played by television and other mass-media in the formation of leaderships and voters (Dalton 2009), the agenda-setting theory (Pingree et al. 2013) and the new influences of social media in political campaigns ( Gibson 2009, Meraz 2009, Sayre et al. 2010, Vargo et al. 2014). 49 Some authors identify this divide as a ‘political’ cleavage, different from ‘social’ cleavages of centre-periphery, state-church, and rural-urban (see Römmele 1999). 50 However, the neoliberal transition of the past decades made such party systems move away from the masses to become elite organisations (Roberts 2002).

differences from the periphery. For example, the divide is typical of highly regionalised party systems, like Belgium (Deschouwer 2009), Canada (Jefferey and Hough 2003), Spain (Alonso, Gómez and Cabeza 2013) and the UK-Ireland (Coakley 2008, Garvin 1974). In more contemporary terms, it also relates to the Europeanisation of national politics in the European Union (Marks and Wilson 2000). A common manifestation of this cleavage occurs with the linguistic differences within an electorate (Flora, Kuhnle and Urwin 1999).

The remaining cleavage is drawn around urban-rural lines. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) traced this cleavage back to the 19th century, in the context of the Industrial Revolution. Agrarian parties opposed liberal and conservative parties in terms of tariff issues and values. In some cases, though, the urban-rural divide could also be linked with the centre-periphery cleavage, as rural communities could be taken as the periphery of cities (Garvin and Mair 2006).

The four traditional cleavages described above can also be labelled as the structural cleavages.51 Their roots came from the social structure they were born into. According to this view (Bartolini 2000, Whitefield 2002: 181), the constituent element of cleavages came from enduring social divisions (Enyedi and Deegan-Krause 2011). Other scholarship influences come from Inglehart’s proposition of political values (“new politics” thesis), which claims that certain cleavages can be based solely on value orientations and attitudes regardless of any social structure anchored in the past (Enyedi and Deegan-Krause 2011, Knutsen 1988: 324, Inglehart 1977). Some scholars have argued that those values are inevitably linked to some sort of social framework, making these ‘new’ cleavages structural anyway (Kriesi 1998).

As a matter of distinction between different types of cleavages, I follow Knutsen (1988). He separates cleavages into two big categories: structural and ideological cleavages. In the first type, he includes pre-industrial (religion, urban/rural) and industrial (e.g., class) cleavages. In the second, he refers to the left-right52 dimension and the materialist-postmaterialist divide proposed by Inglehart. This distinction is important for clarity in the thesis, but it does not mean that the ideological cleavages disregard some socio-structural components.

In new democracies cleavages can indeed appear and develop, as more authors contend. The shorter democracy time periods in most of the third wave cases cannot be taken as an

51 Alternatively, in this thesis I call them traditional or classic cleavages. 52 Knutsen calls it left-right materialist values, as he frames this cleavage into a discussion about the ownership and distribution of means of production.

impediment for the formation of cleavages. Class, religion, ethnicity, regional and urban-rural divides—as well as postmodern divides—are ubiquitous (Casal Bértoa 2014, Kitschelt 1995, Liddle and Mujani 2007). Ethnicity as a relevant cleavage of party systems, for instance, has already been studied for Eastern Central European countries (Evans and Whitefield 1993, Tavits 2008). As Tavits suggests, there is space for some ethnic cleavages in Eastern European countries, but minorities “may not have been able to mobilize effectively behind a unified viable party.” (2008: 130).53 The left-right dimension has been slowly taking place in Asian countries (Jou 2010). Some specialists on Latin America claim otherwise: that cleavages in that region are weak, especially the left-right dimension (Dix 1989, Harbers 2010, Roberts 2002). The first PSI theoretical proposition, in 1995, was based on Latin America. It means that Mainwaring and Scully (1995) were likely influenced by the scepticism about cleavages given their supposed weakness in that region.

The key consequence of cleavages is the stability and predictability of party systems. The most forceful cleavage is the one based on class, but I contend that societies have evolved in such a way that ideological cleavages, especially the left-right orientation, are becoming more meaningful as integrator of greater social interests. The theory of PSI claims that newer democracies had no time to develop cleavages as in Western Europe, and thus cannot be analysed following the theory of freezing party systems. Nonetheless, there is no convincing reason to think that the theories of PSI and of cleavages are mutually exclusive. On the contrary, both theoretical bodies can reinforce each other in developing countries. It means that cleavages should exist, and are much needed in developing countries in order for a party system to consolidate.

Given this brief literature account of cleavages and its relationship with the features of party system institutionalisation, the overall hypothesis states that:54

Cleavages contribute to party system stabilisation in developing democracies, and the left-right orientation contributes more

53 The assumption is that when ethnic minorities cultivate attachments to certain parties, such links are likely to persist over time if there is no middle ground for other parties to get electorally competitive (Evans and Whitefield 1993). On the other hand, it may also happen that no specific party gains ethnic support, and then the ethnicity becomes less important for the party formation and strength. 54 This is a general hypothesis phrasing. It is only outlined, as the other hypotheses of this chapter will also be. Specific and in-depth justified hypotheses are in Chapters Four, Five and Six.

The hypothesis crystallisation is shown below, in Figure 2.4. The diagram indicates the expected relationship between cleavages and PSI, ceteris paribus. The Y axis shows the party system institutionalisation, from lower to higher levels. The X axis indicates three categories of cleavages: weak, traditional and ideological.

FIGURE 2.4 Expected relationship between cleavages and PSI

As can be seen in Fig. 2.4, it can be expected that democratic polities without clear cleavages have lower levels of party system institutionalisation. At least, where there are structural or traditional cleavages in place, the party system should be more consolidated. Finally, the presence of the ideological cleavage is related to the highest levels of party system institutionalisation. The slope is curvilinear as it suggests a smooth institutionalisation process alongside cleavage sophistication and certain stableness once the ideological cleavages are settled. Besides, institutionalisation cannot be an endless upward trend in a competitive system. In summary, this expectation posits the idea that cleavages are needed for party systems to stabilise. Importantly, it also claims that there is a hierarchical order amongst the cleavages, with the ideological cleavages on the top.

2.5.2 Contribution of personalism

The literature of party systems is quite severe against personalism—with good cause, of course (see, for example, Levitsky and Loxton 2013, Linz and Stepan 1996, Mainwaring 1999: 24).55 Personalistic politics is about figures becoming the centre of gravity for elections and policy- making processes—as opposed to party politics, in which the organisation matters the most. The defining characteristic of political personalism is the concentration of power on a single person (Hadenius and Teorell 2007). This excessive concentration can occur at any level—e.g., a municipality, a party or the state. For party systems, however, personalistic56 politics are conceptually encapsulated in this thesis by the role of party leaders and, by extension, how these leaderships have an effect on the party system they belong to.

In this thesis, I will refer to party system leadership every time I mention the overarching conceptualisation of parties’ leaderships in any given system. There is of course no such a thing as a proper leadership of a party system in a competitive setting, but rather different types of leaders in a party system. In the matter of conceptual simplicity, then, party system leadership is no more than the schematic aggregation of party leaderships.

The main association of personalism is with populism (Kriesi 2014, Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Personalism relates to the idea of leaders who take their parties away from programmatic lines and, instead, use them as vehicles of personal use. As such, personalism is expected to be at odds with functioning party systems. Furthermore, according to Mainwaring and Scully, personalism is more common in embryonic party systems (1995: 22). Figure 2.5 shows a schematic graph that highlights the academic consensus thoughts on the relationship between personalism and party systems. It must be stressed that the following graph is valid for any given democratic regime.57 The X axis is a theoretical scale for personalism in party system leadership. The Y axis shows the institutionalisation levels of a party system.

55 In Sartori’s view, personalism is the same as the old conceptualisation of factionalism: units are different of proper parties (1976: 72ff). 56 ‘Personalist’ or ‘personalistic’ will be used here without distinction. 57 If personalism is extreme in such a way that the party system itself is no longer competitive, then the basic idea of party system ceases.

FIGURE 2.5 Mainstream view of the relationship between personalism and PSI

The sketched diagram of Fig. 2.5 indicates that the less personalistic the party system leadership, the more institutionalised the party system is. At the other extreme, the more personalistic the party system leadership, the more under-institutionalised the party system is. In this graph, the edges of the slope are softened to avoid an illustration of both variables depicting extreme levels of PSI.

Nevertheless, the said linear association is not a true concept. It has been taken for granted that consolidating party systems are fertile ground for personalism. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Mainwaring (1999) indistinctively refer to personalism58 as a feature of fluid party systems, but the theory of PSI does not offer a causal explanation of how personalism creates—or is created by—more unstable party systems. This intriguing relationship should be unpicked, especially as personalism can also occur in mature party systems.59 Given the overwhelming demonisation of personalistic politics in our discipline, it should not come as a surprise that the literature has failed to deal with the specific role of charismatic party leaders

58 The concept is used in its widest implications in both works: from personalistic candidates at different levels of representation (e.g., legislators, prime ministers, presidents) to party leaders. 59 For recent accounts, see Aarts, Blais and Schmitt (2011) and King (2002a). Poguntke and Webb (2005) and Webb and Poguntke (2013) focus on the presidentialisation logic of leaderships.

in the configuration of party systems in developing democratic countries.60 It would be wise, however, to open that debate again even if that results in the confirmation of political scientists’ assumptions.

In this part of the thesis, I aim to explore the association between party leadership (and its aggregation as party system leadership) and party system stability in newer democracies. Subsequently, to what extent non-personalistic party leadership relates more differently to party system consolidation than personalistic party leadership does. Based on the literature, one can go ahead and claim that non-personalistic party leadership should contribute positively to party system stabilisation, whereas personalistic party leadership should contribute negatively to party system stabilisation. That is the ultimate assumption I would like to tackle critically here.

If one considers the basic characteristic of leadership, a complete lack of personalism may be detrimental to the necessary incentives which keep a party system functioning well. The rationale behind this is that in the event of a total absence of personal gains for a leader this may discourage her from a strong internal competition. Likewise, if all of the gains go to the leader, others may be discouraged from competing against her. This latter assumption implies that whilst personalism may strengthen a party providing stability and support, it also has a pervasive effect on the party system as it stands. No extreme contributes to institutionalise their party system. Consequently, a leader would be able to direct the party’s programme at a cost: in order for the party to be appealing, it may require its leader to remain strong. Enyedi and Deegan-Krause (2011) state that if established politicians use their time to build organisations, they might also be investing in cleavage formation. This final possibility has not been analysed thoroughly, to the best of my knowledge, in the literature on party systems.

Thus, the overall hypothesis looks like this:

Personalistic party leadership can negatively or positively affect the consolidation of party systems 61

60 The sought relationship is in the context of democratic settings. It is clear that where personalism may perform better is in authoritarian regimes. As for semi-democracies, where party system can indeed exist (party systems cannot exist in pure authoritarian regimes, as analysed in Chapter One), personalism persists as a factor to institutionalise these types of party systems. 61 This thesis does not test the role of personalism in political regimes other than democracies.

The following figure (2.6) reflects the hypothesis claim. It shows the same axes of Fig. 2.5.

FIGURE 2.6 Hypothesis view of the relationship between personalism and PSI

The hypothesis relationship (Fig. 2.6) is two-fold. When a party system is mainly non- programmatically-based, then personalism is associated to higher instability. But according to this logic, this claim hypothesises that regardless of the level of personalisation (i.e., low but also high levels of personalism), more programmatic parties should be related to higher levels of party system stability. It indicates that higher degrees of personalism can have either a negative or positive association with PSI, depending on the degree of programmatic- orientation of parties. This claim is further elaborated in Chapter Five.

2.5.3 Relevance of the legitimacy dimension

According to Weber, legitimacy is a belief that “every such system attempts to establish and to cultivate” (Weber 1978 [1922]: 213). For Beetham (1991), legitimacy refers to rules based on beliefs that are shared by the authority and its subordinates, and accordingly validated by both. As discussed for different currents of scholars for decades now (e.g., Herz 1978, Marquez 2015, O’Kane 1993, Powell 1982, Saward 2000, Stillman 1974) legitimacy is a phenomenon that ultimately connects people to the government in a political system. In a democracy, legitimacy begins with free and fair elections that express the electorate’s preferences or, at least, deliberations (Cohen 1989: 23, Przeworski 1998: 141). Therefore, based on the seminal studies of legitimacy by Weber and Beetham and the scholarship that ensued, this concept does not

help us to understand whether a party system is institutionalised or not, for a very simple reason: legitimacy does not deal with party systems, but with political systems. For example, in the contemporary world legitimacy might be better suited in a debate about democracy itself (Hicken and Kuhonta 2011, 2015b, Stillman 1974: 36-8). This means that the dimension of legitimacy should not be related to the study of party system institutionalisation but, following the idea of a predominant political system type, to the study of democratic systems of government.62

Since the objective of democratic theories is the study of democracies and their variances (Bobbio 1987), legitimacy here is the cornerstone of the popular validity of such a system. Legitimacy must be understood as part of a democratic institutionalisation, but party system institutionalisation does not necessarily follow a parallel road to democratic progression. For instance, a mature and consolidated democracy probably has a strongly institutionalised party system, but not all strongly institutionalised party systems are full democracies—in fact, there can be semi-democracies amongst them. Singapore and Malaysia are the most institutionalised party systems in Southeast Asia (Hicken and Kuhonta 2011, Tan 2015, Weiss 2015), albeit both are farther away from countries such as Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan in terms of democratic qualities. Certainly, it is reasonable to assume that party systems do indeed need to be valued by society in order to function consistently over time; that is to say, that they need a popular ‘blessing’ to justify their presence. Such a rationale lies behind Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) decision to include this category in the PSI conceptualization. However, when voters or major actors deposit their ‘faith’ in a system, they are actually linking this belief to the necessity of democracy and not to the party system itself (Bobbio 1987, Lipset 1959).

In addition, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) are unclear about who grants legitimacy to the system: the voters or key political elites? Sometimes they talk about the former (1995: 14, 25), and sometimes about the latter (1995: ix, 5). If it were the case of voters legitimising elections as the only means to access power,63 this dimension would fit better with a theory of democracy. Furthermore, a political system that is not competitive and is not fair could not be studied using the lens of party system institutionalisation, because both free competition and

62 It could also fit into a debate on authoritarian regimes (Epstein 1984). Regardless of the democratic quality of the issue, legitimacy’s operational range is in the political regime realm. 63 In his later work, Mainwaring (1999) confers legitimacy to parties and not to elections.

fairness are quintessential components of a party system. However, any political system can be analysed upon democratic and non-democratic values; for instance, the 2011 elections in Kazakhstan were clearly non-democratic,64 but polls may suggest that citizens approved the whole process.65 The PSI theory would not provide answers to that debate, but the theory of democracy could. Indeed, as Kenney (2003) highlights in following O’Donnell’s ideas of vertical and horizontal democratic accountability (1999), Fujimori in Peru and the late Chávez in Venezuela could base their democratic credentials upon the fair way they were elected, and also because citizens supported them for breaking down some flawed characteristics (e.g., patronage, corruption) of the previous democratic regimes. As Sartori has pointed out, “democracy still has foes; but it is now best evaded in its own name and by means of its own name” (Sartori 1987: 4 [cit. Kenney 2003]). All of this debate supports the primary notion that legitimacy is a matter of democratic theory discussion, for which this thesis is not aimed.

Given that legitimacy is, in all cases, an issue to be understood from the citizenry’s perspective (government’s source of legitimacy comes from its citizens), there is room for a differing view. If the original theory of PSI referred to this dimension of legitimacy as how major political elites understand elections, in the sense that how the original democratic legitimacy is brought about, we should look at elites. To date this has not been mentioned in the literature as a further option. Thus, it is worth considering a more careful analysis of the relevance of the legitimacy of studying PSI, and also how both citizens and elites tackle legitimacy.

Dependant on the society, a lack of political legitimacy may cause apathy (Easton 1957), or set the basis for democratic breakdown as happened in Latin America and southern Europe (Linz 1978, O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986), as well as Weimar Germany (Evans 2003: 88). As Lipset (1959) suggests, legitimacy implies that political elites convince their society that political institutions and devices are the most adequate instruments for the society to exist as such. Furthermore, since legitimacy relates to the idea of popular support, it can be used as a dimension for systems other than party systems; i.e., for non-representative regimes. Any party state, or oppressive regime, can claim that its party system is legitimate (Lipset 1959).

64 See a joint report on Kazakhstan by the Norwegian Helsinki Committee and Freedom House (2013). 65 According to the Kazakhstan National Opinion Poll (Feb 2011), by IRI, NED and Gallup, 69% of citizens believe that democracy exists in the country, and the same figure applies to those who are confident that the presidential election would be fair and free.

Again, the discussion about political legitimacy goes beyond the specific study of party system, as it will be discussed later on in the thesis.

The theory of PSI is itself framed by the general debate on democracies, especially democratisation (Mainwaring and Scully 1995), so it fits naturally into the broader study of the democratic theory. In the diagram presented in Figure 2.7, the PSI theory is depicted in the simplest way, including its four constituent parts.

FIGURE 2.7 Theoretical family of the theory of PSI

As it has been largely discussed in previous pages, political legitimacy (bolded in Fig. 2.7) does not make sense with the theory of party systems, but instead with democratic theory. Non- competitive and unfair political systems cannot be analysed with the theory of PSI, because they do not have party systems. Free and fair elections are a necessary condition for a party system to exist. The theory of PSI cannot scrutinise, then, systems that are not party systems. Political legitimacy of regimes and parties, however, is a subject which is susceptible to being studied by, for example, democratic theorists. Leaders or parties who win unfair elections can still be legitimised by large segments of the population (for more details, consult Kenney 2003). Legitimacy, then, contributes little to party system consolidation. According to this claim, variations of PSI should not be found in any political legitimacy dimension. Summarily, this hypothesis outlines the following:

Legitimacy does not account for meaningful variation in party system institutionalisation

Figure 2.9 presents a simple diagram indicating the proposed positioning of the concept of legitimacy.

FIGURE 2.8 Reviewed theoretical family of the theory of PSI

The preceding figure (2.9) shows that any revision of the theory of PSI should include the potential removal of its original dimension of legitimacy. Legitimacy, as it is hypothesised, does not deem relevant to the theory of PSI, but separately, to a theory of democracy.

As previously noted, each of these hypotheses are expanded on in greater detail in the relevant empirical chapters. For now, their role and place in the PSI literature has been highlighted as well as their implications for our understanding of the process and explanation of PSI.

2.6 Conclusions

In this chapter I attempted to delve into the rationale of the theory of PSI and its grand relationship with the scholarship on party systems in general. In doing so, I explained how the original PSI theory is structured around four dimensions (inter-party competition stability, party roots in society, legitimacy of parties and elections, and organisational strength of parties) and its uses in different regional and country settings. Taking into account a critical review of the literature of PSI and party systems, this chapter then moved onto three related convictions.

Firstly, electoral volatility sets the standard and is the best indicator for operationalising PSI, as it gauges the core of the theory: the stability of party competition which leads to predictable patterns of competition for voters and parties. Empirical results show that emerging democracies from Latin America, Europe and Asia share similar levels of volatility dispersion, which means that party systems from these regions are homogenously stabilising at a different pace and depth. Secondly, the theory of PSI should not be constrained unnecessarily by settings unrelated to its inner theoretical framework. This means that the theory can be applied to semi-democracies and democracies alike, that party systems of developed countries can be examined using the PSI lens, and that the four dimensions should not be expected to correlate. By implication, the theory can, and should expand its application to different settings. For instance, changes in the levels of party system consolidation can be assessed for cases from different regions in the world regardless of levels of democratic quality. Thirdly, the chapter (and the thesis) moves onto a different level with more substantive challenges. Consideration is then given to how PSI relates to the broad literature on party systems. This broader approach can explain why some party systems in developing countries stabilise quicker, and why they consolidate at a deeper level, than others.

Three subsequent research questions are then presented. In the first question, the thesis looks for a relationship between cleavages and party system institutionalisation. In the second, it opens the possibility that, given a programmatic context, personalistic party politics can contribute to PSI. And thirdly, it disputes the appropriateness of the dimension of legitimacy for the study of party system consolidation. The next chapter outlines how the thesis, whilst motivated by these research questions, uses the appropriate research design and methods to test them.

CHAPTER THREE Testing is any method of checking correspondence with reality by the use of RESEARCH DESIGN pertinent observations. 3 Giovanni Sartori 1970: 1045

3.1 Introduction

This thesis aims to explain why third wave democracies show different patterns in their party systems consolidation. The hypotheses for the subsequent research questions on the role of cleavages, personalism and legitimacy suggest that 1) cleavages, especially the ideological cleavages, play a positive contributing role for party system consolidation; 2) personalistic politics may favour the stabilisation process of certain party systems, and 3) political legitimacy is not related to the institutionalisation of party systems. These research questions will be tackled using different data (surveys, interviews, archival), techniques (statistical, inferential), contexts (cross-country, cross-time) and even levels (individual, aggregate, and institutional). In general, this research design is oriented by a comparative analysis framework (Lijphart 1971) using a mixture of methods.

In this chapter, I will highlight the key proxy to understand PSI (electoral volatility). Based on that indicator three cases will be selected from recently democratised regions of the world. Next I will seek to examine the exploratory indicators to be tested for the subsequent research question dealing with the role of cleavages, personalism and legitimacy. I will then attempt to explain which evidence each research question needs to test the hypotheses. That section is followed by the introduction of data, and the sampling and methods of analysis for the hypothesis testing. The chapter will then close off with a reflection on how the use of different quantitative and qualitative methods is best suited to the requirements and complexities of these research questions on PSI.

3.2 Key Indicator

As discussed in Chapter Two, the standard proxy for party system institutionalisation is the Pedersen index of electoral volatility (Pedersen 1979). Given that the main research question of this thesis seeks to understand the variation of PSI in third wave democracies, the key indicator to use for the selection of cases is the electoral volatility of party systems over time.

The operationalisation of PSI through the electoral volatility of countries uses the following formula structure, which is well-known in the literature of political science:

(1)

Where n is the number of parties in the given election, p is the percentage of votes received by i party in time t, which is then subtracted by the percentage received in time t+1.66

This formula is usually adopted to obtain the percentage of volatility between two elections for a party system. For this thesis, each score is of less importance than the overall trajectory of the electoral volatility of party systems. Some scholars use the simple average of several elections to assess a country’s electoral volatility (e.g., Bartolini and Mair 1990, Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Rose and Munro 2003, Hicken and Kuhonta 2011), yet it provides little information about the changing patterns of volatility over time. The key indicator for this thesis, therefore, is the overall assessment of the electoral volatility of countries over time. Such an assessment can be plotted in a graph showing volatility trajectory.

In order to display a variation of party system stability, this thesis shows the different trajectories that consolidating party systems follow over the years. This indicator will be decisive in selecting the cases that this thesis will look to analyse. The focus is posed on cases that are to be consolidated, but at a different pace (speed) and intensity (depth). That way, the comparison can effectively capture the explanations for these differences. Next I will describe the case selection procedures that will be used alongside electoral volatility.

3.3 Case selection

The target of interest in this thesis is the third wave of democratisation. Although the wave was a global phenomenon (Huntington 1991, Shin 2008), it mainly took place in three regions: Latin America, Europe and Asia. Most countries in the aforementioned regions experienced authoritarian regimes and democratic transitions especially during the 1980s and 1990s. Likewise, democracies later endured due to economic modernisation through liberal policies (Przeworski et al. 1997). Given that the research question asks for reasons behind the variation

66 An overall assessment of this indicator is made in Chapter Two, point 2.3.1.

of party system institutionalisation, the cases to examine should combine an authoritarian past and democratic endurance in the manner outlined by Przeworski et al. 1997. Because this study is looking at indicators that concern competitive party systems, countries with no party systems and/or authoritarian regimes are not included.

The countries of the third wave have diverse histories. There were dissimilar dictatorship regimes (e.g., Argentina, Chile, Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Uruguay), occupied territories by a foreign power (e.g., Baltic states), and new countries resulting from secessions (e.g., of former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia; Timor Leste). In each region, the authoritarian regimes lasted a long time.67 It is important to appraise that common feature, as it somehow illustrates the relatively short experience of countries with competitive party system settings.68

The post-authoritarian period in the three regions shows a large variance in terms of a transition to democracy. Likewise, each region represents a particular illustration on how party systems are formed.69 An inter-regional approach should, then, account for that variation in a comparative analysis of party system stabilisation. In comparative research, case studies are used to understand phenomena of a larger population (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Ideally, the more cases in an analysis, the better, but comparative research requires at least two cases from which to draw analysis for causal inference, provided the cases are representative. Here, case studies are expected to represent the population of third wave democracies accounting for their regional differences. As many scholars have suggested, researchers do well to pursue cross-area studies in order to look for findings based on analytic rather than on geographic basis (Collier 1993, Przeworski 1991, Rustow 1968). Therefore, as there are three regions of interest, this thesis will focus on one case per region, making this an inter-regional cross- country study.

The case selection method comes from what Przeworski and Teune (1970) identify as the most similar system, which aims to compare cases that share certain characteristics in order to

67 East and Southeast Asian authoritarian regimes lasted, on average, longer than in Latin America, but less than in Central and Eastern Europe. 68 For historical accounts of Latin America, see Drake 2009 and Schneider 2007. For Central Eastern Europe, see Lewis (2000) and Petrovic (2013). For Asian countries, see Alagappa (2004), Diamond, Plattner and Chu (2013), Dore (forthcoming 2016) and Jalal (1995). Also, Haggard and Kaufman (2008) famously compare the three regions’ democratic achievements and welfare state structures. 69 Refer to Figure 2.3, Chapter Two.

identify which qualities do not apply to all. “The more similar the units that are being compared, the more possible it should be to isolate the factors responsible for the differences between them,” says Lipset (1990: xiii). The focus of the scholar is to identify and try to explain the differences or ‘concomitant variation’ (Peters 1998). Sartori explains that in a most similar system, a large set of variables are assumed to be equal between systems, and thus they can be overlooked in order to pursue the particular phenomenon of interest (1991:250). Utilising quantitative language, Seawright and Gerring (2008) explain that the difference between cases should be at least one independent variable (the variable of interest to explain), whilst another independent variable should be as similar as possible between the cases. The dependent variable ought to be different, too. Scholars should avoid selecting cases which are based on the dependent variable (Geddes 1990), unless a variation of the dependent variable is considered for analysis (Coillier 1993: 112, Seawright and Gerring 2008: 298, 304-6). When the latter happens, the selection is indeed based on a different outcome, so the comparison may in turn gain richness and depth.

Once again utilising terms from quantitative method language, I will now move onto defining the ‘variables’. The ‘most similar’ variable consists of the strength of economic and political institutions. This means that cases should have similarities with those factors, as they are key determinants of a stable system of parties, as I will explain in further detail. On the other hand, the cases should be different, according to the literature, and based on the key ‘independent variables’ of cleavages and personalism.70

In recent scholarships looking at the causes of electoral volatility, the economic performance of countries and the strength of their economic institutions have a relative positive effect on the stability patterns of their party systems (Roberts and Wibbels 1999, Tavits 2005). Economic growth is the main indicator for assessing development,71 and is usually measured by the well- known Human Development Index (UNDP 2014). In order to see what cases are similar with key independent variables (the matching criterion of cases, following Seawright and Gerring 2008), I will rely on the relative economic development of third wave democracies. Considering that the research question looks for reasons behind (positive) institutionalising

70 As we will see in its chapter, the third factor of analysis, legitimacy, is more controversial in terms of concept formation. Thus, no variable should be mentioned here until the concept is clear. 71 The modernisation theory claims that the more the economic progress, the more developed a society becomes. Development is then associated with material well-being and higher access to goods and services (see, for example, Easterly 2002, Rostow 1960, World Bank 2009: xix-xiii)

variations of party systems, this thesis requires countries with high levels of economic development (Przeworski et al. 1997). Another key determinant of higher levels of party system stability comes from the presence of strong and democratic political institutions (Huntington 1991, Randall and Svåsand 2001, Uffen 2007). The OECD is an exclusive world organisation devoted to economic development, and to which many “of the world’s most advanced countries”72 belong. Only countries respecting political and economic freedom are members.73 In order to select cases of higher economic and democratic development, the requirement was to be a member of the OECD, as of 2012. The OECD condition helped me to select a few cases from each region of interest (Table 3.1).

TABLE 3.1 Developing countries that belong to OECD

Latin Central and East and America Eastern Europe Southeast Asia Mexico (1994) Turkey (1961) Korea (1996) Chile (2010) Czech Republic (1995) Taiwan (2002)** Hungary (1996) Poland (1996) Slovak Republic (2000) Slovenia (2010) Estonia (2010) * In parenthesis, year the country became member. ** Date of admission as observer in the Committee of Competition. Source: OECD

Table 3.1 shows that only two Latin American countries (Mexico and Chile) have met the admission benchmark. As for Asian countries, the only fully developing member shown is Korea, although Taiwan would likely be full member if it were also recognised as a UN member. From Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), there are seven countries that meet the benchmark for selection: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey. In a further filter process, based on a democratic quality assessment (Mainwaring 2015), I have used the index of the Freedom in the World 2012, by Freedom House. The two Asian countries

72 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has 34 members, of which 23 are mature democracies. Its last round of accessions took place in 2010. 73 The OECD mission statement says: “The common thread of our work is a shared commitment to market economies backed by democratic institutions and focused on the wellbeing of all citizens.” (Website accessed August 3rd 2015). For a critical view of the democratic achievements of the OECD countries, see Merkel (2013)

highlighted are considered “free”. In Latin America, only Chile is labelled “free” whereas Mexico is considered “partly free”. In CEE, all but Turkey are considered “free”. An additional filter concerns the level of development, measured by the Human Development Index. This index has values between 0 (least developed) to 1 (most developed); over 0.733 is considered ‘high human development’. Of all the OECD countries in this sample, only Turkey scores below that level. Finally, I have also introduced a pure economic criterion: GDP per capita growth. I have not applied this indicator to the Latin American and Asian OECD countries, as all the other criteria are already in place. For the European cases, GDP per capita growth74 shows that Estonia outperformed all the other cases (16.8% annual average growth), followed by Slovakia (11.3%). No other country in the region grew more than 10%. Thus, Estonia and Slovakia were picked from CEE.

The six cases pre-selected (Chile and Mexico; Korea and Taiwan, and Estonia and Slovakia) do share, then, similarities: they are leading economies in each region, have high development standards, and have very good quality democratic institutions, in general.

Since this thesis looks for differences in how party systems institutionalise over time, it requires countries in which party systems are, indeed, consolidating. I also needed to pick one case per region, as previously mentioned. Thus, moving on to the key indicator of electoral volatility, the three case pairs (two per region) are presented in Figure 3.1. The continuous (blue) line shows the volatility score, and the dotted (red) slope is its linear trend.

74 Period 1993-2012 (IMF 2012).

FIGURE 3.1 Electoral volatility in cases from Latin America, Europe and Asia

America

Europe

Asia

In all cases but Mexico, stabilisation is positive (Fig. 3.1). Thus, the first condition for selecting cases is that they should follow consistent patterns of stabilisation in the time framework under analysis, at least as tendency. Therefore, in Latin America, Chile is selected over Mexico.

Fig. 3.1 indicates that Taiwan has a rather flat tendency, whereas Korea shows a clearer stabilisation pattern.75 Therefore, for that region, the most relevant case for comparative analysis is Korea. The most difficult case to elucidate comes from CEE. Both Slovakia and Estonia show patterns of stabilisation. However, the Estonian trend is much steeper than the Slovakian trend. Also, the Slovakian trend has a pattern similar to that of Korea, so their match for the key indicator of electoral volatility is too close and not really useful for an inter-regional comparative analysis. Therefore, Estonia is chosen as the case from Europe.

Importantly, the previous conditions highlight the fact that Chile, Estonia and Korea do not show the same evolution as per their volatility scores. A linear slope is highlighted in Figure 3.2, taken from a bivariate linear regression with the electoral volatility as the outcome variable, and the consecutive number of elections as the only regressor. Linear regression equations are included in the graph.

FIGURE 3.2 Linear trends of the three selected cases

The linear trends (Fig. 3.2) show that Chilean electoral volatility has remained rather low over time (β=21.6), whereas Estonia presents a rapid downturn (β=66.6), and Korea has experienced a less steeped variation (β=44.2). The cases show different levels in the proxy of party system consolidation.

75 2004 displayed a rather exceptional increase in volatility in Korea. It came in the middle of a political crisis during the government of Roh Moo-hyun, who faced an impeachment even before the legislative elections of April 2014. The impeachment was eventually overturned by the Constitutional Court in May 2004.

So far, three cases (Chile, Estonia, Korea) show similarities in key ‘independent variables’ (high quality in economic, human and political institutions development), and differences in the outcome indicator of electoral volatility. But they also need to be different for other explanatory indicators, which are the factors to be explained. In terms of cleavages, Chile is considered familiar to the cleavage consolidation of Western Europe (Valenzuela and Scully 1997). According to this view, the country enjoyed a well-established party system since the XIX century that, despite being interrupted over 17 years by the dictatorship of general Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990), resisted without fundamental changes (Scully 1995). In Estonia, the most relevant cleavage is ethnic (Tavits 2012), heavily informed by the large influence of the Russian minority (Smith 1998). In Korea, a tenacious cleavage seems to be of sub-national type: regionalism (Kang 2003, Kim, Choi and Cho 2008, Lee 2000). Scholars explain that the modern regional cleavage in Korea deepened during the dictatorships of generals Park Chung- hee (1961–1979) and Chun Doo-hwan (1979–1987), who led the country’s industrialisation: most of the companies benefited with huge state-subsidies and preferences since the 1960s which belonged to families from the province of Yeongnam—home of Park and Chun—, whereas rural areas, especially Honam, were left behind (Cho 1998, Cumings 2005).

As for personalism, Chile is again used as a low level case of personalistic politics (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Estonia is only partially regarded as showing personalistic politics (Grofman, Mikkel and Taagepera 2000), although it still shows patterns of highly charismatic leaders like Edgar Savisaar (Mikkel 2006). Korea, on the other hand, is regarded as a case study for personalistic politics for the so-called “three Kims”:76 Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Il- pil.77 They were major players in the democratisation of the country and ruled the Korean democratic politics during the 1990s and early 2000s (Cumings 2005, Im 2004), although at the cost of boosting the regionalist divide and the weakening of parties (Im 2004).

Legitimacy requires a different analysis, in line with the aim of comparative research for generating concept formation (Coillier 1993: 105-15, Gerring 1999, Gerring and Baressi 2003, Mahoney 2007). For this reason, it is not possible to elucidate here how different the cases are. That is precisely one of the tasks of this thesis.

76 They are not family members. One in three Koreans have Kim as their last name (Cumings 2005: 14) 77 In Korea, family names come first. However, following Cumings (2005: 14), I will keep that order only for leaders who are well-known in the West for that usage. In all other cases, the order will be: given name/family name.

The ‘most similar’ approach in comparative research indicates that these cases are useful to compare in a search for how and why they feature so dissimilar in party system consolidation processes. To begin with, there were no substantial differences between Chile, Estonia and Korea in economic and other development indicators. Provided that development is a relevant determinant of how party systems function, this thesis is not looking for a development institutional explanation to understand the research question. The cases are therefore controlled for their strength in economic and political institutions conditions. They vary in other dimensions of interest. The three cases are not selected either on the dependent variable. As I emphasised some pages back, the outcome indicator is not the positive consolidation process of party system stability, but the trajectories of such stabilising processes. They also differ in the regions they come from, giving this research a cross-area perspective.

In summary, the three cases selected differ in their trajectories and in their geographic characteristics. Furthermore, these countries have differences in key explanatory indicators, such as expected levels of cleavage formation and personalistic politics. They also have other dissimilarities: past experience with democracy, types of regimes, electoral institutions and human geographies. Only incidentally, these latter aspects will be raised in the empirical chapters, as they can provide information about the specific explanatory variables and qualitative assessments.

In the following pages, I will focus on providing details about the evidence required to answer the research questions. Then, I will provide details about the data and the most appropriate methods to test and analyse the hypotheses. Further detailed information of data and methods is included in each empirical chapter.

3.4 Evidence to test

I have introduced the three cases this thesis will compare in order to answer the research question. Chile, Estonia and Korea are leading economies relative to their regions, and also have in common strong political and economic institutions. They seemingly differ, however, in party system stabilisation over time (electoral volatility), and also in at least two of the

explanatory indicators78 this thesis intends to explore further (cleavages and personalism). The third explanatory indicator (legitimacy) requires more exploration to determine how differently it is in the three cases. Each research sub-question needs specific data to test the hypotheses claims. Which data would be more appropriate?

In the following pages, I will outline the characteristics of the data of interest, and explain why the research sub-questions require them.

3.4.1 Evidence for the role of cleavages

The first hypothesis claims that the existence of well-defined cleavages contributes to the stabilisation of party systems in developing countries, and that the left-right dimension contributes more. This claim requires evidence concerning the three-way definition of cleavages, following the works of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Bartolini and Mair (1990): the presence of a divide in society, the groups self-conscious of the divide that distinguish them from one another, and the political representation of the interests associated with the divide.

Most scholarly work delves around the self-consciousness component of cleavages and their political manifestation (Deegan-Krause 2007: 539). To assess such divides as proper cleavages, individuals should identify their preferences and, eventually, translate them into some sort of attachment ‘to’, or ‘choice’ towards, a political organisation—i.e., a political party. The focus of this research question, then, revolves around both individual perceptions and their attachments (or lack thereof) to certain cleavages. This research takes the concept of cleavages as a social and political construct. As such, it can be formally operationalised as the preferences of individuals around given themes, such as class, religion, geography and urban/rural divide (here grouped as structural cleavages), and values-based or attitudinal orientations (here clustered as ideological cleavages).

There are two more considerations about the data which are required to answer this research question. Firstly, cleavage formation is, by definition, a time process. It means that the evidence should take into consideration how the individual self-identification changes (in case it does) over time. And secondly, cleavage formation is both a bottom-up and a top-down

78 As commented previously, I interchange quantitative and qualitative terms to come out with the hybrid of outcome and explanatory ‘indicators’, as a close approximation to ‘variables’. For instance, instead of variables, Ragin refers to conditions of configurations. He defines configurations as the “combinations of characteristics or aspects of cases” (1994: 185; see also 114-118).

construction. This means that both citizens and elites articulate the way cleavages are identified with and shaped (Chhibber and Torcal 1997, Deegan-Krause 2007: 550-551, Przeworski and Sprague 1986).

The data required to tackle this question, then, should be of two types. Firstly, surveys which consider questions dealing with the self-identification of individuals in social and political issues. For this thesis, the surveys should have been conducted in the three case studies, and for as many years since the inauguration of democracy as possible, to account for cross-time variation. For the type of cleavages that the literature has covered in the case studies, questions about sub-national (regional) identification, ethnic identity and ideological preferences should be included. And secondly, an ideal type of data covers what elites think of social and political divides, as they embody—through their organisations—the political structuration of cleavages.

The evidence to be collected for this research question, then, needs to cover both bottom-up and top-down approaches. In the first instance, this requires citizens’ preferences over time, and in the second instance, it requires political elite’s perceptions. This dual requirement can be used for testing other hypotheses, too, as I will cover next. Equally important, the evidence to gather here reflects the fact that there might be a causal relationship between the way cleavages work and the relative stabilisation process of the party preferences: following the hypotheses, there is an implicit correlation—not necessarily one-way causation—between increasingly established cleavages, especially the ideological cleavage, and party system stability.

3.4.2 Evidence for the contribution of personalism

The second hypothesis of this thesis looks at the function of personalistic political leadership in the stabilisation process of party systems. It claims that, when personalistic leaderships co- exist with programmatic party environments, personalism can strengthen the consolidation of party systems. Given that the top-down approach resembles the dimension of organisational strength of parties in the theory of PSI (Mainwaring 1999: 59-60), the main data to test this claim should come from what Mainwaring and Scully call “major political actors” (1995, passim).

On the other hand, party system leadership (the aggregated conceptualisation of leaderships of party systems as coined in the previous chapter) requires a more specific type of approximation. The current literature is much generalised for what constitutes the leadership of parties. Thus, the first task is to provide a meaningful content, based on both literature and historical evidence, for concept formation. It requires, for instance, a substantial assessment to distinguish charismatic leadership as opposed to more bureaucratic leadership.

Aside from a review and interpretation of the literature, the evidence to test this hypothesis should be of at least three types. Firstly, the research question requires elite opinions—from the three case studies—, for only they can provide a necessary top-down approach given the hypothesis. The research question also necessitates an exploration of the type of party leaders who are most prevalent in each system, and in the case of personalistic types, how they are evaluated by the elites in order to discern quality of leadership.

Secondly, in order to determine if the elite views are somehow coherent with more historical measures, an additional piece of archival data needs to be added. The data should concern the number of long leaderships that have participated in the political system, according to different registers. Since the hypothesis asks for personalistic leadership contribution to PSI, historical accounts are needed to contextualise with numbers if any elite perception about personalism is to be supported.

Thirdly, this hypothesis claims that the interconnection between personalistic leadership and programmatic parties creates a positive force that favours PSI. Is that true amongst already consolidated democracies? In the absence of institutional indicators that can measure both variables simultaneously, the judgment of experts is a useful avenue (Hawkins 2011) to pursue ways of generalisation, as their assessments are useful in spite of their limits.79 Thus, to ascertain the implications of this hypothesis, and to what extent the relationship between personalistic leaders and programmatic parties can be associated to party system stability, an expert evaluation may be helpful.

In summary, the evidence required here tackles elite views on the organisation of the parties, and also an institutional corroboration of the duration of leaderships. Likewise, experts can

79 As Mair (2001a) says, problems of accuracy and incongruence between experts, amongst other problems, can always arise.

provide a general judgment of the combination of personalistic leaderships and programmatic parties. The different layers of data needed for this research sub-question also create a challenge for the hypothesis on legitimacy.

3.4.3 Evidence for the relevance of legitimacy

The third hypothesis claims that legitimacy is not relevant to account for variation in the consolidation of party systems. This hypothesis demands two different efforts. The first is concept formation, as legitimacy is a contested concept. The second requires a test to see if legitimacy is meaningful for PSI under the conceptualisation of legitimacy that the literature on political systems has, and under the conceptualisation that the theory of PSI introduces.

Both conceptualisations hold a common factor of legitimacy, which is, at minimum, a perception that comes from citizens. Thus, the evidence to test this dimension has to relate with citizens perceptions around both democracy (satisfaction with), and parties (necessity and role of parties for democracy, people’s trust in parties) across time—to account for changes in perceptions as well as generational differences. Surveys are ideal for this purpose in order to deal with this research question more generally (Luna and Altman 2011, Mainwaring and Scully 1995).

However, the overarching hypothesis points toward a ‘meaningful’ contribution. Meaningfulness here means more contextual exploration for causal inference. Thus, this research sub-question needs data containing details about why parties are—or not— important for a democratic political system, and if the same political system has changed over time to allow for more political party system institutionalisation. Given that the theory of PSI understands legitimacy as an acceptance of elections and parties by elites and citizens alike, the evidence to test these claims should come from the “major political actors” and also, most importantly, from citizens. There are then two pieces of data that can provide the context this hypothesis implies. The first piece of data should be what political elites think of the system, as they are supposed to legitimise it, according to the theory of PSI. This evidence is similar in characteristics and relevance as in the previous hypotheses.

The other piece of data must be what citizens reflect on the party system, because only through their reflection is it possible to attain whether they are legitimising the party system or not, according to this theoretical view. This second piece of evidence is different than the

one obtained from surveys: the latter standardises opinions on a series of issues, whilst the former, by its reflective nature, should be intended to obtain open-ended assessments about forms of legitimacy. In other words, people should voice their opinions openly, without pre- determined choices to choose from in order to provide arguments that back their views. Since the hypothesis partly deals with concept formation, it requires evidence that can lead us to complex thinking processes. Finally, taking into consideration that the research sub-question concerns itself with time variation of party systems, the data from the population have to take into account generational differences, because any reflections would imply judgements about recent history.

The evidence needed for this hypothesis, therefore, is challenging: from the population, it requires closed- and open-ended answers to have a more integrated understanding of what legitimacy is and what it stands for. Likewise, the theory of PSI compels to test the hypothesis related to the role of elites in giving legitimacy to the system.

In general, this section has argued that the three hypotheses require different sets of data. The first should come from the general population, especially to test cleavage formation and persistence, as well as linkages between legitimacy and democracy. Other evidence should come from political elites, as they are the major actors that are in the top of party systems. Elites are unique sources of information useful to better understand causes and consequences of the decision-making processes of political phenomena, and allow examination of the variations detected in the institutionalisation of party systems. An additional piece of evidence must address the assessment of legitimacy by the citizens themselves, but in a more nuanced way than the data of standard surveys. Both the data from elites and from citizens can provide this research a more in-depth description of the processes involved in the party system consolidation, necessary for inferring explanations for the variations in the systems of developing countries. Finally, more specific data are needed for the hypothesis on personalism: around the duration of party leaderships in the analysis, and an expert view to explore whether charismatic and policy-oriented parties co-exist in reality amongst more institutionalised party systems.

I will now move on to discuss how the required evidence was obtained, operationalised and analysed in light of the necessities of the research question. The following section on methods

details the datasets this thesis will use, and the best methods that the hypotheses can be tested with.

3.5 General data and methods

The following pages introduce the main sources of data and the methods for testing the hypotheses. Information not covered here is included in each of the empirical chapters. Firstly, it introduces the survey data for the empirical chapters. Then, it presents the data from the elites that are present in each of the empirical chapters. Finally, it presents a set of data containing more elaborate opinions of the general population.

For each of these, I will highlight the methodological decision made. Limitations of the methods and ways to overcome the limitations are included.

3.5.1 Survey data

The research sub-question about cleavage formation and persistence requires data that fundamentally come from large N surveys (Mair 1989). Trend studies can use survey data to dissect patterns of people’s identification to given attachments or preferences in society. If appropriate methods are in place, the results can be generalised to the population of interest (third wave democracies). To tackle this hypothesis on cleavages, a survey that asks questions about social and political matters, ideally for three countries of study, and for a long time period, would be the best option to follow.

I chose the World Values Survey (WVS) series from waves 2 to 6. It covers the three countries under analysis since the 1990s.80 It is the best available source of information for these countries combined for the questions and timespan of interest. To ascertain the variables on cleavages, I used questions concerning, for example, regional and ethnic attachments of individuals, and their self-positioning in the left-right scale, amongst other issues of self- identification. Likewise, this survey has a question about party voting choice, which is useful as a proxy of the stability of the party system. This survey is also useful to test the hypothesis about the contribution of legitimacy. That hypothesis concerns the confidence perceptions of citizens, over time, to parties and to democracy.

80 For Chile, 4,500 people in total were interviewed for four surveys (1990, 1996, 2005 and 2011); for Estonia, 3,559 persons (1996, 1999 and 2011), and for Korea, 2,400 (2005 and 2010).

Questions relevant for this research have been asked in Chile for a greater number of years than in Estonia and Korea, and more in Estonia than in Korea. There is a good coverage of the 1990s and 2000s for Chile and Estonia, but not as much for Korea. For Korea, the 1990s was the decade of the democratic consolidation. The lack of relevant survey data from WVS for Korea in the 1990s should be taken into account in further analyses.

In order to ascertain the existence of cleavages (explanatory variables), I have used standard questions related to class, religion, region of residence, ethnicity (language spoken)81 and left- right self-placement. To add the dimension of political values (e.g., Inglehart 1977), I include two indicators: one provided by the WVS about post-materialism (Inglehart 1971), and the other created after conducting principal component analysis on moral and market latent issues. On the other hand, I used party voting choice as a proxy for stability in the party competition (dependent variable), as the research question seeks the effect of cleavages on voters’ political party choice.

This thesis uses multinomial logistic regressions with party voting choice as the dependent variable. The aim of using this method is to discover whether a set of cleavages (independent variables) can explain political party vote preference, and how this changes over time in each of the three countries, for which I focus in on the resulting pseudo-R2 across a range of models. Other statistical procedures are then employed to check if the said outcomes do indeed show a meaningful variation over time—alongside the variation of party system stability. The methodological discussion is expanded in greater detail in Chapter Four.

The WVS is also used for appraising citizens’ legitimation of parties and elections, following the conceptualisation of the legitimacy of the theory of PSI. The data are presented in descriptive statistics to show to what extent respondents agree with questions related to trust in parties, in elections and satisfaction with democracy. Some correlations with data on electoral volatility can show a relationship between this conceptualisation of legitimacy and levels of PSI.

For the same research sub-question on personalism, I chose the expert survey of the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project 2008-09 (Kitschelt 2013). This is the only survey where specialists are asked to score parties in the variables of interest for this research

81 The language spoken at home is relevant for Estonia, due to its divide between Estonians and Russians. Almost 30% of the Estonian population has a Russian background.

question: the programmatic orientation of the party and the degree of charismatic style of the party leaders. Since the hypothesis is concerned with the relationship between both variables, I have plotted them together in order to look for a pattern of correlation.

This account of survey data has shown that the WVS contains the most appropriate survey questions for testing this research hypothesis on cleavages. The different waves conducted since the 1990s allow a comparison of changes over time, in line with my concern over trajectory variations of PSI. The WVS also provides relevant data to show an initial assessment of how legitimacy is understood, according to the theory of PSI. Finally, I briefly introduced the expert data to be used for testing the (potential) relationship between charismatic and programmatic parties. This will be important when exploring the research sub-question about the contribution of personalistic politics to PSI.

3.5.2 Elite interviews

As outlined previously, the three hypotheses require data from the political elites of the case country studies. The research questions look at 1) how elites understand cleavage formation and persistence, which can in turn help validate the explanations drawn from the survey data; 2) how elites evaluate personalistic features in party leaderships, and the extent to which charismatic characteristics in party leadership affect their programmatic contents, and 3) whether in institutionalised party systems elites accord legitimacy to parties and elections, as the theory of PSI claims. There is no better way to understand elites’ assessments than by asking them directly (Smart and Higley 1977). Thus, the data was obtained through interviews with politicians and public opinion leaders. I conducted 123 elite interviews in total, with carefully selected elites in Chile, Korea and Estonia.

For this thesis, political elites are a group of people who, organised in some way, wield a large amount of power and have influence over the political system and its society (Bottomore 1964: 12, Garrido Vergara 2013: 33, Parry 2005 [1969]: 13-4). Elites are responsible for shaping the party systems—because they are protagonists and leading representatives of society’s aspirations—and are simultaneously shaped by the system. Interviewing can contribute to give in-depth elements for examination (Aberbach and Rockman 2002). For this reason, elite interviews provide a unique and rich access to explore, understand and explain (Brinkmann 2013, Dexter 1970) the differences in the consolidation process of party systems in new democracies.

Given that political elites mainly, but not exclusively, correspond to leaders from political parties, these actors were the main objective from which to obtain data. In particular, I sought to know the opinions of members of parliament, in particular from the lower chamber.82 Other elite interviewees were included (e.g., party staff members, local level officers, public opinion leaders) to gain a broader knowledge of the underlying narrative of the political competition in each country (Luna 2014, Thelen 1999). For each of them I prepared a questionnaire designed to cover the main hypotheses.

The questionnaire was made up of 11 initial questions. They were open-ended (semi- structured interviews), so that the conversation could flow in any direction helpful to this research. Although the whole questionnaire revolved around the research question of this thesis, only seven questions are presented in Table 3.2, for they tackled the hypotheses more directly.83 The document was designed to be understood by everybody, because elites are not necessarily experts on political science codes.

TABLE 3.2 Questionnaire (extract) N° Question Related hypothesis What are the greatest obstacles that impede voters to be more stable in their party 1 choices/preferences? Are regionalism, ethnicity, personalism or other issues matters of concern for the 2 Cleavages / proper functioning of the [country] party system? Personalism Are all the important interests in society represented in the structure of party 3 competition? If not so: Which interests are not? 4 Do parties in [country] follow the traditional left-right axis to do politics? In your opinion, leaders and common citizens alike legitimise general elections as the 5 only means to access power? Legitimacy Some people argue that citizens do not feel close to parties in [country]. Do you agree 6 or disagree? Why? How much your party should advance to become better organised and enhance its 7 Personalism internal democracy?

The areas covered in the questionnaire presented in Table 3.2 sit as close to the independent variables (statistical models) as possible, to assure consistency. The hypothesis on cleavages

82 Party system stability is operationalised in this thesis by the electoral volatility in votes in the lower chamber. 83 The complete questionnaire can be seen in Appendix B 1.1.

was covered with questions regarding obstacles for representing people’s preferences, and also specific questions about the existence of certain cleavages (regionalism, ethnicity, left- right). The hypothesis on personalism is asked directly (whether personalism is a matter of concern in relation to how the party system works), and then indirectly asked in a question about the organisational strength of parties. Finally, the hypothesis on legitimacy is tackled by two questions addressing the role of elections and parties.

I stayed in each country to conduct interviews. The fieldwork lasted around 13 months between July 2012 and August 2013. I regularly visited the parliaments, as described in Table 3.3.

TABLE 3.3 Outline of the fieldwork

Chile Estonia Korea

Fieldwork period 1 January-3 April 15 July-30 December 5 April-13 August 2013 (≈ 3 months) 2012 (≈ 5½ months) 2013 (≈ 4¼ months) Main city of residence Santiago Tartu Seoul Parliamentary house level Bicameral Unicameral Unicameral House* name Cámara de Diputados Riigikogu Gukhoe [국회] Common name translation Chamber of Deputies Parliament National Assembly Parliament based in Valparaíso Tallinn Seoul * For Chile, its lower house.

It can be seen in Table 3.3 that the longest fieldwork was in Estonia (one semester), because its multiparty system demanded more attention, whereas the shortest was in Chile (one trimester), partly because of my previous expertise on its party system. In Korea, the field research lasted less than a semester with enough time to convey the interviews plan.

To assure a range of different views about their party systems, the choice of interviewees was heavily divided by partisan membership. That is to say, in this dissertation there is a deliberate purpose in giving voice to as many parties as possible, for three reasons. Firstly, in that manner I could reduce selection bias; secondly, the narrative gains depth, and thirdly, the hypotheses on cleavages and personalism are better tested if more nuances are added.84 For that reason,

84 For example, leaders of minority groups may assume that certain cleavages should be more important than others, and they may attempt to shape the cleavages, accordingly.

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in multiparty systems, like Chile and Estonia, more voices were needed than in the two- dominant party system of Korea. To define how many interviews were required relative to each case, I based my decision on the effective number of parties by seats or ENPs (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) following Gallagher’s dataset (2013). Given the Korean’s relatively small number of parties in parliament, of only 2.3 parties, fewer interviews were required in comparison to Estonia (ENPs=3.8) and Chile (ENPs=5.6). In addition to having all the important parties present in parliament included in the sample, there was a selective criterion aimed at having both the most experienced and the newest legislators alike. In that way, a different time experience observation could be taken into account, as the thesis tries to explain variation of PSI over time.

The sample strategy for each case was as follows. Firstly, from the public information provided by each lower chamber, a list of all legislators per party was made. Secondly, they were sorted by experience (longest to shortest), in order to have a balance in seniority. Thirdly, in Estonia and Korea, English speakers were selected amongst the mentioned list,85 whereas individuals in Chile were all interviewed in Spanish. After this, different strategies were used depending on the access provided to scholars by each lower chamber.86

The cut-off number of interviewees needed in each country was made following the saturation principle. Saturation occurs when the data required for research are obtained after consulting multiple sources that lead in the same direction (Bryman 2001). It is what Ritchie et al. (2014)

85 If there is any bias that this language-based selection could introduce, it should be regarding the level of education of the interviewees. However, in Estonia, where all interviews in the Riigikogu were conducted in English, 92% of its members have higher education degrees. Thus, case selection bias is expected to be minimised. In Korea, on the other hand, most of the interviews were conducted in Korean, with English translation on the spot, so no bias was expected. 86 My approach to legislators was similar: first with a formal email/letter inviting the interviewee to take part in an interview. Then different strategies were used in each country, but none is expected to have had any relevant effect on the answers received, for one main reason: elites are exposed to public inquiry (constituents, media, peers) frequently, thus they are used to answering all kind of questions from diverse audiences, regardless of how they take part in each situation. To contact Estonian legislators, I used three approaches: direct personalised emails to specific legislators (sometimes followed by phone calls), formal petitions to the party groups’ staff representatives, and direct petitions to legislators once I was inside the Riigikogu interviewing their colleagues. In Chile, initial contacts were made by email and phone calls, but the overwhelming majority were personally asked to give an interview whilst I was inside the Chamber of Deputies. In Korea, the more dense hierarchical structure of the legislators’ offices and the cultural norms and security policies required several steps in order to talk to authorities. The first step was to send personalised emails, followed by 100 personalised formal letters delivered office to office. The most efficient way to get interviewees was using the snowball system: after the first interview was conducted, the interviewee asked their personal assistant to help me contact more legislators from their party and the main rival party. Staff from other legislators’ offices subsequently contributed to assist by contacting other members, all of which was also facilitated by the active role my interpreter had in scheduling more interviews.

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call the point of diminishing returns: a larger sample size does not provide new evidence. It also implies that given the detail-oriented characteristics of a qualitative approach, each unit of data is rich in evidence and more data may work against an appropriate management of evidence overload. In Estonia, Chile and Korea the saturation point was generally reached early in the parties with the largest representation in each country. This meant that many of the interviews from the biggest parties became repetitive and did not provide substantive margins of further evidence, so the point of diminishing returns was then achieved. On the contrary, opinions from minority parties or excluded groups helped to enrich the analysis in all the countries visited.

As explained previously, in order to consider an even more nuanced approach for each case, a large set of additional elite interviews were added. This group of interviewees was much more heterogeneous to also cross-validate the outcomes of the legislators’ interviews (Table 3.4).

TABLE 3.4 Summary of elite interviews87

Current Lower Former Lower Chamber Total Lower Other elite Chamber members members Chamber interviews Total interviews

Estonia 17 7 24 14 38 Chile 24 2 26 28 54 Korea 15 2 17 14 31 Total 67 56 123

As Table 3.4 shows, I conducted 67 lower chamber elite interviews, and 56 interviews of other political elites, making a total of 123 interviews in the three countries. The country with the most interviews was Chile (26 current and past lower chamber legislators), whereas Korea was the country with the fewest interviews (17 interviewees in total). In Estonia, 24 of these interviews were made. This distribution is concordant with the characteristics of their party systems, with Chile being a country with more effective number of parties in its Cámara de Diputados than Estonia, and Estonia being a country with more effective number of parties in its Riigikogu than Korea in its Gukhoe.

The interviews with other political elites, included a former President of Chile,88 senators (only Chile), former and current high-ranking officials, party staff-members, parliament staff

87 List of interviewees are in Appendix B 1.2.

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members, local authorities and public opinion leaders were asked about the same issues that the legislators answered.

Whenever possible, the language used in Estonia and Korea was English, and in Chile, Spanish; when that was not possible, I used a translation service. Given that the core structure of the questionnaire was the same in each country and based on a rigorous translation, no language or cultural bias was expected. At the same time, the translation services were predominant in Korea, with the same interpreter working in all the interviews in Korean.89 Interviews with legislators in all three countries lasted an average of 40 minutes.

Most times, the structured questions were followed by more detail-oriented queries regarding specific matters of lawmakers and their parties. The way to interpret the answers follows a process of descriptive inference. That is to say, the interpretation of the observations (interviewees’ answers) stems from systematic and non-systematic differences (King, Keohane and Verba 1994) or, in other words, the extent to which a pattern of responses to the specified questions is repeated or not. If interviewees tend to agree or not agree with certain issues, then a pattern can be identified and described. Although descriptive inference can be important in its own right (Gerring 2012: 744) as a source of information, I use it here as evidence with which to test the hypothesis. The presence of patterns is simultaneously attained in a comparative perspective: Do cases differ or are they similar, and if so, to what extent and why? Indeed, the evidence based on descriptive inference is needed for causal inference (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 75). For this reason, the extracts of interviews I am presenting should be considered as good quality examples of the overall narrative I collected during the fieldwork. Quotations from interviewees are, therefore, representative of their expressed opinions and, where possible, of the repeated pattern detected in elite members.

The best way to neutralise degrees of bias is by treating all units and subjects with similar circumstances and opportunities. The structured part of the interviews had that aim: all interviewees were given the same questions and were guided towards the same areas. Furthermore, the number of interviewees from the legislative bodies goes hand in hand with

88 Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006). 89 The Korean interpreter was a political science doctoral student with experience in diplomatic translation. She was specially trained about this research, its potential implications, and the interview strategies and rules to be followed.

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the necessity to contrast opinions, especially from individuals of the same party. In the same vein, the addition of non-parliamentarian elites was intended to cross-check the validity of the former. Furthermore, interviewees’ responses were once again checked, this time with secondary sources (e.g., press, blogs, social media, and scholarly literature).

Right at the beginning of the elite interviews, I explicitly asked if the interviewee would prefer not to be cited as the source of the information.90 An impressive few in total from the elite interviewees preferred anonymity, and some interviewees asked anonymity only for specific comments they did not wish to be attributed to them. They were all informed that they could withdraw their names or the content of the interview at any time before the submission of this thesis and further publications. The possibility to reveal the names of the elite interviewees should be pursued by scholars, as it adds credibility to the results: the answers can be further checked by the scholarly community. For this thesis, name confidentiality applies to elite members who asked for full or partial anonymity. Audio-recording was the most common method of recording interviews. Transcriptions into document software were made in full (repetitions, stammering and marginal material were not transcribed). Audio, original sheets and digital documents are secured in a personal storage.

In summary, interviewing the elites gave this research a unique way of understanding how, and why, party systems in emerging democracies vary in the three foci of interest: cleavage endurance, personalistic politics, and the true value of legitimacy. The interviews were made in situ in each country, and all decisions about interview selection, conduction, collection, treatment, processing and analysis were made in order to reduce bias and ensure the validity and reliability of the results.

3.5.3 Population interviews

The research sub-question about the need for party systems to be legitimised in order to become consolidated requires a multiple approach. Its answer depends on the proper conceptualisation of legitimacy, but also on how the main legitimising actors—the citizens— understand the role and trajectory of political parties. The evidence to be collected, then, requires population opinions that might go beyond that which standard closed-ended survey questions can capture in any great depth (Arksey and Knight 1999, Geer 1991, Rubin and Rubin

90 Same principle was applied to prior or further email exchanges with interviewees.

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2012). Interview results also provide confirmatory results for closed-ended surveys, regardless of the different methods of collection (Harris and Brown 2010: 1). Thus, just as elites were asked directly, this thesis also directly asked the citizens.

During the fieldwork conducted in Chile, Estonia and Korea, then, I conducted population interviews. They were semi-structured (open-ended). Considering the interest for attaining people’s opinions about the necessity of parties for the political system (legitimacy), and how the said system had changed since the inauguration of democracy (variation in legitimacy, related to the variation in the consolidation of party system), I prepared a short and clear questionnaire. It was short, as the people do not usually have time (especially if they are asked to answer on the spot, without prior notice), and was made in plain language, to reduce bias related to the misinterpretation of questions. In order to channel the conversations towards the overarching hypothesis about legitimacy, three questions dealt with what, in general, the respondents think of parties and their relative importance for the democratic political system. The questions and their objectives are introduced in Table 3.5.

TABLE 3.5 Population interview original questionnaire

N. Question Objective during interview Politics understood as the whole political life, including parties, party system, elections, and the like. If people were not interested in politics, they were Is politics something of interest for you? Why? 1. encouraged to explain why and to continue answering

this questionnaire. Both interested and not interested in politics are important, to balance the sample.

Authorities mean political leaders, and in general all In your opinion, is it possible to have authorities the democratic political class. In case of a ‘Yes’ 2. without political parties? (If yes: What or who can answer, people were asked to name which replace political parties?) (If no: Why?) organisations or persons would replace parties.

Recall the times when democracy [and This broad question aims at covering an overall independence for Estonia] was regained in assessment of the political system trajectory over 3. [country]. Do you think that the political system time. Talking about political system is clearer than to TODAY is worse, the same or better than those reduce it to the party system, a concept that could be times? (If the person is too young, add: “Consider too specific and academic for most of the people. what you have been told about those times”).

The questions and objectives described in Table 3.5 were meant to offer the participants a good starting point to make their own claims. The question about the replaceable condition of parties intended to open a debate about the relevance of these organisations. Likewise, the

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question about the evaluation of the overall evolution of the political system sought to gain people’s assessment on a time variable which relates to the observed variation of the PSI.

I conducted geographically extensive fieldwork. The broader the geographic scope, the more diverse the sample could be, which is beneficial to the richness of the research question, especially considering the importance of ethnic (Estonia) and regional (Korea) cleavages. For this reason, an initial target was set for the distribution of interviews over four different cities per country. Map 3.1 reveals the planned cities for which to conduct the population interviews.

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MAP 3.1 Geographic distribution of population interviews

Source: own design using Google Maps illustrations. Maps not to scale. As shown in Map 3.1, in Chile, all planned cities (Copiapó, Viña del Mar, Valdivia, and the capital, Santiago) were visited. They represent each of the macro-regions in Chile: north, centre and south, plus the metropolitan area. In Estonia, the largest cities were covered: Tallinn (capital), Tartu and Pärnu. The exception is Narva (third largest city, pinpointed in orange in the map). Narva is relevant as 94% of its population is Russian-speaking, an ethnic

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group that represents 30% of Estonian population and should, therefore, be taken into account. However, Tallinn is also a city with a large (40%) Russian population, so it could compensate the missing Russian part of the sample. Finally, in Korea it was important to cover the two most relevant historical provinces for their influence in regional politics: Honam and Yeongnam. In both cases, their main cities were visited: Gwangju and Daegu, respectively. Balancing out that geographic diversity was especially important in Korea because of the high salience of its regional cleavage precisely based around Honam and Yeongnam, the other sample comes from the country’s capital, Seoul. In the recent past, especially during the 1980s and 1990s, the historic region of Chungheong played a relevant role in Korean regionalism.91 Although its main associated city (Daejeon) was not visited, that region’s more recent political preferences have coincided with Yeongnam—here represented by Daegu. Consequently, the planned geographic diversity was almost completely achieved during the fieldwork.

To ensure the highest possible standard of validity, I was inspired by the sampling quota selection method when choosing the respondents. This method “minimise[s] misinterpretation and encourage[s] high (if not full) response rate” (Barnett 2002: 169). Sampling quota method is the selection of random individuals based on the specific characteristics they need to meet in order to assure the diversity of the respondents. In formal surveys, this technique enables the researcher to use a desired number of individuals (the quota) when time is limited and when follow-up surveys or callbacks are not feasible (King 1983). This sampling uses subgroups or strata from which individuals are randomly selected. Given that selecting individuals to fill the quota implies a certain judgment process by the interviewer (for example, to choose a man no older than 40 can lead the interviewer to pick men of 41 by mistake), there is always a latent selection bias that the researcher needs to be aware of. At the same time, non-response is naturally absent in this kind of sampling, which also creates bias for the results (Barnett 2002: 126). Likewise, given the design and size of this sample, results are useful to complement other data but are not to be generalised for the whole population.

The sample consisted of almost 500 individuals in total, from which 30% needed to be of ages between 18 and 40, 40% between 41 and 60, and 30% over 61. The age distribution intended to capture generational differences, especially with regards to their different evaluations of the political periods before and after democracy took place, given that this thesis focuses on

91 Chungheong is the birthplace of the third “Kim” (Kim Jong-pil) (see Chapter Five).

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time variation of party system consolidation. In addition, I pursued a gender balance to mirror the gender demographic balance of the countries.

An average of 50 people per city was interviewed, with a total of 495 for all three countries studies combined. In each city the quota-like sampling was applied. The sample is described in Table 3.6.

TABLE 3.6 Sampling distribution of total population interviewees

Chile Estonia Korea Viña Age group Copiapó Santiago Valdivia Tallinn Pärnu Tartu Seoul Daegu Gwangju Total del Mar 18-25 8 7 5 5 8 3 6 6 5 5 58 26-40 15 12 10 7 9 11 13 12 12 10 111 41-50 9 14 10 9 7 11 9 10 10 10 99 51-60 10 11 10 10 9 10 5 10 10 10 95 61-75 7 6 13 5 11 8 11 11 11 13 96 75+ 1 0 2 4 6 7 6 3 4 3 36 50 50 50 40 50 50 50 52 52 51 495 Total [40%] [38%] [50%] [68%] [52%] [58%] [48%] [50%] [52%] [37%] [48.9%] Note: In brackets, female percentage of respondents per city and in total.

As it can be seen in Table 3.6, I was able to use groups from different regions, with different age cohorts and gender. Having different regions take part allows geographic variation that can give nuances based on their distance from the metropolis. Different age cohorts open generational diversity, which is important when we analyse the perceptions of time change in institutions. As for male and female distribution, female respondents account for almost 49% of the sample, closely related to the gender balance in the countries studied.

Population interviews were analysed following the same descriptive inference used with elite interviews: detection of patterns regarding individuals’ assessments of political parties and regimes. The information was then subjected to comparative analysis, in order to look at distinguishable patterns between the cases. In order to provide the necessary evidence to infer causal mechanisms for the relationship between legitimacy and party systems, I coded the data in such a way that the resulting data remained true to the core intention of the answers. To show this true resemblance, I will provide extracts of interviews that are illustrative of individual perceptions. Quotations from interviewees are, therefore, representative of their expressed opinions and often of the repeat pattern detected in elite members.

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The data collection was based on face-to-face interviews. To avoid interviewer errors (bias related to a personal reaction with the interviewer, necessity to agree with what the respondent thinks is expected of her, or on the contrary, a desire to mislead or contradict), a good selection of interviewers and interview training must be conducted. Given that interviews were conducted in different countries and regions, in three different languages, I trained undergraduate and postgraduate students to conduct these interviews under my direct supervision.92 They behaved in a polite manner, had neutral approximation to the topics, and were prepared to handle “yea-saying” responses. In all cases, the brief questionnaire was translated into Spanish, Estonian and Korean following feedback of which phrasing was most clear and appropriate for each context.

The main way to collect data was by street-corner encounters in city centres. This system was designed to preserve the random nature of the selection as much as possible, but it does not of course preclude bias. For example, some individuals of certain social classes could be more willing to visit the city centres while others prefer shopping centres, or some respondents of a certain age available at peak hours in the street may indicate they are predominantly unemployed. Thus, to introduce more variability, some sampling was also conducted in shopping centres93 (in order to reach young people), in a ‘door-to-door’ system (especially to reach elder people), and also in private and public offices (to include middle-age blue and white collars). Again, despite the fact that the objective was to introduce as many diverse opinions as possible, all of the aforementioned steps and decisions involve the potential for selection bias.

All participants were informed that they could refrain from participating in this study at any time, including the period after they provided their answers. They were all assured full confidentiality of their identities, thus their names—when given—would not be disclosed. Each respondent expressed her explicit consent either orally or in writing (signing the worksheet where her answers were annotated). In all cases, they received an informative document containing the research project’s title, researcher’s name, personal and university contact details, purpose of the interview and the participant rights. Each hand-out was written in the native language and its original English format. The questionnaires for the population

92 Fieldwork grants were used to pay small stipends to these research assistants. 93 In Estonia, for instance, less street-corner interviews were made due to cold weather at the time of the fieldwork.

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interviews were written in the native language.94 In these interviews, individuals felt more comfortable if their answers were handwritten by the interviewer instead of being audio- recorded. I keep all the answer sheets in a personal storage system.

To summarise, asking citizens open-ended questions about their own assessments of the political system, in particular of parties, allows this thesis to have a context-oriented interpretation of the research question on legitimacy. Random people could openly talk about why parties are important or not for the democratic political system in each country, and about how that same political system may have changed—if at all—since democracy began. The nuances of the answers had a value of their own, and they are in the basis of the descriptive inference needed to test the hypothesis on legitimacy. Although the method used here is certainly subject to various biases (selection being the most important), it does not aim to provide generalised results. Rather, these population interviews are relevant to contextualise other data and widen our understanding of citizens’ perceptions about parties and party systems.

The use of large N survey data, expert survey data, party leadership data, elite assessments and population opinions fit well with the necessities of the research questions. When combined, these sources of information (citizens, elites, institutions) offer multiple possibilities to test the hypotheses using regressions and comparative analysis in order to achieve more reliable results.

3.6 Conclusions

This thesis attempts to answer the question about the reasons behind the varying trajectories of party system consolidation. After all, the scale of the field of third wave democracies is global and has lasted over two decades. At the same time, the thesis follows a multi-methods approach to answer the key questions underlying the variations in the process of party system consolidation in third wave democracies. This research design attempts to mirror, in terms of complexity, the challenges posed by the research question of this dissertation.

94 Facsimiles of the questionnaires are in the Appendix C 1.

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The selection of Chile, Estonia and Korea is adequate for a most similar case style of comparison. Alongside their leading economies and high human development indicators, they have been consolidating at different levels since democracy was restored. A large quantity of time series data can help boost the explanatory power of the findings. Likewise, the primary data collated during the extensive fieldwork, provided detailed information in order to track the case paths towards party system consolidation.

Each piece of evidence can contribute to expand our knowledge of the field. Survey data provides the opportunity to generalise results, whereas the qualitative material is intended to shape our understanding of processes. Mixed method is not just a mere addition of quantitative and qualitative techniques. It is much more than the sum of those parts. Mixed method is a methodology that enables researchers to inquire with intention and extension. Consequently, it simultaneously deals with descriptive and causal inferences.

This research design is applied to the following three empirical chapters. In Chapter Four, cleavages are parsimoniously modelled as independent variables to predict party voting choice, and the results are sequentially validated with elite interviews. There, an examination of limitations of causality is considered, as well as potential issues of reciprocal causality. In Chapter Five, the comparative analysis of leaderships in party systems relies on qualitatively and quantitatively-based descriptive inference on an iterative process. And in Chapter Six, political legitimacy is critically described, measured, correlated with indicators of party system stability, and finally scrutinised through elite and population interviews.

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CHAPTER FOUR I think politics are dirty. I don’t like any political party. I mean, I don’t support the left. HIERARCHICAL ROLE OF CLEAVAGES I consider myself a centre-right supporter. Female respondent, 21. Viña del Mar, Chile. 4

4.1 Introduction

In mature democracies, voting preferences are relatively stable over time. A widespread approach to understanding how political preferences came about, in a party system, can be seen in what Lipset and Rokkan (1967) called cleavage formation (Bartolini and Mair 1990, Taylor and Rae 1970). As discussed previously, cleavages are critical conflicts in a society that latch onto organisational movements, like political parties, and in doing so gain representation.95 At the same time, for a party system to be institutionalised, it is imperative that social divides or issues are represented by political parties, because otherwise the citizens’ interests are not peacefully translated into politics. Surprisingly, the cleavage theory has not played a substantial role in explaining party system institutionalisation. In this chapter I will pursue the idea that cleavages allow the electorate to make tenacious voting decisions and will then apply this theory to developing countries. The literature on PSI has neglected the relevance of cleavages for processes of institutionalisation (Mainwaring 1999, Mainwaring and Scully 1995). I argue that in developing countries cleavages should be seen as relevant, just the same as in developed countries, and therefore their contribution to party system stability is very important. Furthermore, I believe that some cleavages, particularly those that form a major ideological orientation, are more important than traditional cleavages as factors which explain why some party systems consolidate more quickly and at a greater depth than others.

There is a sequential logic behind the necessity of cleavages. As has been highlighted previously, the party system institutionalisation process requires predictable patterns of competition. Temporary interests or sporadic leaderships that catch the attention of voters do not provide the conditions for these predictable patterns. The only way for parties to be anchored to predictable patterns of competition is by offering programmatic platforms to citizens, and for citizens to be represented by these programmatic offers. Programmes should

95 The literature on cleavages has not always rendered consistency (Deegan-Krause 2006).

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not simply be a sum of proposals. They should have consistent principles that define an organisation over time, in order for citizens to identify with them over the long-term. In the absence of cleavages, the enduring programmatic nature of parties and their relationship with voters is weak. The more parties a political system has formed as cleavages and that are electorally supported by citizens—who locate themselves on one side of the cleavage divide—, the more institutionalised that party system is likely to be. There is, however, a certain ordered logic with cleavages which shapes the degrees of party system stability.

The key contention of this chapter is that the left-right orientation plays the most significant role amongst cleavages towards the establishment of a stable party system. In this view, cleavages leading to the consolidation of a party system work in a hierarchical order. This means that whilst they are all influential, some are more relevant for institutionalisation than others. The classic (structural) cleavages such as social class,96 urban-rural, centre-periphery (including ethnicity) and religion may all contribute to the institutionalisation of party systems. I claim that another divide, the left-right schema, as a summary cleavage, has the most importance. Given the relevance of the placement of voters along a continuum from left to right (Sani and Sartori 1983), this ideological cleavage—termed as left-right cleavage—is proposed to be understood as one of the most relevant ways to interpret voters’ political orientations (van der Eijk, Schmitt and Binder 2005). Whereas I seek to demonstrate and argue for the relative importance of ideology, other scholars point to the relevance of class and religion.97 By virtue of its preponderant role of political domain organiser, my claim is that this ideological cleavage98 has to be of the highest importance for a party system to consolidate, more than any other cleavage.

96 For Marx, social class existed insofar as there was self-consciousness of its members about their class status. The manifestation of class should be materialised by means of a political organisation. For Weber, class should be considered in three different components: class in each economic group to which everyone objectively belongs to, class as a social status that involves hierarchical honours, and finally class as a political extension. For an overview of this debate see Zuckerman (1975: 233ff). I will consider Weber’s view of social class as a socio-economic group, but the class cleavage can only take effect if one follows Marx’s view (i.e., political parties embodying class representation). 97 Rose and Urwin (1969) contend that class and religion cleavages outweigh the other cleavages in their study of 17 Western democracies. Other authors also mention the relatively high preponderance of class and religion cleavages over other cleavages in a number of Western democracies (Lorwin 1971). 98 I will call this cleavage the left-right cleavage for clarity purposes. For some countries, like the United States, the continuum takes the name of progressive (or liberal)-conservative (Fuchs and Klingemann 1989). Likewise, it should be noted that the word ideology originally represents a set of values that are attached to the political domain in a more or less defined fashion. Downs defines it as a “verbal image of the good society and the chief means of constructing such a society”, and through that analysis he links it to the German term weltanschauung (briefly—and

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The explicit linkage between cleavage influence and an approach to party system institutionalisation has been advanced by Casal Bértoa (2014), who applied his results to a group of countries in Central Europe and found significant correlations. In this chapter, I will ascertain the specific impact of the left-right continuum and other cleavages on the institutionalisation process by modelling their effect on party voting preferences in general and over time. To cross-validate and contextualise the results, I interviewed political elites to understand what they think of the role of different social and political divides, and why.

4.2 Hierarchical debate

I have used the term ‘ideological cleavage’ with full awareness of its controversial implications. In works that deal with the extent to which left-right placement has derived from traditional cleavages, more often social class and religion, the left-right continuum is not called a ‘cleavage.’ In contrast, it is regularly mentioned as a schema, orientation, dimension, spectrum or, more generally, as placement or positioning, amongst others (see, for example, Fuchs and Klingemann 1989, Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, Sartori 1976, van der Eijk, Schmitt and Binder 2005)99. The naming debate is worth noting, but it is the practice of ordering the political debate alongside the left-right line which matters the most. In that practice, individuals, either from the elite or from the mass public, have coincided in a locus where each of them is placed. The locus is the political realm, and the place is everyone’s positioning within it.

The left-right scale represents a way of comprising the major political divides in a society. As such, it can be treated as a cleavage on its own, regardless of the society it is located in. In some places, therefore, one can understand the current form of left-right schema as a continuation of previous cleavages, given that they were originally linked.100 In mature

unfairly—translated as worldview). However, he also treats ideologies “as a means to power” (1957: 96-97). The ambiguity of the use of ideology or ideological means that anyone can explore either its ‘essential’ conceptualisation, or, as I do here, its practical implication as shortcut or ‘medium’ for understanding the complexities of the political domain (Fuchs and Klingemann 1989). 99 For American politics, the distinction is usually around a liberal-conservative scale (Converse 1964, Miller et al. 1976). 100 The ideological cleavage is sometimes linked to new ‘political values’, which respond to a layer of attitudes that citizens prefer over time (Inglehart 1971) and should not be understood as a replacement of the left-right continuum. The ‘Silent Revolution’ proposed by Inglehart as early as 1971 expresses how new generations were

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democracies, there seems to be an increased distance that makes the ideological schema appear more ‘autonomous’ of other original conflicts. Knutsen claims that there is an apparent divorce between the left-right scale and any social roots in advanced Western democracies: “The left-right dimension has altered from a structural class or status cleavage to an independent ideological cleavage (in a causal sense)” (1988: 349). There is, nonetheless, the possibility that new conflicts in society are being introduced into the left-right logic. In defence of the evolving nature of some cleavages, van der Eijk, Schmitt and Binder conclude that the reasons behind left-right self-placement vary from person to person, but it seems that they can no longer be directly tracked back to traditional cleavages (2005: 176):

For all kinds of reasons people may consider themselves as located on the left or on the right, and more or less outspokenly so. But they do not do so predominantly because they have a low income, or because they frequently go to church, or reasons like these (…) We can conclude that those aspects of social structure that are related to the traditional cleavages do not exert much impact on where people locate themselves ideologically between left and right.

The left-right orientation, then, can be seen as a prolongation of the traditional structural cleavages as well as of new conflicts. Whether this is totally divorced or not from the more traditional cleavages is a matter of a debate that this thesis will not seek to address. What it does endeavour to tackle however is the relevance of this aggregative cleavage in determining patterns of party system stabilisation. For these reasons I will treat the left-right cleavage as an ideological cleavage.

Given that the ideological orientation is understood in this thesis as a cleavage in its own right, especially for newer democracies, one can assume that any political system may develop it. The left-right schema, as a cleavage, represents a way of embodying divisions of any political space. Inglehart calls the left-right scale the ‘super-issue’ that represents any major conflict

assimilating new values as being more prominent to their political preferences. These observations were primarily made in industrialised Western democracies, from which Inglehart classified values from materialistic to post- materialistic based on attitudinal behaviour. Inglehart has provided more empirical sustainability to his proposition ever since. See Inglehart 1977, 1984 and 2008.

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found in (any) society (1990: 273). Other authors, like Dalton, describe left-right orientations as a conceptualisation that is not rendered into philosophical ideology (like socialism or liberalism), but as a framework that “provides a source of political identity that helps orient the individual to politics” (2010: 146, his italics). The treatment of the ideological orientation has already had the label of scale (and similar) or cleavage for some decades now.101 For this reason it is relevant to understand the logic of a left-right cleavage and its theorised superiority in the cleavage debate around party system institutionalisation.

Every society has conflicts on which differences are based. In Western European countries, the left-right divide has been traditionally decisive in understanding the underlying political differences of citizens (Butler and Stokes 1969, Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990), political parties (Castles and Mair 1984, Gaber and Hubel 2000, Knutsen 1998), or both (Converse 1975, Dalton 1985). Such a means of division should not be taken for granted, but its presence helps to organise politics. In the end, it is not a matter of a name or label, but of a spatial allocation of interests. The left-right102 axis characterised by an economic analysis of the voting decision (Downs 1957: 115ff), is no more than a spatial image of citizens’ interests in society. As Sartori points out, this dimensionality lays on a horizontal ordering of political perceptions following a “spatial archetype” (1976: 334, his italics). This means that the political space requires a certain landscape where citizens (and any political actor) can orientate themselves around certain preferences. Citizens can then identify the parties that are closer to their own preferences.103 As Sartori notes, the Downsian model’s analysis is essentially unidimensional: one horizontal line crossing the whole political landscape. However, the political debate is multidimensional, given that the interests in a society cannot be assumed to follow only one type of preference. The idea of multidimensionality leads us back to the debate on cleavages: the various dimensions in a society are conceived as conflicts that further the formation of specific political structures to which citizens are expected to form attachment.

101 The term left-right cleavage or ideological cleavage has been used in scholarships dealing with advanced democracies (e.g., Caramani 2004, Dalton 2006, Marks and Wilson 2000, Tatalovitch and Schier 1993), and also related to new democracies from all regions (e.g., Coppedge 1998, Diamond 1982, Evans and Whitefield 1993 and 2006, Harbers 2010, Kim, Choi and Cho 2008, Zucco forthcoming). 102 For a brief account on the historical roots of this linguistic division, which dates back to the French Revolution, see Laponce (1981). 103 The Downsian perspective of this relationship voter-party expects that rational voters will vote for the party closest related to the voter´s preferences.

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How could then one single and horizontal dimension—this ideological cleavage—be more important than the other dimensions in explaining political stability? To answer that question, I first need to emphasise that my claim connects cleavages with party system institutionalisation. That is to say, I am not talking about cleavages per se, but rather their roles in the consolidation of a system of political parties.104 The reasoning behind the importance of the left-right cleavage rests on the fact that multidimensionality can be volatile. In a multidimensional plane, any point can be located in any part of space, in accordance with its own dimensional position. A continuum line across the plane allows the political space to be organised in such a way that different actors can take up position, albeit coming from different dimensions. The importance, then, of the left-right cleavage is not given by its extension—or by its name—, but by its presence in the voter’s projection of the political domain. As Fuchs and Klingemann (1990) understand it, the left-right schema is a device that reduces the complex political reality.105 Consequently, the ideological cleavage is expected to work as the organising line of any political party system.

Where an ideological cleavage is well established, as in mature European democracies, the divide is usually drawn on a left-right continuum.106 The wording, however, is of less importance than the substantive relevance of the existence of the mentioned continuum. The logic indicates that if the cleavages move around a determined segment of the organising line, the voter will more easily identify and locate her party of preference. If the party shows an unclear ideological pattern—too diffused or too broad—, voters will find it difficult to locate it in the organising line. That difficulty may make having such a line appear nonsensical.

There is an additional issue to clarify before hypotheses are generated. For a party system to consolidate, it requires clear cleavages in place. This idea aims to challenge the claim of the PSI theory that traditional cleavages did not necessarily have time to develop in some newer democracies and, therefore, should not be included in their party system consolidation

104 This point is crucial, given that cleavages can be analysed in light of different perspectives. For example, cleavages can be used to explain why certain non-government organisations exist in some polities and not in others, or whether cleavages are themselves compelling variables in the scrutiny of democratisation process. To be sure: it is not an aim of this thesis to discuss any effect of cleavages other than those associated to the process of party system consolidation. 105 Alternatively, Kitschelt and Hellemans (1990) claim that the left-right’s meaning is multidimensional, as it can embed not only economic but also cultural significances. Jahn (2010) goes further and suggests that the left-right is time- and country-specific. 106 Back in the 1970s, different surveys showed that citizens from Germany, France, Great Britain, Netherlands and other countries were already able to place themselves along the left-right scale (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976).

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processes. The idea proposed here directly connects the theory of PSI with the freezing hypothesis of party systems. Given that cleavages are both a manifestation of society’s divides and its political representation, cleavages should stabilise the logic of inter-party competition. For a subset of Central European countries, Casal Bértoa (2014) shows that where cleavages are reinforcing, party systems are more institutionalised, whereas where cleavages cross-cut each other, the institutionalisation is weak. This finding suggests that the more straightforward the social divide, the more stabilising cleavages can become for party systems.

Notwithstanding the necessity of cleavages to help with the process of party system consolidation, not every cleavage may equally contribute to it. I claim that the ideological axis is indeed the most important cleavage. Much of the mainstream scholarship on cleavages was based on advanced democracies’ political evolution. Indeed, even the emergence of the Inglehart’s (e.g., 1977, 1990) set of new political values was theorised around Western evidence. It could be argued that context matters, and therefore the hierarchical proposition of cleavages would not be applicable to newer democracies. Even more so, this alternative view could consider that if younger democracies are included in the general cleavage logic, only traditional cleavages would be expected to be present just as they were present in the early formation of current mature Western democracies. On the contrary, I argue that the importance of the ideological cleavage is not given by the context, but by one intrinsic necessity of any party system institutionalisation process: stability around an organiser cleavage. As said in previous paragraphs, the best known integrator is an left-right cleavage— regardless of whether it takes the form of left-right schema, progressive-conservative or some any other comparable axis. In fact, this horizontal line plays a differentiating role in the eyes of voters. It is not about what the left (or progressive, or any other label) and the right (conservative/other label) supposedly mean, or whether they are in the vocabulary of more or less people, or whether each person understands it to be something different. It is about the simplifier effect that this organiser cleavage has on the intricate symbols the political domain is made of. Fuchs and Klingemann state that the relevance of the left-right schema is based on its powerful political decoding settings (1990: 204):

So-called ideological self-identification—measured as self-placement on a left-right or liberal-conservative scale—has considerable effects on political behaviour and political attitudes. Thus, ideological self-identification has considerable explanatory power, even though many respondents interpret or understand ideological terms at a non-

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ideological level and only a minority of citizens actively use ideological terms to classify and evaluate political issues.

This all means that even when new parties or even cleavages enter the competition arena, in well-established party systems they will tend to be oriented towards one coordinate point on the left-right continuum. For example, green movements were once seen as extra left-right- oriented parties, but nowadays are consistently placed to the left of the spectrum in Western democracies (Schmitt 2005). Likewise, a party system should be institutionalised insofar as the organising line takes place and becomes consolidated, regardless of the contextual factors for specific political systems. In other words, the context would be helpful to explain how and why the left-right continuum is formed, but that is not to say that an institutionalised party system could exist without the ideological cleavage. Last but not the least, it is also important to include in this reasoning any meaningful role that new values can be playing in the institutionalisation of party systems. Largely discussed by the works of Inglehart (e.g., 1977, 1990) and others (e.g., Benoit and Laver 2006, Karlsen and Aardal 2014), this approach considers that new underlying values in society (around moral and economic issues, mainly) also help orientate voters in their political preferences. The political values debate has been mostly theorised from Western European experience; that is to say from industrialised societies experiencing postmodern changes (Giddens 1990). Thus, its inclusion as an alternative ideological cleavage for developing countries should be considered with a note of caution.

In sum, the hierarchical cleavage debate proposed in these pages assumes that the left-right continuum should be seen as a proper cleavage, insofar it invokes self-aware social divides that are manifested in the political representation. As such, the left-right cleavage behaves as an organising line that plays a stabilising role in the institutionalisation of party systems. Other approaches, like political values, are of importance as they also can be considered an ideological cleavage, but they might be limited to societies where industrialisation and postmodern values are more anchored. It is worth nonetheless to explore the political values’ relevance for party system institutionalisation in developing countries.

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4.3 Hypotheses and expectations

Given all the preceding theoretical discussion, it is now possible to set the hypothesis claims. Acting as the organiser cleavage in a political system, the ideological cleavages are more relevant than traditional structural cleavages when the citizens inform their voting decisions.

Thus,

Hypothesis 4.1: A powerful left-right continuum is the most important cleavage in place for a party system to be consolidated.

Drawing on the previous idea, there should be a visible consolidation process in time alongside the evolution of the ideological cleavage. Thus,

Hypothesis 4.2: Where the ideological cleavage becomes more divisive over time, the stabilisation process of the party system comes quickly. Conversely, where the ideological cleavage becomes less divisive or experiences little change over time, the said stabilisation stagnates and becomes slower.

These hypotheses are all connected: the hierarchy of the cleavages is given by the premise that the ideological cleavage is the most important for the consolidation of a party system in pace (more quickly) and intensity (deeper). The outlined hypotheses lead us to relevant expectations for the cases under analysis.

If the left-right scheme is truly the defining cleavage, then it follows that the self-placement along the ideological continuum will be relevant in data bearing on party vote preference107 across the cases under analysis. Even more so, the strength of the ideological cleavage is expected to be highly relative to other cleavages, when it comes to predicting more stable patterns of party vote. It means that an operationalisation of the ideological and structural cleavages should give the former a more explanatory power than the latter when they are modelled against the party vote preferences of more stable party systems. Furthermore, I

107 Party vote choice is a better option than party preference, given that in newer democracies there is a less likely chance of having older parties—the ones that precisely allow a sense of loyal preference. Indeed, party identification is a lasting attachment of a voter to a given party, but from that it does not follow that the voter would vote for the party of his/her preference (Butler and Stokes 1969, Thomassen 1976, Thomassen and Rosema 2006). In addition, the WVS series includes questions about party vote choice more consistently than it does around party preference.

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expect a time-effect factor of the ideological cleavage: the stronger it gets relative to the other cleavages, the more consolidated the party system becomes over time.

If the hypotheses are supported, in Chile the ideological cleavage will be the strongest in relation to the other cleavages in the country, given that the Chilean party system is more institutionalised than in Estonia or Korea. The Chilean left-right divisions came from before the democratic breakdown (Valenzuela 1978) and, according to different authors, survived the dictatorial period of Pinochet in relatively good shape (e.g., Angell 2003, Luna and Zechmeister 2005, Valenzuela and Scully 1997). Conversely, in both Estonia and Korea it is expected that other cleavages are more important than the left-right placement, given their comparatively weaker state of party system consolidation. In Estonia, the ethnic divide between Estonians and Russians has been hypothesised before (Grofman, Mikkel and Taagepera 2000: 349, Ishiyama 1994, Tavits 2012) as one of the determinants which divide lines in the country’s political system. In Korea, a regional cleavage has been widely documented in the literature as the dominant factor that defines Korean party politics (Kang 2003, Kim, Choi and Cho 2008, Lee 2000).108 Thus, it is expected that in Estonia and Korea that the respective ethnic and regional cleavages will be of higher importance in relation to any other cleavage, including the ideological cleavage. Notwithstanding that both Estonia and Korea show high levels of electoral volatility, the Estonian party system has stabilised more quickly than the Korean system. This different path progress suggests that, in spite of both Estonia and Korea showing their left-right cleavages becoming gradually important (Mikkel 2006, Wong 2015), the ideological cleavage in Estonia has become more relevant than that of Korea. On the contrary, given the already strong attachment level that Chilean voters are expected to have to left-right orientation, the ideological cleavage in Chile is not supposed to have changed drastically over the last years.

4.4 Data and methods

In order to assess the hierarchical importance of cleavages in the countries under study, I will make use of two different complementary methods. In the first instance, some analysis should target the extent to which each cleavage contributes to generate party vote choice amongst voters. For this purpose, I will run some regression analyses to specifically look for models that

108 For a new view on the way the Korean political party system is getting more ideological, see Steinberg and Shin (2006)

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can better explain the association between citizens and parties, and how such association performs over time. In second place, it is important to confirm the preponderance of certain cleavages over the others, the process by which they took place, and to what extent this is also self-perceived in each country study. To assess this task, the results from the extensive elite interviews in all three cases will be featured.

4.4.1 Data

To assess the relevance of certain cleavages over others, it is necessary to evaluate the way they are translated into voting preferences. One way to look for cleavages is through aggregated indicators (e.g., percentage of population living in rural/urban areas), and the share of votes for parties (Casal Bértoa 2014). Another way is to look at the individual level, which could best capture all of the empirical and normative elements together—e.g., which social group citizens feel they belong to, and/or which attitudinal values represent them better. I will use individual level analysis because it takes into consideration nuances that aggregated analysis cannot. For instance, living in a particular region in Estonia does not indicate ethnic identity, thus aggregation could possibly confuse geographical location and ethnicity. Furthermore, given that the hypotheses look at predicting party vote, it can be seen that an individual-based analysis is much better suited.

In order to evaluate the impact of the expected cleavages on the party choices of voters, I will model the impact of different cleavages upon party vote in the three countries. Given that the research question seeks to explain changes in the institutionalisation of party systems, voters’ party vote choice is an appropriate outcome variable to be predicted by the different cleavages theorised. The more volatile the electoral support for parties, the less institutionalised they become. Consequently, the individual’s party vote is the outcome of interest here.

I used the World Values Survey (WVS) for the three countries, from waves 2 to 6. For Chile, the survey years are 1990, 1996, 2005 and 2011; for Estonia, 1996, 1999 and 2011, and Korea, 2005 and 2010.109 The dependent variable here is the vote choice of respondents for specific

109 Surveys from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) were found for Korea, given the missing data for the dependent variable in earlier periods from WVS. However, the CSES also have important missing data on key independent variables that rendered this dataset useless for this thesis.

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parties or political coalitions: “Which party would you vote for?” Only main parties are considered to simplify the results.110

In Chile the exercise was expected to be straightforward, given the coalitional nature of the government formation: two main coalitions, one in the centre right and one in the centre left, and a third set of parties in the left. In Estonia and Korea, however, the situation is different. As a general rule, all extinct parties were included as part of the main current parties if their leaders or organisations subsequently merged into one of the mentioned main parties. With that decision it was expected that voters of extinct parties would support their successors. When no merge became apparent, the extinct parties were excluded from the analysis.111

For Chile, there are three main party vote choice responses: Alliance (centre-right coalition), Concertation (centre-left coalition), and the leftist parties (sometimes in electoral coalition). For Estonia, there are four main party vote choice responses: Reform Party, Pro Patria Res Publica Union, Centre Party, and Social Democratic Party. For Korea, there are three main party IDs: Grand National Party, Democratic Party,112 and progressive parties (in general).113

The main explanatory variables consist of cleavages that the reviewed literature considers as the most relevant for all cases alike which are under study. Firstly, the ethnic (centre-periphery) cleavage is introduced, but only for Estonia, because it is the sole case with documented ethnic conflicts amongst the case studies. Here, the binary variable of ‘nationalism’ is operationalised by means of the language spoken by respondents (Estonian or Russian). Secondly, the geographic cleavage is included, which also resembles a traditional centre-periphery cleavage.

110 Alternative calculations were made considering all parties, and they showed no significant differences from the more simplified model used here. 111 In a parallel set of regressions, the excluded parties were considered in a category “Others/Independents/None”. See previous footnote about these parallel regressions. 112 When I call parties by their full name, I will translate them into English. If only acronyms are used, I kept the original form. Given the different alphabetic system, an exception is made with Korean party names, for which I will use English-based acronyms for all its parties, except Saenuri. When its name was recalled in English, interviewees usually said “GNP”, for Grand National Party, which in Korean is Hannara—the name of the party before Saenuri. Thus, in some parts of this thesis this party will be called GNP and in other parts, Saenuri. 113 In the 2010 survey in Korea, the option ‘others’ was chosen by an impressive 28.1% of the valid answers. To discern if there is a hidden choice, I sort out the option by different regional preferences —as it was shown to be a relevant predictor for the traditional parties. Surprisingly, the category “other” was chosen by roughly one third of respondents in each region, which makes this option difficult to handle in light of the most traditional parties. Another note of caution should be made regarding the lack of answers ‘none’ and similar. Given that the missing cases for the question in both years are a few (10 cases in 2005 and 39 in 2010), it is possible that the category ‘other’ also included the aforementioned ‘None’ option. I have taken it as ‘constant’ given that it does not interfere in the main partisan voting preferences.

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Here, the variable ‘regions’ is a categorical and consists of 4 or 5 historical regions of the countries, either geographically or culturally divided.

Thirdly, in order to test an alternative measure of ideological orientation, it was additionally considered to capture “political values”. As mentioned previously, its importance derives from the fact that underlying political values can relate to ideological positioning (Benoit and Laver 2006: 62) and party vote choice (Karlsen and Aardal 2014). Using principal components analysis (PCA) of questions regarding values, two variables about moral and market values were identified and added. For moral values, questions about respondents’ tolerance on homosexuality, prostitution, abortion, divorce, euthanasia, suicide, soft drugs use, adultery, sex before marriage, were analysed. For market values, respondents’ views on inequality, state ownership, individual responsibility, competition and hard work, were considered.114 Another variable is the respondent's postmaterialist values, which takes the Inglehart index of four values of materialism/postmaterialism especially anchored in postmodern societies. Those who weigh values such as freedom of speech or political participation higher than issues related to inflation or crime are considered postmaterialist; otherwise, they are considered materialist. The index ranges from 1 (mostly materialist) to 3 (mostly postmaterialist), with 2 as a mixed category. The inclusion of this index also works as a measure for values orientation in post-modern societies. To summarise this paragraph, the ideological cleavage of ‘political values’ includes the variables of moral values, market values and postmaterialism.

The final variable measures the self-positioning of respondents in the left-right schema, based on the question: “In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?” The scale ranges from 1 to 10, being 1 the extreme left and 10 the extreme right. For this prime ideological cleavage, the variable is simply called left-right (L-R).115

114 PCA calculations, variable selection processes and factor loadings are documented in Appendix D 1. 115 To check for problems of multicollinearity for the ideological cleavages (i.e., L-R and the political values variables, and between moral/market values with post-materialist variables), a series of correlations were conducted for all years analysed. For Chile, Pearson’s r for L-R/Moral values = 0.11; L-R/Market values = 0.13, and L-R/Post- Materialist = -0.14 (all significant at .001 level, 2-tailed); Pearson’s r for Post-materialist/Moral values = -0.10 (significant at .001 level, 2-tailed); Post-materialist/Market values = 0.01 (non-significant). For Estonia, Pearson’s r for L-R/Moral values = 0.09; L-R/Market values = 0.12, and L-R/Post-Materialist = -0.08 (all significant at .001 level, 2-tailed); Pearson’s r for Post-materialist/Moral values = -0.07 (significant at .001 level, 2-tailed); Post- materialist/Market values = 0.00 (non-significant). For Korea, Pearson’s r for L-R/Moral values = -0.20; L-R/Market values = -0.14, and L-R/Post-Materialist = -0.18 (all significant at .001 level, 2-tailed); Pearson’s r for Post- materialist/Moral values = -0.12 (significant at .001 level, 2-tailed); Post-materialist/Market values = -0.02 (non-

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Control variables are those that are kept constant because they are always expected to affect both the dependent and independent variables. Most of the socio-demographic control variables here are the usual ones used. Age looks for changes in responses as people get older; age squared tries to capture any curvilinear age effect; gender seeks to gain differences between male and females, and educational level looks for variations in the degree of formal education of respondents. Two other control variables were added in order to represent structural cleavages. Firstly, religiosity is operationalised as the frequency to go to church (religious people are those attending church at least once a week). I included the religious variable as a control because the literature does not give special prominence to it in any of the three countries. Secondly, I added social class here and this was categorically divided in three (lower, middle, higher). Social class is included to test all of my expectations here, since the left-right cleavage is predicted to be the strongest, even if social class is included as a control.116

In Table 4.1, the first two columns show the variable name and its brief description. The next column shows the range of values the variable takes. When necessitated, the specific values of the range (e.g., parties and countries regions) are explained in the table footnotes. The right hand columns indicate the mean of the values of each variable, as well as their standard deviations, per country. From there it can be seen, on average, that respondents from the three countries are of a similar age (around 42), are better educated in Korea, are more identified with the lower class in Estonia, are less religious in Estonia, and feel a similar pride for their country in all three cases. In Estonia, most respondents would speak Estonian at

significant). The results indicate that there are no apparent problems of multicollinearity between the analysed variables. It is worth to note that results are aggregated, because my focus—as I will emphasise later—is on the overall goodness-of-fit of each model. 116 The inclusion of social class as control variable can be debatable, given its traditional association with the left- right continuum. To discern any problems, I have conducted OLS regressions in all three countries for all elections inclusive from 1990 with the left-right schema as dependent variable and the three social classes as independent variables. In Chile, coefficients for social class are relevant and highly significant, although the model’s adjusted R2 is only 2%. In Estonia, coefficients are less relevant compared to Chile, yet still significant, albeit difficult to interpret (upper social class is more leftish than lower class); the model’s adjusted R2 is only 0.4%. In Korea, coefficients are irrelevant and insignificant, and the adjusted R2 of the model is irrelevant. At most, the peril of adding social class as control variable is ‘over controlling’ considering that the ideological cleavage is later added as an explanatory variable. Yet, the OLS regression results show that there is no real concern here to be made aware of. In any case, over controlling is the most conservative approach to consider to what extent other cleavages, and especially the ideological cleavage, are relevant to confirm or reject the hypotheses. It means that results can be even more meaningful if, after over controlling for class, models with L-R variables still show high levels of goodness-of-fit. OLS regressions’ coefficient results are displayed in Appendix D 2.

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home. In terms of regional composition, Chile was divided into four macro-regions and Estonia into five, in both cases upon geographical considerations. In Korea the five regions are both geographically and culturally different. As for moral and market values, PCA results indicate that, on average, the three countries are similar, with the exception of Estonia for market values (more state-oriented). The three countries are similarly postmaterialist (1.9 for Chile, and 1.6 for Estonia and Korea). Finally, on average, respondents from these countries located themselves at the centre of the 1-10 left-right scale, with Chileans closer to the centre (5.2) than Estonians (5.4) and Koreans (5.5)—providing a similar standard deviation of around 2 for all cases.

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TABLE 4.1 Descriptive statistics

Variable Description Range Mean Chile Estonia Korea GNP, 1-3 [C] Alliance, ER, IRL, DUP, Parties (actual) a Main parties/coalitions 1-4 [E] Concertation, EK, SDE Prog. 1-3 [K] Left parties parties 18-93 [C] 43.3 42.3 Age Age 17-93 [E] 41.0 (16.4) (16.6) (14.5) 19-91 [K] 4.2-9.6 [C] Age Squared Age Squared 4.4-9.5 [K] 6.3 (1.3) 6.5 (1.3) 6.4 (1.1) 4.1-9.6 [E] Gender Male and female 0-1 .5 (.5) .5 (.5) .5 (.5) Educ_Level Highest educational level 1-3 1.8 (.7) 2.1 (.7) 2.5 (.6) SocialClass Social Class (subjective) 1-3 2.2 (.7) 1.8 (.6) 2.1 (.7) Frequency of church Religiosity attendance (weekly 0-1 .7 (.4) .9 (.3) .7 (.5) attendance or otherwise) Pride for the country (not Nationalism 0-1 .9 (.3) .8 (.4) .9 (.3) proud or proud) Language spoken at home: Ethnicity 0-1 [E] N/A .4 (.5) N/A Russian (0) or Estonian (1) 1-4 [C] Respondent region of Regions b 1-5 [E] N/A N/A N/A residence 1-5 [K] Attitudes towards values such (3.16)-1.25 [C] as homosexuality, abortion, Moral values (3.46)-2.11 [E] .01 (1.0) .00 (1.0) .01 (1.0) suicide, euthanasia, (3.45)-1.66 [K] prostitution Attitudes towards values such (2.47)-2.77 [C] Market values as competition, property, (3.39)-2.54 [E] .00 (1.0) .00 (1.0) .00 (1.0) individual responsibility (4.16)-2.33 [K] Postmaterialist Index 4-items 1-3 1.9 (.8) 1.6 (1.0) 1.6 (.6) L_R Scale Left-right scale 1-10 5.2 (2.1) 5.4 (2.0) 5.5 (2.1) 1996, 1990, 1996, 2005, Years (actual) Survey years 1990-2011 1999, 2005, 2011 2010 2011 N (listwise) 3535 5494 2395 [C] = Chile; [E] = Estonia; [K] = Korea In country columns, standard deviations are in parenthesis. a In Chile, Alliance comprises UDI, RN and UCC; Concertation comprises DC, PS, PPD and PRSD, and Left, PC and PH. In Estonia, IRL includes I and ERK; Centre includes Arengupartei; SDE includes ERL, RM, VEE, EME, RE, EKRE, W, ESDP, W, ERL, EPL. In Korea, GNP goes for LFP and ULD; Democratic goes for U, MDP, DUP 2007, UNDP, DP 2008, DUP, NPAD; Progressive parties goes for DLP, UPP, NPP. See pages 23-25 for all acronyms. b Chile is divided in four regions: North (From Regions of Tarapacá [old] to Coquimbo), Centre (from Valparaíso to Maule), South (from Biobío to Los Lagos [old]) and Metropolitan (Great Santiago). Estonia is divided in five regions: North West (including Tallinn), West (including Pärnu), Centre (including Rakvere), North East (including Narva), and South (including Tartu). Korea is divided upon five traditional regions: Honam (including Gwangju and both Jeolla), Yeongnam (including Daegu, Busan, Ulsan and both Gyeongsang), Chungheong (including Daejeon and both Chungcheong), Sudogwon (including Metropolitan Seoul), and Yeongdong. Source: World Values Surveys

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4.4.2 Methods

To evaluate the potential contribution of cleavages, I will follow a sequential procedure (stepwise method), with the theoretically weakest expected variables presented first, and the strongest presented last. The addition of variables is not cumulative: each model tests only the baseline control variables plus each set of independent variable(s). As it is outlined below, the control variables alone will be in a set called the Baseline Model. The other different models are numbered from (1) to (4). A final model (5) will add all the control and independent variables together. The reference category in each country’s dependent variable will be party or bloc, which are considered to be the most right-wing in that country. Thus, for Chile it will be Alliance,117 for Estonia it will be the Reform Party, and for Korea the Grand National Party.118

The six models per country per year (country-year) are as follows:

(0) Baseline model. Only control variables included119

(1) Nationalism + control variables (only tested for Estonia)

(2) Regional + control variables

(3) Political values (Moral Values, Market Values, Postmaterialism) + control variables

(4) Left-right + control variables

(5) Final model: Models 1 + 2 + 3 + 4

Following the hypothesis, it is expected that the model (4) will be of higher relevance for the case of Chile than for Estonia and Korea, given the higher Chilean levels of party system consolidation. At the same time, it is also expected that the same ideological cleavage will be increasingly relevant for Estonia compared to Korea, considering that the party system institutionalisation process in Estonia has occurred faster than in Korea. Model (3) should be

117 This coalition bloc has two parties: Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and National Renewal (RN), as of 2014. 118 Grand National Party (Hannara-dang) kept its name between 1997 and 2012. Since February 2012, its name is New Frontier Party (Saenuri-dang). 119 In Chile 1990, the variable for educational level is missing, so it could not be included as a variable in the regression analysis for that year. In Estonia 1996, Religiosity is excluded for its extremely low variance. Religiosity is not considered a rival hypothesis for the case of Estonia, given its highly secular society (Norris and Inglehart 2011: 62, 122). Thus, taking this control variable out of this model should not cause any significantly different results.

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more important for Chile than for the other two cases as well, and more important for Estonia than for Korea, because political values should be more significant in relatively more established party systems of postmodern societies.

It is also expected that the models (1) and (2) will be of higher explanatory power for Estonia and Korea, respectively, given the theory assumptions of a highly divided ethnic society in Estonia and the deep geographic divide in Korea.

For the dependent variable, the total number of parties to be included was reduced in order to obtain meaningful results.120 Each party or bloc includes any related predecessor with a different name. The dependent variable is categorical (each different main party/coalition vote choice). Considering the measurement level of the dependent variable, I performed multinomial logistic regressions.

Some authors (van der Eijk et al. 2005, Franklin and Renko 2013) have criticised the use of multinomial logistic regressions and other probit models used to test party choice. They mainly claim that these techniques would misrepresent smaller parties, so results could involve ecological fallacy. This is not the case here. I am not interested in the voting choices of the citizens for particular parties, but on the mechanisms behind their votes in general. With these logistic regressions, then, I look forward to understanding the explanatory power of models based on structural and ideological cleavages. For this research is not of high importance to identify causal relationships between the independent variables and specific voters’ choices, but to assess the underlying reasons of voters to choose any party/party bloc. In summary, I am interested in comparing model fits.

In looking at the abovementioned variables, the final full model (5) is expressed with the following equation:

120 Without that refining process, the dependent variable could have had too many categories (as many as the parties mentioned) to resort meaningful results. Consequently, a parallel group of regressions were run to include one new category in the dependent variable: preferences for other parties, for independents, and for no parties at all (‘None’). Yet to vote for a party different from the main ones is different than to declare no party at all, they are put together to capture the preference of voters who are not aligned into the most common choices in a given country-year. I also ran different regressions that included categories ‘others/independents’ and ‘none’ taken separately. All of these different groups of regressions showed results that do not differ from the main analyses when they are put together.

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푃푟 (푌 = 푝푎푟푡푦) 푃푟 (푌 = 푝푎푟푡푦′) = 훼 + 훽 퐴푔푒 + 훽 퐴푔푒푆푞푟 + 훽 푆표푐퐶푙푎푠푠 + 훽 퐸푑푢푐퐿푒푣푒푙 + 훽 푅푒푙𝑖푔𝑖표푠𝑖푡푦 1 2 3 4 5 (2) + 훽6푁푎푡𝑖표푛푎푙𝑖푠푚 + 훽7푅푒푔𝑖표푛푠 + 훽9푀표푟푎푙 + 훽10푀푎푟푘푒푡 + 훽11푃표푠푡푚푎푡푒푟𝑖푎푙𝑖푠푚 + 훽 퐿푒푓푡_푅𝑖푔ℎ푡 + 휀 12

where party is the party /coalition vote choice and party’ is the reference party/coalition121

I have suggested to analyse five models for the three case studies in order to compare the importance of given cleavages for their party system. The following pages will introduce the results of the multinomial regressions’ goodness of fit and, subsequently, what are the cleavage patterns over time.

4.5 Regression results

Firstly, I will present the results for all the models per country and per year. They will provide a first approach on cleavage contribution to party voting choice as a way to understand how cleavages can indeed assist or not to help build party system stability. Further on, a unique introduction of the effect of time on cleavages over party system stabilisation is presented. There, using the same multinomial logistic regressions, survey years are now pooled per country. That way, time can become a variable. To refine the potential effect of time on the most relevant cleavage—the left-right dimension—, an additional model includes interaction effects between time (year) and ideological cleavage (left-right continuum). Results will serve to test Hypothesis 4.2, which claims that where the ideological cleavage gets stronger over time, the stabilisation process of the party system comes more quickly.

4.5.1 Cleavage contribution

Tables 4.2 to 4.4 show the pseudo R2 values for each model per country, per survey year. Pseudo R2 values presented here are McFadden,122 considered the most conservative test to assess model’s goodness-of-fit (Pollock 2014: 145), but at the same time the one that most closely resembles the R2 of linear regressions both conceptually and mathematically (Menard

121 All others are depicted in Table 4.1. For Estonia, β6.5Ethnicity is added. 122 McFadden pseudo R2 is a transformation of the likelihood ratio statistic. It is computed as (1-ratio of the log likelihood of the full model)/log likelihood of the intercept.

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2000: 20).123 In each table, the pseudo R2 value with the most significant model contribution (apart from the final model that considers all of the variables together) is in bold.

TABLE 4.2 Cleavages contribution to Chilean party vote choice§

0 1 2 3 4 5 Baseline Nationalism Regional Political Left-right Full /ethnicity cleavage values cleavage 1990 .035 .042 .046 .100 .180 .233

1996 .036* .041** .059** .084 .229 .267

2000 .055 .057 .077 .102 .337 .365

2005 .027† .042* .053** .053* .317 .401

2011 .056 .063 .072 .100 .339 .401

§ McFadden pseudo R2 values of the multinomial logistic regressions p-values of likelihood ratio tests are all <.001, unless in ** (<.01), * (<.05) or † (not significant).

TABLE 4.3 Cleavages contribution to Estonian party vote choice§

0 1 2 3 4 5 Baseline Nationalism/ Regional Political Left-right Full ethnicity cleavage values cleavage 1996 .080 .153 .141 .114 .118 .216

1999 .068 .114 .104 .090 .120 .171

2011 .036 .224 .095 .074 .098 .266

§ McFadden pseudo R2 values of the multinomial logistic regressions p-values of likelihood ratio tests are all <.001

123 Pseudo R2 using the other most common methods, Cox & Snell, and Nagelkerke, are presented in Appendix D 3. Detailed results of the multinomial regressions are in Appendix D 4.

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TABLE 4.4 Cleavages contribution to Korean party vote choice§

0 1 2 3 4 5 Baseline Nationalism Regional Political Left-right Full /ethnicity cleavage values cleavage 2005 .034 .035 .107 .040 .041 .122

2010 .046 .057 .150 .085 .111 .262

§ McFadden pseudo R2 values of the multinomial logistic regressions p-values of likelihood ratio tests are all <.001

The expected importance of certain cleavages over others can be observed for all three countries. In Table 4.2, for Chile, the model that tests the ideological self-placement (4) contributes the most to the fit of the final model (5). Indeed, model (4) can be three times more powerful in explaining the vote than any other previous model. Moreover, the variable of left-right self-placement is statistically significant at p<.001 every time it is tested in every model for Chile. Other models are worthy of consideration too, such as the one based on political values (3) and the model based on regional differences (2), yet neither come close to the ideological L-R cleavage.

As expected, in both Estonia and Korea the ideological L-R cleavage is not the most important cleavage—at least not consistently. Confirming the hypothesis claim, for Estonia (Table 4.3) the ethnic cleavage appears to be more relevant in explaining party votes. The Estonian/Russian divide is therefore the first variable to look at when Estonia is analysed, but in its case the situation is more complex. The regional cleavage is also relevant, probably because the ethnic lines can also be traced territorially. Thus, a caution note should be raised here: models (1) and (2) could be measuring something similar.124 But even more interesting, the models that test political values (3) and ideological cleavage (4) are not far behind. Albeit they are models that contribute less to the general fit of the final model (5), both are not irrelevant, and even for 1999 the ideological cleavage scores slightly higher (12% of fitness) than the ethnic cleavage (11.4%). Indeed, these results show that there is also an ideological cleavage in Estonia that may require some more time in order to become stronger. It can also

124 I have kept them separate, because for Korea the regional cleavage itself is of major relevance. Thus, both models are considered separately in order to draw meaningful country comparisons.

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explain why the party system stabilisation in this country, measured through electoral volatility scores, has improved so quickly in the last elections.

On the other hand, for Korea (Table 4.4) there is little doubt that the regional cleavage persists in being the overwhelming factor to explain vote choice. Yet, the regional cleavage seems to have worked better previously than during the latest period (data up to 2010). Students of Korean politics agree that during the 1990s regionalism was the main driving electoral force, alongside personalism. In the most recent dataset, of 2010, some ideological cleavage emerged, which seems to have occurred in conjunction with a trajectory of party system stabilisation that has taken place in the country.

The difference between Estonia and Korea may, therefore, not be one of trajectories, but one of intensity and speed. Both party systems are getting more stable over time, but the Estonian party system is getting more institutionalised at a faster pace than the Korean party system. Furthermore, both are still far behind the less nuanced and rather more stable trajectory of the Chilean party system.

4.5.2 Cleavage contribution over time

To demonstrate whether there is a time effect in the importance of the main ideological cleavage—i.e., is the left-right continuum becoming more relevant over time?—, the data have been pooled. Again in a multinomial logit regression, now all of the years per country-survey are included. The earliest year is in the reference category. I aimed to see whether there was a time progress in the ideological L-R cleavage within the case studies. In doing so (see Tables 4.5 to 4.7), I have also introduced a variable of interaction effects between time (year) and the L-R cleavage (left-right placement). Chi-squares values have been obtained to show the difference between observed and expected frequencies. Only full models (5) are computed.

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TABLE 4.5 Multinomial logistic regression brief results: Chile Chi-square values

2000 2005 2011 Interacting Interacting Year Interacting Year With Year Year and LR With Year and LR With Year and LR Age 0.21 0.25 0.00 0.01 1.74 1.63 AgeSqr 0.19 0.22 0.02 0.05 1.86 1.73 Gender 0.56 0.63 1.19 1.20 5.07 4.95 Education Level 2.15 2.08 6.60 6.62 5.51 5.49 Social Class 10.18* 10.11* 6.49 6.70 7.85 7.94 Religiosity 0.52 0.48 0.75 0.82 0.65 0.63 Nationalism 0.87 0.87 12.48** 12.62** 0.69 0.61 Regions 4.11 4.28 13.19* 13.26* 14.73* 14.79* Moral values 9.39** 9.68** 8.77* 8.36* 9.63** 9.27** Market values 1.91 1.93 9.38** 8.74* 6.19* 5.47 Postmaterialism 23.67*** 23.65*** 15.43*** 15.94*** 8.87* 8.86* Left-right 332.16*** 0 301.98*** 0 261.45*** 0 Year † 21.26*** 6.27* 0.05 1.57 3.00 1.20 Year x LR 0.59 1.99 1.86 † Years are 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2011. Year 1996 is base category. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

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TABLE 4.6 Multinomial logistic regression brief results: Estonia Chi-square values 1999 2011

With Year Interacting Year and LR With Year Interacting Year and LR Age 5.46 5.46 1.41 1.53 AgeSqr 4.05 4.05 1.38 1.48 Gender 1.85 1.85 0.84 0.84 Education Level 5.88 5.88 12.28 11.70 Social Class 6.80 6.80 15.99* 15.53* Religiosity 4.57 4.57 0.57 0.57 Nationalism 5.71 5.71 11.55** 11.23* Ethnicity 44.70*** 44.70*** 197.32*** 202.70*** Regions 19.03 19.03 9.51 9.73 Moral values 0.87 0.87 1.66 1.71 Market values 7.06 7.06 8.33* 8.56* Postmaterialism 7.06 7.06 2.92 2.78 Left-right 11.95** 0 61.61*** 0 Year † 0 0 37.87*** 23.71*** Year x LR 0 0 11.22** † Years are 1996, 1999 and 2011. Year 1996 is base category. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

TABLE 4.7 Multinomial logistic regression brief results: Korea Chi-square values With Year Interacting Year and LR

Age 12.54** 12.49** AgeSqr 10.71** 10.57** Gender 5.48 5.58 Education Level 7.07 6.80 Social Class 9.10 8.84 Religiosity 2.87 2.85 Nationalism 6.82* 6.61* Regions 321.25*** 318.33*** Moral values 14.19** 13.55** Market values 2.43 1.86 Postmaterialism 28.76*** 26.79*** Left-right 81.95*** 84.07*** Year † 15.91*** 15.21*** Year x LR 19.30*** † Years are 2005 and 2010. Year 2005 is base category. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

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Table 4.5 shows no meaningful differences in the left-right continuum preferences for Chile over time. Country-years 2000, 2005 and 2011 are compared to 1996, and in this time span the ideological relevance for understanding cleavages in Chile is stable.125 Changes are more visible in other variables, such as postmaterialism and especially moral values, all of which denote a change in values in Chile over 15 years. One can interpret this as the result of a strong ideological left-right cleavage that has been in place for a long time, even before the dictatorial period. These results appear to confirm the expectation that in Chile the strongest cleavage is ideological and has been in place as such for a long time, rendering substantive evidence to the relationship between ideological strength and party system stability.

In the case of Estonia (Table 4.6), the ethnic divide is confirmed as the most relevant in the years under analysis. In both models pooling by year and with interaction effects between year and left-right placement, ethnicity kept growing in significance in years 1999 and 2011 when compared to 1996. For Korea (Table 4.7) something similar can be said about its regionalism. Although only one year (2010) could be compared to the base year (2005), the significance of regionalism is overwhelming. Considering that these results in Korea are recent, it is reasonable to assume that regionalism was even more prominent during the 1990s. Rather than diminishing its impact over time, it seems that regionalism is prevalent as an indicator of the way in which Korean politics perform. On the other hand, the cases of Estonia and Korea show significant time effects in the L-R cleavage. Although the ethnic and regional cleavages are confirmed as powerful elements for which to better understand the respective countries’ party systems, the left-right continuum shows significant changes over time. This means that in both Estonia and Korea the ideological cleavage is being introduced into the political camp, but at a very timid pace and from a distance. In any case, the advance of the L-R cleavage is consistent with the gradual stabilisation of the political party system in both countries. This all provides evidence to confirm the hypothesis that party system institutionalisation grows at a

125 Both for the cases of Chile and Estonia, the coefficients for L-R and even year come down to zero. These results could be of concern if they were final regression models’ coefficients, but not necessarily for these tables summarising chi-square values. The likelihood ratio-test compares the final model (i.e., the models with all the variables) with a model that does not include the respective parameter. It shows that if by including the variables, the fit is improved. In the case of Chile, L-R is part of the LR_scale*year so the LR_scale alone does not add any extra degrees of freedom to the final model, and thus the chi- square cannot be computed. In the case of Estonia, the year is constant across all cases (there are valid observation only for 1996), hence the effect of year is impossible to estimate.

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slower pace in places where the ideological cleavage contribution increases at lower rates, and where other cleavages are more influential for conducting politics.

In summary, the claim that the ideological L-R cleavage plays an important role in the pace and depth of institutionalisation is confirmed, as seen by looking at how this cleavage in Estonia is becoming more important relative to Korea. In both cases, however, other cleavages are still more relevant. Likewise, these results confirm that the Chilean party system is relatively highly institutionalised given the more important role of the ideological dimension in the cleavage hierarchy. Such ideological preponderance has been high over the years of democratisation.

The results of the quantitative models provide fundamental evidence about the contribution of cleavages to PSI, and confirm the claims that the ideological cleavages play a more important role than other cleavages towards institutionalisation. Do these results, taken from the perspective of citizens, have a correspondence when they are tested with the views of the major political actors? Next I will aim to show how the political elites ponder the role of cleavages.

4.6 Cleavage hierarchy for political practitioners

Political practitioners are simultaneously shapers and witnesses of the effect of the vote on cleavage formation, and vice-versa. For their unique position in party systems, legislators, government representatives and party staff members can provide meaningful insights into how parties develop strategies aimed at attracting voters, and why they choose some messages over others. That is to say, political elites are the mirrored side of the voters, so the choices (and actions) of the latter are expected to be responded to by the actions (and choices) of the former. When this circuit works best, party systems are more stable and predictable. When what voters want is not well matched by what parties offer, the circuit weakens and the party system is less stable.

The regression models highlight the way that voters support parties and what lies behind the citizens’ decisions. For each country, outcomes show that the hypothesised set of assumptions are confirmed: where the electoral volatility is low, the attachment of voters to parties is more dependent on ideological cleavages, including political values; where the mentioned volatility is high, such attachments are diverted to other cleavages. Likewise, where the electoral volatility is stabilising faster and steeper, the ideological cleavage is also getting more

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prominent over time. Whereas, where the electoral volatility gets lower at slower pace, the ideological cleavage is less relevant in explaining party voting choice.

Voters’ behaviour confirms the hypotheses, but is that also the case when the political elites are examined? Are political elites aware of any cleavage’s order of importance, or do they not consider cleavages a relevant factor to engage voters? A series of topics will be analysed. Each theme covers one specific cleavage relevant for the case studies. Three big topics will be scrutinised using the elite interviews: ideological L-R cleavage, ethnic cleavage, and regional cleavage.

4.6.1 Ideological cleavage

The hypotheses suggest that where ideological divisions are in place, voters’ linkage with given political parties is more persistent over time. With longstanding relationships, party systems become more consolidated and less electorally volatile. This ideological cleavage here is the polarised continuum that goes from left to right—according to the most classic reference. Although left and right can adopt more specific meanings and adaptations upon each polity, the general idea is that voters identifying themselves with the left will also identify (with) leftist parties, and voters identifying themselves with the right will identify (with) rightist parties. Those in the middle should be able to locate the centre (either centre-left or centre- right) parties, and place themselves accordingly. Thus, this cleavage is not supposed to be framed with an exact and universal meaning scale. What it represents is the balance on which voters move their preferences from one extreme to the other usually between the most liberal and the most conservative values and attitudes.

Amongst the three countries under study here, in Chile the vast majority of respondents perceive that the left-right ideological placement plays a huge role for understanding local politics. In Estonia and Korea, alternately, the same placement is thought to be more an issue of Western politics.

Chile

The common ground for the vast majority of interviewees is that the ideological cleavage in Chile has been in place for a long time. Most people can trace it back to the pre-authoritarian period (pre-1973), in line with the works of Valenzuela (1978) and Valenzuela and Scully (1997). These accounts argue that the establishment of traditional cleavages in Chile mirrored the

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party system formation in Europe. And, as in Europe, cleavages have changed and do not necessarily follow the same structures as when they framed the origins of party systems.

In Chile we have had a typical and stable left-right structure of organisations. However, its composition cannot be understood as it was in the past. In the 1930s and 1940s all the working class were Socialist or Communist. In Valparaíso, for instance, workers were all part of the Socialist Party machine. In Magallanes,126 once ranches were created, all their workers became Socialist almost by default. Today they do not. This all changed after the dictatorship period. Social classes changed. These old political cultures did not reproduce culturally, but generationally. So today the left-right scheme does not necessarily mirror social class—but it mirrors other values or interests. If you look at working-class neighbourhoods, they now think they got out from poverty due to their own efforts and means, and they become individualistic. Marcelo Schilling, Deputy, PS. January 2013

There is a widespread view that the limits between left and right are getting blurred over time. According to right-wing politicians, this phenomenon is not necessarily bad for the system, because it would mean that the society is showing more agreements on major issues.

Parties do follow the left-right axis. However, the border between left and right is becoming less rigid. Our proposals and political views have more meeting points, and I think that is positive for the country. Look at the American system: they are polarised and then the country is worse off. I do not support extreme pragmatism, but we must be able to accept good ideas from the other side. Edmundo Eluchans, Deputy, UDI. January 2013

Legislators in the Christian Democracy (DC) feel well-placed at the centre of the spectrum. However, there is a sense of struggle in where the party is heading to. According to some interviewees, parties like the DC have been emptied of ideological content. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the cleavage axis no longer applies; on the contrary, parties accommodate themselves to respond to new generational demands.

126 Region in the extreme south of the country. It has a large sheep farming industry.

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Almost all parties follow that axis to do politics. It could be possible that in some parties, like the PPD [Party for Democracy], such a difference is less pronounced. Even in my party [Christian Democracy] there is some mix, with some fighting whether we are more centre-left or more centre-right. Things are changing. They change slowly, though. Gabriel Ascencio, Deputy DC. January 2013

In local politics, the ideological cleavage is more important—and apparent—for practitioners on the left more so than other orientations. The Communist Party (PC) is identified as the most polarised party, which in turn allows the right-wing party to stress their own identity to the other side of the spectrum.

Yes, we do politics following the ideological axis. It does not change. What happens is that some try not to show which party they belong to, or whether they are right-wing or left-wing, because they don’t want to look like traditional politicians. We in the PC vindicate our place on the left. Rosa Ahumada, city councillor, PC. March 2013

In general, according to Chilean elites, citizens use the left-right axis even if they are detaching from parties or are not consistent with the orientations of the axis. The political parties, on the other hand, are aware of the cleavage and usually move around its axis.

Estonia

Estonian elites often follow the L-R cleavage but also think that the citizens are less interested or unaware of the divide. Although there are some party efforts to strengthen this cleavage in the citizenry, especially from the social democrats (SDE), cleavage formation takes time.

Some interviewees in the right-wing Reform Party (ER) note that citizens only want government efficiency.

In everyday life you don’t notice the parties if all is ok. All this political life is mostly the life of politicians. I don’t think it’s normal for 1.3 million people to think about politics all the time. It’s not normal. It’s very good if they are not interested in politics: it means that they have no problems. Laine Randjärv, MP, ER. October 2012

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Some others believe that a lack of good political education is behind the people’s ignorance about the left-right scheme.

In Estonia it is not so clear. We have right- and left-wing parties, but voters don’t understand what the division means. Maybe it is because they believe policy making is something that happens elsewhere. People just think this: ‘If we have elections then next time there will be change.’ I’m afraid that Estonian people’s political education is quite weak. Mart Meri, MP, SDE. October 2012

Reading politics in a left-right dimension does indeed exist in Estonia, yet it is limited. It might be inchoate. Contributing to the confusion is the fact that the left-right ‘parameters’ are not the same as in Western Europe.

Two right-wing parties are Reform Party (ER) and the conservative Pro-Patria and Res Publica Union [IRL]. IRL has a very long history in conservatism. Our party also has almost as long history coming from the liberals in 1994. Liberal parties joined ER. On the left you see SDE and Centre Party [EK]. It’s very difficult to translate this into the European context. Clearly the Estonian society is very progress-oriented. Our aim is to achieve a better living standard and most of the parties compared to the European level are clearly more right-wing. SDE is more right-wing than social democrats in other countries. And we are more economic liberal than most European parties. Taavi Rõivas, MP,127 ER. October 2012

ER should be considered extreme right. I think IRL is to the right, and SDE is centre-left. As for EK, it is in the centre-right. EK is a strange party. Part of its agenda is rightist, like promises to entrepreneurs and corporations, but most of the rhetoric seems leftist. This mix pervades the whole Estonian party system. Hindrek Lootus, academic, SDE. October 2012

There is no full agreement between the interviewees as to whether an ideological cleavage is in formation or not. In general, those who identified themselves with the left, especially Social Democrats, are keen to relate Estonian politics as being increasingly ideologically rooted. SDE,

127 Starting in March 2014, Taavi Rõivas has been the Prime Minister of Estonia.

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and to a lesser extent EK members, are more willing to make ideological distinctions in the way Estonian politics is conducted in order to differentiate themselves from the liberal coalition.128 Those who place themselves on the right, in particular from the ER, tend to stress the existence of Estonian consensus about major economic and political guidelines that all parties follow, with small differences. This latter vision seems to be reinforced by the way Estonian parties are perceived at the European Union level.

There is no radical right-wing or left-wing in Estonia. We all are around the centre. The ER is the liberal party so we are more to the right. Usually IRL is further to the right because of its ‘nationalistic’ [identity]. But if you take the economic policy then we are more to the right. [What about the Centre Party?] You know, in the EU they are in the liberal wing, like us. However, if you compare them following European standards, I would say they [EK] are to the left. Andrei Korobeinik, MP, ER. October 2012

There is a major trend along the lines of the left-right narrative. From the overall responses, Estonian elites feel the left-right continuum is too narrow to be a full continuum. Too narrow here would imply that the space where political parties can move around is small, but especially small for the left. Although elites can instinctively locate Social Democrats “on the left”, most of them acknowledge that ‘left’ really means, at best, ‘centre-left’. The reason for this smaller space ought to be unearthed from the Soviet past.

The most important characteristic to the Estonian political system is that the Estonian Social Democratic Party [SDE] was not the former communist party. It was different even in Latvia, Lithuania and Hungary and other central European parties, where they had communist parties […] Sometimes people from the West do not understand that. Everywhere in the [former] Soviet Union, the social democrats were former communists but not in Estonia. Mart Nutt, MP, IRL. September 2012

128 The ER-IRL government coalition ceased in March 2014. SDE replaced IRL as the ER’s partner in government. This cabinet formation is not new to Estonian politics. If ER is considered on the rightist side of the ideological continuum, and SDE on the leftist side, such a cabinet mix illustrates that the Estonian ideological cleavage is still in inchoate state. After the 2015 elections, a new coalition government between ER, IRL and SDE was formed.

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The SDE is rather right-wing and they know it. The first thing [they were called] was Mõõdukad—Moderates. The left side is rather empty and there are lots of small right- wing parties […] The Soviet Union had a left ideology. The difference between the Soviet Union and Estonia is that we have a SDE that is amongst the most right-wing social democrats [in Europe]. Olev Raju, Tartu city councillor, EK. December 2012

The underlying explanation for the diminished ideological continuum is that a sort of leftist trauma broke up the ideological continuum before it could develop during democracy. The Soviet rule is so closely identified with the ‘left’ that parties and voters alike keep a certain distance from being too closely related to socialist or communist ideologies. According to some interviewees, the extreme right is not so popular either given its resemblance to Nazism, although there is an agreement that it is easier to have nationalistic, rather than socialist parties in Estonia.

Korea

The adoption of ideological positions seems less important in Korea than in Western societies, according to the interviewees. But it exists in an inchoate status. In the political language observed in the media and amongst the elites, the Grand National Party (GNP) is conservative, the Democratic Party (DUP) is liberal, and there is a third group who call themselves progressives and are supposedly located to the left of DUP.

You may ask “does the opposite party mean ‘left’ and the ruling party mean ‘right’?” It isn’t exactly correct. Inside the opposition party there are conservative people. In the ruling party there are progressive groups. Therefore we should not say it like an equation: the ruling party=right, the opposite party=left. Hai-jin Cho, Assemblyman, GNP. May 2013

Between the two main organisations (GNP and DUP), any ideological border seems blurred when the discussion centres on their policies. Korean politicians and scholars emphasise that this mixing reality is two-fold. On the one hand, electoral programmes tend not to differentiate except in marginal matters, unless the debate turns to attitudes about North Korea (the DUP is more open to dialogue and cooperation, whereas the GNP are less willing to negotiate). On the

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other hand, both parties have conservative and liberal wings, which means that conservatives and liberals within each party overlap each other.

In the latest local administration’s election, DUP and GNP used the common ‘social welfare’ concept for the first time since 1948. Usually ‘social welfare’ concept is used by DUP, not GNP. And lots of time GNP criticised that DUP for its use of it. Ironically, GNP borrowed the concept of ‘economic democratization’ too. So, the conflict of ideology is weak. Ideology has not sharpened edges. Seung-hee You, Assemblywoman, DUP. July 2013

In Korea, given that the country is divided into North and South, the left-right concept is different from the European one. Due to the National Sovereign Security Law, no real leftist party can exist. GNP is the conservative right. Democratic Party is just the progressive right. Eui-rak Hong, Assemblyman, DUP. July 2013

A few interviewees believe that some left-right orientation remains since the struggle for democratisation, especially during the 1980s.

We have gone through the Korean War, and before that there were many socialist-like parties. After the war, communism was banned and an anticommunist sentiment arose in South Korea. However, the principles were still in place and many social movements were partly inspired by those principles, especially after the Gwangju massacre.129 Such activist elements have still been in place in the opposition party. Tae-keung Ha, Assemblyman, GNP. July 2013

Some interviewees consider that there is a negligence of the representation of social interests. Many of them lament this with personal grievance. Assemblywoman Soon-ok Chun, for instance, became a labour activist during the authoritarian period inspired by her brother: in 1970, when he was 22 and she was just 16, he burnt himself in front of a factory as an immolation protest to the abuse of female workers.

129 Amidst the martial law declared by general Chun Doo-hwan to seize power, some 500 people protested in the streets of Gwangju on 18 May of 1980. Elite paratroopers stormed the town and murdered men, women, students and children. Some people were tortured. More killings occurred during that month. Unofficial accounts imply that 2,600 persons were killed in May 1980 in Gwangju. (Cummings 2005: 380-6).

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Labour movements brought democracy to Korea, so it is very sad to know they are invisible at the moment. No party represents the labour movement now. It’s a shame that we don’t have an important progressive political party. Soon-ok Chun, Assemblywoman, DUP. July 2013

Korean political leaders agree that the debate about the left-right dimension can be more of an elite rather than a grassroots concern. Even at the elite level, the differences between main parties do not lie in major programmatic intersections between left and right, but mostly on very specific issues. The only clear dividing line between both major parties (GNP and DUP) is drawn alongside attitudes towards North Korea.

There are obvious differences between GNP, DUP, Democratic Labour Party130 and Progressive Party. Any ideological discussion includes North Korea. In Korea, for any political party, the number one issue is seizing power and the second is the North Korean issue. In-jong Lee, assembly staff member. August 2013

Similar to Estonia, the underlying narrative in the Korean party system refers to a narrow ideological continuum. The ideological organising line is not as long as it could be, mainly due to the North Korean issue. Being leftist might mean being pro-North Korean, and any pro- North proselytism is raucously prohibited.131 Current Assemblywoman Su-kyung Lim entered North Korea in 1989 as pro-unification young leader. Upon her return to South Korea, she served 30 months in jail.

The emotional feeling for North Korea is blind and reckless. It is not healthy. It touched the emotions of the people who passed the border-line in the Korean War. These emotions are not the ‘past’ that passed over. It is still ‘on going’ and it hurts. It is countless and continuous rages. Su-kyung Lim, Assemblywoman, DUP. July 2013

130 The Democratic Labour Party was split into the Justice Party and the New Progressive Party. 131 In 2013, five members of the Unified Progressive Party were arrested upon charges of plotting a rebellion related to the Kim Jong-un North Korean regime. A year later, the constitutional court banned the party, which had five assembly-members at that time (BBC 2014).

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In deference to these deep emotions, it seems that the traumatic consequences of the Korean War and a divided nation are hard to placate. For as long as the traumatic rift remains, the expectation of having an unimpeded ideological continuum in Korea is limited.

On the whole, the elites in Chile, Estonia and Korea have outlined a clear pattern of how the ideological cleavage performs in developing democracies. The discussion in Chile revolves around to what extent parties will be placed in the spectrum, but not about the existence of the spectrum. The left-right axis is relevant for the political language of parties and representatives, even when some of them believe that citizens are not attached to ideological discourses. Thus, Chilean political elites stick to the left-right organising line when they conduct politics, but they may be less interested in stressing such differences in a campaign period, especially for local elections.

By way of contrast, in countries like Estonia and Korea the left-right division is harder to detect. When the question about left-right axis was posed, most of the interviewees initially explained that such a continuum was not especially applicable to Estonia or Korea. What they in general claim is that the left-right dimension is an axis that only makes sense in Western democracies. There are some nuanced opinions about the contextual framework for the missing cleavage, which seem to point towards traumatic events associated to ideology. However, at the elite level there are left-right political manifestations. In a top-down approach, then, they can help build this cleavage amongst citizens, but that process would take time.

4.6.2 Ethnic cleavage

Amongst the cases under study, only in Estonia were the ethnic issues highlighted by the interviewees. In Korea it was not mentioned directly, aside from a few mentions referring to international immigrants who can be considered a minority electoral force. In Chile, during the last years there has been a rise of demands and struggles from indigenous people, especially the Mapuche in the centre-south of the country. Yet, although many legislators acknowledge the existence of a conflict, they frame it as one not strong enough to be considered an issue that could give way to a new divide. In Estonia, however, ethnic lines are much more decisive in the political outcomes of parties.

Estonia

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Around 30% of the Estonian population is ethnically Russian, and the figure climbs up to nearly 40% in the capital, Tallinn. During the 1990s, there was an ethnic party that had relative success (the Russian Party in Estonia, VEE), but it did not last. Further to that, a new strategy by the Centre Party (EK), led by Tallinn mayor Edgar Savisaar, contributed to gather the Russian votes.

EK is popular amongst Russian speakers. That party is all about its leader, Edgar Savisaar, and because Russians like him, they vote for his party. He went actually out for the Russian vote much earlier than other major parties. For the supporters the leader is something very important. Sven Mikser, MP, SDE chairman. November 2012

In the words of many interviewees from different parties, Savisaar gave voice to this large minority. The electoral strategy was successful. Unlike VEE, EK was seen as an Estonian political party looking to integrate Russians into society.

Once a Russian voter told me ‘yes, I vote for EK.’ I asked why. And do you know what he told me? ‘You are the only party that considers us human beings.’ Of course he exaggerated, but there is deep meaning. I don’t think we are the only party that thinks that. But yes, we try to comfort them. Because in many ways in other parties think that if people don’t like to live in Estonia why they are here. It’s not the solution. Enn Eesmaa, MP, EK. November 2012

One event reinforced the ethnic divide in Estonia. It has been called the Bronze Night. In 2007, the Estonian government decided to remove a statue of a Russian soldier (the Bronze Soldier) from its place in central Tallinn. Estonians considered it as a Soviet symbol that they did not wish to remain there. Russians, however, considered it as a cultural piece and a remembrance of the Soviet victory over the Nazis in the World War II. There were riots and looting, but the statue was eventually removed and reallocated in a military cemetery.

There was this kind of statement made by the speaker of the Russian parliament, [Boris] Gryzlov, that they were waiting for international community reactions. They expected the EK to step in into this controversy, and Savisaar did it. What Savisaar did made EK to have more recognition from the Russians in Estonia. Toomas Alatalu, former MP, SDE (ex EK-EKR). October 2012

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Campaigning is also focused on places where the ethnic factor is present. EK has representatives all over Estonia, not just from Tallinn or Narva, to mention a few of the most Russian-populated cities.

Russians are very well represented in the Tallinn city council. In Tartu132 not so very much, but there is still an effect here. We don’t do campaigns in [the neighbourhood of] Annelinn, for example, where lots of Russians live. EK campaigns there, they have candidates, they have something to offer. Martin Bek, Tartu branch staff member, ER. December 2012

For some opponents of EK, Russians see themselves more as left-wing supporters. That means that their choice could also be explained in a more ideological basis.

EK is much more leftist than SDE, and populist. And they are interested in Russian voters, but Russian voters are much more left-wing than Estonians. Mihhail Lotman, Tartu city council chairman, IRL. December 2012

These interviews in Estonia reflect a deep belief amongst elites that the ethnic divide is not only very much present, but also politically well-articulated. The organisation that aggregates Russian interests is not a Russian party, but a party (EK) that appeals to Estonians alike. A sense of ‘left-wing’ is also introduced into that party, which in turn seems to give it more programmatic content.

4.6.3 Regional cleavage

The regression models in the previous section show that regionalism is a dominant cleavage in Korea, and less so in Chile and Estonia. Is there any pattern along those lines in the elites view? In Chile there seems to be a very small concern about regionalism, whereas in Korea the opposite happens. I excluded from this review the case of Estonia, as it was not credited by the interviewees to be important on its own. Consequently they see it as being absorbed by the ethnic cleavage.

Chile

132 Tartu is Estonia’s second largest city after Tallinn.

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Most interviewees do not see regionalism as a variable that could display a major issue in Chilean politics. Some acknowledge that there is a constant discourse that stresses anti- centralist politics—that is to say, a sentiment against Santiago as the centre of power and resources. Only a few feel that regionalism is on the rise, but it so happens that these interviewees come from regions located in the extreme north and extreme south of the country. Amongst the few extra-coalitions candidates (either running for small parties or as independents) who have been elected, most have represented those extreme zones.

If parties were open so everyone can interact with their leaders, then parties would become part of the everyday citizens’ lives. But our parties do not do that. Then, regional leaderships embody the citizens’ aspirations, greatly because they are closer to the citizens than party structures are. Carlos Bianchi, Senator, independent. March 2013

What this and other interviewees observe is a weaker presence of the national parties in the extreme parts of the country. The phenomenon, however, is not systemic: amongst all representatives from extreme districts, at least one out of two people always belong to a national party. Independent candidates are more likely to win a seat in the extreme north and south, but they are unlikely to secure the two seats in each district in Chile.133

Korea

Regionalism is the feature that every single respondent agreed on to characterise the Korean political system. According to the vast majority of interviewees, during the 1990s Korean politics was prolific with personalistic leaders.134 This indissoluble link between leaders and regions came, at least, from the dictatorial regime led by Park Chung-hee. Raised in Daegu, Yeongnam region, Park and his eventual successor Chun Doo-hwan devoted more state subsidies to family businesses (chaebols) from their home region than from the others as part of the rapid industrial development of Korea during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s (Kuk 1988). Other regions, especially Honam in the south west, remained underdeveloped. Honam, in particular, was the birthplace of pro-democratic leaders, most notably Kim Dae-jung. The other

133 In Chile, the district magnitude since the restoration of democracy in 1990 has been 2 for all 60 districts in the Lower Chamber. A recently approved reform of the electoral law will change the district magnitude for the Congress taking power in 2018. 134 Personalistic politics is developed further in Chapter Five.

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two well-known Kims, also pro-democratic leaders, were born in Chungcheong (Kim Jong-pil) and Yeongnam (Kim Young-sam) (Cumings 2005: 299-403).

The divide between Yeongnam and Honam, and to some extent Chungcheong, continued when the democratic transition began in 1988. Regionalism transcended leaderships and became a structural pattern of Korean politics. A direct consequence was that any ideological cleavage became prematurely weakened when confronted with a regional preference of voters.

In our system, candidates who would really want to run in a progressive party ticket prefer to come to the Democratic Party—they have a rare chance to be elected under the label of any progressive party. This is a negative point of regionalism. Current Korean political party system is a two-party system based on specific regions. So from the left to the right, members from various ideological spectra co-exist in one party. Ihn-tae You, Assemblyman, DUP. July 2013

Regionalism especially hinders parties that try to base their programmes on more ideological roots. In South Korea, the progressive parties are the ones that have tried to push politics in a more traditional left-right competition style. Indeed, everyone acknowledges that the progressive parties are to the ‘left’, which means that these parties are somehow placed in the spectrum. The problem, they argue, is that regionalism is strong enough to impede citizens from making electoral decisions based on differentiated policies.

Regionalism does not have any good points. Regionalism in Korea is the system in which one specific party dominates one specific region. Under the regionalism we hardly find the difference of policies and political belief. Hoe-chan Roh, Assemblyman, JP. April 2013

For political parties, the candidate selection process begins with checking the place of origin of potential electoral runners.

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If someone wants to be an assemblyman, he needs to get the party’s [based on that region] nomination. If a person was nominated by the party rooted in that region, he is already done. The election becomes ceremonial, because voters only choose a candidate from ther party’s regional origin. No matter his promises, no matter his personal character or reputation. Woo-hyun Lee, Assemblyman, GNP. May 2013

Regionalist attachments also have an ‘internal migrant’ composition. Migrants from Honam to Seoul are concentrated in specific districts (Gangbook district), and the same applies to migrants from Yeongnam and Chungcheong (around Incheon). This all leads to regionalist patterns that are present in Seoul itself. Even more so, those who are born in Seoul are usually asked where they are really from; that is to say, where their parents or ancestors come from. Regionalism, then, transcends generations.

Although regionalism is negatively perceived by most of the interviewees, there is a nuance that deserves some attention. A few interviewees claim that regional attachments are overlapped with policy preferences.

Regionalism is not contradictory with a more policy-based way of doing politics. If you look at Honam, you have an agricultural-based province. They are less industrialised. So their interests are different from regions with higher levels of industrialisation. What we as DUP need to do is to challenge GNP in regions where GNP is dominant, because our policies could be more attractive to voters in those regions. Han-jun Kim, scholar, DUP. July 2013

To conclude this sub-section on regionalism, its cleavage is not really formed in Chile, whereas it remains strong in Korea—in line with the regression models. Unlike the Korean case, regionalism in Chile seems to be based on an anti-political party attitude. Alternately, Korean regionalism is based on the historic conflicts between Honam and Youngnam, with two parties usually taking most or all of the seats from those regions. The divide transcends to Seoul and other cities, and continues across generations.

To summarise the results from these interviews, political elites’ opinions can lead us to confirm the importance of cleavages for the consolidation of party systems. As expected, the

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ideological cleavages, especially the L-R dimension, are more clearly present in Chile than in the other countries. However, there is a growing trend in Estonia and Korea to divert attention to ideological issues in society and in the orientation of parties. As can be expected, in Estonia the elites comment that the ethnic cleavage is very important and in Korea the elite perception is that regionalism is ever-present despite some efforts to reduce its influence. Next I will present this chapter’s conclusions, which frame the diverse evidence collected and its results.

4.7 Conclusions

This chapter has showed that cleavages are relevant to understand party system institutionalisation, and that the order of importance of the said cleavages is significant in understanding the pace and intensity of the process. There might be a hierarchical order of cleavages playing a role in party system institutionalisation: the ideological cleavage outperforms all others as the one that can relate party systems with more predictable and stable over time.

The series of multinomial regressions tested different models, predicting the effect of cleavages on party vote choice. As expected, in Chile the model with the ideological cleavage showed the highest explanatory power. This means that the ideological self-placement of voters allows us to understand better how party vote choice is made, relative to other cleavages. The ideological cleavage in Estonia and Korea is important, but not as decisive as ethnic (Estonia) and regional (Korea) divides.

In a subsequent statistical calculation, the data per country were pooled in order to discern any time-effect from the previous full model. Interaction effects between year and the left- right self-placement were added. Results showed a statistically significant interaction effect between time and L-R cleavage for Estonia in 2011 (relative to the base year 1996) and Korea (2010 relative to 2005), which means that the organising line is (slowly) becoming important. Yet, in both cases the most prominent cleavages (ethnic and regional, respectively) continued to grow. As for Chile, its L-R cleavage did not show significant changes over time, probably due to an already well-established cleavage that had little room for expansion. The general conclusions obtained from the statistical tools were later corroborated with intensive waves of elite interviews.

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In Chile, voters can address their political preferences around the L-R spectrum, according to the interviewees. Political values reinforce the ideological cleavage work, making this party system acclimatize towards postmodern values. In both Estonia and Korea, the relevance of other cleavages (ethnic and regional, respectively) has helped organise their party systems in a way that can be understandable for voters, although they are insufficient to provide more stability. Nonetheless, there are incipient steps looking to strengthen their ideological cleavages in Estonia and Korea. This is principally led by more progressive parties that try to differentiate from the others by following more programmatic platforms. The ideological continuum is not yet the strongest explanatory element to understand party systems in Estonia and Korea, but it would be a mistake to disregard it as meaningless. The evidence collected and processed in this chapter confirms the hypothesis that a clear left-right dimension is the most important cleavage for a party system in order for it to be institutionalised. The claim made that the strengthening of the ideological cleavage over time contributes to increase party system stabilisation is also confirmed: the stronger the ideological cleavage over time, the quicker the institutionalisation process of the party system. Likewise, where the left-right orientation experiences little improvement over time, the process of party system consolidation becomes slower.

However, it is important to be aware of the limitations of any given causal relationship explored here. Although there is a logic sequence observed in the literature that cleavages allow party systems to stabilise, any conclusion here should also acknowledge that the overall relationship between ideological cleavage formation and party system consolidation might be a process of reciprocal causation: political parties can contribute to creating a left-right divide. A society that is ideologically polarised is more likely to have parties anchored in the community along the lines of polarisation, seeding the roots of a stable party system.

This discussion leads to the starting point: the left-right schema stands out as a cleavage in itself. If its origins can be traceable to class divide or religious cleavage, it no longer works in more experienced democracies as it is not strongly linked conversely in the younger democracies studied here. Following the theoretical arguments of previous pages, this ideological cleavage plays an organising role in the political system configuration. This cleavage prevails over others, especially in newer democracies that are still looking for stability. Other cleavages are not sufficient on their own to promote the party system to a highly stable pattern of institutionalisation, but they can help to create the organising line.

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The elite interviewees provided some clues to why the L-R cleavage has performed so slowly in Estonia and Korea. Taken from the narratives acquired in this fieldwork, I suggest that some sort of ideological trauma lies behind the difficult formation of the left-right continuum. Indeed, in the cases of Estonia and Korea it could be called ‘left trauma’, as it deals with past regimes identified with the left: for Estonia, the communist totalitarianism of the Soviet regime; for Korea, the ongoing hereditary regime of the communist Workers’ Party of North Korea. Estonians could be seen to be freeing themselves from the Soviet memory as time progresses, but for Koreans the trauma could be more persistent as the North Korean autocratic regime seems to be ongoing. Why did Chile not experience a similar trauma—in its association with the right? I suggest that there are two big reasons to explain the Chilean case: firstly, it had already been a well-established party system before democracy broke out, and secondly, the military junta led by Augusto Pinochet was, after all, an endogenous authoritarian regime. In both Estonia and Korea, the origin of the trauma comes from ‘outside’; to simplify: Moscow, in one case, and Pyongyang, in the other. I have given potential explanations up to this point. However, in this chapter I acknowledge that the ideological trauma hypothesis opens possibilities for future research.

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CHAPTER FIVE The national leaders are very selfish, but the policies are correct.

THE SHINING SIDE OF PERSONALISM Male respondent, 76. Tallinn, Estonia.

5.1 Introduction

Personalistic politics is like one of those plagues that rapidly seems to break out when a party system fails to develop. The literature is explicit around the perils of personalistic figures (Linz and Stepan 1996) and its related populism (Sartori 1976). The mainstream literature has evidence to support the negative effect of personalism on party system formation—but is that evidence complete? This chapter aims to revisit to what extent personalistic politics negatively affects the consolidation process of party systems in newer democracies. Building on a deductive logic of what types of party leadership should be paired with which types of programmatic parties in order for party systems to institutionalise, this chapter proposes a new typology of party leaderships. The classification sheds light on how specific types can be associated with more or less stable party systems. This chapter explores how party systems stabilise depending on which party leadership is more prevalent in a country. As a matter of simplification, I will at points talk about party system leadership as a shortcut to denote prevalent party leaderships in a party system.

The preponderance of party leaders is enormous in democracies. In parliamentary regimes, for instance, the leader of the dominant party is the most likely candidate to become prime minister. In presidential regimes, party leaders can act as veto players of presidential candidacies. Regardless of the regime it takes place in, political party leadership is of natural importance for the degree of consolidation in party systems. Nevertheless, political scientists warn against leaders who become personalistic, because personalism would bring about undesirable features such as selfishness and populism.

Personalism, or sultanism in the words of Linz and Stepan (1996), is a display of “distinctive features, such as discretionary rule and the concentration of power in hands of a single person” (Hadenius and Teorell 2007: 149). When discussing authoritarian regime types, Geddes (1999)

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includes personalist as one of the types of regimes that, in fact, lasts longer than military and single-party regimes. As self-evident as it is, personalist regimes are those that are built around one figure who holds the power control in a country. Hadenius and Teorell (2007) go further when they state personalism as a defining property that may be associated to any type of regime, including democracies. Unlike Geddes, they acknowledge that personalistic attributes are not only present in authoritarian regimes. But since party system is a different unit of analysis than political regimes, the evaluation of personalism is also different, as this chapter will argue.

Here and there, personalism is taken as a phenomenon that erodes institutionalisation, especially in presidential settings (Linz 1990). Furthermore, it has been suggested that mobilisation by charismatic personal leadership leads to populism (Kriesi 2014). The logic is simple: if parties are led by individuals that control party machines at their will and have direct communication with voters, then no collective organisation in its own is needed. In this situation, the organisation only makes sense as an instrument of the leader. Personalism can also materialise as the figure of a sole anti-party leader who is seen (by himself, by a large segment of the citizenry, or by both) as the only ruler who can guide a polity, as Mainwaring suggests (1998: 73-74).

There is, however, a seemingly less likely possibility that leaders do indeed play stabilising roles in the formation of party systems.135 The idea of having leaders with positive contribution to the consolidation of political settings has not been studied in depth. I argue that the possibility of the existence of a positive relationship between personalism and stabilisation cannot be discarded. There are two ways to look at such an association. The first and most obvious one is about party charismatic leaders who create the conditions of stability based on their own appeal. Consequently, the party system stability, measured in terms of low electoral volatility, is achieved by virtue of depleting the sense of parties as vehicles of representation and, alternately, the leaders are the ones embodying voters’ interests. If that happens, one vital element of party system institutionalisation (well organised and representative parties) is missing.136 The second way to look at personalist politics is to understand the role of

135 Personalism in small parties is not relevant for the party system as a whole. One charismatic leader attracting a small portion of the electorate here and there will not affect the overall function of the party system. 136 Coppedge proposes a personalist party type consisting of organisations programmatically void (off-left-right logic), too heterogeneous or just “independent” (1997).

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charismatic party leaders as the mid-term or long-term facilitators of party system organisation strengthening (Enyedi and Deegan-Krause 2011). Here, party leaders do play a role in becoming transitional figures between potentially disfranchised electorates and compromised voters: in particular, citizens can enter politics by virtue of first being attracted to certain politicians and then their party lines. In that case, such personalistic leaders can help create political cleavages amongst citizens, amongst their own supporters and, by opposition, amongst rivals. The most important cleavage, represented by the left-right scale, can become the automatic translation from personal appeal to party ideological base. This relationship has not been discussed in the literature, despite its seemingly enormous importance in the understanding of party system institutionalisation.

In the following pages, I will aim to frame and outline the ideal types of party leaderships. Then, I will present the evidence collected in the fieldwork and other data. This is followed by looking at where most parties of the three countries should be located according to the ideal types. To check whether these types can be found elsewhere, I will introduce an expert survey that considers developed party systems by variables such as charisma and policy-orientation. The chapter ends by highlighting the nature of personalistic party leadership and under which conditions it can help or hinder the whole institutionalisation process of party systems.

5.2 Framework for analysis

The role of party chairs is diverse. They can go from being founders and natural guiders of movements, to managers of highly bureaucratic organisations. They can also be mere bosses in charge of small factions within parties, or indeed the marionettes of puppeteers (the real leaders) acting behind the scene. In well-organised party systems, it is therefore expected that parties change their chairs on a regular basis, or that at least party leaders can be challenged with some degree of success. In institutionalised systems, leaders carry on the programmatic principles of the organisations, and not the other way round—organisations heralding leaders’ own principles. In less consolidated party systems, parties might be taken as structures which are useful to their leaders. The more personalistic a party, the less programmatic one can expect it to be—and consequently, less institutionalised.

There might also be some types in between. In institutionalising party systems there could be parties with flawed leaderships as well as parties with strong leaderships. There could be parties with weakly built programmes and also weak leaders. But also, given that what matters

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the most is the programmatic nature of the party, there could be strong personalities who are programme-builders. The latter kind of leadership would therefore be highlighted as one option that so far the literature has not paid enough attention to. Here, I look forward to highlighting that whilst the typical way to build programmatic parties is through routine leadership change, there is also the possibility to think of parties that are programmatically- based around personalistic leaders. This mechanical understanding allows us to ascertain that, under certain conditions, personalistic politics can also lead to party system institutionalisation. Summarily, the most institutionalised party systems are expected to be the ones with well organised and competitive party structures around well-known political programmes. The least institutionalised party systems are those having strong personalities who shape most parties by strength of will.

However, it is not clear how personalistic politics are translated into party system institutionalisation. Contemporary literature dealing with this dimension of party leadership is, in my best knowledge, almost inexistent. Thus, exploring links between personalism and party system institutionalisation is recommended in order to take a deductive process in identifying party leadership categories vis-à-vis programmatic categories.

5.3 Four ideal types of party leaderships

To study the extent in which party personalism plays in favour of/or against institutionalisation, it is important to flesh out the two components of political party leadership: content and authority. That way it is possible to understand the various possibilities for how parties—and by extension, party systems—are predominantly managed. In order to do this, a typology might be useful. Drawing up typologies is a practice in social sciences that yields a better understanding of complex issues (Collier, LaPorte and Seawright 2012). Party typologies, indeed, are a fertile field in the political science scholarship.137 Firstly, I will briefly set up a binary category for parties according to their content: between programmatic and non- programmatic organisations. Secondly, two classes of authority will be considered to understand the role of managers in parties: bureaucratic and charismatic. Thirdly, both categories will be combined to produce a new, general classification of party leaderships.

137 Gunther and Diamond (2003) provide a rich account of typologies used in the literature. Then, rather than narrow down a general classification, they use the pre-existing categorisations of parties to build an ultimate tree of 15 different ‘species’ of party coming from five ‘general’: elite-based, massed-based, ethnicity-based, electoralist, and movement/parties. For a historical account of main typologies, see Wolinetz 2002.

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5.3.1 Programmatic parties

Kitschelt (2000) aims his typology of parties138 at exploring the relationship between parties and citizens (“linkages”). He notes that programmatic parties are not only defined in terms of what they offer to voters, but also what they invest in internal conflict resolution in order to make the whole process of deliberation worthwhile. Another feature commonly associated with party and party system types is clientelism. Sometimes it is taken as a kind of party in itself (Gunther and Diamond 2003, Kitschelt 2000). Clientelist politics are considered the practice of iterative and contingent relationships of the exchange of goods for votes (Hicken 2011: 296). Clientelism exists on patronage, vote-buying, club goods, pork barrel and other forms of contingent targeted benefits (Hicken 2011: 296). Although clientelist politicians compete for office through negotiating votes for goods—e.g., materials, jobs, state resources, intermediation before public entities, etc.—, clientelism is not, as Kitschelt (2000) implies, necessarily mutually exclusive with programmatic-based politics.

Kitschelt (2000) and other authors (e.g., Coppedge 1998, Hicken 2011) acknowledge that clientelism can exist in different types of political environments (i.e., democracies and authoritarian regimes), but they neglect the fact that clientelism can also occur in programmatic parties (Piattoni 2001, Scheiner 2006). In order to classify parties in terms of what they look like, then, clientelism cannot be taken as a separate category, as it can form a part of any category. Alternately, the most appropriate criterion is to proceed with a simple but efficient binary categorisation: parties are either programmatic or non-programmatic.139 There is a grey area between both that which is important to be aware of and that which is relative to the extension, depth, density, and coherence of the programmatic platforms. In electoral periods, parties can offer ‘programmes’ to the electorates that indicate how they will govern if given the chance, although here the programmatic appeal is understood as a deeper articulation of longstanding and coherent ideas in different issues and areas. In an ideal type,

138 For Kitschelt (2000), there are three types of parties based on the linkages with citizens: programmatic, clientelistic and charismatic. Programmatic parties are those which build on programmatically-driven conflict resolution and that create organizational structures. Clientelist parties involve forms of domination over citizens through exchange of goods. Kitschelt is careful about the empirical implications of clientelism in democratic and authoritarian contexts, because clientelist behaviour can be present in both. Charismatic parties are those that pull together based on one personality. 139 Luna (2014) makes a convincing argument in favour of a cross-sectional analysis of parties. His argument focuses on how parties use different strategies of segmentation of voters to appeal to as many supporters as possible. Although his analysis is framed upon “unequal democracies”, segmented party strategy can be found in any democracy. For instance, Japan and its Liberal Democratic Party (see Krauss and Pekkanen 2011: 29-99).

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the greater the amount of issues included in the programme then the deeper the areas of party definition. Furthermore, the denser the internal discussion, and the coherence of all involved and the party representatives, the more programmatic the party should be considered to be. And as the literature has made clear, more programmatic parties are increasingly related to institutionalised party systems (e.g., Mainwaring and Torcal 2006).

5.3.2 Authority classes

When political leaders are analysed, the overwhelming amount of literature is devoted to explore and conceptualise the various kinds of regime—not necessarily party—leaderships. Especially from Weber’s (1978 [1922]) seminal conceptualisation of charismatic leaders, the main focus of this scholarship has been applied to the study of major leaders of polities. In particular, scholars have sought rich nuances in the realm of authoritarian regimes—e.g., the sultanistic regimes proposed by Chehabi and Linz (1998). There is another focus of studies dealing with general types of leadership authority, in a few instances referring to parties (Ansell and Fish 1999, Jowitt 1992, Michels 1915, Panebianco 1988, Selznick 1952), or personality-led factions within parties (Janda 1970, Sartori 1976).

There are many classes of leaders suggested by the literature and there is a certain consensus that two types are ubiquitous. The first is the charismatic type, or pure personalism, consisting of loyalty shown to persons rather than to organisations. The second class is what Weber refers to as rational-legal authority, or leaders who happen to be in charge of the organisation but to whom there is not necessarily any loyalty shown. For this class, I will use the term bureaucratic style, given the implicit impersonalism or depersonalisation that bureaucratic management requires and is defined upon (Selznick 1943: 50-51). Given these basic criteria, authority classes of charismatic and bureaucratic styles are opposite categories. There is also a grey area in between, because both charismatic and bureaucracy styles are not necessarily absolute or immutable. Where to accurately place this grey area can be a subject for debate, but for now it is enough to raise this as a caveat.

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5.3.3 Assessing political party (system) leadership140

In the scholarship of parties and party systems little has been devoted to classify political party leaderships. Amongst the few classifications found on this topic, Ansell and Fish (1999) provide categories based on two dimensions: leadership authority based on representation, and loyalties of members. However, there are no attempts to relate the programmatic nature of the party with the kind of leadership it displays. Some party types mentioned in the literature are defined by the way strong personalities shape parties. Gunther and Diamond (2003: 187), for instance, call them “personalistic parties” (see also Coppedge 1997). But this is no different from parties with charismatic leaders and does not provide elements to identify possible programmatic lines. Kitschelt (2000: 855) even rules out the co-existence of charismatic leaders and programmatic platforms, given that, in his accordance, the building of personality qualities is not compatible with routinised party machines and fixed programmes. This is partially defied by Pedahzur and Brichta (2002), who observe the institutionalisation of ‘hard charismatic parties’ in the cases of the French National Front and the Austrian Freedom Party. Coppedge contends that personalism and ideology “are not necessarily mutually exclusive qualities” (1998: 551-552). Likewise, King explains that leaders can indirectly influence voters based on what the leader does—as opposed to what the leader is—, including party programmatic shifts (2002b: 4-7). In contrary to what Kitschelt suggests, I argue that it is not impossible to suggest the co-existence of programmatic parties and charismatic leaderships; or, contrarily, I contend that the potential association of strong personalities in parties with programmatic-platforms in formation is possible, and even desirable, in consolidating party systems.

The combination of party content and party authority can shed more light on a process of party system institutionalisation. The reason is rather mechanic. The more capable a personalistic leader is of building a programmatic party, the more likely the party will become stable over time. Stability is the essential condition for institutionalisation. The possibility of a programmatic party with a charismatic leadership may change our view on which ways the institutionalisation of party systems can take place in new democracies. A new typology blending these qualitative dimensions is then needed.

140 Unless explicitly differentiated, party leadership also means, by implication, party system leadership.

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It is appropriate to propose a nuanced yet simple typology of party leaderships. In doing so, the main driving factors that differentiate party leaderships are allocated within two dimensions: the authority of leaders, and the programmatic content of parties. Authority of leaders relates to the power that leaders exercise in their own parties, and can be divided between charismatic and bureaucratic leaders. If they control most of the party machine and are the biggest selector of candidates, then they will dominate the party. Charismatic party leaders are used to being the party founders or cofounders, and in the internal hierarchy they are the chairmen or equivalent position, including active roles behind the scene. If internal elections are in place to choose the major positions, they—or their representatives—win by large margins. A side effect of having these leaders is that the electorate can confuse party and leaders as interchangeable elements. Conversely, the opposite type of leaders are more bureaucratic figures who are not necessarily party founders, but efficient politicians who compete for the most important position in the party. They can even control large factions of the party, but not the whole machine. Their positions are normally contestable and contested, and so they can lose the chairmanship or equivalent. They tend to remain in the party if they resign or are defeated. In general, these parties last longer than one leadership period. Furthermore, electors can differentiate the party from its leader.

The content of the party is of importance as well, because they represent the opposite side of party leaders. In a very basic but useful distinction, and for the matter of this discussion, parties can belong to two dimensions: programmatic and non-programmatic organisations. Programmatic parties are institutions with well-known ideological positions that normally last longer than one campaign. Non-programmatic organisations have more diffused ideological platforms in most issues, and can have some clear definitions in a set of specific subjects. For example, non-programmatic parties include those who compete on the basis of anti-politics slogans. Some non-programmatic parties can take positions only dependant on their leaders’ opinion, which makes the parties more suitable for strong personalistic leaders. However, some strong personalities can also be found in programmatic parties.

In describing the four ideal types, I seek to follow the advice given by Collier, LaPorte and Seawrite (2012) that typologies should contribute to concept formation (2012: 222-223). Consequently, cell types are more useful when they are labelled with a conceptual meaning as derived from the intersection of its respective row and column variables. The following typology of party leaderships is inspired by the current literature of the field. Party leaderships

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that integrate contestable authorities with longstanding ideological appeals are more sophisticated, as they balance the two dimensions progressively. Parties with collegial leadership, but where the party itself is not filled with a distinguishable programmatic content, represent a blurred party leadership type. Party leaderships whose central core revolves around the leader as the main source of authority and content are egocentric. Party leaderships that combine a strong but increasingly contestable authority, and which appeal is increasingly filled with programmatic content, are essentially on track to maturity; the projection which makes them promising.

The ideal types of party leadership and their main characteristics are summarised in Table 5.1.

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TABLE 5.1 Ideal types of party leadership

Authority Bureaucratic Charismatic

Sophisticated Promising Mature parties based on longstanding Parties have programmatic positions in most platforms. Programmes are ideologically clear. of issues, over a long time period. Leaders There is regular rotation of leaders, or control the party machine, but may be chairmanship is challengeable and contested. challenged and/or can be replaced. Leaders

No leader controls the whole party machine. are founders of the party, have been in the Factions are common. Candidate selection can post for long time periods, or are the person be open or centralised. Leaders are usually around whom partisans group together. At career politicians. Routine defections are rare, least one opposition faction exists that

Programmatic and tend not to break up the party. impedes candidate selection from being completely centralised. Issue positions of

leaders are usually taken as the party’s position.141 Routine defections are common

content

but do not tend to break up the party.

Party Blurred Egocentric Programmes are diffused around most issues, Leaders are almost always the party due to 1) party covers a large ideological founders. Leaders’ opinions fill the party’s

spectrum142, or 2) party has one or a few programme. They can be one-campaign specific big subjects (e.g., anti-politics stands, parties, with specific issues to fight for. pro regional organisations), and/or 3) party is Leadership positions are not contestable or plainly clientelist. Regular leadership rotation. contested. No factions are present.

programmatic

- No leader controls the whole party machine, Centralised candidate selection. If the leader Non because there are several factions. Candidate has left, the party disappears. Routine selection is likely to be decentralised. Routine defections are common and more likely to defections are rare. break up the party.

In the preceding categorisation (Table 5.1), four ideal types of party leadership are presented and depicted: sophisticated, promising, blurred, and egocentric.143 The description of each of

141 The leader’s preferred policies do not mean that the leader has necessarily created an ideology. Thus, this type does not follow the Weberian idea of routinizing charisma (Weber 1978 [1922]). 142 Commonly known as catch-all parties. 143 In his own typology of parties, Panebianco (1988) distinguishes between mass-bureaucratic parties and electoral- professional parties. In the first type, there is pre-eminence of internal leaders and collegial leadership, stressing the

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them allows us to identify most parties in a system according to their leadership settings. The party system as a whole can be defined by one of these ideal types if all main parties show the same type (fully-). If one type is more (but not fully) prevalent, then the party system can be defined as mostly- by that type. If there are two, three, or all four types present, then the party system becomes mixed. Rather than summarising what each quadrant in Table 5.1 already depicts, I will just mention some examples of each from developed and developing countries alike. Most mature parties in developed democracies in Western Union are the sophisticated types. Party leaderships that are blurred include the Justicialist Party in Argentina and, to some extent, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. Finally, the egocentric type (“non-programmatic personalism”, according to Mainwaring and Torcal 2006: 218) can be illustrated with Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi‘s Forza Italia and People of Freedom (PdL), and to a certain extent France’s Jean Marie Le Pen’s and Marine Le Pen’s National Front (FN).144 Examples of promising types, on the other hand, can be found in Israel’s Ariel Sharon’s Kadima, or Canada’s Lucien Bouchard’s Bloc Québécois. Both founded parties, which led them through ideological lines, and the parties survived their exit.

5.4 Hypotheses and expectations

Considering the typology of party leaderships, and based on the review of the literature on party system institutionalisation, I suggest three hypotheses.

Hypothesis 5.1 Party systems with non-personalistic leaders and programmatic parties will be more institutionalised.

Hypothesis 5.2 Party systems with personalistic leaders and programmatic parties are more likely to institutionalise than party systems with non-personalistic leaders and non-programmatic parties.

ideological nature of the organisation. In the second, leadership is personalised and the party platforms are issues and the same leaders. The first type is congruent with what I call the bureaucratic type of party leadership (bureaucratic leaders in programmatic parties); the second resembles the egocentric type (charismatic leaderships in non-programmatic parties). Thus, both ideal types presented by Panebianco are the extreme ends of the categorisation proposed here. 144 Arguably, the National Front is a case of dynasty—regardless of how bad its family ties are becoming.

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Hypothesis 5.3 Party systems with personalistic leaders and non-programmatic parties will be more under-institutionalised.

The three case studies show different patterns of party system stabilisation. Chile has shown a stable party system since shortly after the restoration of democracy. Estonia started with high levels of electoral volatility but has nonetheless reduced them uninterruptedly and at a faster pace than Korea. Korea, in turn, has increased its party system stability on average, but has experienced setbacks so its institutionalisation has been less consistent than that of Estonia. In sum, Chile features the highest and most consistent stability amongst the three cases, Estonia shows the quickest stabilisation trend, and Korea displays a rather slow and more erratic process of stabilisation over time.

Following Hypothesis 5.1, if it is true that party systems combining programmatic content with bureaucratic authority (sophisticated party leadership type) are more likely to be connected to more stable party systems, then the Chilean party system leadership is expected to be fully or mostly sophisticated. Neither Estonia nor Korea are expected to be fully or mostly sophisticated.

On the other hand, the conventional literature expects personalistic leaders to be detrimental for party systems. Hypothesis 5.2 seeks an unconventional answer in the opposite interaction (positive interaction between personalism and PSI), when parties are programmatically- oriented. It stresses that the interaction personalism & programmatic is more helpful for institutionalisation than the opposite (non-personalism & non-programmatic). Hypothesis 5.3, on the other hand, takes on board the literature assumption about the negative effects of personalism, although it narrows personalism down to non-programmatic parties. Thus, if Estonia, Korea and Chile have had relevant personalistic leaders, it could be expected that Korea would have experienced more of this latter type than Estonia, and consequently Estonia more than Chile, given their different party system stabilisation processes documented elsewhere in this thesis. If the party leadership types are applied, it is expected that Korea has experienced more personalist and less programme-oriented parties (egocentric type) than Estonia, whereas Estonia is more likely to have experienced more personalistic and programmatic-oriented parties (promising type).

In the next part of this chapter I will present the evidence collected in order to test the hypotheses, and show how it will be analysed.

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5.5 Data and methods

This chapter analyses three sets of data. In first place, it extensively presents the outcomes of the elite interviewees. Secondly, it provides the results of an original dataset accounting for leadership duration in a given party system. These two data are the source of the descriptive inference that will check the correspondence of the hypotheses against the reality (comparative analysis). In addition, a third piece of data coming from a survey expert is presented in order to contextualise the previous results.

5.5.1 Elite interviews

Political elites from the three countries were consulted for this research sub-question. Two questions from semi-structured questionnaires were designed in order to evaluate the existence and influence of personalism within parties. Firstly, interviewees were asked to freely assess if personalism is a matter of concern for the proper functioning of the party system. And secondly, to indirectly test leadership influences, they were asked about how much parties should advance in order to become better organised and to improve their internal democracy. 145 Answers from other questions could also shed light on these issues; for example, in replying to the question on the linkage between citizens-parties, some interviewees mentioned the role of party figure heads in generating a connection with voters.

5.5.2 Net leadership duration

This dataset deals with the leadership duration of all political parties in Chile, Estonia and Korea in democracy. It calculates the period of time one individual has been party chair. It is centred on the individual leader, thus if the same person has chaired different parties, what is most important is the total chairmanship net period of that particular leader.146 There are two criteria met in the data: 1) the starting point is the first year of democracy and the end point is

145 Questions 2 and 7 of the excerpted questionnaire (see Table 3.2, Chapter Three). 146 For example, if the fictitious leader Mrs Huenchuñir has chaired Party Blue between 1990 and 1995, and then party Yellow between 1998 and 2002, and party Pink since 2010 onwards (the cut-off year for this dataset is 2014), her net chairmanship duration is 5+4+4=13 years. Parties Blue, Yellow and Pink are the same party that has changed its label frequently, and represents a major force in this party system. There are many other leaders in that party system, but only one other main party: Party Grapes. Mr Grau has led it for a net period of 12 years. Mr. Contreras has led other parties for 5 years, Miss Sepúlveda for 4 years, and other minor leaders no more than 3 years each. If all leadership net years are summed, the total is 50 years. In this illustrative example, Mrs Huenchuñir’s leadership represents 26% of the total system leadership, and Mr Grau accounts for another 24%. Thus, only two leaders account for half of the total leadership net duration of the system.

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2014, and 2) it includes all leaders for any party who have gained at least one seat in the lower chamber at any time. Parties that are currently vanished—for any reason—are also included.

The ideal unit of duration should be a month, but it was unfeasible to collect data disaggregated until that level. Thus, the unit of duration is a year.147 This dataset, therefore, contains the total duration of all chairmanships in the party systems of Chile, Estonia and Korea since democratic restoration.148

5.5.3 Expert survey

This chapter uses the data of the global expert survey of the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project 2008-09 (Kitschelt 2013). In particular, I selected two questions that ask how programmatic and charismatic the main parties are in experts’ countries at the time of the survey. Parties are scored from 1 (nothing programmatic/charismatic) to 4 (fully) in each question. Experts’ assessments of policy-oriented and charismatic parties resemble, similarly but not exactly, the typologies of party leaderships proposed in this chapter. The data include all relevant party systems of developed countries in 2008-9.

5.6 Party leadership types in action

Based on the interviewees, I will discuss to what extent the main parties of each country suit each of the four ideal types of party leaderships. For some countries, most of their parties fit well into one type, but I will still offer a wider discussion of how certain parties can fall into two ideal types.

5.6.1 Sophisticated party leaderships

This type revolves around the most well-known Western European kind of party leaderships: longstanding political parties, with well-defined ideological stances, and with leadership positions that are contested or are contestable for routine rotation.

147 This decision implies, for example, that if a leader took power in December 2000 and left power in January 2001, her chairmanship duration will be 2001-2000=1. If another leader took office in January 2005 and left it in December 2005, her duration could be wrongly computed as 2005-2005=0. To avoid the latter problem, any chairmanship beginning and ending on the same year is computed as 0.5. After checking the database for reliability, when monthly data were available, I did not find any systematically overweight or underweight due to the mentioned decisions. 148 Full list of leaders per party per country, ordered by each net leadership period, is included in Appendix E 1.

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Chile

Chile is the place where most of the interviewees consider party leaders as playing an important role in voicing the party positions. If personalism exists, it is at lower levels of the political system. Leaders are not considered to be owners of the party, according to interviewees from left-to right-wing parties.

Of course there are high degrees of personalism, but this is more common when you look at legislators or key figures rather than at party leaders. Even more, sometimes party leaders can be overtaken by individual legislators. Party leaders are useful to organise the big meetings, to control party finances and to mediate between factions, but in the end they need to follow what party members say. If not, they are ruled out. Pablo Lorenzini, Deputy, DC. January 2013

Nobody can be caudillo in the desert. They only exist when there is a deficit in the party system, and in Chile that is not the rule. I believe we have leaders who are influential peers, but not caudillos who want all the power for themselves. Lautaro Carmona, Deputy, PC. January 2013

In general, I would say that the collective is more important than the individual. So yes, there are individualistic people in parties as in everything; but parties are in the end more important than their temporary leaders. María Antonieta Saá, Deputy, PPD. March 2013

All main parties in the country have had a rotation of leaders. The largest party in the National Congress, the right-wing Independent Democrat Union (UDI), is different to the others in the sense that it has no visible factions. There is no one leader, but a group of leaders who act as controllers of the party. They are colloquially known as the ‘colonels’. Most of them are the heirs of late Senator Jaime Guzmán, founder of the party and who was the main architect of the current Chilean constitution which was implemented during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. Despite criticisms of the way the party is conducted, the colonels reinforce the idea that leaderships are important in keeping the principles of the party alive.

In general, in Chile parties do not die suddenly. On the very contrary: they remain the same and not necessarily with the same leaders. Our party has certain peculiarities. Our internal democracy is based on a set of leaders. I think that our structure is more

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important and efficient than one-member, one-vote system. Indeed, a great UDI’s achievement has been the formation of leaders, because citizens can see that our party is predictable and disciplined. Leaders, in plural, define our policies. That’s why we are the most voted party in the country! Juan Antonio Coloma, Senator, UDI ex-chairman. January 2013

Despite being ruled by the colonels, the party has still held competitive leadership elections.

Until not so long I had a critical opinion of the internal democracy of the party. You didn’t know what was going on. But this all has changed dramatically in recent years. Leaders are more open to hear different opinions, yet there is always certain tension between older and younger generations. Now you see the birth of factions, which is something new to this party. Giovanni Calderón, Deputy, UDI. January 2013

For Chilean elites, then, non-personalistic party leadership is common and widespread in the system. For Korea and Estonia, on the other hand, the situation is less clear.

Estonia

In Estonia, social democrats have shown more leadership rotation than their peers. The Estonian People’s Union (ERL) was the largest party in Parliament at the beginning of the 2000s, and was officially dissolved in 2013. Many of its turncoats were later affiliated with the Social Democratic Party (SDE), so ERL eventually merged to SDE. In the 2011 elections, SDE became one of only four parties in the Estonian Parliament. Politicians from the extinct ERL, from SDE and from all other parties agree that the SDE has a better internal democracy than the rest, and that its leaders work as first amongst equals rather than as charismatic figures.

The existence, or lack thereof, of internal democracy is an eternal problem of all parties. The deficit of internal democracy has rapidly deepened and is perceptible both in the Centre Party [EK] and the two governing parties (Reform Party [ER] and Pro Patria and Res Publica Union [IRL]). The situation is better in the SDE. It is significant that the popularity of parties in Estonia and elsewhere is largely dependent (in Estonia, perhaps even too much) solely on leaders —the force of their personality, charisma, appeal. Even the media tends to simplistically equate parties with their leaders. Then again,

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powerful personalities have a tendency towards authoritarianism. As a rule, a person without ambitions of power does not end up as a top executive/leader. Jaanus Männik, mayor of Surju, former MP, ERL ex-chairman. November 2012

In Estonia, the characteristics of SDE are not necessarily shared by the other parties. One exception, according to the interviewees, might be IRL. Although it was characterised by the leadership of Mart Laar,149 in recent years its leadership has been routinely rotated framed by clear programmatic contours. Thus, IRL can be located, at some point, between the sophisticated and the promising party leadership type.

Korea

There are also some programmatic parties in Korea, but on the left side of the spectrum and with no wide support. The main two progressive parties (Progressive Unified Party and Justice Party) have passed through the same rebranding as the two dominant parties, but leaders are rotated regardless of the brand. Consequently, the same parties can have more leaders without dramatic effects on the party’s programmatic offer.

Our party is rather programmatic, especially when you compare it with DUP and GNP. We also prefer direct election as method to select our candidates. The leaders of the party rank candidates, but the members are the ones who say yes or not to the ranking. We believe that the political system is made up of parties’ insiders, people who belong to a party for a long time. Won-suk Park, Assemblyman, JP. August 2013

In both Estonia and Korea, then, this sophisticated type of party leadership is not as well-established as in Chile.

5.6.2 Blurred party leaderships

This type of party leadership is not as common as the others in the case studies. Firstly, because non-programmatic parties are usually linked to charismatic personalities who use political organisations as a method of obtaining power. Secondly, because the lack of

149 Especially when the party was only “I” (Isamaaliit or Fatherland [Pro Patria] Union) during the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s. In 2006 it merged with Res Publica in order to form IRL. Laar was the IRL chairman from 2007 to 2012.

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programmes, or the limited content of them, is not suitable for gathering followers for a party, but more for supporting independent candidates. And thirdly, because the nature of this leadership for the countries under analysis implies that this kind of party is not likely to survive over the long term, given its absence of policy content.

Notwithstanding, their existence is worthy of consideration given that interviewees also have this leadership type in mind. Both in Estonia and Korea—but not in Chile—it is possible to track this feature to organisations that can be policy-less and more concerned about specific issues.

Korea

In the case of Korea, the regional origin of candidates and representatives seems to be more important than their capacities.

Rather than personalism, regionalism in Korean Politics was harsh […] Regionalism was spread to all aspects of society. In the 1990s, if someone wanted to be a MP, he would need to get the party (based on that region)’s nomination. If a person was nominated by the party rooted it that region, it is already done. Nowadays, personalism is not so popular and it isn’t big deal to Korean politics. Woo-hyun Lee, Assemblyman, GNP. May 2013

At that time [1990s], the Korean political system was one-person-centred ‘boss’ system. ‘One boss’ system has existed for a long time. Citizens voted for a candidate from the party based on their original hometown. Other aspects, like as the reputation of the candidates, or policy’s pros and cons were not considered. Hai-jin Cho, Assemblyman, GNP. May 2013

The pervasive nature of regionalism is especially problematic for minor parties. They find it hard to break the logic of the non-programmatic vote and when they do, indeed, offer programmatic alternatives.

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Amongst regionalism, personalism and factionalism, if you ask me which factor is the biggest problem in Korean politics, I think regionalism is the one. Regionalism does not have any good points. Regionalism in Korea is the system that one specific party dominates one specific region. Under the regionalism we hardly find the difference of policies and political belief. Hoe-chan Rho, Assemblyman, JP. June 2013

In Korean politics, the main parties are mostly oriented by regional issues rather than broad programmatic settings. In the past, regionalism was paired with personalism. More recently, and especially after the three Kims exited the scene, the leadership positions of parties started to become more bureaucratic.

Estonia

The presence of bureaucratic leaderships can also be found in parties that are not really programmatic. For example, the star of the 2003 general elections in Estonia was Res Publica (RP), a party that campaigned anti-party slogans and proclaimed itself as the party of “new politics”. The organisation was not known for one leader, but instead for presenting a group of young professionals who wanted to change the way politics were conducted in Estonia. They did not have a clear ideological content.150 They won the elections and formed government, but two years later the coalition government broke out and RP merged with the conservative Pro Patria to form IRL.

Similarly, in 2007 the Greens (EER) gained considerable support and gained six seats in Parliament. However, their programme was mainly centred around environmental issues and any other interests were about promoting direct democracy. For the rest of the programme, the party decided to let its MPs act freely. For the 2011 elections, the party leadership approved the idea to summon independents as candidates.

We made the choice that half of our candidates should come from outside the parties—like publicly known people. And we announced also that whether they were elected, we were not going to impose them any vote guide. They were going to be

150 The famous political scientist Rein Taagepera was the first RP chairman. In Taagepera (2006), he describes how the party was formed.

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freed from our party. We said: they can belong to our parliament group, but let them do what they want. Marek Strandberg, former MP, EER ex-chairman. October 2012

Eventually, the Estonian Greens could not repeat their past success and lost all of their six seats in the 2011 elections. Henceforth, it ceased to be a meaningful electoral party.

Thus, in two cases of recent history, Estonia has had two instant-success parties who were ideologically diffused, but who were, however, collegiate-led and campaigned for new methods of politics.

5.6.3 Egocentric party leadership

A common case of personalistic leadership is of charismatic figures who take over organisations. They are also popular with any party they create—because they used to be the party founder—who is secured by a number of members and candidates. In the absence of programmes, leaders fill campaigns with their own personal appeal or attributes. But the most important feature of this type of party leadership is that without the leader, the party is not supposed to survive. Thus, the leader position is essentially not challengeable.

Korea

Amongst the cases for study, Korea stood out as the place where party personalism was most rooted in its democratic history. All the interviewees acknowledged that during the first phase of democratisation, which started in 1987, everything occurred around the so-called Three Kims: Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and Kim Jong-pil. Each of the three Kims founded and led parties that were conducted at their own political will. Bossism in Korea was evident of this way of conducting politics in times of democracy transition during the 1990s.

In Korean politics, what big leaders would do is to create a new party when they no longer control their former party, if that’s possible. Kim Dae-jung created his own party to compete for the Presidency. He created the 12th Democratic Party—a new name for 12th time, to say something. He was the lord and master of his party. Boo-young Lee, former Assemblyman, DUP and GNP. August 2013

The style of charismatic parties is similar here: the boss is in charge of the campaign proposals and of the candidate selection.

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Until Kim Dae-jung’s era, the internal democracy didn’t emerge both in the DUP or also GNP. The boss of the party decided the nomination for the candidates in elections. Ihn-tae You, Assemblyman, DUP. July 2013

Has this changed over time? Some believe that the extreme ‘bossism’ in Korea no longer exists, at least at the party leadership level. Others think that there are still party bosses in charge.

The chairman had the right for making public nomination to candidates. That way, the party was working in perfect order. This changed in more recent years. During Mr. Lee Myung-bak’s presidential administration [2008-2013], there was some distance from [his party] Saenuri. At that time the current President of Korea, Miss Park Geung-he, was already the chairwoman of the party. The party’s owner was already Miss Park. She had been the rival of Mr. Lee in previous presidential election’s party primary. Jeong-ha Park, spokesperson of former President Lee Myun-bak, GNP. August 2013

Upon the death or retirement of the three Kims, the parties they created no longer ran—at least not under the same label. Currently, some factions within parties resemble their former leaders, yet such factions still need to compete with others.

Today, parties are less dependent upon strong defining figures like the three Kims. You know, the three Kims were always leaders of their parties, so it was not possible to differentiate party from the leader. Personalism is playing now a minor role in comparison to the three Kims’ era, but the problem is now about what parties stand for in terms of programmatic offer. Tae-keung Ha, Assemblyman, GNP. July 2013

We have factions, each of which wants to nominate their own members. The national leadership cannot dismiss factions, so the right for nomination was divided by each small-boss. The one-boss system is gone, but we have now the multi-boss system. Name held in reserve, Assemblyman, DUP. July 2013.

Although in Korea the big influential leaders of the 1990s are not controlling the parties, the continued rebranding of party names opens potential gateways for new leaders to establish parties.

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Chile

The sole probability of having personalistic leaderships is ruled out in Chile, at least as a principle. No matter what part of the ideological spectrum they stand for, interviewees consider that in this country there is no room for charismatic leaders of loose ideological parties, or caudillos.151 This holds true even for minor parties that are not represented in the National Congress.

Caudillos do not have destiny in Chile. If you look at our democratic history, we have had strong political leaders, but people outside parties, or using parties for their own benefit, are lost here. Antonio Horvath, Senator, RN. January 2013

We all attended a social laboratory of what could have happened in Chile regarding caudillism: look back at 2011, when all the massive social movements took the streets and parties and traditional politicians were largely questioned. No one charismatic figure emerged! I think Chileans are afraid of personalistic politics, or, put it the other way round, personalistic politics do not pay off in Chile. Maybe the people distrust parties, but they distrust more caudillos from either inside or outside parties. Danilo Monteverde, PH chairman. March 2013

The impersonalism of parties is a valuable feature in Chilean politics, which does not mean that strong personalities are absent. As in most democracies, electoral competition tends to be candidate-centred. But legislative and presidential elections are different to party politics. Many interviewees believe that any mention of caudillism can be a handicap for a party. Caudillism is also associated to corruption and perverse clientelism practised in some other Latin American countries, from which the Chilean political elite feels rather set apart.

There was only one Chilean party active during the 2000s that can be considered in this category. It is the Regionalist Action Party (PAR), a local organisation that was present in the northern regions of Chile. The party was particularly strong in one district, Iquique, thanks to the caudillo Jorge Soria, the former mayor of that city. He founded the party and selected the

151 The introduction of the concept of “caudillism” and its synonymous “caciquism” (for ‘caciques’ or bosses) into the Anglo-American scholarship on Latin American politics is not recent. See Chapman (1932).

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candidates, one of whom was elected as deputy in 2005 (Marta Isasi). PAR eventually disappeared.

5.6.4 Promising party leadership

The literature usually takes leaders who have founded parties and have remained with them as chairmen or equivalent posts for charismatic figures—as they probably are. Whilst these features can be characteristic of any charismatic leader especially in developing democracies, they stress a difference when they fill parties with programmatic content. The party turns out to be programmatic and not plainly charismatic and offers an ideological platform to voters, or is increasingly performing in that way. The leader helps exacerbate the ideological characteristics of the organisation.

Estonia

There are many voters who don’t care for what party they vote for, but the party leader they vote for. Edgar Savisaar [EK] is clearly one of those. I’m sure also that some people also voted for Mart Laar [IRL] but they didn’t ever think about that party. I think some people vote for me and it is not important what party I am from. Mart Nutt, MP, IRL. September 2012

Every medal has two sides: the good one and the bad one. The good one is that the person, like Mr. Savisaar—but I would like to mention Mr. Ansip [Reform Party] too—, a strongman, is respected as a wise man. There’s a lot of people standing behind Savisaar, behind Ansip. The bad thing is that there is less democratic discussions, less different roundtable meetings, less participation of different opinions. Rein Ratas, city councillor, EK. November 2012

Most interviewees in Estonia came up with the idea of strong leaderships when they were asked about some defining features of their political system. The most divisive figure is Edgar Savisaar, former member of the Estonian Soviet government and a leading figure of the independent movement through the Popular Front (Rahvarinne). He founded the Centre Party in 1991 and since then has served as its president, with a 6-month interruption between 1995 and 1996. Main decisions in the Centre Party are taken by Savisaar, his critics inside and outside the party state. But he has also strong defenders.

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He’s a strong leader. What he is thinking about is what matters. […] This kind of internal belief that he is the guy is given by his strong character. In a moment of crisis he knows what to do. People nostalgically want someone who takes them strongly somewhere, leads to somewhere, because they seem to have the right answers. Mailis Reps, MP, EK. November 2012

[Savisaar] is definitely the most charismatic of the top politicians. And if we compare the votes that he obtained during elections, he would represent one quarter of the vote for our party. So no one has gained more votes than him in history. At the same time he has established a party that gives room to those people that are not so well represented by other parties. I mean people who are earning the lower salaries, who are pensioners, Russian speaking minorities. Kadri Simson, MP, EK. September 2012

In spite of the fact that most critiques go against Savisaar, he is not alone. Andrus Ansip, leader of the Reform Party [ER] and Prime Minister of Estonia,152 is considered authoritarian by his opponents and even by some insiders. Rivals think that Ansip belongs to the same group of charismatic leaders.

The Prime Minister [Andrus Ansip] has a club of three people who have decided what to do to the country for over 10 years now. That is not good for Estonia. The leader resolves about almost everything. ER copied the model of the EK: members must be loyal to the charismatic leader. Indrek Saar, MP, SDE. October 2012

However, almost all members of ER interviewed claim that inside the party there is room for debate. MP Kaja Kallas considers that newcomers’ opinions are not always taken into account, though, and she says that sometimes women are set apart from the rest. But she does not go so far as to claim that ER is like EK. Other newcomers do not see an oppressive environment in ER which does not allow them to dissent from the leader.

There is no personalism at ER. We have several discussions about all issues, and we don’t have a better discipline than the other parties […] I know PM Ansip is emphatic

152 At the time of this fieldwork.

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when he speaks, but he understands all the arguments and does not have problems to change his mind if necessary. Andrei Korobeinik, MP, ER. November 2012

So far, these cases in Estonia show rather charismatic parties.

Chile

Some similar questions are presented in one of the two right-wing parties in Chile. National Renewal (RN) has been chaired by millionaire Carlos Larraín since 2006. According to his critics, his tenure has been tyrannical. They claim that due to the lure of money Larraín has supported candidates who, in return, support his party. Larraín refuses to be qualified as authoritarian and defies to be contested by anyone who wants him out.

On one hand, parties that are strong are more stable, which is a desirable condition in a democracy. On the other hand, voters think that strong parties end up serving themselves and not to the people, so they [voters] get distant from parties. When this distance grows, then the existence of caciquismo [bossism] is more likely. The chairman of our party is lord and master. He [Carlos Larraín] controls the leadership board and the party machine. His style of governing the party is authoritarian. His leadership style is not different from what we see in countries with weak parties. We don’t have room for greater debate. So we the dissidence have two options: we go away or we resist until he [Larraín] leaves. Karla Rubilar, Deputy, RN. January 2013

We practice internal democracy intensively. For instance, we are more democratic than the UDI. We are one-member, one-vote. Everyone here can have her opinion heard. They say that I control the party. That’s nonsense. OK, this is easy to solve: they can compete and control the party! But you know what has happened? They haven’t won one [internal] election. What do they imply when they say I fund candidacies and that way I control the party? Are they saying that such candidates are all mercenaries? Carlos Larraín, Senator, RN chairman. January 2013

Albeit Carlos Larraín is indeed a dominant leader in this party at the time of this fieldwork, it is also true that he is not the most popular politician within the party. Indeed, he has promoted others as candidates for the country’s Presidency. At the time of this interview he was senator,

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but the seat was given to him as a replacement post from democratically elected Senator Andrés Allamand. Thus, there is room to consider Larraín’s tenure as a bureaucratic type of leader as well as charismatic. There are two factors that weigh the decision to include this party in the charismatic leadership type. Firstly, Larraín has embraced more conservative flags to a party that is both right-wing liberal and conservative. Some insiders claim that Larraín’s conservative appeal has made voters confound him with the party itself. And secondly, Larraín is an important source of money and resources for campaigning.

Nonetheless, if the party chairman follows ideological lines, this at least allows voters to distinguish the party on their programmatic basis. That is to say, the leader does not own the party with his/her personality alone, but with some specific programmatic discourse. If the party formed the sole basis of a leader, without ideological content, then there would not be room to challenge the leader.

I don’t like the style of Carlos Larraín. He is authoritarian and has not made any good to the party. Nonetheless, I don´t think we see in Chile high degree levels of personalism. Despite having strong leaders, they are still framed by their parties and he [Larraín] can be contested. Joaquín Godoy, Deputy, RN. January 2013

Henceforth, as of 2013, the case of National Renewal leadership was at the precipice of two types: sophisticated and promising. Larraín did not found the party, although he has been serving as chairman since 2006. Other elements, including the mimesis between party programme and leader, and his funding role, make this party leadership slightly better positioned on the promising side. Larraín’s example shows that party leaderships can change over time. In the case of charismatic leaders in programmatic parties, if the leader has gone and nobody close to him replaces—including relatives or close aides—, and the party manages to survive with new leaders, what remains is the programmatic nature of the party.153

153 Update: By January 2014, five legislators (including interviewees Karla Rubilar, Joaquín Godoy and Antonio Horvath) had recently defected from RN. Whilst all these new elements could confirm the charismatic leadership style of RN, in June 2014 Carlos Larraín stepped down as chairman. Therefore, if we look to update the situation as of 2014, it is more reasonable to reallocate RN into the bureaucratic leadership style (into the sophisticated party leadership type)

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Estonia

The Chilean cases show the complex mix that can occur in charismatic settings when programmatic content is introduced. I refer back to Estonia, because its cases are more complex than initially thought. In the EK congress held on August 2011, Savisaar’s chairmanship in EK was almost successfully challenged by Jüri Ratas, a young leader who got 41% of the internal votes. That was the first time that Savisaar’s leadership was seriously in danger. Although five supporters of Ratas, including three MPs, decided to leave the party after his defeat, Ratas stayed in order to prevent in-house fighting.

We saw that we couldn’t move the system or change the system from the inside. It wasn’t likely and, in fact, we lost. A lot happened and we decided to quit. With Savisaar we don’t want to have these kind of pointless battles for 4-5 more years. Rainer Vakra, MP, independent [defected EK]. November 2012

There were two candidates to the [EK] chairman’s position, Edgar Savisaar and me. Look, SDE had the same election only two or three years ago. In ER and IRL there was only one candidate. I don’t know whether this is a kind of democracy trigger or not, but we had two alternatives in our party! After the defeat, to decide to stay in the party was a very hard career decision. Why was it too hard for me to move away? Because 41% of my party members supported me. I asked myself what would be my answer to them. […]They [defectors] had a little bit more possibilities to the ‘moving away and making a new party in the future’ thing. For me it was quite hard. Look, 41% percent in my party supported me. It wasn’t very simple. Jüri Ratas, MP, EK. October 2012

The challenge against Savisaar confirms that although he is the most relevant figure of the party, he is not the ‘political almighty’. The party is filled with programmatic content (aligned with SDE in many social and economic issues), even in spite of critics who claim the party cannot be classified in an ideological scale. What is also important is that the challenger of Savisaar decided to remain in the party, which gives way to possible future challenges and furthers party democratisation. The key acid test to confirm this party in this type is: What will

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happen with Savisaar out of the party? At the time of the interview, most of the Centre Party interviewees were strong believers in the strength of the party itself.154

A similar thing can be said about the Reform Party. Already programmatic, the leadership rotation is a key factor to consider to what extent its charismatic nature gives way to more bureaucratic authority. At the time of this fieldwork, its leader, Andrus Ansip, had announced he would not lead another party campaign.155

In previous pages I have shown the main characteristics of the four ideal types of party leaderships (sophisticated, blurred, egocentric and promising) and how parties from Chile, Estonia and Korea correspond to each type. Sometimes the distinction lines between each type are subject to debate, which is telling about party system dynamics: parties do not necessarily remain the same type all the time. Parties, then, can be assessed on how they have recently been, or by how they have historically been. To add more evidence for an assessment in both matters, I will now consider the long-term data around party leaderships.

5.7 Party leadership duration

The three party systems under study show some key differences in the way party leadership is usually managed. Although I have assessed parties according to different types, some relevant evidence is missing: the duration of party leaderships. Considering that according to Korean and Estonian interviewees the leaders are of high importance in their respective political systems, and according to the Chilean interviewees the leaders are of less relevance to the functioning of the Chilean political system, all should be reflected in the effective duration and rotation of leaders.156

I assembled an original dataset with all leaderships from all parties which gained representation at least once in all country studies since they regained democracy. Table 5.2

154 Update: after the recent elections of 2015, the Centre Party once again secured the second largest share of seats. The leading party, Reform Party, refused any coalition negotiation with the Centre Party as long as Savisaar is in power. Some MP members asked for leadership renewal. In March 2015, Savisaar was hospitalised due to a leg infection and subsequent amputation. MP Kadri Simson is the current caretaker chair of the party, although Savisaar has been coming back to his duties. 155 Update: in March 2014, Ansip resigned his post as Prime Minister and ER leader. Taavis Rõivas subsequently took up the position. 156 See Appendix E 2 for a graph showing the distribution of leaderships.

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summarises each leader’s total years as party chair, expressed as a percentage of the sum of years of chairmanships in all parties per country.

TABLE 5.2 Leaders net duration157 as % of all leaderships

Leader Chile Estonia Korea 1 4.5 7.9 10.5 2 9.0 11.6 17.5 3 12.7 15.4 23.8 4 16.0 19.1 28.6 5 19.3 22.7 33.0 6 22.5 26.0 36.8 7 25.4 29.0 40.6 8 28.3 32.0 43.2 9 30.9 34.6 45.1 10 33.4 37.3 47.0 11 35.9 39.9 48.9 12 38.3 42.1 50.8 13 40.4 44.4 52.7 14 42.4 46.6 54.6 15 44.1 48.7 56.5 16… n 55.9 51.3 43.5 Note: Each column per country sums 100%. Source: author’s dataset based on the following sources for country. Chile: Parties' websites, Chile's National Congress Library, Electoral Service, Memoria Chilena. Estonia: Parties’ websites, National Election Commitee, Bugajski 2002, Estonian History of Political Parties. Korea: Parties’ websites; CIA Factbook, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Lee (2014); Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001); Chosun Ilbo newspaper; Korea Times, Encyclopædia Britannica.

In Korea, Kim Dae-jung led five different parties for an accumulated period of 16.5 years. It means that in the recent party system period of democratic Korea, the duration of the chairmanships of Kim Dae-jung (the ‘leader 1’ of Korea in Table 5.2) represents 10.5% of the years of all chairmanships together in the country. Leaders 2 and 3 in Korea are the other famous Kims (Jong-pil and Young-sam), who account for 7% and 6.3%, respectively. In Estonia,

157 Unique refers to the net leadership duration of one leader. Thus, if a leader has led one party in two different periods, all their periods are summed and counted as one. The period unit is one calendar year. For leaders whose period lasted less than one calendar year, the period unit is computed as 0.5.

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the leader 1 is Edgar Savisaar, who, in the consulted period was the Centre Party’s chairman for 21 net years, or almost 8% of all Estonian party system leaderships duration put together.

This dataset confirms that in Estonia, and especially in Korea, a few leaders construe most of the ‘amount’ of unique leaderships in the political party system. In Korea, five leaders explain the 33% of the total period of leadership in all Korean history after the recovery of democracy up to 2014. In Estonia, for a similar time span and same number of leaders, the percentage is 22.7%, and for Chile it is 19.3%.158 These results offer more evidence to demonstrate that Korea has experienced excessive personalistic party leadership.

5.8 Party leaderships and party system institutionalisation

5.8.1 Classifying case studies

From the evidence gathered it is possible to establish most parties in each country in some of the ideal types. In Table 5.3, parties are included in each quadrant by how they ‘best-fit’ at the time of the fieldwork. Time is an important factor to be aware of, given that parties can change and therefore move from one category to another, yet such moves are not likely to happen frequently. To simplify the table, parties included are those that already existed up to, or were created from, 2000. If parties that existed until 2000 were included, more Korean and Estonian parties should be classified in all—except in sophisticated—types.

158 There are two caveats to consider. Firstly, the older the party system, the less concentrated the number of net leaderships should be. A new party system will obviously have all leaders lasting more or less the same; likewise, in an older system, where actors are dying off, the concentration of leaders is also diluted. Having said that, despite Korea has more democratic years than Chile and Estonia, it still shows more personalism. Secondly, this dataset is not weighted by any seat-share of the parties. Thus, it is not possible to know, from the data alone, if the longstanding chairs belong to important parties or to minor parties. An examination of the data shows that the more lasting chairmanships in Estonia and Korea belong to main parties, whereas in Chile it is distributed between the main and minor parties.

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TABLE 5.3 Ideal types of party leadership in case studies

Sophisticated Promising Social Democratic Party (SDE, Estonia, 1990-1996; 2004-) Pro Patria Res Publica (IRL, Estonia, 2006-)

Russian Party in Estonia (VEE, Estonia, 1994-2012) Constitution Party (K, Estonia, 1994-2008) Pro Patria Union (I, Estonia, 1995-2006) Christian Democracy (DC, Chile, 1988-) Centre Party (EK, Estonia, 1992-) Party for Democracy (PPD, Chile, 1988-) Reform Party (ER, Estonia, 1994-) Humanist Party (PH, Chile, 1988-) Estonian Rural Union (EM, Estonia, 1991-2000) Socialist Party (PS, Chile, 1990-) National Renewal (RN, Chile, 2006-2014, Larraín period) National Renewal (RN, Chile, 1988-) Centre Centre Union (UCC, Chile, 1991-2002) Independent Democrat Union (UDI, Chile, 1989-) Our Party (U, Korea, 2003-2007) Radical Social Democratic Party (PRSD, Chile, 1994-) Communist Party (PC, Chile, 1990-) Regionalist Party of Independents (PRI, Chile, 2006-) Liberal Party (PL, Chile, 2008-) Democratic Labour Party (DLP, Korea, 2000-2011) Unified Progressive Party (UPP, Korea, 2011-) Justice Party (JP, Korea, 2012-) Blurred Egocentric

Regionalist Action Party (PAR, Chile, 2004-2006) Estonian Greens (EER, Estonia, 2005-) National Congress for New Politics (NCNP, Korea, 1995-2000) Res Publica (RP, Estonia, 2001-2006) United Liberal Democrats (ULD, Korea, 2000-2006) Estonian Pensioners’ Union (EPL, Estonia, 1991-2000) Democratic Party 2007/Centrist Reformist Democratic Party (DP Estonian Coalition Party (EK, Estonia, 1992-2002) 2007, Korea, 2007-2008) Grand National Party/New Frontier Party (GNP, Korea, United New Democratic Party (UNDP, Korea, 2007-2008) 1997-) Creative Korea Party (CKP, Korea, 2007-2012) Democratic Party 2011 (DUP, Korea, 2011-)159 Democratic Party 2008 (DP 2008, Korea, 2008-2011) Millennium Democratic Party/Democratic Party 2000 (MDP, Advancement Unification Party/Liberty Forward Party (AUP, LFP, Korea, 2000-2007) Korea, 2008-2012) Future Hope Alliance (FHA, Korea, 2008-2012)

Note: Parties in bold are active parties as of 2014. Non-bolded parties existed at any time between 2000 and 2013.

According to Table 5.3, it is possible to depict the Chilean party system leadership as mostly sophisticated, and the Estonian party system as mixed sophisticated-promising. The Korean

159 The party was dissolved in 2014. It was replaced by New Politics Alliance for Democracy (Saejeongchi Yeonhap).

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party system needs a different specification. It seems to be currently mixed blurred- sophisticated, but it is historically mostly egocentric. The relative strength of parties’ health in Chile is indicative of the institutional stability of its system, whereas the programmatic building process in Estonia and, to a much lesser extent, in Korea, is revealing about their relative success in becoming consolidated.

The evidence gathered permits one to infer that the Hypothesis 5.1—party systems with non- personalistic leaders and programmatic parties are more institutionalised—may be confirmed. Chilean parties fitting into the category of mostly sophisticated party system leadership are coherent with its more institutionalised party system. The parties belonging to that type are the most voted parties, and most of this group are relatively tenacious considering the democracy age. Only three charismatic party leaderships are included: two in the promising type (Centre Centre Union, now disappeared, and National Renewal under Carlos Larraín), and one in the egocentric type (Regionalist Action Party, disappeared). National Renewal is, however, also considered as a bureaucratic authority class if an assessment of its whole history is contrived, thus there are reasons to place it into the sophisticated quadrant. If that was the case, then the Chilean party system leadership should be considered fully sophisticated.160

Hypothesis 5.2 states that a combination of personalistic leaders and programmatic parties can boost party system institutionalisation more than it could in an absence of personalistic leaders and programmatic parties. The evidence gathered, especially from Estonia and Korea, helps confirm the hypothesis. From the same Table 5.3 it is possible to distinguish the four current Estonian parliamentary parties as being mostly programmatic. In two of them (SDE and IRL), leadership rotation has become apparent. ER and EK have also increasingly built their programmatic structures around specific visions of society and economy; their leaders are more powerful inside their parties, but can be contested. The Estonian transition to a more programmatic and less charismatic party leader types is consistent with the stabilisation of its whole party system. It shows that when personalistic politics meet long-term policies, PSI can increase. The institutionalisation process can become slower when parties are not programmatic, as the Korean example shows. The current two main Korean parties (GNP and

160 In Chile, only PAR is considered in the egocentric type. Its electoral relevance, however, is insignificant (0.4% of national votes in 2005).

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DUP) are insufficiently programmatic, as seen in Table 5.3, but at least two of the minor parties with electoral representation (UPP and JP) are more programmatic.

The Korean case is also illustrative of the perils of having, in addition to non-programmatic parties, only personalistic leaders in charge of their said parties. Korea during the 2000s had parties that were rather charismatic and scarcely programmatic. That combination was evident especially in the 2004 general elections, when the electoral volatility climbed up to 50% compared to in 2000. With that evidence, and the absence of the same patterns for Chile and Estonia, Hypothesis 5.3—non-programmatic and rather personalistic party leaderships leading to party system under-institutionalisation—can be confirmed.

In Korea, there were two different stories. In the past, pivotal figures dominated politics and electoral support. As the myriad of parties no longer existent reveals, leaders were the parties. The egocentric quadrant in Table 5.3 is full of Korean extinct parties. There is little doubt that, historically speaking, the Korean party system leadership was mostly egocentric. That quadrant only shows parties existing in and after 2000, but it is plausible to assume that this type was similar or even more exacerbated in the 1990s. Currently, however, leadership positions in main parties are rotated. The pending task is to fill parties with more programmatic content. The two other minor parties are highly programmatic and their leaderships are not charismatic. These minor leftist parties, which are present in the National Assembly, are the ones which allow the Korean party system leadership to have some kind of sophisticated flavour; otherwise, it would be proportionate between egocentric and blurred types. The inconsistent evolution towards a more sophisticated or even promising type seems coherent with the interrupted process towards party system institutionalisation.

5.8.2 Wider application of the typology

I have contended so far that, contrary to mainstream acceptance, personalism can help institutionalise party systems. For that to happen, however, it should be on a par with a more programmatic party content. This thesis has associated this combination with a type labelled as promising party leadership.

In order to see if the promising type can be associated with higher levels of PSI in most cases, I will now look to add some data from the expert survey of the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project 2008-09 as mentioned earlier. The following figure (5.1) shows the experts’

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scores on two dimensions: parties that are policy-oriented (from 1, least policy-oriented, to 4, most policy-oriented), and parties with charismatic leadership (same 1-4 scale). A total of 130 parties from 20 developed countries are evaluated. The Y axis features the programmatic (policy) nature of the parties, and the X axis indicates if the authority class is bureaucratic or charismatic. The graph is sectioned to mark the 2.5 points of each scale, so everything above indicates more of the item (i.e., more programmatic, more charismatic), and everything below indicates less of the item. That way I can reproduce the quadrants of the four ideal types of party leaderships.

FIGURE 5.1 Position of parties in scale between programmatic content and authority class

Source: Kitschelt (2013).

There are three main conclusions from Figure 5.1. Firstly, almost all the parties are programmatic-oriented, which is revealing about a condition that seems essential for high levels of stability—a characteristic mostly shared by mature democracies. Secondly, there are almost equally distributed parties featuring bureaucratic and charismatic authority. There is some room to interpret that charismatic styles are somehow over-reported,161 but the

161 Hawkings (2011) mentions that the conceptualisation of charismatic party leaderships could not have been well- understood by all experts.

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aggregate evidence indicates that personalistic authority (charismatic leaders) does not necessarily ensue a correlation with party system instability. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight that any contribution of charismatic leaderships towards party system consolidation is not equally important as the programmatic orientation of the same parties. In addition, one can further suggest that once party systems have achieved certain levels of maturity (so other democratic institutions that are already in place), having charismatic leaders does not represent the same perils as it does in inchoate party systems.

Thirdly, following the four ideal types of party leaderships for newer democracies, most of the developed countries fit into either the sophisticated or the promising types. Both are related to higher levels of party system stability.

5.8.3 Further reflections

The way parties are managed is relevant to any process of institutionalisation of party systems. As it is well established, the consolidation of a system is more likely when parties are programmatic-based. In settings where parties are mostly programmatic, the party system institutionalisation comes earlier if leadership is routinely contested and transferred. Thus, the best environment for an institutionalised party system is one where most or all of the parties are programmatic-based and have bureaucratic authority. Programmatic parties work well when internal leadership is competitive, because no actor or faction can own the party machine. Competition is not necessarily a means to have limited or rather short periods of formal leadership, but it does instead offer the possibility to win the highest positions in a party. Routine leadership rotation is seen as a natural phenomenon.

In contradiction, the least welcoming environment for party system institutionalisation is one where parties are non-programmatic and their authority is essentially charismatic. In such settings, parties are mostly driven by leaders and elites rather than by citizens. Voters are given options which are not based on whole principles, but on groups of individuals held together around a specific personality. A party system built around charismatic figures who lead programmatically diffused organisations is likely to be unstable, as the case of Korea showed in the past.

There are two other options that shed further light on what contributes to party system institutionalisation. On the one hand, there are non-programmatic parties that do have a

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routine rotation of leadership. This setting can positively push for a process of institutionalisation given that, at least, parties do not act as mere vehicles of representation for personalities. Many party systems fit into this category, especially those having catch-all parties—not uncommon even in mature democracies.162 It is expected that once a party already has an established way of changing its leaders, more formal charts of principles could follow suit, unless the mentioned party is old enough to change its unimpeded identity,163 or chaotic enough to last much longer. Thus, this type of party leadership can be either a transitional type towards a programmatic party, or a type established on its own. If all main parties in an emerging democracy’s party system are of this type, it would not be possible to expect a highly institutionalised party system, as the Korean case shows.

On the other hand, there are programmatic parties with charismatic leaders. This idea challenges Kitschelt’s (2000: 855) enunciation that both dimensions cannot be together. They can. When leaders found parties, or become dominant figures of the parties which they (usually) chair, they can also build programmatic-based platforms. The process of programme- building would normally take time, which is compatible with the association of charismatic leaders as long-lasting chairpersons. The programme is not necessarily tailored to any leader’s new ideology, but it can be an established ideology that the leader and their coterie subscribe to. The Estonian case shows that this type of party system leadership (promising) can facilitate the process of party system institutionalisation. There is a diffuse limit on where this party system’s leadership stops contributing further to PSI, which seems indicative that a full promising type would not correlate with highly institutionalised party systems in newer democracies. The fact that the main figure of a party can be defied by internal opposition necessarily strengthens the party institutional framework. If a leader can be beaten and replaced, they are ultimately not the only resource in a partisan organisation—regardless of how much they and their supporters ponder their value. The condition of possible replacement can be understood either as cause or as consequence of the programmatic nature of parties. If taken as a cause, it means that the leader has probably created the conditions in order to build solid structures in the party with dense ideological debates (top-

162 Factions within catch-all parties might be more programmatically oriented and defined. However, as the unit of interest here is the party level, faction level analysis is not appropriate in this context. 163 Paramount examples of longstanding catch-all parties are the Justicialist Party (Argentina), National Congress Party (India) and Liberal Democratic Party (Japan). Interestingly, none of these party systems show levels of electoral volatility as low as in typical mature democracies.

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down approach). If we consider it as a consequence, it means that the party affiliates have found their way to open internal discussions that are so wide and deep that they can put their own leader to the test (bottom-up approach). Programmatic-building process could even be top-down and bottom-up at the same time, or one after the other.

5.9 Conclusions

This chapter has covered distinctive types of party leaderships, based on a dual dimension: programmatic content and authority. Inspired by the literature, four ideal types were derived: sophisticated, promising, blurred and egocentric. The overall evidence gave support to the idea that personalistic party leaders should no longer be perceived as intrinsically pervasive for party system institutionalisation in newer democracies.

There is a high level of congruence between programmatic-based parties with bureaucratic authority (i.e., sophisticated party leadership) and party system institutionalisation, like the Chilean party system shows. The programmatic nature of a party is reinforced when its leadership is routinely changed, as it means that nobody can embody the party themselves. The party is not the prolongation of a boss, even if some internal leaders control large factions.

However, in certain contexts where ideological density is present and, for different circumstances, it is associated with a big personality, such a figure is not harmful per se. On the contrary, personalist figures can endure programmatic parties and, that way, help institutionalise party systems. As it was seen, and especially in Estonia’s Centre Party with Edgar Savisaar (also in the Reform Party), his figure allowed the Russian minority to support a party whilst traditional followers were not necessarily alienated. Progressively, there is a programmatic-building process in the party, and Savisaar has been seriously challenged as leader. Importantly, his challenger did not defect the party and since then has led an opposition faction. The acid test of the consolidation of the party, and to a large extent of its party system, will come when Savisaar is out of the chairmanship. This all indicates that the Centre Party can survive. What the Centre Party shows is not unique to Estonia. In general, developed countries with stable party systems may have many promising party leaderships.

For a party system to institutionalise, the most important factor is to have programmatic- based parties. The class of party authority comes after, as the Korean party system has shown

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over time: if not entirely programmatic, the party system should at least be non-personalistic to avoid chronic under-institutionalisation.

In summary, the most relevant dimension in a party system leadership is its programmatic content, followed by its authority. The more programmatic the party system, and secondly, the more bureaucratic its leadership (sophisticated type), the more institutionalised it is. It is therefore better for the institutionalisation of a party system to be programmatic-based with charismatic authority (promising type) than non-programmatic-based with bureaucratic authority (blurred type). It is implied here that, in given circumstances (low levels of cleavage formation, for example), having a strong party leader can be desirable to build programmatic parties, as voters can first be attracted to the leader rather than to any given programme. The least contribution to any process of institutionalisation is the one of non-programmatic parties with charismatic authority (egocentric type), because everything occurs around a personality’s will, and not around the collective will. This final type can only lead to party system under- institutionalisation.

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CHAPTER SIX Parties fight each other and have no interest in the people. But this has happened all the time. CAN PARTY SYSTEMS BE CONSIDERED Elections go well, so I can say the political system is developed. Call it democracy. EGITIMATE L ? Male respondent, 69. Gwangju, Korea.

6.1 Introduction The concept of legitimacy is like the flame on the hob: everybody uses it to cook, but nobody is really eager to touch it. With a touch of sarcasm, Huntington said that “legitimacy is a mushy concept that political analysts do well to avoid” (1991: 46). What, then, do we mean when we talk about political legitimacy? Does it relate to the process of institutionalisation of party systems, and if so, how? This chapter conducts a careful review of the appropriateness of the dimension of legitimacy in the theory of Party System Institutionalisation (Mainwaring 1999, Mainwaring and Scully 1995). In dealing with the aforementioned questions, it evaluates legitimacy both theoretically and empirically. For the former, it presents a discussion of what should be understood for legitimacy of power and the extent to which the debate agrees or not with the dimension of legitimacy proposed by the theorists of PSI. For the latter, it sorts out different interpretations for the proposition of legitimacy and frames each of them into a conceptual debate. Then, it tests if any of the most plausible ways to understand legitimacy convey meaningful effects on the stability of party systems. To take a deeper review of the matter and provide multiple means for validity, the testing process will be conducted via a variety of mechanisms. The innovative approach combines political elite opinions, public opinion surveys, and unique qualitative data obtained from almost 500 population interviews conducted in 10 cities in Chile, Estonia and Korea. Results show that legitimacy relates to higher levels of party system stability only if its meaning is different to the one proposed by the theory of PSI.

In Mainwaring’s writings on legitimacy, especially Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 5, 14) and Mainwaring (1999: 35), it is proposed that for a party system to be institutionalised, political elites and citizens must perceive both elections and parties as the only means and methods to

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access power. Theoretically speaking, however, we should view political legitimacy in a more complex way: the general people’s perception that the exercise of power by a political regime is recognised and justified. I will elaborate more on this definition in the next section, but for now I stress that this definition is ultimately framed by a democratic understanding of political legitimacy.

If, nonetheless, we stick to what the original theory proponents think about legitimacy, is this concept of legitimacy still irrelevant to understand party system institutionalisation? The original PSI theory is somewhat unclear around the definition of legitimacy and in some cases assigns different objects and subjects of legitimacy. This chapter covers all of the original theory of PSI approaches to the referred dimension in the fairest possible way. If any or all of the PSI theory’s understandings of legitimacy do indeed contribute to party system institutionalisation, then the original theory might be right to link it to such a process of consolidation. In my opinion, though, legitimacy is misplaced in the theory of PSI.

I contend that any sort of ‘legitimacy’ of elections and parties would not contribute to any party system institutionalisation, because legitimacy is conceptually relevant only for a debate on democracy. That is to say, we can better understand legitimacy as a dimension of democracy institutionalisation.164 The scholarship on party system institutionalisation has already debated the validity of the proposed dimension of legitimacy, but insufficiently. Whilst the original proponents claim legitimacy is relevant to ascertain institutionalisation, others like Hicken and Kuhonta (2011), Luna and Altman (2011) and Zucco (forthcoming) are more elusive in tackling such dimensions in the PSI theoretical framework. Hicken and Kuhonta assert that legitimacy is more related to regime—not party system—stability (2011: 20). Given that Mainwaring (1999) has also mentioned that it is not necessary for all of the four PSI dimensions to run in the same direction, legitimacy can easily be taken as one of those ‘unrelated’ dimensions per se.

In order to assess the different conceptual and empirical paths that legitimacy and party system institutionalisation take, I offer, firstly, a theoretical discussion about the conceptualisation of legitimacy. Secondly, I will look into which original PSI propositions are implied for legitimacy as one of its dimensions. This is followed by the hypotheses, and a

164 Hicken and Kuhonta (2011, 2015) add that authoritarian regimes can also be institutionalised in line with the consolidation of their own restricted party schemes.

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presentation of different sets of data and methods to analyse them. I contend that no matter how one assesses the role of legitimacy, it is consistently off topic regarding the stability of systems of parties. Exceptions, however, can be made to the relationship between political legitimacy (as a whole) and the stability of party systems.

6.2 The boundaries of legitimacy According to Max Weber (1978 [1922]), political legitimacy is the belief or faith that participants place in their political system. It means that the participants accept the exercise of institutional authority in who governs the political system, but it does not mean that they support any specific ruler. In further examination, Beetham claims that legitimacy of power (as he clarifies) requires people’s conformity to rules, shared beliefs in the said rules, and expressed consent to the rules through subordinates’ actions (Beetham 1991: 20). As O’Kane reflects upon the preceding authors, the Weberian definition relies more in beliefs and moral authority, whereas scientifically Beetham’s definition stresses the fact that people’s beliefs can be justified (O’Kane 1993: 472-473). In both cases, legitimacy refers to the relationship between a regime authority and its subordinates.

Lipset (1959: 86) explains that “legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society.” Easton offers a clarifying perspective by saying that legitimacy is “a quality that is ascribed to the norms and structure of a regime” (1965: 286). These accounts lead us to immediately think that it is the political system as a whole, not one of its eventual components (set of parties), that is attributed to be legitimised to work.165 Although it seems that legitimacy eventually leads to general issues about government, there is also a dual manifestation in how governments are on the representative side, and on the other hand, how they respond to their communities’ demands.

In deepening our understanding of legitimacy, Scharpf (1999, 2012) distinguishes between input- and output-oriented legitimacy. Input-oriented legitimacy refers to government by the people, that is to say, of how representative the political regime is of the authentic preferences of the society. Output-oriented legitimacy consists of the government for the people, as this

165 Mainwaring provides his nuance to this approach: “Legitimacy usually refers to attitudes about the political regime as a whole, but the concept can also be attached to particular democratic institutions” (1998b: 75).

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denotes how well-delivered the provision of public goods is to the community (Scharpf 2012: 6, his emphasis).166 Consequently, it can be asserted that legitimacy consists of 1) a belief in the representativeness of the political system of citizens’ preferences, and 2) a belief in the responsiveness of the political system to the citizens’ needs (Birch 1964, Mair 2009).167 As Scharpf suggests, legitimacy relates to collective self-determination, which is what democracies aim towards (1997: 19).168

6.2.1 Input- and output-oriented legitimacy

Thus far, following scholars like Beetham (1991), Easton (1965), Lipset (1958) and Weber (1978 [1922]), political legitimacy can be understood as the people’s beliefs that the political system’s exercise of power is recognised and justified. If we add Scharpf (e.g., 1997) and others (e.g., Birch 1964, Mair 2008, 2009), the exercise of power is based on the representativeness of society’s preferences, and on the effectiveness of the delivery of public goods. If this debate was not based on democracies, then none of these essential characteristics of legitimacy would require a political party system—much less an institutionalised one.

Is any output or input-oriented legitimacy somehow related to PSI, then? Let’s take the case of output-oriented legitimacy. How relevant could parties be in effectively delivering public goods? Political parties are not necessarily essential to the legitimation of government effectiveness, mainly because if a party system is in place, no party can be the government.169 Even more so, Mair claims that parties are doing better as governors or administrators of the polity, given that they have downplayed their role as representatives (2008: 9).170 On the other hand, input- oriented legitimacy is slightly different and may provide more room for claims that link party system institutionalisation with legitimacy. In fact, the only way to legitimise the

166 In general, Scharpf (e.g., 1997, 1999 and 2012) debates the conceptualisation of legitimacy as applied to welfare states and the role of supra-governments, namely the European Union. Nevertheless, legitimacy as a dual mirror of representativeness and responsiveness can indeed be applied to any political process. 167 Scharpf calls these two dimensions “authenticity”, in looking at how authentically represented the citizens’ preferences are, and “effectiveness”, for how well governments achieve their goals (1997: 19). 168 Dogan (1992) provides a literature review accounting for how legitimacy conceptualisation has changed over time. He acknowledges, for instance, that the concept acquired another dimension with the emergence of democratic regimes (p. 116-117) 169 This is not a discussion about political parties’ accountability. Citizens hold parties responsible for ineffective governance, but that does not mean that citizens delegitimise the role of the government as the most effective body in charge of delivering public goods. 170 For example, in a record of 589 days (2010-2011), Belgian political parties did not agree to form a government, but it did not impede the bureaucracy by in running regular programmes and by providing citizens with public goods.

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representativeness of a political system is through functioning parties, regular free and fair elections and, in general, institutions and rules which are known and accepted by the society. As a result of this, political parties would be relevant to understand input-oriented legitimacy, but we should not lose sight of the fact that legitimacy is about the political system and not party systems. To make this point clear: if party systems are more stable, it does not necessarily follow that the political system is ‘legitimate’—or vice versa.

This all leads us to think of legitimacy in much broader terms. If, for some reason, participants of the political system in place lose their faith in it, the said system becomes illegitimate, and all of its structural components—including its party system—may fall apart and be replaced. But if only the party system is the one that gets questioned, then the party system could be weakened and perhaps even modified. However, the political system can retain its legitimacy and may even strengthen it in doing so.

6.2.2 Legitimacy and democracy

This thesis contends that legitimacy escapes the debate around party system institutionalisation. Legitimacy deals with the justification of political regimes, especially between democratic and authoritarian governments (Huntington 1991: 46). When Mainwaring (and co-authors) say that elections should be validated as a means to access power, they are targeting how democracy should work. This is understandable. At the time of writing, Mainwaring and other scholars of Latin American politics witnessed the third wave of democratisation with a note of caution. Many regimes were indeed developing promising democracies (e.g., Uruguay, Argentina, Chile) whilst others were experiencing some reversals (e.g., Peru, Brazil). For these scholars, the commitment to democratic values was too important to be overlooked and, therefore, they should be organically connected to the institutionalisation of their party systems. As a matter of fact, Mainwaring rightly links parties with democratic legitimacy (1999: 14-15).

However, the referred scholarship unintentionally mixes democracy and party systems. Democratic settings require a minimum record of fair elections and competitive parties to work (Huntington 1991, Schumpeter 1943). But highly stable party systems and highly unstable party systems can both work in a society where democracy is legitimised though elections in order to access power. If the elections are not entirely fair and free, there might be a problem with the legitimacy of such democracy. In a similar vein highly stable or highly unstable party

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systems can work in a semi-democratic setting. As Hicken and Kuhonta (2011) emphasise after their research on Asian politics, a party system can be consolidated in semi-democratic as well as in democratic contexts. The explanation lies in the fact that as far as a political system allows the citizens to feel represented, in a minimum required competitive environment, it also comes to terms with legitimacy.171

In a discussion about institutionalisation, legitimacy ought to be linked to how democracies— not party systems—consolidate. Given that elections and parties are sine qua non factors present in any democracy or semi-democracy, the pure validation of fair elections and the existence of competitive parties provides democratic legitimacy to the system; they do not award any sort of ‘legitimacy’ to the party system. Even if parties are not considered credible or trustworthy by most citizens or political elites, for whatsoever reason, it does not mean that the party system will not display well-known patterns of behaviour, which is what matters most for its institutionalisation process. The decrease in trust of parties in mature democracies is well-known, however citizens keep on choosing the same parties election after election. As Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 4) define, the institutionalisation of party systems is the process that makes practices or organisations well established, widely known, and even accepted. Some may confuse acceptance with approval. Being accepted does not necessarily mean being approved of or being trusted (‘legitimated’), but instead being considered as part of the whole political system.

In this section I have tried to highlight that, theoretically speaking, legitimacy is wrongly placed as a dimension for a theory on party system institutionalisation. To provide evidence that could show that the relationship is inappropriate, though, one also needs to concur with what the original propositions mean by legitimacy. Therefore, for a party system to be ‘legitimate’, if we follow the proponents, one ought to expect that citizens and political elites have deposited their belief in it. Starting in the next section, I will discuss the implications of this approach.

171 Even in a non-democratic environment there could be legitimacy of the government, usually referred to as ‘performance legitimacy’ (Huntington 1991). An extreme example is a monarchic regime, where no parties are in place and only the royalty embodies the popular representation. Another example is what some scholars call one- party state systems, like communist regimes. In both situations, for whatsoever reason most of the populace feels represented by the government, then the regime itself—or its party-state—can be seen as legitimate. Nonetheless, this present research on party systems emphasises that for a party system to exist, there should be at least two parties competing for power (Sartori 1976). Therefore, this footnote about government legitimacy for regimes not having party systems should only be taken as a side note in order to illustrate a broader point.

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6.3 By whom and to whom? In the proposition of the theory of PSI (Mainwaring 1999, Mainwaring and Scully 1995), there are, widely expressed, two subjects of legitimacy and two objects of legitimacy. According to this framework, the two subjects for legitimacy are the citizenry and the political elites, and the two objects are elections and parties.

In order to understand how these two pairs work, Table 6.1 displays a brief description for each category.

TABLE 6.1 Description of subjects and objects of legitimacy

Objects Elections Parties

The people validate elections as The electorate positively sees parties the only method in which to use and considers them as the primordial

Citizenry and access power. entity to compete and govern.

Subjects Subjects Major political actors feel that The elites regard parties and consider elections are the only means to them as the key actor to determine the

Political elites Political access power. accession to power. Source: Author’s adaptation from Mainwaring and Scully (1995: ix, 5, 14, 25) and Mainwaring (1999: 35-36).

According to this depiction (Table 6.1), the legitimation process is similar from both subjects to both objects. Briefly, both citizens and political elites consider elections and parties as the only means in which to determine who accesses power. Now that the ‘legitimacy’ for the theory of PSI is clear, I shall analyse—and criticise—how ‘legitimacy’ is viewed from the elites perspective, and then from the point of view of the citizenry.

6.3.1 Legitimation by the elites

In a democracy, legitimacy is barely understandable if we consider it from the perspective of political elites. An example would be if Louis XIV considered the royalty legitimate as a means of accessing power and the royal succession as means of accessing power: he could have considered it relevant, appropriate or beneficial, however political legitimacy only lies within people’s beliefs. To legitimise something is different than interpreting people’s legitimacy of

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something. Louis XIV could rightly have interpreted the people’s beliefs—something that Louis XVI seemed somehow unable to do—because his source of legitimacy was the divine right of his lineage. The French people seemingly agreed and supported that source of legitimacy during that time. Thus, the real question to ask when we talk about party systems has to be posed in some sort of democratic context, and it should consider whether elites correctly interpret the citizenry’s pursuit for legitimacy in elections and parties. If elites do not understand what the citizens are considering legitimate, it is not just the party system which is at stake, but the whole political regime—which links directly to the quality of democracy.

One may consider, however, the idea behind the original proposition. One can say that the more validated the parties and elections are by the political elites, the better established the party system is—i.e., if the participants agree that the system works, then the system will work and last. This assessment has two problems, though. Firstly, the fact that their own participants proclaim the validity of the system they lead, could be proof of anything but self- interest. Surely, it could happen that Parliament outsiders will in general be more critical of the system, but such criticism is hardly differentiable between party systems with varied degrees of institutionalisation. Secondly, although the validation of the elections does say more about the strength of the process of institutionalisation—they aim for a basic structure of a legitimation process—, having elections refers to the quality of the democratic political system and not directly to the party system.

In summary, any discussion about legitimacy should consider that it stems from below. What is legitimised cannot be processed in the same way to those who are the recipients of legitimacy. Political elites would be able to correctly interpret and represent citizens’ demands, including demands for better parties, but would not be in a position to legitimise the processes or organisations which are the same as those in which political elites have a shaping role. Legitimacy is not passed down from above.

6.3.2 Legitimation by the citizenry

There are two basic claims from the PSI original theory about the role of citizens in what they see as the ‘legitimation’ of party systems. It says that the people are supposed to legitimise the electoral process, and that they also need to legitimise the political parties who participate in the elections. In both cases, the bottom-up approach that a legitimation perspective requires is in place. However, there are also elements that are not well resolved and can cause

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confusion. Firstly, I will talk about a given citizen legitimation of elections, and secondly, about a given citizen legitimation of political parties.

Firstly, in modern political regimes, free and fair elections give legitimacy to democracies. The degree of freedom and fairness (or lack thereof) provides a key feature of the quality in the level of democracy.172 Therefore, citizens who are eligible to vote are the only ones to grant legitimacy to the said system. Citizens need to legitimise the elections—not necessarily by voting—in order to legitimise the outcome of such elections. Especially evident in presidential democracies, presidential candidates with no political party support can be elected. Thus, the citizens’ valuation of elections does not necessarily translate into their valuation of the political parties, nor that legitimation should be considered for the institutionalisation of a party system.

Secondly, the original PSI propositions say that the lower the level of legitimation from voters to political parties, the less institutionalised a party system becomes. This assessment requires a deeper observation. The valuation of the citizens in the role played by political parties in the system is relevant to ascertain to what extent the system is—according to this view— legitimised, but it does not provide clues about the level of institutionalisation of the said party system. As it has been noted in several sections of this thesis, institutionalisation is the process that routinizes the citizens’ choices of political parties and the stabilisation patterns that follow. In no way could the validation of the political parties, by the people, represent a direct assessment of its levels of consolidation. Subsequently, the valuation could provide hints for future trajectories of the institutionalisation. For example, if the perception of the parties is negative, new populist leaders could take advantage and offer off-party solutions to the citizenry—all of which will eventually directly affect the institutionalisation process of that party system. But, contrarily it could also occur that the perception of the parties is negative, the voter turnout is low, and the political parties stay the same over time and remain stable.

It is desirable that citizens feel a high sense of trust for parties, for elections, and in general for all the different institutions. This keeps democracy healthy and alive. However, it does not mean that the parties will be the same all the time. It could certainly happen, theoretically

172 There is an endless debate about the different requirements and conceptualisations of democracy. I have just outlined one common requisite to all definitions, which is the existence of free and fair elections. Other considerations and authors are briefly discussed in Chapter Two (2.2.1).

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speaking, that the trust shown in political parties does not correlate with well organised parties or with parties that offer longstanding programmatic platforms. In this instance, it is better to have parties who are well-valuated by the people, mostly because it helps to build a robust democracy on the whole, however there is no necessary and binding link between any sort of ‘legitimation’ of parties and the institutionalisation of the party system they belong to.

Summarily, any kind of legitimacy shown by the citizens to the party system does not agree with what legitimacy should entail, and with what parties stand for. People’s legitimation refers to the way the whole political system works, and not to just how one of its components—the party system—performs.

6.4 Hypotheses and expectations I will now frame the previous discussion into working hypotheses. Two sets of propositions are introduced. In the first, I will debate the relationship between the definition of political legitimacy which I support, and the stability of party systems. In the second, I will concur with the original proponents’ definition of legitimacy as a dimension to better understand PSI.

In the classic tradition about political legitimacy, it refers to the belief that members of a society place on the political regime that governs them. Despite the fact that a party system is a component of a political regime, they are not the same. Therefore;

Hypothesis 6.1: There is no relationship between the legitimacy of a political regime and party system stability.

If we consider the theory of PSI, the only way to concur is by assuming that the working definition of the legitimacy of elections and political parties by political elites and citizens is correct. Following that view, there should be a relevant relationship between the ‘legitimacy’ of the party system (parties and elections) and the electoral volatility—otherwise it would not make sense to provide legitimacy which will not lead to institutionalisation.173

173 Mainwaring claims that “comparatively positive attitudes toward parties increase the likelihood that the system will be stable” (Mainwaring 1999: 35). In some of his works, however, he has warned that some dimensions of the PSI theory, but especially the one of legitimacy, do not need to correlate with the others. Such a warning should be understood as an exceptionality clause: it could only be acceptable for one or a narrow set of cases and not as a general principle.

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Hypothesis 6.2a: Legitimacy of elections by political elites contributes to institutionalise party systems.

Hypothesis 6.2b: Legitimacy of parties by political elites contributes to institutionalise party systems.

Hypothesis 6.2c: Legitimacy of elections by citizens contributes to institutionalise party systems.

Hypothesis 6.2d: Legitimacy of parties by citizens contributes to institutionalise party systems.

Hypothesis 6.1 implies that there is a theoretical dissonance to talk about legitimacy when the object is not the democratic landscape of a country as a whole. To tackle this hypothesis, I will look at the relationship between political legitimacy and electoral volatility. I am not expecting to find a meaningful correlation here, as the stability of the party system can waver regardless of the trajectory of the democratic contentment. There is however some leeway to accept that if they do indeed correlate, they might be related to the fact that well-functioning party systems are desirable for democratic settings.

If the Hypotheses 6.2 were true, one can expect that any form of ‘legitimate’ perception of elections and parties, either from citizens or from political elites, will bear relationship on the degree of electoral stability of the party systems. Furthermore, regardless of the different degrees of party system consolidation, any sort of ‘legitimacy’ of elections and of parties will be relevant. This should be demonstrated by analysing the trajectories of electoral volatility in the three case studies. Each of them has different positive trajectories: in Chile, the volatility has been low almost since the restoration of democracy; in Estonia, the volatility was the highest amongst these three cases but has decreased at the fastest pace; in Korea, the electoral volatility was higher than in Chile but lower than that of Estonia, and has decreased smoothly. If the legitimacy of elections and parties, as it is viewed by the original proponents, does show similar patterns of trajectory as does the electoral volatility, it would therefore indicate that there is relationship. For some claims, notably the legitimacy of parties by the citizens, I will also take a large N sample of countries to discern if the three case studies are peculiar cases or part of a generalised phenomenon.

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6.5 Data and methods Different sets of data are required to deal with the multiple claims regarding legitimacy. Likewise, different methods of analysis can help answer the questions and properly test the five hypotheses outlined in this chapter. I will describe the data needed, the best sources in order to obtain the data, and the best ways to operationalise the chapter’s research questions.

For the Hypothesis 6.1, related to the political regime legitimacy and PSI, legitimacy can be operationalised as satisfaction with how democracy works in any country. This typical survey question deals with the critical individual assessment of how the principles of democracy are brought into practice (Linde and Ekman 2003). For the Hypotheses 6.2, related to the core argument proposed by Mainwaring and Scully (1995), the different works of the measurement of legitimacy have been focused on how political elites and citizens assess the confidence in their political institutions.

For political elites (Hypotheses 6.2a and 6.2b), Mainwaring and Scully (1995) relied on a qualitative assessment of how those actors accept both elections and parties as relevant mechanisms in order to access power. Although data coming from elite surveys would be useful here, there is no comparable or cross-regional data currently available. The other way to conduct assessment is by asking the protagonists themselves what their perceptions are about the role and validity of elections and parties in order to access power. In this case, I will use the data collected during the fieldwork in Chile, Estonia and Korea. Political elites were directly asked if they felt that for leaders and citizens alike, the elections are the only means to access power in their countries. In addition, as a way to evaluate the relevance of parties, they were also questioned about the degree of closeness of people to parties.174 Results from more than 120 interviews will be summarised in the next section.

Mainwaring and Scully (1995) do not tackle how citizens evaluate their system, but they do suggest that population surveys can help ascertain the mentioned task (Hypotheses 6.2c and 6.2d). Jones (2007) and Luna and Altman (2011) have used general public opinion surveys to cast light on the citizenry’s trust in political parties. Trust works as the closest concept to legitimacy, because it denotes the degree to which a particular set of institutions is considered

174 Exact wording of the questions are in Chapter Three (Table 3.2)

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as necessary for a system to function.175 As for the legitimacy of elections, the results taken from the surveys consider legitimacy to be a characteristic which can evaluate the quality of a democracy. In this regard, this goes in line with my theoretical critique of the original PSI propositions. Nonetheless, we can still use that kind of question to ponder any relevance of this issue with party system institutionalisation.

To keep consistency across the survey data used in this thesis, and also due to its own richness as an extensive and long-dated cross-regional source of data, I will rely on the World Values Surveys. In different waves, these surveys contain specific questions on satisfaction with democracy, and on both confidence in elections and trust in political parties. Satisfaction with how democracy works is consistently asked for most countries in all waves. It also asks whether it is essential in a democracy where people choose their leaders in free elections.176 This question is asked in two waves for Chile (2005 and 2011), one wave for Estonia (2011), and two waves for Korea (2005 and 2010). It is important to highlight a caveat with this question, as it focuses on a desirable condition and not on an assessment of the actual situation. In the second case, it is asked about the level of confidence of the respondents in political parties.177 This more common inquiry is present in five waves in Chile (1990, 1996, 2000, 2006 and 2011), two waves in Estonia (1996 and 2011) and four waves in Korea (1996, 2001, 2005 and 2010). I will present tables showing each of the aforementioned categories.

The most relevant of all claims by the original proponents which link legitimacy with party system institutionalisation is the legitimacy of political parties by the citizens. In order to demonstrate to what extent the results for Chile, Estonia and Korea can be generalised, I will look for a relationship between the legitimacy of parties and electoral volatility for a larger group of countries. For this, I chose the same question about confidence in political parties; results per country were aggregated. This resulted in 120 cases from surveys conducted between 1990 and 2013. I compared the percentage of people who expressed “a great deal”

175 Another proxy measure is used by Luna and Altman (2011) by selecting a question that asks if democracy can work without political parties—this question is present in the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), but there are no similar questions in cross-regional surveys. 176 The question is: “Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use the scale where 1 means ‘not at all an essential characteristic of democracy’ and 10 means it definitely is ‘an essential characteristic of democracy’: People choose their leaders in free elections.” 177 The question phrasing is: “I’m going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much trust you have in them. Is it a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much trust, or none at all?: Political parties [not any specific party].”

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and “quite a lot” trust, with the electoral volatility score of the same year or closest year to the survey.

The outcomes of the survey data should help to identify general trends in society about the relevance of elections for democracy, and of parties for the political system. However, it does not provide more nuances about why the opinions are the way they are. Surveys’ responses to these topics are straightforward, but they do not allow us to consider why the respondents are behaving in a certain way. This more informed understanding of the society can be achieved only if we directly ask the people why elections and parties are necessary or not. However, if we want to follow the idea behind the original proposition of the dimension of legitimacy as a constitutive part of party system institutionalisation, we may want to know a slightly different issue: in a democratic regime, can parties be replaced in their function? If that is the doubt to clear up, then we would indeed be tackling to what extent the core of the party system, from the citizens’ perspective, could be replaced—despite the fact that we could no longer call it a proper ‘party’ system.

To find out if parties in an institutionalised party system are not just depositaries of trust (as the theory of PSI claims), but the only organisation that can democratically work for the people’s representation, then the same people should be given the opportunity to provide a more justified opinion. Unlike standard opinion surveys with structured questionnaires, in a population interview the researcher can ask for contended views of the person that inform about deeper beliefs and perception (Arksey and Knight 1999, Geer 1991). Following this criterion, I conducted population interviews in the three countries to find further evidence on the perception of the citizens of parties and the political system.

In Chapter Three (section 3.5.3), I detailed how these data were obtained and sampled. It considered 495 interviewees from four cities in Chile, three cities in Estonia, and three cities in Korea. Considering that the research question concerns time variation, the sampling targeted individuals primarily on the basis of age—to account for generational differences. Table 6.2 sets out the general characteristics of the sample.

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TABLE 6.2 Age distribution of population interviewees (%)

Age group Chile Estonia Korea Total 18-40 36.3 33.3 33.3 34.1 41-60 43.7 34.0 38.7 39.2 61+ 20.0 32.7 29.0 26.7

The sample of this qualitative data is distributed into three parts by age (Table 6.2). The youngest cohort (18-40) represents a third of the whole sample, whereas the most experienced voices form the majority for this piece of evidence. In this way I hope to balance the sample to give voice to newer and older citizens alike, as well as the cohort in the middle (41-60) who experienced the democratic transitions whilst they were young.

Considering the methodological framework here described, the results need to be assessed with caution. Following Arksey and Knight (1999: 57), the method and technique employed here (population interviews from a quota-like sampling method) do not allow the results to be generalised. To be sure, then, this exercise is a complementary source of data to the WVS datasets that will also be in place. On the other hand, the rich depth of these population interviews comes from the fact that people are not just choosing one option from a set of options, but are also encouraged to provide their opinions in an open-ended manner about specific and brief political topics. Furthermore, I will provide the general results of the interviews in two ways. Firstly, I will codify the answers in order to distinguish identifiable trends for questions related to the replaceability of parties and the evolution of the political system.178 Secondly, I will show examples of answers for the same questions in order to evaluate their arguments. Cross-country comparisons of the three case studies will shed more light on the matter in question.

6.6 Results In the following pages, the results will be presented by following the two hypotheses claims. Therefore, in first place I will show the results for Hypothesis 6.1, which claims that there is no relationship between the legitimacy of the political system and the stability of its party system.

178 See Chapter Three, Table 3.5, questions 2 and 3.

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After that, I will present a series of methods to test the Hypotheses 6.2. Their claims are broken up into four distinctive relationships, all of them leading to a contribution of the process of party system consolidation (see Table 6.3):

TABLE 6.3 Claims in Hypotheses 6.2

Table 6.3 summarises the four claims of Hypothesis 6.2, which interprets what the theory of PSI proposes as legitimacy interactions. They take each of the two subjects of legitimacy (political elites and citizens) as being related to each of the two objects of legitimacy (elections and parties).

6.6.1 Political legitimacy and party system stability

To find out whether the stability of the party system has any sort of link with the legitimacy of the whole political system where it belongs, I conducted some straightforward analyses. The stability of the party system is measured as its electoral volatility, whereas the legitimacy of the political system is operationalised through a common survey question about satisfaction with how democracy works. The level of satisfaction ranges from 1 (“Very satisfied”) to 4 (“Not at all satisfied”), although I have recoded answers to fit in a dual category—satisfied with democracy versus unsatisfied with democracy.179 The resulting graph is shown in Figure. 6.1.

179 It covers waves spanning from 1994 to 2009 from the WVS. The question is: “On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in your country?” More than 60 cases are included.

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FIGURE 6.1 Relationship between political legitimacy and electoral stability

Source: Mainwaring and Olivares Concha (2015), and WVS. Same sources apply to Figs. 6.2, 6.4 and 6.5.

As it can be seen in Fig. 6.1, there is a negative relationship between the legitimacy of the democratic system and the volatility of its party system. The linear R2 explains 48% of the relationship. The Pearson correlation is -.69 (significant at .01 level, 2-tailed), which means that the more volatile a party system is, the greater the percentage of people who are dissatisfied with how democracy works in a given political system.

In Figure 6.2, I will further explore if this relationship holds true regardless of the development status of the countries.

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FIGURE 6.2 Relationship between political legitimacy and electoral stability, by development

Although in Fig. 6.2 the electoral volatility in developed countries shows less variance, they still tend to confirm more satisfaction with democracy where less volatility remains present. In developing countries, the trend is clearer as the volatility is more widespread: the higher the stability (left side of X axis), the higher the satisfaction with the democracy (top side of Y axis).180

This all indicates that, contrary to my expectation, Hypothesis 6.1 is rejected. On one hand, this is hardly surprising. Where people tend to think democracy works well, the country’s political system is generally more predictable. As constitutive parts of the political system, party systems in well-functioning democracies will tend to be more stable. There is slight leeway to experience some volatility if it can be seen that citizens are exercising their democratic rights in full when they want to ‘shake the party system up’. Indeed, in Fig. 6.2, for developed countries, the two outliers to the right are Japan 2000 and Italy 2001. In Japan, the

180 The negative correlation coefficients in both cases are moderately high (over .4) and significant. For developing countries, Pearson’s r= -0.52 (significant at .01 level, 2-tailed). For developed countries, Pearson’s r = -0.42 (significant at .05 level, 2-tailed).

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dominating coalition led by LDP lost 65 seats, whereas in Italy Silvio Berlusconi regained power. Both cases show high volatility (score of 33.8 in Japan, and 29.3 in Italy) with 36% or more of the population satisfied with how democracy is working. Amongst developing countries, over 40% of the population was content with democracy in Estonia in 1996—a year after the party system was drastically changed. Likewise, in Poland in 1999 43% of the population liked their democracy, a couple of years before the party system’s volatility peaked as high as a score of almost 57—as they witnessed the sinking of the Solidarity political movement.

Thus, in general an environment of political stability and democratic legitimacy is linked to a consolidated party system. The more stable the party system is, the more indicative it is that the political system as a whole will be legitimised. I will now show how the conceptualisation of legitimacy by the theory of PSI works empirically.

6.6.2 Elites’ legitimation of elections and parties

In the analysis of Hypotheses 6.2a-b, the condition that elites should legitimise elections and parties will be taken altogether. The question about elections181 was asked in most of the interviews182 and had coincidental answers. A selection of answers is displayed in Table 6.4.

181 The wording of the question is: “In your opinion, do political leaders and common citizens legitimise elections as the only means of accessing power?” 182 Given the overwhelming consensual response to this, this was excluded when the interviews were set in a tight schedule. In those occasions, it was preferable to focus on other questions that would lead to more significant variations in other aspects of this research.

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TABLE 6.4 Elite interviews’ outcomes

Chile “Yes. In the end, everything goes through political decisions—beyond what social movements could demand.” (Pablo Lorenzini, Deputy, DC. January 2013) “Yes. Electoral participation is very rooted in society.” (Carlos Vilches, Deputy, UDI. January 2013) “Yes. Today nobody is thinking of dictatorships or of military movements. Not even social movements disregard elections, considering that their own leaders are now candidates for Congress.” (Joaquín Godoy, Deputy, RN. January 2013) Estonia “There is only one legitimate way to access power: elections. There is no other option.” (Denis Boroditš, MP, independent. October 2012) “Elections are the only means. Maybe if you go for a second term in opposition, and cannot change things, this can be boring, but still this is the only way everybody accepts.” (Erki Nool, MP, IRL. November 2012) “Of course.” (Sven Mikser, MP, SDE chairman. November 2012) Korea “In the last few decades, MPs were nominated persons—even though the scheme was via election. Now, MPs are those who received the ballots from citizens.” (Confidential, Assembly member, GNP. May 2013) “Of course. What other means do we have? Indeed, parties are less dependent upon figures like the three Kims, so elections also play a major role in legitimising representatives.” (Tae-keung Ha, Assemblyman, GNP. July 2013) “Yes. A different question is whether there is a problem with representation. I think that citizens feel they are not fully represented, but it doesn’t mean that they don’t legitimise elections.” Han-jung Kim, scholar and former aide of Kim Dae-jung, DUP. July 2013)

Table 6.4 reflects the overwhelming agreement that the ‘legitimacy’ of elections is widely guaranteed and taken for granted. Some nuances arise when the discussion focuses on further representation (‘legitimacy’ of political parties). Political elites acknowledge that people feel distanced from parties and in general from the political system. Nonetheless, they suggest that this process is framed by the institutions already in place; even if these institutions require changes, they will be done following the current rules. For elites, on the other hand, parties are the only method to channel people’s preferences onto the political representation.

According to these pieces of evidence, political elites of Chile, Estonia and Korea ‘legitimise’ elections and parties as the only ways and methods of accessing power. Unsurprisingly, there is no variation in the responses from the three countries. The lack of variation gives support to reject Hypotheses 6.2a and 6.2b, because scores of electoral volatility do not bear any relation to the extent in which elites evaluate the party system. In other words, irrespective of how

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volatile or stable a party system is, political elites accord ‘legitimacy’ to elections and parties. There may be cases where elites are willing to provide ‘legitimacy’ to mechanisms other than elections and representative channels other than parties, but in those cases we should not be concerned about the strength of the party system, but about the democratic system itself.

6.6.3 Citizens’ legitimation of elections and parties

Hypotheses 6.2c and 6.2d have the advantage over their predecessors in that they emphasise the bottom-up nature of any true process of legitimacy. That is to say, that the first condition for legitimacy is that it should come from below—the populace. In the following pages, I will proceed with a detailed examination of the different ways that citizens may validate both elections and parties. Firstly, I will examine to what extent citizens’ legitimation of elections has any link to party system stability (Hypothesis 6.2c). And secondly, I will devote special attention to the citizens’ legitimation of parties (Hypothesis 6.2d), given that it is the only claim that clearly links the people and the main unit of party systems—the parties.

Hypothesis 6.2c states that the people’s legitimacy of elections contributes to party system stability. Since the question to use from the WVS183 focuses on democracy, the answer should not be framed in an evaluation of the functioning of party systems. In Table 6.5 the main results of recent surveys are shown.

TABLE 6.5 Free elections to choose leaders (% of agreement and mostly in agreement)184 2005 2010 2011

Chile 81.1 86.9 Estonia 87 Korea 87.7 82.5 Note: grey-coloured cells indicate that the survey was not conducted in the country that year or that the question was not asked. Source: WVS.

183 “Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means ‘not at all an essential characteristic of democracy’ and 10 means it definitely is ‘an essential characteristic of democracy’: People choose their leaders in free elections”. 184 The question has been asked since 2005.

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Figures in Table 6.5 show that the vast majority of the population (around 85% on average) in the three countries agree that having free elections to choose their leaders is a condition of having a democracy. Although this question was not available for previous waves, it is reasonable to assume that the support for having free elections was similar or higher before— when the subject of democracy was more salient in the public debates.

To assess to what extent this coincidence in the three cases applies globally, Figure 6.3 shows a simple histogram for 78 countries included in WVS. It includes the answers about levels of agreement (from 1, mostly disagreement, to 10, mostly agreement) to the question that asks if choosing leaders in free elections is essential to democracy.

FIGURE 6.3 Agreement level of having free elections to choose leaders

Source: WVS.

Results from Fig. 6.3 indicate that the distribution of responses is abnormal. The sample shows a clear negative skew: 185 there is more count in the tail than could be expected for a normal distribution, which in turn highlights an intuitive outcome. This means that regardless of any other variable in place, most of the people consider free elections a necessary condition for

185 This sample includes a few authoritarian regimes, without which the histogram could be even more skewed.

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having working democracies. There is no relationship between any legitimation of elections and PSI, then. As this is not surprising, it should be that these first results provide support for the rejection of the Hypothesis 6.2c, which establishes that citizens’ legitimacy of elections contributes to party system stability.

Finally, I will analyse the hypothesis which claims that people’s legitimacy of parties do contribute to a process of stabilisation of the party system (Hypothesis 6.2d). This claim is, from a theoretical point of view, the most compelling one. Its assertiveness comes from two reasons: firstly, it takes a bottom-up approach (citizens), that usually relates to a broader understanding of legitimacy, and secondly, it directly tackles the pertinence of the most important unit of analysis in the study of party systems: the parties themselves. This theoretical relationship demands more evidence to test. In doing so, I will use survey outcomes as well as population interviews’ results from the data collected for this thesis.

The most common way to ascertain legitimacy of parties, as understood by the theory of PSI, is through the level of confidence in political parties expressed in public opinion surveys (Mainwaring 1999, Zucco forthcoming). The feedback from the respondents to this question from WVS186, though, is far from being widely varying between cases, as the figures reveal in Table 6.6.

TABLE 6.6 Confidence in political parties (% of mostly confident) 1990 1996 2000 2001 2005 2006 2010 2011

Chile 50 25 27 17 17 Estonia 23 27 Korea 25 11 24 26 Note: grey-coloured cells indicate that the survey was not conducted in the country that year or that the question was not asked. Source: WVS.

As can be seen in Table 6.6, at least since 1996, all confidence ratings remain very low. The highest confidence rate is in Chile in 1990, which is understandable considering that it was the first year of the new democratic period. But three years later the Chilean party system

186 “I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?: Political parties.”

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experienced the highest level of electoral volatility (score of 22.3), though. Thereofore, had this question been asked in Estonia and Korea in the opening democratic years, confidence could have also been high. In Chile, trust in parties lowered to around 25% in the second half of the nineties, and sank to 17% during the 2000s. In the two surveys where this question was asked in Estonia, the confidence level also remained low, but still at around 25% average. In Korea, the pattern is clearly low, but similar to Estonia at around 25% on average; the exception occurred in 2001, when trust plunged to 11%, probably as a result of the political crisis during the presidency of Kim Dae-jung.

The lack of appreciation for political parties is rather similar between countries that nonetheless have different patterns of party system stability. That result goes against what the PSI theory expects. Mainwaring (1999) does express that these two indicators do not need to go hand-in-hand, and adds that it is well known that the valuation of political parties in recent times is decreasing—in all systems, including old democracies. He says that in more mature democracies, where party systems are more stable, the valuation of parties is better than in younger democracies (1999: 35-36).

To see if the lack of relationship between legitimacy of political parties and party system stability in Chile, Estonia and Korea can count as exceptional, next I will consider the bigger picture by including more countries. Figure 6.4 shows the correlation between electoral volatility scores of 120 cases and the percentage of survey respondents who felt mostly confident in political parties.

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FIGURE 6.4 Relationship between legitimacy of parties and party system stability

The scatter plot in Fig. 6.4 shows no evident relationship between legitimacy of parties by citizens, and the stability of the same party system. The line of best fit runs flat, and correlation coefficients support the lack of linear or curvilinear relationship.187 It also indicates that the cases of Chile, Estonia and Korea are indeed representative of what happens generally in the democratic world.

In order to see if there is a different pattern when we look at developed as opposed to developing countries, I have split the sample in order to see each category separately. The resulting graphs are shown in Figure 6.5.

187 The Pearson correlation value for the variables depicted in Fig. 6.4 is a mere -.11, and it is not significant. I also ran a Spearman’s rho to see if there was a hidden non-linear relationship, but the value was similar: -.15, also statistically insignificant.

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FIGURE 6.5 Relationship between legitimacy of parties and party system stability, by development

At a glance, the scatter plots in Fig. 6.5 reveal that there is no relationship of any sort between the variables under examination, regardless of whether they are in developed or developing countries. The line of best fit shows a low explanatory power as well.188 Likewise, calculations made in order to get linear and hidden non-linear correlations did not provide meaningful results except to show a small non-linear trend in developing countries.189 This demonstration indicates that it does not seem plausible to vinculate the degree to which political parties are trusted and the way the party system performs.190

188 The R2 of the linear slopes was extremely low: for developing countries it was 4.3%, and for the developed countries, 0.2%. A quadratic fitting line was separately introduced with no better results. 189 In Fig. 6.5, Pearson’s r for developing countries is -.21, but insignificant. To detect any non-linear trend, I conducted Spearman’s r test. It shows a coefficient of -.24 and significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed), which may indicate a rather low level of non-linear correlation; that is to say, confidence in political parties might be higher when volatility is lower and also higher. The former relationship applies as a situation already found in developed countries (stable party systems are found in more stable democracies). It may imply that citizens feel political parties are more confident when big changes in the political system take place. In any case, the relationship is low. For developed countries, the Pearson’s r is -.04, and non-significant. Similarly, Spearman’s r is -.004 and non- significant. 190 These graphs provide more information, albeit not essential for the hypothesis being tested here. Thus, I will describe the most relevant results, but will not develop any further interpretation. Firstly, Fig. 6.5 shows that the variance of confidence on political parties is much higher in developing systems. This should not come as a surprise,

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Quantitative tests indicate no relationship between the variables of interest, but we still need more information in order to understand the nature of the results. A qualitative approach is therefore more advisable to discern the reasoning behind citizens’ valuation of political parties. Although opinion public surveys are indicative of the general trends, semi-structured interviews can offer the nuances that the large N may be missed out from the analysis. I will now present the results of almost 500 population interviews conducted in a total of 10 cities across Chile, Estonia and Korea. Respondents did not face any constraining set of options to choose from, which can be helpful to grasp what citizens freely think of their political systems.This innovative part of the thesis is expected to provide new approaches for social research on political parties, as it aims to look at open answers from randomly selected citizens.

As outlined in the methodological section of the thesis, the question about interest in politics191 could not be considered as a control variable, given the constraints of the sample size. I used it, instead, to monitor if the next answers were going to represent the opinions of people mostly interested or mostly uninterested in the topic. In Chile, 49% of respondents manifested that they were interested in politics; in Estonia the figure was 65%, and in Korea, 59%. The same question in the last WVS wave available for each country showed that 27.2% of Chileans were interested in politics; 38.2% of Estonians, and 42.3% of Koreans. Thus, the sample of the population interviews weighs in more people interested in politics, but is consistent with more interest found in Estonia and Korea than in Chile.

Unlike the standard survey question about trust in parties—similarly low confidence in parties in all cases—, here the objective was to ask about the extent to which authorities can govern with something other than political parties. More explicitly, the goal was to go beyond a pure

given that in inchoate systems exiting authoritarian periods citizens had very high expectations of political parties. When expectations were not met later—natural in any process of democratisation—, the valuation of parties went down rapidly. Eventually, the cycle should stabilise at rates similar to those seen in mature democracies. Secondly, in most developed countries around 1 out of 5 citizens are mostly confident about political parties, whereas a clear pattern is less distinguishable in developing countries. Thirdly, in the developing countries’ graph, the two outliers on the top (very high trust in parties) are Singapore in 2012 (67.5% of citizens) and Malaysia 2006 (58.3%), considered semi-democracies. The third outlier is fully democratic India 1990 (55.3%). Fourth, the outliers on the top amongst industrialised countries are Denmark 2008 (43.7% of respondents that mostly trust parties) and Spain 1990 (39.2%). 191 See Chapter Three, Table 3.5, question 1.

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evaluation of how an institution (political parties) works, but to consider whether it is needed in oder for the government to work. To be clear of any respondent’s understanding, the question tries to capture a specific structure (government rule) instead of a more diffuse concept (democracy). Results from Chile largely diverged from those in Estonia. Korea was somewhere in between the two (Table 6.7).

TABLE 6.7 Can political parties be replaced? (%)

Chile Estonia Korea No 52 86 62 Yes 44 14 32 Don’t know 4 0 6 N 190 150 155 Source: Author’s database

At a first glance, the results shown in Table 6.7 can be surprising. Citizens from the country with the largest democratic tradition, Chile, are by implication more critical regarding the role of political parties: 44% of the respondents claim that parties can be replaced by something else which will govern in place. In Korea, 32% of respondents consider parties replaceable. In Estonia, the overwhelming minority of interviewees (14%) think that parties are replaceable in government duties.

These results do not appear coherent with the levels of party system stability in each country. Furthermore, they show the opposite of what could be expected: given the highly stable party system in Chile, more commitment to the political parties should be expected of interviewees than in either Korea or Estonia. One possible explanation is that Chilean interviewees felt free to express their dissapointment because they take democracy for granted, given their longer democratic tradition compared to the other two countries. Another complementary reason is the type of government: in being a presidential system, Chilean interviewees might think that people rather than parties are more relevant to sustain democratic governments. In Estonia, in the other extreme, the Parliamentary system may play a role towards the valorization of parties as a central piece of the democratic engine. Korea sits somewhere in the middle, coincident with some features of semipresidentialism in its institutions.

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To identify the trends derived from the interviews just summarised, Table 6.8 shows a selection of answers192 that are representative of the different samples per city.

TABLE 6.8 Population interviews’ outcomes: replaceability of parties

Parties are replaceable Parties are not replaceable Chile “I’m not a follower of Pinochet, but I think that the “Being independent, without political parties, is military rule is better because they demand not enough to propose ideas or a programme. A discipline. Nowadays, our country seems out of representative needs support” (Female, 53. Viña control” (Female, 56. Copiapó) del Mar) “Community organisations or social groups could “Thinking of replacing parties is pure fantasy. It be organised in such a way that they win elections. sounds good when you say it, because political It would be good if they enter politics and kick parties are not well evaluated. But in practice, an political parties out” (Male, 33. Viña del Mar) independent is powerless when competing against a candidate supported by a political party” (Male, 44. Santiago) “There are so many people with good ideas that “A person who runs for elections without support are not working in government because they don’t only represents his/herself. Governments are belong to political parties; those people should be based on principles, and principles are given by there, not parties” (Male, 36. Santiago) political parties” (Male, 70. Valdivia) Estonia “All that you need is a ruler with a firm hand. “Parties are a collection of ideas. Without them There is less hassle with a single ruler” (Male, 39. things would be much more random in nature” Tallinn) (Male, 58. Tallinn) “The people. One big community is all of us, not “There are no decent alternatives. We’ve already political parties. If everyone is considered, then we seen other types of government and we don’t would really be involved in democracy” (Female, want them back” (Female, 78. Pärnu) 60. Pärnu) “Historically, there have been all sorts of forms of “Estonia is a democracy—it would be very noisy government without parties. Why not try to have a without parties and very ineffective. A small group monarchy, for example” (Male, 49. Tartu) leads and takes responsibility. Everyone knows how to do things and they get them done” (Male, 30. Tartu) Korea “Political organisations based on civil society and “Assembly members give directions to the people. independent supporters can replace parties” When a politician does not belong to a party, to (Female, 57. Seoul) whom does he/she represent?” (Male, 42. Daegu) “If the candidate is qualified, why not? A united “This is a system based on political parties. No force of supporters can play the role of a party” party means failure. You cannot move as you want (Male, 46. Daegu) without parties. Except for at local level elections, the idea of independent politicians won't work” (Male, 72. Seoul) “It is possible. Parties could be replaced by Independent politicians will face difficulties. whoever has the right capabilities and qualities National Assembly members who are (sincerity, integrity, honesty, compassion): people independents can't pursue their goals. Also, if a can recognize him/her” (Female, 45. Gwangju) candidate wants to be President, he/she should have strong supportive organisations” (Male, 34. Gwangju) Note: Grey-coloured cells indicate the person declares herself not interested in politics. Names are anonymised.

General responses portrayed in Table 6.8 show different patterns. Amongst those who say that parties are replaceable, are those who think of other groups of representation (community

192 The question was: “In your opinion, is it possible to have authorities without political parties?”

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organisations, social groups) or of qualified indepedents supported by the people. One can freely interpret that they are indeed criticising that parties are not coping with what they are supposed to be: vehicles for representation. Only a few respondents thought of certain models of authoritarian leadership, including military rule or old monarchies, which is revealing of the limited scope for non-democratic alternatives. As for those who claim that parties are irreplaceable, there are two big general trends: those who think that parties represent ideas better than any alternative, and those who think that parties are powerful enough to impede alternatives to get in. In either case, parties are considered sine qua non elements of the democratic game. They are valued as divisions that make the political system work. This appreciation is much more widespread in the countries with higher electoral instability (Estonia and Korea) than in Chile, which goes agaisnt the implications of the theory of PSI.

An additional question was included to offer a more general and long-term evaluation of the political systems by the respondents. They were asked to judge the change in quality of the whole political system since the time that democracy took place: Did the political system get better, worse or experienced no change?193 Despite the general sentiment of criticism against political parties, most interviewees perceive that the current political system is better than the one that existed right at the beginning of the democratisation period (Table 6.9).

TABLE 6.9 Perception of political system since recovery of democracy (%)

Chile Estonia Korea Better 51 43 55 Same 32 19 26 Worse 14 29 10 Don’t know 3 9 8 N 190 150 155 Source: Author’s database

According to Table 6.9, more than 50% of interviewees in Chile and Korea consider the current political system better than when democracy started. In Estonia the percentage is slightly lower (43%). These answers illustrate that most respondents perceive progress in the way democracy has been exercised. Only in Estonia are those who think that things are getting worse (29%), representive of a warning signal to society for the way that democracy itself is being conducted. Nonetheless, as in the previous question about the replaceability of political

193 See Chapter Three, Table 3.5, question 3.

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parties, we need to contextualise these responses. Are they the result of reflexive accounts of the past or an exercise in critical thinking about how the situation can improve?

In Table 6.10 a series of excerpts of answers are introduced. They show three types of respondents: those that acknowledge an evolution of the political system, those who observe an involution, and those who see no change at all. To keep conciseness, only two answers per type, per country will be shown. I will differentiate by colour those coming from respondents who previously claim that parties can be replaced, or otherwise.

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TABLE 6.10 Population interviews’ outcomes: political system evolution Political system is better today Political system is the same today Political system is worse today Chile “Anything is better than the “I don’t see much change. “Maybe the current political dictatorship—where human Political agreements do not system is more modern with rights are violated and human consider anything good for the regards to institutions and ways dignity is trampled on. Any people—the only difference is the to exercise power. But if you system, even anarchy, is better bonuses they give at the make an overall analysis, you will than a dictatorship. You may beginning of each government” realise that the political system is disagree with what I say, but you (Male, 47. Copiapó) worse due to the high levels of ought to respect it as we live in a corruption [we witness] democracy” (Male, 57. Valdivia) everyday” (Male, 66. Santiago)

“The current system is much “We keep on having the same. “They [politicians] started with better. People’s liberties are not The only ones who are better off good ideals and transformations. in question and we no longer live are the rich. Queues at healthcare They proposed many things but in oppression” (Male, 55. Viña del centres are as long as before, over time they did not meet [their Mar) education has not shown any promises.] People are cheated improvements; wages are almost every day and look foolish all the the same whilst prices are hiked time” (Male, 65. Viña del Mar) up…” (Female, 49. Santiago). Estonia “It’s more professional, but party “It’s the same—lots of intrigue “In the 90s the people politics takes precedence over and no one takes responsibility. participated more and there were decision-making. [Before] there [There is] betrayal and silence. It opportunities to be more active. I was more euphoria. Now there’s seemed better at first—for a very liked the [leaders] more. The 90s more disappointment” (Male, 38. short period. [In the beginning] were filled with hope. The Tartu) there was more hope, it was political system has become different. Now the borders are musty and everything is at a open but the wallets are closed” standstill. Now the politicians just (Male, 66. Tartu) ‘are.’” (Female, 65. Tallinn) “The economy is much better and “It’s been bad the whole time. “We were inspired by ideals. They our lives are our own. It’s calm. The system is the same, but the [politicians] don’t care about the The 90s were very turbulent. politics have changed. The focus people at all—a substantial Now, perhaps, the political is currently too centred on the difference [between the two system is closed too” (Male, 41. economy. Corruption is still at the periods]. Currently there is Pärnu) same level” (Male, 36. Tallinn) political chaos everywhere. Something has to change. People are under too much strain” (Female, 60. Pärnu) Korea “[The country is] more “[It’s been] similar. Participatory “The economic performance was democratised, but the poor get politics were improved but this not so good but the society was poorer. Politicians aren't was retracted recently. I had safer with such coerciveness” interested in the people. They many expectations for the Park (Male, 30. Seoul) pretend to [be interested] during [Geunhye] administration, but the elections, but assembly now I am very disappointed” members pay no attention to (Female, 31. Daegu) their districts after elections” (Female, 65. Daegu) “It’s better. We can show our “[There is] talk only, no practice. “I think it’s worse. [At least] we opinions freely! Politicians need Seems better, but not really. don't have serious corrupted to pay more attention to the There is less corruption, but more elections any more. We only people, though. In old times, we political struggle amongst witness conflicts of politicians” had some politicians who would politicians. They are not (Male, 49. Gwangju) die for the people. Not now, as concerned about people's lives” they take care of themselves (Female, 41. Seoul) only” (Male, 56. Gwangju) Note: Grey-coloured cells indicate the person declares political parties can be replaced as government rulers.

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Responses clustered in Table 6.10 show at least two patterns. Firstly, people from different generations are in general very critical in the way the political system has performed over time. Even if they value the current system better than the one before, it does not necessarily mean this is the best possible outcome. Respondents are severe in criticising politician’s jobs, but this range of criticism can be expected in any democracy—young or mature. The second trend are the different perceptions of what citizens expect as an evolution of the political system: many consider everything—party competition, economic success, levels of corruption, quality of education, security and social peace. People’s expectations, therefore, need to be framed in a scope larger than the sole role of political parties. Just as the question was designed for, respondents freely understood the political system as the government, as the political class but also as the evolution of the economy and the society itself. Furthermore, opinions in the three countries cannot be taken as widely different from one another.

The similarities between the cases under analysis provide new evidence for the study of party systems: no matter the perception of the role of political parties and the political system, citizens’ critical opinions are usually harsh even if they acknowledge that the political system is better than in the beginning of democracy—whatever they understand as better. Opinions are naturally more critical if their assessments on the evolution of the system say that it has showed no change or has worsened. There are no big differences between different age cohorts. What matters, however, is that the critical views do not seem to correlate at all with the level of stability of the party system in each country. Answers are not too different between countries, despite that the three countries exhibit different levels and trajectories of PSI.

Over the preceding pages I have tested the different hypotheses that link legitimacy of elections and political parties by the citizenry. Quantitative analyses show no meaningful correlations between these two sets of variables, which means that there are no elements to consider legitimacy as a valid dimension to ascertain party system institutionalisation. The qualitative analysis appears to strengthen the quantitative outcomes. It is totally expectable to find different views in any country about its political system, but if we follow the original PSI theory we should see predominantly positive views in those systems with higher stability of party systems, and predominantly negative views in countries having less stable party systems.

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That is not the case when the citizens’ opinions are scrutinised in depth. With all the new qualitative evidence added, it is not plausible to confirm Hypotheses 6.2c and 6.2d. Therefore, the hypotheses that state that citizens’ legitimation of elections and parties contribute to party system stability are rejected.

6.7 Conclusions This chapter aimed to tackle how legitimacy could be related to the consolidation process of party systems. First, I looked at how legitimacy should be conceptualised. Building on that, the ultimate objective of this chapter was to examine in depth to what extent the conceptual invocation of legitimacy by the PSI theory should be included amongst its own dimensions. Theoretically and then empirically, I have provided extensive evidence to demonstrate that legitimacy cannot be linked to parties, party systems or elections; rather, political legitimacy is a concept only applicable to political systems as a whole—and to democracies in particular.

The theory of PSI includes legitimacy as a dimension to analyse in order to evaluate how consolidated party systems are. According to that view, for a party system to be institutionalised, political elites and citizens alike should “accord legitimacy” to elections as the only means to access power, and parties as the only vehicles allowed to gain access to that power. The inclusion of legitimacy in the works of Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Mainwaring (1999) is reasonable: in the 1990s, new democracies were still consolidating—if not fighting to survive. Then, any sort of acknowledgement of the importance of having parties and elections was seen as pivotal for the survival of the party systems, which in turn were quintessential for the health of democracy itself.

With the dawn of the new century, some of the old concerns should be better placed in a different category. Theoretically, legitimacy can only be conceived as the belief that society members have on the ruling system. That conceptualisation implies a bottom-up approach in looking at the whole democratic political regime: legitimacy belongs to a category one-level up of party systems. Empirically, results indicate that there is a high correlation between the legitimacy of democratic political regime and the stability of party systems. These results should not come as a surprise: the perception of an improved democracy suggests satisfaction with different institutions that the democracies are made up of—including party systems. More stability implies more predictability in the variety of options that citizens have to choose

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in parties, which can be expected of more consolidated democracies. The mistake would be to misplace legitimacy, as the theory of PSI seems to do.

According to the PSI theory, legitimacy involves two sets of subjects and objects. In the first, the theory claims that political elites should legitimise both elections and parties in order for a party system to be institutionalised. In the second set it proposes that citizens should legitimise both elections and parties for a party system to also be institutionalised. I went through all of these combined options.

None of the four different combinations nevertheless showed positive or negative meaningful relationships with the consolidation of party systems. Political elites’ support of (legitimation of) elections and parties showed no variations between countries that have different levels of party system consolidation. Political elites in Chile, Estonia and Korea agree that elections are the only means to access power. And although most of them also acknowledge the discredit of political parties, they agree that there is no other means of representation better than parties in order to gain power. In sum, the relationship of ‘legitimacy’ by elites and party system stability is meaningless.

Likewise, citizens in the three countries are similarly coincident with their high valuation of elections as necessary conditions for democracies, and on their general discredit of the role of political parties. Even in a large sample of countries—with varied democratic developments— the vast majority agrees that having free elections to choose leaders is a requirement for democracies. The lack of variance in this variable shows that it cannot be linked to any kind of process of party system institutionalisation in a straightforward manner.

Finally, I have conducted several quantitative and qualitative examinations, for a large number of countries and also in-depth assessments for the three country studies of this thesis, to test the relationship between citizens’ legitimacy of parties and PSI. None of them appeared conducive to support the claim. Quantitative analyses showed that confidence in political parties was similarly low in Chile, Estonia and Korea over time. Furthermore, tests for a larger sample of countries indicated irrelevant or meaningless correlations between the levels of confidence in parties and the stability of party systems. In subsequent analyses, I focused on the responses from almost 500 citizens randomly selected in the three countries of study. In terms of valuation of political parties, Chilean interviewees expressed the highest level of distrust, which goes against what is expected for the country with the highest party system

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stability when compared to Estonia and Korea. Other responses provided nuances that show that regardless of the degree of criticism towards political parties and the political system and of the age cohort, the stability of the party system takes a path unrelated to legitimacy.

In summary, political legitimacy is a concept that should be properly understood in order to avoid confusion. As it has been discussed in this chapter, legitimacy can only refer to the justified beliefs of the populace about the ruler and the democratic ruling government. As such, it only allows an approach from the will of the citizens all the way up to the political system regime. It does not refer to beliefs related to components of the political system; they are all necessary for having a legitimate political system, but they are not separate objects of legitimacy. The theory of Party System Institutionalisation has contributed enormously to our understanding of party systems,especially in newer democracies. However, for this theory to work better, its dimension of legitimacy of elections and parties should be entirely reconsidered. If any dimension of legitimacy exists, it should be better placed in the study of democratic institutionalisation.

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CHAPTER SEVEN Always remember that the most important thing in a good marriage is not happiness, but GENERAL CONCLUSIONS stability. Gabriel García Márquez Love in the Time of Cholera 1988: 112

7.1 Introduction The scholarship on new democracies has made increased progress during the last decades. In the main, it was naturally born alongside the third wave of democratisation, especially in the late 80s and the beginning of the 90s. Whilst one robust group of area specialists covered Latin American politics, another looked in depth at post-communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. Relatively speaking, less attention was put on the dynamics of younger Asian and African democracies. In all cases, however, major efforts were put on the issues of democratisation itself: how institutions were adjusting to a new way of governing within a framework of free and fair elections, and the consolidation of democratic institutions.

The preoccupation with party systems formed part of the aforementioned broader study of democracies. As political scientists agree, political parties are necessary institutions for democracies to work, and consequently, party systems are expected to perform in predictable ways in order to facilitate that process of democratisation to become ingrained over time. Early efforts by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) in Latin America promoted the interest to do research on the institutionalisation of party systems in other regions (Lewis 2008), notably post-communist Europe and, more recently, in Asia and Africa. The literature has identified patterns for institutionalisation, including the four dimensions proposed by Mainwaring and Scully in the theory of Party System Institutionalisation (PSI), but also other well-known institutional settings such as electoral behaviour, electoral rules, and types of government.

This thesis addresses the question of how and why party systems in third wave democracies vary in their processes of institutionalisation over time. It examines some reasons that may be behind different trajectories on the process of the consolidation of systems of parties, and focuses on specific factors related to cleavages, personalism and legitimacy. The data and methods used here are a reflection of the complexities of the issues involved in the field.

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Broadly speaking, this thesis applies major efforts to cover relevant issues to understand why comparable young democracies from different regions of the world have party systems evolving at different levels of speed and intensity.

7.1.1 Thesis review

The critical assessments of the literature, included in Chapter Two, provide the starting platform from which the research has developed. Chapter Three outlines the data used and methods of analysis. In turn, empirical analyses of chapters Four, Five and Six encompass the backbone of this dissertation. The sequential logic of the chapters allows a comprehensive reading of what is behind party system institutionalisation in newer democracies.

In the literature review, this thesis has gone through the main themes that the theory of PSI can take advantage of in order to enhance its own validity and explanatory power. I have mentioned the difficulties of measurement of the theory, the necessity of better indicators to assess it, and the problematic mechanism to associate and correlate the different PSI dimensions. The thesis has pointed out the benefits of linking this theory with the well- regarded theory of cleavages, because they are not mutually exclusive and, quite the opposite, can guide each other. In Chapter Two I also raised a concern about the conceptualisation of personalism as an enemy of party system stability, as it is usually treated by the field scholarship. Following on from the complications derived from correlating PSI dimensions, I have questioned whether one controversial dimension—legitimacy of elections and parties— should be included in the theory of PSI. Each of these relevant issues—role of cleavages, of personalism and of legitimacy—were the subject of the hypotheses related to a general dependent indicator on electoral stability. They are all tested based on a variety of quantitative and qualitative data.

Chapter Four shows that cleavages are important to stabilisation and that there is a hierarchical order—led by the left-right cleavage—to explain why some party systems become consolidated more quickly and in greater depth. Chapter Five indicates that it is a mistake to classify personalism as a political malaise without a profound revision of its potential benefits when it is accompanied by programmatic party building. Finally, Chapter Six provides evidence that strongly suggests the necessity for the revision of the dimension of legitimacy for the theory of PSI, given its irrelevance in explaining party system stabilisation. The general

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structure of this thesis aims to set a coherent and critical body inserted on the party systems’ current literature.

7.1.2 Generalising inferences

Citizens are losing trust in parties everywhere; this happens in Western democracies and in newer democracies alike. Thus, party systems do not stabilise with the amount of confidence they gain from citizens. Although the theory of PSI confounds ‘legitimacy’ of the party system with the confidence of citizens with specific parties, in either case there is no association with the consolidation mechanism of systems of parties. In the three countries (Chile, Estonia and Korea) this connection was examined at length, as well as in broader global comparisons, there was no evidence suggesting any correlation between the trust placed in given parties and the performance of the party systems.

The case selection further played a relevant role in enhancing our understanding of how party systems work in at least two spheres: cleavage formation and personalism. Chile, Estonia and Korea do not only represent leading economies in their regions, but they also embody the trend that young democracies can follow in the processes to consolidate their party systems. The stabilisation process requires cleavages working well both in their social structuration (how members of society are divided and are aware of the divide) and in their political representation (how these interests are assumed by political parties). Nonetheless, where the ideological cleavages are more important, as Chile shows, the party system consolidates deeper. Cleavage formation is not a next-day process, though. It takes time. But the sooner it becomes prominent, the more quickly the consolidation of the party system takes place, as the Estonian case suggests. Where the ideological cleavage grows at a slower pace, the party system also settles at a slower pace, as the Korean pattern exhibits.

The fact that personalism can contribute to party system institutionalisation may come as a surprise. The cases of Estonia and Korea are illustrative of the fact that the fundamental issue to look at is the interplay between personalism and policy-orientation of parties. It is the healthy combination of both that makes the difference in the trajectories of party systems towards consolidation. Charismatic figures can help attract voters to specific parties and stick with the same parties for more than a few elections. That type of loyalty-building creates conditions which can stabilise the inter-party competition in recently inaugurated democracies. Estonia and Korea show how specific leaders founded or led certain parties in such a way that

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the voters could have confounded leader and party. But there is something more required than just the sole presence of a charismatic individual: he/she should fill the party with programmatic content that transcends their own figure head. In Estonia, leaders have been achieving that phase in which personal appeal is transferred into policy appeal. In Korea, the same transfer has been less successful. As a result, in Estonia the stabilisation of the party system has been realised more quickly and more substantively than in Korea. Chile, on the other hand, does not have a record of party charismatic leaders, and on the contrary has a record of programmatic-oriented parties. That combination contributes to make its party system stable.

7.1.3 Structure of conclusions

The chapter is divided into two main areas. In the first one, I will discuss which patterns of party system institutionalisation are identifiable in new democracies. This general framework is filled with observations about the important role of cleavages, the demystifying understanding of personalistic politics, and to what extent party system strengthening is relevant for democratic legitimacy.

This conclusive chapter deals with how this work is contributing to the current scholarship on party systems and also which avenues are open for further research. In the second part, then, I will adjust the debate of party system to look at why given parties remain under- institutionalised, and what should be understood as de-institutionalisation. These concepts are rather absent in the thesis given the focus on the positive side of the consolidation. However, it is important to reflect on them, because the entering of party systems into stages of stability does not involve path dependency or one-way trips. Other ideas for further research are briefly explored. My final remarks will be devoted to wrap up the main reflections about what we can learn from the consolidation process of party systems in younger democracies.

7.2 Patterns of party system institutionalisation in new democracies I will briefly account for at least three aspects that the scholarship might have benefitted from when it deals with party system consolidation. I will also open the debate for why cleavages are relevant, why personalism is not necessarily bad news to institutionalisation, and why certain views of legitimacy are not relevant for our understanding of the field.

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7.2.1 Cleavages are relevant variables

The scholarship on party system institutionalisation overlooks the role of cleavages for new democracies. The main question lies in the fact that younger democracies were not able to develop social divides to the same extent that mature democracies did. But according to the classic literature on cleavages, democracies could inform party systems along the lines of critical conflicts on countries’ communities. Given their interconnected nature, the more important the cleavages, the more relevant their role is for party systems in becoming stabilised.

The theory of PSI tells us that given the short time that developing democracies have had to build the necessary fabric of cleavages, the freezing hypothesis might not be well-suited to our understanding of younger democracies’ party systems. Generally taken, the said assumption is well-supported. It is true that most countries in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and Eastern and South-Eastern Asia have not been able to forge their conflicts in society onto political organisations competing in the open public sphere. I did not try to contest that assumption. What I proposed, instead, was to bridge the gap between these two theories: any sustainable party system consolidation is unlikely to materialise without the formation of clear cleavages. This theoretical proposition goes further to say that not all cleavages are equally powerful for motivating party system consolidation: left-right cleavage is the most important one.

In order to test the theoretical expectations, I used regression methods for a large dataset of WVS, and qualitative evidence originating from a large set of elite interviews from the three country studies. I can claim that where cleavages are relevant, party systems are likely to consolidate along their lines. It means that, ceteris paribus, the political configuration of social conflicts does help to stabilise political party competition. I do not claim that cleavages are the most relevant factor to explain party system stabilisation, because there is no supporting evidence. I do, however, suggest that party system institutionalisation is an unlikely process without the existence of cleavages, as Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Bartolini and Mair (1990) define them. Furthermore, this thesis confirms the expectations that even if cleavages emerge and adhere for a time, not all of them are equally significant for contribution to party system stabilisation.

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In third wave democracies, the differentiation of the populace along ideological lines (left-right scale) is less obvious but more important than other cleavages. Regardless of what specific meaning left and right may have in each society, what is important is that people can locate themselves in the spectrum. Unfortunately, the scholarship on party system institutionalization has not paid enough attention to the left-right orientation as the ideological cleavage and, therefore, has missed a crucial explanatory variable when it tackles components to better understand party system consolidation. Chile, Estonia and Korea show that where the left-right continuum is more prevalent for party vote choice, the consolidation is quicker and deeper.

As a possible explanation for why some countries develop their ideological cleavages more than others, I have sketched out the idea of the ideological trauma. Based on qualitative assessments from my fieldwork, I propose that in countries where a conflict is fixated on one side of the left-right spectrum, such a side is less likely to be supported by citizens once democracy is in place. As a result, the whole range of the left-right continuum is shortened, which in turn lessens the capacity for voters to choose from a broad range of options. The left in Estonia is associated with the Soviet rule, and in South Korea it is associated with North Korea’s authoritarian regime. In Chile, the right was associated with Pinochet’s dictatorship. But the identification of one ideological side in a particular regime seems not to be a sufficient condition to “shrink” the left-right spectrum. For the trauma to materialise in these cases, the foreign nature of the conflict can be relevant. Whereas in Chile the autocratic regime of Pinochet was endogenous, in Estonia and South Korea the phenomenon was exogenous. In Estonia, the Soviet rule was applied by a foreign invader, and in South Korea there has been a historical fear of invasion by/war with its northern neighbours. Anything related to Soviets or North Koreans is associated with the left, which in turn prevents many citizens from feeling close to potential parties representing leftist positions. Consequently, parties try to avoid being identified with the left. This explanation, although plausible, requires further research.

The main conclusion here is that cleavages are necessary in new democracies in order for party systems to become consolidated over time. Although I have not tested the necessary and sufficient conditions, it can be expected that the existence of relevant cleavages, and their hierarchical order led by the ideological dimension, does represent the necessary conditions for party system stabilisation. For sufficiency, however, other factors (e.g., electoral systems, political regime, social heterogeneity, etc.) should also be noted.

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7.2.2 The other side of personalism

The literature on party systems and also on democratisation is severe regarding the perils of personalism. For the most part, such cautions are well-deserved. Personalistic politics are built around popular figures whose interests are usually particularistic and selfish. That is in no way positively correlated with the building of political parties pursuing collective preferences and public policies. Personalistic politics, manufactured around peculiar leaders, is by all definitions taken as the epitome of fluid party systems—or even worse, an absence of a party system at all: only certain leaders organise the political space regardless of any institutional vehicle of representation.

This thesis addresses personalism in association with the programmatic content of parties. The idea behind such an association seeks to understand personalism through the lens of party system institutionalisation. Ultimately, the question asks whether personalistic politics does indeed affect the consolidation process of party systems, and if it does, in which direction. Based on the assessments of more than 120 elite interviewees in Chile, Estonia and Korea, and on a dataset that considers the duration of leaderships in the same countries, I could confirm that when charismatic leaders help build programmatic-oriented parties, as shown in Estonia, then personalism can be related to more institutionalised party systems. Although there is no doubt that institutionalisation is better preserved with programmatic parties and bureaucratic leaderships (for example, where the chair position is routinely rotated), as the Chilean case illustrates, this research shows that personalism is not per se a harmful condition working against PSI. Likewise, the absence of personalism is not necessarily a benefit for party systems when the parties are non-programmatic, which may explain why the Korean party system has consolidated at a slower pace than Estonia. This thesis confirms, however, that personalistic politics could make party systems under-institutionalised when parties are essentially non- programmatic (e.g., Korea before 2005), because every campaign revolves around a sole charismatic figure.

Personalism should not be demonised. It is not personalistic politics itself that is the problem, but when it works in combination with weak programmatic parties. Personalism works as a double-edged sword in a sense: it can be harmful to political systems, but it can also be helpful. When the electoral competition is set around programmatic discussion, the introduction of personalism can indeed help contribute to provide density to the content of the parties’

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platform. Charismatic leaders may become drivers to attract voters to given parties. If parties are then able to build upon their leaders’ charisma creating a solid programmatic foundation, then the initial personalisation of politics could be considered beneficial for the process of party system consolidation. If a relevant party is able to survive its leader, then the consolidation for that given party can be achieved, and as such, it confers its larger share of institutionalisation to the whole party system.

7.2.3 The problematic legitimacy

The theory of PSI allows scholars to rethink how party systems are to be tackled in newer democracies. Young democracies, especially in Latin America, had several problems to deal with. Party systems were one of them, because they were unorganised and fluid. As one of the features of how institutionalised parties are, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) claimed that party systems should be legitimised by political elites and citizens. This thesis proposes a revision of that assumption.

There were two ways to test the concept of legitimacy for party systems consolidation: on one side, a theoretical assumption on its relevance; on the other, an empirical demonstration of whether it is relevant or not in order for the theory to work well. This thesis takes both approaches to ascertain that legitimacy is not a condition related to party system consolidation, but to democratic consolidation. Theoretically, this thesis claims that legitimacy can only be linked to how the whole political system is considered by citizens. Political legitimacy involves the justified belief of citizens that the regime is just and fair. This goes far beyond the discussion about the components of any democratic or even semi-democratic political system—including its party system. Party systems can contribute towards the legitimacy of the regime, but they are not themselves a matter for legitimacy. If a party system is fluid and unstable, it does not mean that the political regime is illegitimate; or contrarily, if the political regime is considered illegitimate, it does not follow that its party system has not been consolidated. Both issues can be found in different categories and legitimacy is by no means the bridge which will connect them.

In addition, in the theory of PSI legitimacy has two subjects: the populace and political elites. This thesis argues that the source of legitimacy in democracies comes from citizens and not from political elites. The former are the principal in a political regime, to which the agents (political elites) are expected to serve. Legitimacy, thus, should not be directly linked to how

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political elites evaluate their own system, as they are agents of the object to be legitimised. Citizens’ attitudes are eventually shaped by the same elites, but legitimacy only makes conceptual sense if the depositary of sovereignty, the populace, has belief in the political system. This is necessary in order for it to work and for this to be adhered to by the same citizens.

Empirically, I have proceeded in two ways to look for relationships between political legitimacy and the stability of party systems. Firstly, I used the conceptualisation of legitimacy that matches it to the whole political system. And secondly, I followed the theory of PSI conceptualisation of legitimacy. I tested how both conceptualisations relate to party system consolidation, using different methodological approaches. The ensuing results were dissimilar.

In the first instance, there is a correlation between the legitimacy of the political system and the process of institutionalisation of party systems. In polities where satisfaction with democracy is high, the stability of party systems is also high. On the contrary, when satisfaction is low, the party systems tend to be unstable. This relationship is understandable: people do not trust party systems, only political systems. As a result of this, party systems can be vested with stability. It is not plausible to conclude that citizens provide legitimacy to party systems; rather, they confer legitimacy to the political system where party systems, with all the other components of the given political system, belong to. Therefore, legitimacy can be shown here as a variable depicting democratic stability, and as such it should be studied by using the lens of democratic theories.

In the second instance, this thesis finds it difficult to link any of the PSI theory’s options of legitimacy to the stability of party systems. The elite interviews and almost 500 face-to-face population interviews data from the three case studies, in addition to survey data from a large number of countries, allow me to suggest that: 1) political elites cannot ‘legitimise’ political parties and elections, and 2) citizens’ valuation of parties and elections is not related to party system consolidation. In all cases, correlation tests indicate weak, if any, association with inter- party competition. None of the aforementioned options are meaningful, or even relevant, to ascertain party system stability.

Given all the gathered evidence, this thesis contends that legitimacy is misplaced as one of the pillars of the theory of PSI. For that reason, it is important to re-evaluate if the theory of PSI would work better without the dimension of legitimacy as part of its toolkit. It seems that

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legitimacy is definitely appropriate to study (democratic) regime institutionalisation, in which case it is only indirectly associated to party system institutionalisation. Yet nobody would refrain from expecting a legitimate political system to be the best environment for a party system to mature, both political system and party system belong nevertheless to different analytical categories of political studies. Political legitimacy, therefore, is well-suited for an analysis of the grand category of political systems rather than for any of its components, most notably party systems.

7.3 Further research I will now outline the matters that should deserve more attention in future research on party system institutionalisation. Firstly, this thesis has not focused on party systems which display setbacks in their stabilisation process. The scholarship may benefit from an exhaustive examination of the reasons of under-institutionalisation in party systems in newer democracies. Secondly, the situation of mature democracies that face a process of party system de-institutionalisation requires a careful study. In addition, it is important to explore how factors like defections and electoral systems—not included in this thesis—may provide contextual information about the development of party systems.

7.3.1 Under-institutionalisation

The study of party systems becoming more institutionalised in newer democracies is the focus of this present research. Throughout this thesis, claims and tests are directed at what allows party systems to become more stable over time, more predictable to voters, and why in some cases more quickly consolidated than others. For a piece of work of this scale, there are limits of scope and depth. One of the limits that can turn into opportunities for further research here would be to take a look at party systems which are consistently unsuccessful in their maturation processes. They represent the cases of party system under-institutionalisation.

There is a number of young democracies whose party systems have never really taken off in terms of consolidation. In Latin America, countries like Ecuador (Roberts 2014b) show levels of volatility of more than 30% on average since the restoration of democracy. In Europe, similar levels of constant instability are shown in countries like Lithuania (Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 2014). In Asia, polities like Thailand (Sinpeng 2014) show chronic volatility of over 20%. In these cases, unpredictable patterns of inter-party competition have remained high ever since.

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It is possible to hypothesise that these party systems have not developed along the lines of cleavages, and certainly not around ideological cleavages. Likewise, they have probably lacked programmatic-party-building charismatic leaders. Instead, they have more likely had non- programmatic parties with personalistic leaders, impeding the said party systems from having long-term platforms. Voters, therefore, cannot base their preferences on longstanding offers, but mostly on short-term attractive packages which may be either populist or programmatically void.

Unless other areas of democracy are unexpectedly well ingrained, such as essential liberties, social organisations’ participation in the public debate, high levels of government accountability, and efficiency and transparency of the bodies of representation, it is unlikely that under-institutionalised party systems can lead to fully-functioning democracies. This link between the level of institutionalisation of party systems and its contribution to the quality of democracies is also another field for exploration in any further research.

7.3.2 De-institutionalisation

Institutionalisation and under-institutionalisation are not the only possible outcomes for party systems. Once-institutionalised party systems can also go backwards and de-institutionalise. A process of de-institutionalisation should only take place in countries with a long history of stable party systems, mostly in mature democracies, that gradually or suddenly experience a disintegration of the parties that formed the basic fabric of their political systems.

Mainwaring contended early on that “party systems can deinstitutionalize—the Italian, Canadian, Peruvian, and Venezuelan cases in the 1990s serve as prime examples” (1999: 25- 26). However, much work is needed to outline a definition of de-institutionalisation in light of the PSI theory. Apart from Mainwaring’s account for two developed countries (Italy and Canada during the 1990s), little has been said about party system de-institutionalisation in developing systems other than Colombia (Boudon 2000; Dargent and Muñoz 2011), Venezuela (McCoy and Myers 2004), Turkey (Özbudun 2000), and, arguably to include them here, the Philippines and Argentina (Eaton 2002, 2008, Scherlis 2008).

Future research should devote special attention to the decomposition of once-institutionalised party systems in mature democracies. The case of Italy is illustrative (Mair 2006). As a mature democracy, it showed a rather stable party system until 1994, shortly after the crisis of the

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tangentopoli broke out. The crisis of the political system did not only affect political parties, who were seen as corrupted and rotten, but also the representativeness of the bodies of government. Electoral rules were changed and as a consequence old parties vanished and new parties emerged. Some of the new parties were particularly populist and programmatically poor, notably Forza Italia, the organisation led by the media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi. The Italian voters, once divided between two competitive poles agglutinated around the Christian Democracy and the Communist Party, were left with neither of them. Additionally, both poles have ended up merging and being pushed aside by new populist movements, especially the one led by Berlusconi.194 The ideological and other strong cleavages, especially the religious one, were broken: they existed as social conflicts in society, but lost their political representation in the competitive public sphere. Voters realised that their interests were no longer well-represented by the old parties, given the high levels of corruption. The social pact between citizens and political parties was withdrawn, and as a result the party system began a process of de-institutionalisation from which it has not fully recovered. Although Berlusconi has been set apart from the competition, other populist and charismatic-led organisations, like comedian Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement, have made their way into Italian politics. In the last elections (2013) for the Chamber of Deputies, the Five Star Movement gained almost 26% of popular support.

The Italian case is probably the most evident of how a party system in a mature democracy can lose its institutionalised features. Citizens felt that democracy was necessary, but the party establishment could not cope with it. That erosion of legitimacy made many of its components reform, including the party system and also the Legislative and Judiciary powers. Indeed, the Mani Pulite (“clean hands”) judicial investigation of the corruption scandals was harsh enough to cause the fall of the First Republic.195

Italy is not the only case of a mature democracy’s party system witnessing a disintegration of its party system. More recently, Greece has seen the rise of extreme parties in left and right that are gaining extraordinary support in lieu of the consequences of the economic crisis and the European Union austerity measures. In Spain, the local election results and pollsters are

194 Over a few years, Italy changed its fully sophisticated type of party system leadership into a mixed egocentric- blurred type, according to the typology of party system leaderships proposed in Chapter Five. 195 For an account of the demise of the First Republic and how the Second Republic started over with new parties, see Burnett and Mantovani (1998).

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predicting the demise of the two-party system dominated by the Popular Party (PP) and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) in the hands of new, growing forces (Podemos and Citizens) led by young and charismatic leaders. De-institutionalisation, however, would only take place after a process of dissolution or shrinking of old parties occurred—as in the case of Italy. In once-consolidated democratic developing countries, like Colombia and Venezuela, the same process of de-institutionalisation of their party systems materialised alongside security and economic crises during the 1980s and 1990s, and the effects can now be observed.

De-institutionalisation is, therefore, an open field to look at in more depth. Causes of de- institutionalisation can be corruption scandals, economic crisis, state security weakness, and in general situations that have a deep impact on society. In most cases, it seems that the political parties were simply by-passed by events. The primordial objective of political parties is to represent voters’ interests and preferences; if they are detached from society, they will be unable to work well. If the situation in society worsens, but democracy is kept in place, citizens might find a way out without the same old parties. New organisations replace them and the party system collapses, giving way to de-institutionalisation.196

Just as institutionalisation is not path-dependant, neither is de-institutionalisation. Political systems can have crises of representation, but if parties are able to make corrections and even self-reform, there is no reason to imagine a decomposition of the party system. Quite the opposite: if parties react in time and with depth to catch up with voters’ expectations, the party system can be further strengthened. De-institutionalisation is not necessarily the only fate to occur after a crisis of the political system, and does not need to be a one-way trip with no return to institutionalisation. Party systems, therefore, can re-institutionalise.

7.3.3 Other factors

In allowing this thesis to focus on specific issues, some factors are left out from the analysis. It does not mean that they are unimportant or that they are negligently unobserved. On the contrary, they may be relevant to look at in the future developments of this field, as they can shed more light on the process of consolidation of party systems. However, I do not expect

196 If we follow the conditions that established parties need to lose and newly founded parties need to replace in order for a de-institutionalisation process to begin, systems in mature democracies (i.e., the UK) might not be experiencing de-institutionalisation. Some are witnessing strong new competition or party system fragmentation, albeit not following the aforementioned de-institutionalising conditions.

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that they will change the main conclusions of this thesis. Factors including national versus regional level party systems, state resources exploitation and corruption could add evidence for the study of party system stabilisation processes. I will briefly mention another two factors that can contribute to expand our understanding of the stability of party systems. One is the study of defection and the other is the analysis of electoral rules.

Defections and party switching can be a sign of a party system weakening. Traditional scholarship sustains that these practices are consequences of under-institutionalised party systems (e.g., Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). In this view, although party switching also occurs in established party systems,197 it always indicates an underlying problem in the political system. Indeed, different levels of party system institutionalisation can be analysed in light of how parties try to stop or minimise defections (Janda 2005, 2009). If the practice of party switching becomes routine, voting may become highly centred on individuals rather than parties. Albeit elections everywhere are not unusually candidate-centred, the basic grid of politics as a collective will would be betrayed if once-elected legislators regularly cross the floor as the normal way to do politics. This factor can be related to the stability of party systems in at least three ways: to what extent the phenomenon of defection is widespread, what countries have done (if they have) to stop it, and how successful the anti-defection measures have been.

Another factor is well-known: the electoral settings. Their relevance comes from the fact that electoral systems contribute to shape party systems (e.g., Diamond and Gunther 2001, Shugart and Carey 1992). Non-proportional electoral systems are usually aimed at having more stable governments, whereas proportional systems are aimed at having better representation in the allocation of seats from votes.198 The trade-off between stability and representation seems to be fallacious, though, as PR systems are not associated with political instability (Farrell 2011: 229). Non-proportional systems, especially first-past-the-post (FPTP), are empirically related to countries of low electoral volatility (e.g., USA, UK, Canada, Jamaica)—although that is not a complete picture. India, for instance, has high electoral volatility despite having a FPTP system. Likewise, PR open list systems offer examples of democracies showing volatility of high (e.g.,

197 For an exhaustive examination of the issue, see Heller and Mershon (2008, 2009). 198 Mixed electoral systems might feature somewhat in the middle (Moser and Scheiner 2004).

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Slovakia, Poland, Brazil) and low scores (e.g., Switzerland, Austria, Finland).199 Thus, this factor is full of possibilities to link how different party systems in consolidation respond to different sets of electoral rules, either alone or in association with other factors.

7.4 Final remarks Party system consolidation approaches, and the theory of PSI in particular, broke the mould in the study of third wave democracies’ party systems since the 1990s. Many scholars joined the efforts made by Scott Mainwaring to change the conventional way in which to analyse young party systems from a Western perspective to a more institutionalised outlook. That same aim was the biggest motivation for conducting this research.

In the research process, however, unexpected issues came up. Firstly, given that the theory of PSI was not supposed to outpace other theories of party systems or declare superiority, it was startling that scholars had not paid enough attention to blend the theory of PSI with other related scholarships. The role of cleavages, so much studied in Western Europe and less so in Latin America and Central Eastern Europe, was almost totally neglected by the scholars using the PSI theory toolkit. They are not opposing theories. Just as the freezing hypothesis is efficient in explaining the party system consolidation in Western Europe, it is also useful for newer party systems. Likewise, even if the theory of PSI was inspired by third wave democracies, that should not prevent scholars in applying its inner logic to mature democracies. More importantly, there are no reasons to avoid the use of both theoretical bodies simultaneously, provided that their combined aim is the same: reveal how party systems work, and why they work the way they do, wherever and whenever they take place.

A second surprise to emerge was that there was little—although not insignificant— constructive criticism aimed at enhancing the validity of the PSI theory. The pieces found that raise serious challenges for the logic and structure of the PSI theory can be counted on one hand.200 Furthermore, most of the works dealing with the PSI theory have mechanically applied its proposed dimensions and have made (many times fruitless) efforts to operationalise them.

199 Chile has been characterised by a PR open list system of a district magnitude of 2, conducive of a two-dominant coalition system. Estonia has a PR ordered list system in multi-member constituencies, with an electoral threshold of 5% that constrains its multi-party system. Korea has a mixed-member majoritarian electoral system, but its nominal tier (single-member constituencies) is far more relevant, causing Korea to be a two-dominant party system. 200 The main works are Hicken and Kuhonta (2011 and 2015a), Luna (2014), to a lesser extent Luna and Altman (2011), and Zucco (forthcoming as book chapter).

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Except for the works of Hicken and Kuhonta, scholars have not questioned the appropriateness of the dimension of legitimacy for the whole validity of the theory. The two previous surprises help explain why, on the other hand, old assumptions such as the “pervasive” nature of personalistic politics have been massively neglected from revision. In social sciences it is difficult to find laws, so there should not be axioms decreeing that given qualities (e.g., charismatic leaderships) generate unidirectional effects.

The three surprises regarding the limits of social inquiry opened a window of opportunity for this thesis. This research now expects to expand the knowledge about party system consolidation variation amongst third wave democracies, especially for the role of cleavages and personalistic politics. Likewise, this research seeks to contribute to rethink the theory of PSI regarding internal inconsistencies (e.g., legitimacy) as well as its combination with other theoretical devices (e.g., cleavages). There are good reasons to foresee that the scholarship on party system institutionalisation can further expand in order to enhance our comprehension of particularly complex phenomena.

End.-

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APPENDICES

A. OPERATIONALISATION

It is less clear how to operationalise and provide measurable indicators of the PSI theory’s dimensions other than that of inter-party stability. Legitimacy and party roots in society dimensions are traditionally gauged by opinion surveys. The dimension of party roots in society is traditionally measured by levels of popular closeness to political parties and, alternatively, by the social contours of party electorates. With regards to the fourth dimension concerning the organisational strength of parties and party systems, measurement attempts are as abundant as they are intricate. They range from gauging how parties finance and conduct their campaigns (Farrell 2006, Gunlicks 1993, Hopkin 2004), carry out their recruitment (e.g., Katz and Mair 1994, Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008), select their staff members (e.g., Webb and Kolodny 2006), calculate organisational strength by party age (Dix 1992, Jones 2007, Croissant and Völkel 2010), exhibit legislator switching (e.g., Desposato 2006, Cumings 2005, Kamiński and Kurczewska 1994, Ufen 2008a), and carry out party discipline (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1993, Desposato 2005, Rice 1925, Wilson and Wiste 1976).

Next I will review how the other dimensions are operationalised using the literature. In some cases, I will make suggestions to enhance the aforementioned operationalisations.

A 1.1 Roots in society

This dimension looks to identify how close—or how identified—citizens deem themselves to be to a given political party. According to Mainwaring and Scully (1995), the closer the relationship, the more institutionalised the system becomes at the aggregate level, because such a closeness means that parties are representative of community interests. The method that scholars have used to measure this dimension is by using public opinion survey results where citizens are asked about their identification with specific political parties (Luna and Altman 2011, Jones 2007, Payne 2006). Payne (2006) uses the results of a survey which asks citizens how close they feel to a party of their preference. He standardizes the responses and compares the results for two different years, to evaluate the trend over time. Jones (2007) includes how legislators place their parties in a distance scale from society, using an elite survey.

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Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) privilege the ideological self-position of voters, and the probability of those voters voting for parties under the left-right scheme (spatial model). They find that where ideological linkage from party supporters to parties is strong, electoral volatility tends to be lower, confirming what Lipset and Rokkan (1967) postulate (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006: 211). On the contrary, weak ideological/programmatic linkages to parties lead to ‘floating voters’. Thus, a method of measuring party roots in society could look at the relative strength of a particular social group and social interest amongst the electorate of a given party. The links between party system stability and cleavages require more attention, and open an unexplored channel between both theories (i.e., theories of PSI and of cleavages). It implies that the gap between the PSI theory and the cleavage theory is far from being bridged.

Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) also highlight personalistic voting: the more personalised an election result is, the less programmatic it is—which leads to weaker party roots in society. They test this by simply seeking out cases where outsider candidates campaigned in presidential elections, and measuring the amount of success they have had; albeit this approach leaves out parliamentary and some semi-presidential systems. To further complicate the matter, Stoll (2008) suggests that the conclusions made after operationalising social cleavage indicators on party systems depend upon the measure employed, so the way social cleavages are measured does indeed matter.

A 1.2 Legitimacy

Following how legitimacy is defined upon the theory of PSI, a number of studies have consistently measured it (Luna and Altman 2011, Jones 2007, Mainwaring 1999, Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Mainwaring and Scully (1995) admit there is not enough survey data to measure this dimension, thus they offer some estimates (p. 14). Although Mainwaring and Scully (1995) also include the extent to which citizens perceive that parties and elections are the means of determining who is in power (p. ix, 5), they then shift their focus towards how major political elites see processes of determining who governs (p. 14, 25). The way they eventually proceed to tackle this dimension is through qualitative assessments on which countries, at that time, had shown patterns of legitimate access to power (in their exercise, these were Venezuela, Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, and Colombia) and those that had been weaker in those respects (Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru). Qualitative evaluations are worthy of

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inclusion for comparative analyses not only in the absence of quantitative data, but also on their own merit. Depending on the specific methodological uses, they provide insights and nuances of the cases hard to obtain with other data.

In general, the question that most scholars prefer to use to gauge legitimacy relates to the extent in which citizens trust a party, and the extent to which they agree that democracy needs parties. The natural problem with both questions is that they seem to be measuring something different. The question about trust fits better in the dimension of party roots in society, because trust involves values of attachment to a given party. The question about democracy and parties, on the other hand, could work as an indicator to estimate the people’s preference for democracy itself, but it says little about their trust in a party or even less in a party system. They both show the problematic use of the dimension of legitimacy, as analysed in Chapter Six. In addition, as Mainwaring (1999) says, such questions are not usually fielded in advanced European countries, because it is assumed that Western European voters see parties as essential components of the political system. Furthermore, if an inter-regional cross- national comparison was made about legitimacy as structured by the original PSI theory, a subset of countries would be left out of the analysis.

A 1.3 Party organisation

The party organisation dimension is probably the most difficult to gauge. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) measured this dimension based on qualitative assessments of each of the reviewed Latin American countries. They scored them from 1.0 (= low level of party organisation) to 3.0 (= strong party organisation). Firstly, countries were grouped following labels of loyalty that do not account for much variation; for instance, authors posited that political elites in Venezuela, Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, Mexico and Paraguay “are loyal to their parties, and party discipline in the legislature is reasonably solid” (p. 16). 201 Secondly, Mainwaring and Scully seem to have fallen into a tautological argument stating that these countries do well in this dimension because “[their] parties are well organized” (p. 16): if the dimension is about how well organised parties are, it would be of more use to provide other characteristics or variables that describe on what basis their organisations are strong. Thirdly, this approach would be enriched if it allowed ideal categories or scales to place these party

201 There is no explanation of why Uruguay is given a score of 2.5 rather than 3.0, like the other countries mentioned.

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systems. In that case, this dimension would be applicable to countries from regions other than Latin America.

Other researchers have focused on party resources, either party finance (Hopkin 2004, Gunlicks 1993), party staff (e.g., Webb and Kolodny 2006), or party membership (e.g., Katz and Mair 1994), in most cases making qualitative comparisons. These three aspects can also be intertwined, as contributors to Webb, Farrell, and Holliday (2002) as with the party systems of all major industrialized countries. Overall, these latter contributors find that, for their selection of developed countries, parties’ income and central staffing show an upward trend over time—consistent with a greater professionalization of parties (Panebianco 1988).202 Although the findings suggest that parties in Western industrialized democracies are using more resources, the data collected is usually dispersed and not standardised (Webb, Farrell, and Holliday 2002). The view of party strength based on finance and staff seems to be a convincing approach, but there are also indicators based on the degree of internal discipline, the collective and programmatic characteristics that political parties should have, and how long parties last in a political system.

In a further effort to understand the strength of parties, but in a context of new democracies, other authors have experienced difficulty gathering information given the inaccurate or patchy nature of the existing data (see contributions in Webb and White 2007203). For instance, in the case of Brazil, Ames (2007) finds a fair amount of data regarding finance and membership for the Workers Party, but not for other political organisations. Both in Webb, Farrell, and Holliday (2002), and in Webb and White (2007), the final conclusions are driven by qualitative assessments of the behaviour of political parties rather than by standardised sets of data (i.e., parameters that scholars could use across systems). Despite authors and editors’ efforts, there are no international standards on how to measure party resources, setting aside party system resources.

202 Other typical control variables, such as level of economic development, inflation, unemployment and overall welfare indicators can also be relevant to understand political sophistication. 203 For Paul Webb, his two co-edited volumes on political parties are linked. Actually, contributors to both books (Webb, Farrell, and Holliday 2002, and Webb and White 2007) pursue similar questions about political parties’ structure, legitimacy, and organizational strength. In the first volume, they describe parties in industrialized democratic societies, whereas in the second volume they focus on the newly democratized countries of Latin America and Eastern Europe.

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One option for comparing organisational party strength is to measure the directional behaviour of parties; that is to say, whether party finance, for example, is now better or worse (or ‘ups’ and ‘downs’ in Webb, Farrell, and Holliday 2002’s language) than at a certain point in the past, but this achieves little in a comparative perspective. As Webb and White acknowledge, “in the absence of comparable hard quantitative data, it is hard to be sure whether there are significant differences in the overall strength and reach of parties in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the established democracies” (2007: 356).

Luna and Altman (2011) use two proxies to tackle organisational strength: the importance of candidate selection (see Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008) and civil participation in campaigns. The former is at the core of a party organisation, because it reveals internal structuring. Yet the latter has more data available, it is not related at all to party structure; rather, it is connected to citizens’ interests in politics, so it should go in the dimension of party roots in society. Finally, the best way Luna and Altman (2011) use to find out details of party internal strength is through interviews with parties chairmen, legislators and local leaders. This qualitative method is a great help in describing events and extracting some plausible explanations not found in the (scant) data.

Another way to determine party organisation strength is via the level of correspondence between a party’s leadership, programme and legislators’ decisions (whether they vote on bills according to the leadership or the manifesto); that is to say, the degree of party discipline or party cohesion (Crutzen, Castanheira and Sahuguet 2010; for the American case, see Cox and McCubbins 1993, Rohde 1991, McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2001; for European cases, see Sauger 2009, Wilson and Wiste 1976). One widely used indicator of party cohesion is the Rice Index of Party Cohesion (Desposato 2005, Rice 1925). This index subtracts all rejection votes of legislators of party X from all support votes of legislators of party X, dividing the result by the total number of legislators from party X. The closer the result is to 100, the more cohesive the party is; the closer to 0, the less cohesive. There are several applications and modifications of this index.204 For example, Desposato (2005) finds that the index inflates cohesion scores of small parties, especially those which are less unified. In any case, the Rice Index has been

204 See, for example, the Agreement Index, which puts special attention on abstentions (Attinà 1990, Hix 1998), and the Index of Party Unity, which was mostly developed to explain eventual divisions in the early motions of the British Parliament (Bailey and Nason 2008). For an overall evaluation of party cohesion methods, see Anderson, Watts, and Wilcox (1966).

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useful in helping scholars focus on legislative unity as a measure of party discipline (Born and Nevison 1974, Depauw and Martin 2009, Krehbiel 2000, Rahat 2007). Overall, the degree of cohesiveness is linked to the regime type: parliamentary systems tend to be more cohesive than presidential systems (e.g., Bowler, Farrell and Katz 1999, Carey 2007, Tsebelis 2002). In Western democracies, setting aside the U.S. case, there is a tendency toward party discipline because it is in the nature of parliamentary systems. If members of a party or coalition stop voting for the government’s bills, what probably would follow would be a vote of no confidence, wherein the government can fall. In a presidential system, legislators are more willing to defy government proposals, even if both belong to the same party, because their electorates are different. Thus, party discipline is biased in favour of parliamentary systems, or rather: parliamentary systems are at a slight advantage when compared to other systems in terms of party organisation. The explanation for this different behaviour lies in the origin and survival of the executive branch: whilst in parliamentary systems both origin and survival are the same (a vote of no confidence will lead to dissolution of the executive and probably the legislative, due to a call for new elections), in presidential systems both bodies are quite independent, leading to different behaviours (Shugart 2005). Despite its longevity, the Rice Index of Party Cohesion can provide a good proxy of the party organisation dimension, because well-organised parties should be more disciplined. The main problem with using this measure, though, is the lack of systematic data collected for each country, and overall the missing data for an important sample of developing countries.

However, a party being cohesive does not imply its decision-making processes are collective, because a party can be united only, for example, due to a personalistic leader in an egocentric party leadership type. Such a personalistic structure—without counterbalances and in anon- programmatic settings—is at odds with party organisational strength and internal democracy, because if a leader has gone, the party structure would tend to dismantle and lose popular ground. At the same time, party cohesion can be headed in the opposite direction of high levels of democracy. For example, the Mexican PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) exhibited high scores of cohesion during its long period governing Mexico.205 Furthermore, party cohesion also depends upon the type of party involved. For instance, Mainwaring (1999) says that one of the defining features of Brazilian politics is its catch-all parties, leading to the

205 Even more surprising was the fact that PRI legislators’ cohesion kept highly stable after the party lost the government, in 2000 (González Tule 2010).

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continued presence of undisciplined congressmen. On the other hand, governing parties in presidential systems are more likely to succeed in implementing their policies when they act cohesively and the opposition lacks cohesion, as occurred in the case of Chile during Ricardo Lagos government (2000-06) (Toro Maureira 2007).

The degree of legislators’ party switching is another indicator of the strength of party systems. Party switching has effects on party discipline (Best and Heller 2005, Heller and Mershon 2008), and cabinet positions (Schofield and Laver 1985), which may result in changes in policy outcomes (Heller and Mershon 2009). Party switching and defections are rare in old or consolidated democracies (Desposato 2006).206 However, if party switching is combined with other features of weak party system institutionalisation, one may assume even worse effects than the abovementioned. In fact, developing democracies—typically characterized by having more weakly institutionalised party systems than industrialized countries—account for more cases of party switching (Desposato 2006), which is sometimes linked to political populism (Weyland 1999). In developing regions, party defection is a common phenomenon. For Latin America, there are studies of party switching in Brazil (Desposato 2006, Mainwaring 1999), Colombia (Dargent and Muñoz 2010, Pizarro 2002) the Dominican Republic (Benito Sánchez 2010), Ecuador (Mejía 1999), Guatemala (Fortín 2010), Mexico (Barrow 2007), and Peru under Fujimori (Kenney 2003). It seems that the prevalence of party switching is even more common in Central Eastern Europe and Southeast and East Asia.

In Southeast Asia, the best example is the Philippines. Even more, the Philippines can be considered one of the world’s foremost cases of chronic party switching in an electoral democracy. The so-called Philippine turncoatism refers to a commonly accepted practice of crossing from one party to another (Sabangan 2004). The two main parties, Liberal and Nacionalista, as a result of party switching, are virtually indistinct in ideological terms (Eaton 2002, Montinola 1999).207 There are also high levels of party switching in Thailand, and to a

206 There are prominent exceptions, such as the U.S. during the so-called period of realignment (Aldrich and Bianco 1992, Canon and Sousa 1992; for a larger historical review, see Nokken and Poole 2002), the Fourth Republic France (MacRae 1967), India (Kashyap 1970), Japan (Kato and Yamamoto 2005, Scheiner 2006), and Italy (Heller and Mershon 2008). In Italy, for instance, during the 1996-2005 legislatures, one-fourth of its lower house members switched parties at least once (Heller and Mershon 2008). 207 In the pre-Marcos era, there was a common practice known as running for office in the “free zone:” Several candidates in a locality could run under the same party label because the party could not decide who the official nominee was; such practices still occur in present day, although not to the same degree (Kasuya 2009). Currently, candidates not nominated by their parties can either migrate to another party or create a new one; partisan loyalties are not legally enforced either (Caballero-Anthony 2006). Even more surprisingly, candidates distribute

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lesser extent, Indonesia (Hicken 2006, Ufen 2008b). In South Korea there have been cases of massive defections (in 1998 after an investigation prompted by Kim Dae-Jung against opposition Grand National Party’s legislators; see Kim 2000). Taiwan’s dominant party in the 1990s, KMT, was affected by two waves of defections (1993 and 1999), which are said to have mortally weakened the KMT (Solinger 2001) and pumped a proliferation of parties (Hsu 2006). All these examples highlight the looseness of party organisation amongst well-known third wave democracies.

The situation in post-communist Europe does not seem to be so different. Scholars refer to party switchers as ‘institutional nomads’ (Kamiński and Kurczewska 1994), clan systems (Wedel 2003), and ‘political tourists’ (see Shabad and Slomczynski 2004). Shabad and Slomczynski (2004) find that the Czech Republic had become more institutionalised, related to lower rate of party switching, whereas Poland had not shown a similar decreasing trend of party switching (McMenamin and Gwiazda 2011, Hug and Wüest 2011). In the Baltic states defections have been common, although it seems that parties are more prone to realignment (through merges and switching between existing parties, especially in Estonia and Latvia) than de-alignment (through fissions and startups) (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003). Ukraine has also been studied for its high levels of political shifting amongst members of the Rada (Thames 2007), although a law was passed to stop this behaviour.

Janda (2009) collected data on which he asserts that amongst 36 older democracies, only 14% had laws against party defections, whereas a higher number of newer democracies (24%) and semi-democracies (34%) had such laws. As expected, consolidated democracies do not have similar. In a subset of 65 countries for which there are data, 55 experienced party defections, despite that 30% had anti-defection laws (Janda 2009). Hence, there is a weak correlation between anti-defection laws and actual party switching, which makes this potential measure hard to use when tackling the strength of party organisation dimension.

multiple sample ballots during the campaign period, because individual candidates may prefer to link their names with more popular or visible candidates—even if they belong to different parties (Rood 2002).

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Finally, another way to assess party organisation focuses on party longevity (Dix 1992).208 The idea behind this is that strong parties are more likely to survive due to their programmatic characteristics, which capture the long-term loyalties from the electorates. Thus, the age of parties seems to be useful in testing the strength of party systems (Dix 1992, Jones 2007, Croissant and Völkel 2010). As Jones (2007) appraises, the party system age variable is an average of a) the percentage of relevant parties (at least 10% of seats in the lower house) that has been in existence for at least 10 years at the time of the evaluation, and b) the percentage of the same parties that has been in existence for the last 25 years. The first measurement (a) requires some re-evaluation, because it might be questionable as to why 10% is the threshold by which to consider a party as relevant. Instead, we could use Taagepera’s formula of seat- winning parties (P), which refers to parties that win at least one seat in the assembly based on a predictor model. Taagepera (2001) set up his model and then tested it across 30 electoral systems. The model derives that when an assembly of S seats is elected in districts of M seats (the ‘Seat Product’), the most likely P should be:209

1/4 P0 = (MS)

This model fits for a large sample of elections; thus, it does not necessarily fit for individual elections (Taagepera 2007). By using this formula, then, scholars can get the minimum number of relevant seat-winning parties that should be taken as ‘relevant’ parties for (a’) instead of the threshold of 10% of (a) in Jones’s (2007) proposition.210

The second measurement, b (the percentage of the same parties in existence over 25 years) works to the detriment of newly democratised countries whose first elections occurred after the mid-1980s, including several Latin American states as well as almost all of the post- communist polities. To gauge how strong parties are as organisations, the presence of parties in elections is more important than their mere formal existence. For example, the Common Wealth Party in the UK elections during the 1940s was able to elect five members of

208 Mainwaring and Scully use this indicator as a proxy measure for the dimension of party roots in society. They understand that the more loyalty parties can cultivate from voters, the more the parties can hope to last (1995: 12- 15). 209 According to Taagepera (2007), the world averages behind his predictive model determine that “the number of parties represented in the assembly is approximately the fourth root of the seat product. The fractional seat share of the largest party is approximately the inverse of the eighth root of the seat product.” He calls N0 and Actual N0 (Taagepera 2007: 116-7) what I refer to as P0 and Actual P0 here. 210 This proposition does not prevent one from considering an alternative way to tackle relevant parties in a more universal fashion: relevant party is any party in parliament.

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Parliament and was even considered a British ‘third party’ in that time (Prynn 1972). Notwithstanding, all of its Parliament members crossed the floor shortly after they got elected. More surprisingly, the party was legally active until its dissolution 51 years later. Consequently, during more than 40 years the party was not decisive at national level. If for some reason it had managed to compete and get members elected in the 1990s, it could have been labelled as a mature party according to the longevity measure by Jones. Such a label would have been inappropriate, considering the inability of the party to keep its own MPs.211 Thus, the number of consecutive elections in which parties compete is a better complement to measurement (a’). Having four consecutive elections (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006) shows a system with a higher probability of remaining rather than being interrupted or transformed. Henceforth, I would reformulate the original Jones’ measurement for (b), with the following: (b’) the percentage of the same parties that has participated in all the last four lower house elections.

211 There are also parties with local vocation. That is to say, parties that compete only for local or sub-national elections, that can eventually decide to compete nationally. It may also be the case of parties that are not nationally competitive mostly due to the electoral system in place. For example, the Greens and UKIP have been able to secure more representation in legislatures other than the House of Commons. The proposition here, however, considers party systems at country level, thus only national elections and national representation are highlighted.

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B. ELITE INTERVIEWS

B 1.1 Questionnaire

TABLE B 1 Elite interviews’ structured questionnaire

Let’s talk about the party system as a whole. In your own understanding, is there any special characteristic unique to [country] that makes its party system different from others in [region]? Is the [country] party system as mature as in developed democracies? In your opinion, has the party system as a whole in [country] got better, worse o has experienced no big changes compared to when democracy was re-established? Think of the years of authoritarian regime. Are there factors from that period that helped shape, for good or for bad, the way this party system has evolved till now? What are the greatest obstacles that impede voters to be more stable in their party choices/preferences? Are regionalism, ethnicity, personalism or other issues matters of concern for the proper functioning of the [country] party system? Are all the important interests in society represented in the structure of party competition? If not so: which interests are not? Do parties in [country] follow the traditional left-right axis to do politics? In your opinion, leaders and common citizens alike legitimise general elections as the only means to access power? Some people argue that citizens do not feel close to parties in [country]. Do you agree or disagree? Why? How much your party should advance to become better organised and enhance its internal democracy?

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B 1.2 List of Chilean elite interviewees

Table B 2 Interviewees for Chile Name Category Political party Gabriel Ascencio Deputy DC José Miguel Ortiz Deputy DC Juan Carlos Latorre* Deputy DC Pablo Lorenzini Deputy DC Sergio Aguiló Deputy IC Lautaro Carmona Deputy PC Andrea Molina Deputy UDI Carlos Vilches Deputy UDI Edmundo Eluchans Deputy UDI Giovanni Calderón Deputy UDI María Angélica Cristi Deputy UDI Patricio Melero Deputy UDI Joaquín Godoy Deputy RN Karla Rubilar Deputy RN Marcela Sabat Deputy RN Alejandra Sepúlveda Deputy Independent Marta Isasi Deputy Independent Adriana Muñoz Deputy PPD Jorge Tarud Deputy PPD María Antonieta Saá Deputy PPD Alberto Robles Deputy PRSD Alfonso de Urresti Deputy PS Marcelo Schilling Deputy PS Osvaldo Andrade Deputy PS Julio Dittborn Former deputy UDI Carlos Olivares Former deputy PRI Andrés Zaldívar Senator DC Ignacio Walker Senator DC Ximena Rincón Senator DC Ena Von Baer Senator UDI Jovino Novoa Senator UDI Juan Antonio Coloma Senator UDI Antonio Horvath Senator RN Carlos Larraín Senator RN José García Ruminot Senator RN Carlos Bianchi Senator Independent Eugenio Tuma Senator PPD José Antonio Gómez Senator PRSD Carlos Ominami Former Senator PRO

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Former President of the Ricardo Lagos Republic PS Julia Urquieta High-ranked party member PC Danilo Monteverde Party chairman PH Ricardo Solari High-ranked party member PS Rosa Ahumada Copiapó City Counciller PC Mario Bordoli Copiapó City Counciller RN José Fernández Copiapó City Counciller PPD Luis Orrego Copiapó City Counciller PRO Omar Luz Copiapó City Counciller PRSD Anelice Véliz Copiapó City Counciller PS Eugenio González A. Macul City Counciller RN Leonardo Grijalbo Santiago Regional Councillor DC Juan Godoy Santiago Regional Councillor PPD Claudia Pascual Santiago City Counciller PC Osvaldo Delgado Tierra Amarilla City Mayor PRO Public workers (ANEF) leading Jorge Conçales staff DC

B 1.2 List of Estonian elite interviewees

Table B 3 Interviewees for Estonia Name Category Political party Confidential MP EK Enn Eesmaa MP EK Jüri Ratas MP EK Kadri Simson MP EK Mailis Reps MP EK Andrei Korobeinik MP ER Kaja Kallas MP ER Laine Randjärv MP ER Taavi Rõivas MP ER Annely Akkerman MP IRL Erki Nool MP IRL Mart Nutt MP IRL Indrek Saar MP SDE Mart Meri MP SDE Sven Mikser MP SDE Denis Boroditš MP Independent Rainer Vakra MP Independent Marek Strandberg Former MP EER Ignar Fjuk Former MP ER Jaanus Männik Former MP ERL

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Ott Lumi Former MP IRL Toomas Alatalu Former MP SDE Aleksander Laane Leading party member EER Hindrek Lootus Leading party member SDE Veiko Lumi Party staff member IRL Martin Bek Party staff member ER Priit Kallakas Party staff member ER Daisy Järva Tallinn City Council EK Rein Ratas Tallinn City Council EK Toomas Vitsut Tallinn City Council EK Reet Trei Tallinn City Council IRL Olev Raju Tartu City Council EK Mihhail Lotman Tartu City Council IRL Kristjan Karis Tartu City Council ER Toomas Kapp Tartu City Council ER Urmas Kruuse Tartu City Council ER Peep Peterson Tartu City Council SDE Argo Ideon Editor Postimees unknown

B 1.2 List of Korean elite interviewees

Table B 4 Interviewees for Korea Name* Category Political party Chun Soo-nok Assembly member DUP Confidential Assembly member DUP Hong Eui-rak Assembly member DUP Lim Su-kyung Assembly member DUP You Ihn-tae Assembly member DUP You Seung-hee Assembly member DUP Park Won-suk Assembly member JP Roh Hoe-chan Assembly member JP Cho Hai-jin Assembly member GNP Ha Tae-kyung Assembly member GNP Hong Il-pyo Assembly member GNP Kim Yong-tae Assembly member GNP Lee Jasmine Assembly member GNP Lee Woo-hyun Assembly member GNP You Gi-jeon Assembly member GNP Lee Boo-young Former assembly member DUP Kwon Ki-kyun Former assembly member GNP You Jong-keun Former governor DUP Park Chan-ju Editor Hangyere newspaper unknown

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Yoo Ku-nil Journalist Retired unknown Journalist JoongAng Ilbo Kim Gyung-jin newspaper unknown Park Jeong-ha LMB spokeperson GNP Kim Hak-min Party leading member DUP Scholar Kim Daejung Presidential Kim Han-jung Library DUP Scholar (Australian National You Jong-sung University) DUP Bruce Cumings Scholar (University of Chicago) na Yoo Hwan-joon Sejong City Council President GNP Kim Moon-soo Seoul City Council DUP Kim Sang-ho MP Woo Sangho's senior advisor GNP MP Ha Taekeung's executive Yoo Hyun-tae secretary GNP Committee of Future Planning’s Lee In-yong Chief of Staff unknown * I have preserved here the order last name / first name

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C. POPULATION INTERVIEWS

C 1.1 Chile

FACSIMILE C 1 Questionnaire for population in Chile (in Spanish)

Name has been concealed

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C 1.2 Estonia

FACSIMILE C 2 Questionnaire for population in Estonia (in Estonian)

Name has been concealed

C 1.3 Korea

FACSIMILE C 3 Questionnaire for population in Korea (in Korean)

Name has been concealed

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D. REGRESSION CALCULATIONS AND RESULTS

D 1. PCA procedure and results

For the Principal Component Analysis I selected a series of value-based variables from all available waves (from 2 to 6) of the World Values Survey. There are three categories of variables to choose: cultural values, socio-economic variables, and post-materialism indicator.

I have included seven basic values of new politics: four cultural (tolerance to homosexuality, abortion, divorce and suicide), three socio-economic (attitudes towards state/ private ownership, towards state/individual responsibility and towards market competition), and the post-materialist index (4-item index). All these variables are present in all waves for the three countries, but Estonia is not included in the wave 2005-2007. For some countries, some other questions were added if they were included in the respective wave. Socio-economic value related to importance of hard work to get individual rewards was not asked in wave 4 to any country, and not asked in Chile in wave 6. Questions left out of consideration include attitude towards income inequality, for being consulted only in Korea and been eventually meaningless in all PCA analyses. A question of pride for the own country (a measure of nationalism) was included in preliminary analysis of PCA but was then excluded from the final loadings given its low loading into factor components, so it is included as an independent variable on its own for the subsequent regression analyses.

Variables are recoded so that higher values represent more conservative moral values and more market economic interests, in both cases associated with more right-wing parties. That way of scaling is expected to correlate positively with the Left-Right self-placement scale. Variables and coding are presented in Table D 1.1. Next to them scales are shown.

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Table D 1.1 Initial values of variables for PCA Variables Recoded as Scale Cultural Tolerance to homosexuality CULT_Homosexuality Tolerance to prostitution CULT_Prostitution Tolerance to abortion CULT_abortion Tolerance to divorce CULT_divorce 1 Always Tolerance to euthanasia CULT_euthanasia (…) Tolerance to suicide CULT_suicide 10 Never Tolerance to soft drugs CULT_softdrugs Tolerance to adultery CULT_adultery Tolerance to sex before marriage CULT_sexbefmarried National Pride CULT_Nationalism 1 No (…) 4 Big Socio-economic Favour to income Inequality SE_Inequality Favour to State over Private Ownership SE_Ownership 1 Always Favour to State over Individual Responsibility SE_Responsib (…) Favour to Strong Market Competition SE_Competition 10 Never Favour to Hard Work Rewards Persons SE_HardWork Postmaterialist Post-materialist index Postmaterialist 1, 2, 3

All the variables and the waves, years and countries when and where they were asked are presented now in Table D 1.2. Blue ones represent the variables asked all the times the surveys were conducted; light blue indicates that they were almost always asked; pink for sometimes asked. In purple I left CULT_Nationalism and SE_Inequality, which were initially considered to be included here. However, their loadings in several surveys’ PCA were meaningless and therefore were filtered out from this selection. Postmaterialism was asked in all waves and countries under study, but its loadings were eventually too low to be included in any component.

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Table D 1.2 Presence of questions about values Variables Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 1989-1993 1994-1999 1999-2004 2005-2007 2010-2014 Year ‘90 ‘90 ‘90 ‘96 ‘96 ‘96 ‘00 ‘99 ‘01 ‘05 ‘05 ‘11 ‘11 ‘10 CULT_Homosexuality C E K C E K C E K C E K C E K CULT_Prostitution C E K C E K C K C E K C E CULT_abortion C E K C E K C E K C E K C E K CULT_divorce C E K C E K C E K C E K C E K CULT_euthanasia C E C E K C E K C E K CULT_suicide C E K C E K C E K C E K C E K CULT_softdrugs C E K E E CULT_adultery C E K E E CULT_sexbefmarried E C E CULT_Nationalism C E K C E C E K C E K C E K SE_Inequality K K K E K K SE_Ownership C E K C E K C E K C E K C E K SE_Responsib C E K C E K C E K C E K C E K SE_Competition C E K C E K C E K C E K C E K SE_HardWork C E K C E K C E K E K Post-materialist index C E K C E K C E K C E K C E K (C) = Chile; (E) = Estonia; (K) = Korea. Wave 5 was not conducted in Estonia.

I have used the recommendations by Costello and Osborne (2005) for exploratory analysis. A relevant step taken from there is about the numbers of factors retained, based on the scree test. If any inconsistency arises, the authors recommend to run successive times the data until the simplest, best structured results come up. For instance, no factor should have less than three items, or have item loading less than .30212, and less crossloadings are preferred. Given these and other suggestions in mind, I present below all relevant results of the Principal Components Analyses for each survey year country, using the statistical package SPSS 20. Resulting factors are saved and prepared as independent variables for regression analyses. The rotation method in all cases is Varimax, which was consistent with other rotation methods used randomly in different country-waves of this dataset213.

The final PCA’s factors to be used in subsequent regressions are below. Only results that were eventually used for the regression analyses in the respective chapter are shown. Tables D 1.3 to D 1.6 correspond to Chile; from Tables D 1.7 to D 1.9, to Estonia, and Tables D 1.10 and D 1.11 are for Korea. Results for Chile, Estonia and Korea are ordered by survey year.

212 As general rule, I use a minimum of 0.35. Only those loadings are shown in this report. 213 I used the oblique rotation procedure Direct Oblimin (SPSS 20). Factor loadings were similar to Varimax. Postmaterialist marked low loadings in both Varimax and Direct Oblimin.

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Table D 1.3 Chile 1990 Principal Component Analysis: factor loadings Value items Moral values Market values Homosexuality .726 Prostitution .716 Abortion .727 Divorce .631 Euthanasia .532 Suicide .550 Soft drugs .560 Ownership .589 Responsib .547 Competition .705 HardWork .634 Explained variance (%) = 40.4; KMO = .767; Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity χ² (df 55) = 2257.636, p < .001

Table D 1.4 Chile 1996 Principal Component Analysis: factor loadings Value items Moral values Market values Homosexuality .730 Prostitution .763 Abortion .758 Divorce .720 Euthanasia .642 Suicide .622 Ownership .350 Competition .795 HardWork .699 Explained variance (%) = 47.9; KMO = .774; Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity χ² (df 36) = 1661.689, p < .001

Table D 1.5 Chile 2005 Principal Component Analysis: factor loadings Value items Moral values Market values Homosexuality .732 Prostitution .693 Abortion .696 Divorce .715 Euthanasia .664 Suicide .594 Responsib -.469 Competition .721 HardWork .746 Explained variance (%) = 46.5; KMO = .770; Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity χ² (df 36) = 1275.800, p < .001

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Table D 1.6 Chile 2011 Principal Component Analysis: factor loadings Value items Moral values Market values Homosexuality .751 Prostitution .780 Abortion .669 Divorce .664 Suicide .629 Sex before marriage .697 Ownership .723 Responsib .683 Competition -.354 Explained variance (%) = 49.2; KMO = .754; Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity χ² (df 36) = 1698.582, p < .001

Table D 1.7 Estonia 1996 Principal Component Analysis: factor loadings Value items Moral values Market values Homosexuality .587 -.352 Prostitution .659 Abortion .700 Divorce .707 Euthanasia .619 Suicide .503 Ownership .655 Responsib .459 Competition .498 HardWork .598 Explained variance (%) = 40.5; KMO = .718; Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity χ² (df 45) = 1193.985, p < .001

Table D 1.8 Estonia 1999 Principal Component Analysis: factor loadings Value items Moral values Market values Homosexuality .726 Prostitution .716 Abortion .727 Divorce .631 Euthanasia .532 Suicide .550 Soft drugs .560 Ownership .589 Responsib .547 Competition .705 HardWork .634 Explained variance (%) = 40.37; KMO = .767; Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity χ² (df 55) = 2257.636, p < .001

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Table D 1.9 Estonia 2011 Principal Component Analysis: factor loadings Value items Moral values Market values Homosexuality .629 Prostitution .662 Abortion .776 Divorce .807 Suicide .490 Sex before marriage .747 Ownership .698 Responsib .557 Competition .530 HardWork .535 Explained variance (%) = 45.1; KMO = .766; Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity χ² (df 45) = 2383.772, p < .001

Table D 1.10 Korea 2005 Principal Component Analysis: factor loadings Value items Moral values Market values Homosexuality .693 Prostitution .717 Abortion .812 Divorce .761 Euthanasia .717 Suicide .714 Ownership .439 Responsib -.627 Competition .799 HardWork .581 Explained variance (%) = 49.1; KMO = .807; Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity χ² (df 45) = 2837.522, p < .001

Table D 1.11 Korea 2010 Principal Component Analysis: factor loadings Value items Moral values Market values Homosexuality .804 Abortion .818 Divorce .811 Suicide .701 Responsib -.556 Competition .788 HardWork .729 Explained variance (%) = 51.4; KMO = .751; Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity χ² (df 28) = 1847.397, p < .001

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D 2. OLS Regressions for Social Class

Table D 2.1 OLS Regression analysis

Chile Estonia Korea

n= 3211 n = 5494 n = 2395 β β β .73*** -0.43*** -0.04 Social Class (Upper) (.11) (0.09) (0.12) .58*** -0.14* -0.04 Social Class (Middle) (.10) (0.06) (0.11) Social Class (Lower) . . . 4.48*** 5.80*** 5.56*** Constant (.12) (0.09) (0.14) Adjusted R2 0.02 0.004 -0.001 F-test 24.68*** 12.29*** 0.08 Dependent variable: Left-right self-position Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

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D 3. Other pseudo R2

Table D 3.1 Chile: Multinomial logistic regression’s§ Pseudo R2 0 1 2 3 4 5 Year Pseudo R2 Baseline Nationalism Regional Political Ideological Full model /ethnicity cleavage values cleavage Cox and Snell .040*** .047*** .051*** .110*** .190*** .239*** 1990 Nagelkerke .058*** .069*** .075*** .160*** .275*** .346*** Cox and Snell .052** .060** .085** .121*** .293*** .336*** 1996 Nagelkerke .067** .077** .110** .154*** .376*** .429*** Cox and Snell .044* .072*** .077*** .071** .388*** .458*** 2005 Nagelkerke .053* .088*** .094*** .087** .472*** .558*** Cox and Snell .081*** .090*** .107*** .146*** .446*** .504* 2011 Nagelkerke .098*** .109*** .129*** .174*** .536*** .604*** § The dependent variable is the main parties/coalitions identification of respondents. Each model corresponds to the Baseline (0) of control variables, plus separate sets of independent variables. The Full model (5) add all independent variables altogether to the Baseline. More details in the corresponding chapter. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table D 3.2 Estonia: Multinomial logistic regression’s§ Pseudo R2 0 1 2 3 4 5 Year Pseudo R2 Baseline Nationalism Regional Political Ideological Full model /ethnicity cleavage values cleavage Cox and Snell .181*** .325*** .295*** .243*** .253*** .423*** 1996 Nagelkerke .197*** .352*** .322*** .266*** .276*** .459*** Cox and Snell .168*** .269*** .246*** .218*** .282*** .377*** 1999 Nagelkerke .180*** .288*** .263*** .234*** .301*** .402*** Cox and Snell .093*** .452*** .223*** .180*** .232*** .511*** 2011 Nagelkerke .100*** .485*** .240*** .194*** .249*** .548*** § The dependent variable is the main parties/coalitions identification of respondents. Each model corresponds to the Baseline (0) of control variables, plus separate sets of independent variables. The Full model (5) add all independent variables altogether to the Baseline. More details in the corresponding chapter. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table D 3.3 Korea: Multinomial logistic regression’s§ Pseudo R2 0 1 2 3 4 5 Year Pseudo R2 Baseline Nationalism Regional Political Ideological Full model /ethnicity cleavage values cleavage Cox and Snell .065*** .067*** .193*** .077*** .078*** .216*** 2005 Nagelkerke .076*** .077*** .223*** .090*** .091*** .250*** Cox and Snell .082*** .101*** .245*** .148*** .188*** .388*** 2010 Nagelkerke .097*** .120*** .290*** .175*** .222*** .458*** § The dependent variable is the main parties/coalitions identification of respondents. Each model corresponds to the Baseline (0) of control variables, plus separate sets of independent variables. The Full model (5) add all independent variables altogether to the Baseline. More details in the corresponding chapter. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

314

D 4. Multinomial logistic regression: Full models results

Table D 4.1 Chile 1990 Party identification Multinomial logit estimates§ Chile 1990 (1 of 1) Concertation vs. Alliance Left parties vs. Alliance Concertation vs. Left parties 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Intercept -3.039 (2.634) 0.911 (5.939) -3.95 (5.407) Age -0.13 (0.067) 0.77 0.88 1.00 -0.056 (0.159) 0.69 0.95 1.29 -0.074 (0.146) 0.70 0.93 1.24 AgeSqr 1.894 (0.851)* 1.26 6.65 35.22 0.607 (1.959) 0.04 1.84 85.28 1.287 (1.789) 0.11 3.62 120.79 Gender -0.058 (0.218) 0.62 0.94 1.45 -0.2 (0.462) 0.33 0.82 2.03 0.142 (0.414) 0.51 1.15 2.60 Social Class (Lower) b 1.085 (0.384)** 1.40 2.96 6.28 0.766 (0.877) 0.39 2.15 11.99 0.319 (0.803) 0.29 1.38 6.64 Social Class (Middle) b 0.706 (0.309)* 1.11 2.03 3.71 0.204 (0.783) 0.26 1.23 5.70 0.502 (0.733) 0.39 1.65 6.96 Religiosity -0.24 (0.242) 0.49 0.79 1.26 -1.051 (0.711) 0.09 0.35 1.41 0.811 (0.675) 0.60 2.25 8.44 Nationalism -0.285 (0.32) 0.40 0.75 1.41 0.361 (0.548) 0.49 1.43 4.20 -0.646 (0.459) 0.21 0.52 1.29 Regions: Metropolitan c 0.069 (0.281) 0.62 1.07 1.86 -0.065 (0.59) 0.30 0.94 2.98 0.135 (0.529) 0.41 1.14 3.22 Regions: North c -0.079 (0.374) 0.44 0.92 1.92 -0.818 (0.837) 0.09 0.44 2.28 0.74 (0.759) 0.47 2.10 9.28 Regions: Centre c 0.071 (0.324) 0.57 1.07 2.03 -0.146 (0.753) 0.20 0.86 3.78 0.217 (0.69) 0.32 1.24 4.80 Moral 0.062 (0.108) 0.86 1.06 1.31 -0.281 (0.177) 0.53 0.76 1.07 0.343 (0.145)* 1.06 1.41 1.87 Market -0.375 (0.112)** 0.55 0.69 0.86 -0.955 (0.232)*** 0.24 0.39 0.61 0.58 (0.206)** 1.19 1.79 2.68 Postmaterialist 0.408 (0.165)** 1.09 1.50 2.08 0.561 (0.355) 0.87 1.75 3.52 -0.153 (0.319) 0.46 0.86 1.61 LR_Scale -0.465 (0.049)*** 0.57 0.63 0.69 -0.94 (0.124)*** 0.31 0.39 0.50 0.475 (0.114)*** 1.29 1.61 2.01 Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke = .346, McFadden = .233. Model χ2 (32)= 247.74, p<.001 § The top entries are multinomial logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 Reference categories: a Higher, b Upper, c South, d Extra-national

313 Table D 4.2 Chile 1996 Party identification Multinomial logit estimates § Chile 1996 (1 of 1) Concertation vs. Alliance Left parties vs. Alliance Concertation vs. Left parties 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Intercept 5.553 (3.415) -0.563 (6.637) 6.116 (5.863) Age 0.023 (0.084) 0.87 1.02 1.21 -0.025 (0.162) 0.71 0.98 1.34 0.048 (0.143) 0.79 1.05 1.39 AgeSqr -0.205 (1.066) 0.10 0.81 6.58 0.669 (2.059) 0.04 1.95 110.54 -0.875 (1.811) 0.01 0.42 14.51 Gender -0.115 (0.265) 0.53 0.89 1.50 0.755 (0.516) 0.77 2.13 5.85 -0.87 (0.458) 0.17 0.42 1.03 Education (Lower) a -0.12 (0.402) 0.40 0.89 1.95 -0.968 (0.76) 0.09 0.38 1.68 0.848 (0.666) 0.63 2.34 8.61 Education (Middle) a -0.077 (0.363) 0.46 0.93 1.89 -0.38 (0.632) 0.20 0.68 2.36 0.304 (0.541) 0.47 1.36 3.91 Social Class (Lower) b -1.167 (0.426)** 0.14 0.31 0.72 -1.506 (0.845) 0.04 0.22 1.16 0.339 (0.757) 0.32 1.40 6.18 Social Class (Middle) b -0.191 (0.329) 0.43 0.83 1.57 -0.145 (0.615) 0.26 0.87 2.89 -0.046 (0.538) 0.33 0.96 2.74 Religiosity 0.185 (0.31) 0.66 1.20 2.21 -0.523 (0.701) 0.15 0.59 2.34 0.708 (0.644) 0.58 2.03 7.17 Nationalism -0.363 (0.469) 0.28 0.70 1.74 0.632 (0.73) 0.45 1.88 7.87 -0.995 (0.609) 0.11 0.37 1.22 Regions: Metropolitan c -0.111 (0.335) 0.46 0.90 1.73 0.55 (0.712) 0.43 1.73 6.99 -0.661 (0.644) 0.15 0.52 1.82 Regions: North c -0.367 (0.433) 0.30 0.69 1.62 0.373 (0.809) 0.30 1.45 7.09 -0.74 (0.709) 0.12 0.48 1.92 Regions: Centre c -0.089 (0.455) 0.38 0.92 2.23 0.257 (0.951) 0.20 1.29 8.34 -0.346 (0.86) 0.13 0.71 3.82 Moral 0.094 (0.14) 0.84 1.10 1.45 -0.259 (0.236) 0.49 0.77 1.23 0.353 (0.201) 0.96 1.42 2.11 Market -0.015 (0.138) 0.75 0.99 1.29 -0.127 (0.257) 0.53 0.88 1.46 0.112 (0.224) 0.72 1.12 1.74 Postmaterialist 0.488 (0.228)* 1.04 1.63 2.55 1.421 (0.424)** 1.80 4.14 9.51 -0.933 (0.37)* 0.19 0.39 0.81 LR_Scale -0.702 (0.082)*** 0.42 0.50 0.58 -1.084 (0.155)*** 0.25 0.34 0.46 0.382 (0.134)** 1.13 1.47 1.91 Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke = .429, McFadden = .267. Model χ2 (36)= 197.98, p<.001. § The top entries are multinomial logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. Reference categories: a Higher, b Upper, c South, d Extra-national

316

Table D 4.3 Chile 2000 Party identification Multinomial logit estimates § Chile 2000 (1 of 1) Concertation vs. Alliance Left parties vs. Alliance Concertation vs. Left parties 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Intercept 2.979 (3.819) -1.262 (9.006) 4.241 (8.359) Age -0.03 (0.092) 0.81 0.97 1.16 -0.131 (0.243) 0.55 0.88 1.41 0.101 (0.229) 0.71 1.11 1.73 AgeSqr 0.628 (1.19) 0.18 1.87 19.31 1.198 (2.984) 0.01 3.31 1149.13 -0.57 (2.794) 0.00 0.57 135.09 Gender -0.333 (0.261) 0.43 0.72 1.19 -0.755 (0.547) 0.16 0.47 1.37 0.421 (0.498) 0.58 1.52 4.04 Education (Lower) a 0.06 (0.483) 0.41 1.06 2.74 0.974 (0.902) 0.45 2.65 15.50 -0.914 (0.797) 0.08 0.40 1.91 Education (Middle) a -0.34 (0.385) 0.34 0.71 1.51 -0.063 (0.702) 0.24 0.94 3.71 -0.277 (0.616) 0.23 0.76 2.54 Social Class (Lower) b -0.842 (0.444) 0.18 0.43 1.03 0.005 (0.886) 0.18 1.01 5.71 -0.848 (0.811) 0.09 0.43 2.10 Social Class (Middle) b -0.157 (0.331) 0.45 0.86 1.64 -0.11 (0.659) 0.25 0.90 3.26 -0.047 (0.588) 0.30 0.95 3.02 Religiosity -0.014 (0.289) 0.56 0.99 1.74 0.21 (0.638) 0.35 1.23 4.31 -0.225 (0.588) 0.25 0.80 2.53 Nationalism -0.187 (0.54) 0.29 0.83 2.39 -0.241 (0.867) 0.14 0.79 4.30 0.054 (0.722) 0.26 1.06 4.35 Regions: Metropolitan c 0.328 (0.317) 0.75 1.39 2.59 0.721 (0.91) 0.35 2.06 12.23 -0.392 (0.874) 0.12 0.68 3.75 Regions: North c 0.702 (0.441) 0.85 2.02 4.79 2.101 (0.97)* 1.22 8.17 54.74 -1.399 (0.901) 0.04 0.25 1.44 Regions: Centre c 0.347 (0.404) 0.64 1.42 3.12 1.069 (0.957) 0.45 2.91 19.01 -0.722 (0.894) 0.08 0.49 2.80 Moral 0.151 (0.153) 0.86 1.16 1.57 -0.505 (0.294) 0.34 0.60 1.07 0.656 (0.263)* 1.15 1.93 3.22 Market 0.062 (0.143) 0.80 1.06 1.41 -0.144 (0.27) 0.51 0.87 1.47 0.206 (0.237) 0.77 1.23 1.96 Postmaterialist 0.382 (0.203) 0.99 1.47 2.18 1.227 (0.448)** 1.42 3.41 8.21 -0.845 (0.412)* 0.19 0.43 0.96 LR_Scale -0.873 (0.085)*** 0.35 0.42 0.49 -1.027 (0.166)*** 0.26 0.36 0.50 0.155 (0.147) 0.88 1.17 1.56 Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke = .547, McFadden = .365. Model χ2 (36)= 316.64, p<.001 § The top entries are multinomial logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. Reference categories: a Higher, b Upper, c South, d Extra-national

317

Table D 4.4 Chile 2005 Party identification Multinomial logit estimates § Chile 2005 (1 of 1) Concertation vs. Alliance Left parties vs. Alliance Concertation vs. Left parties 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio Lowe r Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Intercept 5.553 (4.248) 9.461 (6.804) -3.908 (6.065) Age -0.017 (0.1) 0.81 0.98 1.20 0.088 (0.161) 0.80 1.09 1.50 -0.104 (0.145) 0.68 0.90 1.20 AgeSqr 0.041 (1.292) 0.08 1.04 13.12 -1.491 (2.072) 0.00 0.23 13.07 1.532 (1.859) 0.12 4.63 176.92 Gender -0.019 (0.35) 0.49 0.98 1.95 -0.828 (0.545) 0.15 0.44 1.27 0.809 (0.468) 0.90 2.25 5.62 Education (Lower) a 1.535 (0.624)* 1.37 4.64 15.75 1.235 (0.912) 0.58 3.44 20.55 0.3 (0.793) 0.29 1.35 6.38 Education (Middle) a 0.147 (0.471) 0.46 1.16 2.91 -0.94 (0.724) 0.10 0.39 1.61 1.087 (0.636) 0.85 2.96 10.30 Social Class (Lower) b -0.507 (0.589) 0.19 0.60 1.91 -1.454 (0.908) 0.04 0.23 1.39 0.948 (0.792) 0.55 2.58 12.19 Social Class (Middle) b 0.442 (0.41) 0.70 1.56 3.47 0.398 (0.629) 0.43 1.49 5.11 0.044 (0.542) 0.36 1.05 3.02 Religiosity -0.019 (0.413) 0.44 0.98 2.20 -0.156 (0.657) 0.24 0.86 3.10 0.137 (0.586) 0.36 1.15 3.61 Nationalism -1.675 (0.637)** 0.05 0.19 0.65 0.724 (0.756) 0.47 2.06 9.08 -2.399 (0.668) 0.03 0.09 0.34 Regions: Metropolitan c 0.567 (0.443) 0.74 1.76 4.20 1.508 (0.701)* 1.14 4.52 17.83 -0.941 (0.617) 0.12 0.39 1.31 Regions: North c 0.461 (0.59) 0.50 1.59 5.04 1.489 (0.827) 0.88 4.43 22.43 -1.028 (0.695) 0.09 0.36 1.40 Regions: Centre c -0.274 (0.542) 0.26 0.76 2.20 -20.629 (0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.355 (0) 9E+07 9E+07 9E+07 Moral -0.409 (0.196)* 0.45 0.67 0.98 -0.539 (0.295) 0.33 0.58 1.04 0.13 (0.251) 0.70 1.14 1.86 Market -0.136 (0.188) 0.60 0.87 1.26 0.205 (0.289) 0.70 1.23 2.16 -0.341 (0.244) 0.44 0.71 1.15 Postmaterialist 0.384 (0.292) 0.83 1.47 2.60 0.592 (0.427) 0.78 1.81 4.17 -0.208 (0.37) 0.39 0.81 1.68 -1.192 -1.084 (0.126)*** 0.26 0.34 0.43 0.22 0.30 0.42 0.108 (0.124) 0.87 1.11 1.42 LR_Scale (0.167)*** Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke = .623, McFadden = .401. Model χ2 (32)= 253.10, p<.001 § The top entries are multinomial logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. Reference categories: a Higher, b Upper, c South

318

Table D 4.5 Chile 2011 Party identification Multinomial logit estimates § Chile 2011 (1 of 1) Concertation vs. Alliance Left parties vs. Alliance Concertation vs. Left parties 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Intercept 1.574 (4.945) -3.947 (7.711) 5.521 (6.345) Age -0.148 (0.115) 0.69 0.86 1.08 -0.235 (0.177) 0.56 0.79 1.12 0.087 (0.145) 0.82 1.09 1.45 AgeSqr 1.832 (1.531) 0.31 6.25 125.57 3.015 (2.345) 0.21 20.39 2020.1 -1.183 (1.911) 0.01 0.31 12.97 Gender -0.537 (0.393) 0.27 0.59 1.26 -0.136 (0.577) 0.28 0.87 2.70 -0.401 (0.452) 0.28 0.67 1.62 Education (Lower) a 0.313 (0.61) 0.41 1.37 4.52 -1.241 (0.891) 0.05 0.29 1.66 1.553 (0.703)* 1.19 4.73 18.75 Education (Middle) a 0.155 (0.487) 0.45 1.17 3.03 -0.799 (0.674) 0.12 0.45 1.69 0.954 (0.515) 0.95 2.60 7.12 Social Class (Lower) b -0.71 (0.565) 0.16 0.49 1.49 -1.425 (0.826) 0.05 0.24 1.21 0.715 (0.656) 0.57 2.04 7.39 Social Class (Middle) b 0.216 (0.438) 0.53 1.24 2.93 -1.161 (0.65) 0.09 0.31 1.12 1.376 (0.513)** 1.45 3.96 10.82 Religiosity -0.632 (0.444) 0.22 0.53 1.27 0.072 (0.747) 0.25 1.07 4.65 -0.704 (0.64) 0.14 0.50 1.74 Nationalism 0.221 (1.162) 0.13 1.25 12.15 0.744 (1.406) 0.13 2.10 33.13 -0.523 (0.872) 0.11 0.59 3.27 Regions: Metropolitan c 0.528 (0.548) 0.58 1.70 4.96 3.125 (1.233)* 2.03 22.75 254.77 -2.597 (1.131)* 0.01 0.08 0.68 Regions: North c 1.126 (0.616) 0.92 3.08 10.30 2.39 (1.41) 0.69 10.91 172.99 -1.264 (1.287) 0.02 0.28 3.52 -2.983 -0.054 (0.522) 0.34 0.95 2.64 2.929 (1.233)* 1.67 18.70 209.53 0.01 0.05 0.48 Regions: Centre c (1.146)** Moral 0.077 (0.24) 0.68 1.08 1.73 -0.42 (0.335) 0.34 0.66 1.27 0.497 (0.258) 0.99 1.64 2.72 Market 0.234 (0.212) 0.83 1.26 1.92 0.545 (0.311) 0.94 1.73 3.17 -0.311 (0.247) 0.45 0.73 1.19 Postmaterialist 0.113 (0.18) 0.79 1.12 1.59 0.405 (0.387) 0.70 1.50 3.20 -0.292 (0.353) 0.37 0.75 1.49 -1.121 -1.651 0.25 0.33 0.43 0.13 0.19 0.28 0.53 (0.145)*** 1.28 1.70 2.26 LR_Scale (0.139)*** (0.199)*** Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke = .617, McFadden = .401. Model χ2 (32)= 252.39, p<.001 § The top entries are multinomial logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. Reference categories: a Higher, b Upper, c South

319

Table D 4.6 Estonia 1996 Party identification Multinomial logit estimates § Estonia 1996 (1 of 2) IRL vs Reform Party Centre Party vs Reform Party Social Democratic Party vs Reform Party 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Intercept -1.705 (7.686) 11.661 (6.686) 17.343 (6.036) Age 0.154 (0.197) 0.79 1.17 1.72 0.362 (0.177)* 1.02 1.44 2.03 17.343 (6.036)** 1.12 1.54 2.11 AgeSqr -1.277 (2.411) 0.00 0.28 31.46 -3.833 (2.15) 0.00 0.02 1.47 0.429 (0.162)** 0.00 0.01 0.44 Gender -0.026 (0.429) 0.42 0.97 2.26 -0.164 (0.402) 0.39 0.85 1.87 -4.644 (1.954)* 0.35 0.69 1.36 Education (Lower) a -0.042 (0.886) 0.17 0.96 5.44 0.034 (0.763) 0.23 1.03 4.62 0.96 (0.662) 0.71 2.61 9.55 Education (Middle) a -0.404 (0.467) 0.27 0.67 1.67 0.138 (0.452) 0.47 1.15 2.78 0.156 (0.394) 0.54 1.17 2.53 Social Class (Lower) b -0.73 (0.973) 0.07 0.48 3.25 -0.126 (0.87) 0.16 0.88 4.85 -0.605 (0.789) 0.12 0.55 2.56 Social Class (Middle) b -0.316 (0.587) 0.23 0.73 2.30 -1.072 (0.473)* 0.14 0.34 0.87 -1.257 (0.414)** 0.13 0.29 0.64 Nationalism 0.072 (0.514) 0.39 1.08 2.94 -0.425 (0.47) 0.26 0.65 1.64 0.363 (0.386) 0.67 1.44 3.07 Ethnicity 0.674 (1.329) 0.15 1.96 26.54 -2.154 (0.798)** 0.02 0.12 0.55 -3.179 (0.749)*** 0.01 0.04 0.18 Regions: North West c -0.344 (0.514) 0.26 0.71 1.94 1.29 (0.671) 0.98 3.63 13.55 -0.7 (0.453) 0.20 0.50 1.21 Regions: West c -1.185 (0.781) 0.07 0.31 1.41 1.117 (0.734) 0.73 3.06 12.88 -0.711 (0.536) 0.17 0.49 1.41 Regions: Centre c -0.807 (0.642) 0.13 0.45 1.57 1.113 (0.716) 0.75 3.05 12.39 -0.295 (0.471) 0.30 0.74 1.87 Regions: North East c -0.297 (1.093) 0.09 0.74 6.33 0.88 (1.022) 0.33 2.41 17.89 -1.795 (0.889)* 0.03 0.17 0.95 Moral -0.217 (0.235) 0.51 0.81 1.28 -0.053 (0.208) 0.63 0.95 1.43 0.095 (0.179) 0.78 1.10 1.56 Market -0.067 (0.269) 0.55 0.94 1.58 -0.421 (0.239) 0.41 0.66 1.05 0.071 (0.208) 0.71 1.07 1.62 Postmaterialist 0.399 (0.373) 0.72 1.49 3.09 0.036 (0.357) 0.52 1.04 2.09 -0.447 (0.305) 0.35 0.64 1.16 LR_Scale 0.334 (0.142) 1.06 1.40 1.85 -0.162 (0.129) 0.66 0.85 1.10 -0.103 (0.107) 0.73 0.90 1.11

320

Estonia 1996 (2 of 2) IRL vs. Centre Party Social Democratic Party vs Centre Party IRL vs SDP 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper -13.366 (7.765) 5.682 (4.81) -19.048 (7.183)** Intercept Age -0.208 (0.187) 0.56 0.81 1.17 0.066 (0.118) 0.85 1.07 1.35 -0.274 (0.173) 0.54 0.76 1.07 AgeSqr 2.556 (2.355) 0.13 12.88 1301.54 -0.812 (1.488) 0.02 0.44 8.21 3.368 (2.169) 0.41 29.01 2034.59 Gender 0.138 (0.487) 0.44 1.15 2.98 -0.204 (0.346) 0.41 0.82 1.61 0.342 (0.438) 0.60 1.41 3.32 Education (Lower) a -0.076 (0.9) 0.16 0.93 5.41 0.926 (0.58) 0.81 2.53 7.87 -1.002 (0.815) 0.07 0.37 1.82 Education (Middle) a -0.541 (0.534) 0.20 0.58 1.66 0.019 (0.389) 0.48 1.02 2.19 -0.56 (0.486) 0.22 0.57 1.48 Social Class (Lower) b -0.605 (1.064) 0.07 0.55 4.40 -0.479 (0.716) 0.15 0.62 2.52 -0.125 (0.994) 0.13 0.88 6.19 Social Class (Middle) b 0.755 (0.6) 0.66 2.13 6.90 -0.185 (0.366) 0.41 0.83 1.70 0.94 (0.548) 0.88 2.56 7.50 Nationalism 0.497 (0.582) 0.53 1.64 5.15 0.788 (0.396)* 1.01 2.20 4.78 -0.291 (0.511) 0.28 0.75 2.03 Ethnicity 2.829 (1.285)* 1.36 16.92 209.91 -1.025 (0.525) 0.13 0.36 1.00 3.853 (1.253)** 4.05 47.14 549.26 Regions: North West c -1.635 (0.723)* 0.05 0.20 0.80 -1.99 (0.638)** 0.04 0.14 0.48 0.356 (0.527) 0.51 1.43 4.01 Regions: West c -2.302 (0.94)* 0.02 0.10 0.63 -1.828 (0.697)** 0.04 0.16 0.63 -0.474 (0.796) 0.13 0.62 2.96 Regions: Centre c -1.921 (0.837)* 0.03 0.15 0.76 -1.409 (0.675)* 0.07 0.24 0.92 -0.512 (0.636) 0.17 0.60 2.09 Regions: North East c -1.177 (1.195) 0.03 0.31 3.20 -2.676 (0.802)*** 0.01 0.07 0.33 1.498 (1.092) 0.53 4.47 38.06 Moral -0.164 (0.26) 0.51 0.85 1.41 0.148 (0.178) 0.82 1.16 1.64 -0.312 (0.235) 0.46 0.73 1.16 Market 0.354 (0.296) 0.80 1.43 2.54 0.492 (0.2)* 1.11 1.64 2.42 -0.138 (0.272) 0.51 0.87 1.48 Postmaterialist 0.362 (0.433) 0.62 1.44 3.36 -0.483 (0.315) 0.33 0.62 1.14 0.846 (0.391)* 1.08 2.33 5.01 LR_Scale 0.496 (0.161)** 1.20 1.64 2.25 0.059 (0.105) 0.86 1.06 1.30 0.437 (0.143)** 1.17 1.55 2.05 Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke = .402, McFadden = .171. Model χ2 (60)= 128.07, p<.001 § The top entries are multinomial logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. Reference categories: a Higher, b Upper, c South, d Extra-national

321

Table D 4.7 Estonia 1999 Party identification Multinomial logit estimates § Estonia 1999 (1 of 2) IRL vs Reform Party Centre Party vs Reform Party Social Democratic Party vs Reform Party 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Intercept 1.877 (6.307) 1.609 (6.154) -5.104 (6.316) Age 0.238 (0.15) 0.95 1.27 1.70 0.117 (0.148) 0.84 1.12 1.50 -0.004 (0.152) 0.74 1.00 1.34 AgeSqr -2.587 (1.894) 0.00 0.08 3.08 -0.888 (1.879) 0.01 0.41 16.36 0.628 (1.935) 0.04 1.87 83.21 Gender -0.281 (0.418) 0.33 0.76 1.71 -0.119 (0.403) 0.40 0.89 1.96 -0.127 (0.416) 0.39 0.88 1.99 Education (Lower) a -1.548 (0.68)* 0.06 0.21 0.81 -0.467 (0.613) 0.19 0.63 2.08 -0.073 (0.631) 0.27 0.93 3.21 Education (Middle) a -0.668 (0.466) 0.21 0.51 1.28 -0.531 (0.481) 0.23 0.59 1.51 -0.344 (0.493) 0.27 0.71 1.86 Social Class (Lower) b 0.76 (0.619) 0.64 2.14 7.19 1.07 (0.601) 0.90 2.92 9.47 2.047 (0.69)** 2.00 7.75 29.95 Social Class (Middle) b -0.036 (0.514) 0.35 0.97 2.64 -0.083 (0.531) 0.33 0.92 2.61 1.308 (0.606)* 1.13 3.70 12.14 Religiosity -0.063 (1.414) 0.06 0.94 15.00 0.453 (1.392) 0.10 1.57 24.07 -0.365 (1.613) 0.03 0.69 16.38 Nationalism -0.252 (0.505) 0.29 0.78 2.09 -0.018 (0.457) 0.40 0.98 2.41 -0.139 (0.488) 0.33 0.87 2.27 Ethnicity -0.014 (1.296) 0.08 0.99 12.50 -1.456 (0.825) 0.05 0.23 1.18 -1.084 (0.831) 0.07 0.34 1.72 Regions: North West c 0.352 (0.521) 0.51 1.42 3.95 0.832 (0.53) 0.81 2.30 6.49 0.68 (0.52) 0.71 1.98 5.48 Regions: West c -0.502 (0.783) 0.13 0.61 2.81 -0.142 (0.747) 0.20 0.87 3.75 -0.773 (0.825) 0.09 0.46 2.33 Regions: Centre c 1.085 (0.856) 0.55 2.96 15.83 0.692 (0.912) 0.33 2.00 11.93 1.083 (0.872) 0.54 2.96 16.33 Regions: North East c 0.126 (0.772) 0.25 1.13 5.15 0.819 (0.68) 0.60 2.27 8.60 0.018 (0.722) 0.25 1.02 4.20 Moral 0.262 (0.204) 0.87 1.30 1.94 0.24 (0.206) 0.85 1.27 1.90 -0.029 (0.205) 0.65 0.97 1.45 Market 0.018 (0.235) 0.64 1.02 1.61 -0.282 (0.233) 0.48 0.76 1.19 -0.125 (0.237) 0.55 0.88 1.40 Postmaterialist -0.045 (0.152) 0.71 0.96 1.29 0.028 (0.161) 0.75 1.03 1.41 0.231 (0.194) 0.86 1.26 1.84 LR_Scale 0.381 (0.139)** 1.12 1.46 1.92 -0.168 (0.138) 0.65 0.85 1.11 -0.065 (0.139) 0.71 0.94 1.23

322

Estonia 1999 (2 of 2) IRL vs. Centre Party Social Democratic Party vs Centre Party IRL vs SDP 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Intercept 0.269 (6.1) 0 -6.712 (5.764) 6.981 (6.252) Age 0.12 (0.132) 0.87 1.13 1.46 -0.121 (0.127) 0.69 0.89 1.14 0.241 (0.137) 0.97 1.27 1.66 AgeSqr -1.7 (1.732) 0.01 0.18 5.45 1.516 (1.68) 0.17 4.55 122.42 -3.215 (1.79) 0.00 0.04 1.34 Gender -0.163 (0.401) 0.39 0.85 1.87 -0.008 (0.378) 0.47 0.99 2.08 -0.154 (0.417) 0.38 0.86 1.94 Education (Lower) a -1.081 (0.616) 0.10 0.34 1.14 0.395 (0.539) 0.52 1.48 4.26 -1.475 (0.643)** 0.07 0.23 0.81 Education (Middle) a -0.138 (0.449) 0.36 0.87 2.10 0.187 (0.455) 0.49 1.21 2.94 -0.324 (0.467) 0.29 0.72 1.81 Social Class (Lower) b -0.311 (0.576) 0.24 0.73 2.27 0.977 (0.632) 0.77 2.66 9.17 -1.287 (0.667) 0.08 0.28 1.02 Social Class (Middle) b 0.048 (0.55) 0.36 1.05 3.08 1.392 (0.612)* 1.21 4.02 13.34 -1.344 (0.625)* 0.08 0.26 0.89 Religiosity -0.516 (1.122) 0.07 0.60 5.38 -0.817 (1.33) 0.03 0.44 5.99 0.302 (1.408) 0.09 1.35 21.35 Nationalism -0.234 (0.468) 0.32 0.79 1.98 -0.121 (0.423) 0.39 0.89 2.03 -0.113 (0.506) 0.33 0.89 2.41 Ethnicity 1.441 (1.183) 0.42 4.23 42.96 0.371 (0.622)* 0.43 1.45 4.90 1.07 (1.194) 0.28 2.92 30.24 Regions: North West c -0.48 (0.53) 0.22 0.62 1.75 -0.152 (0.498) 0.32 0.86 2.28 -0.328 (0.53) 0.26 0.72 2.03 Regions: West c -0.36 (0.854) 0.13 0.70 3.72 -0.631 (0.845) 0.10 0.53 2.79 0.271 (0.922) 0.22 1.31 7.99 Regions: Centre c 0.393 (0.772) 0.33 1.48 6.73 0.392 (0.753) 0.34 1.48 6.47 0.001 (0.746) 0.23 1.00 4.32 Regions: North East c -0.693 (0.741) 0.12 0.50 2.14 -0.801 (0.642) 0.13 0.45 1.58 0.107 (0.806) 0.23 1.11 5.40 Moral 0.022 (0.213) 0.67 1.02 1.55 -0.269 (0.205) 0.51 0.76 1.14 0.291 (0.212) 0.88 1.34 2.03 Market 0.299 (0.232) 0.86 1.35 2.13 0.156 (0.217) 0.76 1.17 1.79 0.143 (0.238) 0.72 1.15 1.84 Postmaterialist -0.073 (0.148) 0.70 0.93 1.24 0.203 (0.184) 0.86 1.23 1.76 -0.276 (0.182) 0.53 0.76 1.08 LR_Scale 0.549 (0.127)*** 1.35 1.73 2.22 0.103 (0.121) 0.87 1.11 1.41 0.446 (0.128)** 1.22 1.56 2.01 Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke = .402, McFadden = .171. Model χ2 (60)= 128.07, p<.001 § The top entries are multinomial logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 Reference categories: a Higher, b Upper, c South, d Extra-national

323

Table D 4.8 Estonia 2011 Party identification Multinomial logit estimates § Estonia 2011 (1 of 2) IRL vs Reform Party Centre Party vs Reform Party Social Democratic Party vs Reform Party 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Intercept -2.125 (3.357) 3.061 (3.722) 1.206 (3.036) Age -0.031 (0.076) 0.84 0.97 1.13 0.026 (0.082) 0.87 1.03 1.21 -0.016 (0.069) 0.86 0.98 1.13 AgeSqr 0.436 (1.008) 0.21 1.55 11.16 0.194 (1.103) 0.14 1.22 10.55 0.424 (0.914) 0.26 1.53 9.15 Gender -0.128 (0.262) 0.53 0.88 1.47 0.209 (0.289) 0.70 1.23 2.17 0.106 (0.24) 0.70 1.11 1.78 Education (Lower) a -1.051 (0.75) 0.08 0.35 1.52 -0.442 (0.576) 0.21 0.64 1.99 -0.58 (0.513) 0.21 0.56 1.53 Education (Middle) a -0.432 (0.291) 0.37 0.65 1.15 0.044 (0.328) 0.55 1.05 1.99 -0.499 (0.27) 0.36 0.61 1.03 Social Class (Lower) b 0.349 (0.387) 0.66 1.42 3.03 -1.009 (0.439)* 0.15 0.36 0.86 -0.847 (0.369)* 0.21 0.43 0.88 Social Class (Middle) b 0.254 (0.337) 0.67 1.29 2.50 -0.701 (0.334)* 0.26 0.50 0.95 -0.485 (0.284) 0.35 0.62 1.07 Religiosity 0.873 (0.904) 0.41 2.40 14.08 0.791 (0.945) 0.35 2.21 14.07 0.269 (0.928) 0.21 1.31 8.07 Nationalism 0.369 (0.449) 0.60 1.45 3.49 1.262 (0.398)** 1.62 3.53 7.71 0.925 (0.37)* 1.22 2.52 5.21 Ethnicity -0.728 (0.627) 0.14 0.48 1.65 -4.528 (0.541)*** 0.00 0.01 0.03 -1.666 (0.53)** 0.07 0.19 0.53 Regions: North West c -0.035 (0.293) 0.54 0.97 1.72 -0.288 (0.332) 0.39 0.75 1.44 -0.138 (0.266) 0.52 0.87 1.47 Regions: West c 0.641 (0.421) 0.83 1.90 4.33 0.271 (0.496) 0.50 1.31 3.46 0.49 (0.399) 0.75 1.63 3.57 Regions: Centre c 0.236 (0.372) 0.61 1.27 2.62 -0.363 (0.447) 0.29 0.70 1.67 -0.139 (0.345) 0.44 0.87 1.71 Regions: North East c 0.323 (0.773) 0.30 1.38 6.29 -0.887 (0.682) 0.11 0.41 1.57 -0.669 (0.683) 0.13 0.51 1.95 Moral -0.044 (0.136) 0.73 0.96 1.25 0.3 (0.155) 1.00 1.35 1.83 -0.017 (0.124) 0.77 0.98 1.25 Market -0.213 (0.155) 0.60 0.81 1.10 -0.596 (0.168)*** 0.40 0.55 0.77 -0.257 (0.142) 0.59 0.77 1.02 Postmaterialist 0.241 (0.174) 0.91 1.27 1.79 0.176 (0.129) 0.93 1.19 1.53 0.102 (0.119) 0.88 1.11 1.40 LR_Scale 0.099 (0.072) 0.96 1.10 1.27 -0.372 (0.082)*** 0.59 0.69 0.81 -0.211 (0.067)** 0.71 0.81 0.92

324

Estonia 2011 (2 of 2) IRL vs. Centre Party Social Democratic Party vs Centre Party IRL vs SDP 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper -5.186 (4.036) -1.855 (3.384) -3.331 (3.461) Intercept Age -0.057 (0.089) 0.79 0.95 1.13 -0.042 (0.074) 0.83 0.96 1.11 -0.015 (0.078) 0.85 0.99 1.15 AgeSqr 0.242 (1.198) 0.12 1.27 13.33 0.229 (1.003) 0.18 1.26 8.98 0.013 (1.041) 0.13 1.01 7.79 Gender -0.337 (0.312) 0.39 0.71 1.32 -0.103 (0.255) 0.55 0.90 1.49 -0.234 (0.27) 0.47 0.79 1.34 Education (Lower) a -0.61 (0.758) 0.12 0.54 2.40 -0.139 (0.464) 0.35 0.87 2.16 -0.471 (0.72) 0.15 0.63 2.56 Education (Middle) a -0.476 (0.345) 0.32 0.62 1.22 -0.542 (0.284) 0.33 0.58 1.02 0.067 (0.298) 0.60 1.07 1.92 Social Class (Lower) b 1.359 (0.468)** 1.55 3.89 9.74 0.163 (0.401) 0.54 1.18 2.58 1.196 (0.409)** 1.48 3.31 7.38 Social Class (Middle) b 0.955 (0.372)* 1.25 2.60 5.39 0.216 (0.288) 0.71 1.24 2.18 0.739 (0.333)* 1.09 2.09 4.02 Religiosity 0.082 (0.805) 0.22 1.09 5.26 -0.522 (0.714) 0.15 0.59 2.40 0.604 (0.794) 0.39 1.83 8.68 Nationalism -0.893 (0.412)* 0.18 0.41 0.92 -0.337 (0.28) 0.41 0.71 1.24 -0.556 (0.392) 0.27 0.57 1.24 123.3 3.801 (0.518)*** 16.22 44.72 2.862 (0.333)*** 9.11 17.49 33.59 0.939 (0.506) 0.95 2.56 6.89 Ethnicity 4 Regions: North West c 0.254 (0.36) 0.64 1.29 2.61 0.15 (0.298) 0.65 1.16 2.09 0.103 (0.301) 0.61 1.11 2.00 Regions: West c 0.37 (0.502) 0.54 1.45 3.87 0.219 (0.429) 0.54 1.25 2.88 0.1510.407 0.52 1.16 2.58 Regions: Centre c 0.599 (0.483) 0.71 1.82 4.69 0.224 (0.417) 0.55 1.25 2.83 0.375 (0.39) 0.68 1.46 3.12 Regions: North East c 1.209 (0.682) 0.88 3.35 12.75 0.217 (0.498) 0.47 1.24 3.30 0.992 (0.698) 0.69 2.70 10.60 Moral -0.343 (0.166) 0.51 0.71 0.98 -0.317 (0.139)* 0.55 0.73 0.96 -0.026 (0.14) 0.74 0.97 1.28 Market 0.384 (0.18) 1.03 1.47 2.09 0.339 (0.146)** 1.06 1.40 1.87 0.045 (0.158) 0.77 1.05 1.43 Postmaterialist 0.065 (0.182) 0.75 1.07 1.53 -0.074 (0.118) 0.74 0.93 1.17 0.139 (0.176) 0.81 1.15 1.62 LR_Scale 0.471 (0.087)*** 1.35 1.60 1.90 0.161 (0.071)* 1.02 1.17 1.35 0.31 (0.074)*** 1.18 1.36 1.58 Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke = .548, McFadden = .266. Model χ2 (51)= 498.21, p<.001 § The top entries are multinomial logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. Reference categories: a Higher, b Upper, c South

325

Table D 4.9 Korea 2005 Party identification Multinomial logit estimates § Korea 2005 (1 of 1) Democratic Party vs GNP Progressive parties vs GNP Democratic Party vs Progressive parties 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper -5.404 (2.692)* -7.682 (3.491)* 2.278 (3.608) Intercept Age -0.135 (0.067)* 0.77 0.87 1.00 -0.213 (0.089)* 0.68 0.81 0.96 0.078 (0.092) 0.90 1.08 1.30 AgeSqr 1.467 (0.842) 0.83 4.33 22.56 2.418 (1.111)* 1.27 11.23 99.13 -0.952 (1.143) 0.04 0.39 3.63 Gender -0.12 (0.149) 0.66 0.89 1.19 0.045 (0.184) 0.73 1.05 1.50 -0.166 (0.19) 0.58 0.85 1.23 Education (Lower) a 0.311 (0.33) 0.71 1.37 2.61 -0.548 (0.516) 0.21 0.58 1.59 0.859 (0.527) 0.84 2.36 6.63 Education (Middle) a -0.13 (0.174) 0.63 0.88 1.24 -0.3 (0.215) 0.49 0.74 1.13 0.17 (0.225) 0.76 1.19 1.84 Social Class (Lower) b 0.124 (0.225) 0.73 1.13 1.76 0.417 (0.269) 0.90 1.52 2.57 -0.293 (0.274) 0.44 0.75 1.28 Social Class (Middle) b 0.127 (0.178) 0.80 1.14 1.61 0.086 (0.223) 0.70 1.09 1.69 0.042 (0.226) 0.67 1.04 1.63 Religiosity 0.507 (0.163)** 1.21 1.66 2.29 0.096 (0.216) 0.72 1.10 1.68 0.41 (0.214) 0.99 1.51 2.30 Nationalism 0.252 (0.231) 0.82 1.29 2.03 0.559 (0.262)* 1.05 1.75 2.92 -0.307 (0.28) 0.43 0.74 1.28 Regions: Honam c 3.983 (0.599)*** 16.59 53.65 173.52 2.886 (0.542)*** 6.20 17.92 51.81 1.097 (0.601) 0.92 3.00 9.72 Regions: Yeongnam c 0.568 (0.518) 0.64 1.77 4.87 -0.267 (0.44) 0.32 0.77 1.82 0.835 (0.6) 0.71 2.31 7.47 Regions: Chungheong c 1.213 (0.545)* 1.16 3.37 9.80 -0.636 (0.552) 0.18 0.53 1.56 1.849 (0.686)** 1.66 6.36 24.38 Regions: Sudogwon c 1.241 (0.507)* 1.28 3.46 9.35 -0.154 (0.432) 0.37 0.86 2.00 1.395 (0.587)* 1.28 4.04 12.74 Moral -0.119 (0.077) 0.76 0.89 1.03 -0.178 (0.096) 0.69 0.84 1.01 0.059 (0.101) 0.87 1.06 1.29 Market 0.012 (0.076) 0.87 1.01 1.17 0.039 (0.094) 0.87 1.04 1.25 -0.027 (0.098) 0.80 0.97 1.18 Postmaterialist 0.328 (0.133)* 1.07 1.39 1.80 0.373 (0.16)* 1.06 1.45 1.99 -0.045 (0.165) 0.69 0.96 1.32 LR_Scale -0.139 (0.038)*** 0.81 0.87 0.94 -0.146 (0.048)** 0.79 0.86 0.95 0.008 (0.049) 0.92 1.01 1.11 Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke = .250, McFadden = .122. Model χ2 (34)= 282.90, p<.001 § The top entries are multinomial logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. Reference categories: a Higher, b Upper, c Yeongdong

326

Table D 4.10 Korea 2010 Party identification Multinomial logit estimates § Korea 2010 (1 of 1) Democratic Party vs GNP Progressive parties vs GNP Democratic Party vs Progressive parties 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio 95% CI for Odds Ratio Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Lower Odds Ratio Upper Intercept -3.334 (3.169) -11.689 (5.065) 8.355 (4.831) Age -0.112 (0.078) 0.77 0.89 1.04 -0.323 (0.134) 0.56 0.72 0.94 0.211 (0.129) 0.96 1.24 1.59 AgeSqr 1.453 (1) 0.60 4.28 30.34 3.766 (1.651) 1.70 43.22 1099.79 -2.313 (1.582) 0.00 0.10 2.20 Gender -0.214 (0.197) 0.55 0.81 1.19 0.403 (0.295) 0.84 1.50 2.67 -0.618 (0.286) 0.31 0.54 0.94 Education (Lower) a 0.319 (0.453) 0.57 1.38 3.34 -19.133 (0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.452 (0) 3.8E+07 3.8E+07 3.8E+07 Education (Middle) a -0.283 (0.238) 0.47 0.75 1.20 0.309 (0.35) 0.69 1.36 2.70 -0.592 (0.338) 0.29 0.55 1.07 Social Class (Lower) b 0.668 (0.298) 1.09 1.95 3.50 0.397 (0.408) 0.67 1.49 3.31 0.271 (0.384) 0.62 1.31 2.78 Social Class (Middle) b 0.598 (0.22) 1.18 1.82 2.80 0.205 (0.33) 0.64 1.23 2.34 0.393 (0.324) 0.79 1.48 2.79 Religiosity -0.295 (0.209) 0.49 0.75 1.12 -0.368 (0.339) 0.36 0.69 1.34 0.073 (0.333) 0.56 1.08 2.07 Nationalism -0.087 (0.369) 0.45 0.92 1.89 0.635 (0.444) 0.79 1.89 4.51 -0.722 (0.402) 0.22 0.49 1.07 Regions: Honam c 4.73 (1.138) 12.18 113.26 1053.48 4.066 (1.281) 4.74 58.35 718.34 0.663 (0.728) 0.47 1.94 8.08 Regions: Yeongnam c -1.198 (0.543) 0.10 0.30 0.87 -0.785 (0.763) 0.10 0.46 2.04 -0.414 (0.709) 0.17 0.66 2.66 Regions: Chungheong c -1.158 (0.595) 0.10 0.31 1.01 -2.072 (0.948) 0.02 0.13 0.81 0.914 (0.902) 0.43 2.49 14.60 Regions: Sudogwon c -0.136 (0.524) 0.31 0.87 2.44 -0.77 (0.745) 0.11 0.46 1.99 0.634 (0.679) 0.50 1.89 7.13 Moral -0.258 (0.108) 0.63 0.77 0.96 -0.393 (0.158) 0.50 0.68 0.92 0.135 (0.151) 0.85 1.15 1.54 Market -0.2 (0.098) 0.68 0.82 0.99 -0.314 (0.147) 0.55 0.73 0.98 0.113 (0.141) 0.85 1.12 1.48 Postmaterialist 0.453 (0.163) 1.14 1.57 2.16 1.201 (0.24) 2.08 3.33 5.33 -0.749 (0.228) 0.30 0.47 0.74 LR_Scale -0.417 (0.052) 0.60 0.66 0.73 -0.478 (0.079) 0.53 0.62 0.72 0.062 (0.075) 0.92 1.06 1.23 Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke = .458, McFadden = .262. Model χ2 (34)= 375.00, p<.001 § The top entries are multinomial logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. Reference categories: a Higher, b Upper, c Yeongdong

327

328

E. PARTY LEADERSHIPS

E 1.1 List of party leaders per country

Table E 1 Party leadership net duration per country

Chile Estonia Korea Leader Years Leader Years Leader Years

Camilo Escalona 11 Edgar Savisaar 21 Kim Dae Jung 16.5 Gladys Marín 11 Andrus Ansip 10 Kim Jong Pil 11 Guillermo Teillier 9 Siim Kallas 10 Kim Young Sam 10 Carlos Larraín 8 Stanislav Tšerepanov 10 Jung Hee Lee 7.5 José Antonio Gómez 8 Arvo Sirendi 9.5 Hoi Chang Lee 7 Jovino Novoa 8 Mart Laar 9 Chun Doo Hwan 6 Andrés Allamand 7 Kalle Kulbok 8 Hoe Chan Rho 6 Sergio Bitar 7 Viktor Andrejev 8 Sun Cho 4 Anselmo Sule 6.5 Andres Tarand 7 Chong Ho Kim 3 Efrén Osorio 6 Elmut Laane 7 Chong Ku Jei 3 José Gabriel Feres 6 Villu Reiljan 7 Choung Won Suh 3 Pablo Longueira 6 Arnold Rüütel 6 Hwa Kap Han 3 Adolfo Zaldívar 5 Nicholas Maspanov 6 Joon Ho Cho 3 Tomás Hirsch 5 Toivo Jürgenson 6 Ki Kap Kang 3 Alejandro García-Huidobro 4 Ants Erm 5.5 Kook Hyun Moon 3 Danilo Monteverde 4 Mai Treial 5.5 Park Geun Hee 3 Ignacio Walker 4 Ivary Padar 5 Roh Tae Woo 3 Juan Antonio Coloma 4 Kalju Põldvere 5 Hak Guy Son 2.5 Osvaldo Andrade 4 Lagle Parek 5 Sung Hyun Moon 2.5 Ricardo Núñez 4 Marju Lauristin 5 Dae Pyung Sim 2 Sergio Onofre Jarpa 4 Tiit Vähi 5 Hak Won Kim 2 Vlado Mirosevic 4 Tunne Väldo Kelam 5 Ho Sun Cheon 2 Volodia Teitelboim 4 Marek Strandberg 4.5 Jae Sup Kang 2 Alejandro Foxley 3 Aivar Kala 4 Ju Yung Chung 2 Carlos González M. 3 Alar Sepp 4 Kook Hwan Shin 2 Eduardo Díaz Herrera 3 Asso Kommer 4 Se Kyun Chung 2 Enrique Silva Cimma 3 Ivar Raig 4 Woo Yea Hwang 2 Guido Girardi 3 Jüri Liim 4 Han Gil Kim 1.5 Jorge Schaulsohn 3 Karli Eskusson 4 Ki Taek Lee 1.5 Julio Dittborn 3 Paul-Eerik Rummo 4 Sang Chun Park 1.5 Laura Rodríguez 3 Sven Mikser 4 Bu Young Lee 1 Sebastián Piñera 3 Tiit Made 4 Byeong Yul Choi 1 Víctor Barrueto 3 Aleksander Laane 3 Cheoi Rae Roh 1 Carlos del Campo 2.5 Illar Hallaste 3 Dae Chol Chong 1

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Alberto Cardemil 2 Jevgeni Tomberg 3 Dae Chun Park 1 Andrés Zaldívar 2 Juhan Parts 3 Dae Jong Kim 1 Augusto Parra 2 Jüri Martin 3 Dae Pyong Shim 1 Carlos Olivares 2 Raoul Üksvärav 3 Hee Sang Moon 1 Carolina Tohá 2 Enn Tarto 2 Hee Tae Park 1 Eduardo Frei R-T 2 Jenni Hansen 2 Hjay Gun Yoo 1 Enrique Krauss 2 Karel Rüütli 2 Hye Kyung Kim 1 Erich Schnake 2 Kubo Märt 2 June Kyu Park 1 Germán Correa 2 Leo Starkov 2 Ki Choon Park (i) 1 Gonzalo Martner 2 Sergei Kuznetov 2 Mong Joon Chung 1 Gutenberg Martínez 2 Taavi Veskimägi 2 Myeon Hee Han 1 Hernán Larraín 2 Tõnis Lukas 2 Myeong Sook Han 1 Hugo Fernández 2 Toomas Hendrik Ilves 2 One Ki Kim 1 Jaime Quintana 2 Urmas Reinsalu 2 Sang Jeong Shim 1 Juan Carlos Latorre 2 Vambo Kaal 2 Sang Soo Ang 1 Juan Carlos Moraga 2 Andrus Öövel 1.5 Si Min Rhyu 1 Marco Enríquez-Ominami 2 Sulev Alajõe (i) 1.5 Sye Kyun Chung 1 Marilén Cabrera 2 Aleksei Lotman 1 Tong-kil Kim 1 Patricio Aylwin 2 Anatoli Jegorov 1 Ul Pyong Chang 1 Patricio Melero 2 Andra Veidemann 1 Won Ki Kim 1 Ricardo Lagos 2 Andrei Zarenkov 1 Won Ung Kim 1 Sergio Diez 2 Andrus Blok 1 Yong Oh Son 1 Soledad Alvear 2 Eiki Nestor 1 Young Ghil Kwon (i) 1 Adriana Muñoz 1 Harri Kärtner 1 Byeong Ki Kang 0.5 Alberto Precht 1 Jaanus Marrandi 1 Chae Jung Lim (i) 0.5 Ángela Vivanco 1 Jüri Pihl 1 Cheol Soo Ahn 0.5 Eduardo Prieto 1 Karin Jaani 1 Cheong Won Seo 0.5 Fernando Flores 1 Margo Miljand 1 Dong Young Chun 0.5 Fernando Meza 1 Mart Siiman 1 Hae Chan Lee 0.5 Francisco Javier Errázuriz 1 Peeter Jalakas 1 Han Dong Lee (i) 0.5 Humberto de la Maza 1 Rein Taagepera 1 Hye Young Won (i) 0.5 Jaime Mulet 1 Sergei Jürgens (i) 1 Jae In Moon (i) 0.5 Jorge Arrate 1 Eduard Sedašev 0.5 Jie Won Park 0.5 Jorge Concha 1 Ester Tuiksoo 0.5 Jun Pyo Hong 0.5 Jorge Soria 1 Juhan Aare 0.5 Ki Nam Shin 0.5 Luis Maira 1 Oleg Sidelnikov 0.5 Kwan Jong Park (i) 0.5 Mario Hugo Astorga (i) 1 Siiri Oviir (i) 0.5 Lee Min Woo 0.5 Orlando Cantuarias 1 Taavi Rõivas 0.5 Moo Sung Kim (i) 0.5 Patricia Morales 1 Rhee In Jae 0.5 Patricio Tombolini 1 Tae Chun Park 0.5 Pedro Araya 1 Ui Hwa Jeong (i) 0.5 Pepe Auth 1 Wan Koo Lee 0.5 Ricardo Hormazábal 1 Yong Sun Lee (i) 0.5 Alberto Espina 0.5

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Clodomiro Almeyda 0.5 Cristián Monckeberg 0.5 Eduardo Díaz del Río 0.5 Ernesto Silva 0.5 Fulvio Rossi 0.5 Jaime Guzmán 0.5 Jorge Gómez 0.5 José Tomás Sáenz 0.5 Lautaro Lobos (i) 0.5 Luis Luengo 0.5 Marco Pérez Barría 0.5

Notes: The list includes interim (i) chairmanships. Data up to 2014.

E 2 Distribution of leaders over time

In Figures E 1, E 2 and E 3, graphs show the whole set of political parties in each country since the restoration of democracy. Some significant parties that were founded before formal democracy are included if they remained the same afterwards. Significant parties are taken as every party that has gained at least 3% in any legislative election, or gained at least one seat in the lower chamber, during all the democratic electoral period of the country. Figures show the total number of different chairmanships per party, with the amount of calendar years per leadership. If a chairmanship lasts less than a year, it takes the value of 0.5.

The first general conclusion is that the older the parties, the more chairmanships they have. It is clearly represented by colourful bars that top each chart. The most colourful graph is in Fig. E 1, which represents the Chilean party system. It has fewer political parties that the other cases and its main parties show different leaderships over time. All but two cases (PAIS and PdS) show more than one chairmanship during the period.

In Figs. E 2 and E 3, for Estonia and Korea, respectively, there are more parties in general, and more parties show only one colour. The 1-colour blue bars indicate the presence of 1-leader parties, with all of them fitting in the category of charismatic type of leadership.

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FIGURE E 1 Parties in Chile and number of chairmanships

Sources: author’s elaboration based on parties’ websites, Chile's National Congress Library, Electoral Service, Memoria Chilena.

332

FIGURE E 2 Parties in Estonia and number of chairmanships

Sources: author’s elaboration based on parties’ websites, National Election Commitee, Bugajski 2002, Eesti Erakondade Ajalugu.

333

FIGURE E 3 Parties in Korea and number of chairmanships

Sources: author’s elaboration based on parties’ websites, CIA Factbook; IPU, Lee, Jongkon (2014); Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001); Chosun Ilbo; Korea Times, Enciclopaedia Britannica.

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