CHS-8 00 June 1984 I Cfl ::.i:: u

STUDIES IN CERN HISTORY

The Italian Scenario Parts I and II

Lanfranco Belloni

GENEVA 1984 II

The Study of CERN History is a project financed by Institutions in several CERN Member Countries.

This report presents preliminary findings, and is intended for incorporation into a more comprehensive study of CERN's history. It is distributed primarily to historians and scientists to provoke discussion, and no part of it should be cited or reproduced without written permission from the Team Leader. Comments are welcome and should be sent to:

Study Team for CERN History c/oCERN CH-1211GENEVE23 Switzerland

© Copyright Study Team for CERN History, Geneva 1984

CERN -Service d'information scientifique - 300 - juin 1984 The Italian scenario. Part I

As is well known, Italian science had suffered grevious losses before the outbreak of World War II due to Mussolini's racial laws of July 14, 1938.

Besides Fermi, Emilio Segre and Bruno Rossi were forced to leave the country. 1 No one could possibly hope for their return: in these post war years Italy had very few attractions both from the scientific and the political point of view.

Already before the war Edoardo Amaldi2 was practically left alone and as a consequence tried to concentrate Italian talents and resources in nuclear pyhsics around Rome's Physics Institute. 3 Thus Amaldi arranged the move to Rome of several physicists, who were scattered in Italian universities and were left without an adequate support and a proper guide. Among them was Bernardo Nestore Cacciapuoti, 4 who in the immediate post-war years opted for a carrer at UNESCO and played a role in CERN's prehistory as the link between two of the Founding Fathers, Amaldi and Pierre Auger.

Before the war, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR) was the only government agency dealing with the problems of scientific and technological research. 5 After its foundation in 1923, CNR had managed to make its presence felt amidst many difficulties trying to act as a link between University research and industry.6 Just before the end of hostilities, CNR was reorganized to meet the challenges of "the years of reconstruction". 7 As an autonomous body of the State, directly dependent on the head of government, the main task of CNR remained "promotion, coordination and regulation of scientific research". Among CNR's primary functions, the "decreto" of March 1945 explicitly stated "consulting for the State in scientific and technical matters", while 2

post war emergency further recommended "investigation of scientific and technical problems bearing on the reconstruction of the country".

In order to fulfil its mandate, CNR was entitled a) to co­ ordinate national activities in the various branches of science, b) to promote the stablishment and transformation of scientific laboratories providing financial support within its budgetary limits, possibly in association with other administrations, c) to implement and support research programs of national interest, d) to assist and help scientific institutes and individual scholars and researchers through grants, prizes etc., e) to do bibliographical, documentary and editorial work, f) to take care of Italian participation in inter­ national scientific and technical organizations in agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such a list of "attribuzioni" provided the juridicial framework of the CNR President's future action in support of the European laboratory project.

The main innovation of newly elected (in December 1944) CNR President Gustavo Colonnetti8 was the idea of CNR funded research "centers". Colonnetti's idea was duly embodied in a March 1945 Decreto. In order to fulfil CNR's mandate, specialized research in­ stitutes would have been the ideal solution. However, due to the extremely difficult situation of the immediate post-war years, CNR could not afford to establish even a single specialized research institute. The alternative solution, suggested by Colonnetti, was to help already existing and particularly distinguished research groups. By establishing its "centers", CNR could provide research funds to University-based groups.

As far as physics was concerned, Amaldi's group was no doubt prominent. Thus already on October 1st 1945, the "Centro di studio per la fisica nucleare" was established in Rome University under Amaldi's directorship. Personnel and funding were provided by Rome University, while CNR provided funds for equipment and research expenses. The 3

initial endowment of Rome Centro was 5 Million Lire for research expenses. 9 The convention between CNR and Rome University establishing the Centro was supposed to 1 ast f or f ive. years. 1 0 Rome Centro was the first one in Italy as far as nuclear physics was concerned and provided a useful tool for Amaldi's policy of concentrating resources and man-power in the Italian capital. In the following years, two more centers for nuclear physics were established in Northern Italian universities - at Padua (1947) and Turin (1951).

Besides CNR Centro in Rome, another important initiative in nuclear physics developed in industrial Northern Italy right after the war. In November 1946, a new laboratory, named Centro Informazioni Studied Esperienze (CISE), was established in Milan with financial support from several Northern Italian private firms. The laboratory's name was purposely kept vague, since at the time of its inception peace talks were still going on in Paris, and it was not clear yet whether Italy would be allowed to develop a nuclear energy program. In fact, CISE's basic goal was the design and construction of a low power experimental reactor. 11

At the time, production and distribution of electric energy in Italy was still in private hands. 12 The interest of electrical (and non-electrical) firms in the new nuclear energy technology was stimulated by industry-based engineer Mario Silvestri. He joined forces with Milan University physicist Giuseppe Bolla1 3 and managed to get support from industrial circles.

As already said, theirs was a specific nuclear engineering program and they envisaged CISE as the main source of operative tech­ nology for the development of an Italian nuclear industry. Bolla and Silvestri gathered a group of brilliant young physicists and engineers and started a vigorous research program. CISE's young researchers had the benefit of frequent visits from Rome Centro physicists, namely Amaldi, Gilberto Bernardini and Bruno Ferretti. 4 The CISE physics 4

group started doing measurements of uranium nuclear constants, measurements of neutron diffusion etc. concentrating mainly on funda­ mental research relevant to reactor technology. Not surprisingly, the physicists were more interested in such fundamental researches than in technological puzzles themselves. Especially the consultants from Rome (with the possible exception of Ferretti) never showed more than a passing interest in reactor physics and technology. In fact, the Rome physicists were inclined to carry on the tradition of the "Italian" Fermi, so to speak, and never became involved in the kind of applied nuclear physics to which Fermi himself had turned after his move to the US.

In a conference in 1949 on reactor developments, Amaldi explained that after 1945 nuclear research branched in three different directions. 15 The first one was "straight" nuclear physics, that is, the study of nuclear structure, nuclear energy levels and reactions. The second line of development of nuclear physics was represented by the study of elementary particle interactions, that is the kind of interactions ultimately determining nuclear structure. Such investigations were carried out either through the study of cosmic radiation or through the study of nuclear processes artificially pro­ duced by big accelerating machines. The third branch of post-war nuclear research was nuclear engineering. Amaldi stated that in his opinion, nuclear technology (whose main goal was reactor construction) would soon cut its umbilical chord connecting it with "mother" physics to become a straight engineering subject.

Amaldi remarked that the three sectors of nuclear physics were not independent from each other. As he put it, "it is deemed certain that the solution of the fundamental problems of elementary particle interactions will have decisive influence, even if not an immediate one, on all researches of nuclear physics and engineering."

Reports of research activities at Rome Centro, published 5 once a year in the CNR bulletin16 provide direct evidence of Amaldi's group's preferences regarding the three sectors in which nuclear physics had branched out after 1945. From the list of research papers put together at the end of each yearly report, one sees that reactor physics was definitely not pursued in Rome. "Straight" nuclear physics was a gradually abandoned field, while increasingly more effort went into particle physics. Rome Centro officially extended its activities to particle physics in 1947, when its denomination underwent a significant change from "Centro di studio per la fisica nucleare" to "Centro di studio per la fisica nucleare e delle particelle elemen­ tari". In fact, the second subject of research, that is particle physics, started prevailing on the first and original one at an over­ whelming rate.

In his 1949 conference papers, Amaldi commented also on the relation between nuclear research and industrial technology. He mentioned the close links between nuclear physics and electronics and further remarked: "It is not possible to develop nuclear physics and, particularly, nuclear engineering ... in a country lacking an adequate technical and industrial development in all sectors and viceversa". Such remark somehow bears witness to Amaldi's scepticism toward the prospects of a nuclear engineering program in a country like Italy. Nuclear engineering developments needed a specific technical know-how that was not yet available to Italian industries and had still to be developed from scratch by CISE. In Amaldi's view, the Italian industrial situation did not favour nuclear engineering developments.

One may add here that on the contrary, the Italian industrial situation of post was years was more likely to favour an effort in the direction of accelerator construction rather than that of reactors. In fact, a particle accelerator is a purely electromagne­ tic machine, which means that the construction of even the most sophisticated and powerful accelerator involves only traditional (non nuclear) technologies, like vacuum technology, magnet technology, fast 6

electronics etc. Such traditional technologies were available to Italian industry or could be developed at a fairly sophisticated level by several Northern Italian firms. In conclusion, Amaldi's drive toward particle physics and accelerators was prompted by pure scientific interest coupled to a shrewd perception of the Italian industrial (and political) situation.

Under such premises, the Rome physicist's relationship with CISE was doomed. On their side, the industrialists who were funding CISE were obviously more interested in a straight nuclear engineering programme and disapproved of the physicist's exclusive preference for fundamental problems. The general political situation was also diffi­ cult, with left wing opposition parties demanding the nationalization of the electricity industry. Furthermore, economic returns from a nuclear energy laboratory were to be expected in a far distant future and the industrialists started to question the economic convenience of developing nuclear technology from scratch, when the US and Britain were offering ready made at an appropriate price.

Relationships between the Rome physicists and the CISE became gradually strained. Divergences reached a high point in the summer of 195017 and prompted an interesting memorandum by Bruno Ferretti to CISE Director. 18 Ferretti's memo contains a clear exposition of the Rome physicist's institutional "philosophy". He started by explaining that "according to prof. Amaldi and myself [Ferretti], the problem of atomic energy ... cannot be reduced to a mere problem of production 1 since it involves several aspects related to the life of the nation. Thus the problem of nuclear re­ search in itself cannot be completely subordinate to production needs".

According to Ferretti and Amaldi, at the root of the whole question was the necessary distinction between fundamental research and applied research: "We think that 'fundamental' research is 7

absolutely necessary ... " for, according to past experience, neglect of pure research invariably resulted in severe damage for applied work as well. Ferretti then went on to emphasize the need of absolute freedom for pure research, willingly allowing a sort of "limited sovereignty" to applied work. The latter ought to be subject to external control (Ferretti conceded) and its relevance for production needs had to be assessed beforehand.

On these premises, Ferretti stressed the necessity of having separate institutions and organizations for aplied and fundamental research and made a few suggestions concerning nuclear physics institutions. He stated that according to Amaldi and to himself, "a national atomic policy should be elaborated and controlled by an Atomic Energy Commission, modeled on the American AEC." The task of implementing a national atomic policy should fall upon two institutions: a) a national institute for nuclear physics, with the mandate of pur­ suing fundamental research, b) a State controlled center for atomic studies, with the mandate of pursuing applied research and ultimately of developing electric energy production from nuclear sources.

Ferretti's memo provides a concise outline of the Rome physicist's political and institutional program. It makes quite clear that fundamental physics and its absolute freedom were their first concern - hence the proposal of a specialized institute for fundamental nuclear physics and of a separate organization for applied nuclear physics and engineering.

The gradual implementation of the Rome physicist's insti­ tuational plan occured in the following years at a steady pace. In the summer of 1951, the embryo of the Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucle- 8

are (INFN) was formed within CNR. As mentioned before, besides Rome Centro, a second CNR Centro was established at Padua in 1947, and a third Centro was set up in Turin in the summer of 1951. These three Centri joined in coordinating their activities thus giving rise to a new CNR institute, the above mentioned Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare. 19 The financial situation of the country had considerably improved since the immediate post-war years and the idea of having a specialized research institute was no more just a forbidden dream. Support for nuclear physics had gone up form the few million lire granted to Rome Centro in 1946 to a projected budget of 100 million lire for the first year of operation of INFN. 20 Already in 1952 INFN received 200 million lire for its second year of activity.21 A first step was thus made towards the creation of a specialized institute for fundamental nuclear physics.

As for the second point of the Rome physicist's insti­ tutional programme, namely the establishment of a center for applied research with the task of formulating and implementing a national atomic policy under state control, prospects were rather bleak around 1950. Italian politicians were not inclined to take nuclear matters seriously and energy production from nuclear sources was not felt to be a high priority issue, especially as electric energy production was still in private hands.

Rome physicists joined forces with Milan Polytechnic chemist Mario Alberto Rollier, 22 then a private consultant on nuclear affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Although Rollier was not a government official, he did provide a connection with government circles. Thus a handful of nuclear scientists started pressing politicians in an effort to convince them to establish a sort of specia. l'1ze d CNR f or nuc 1 ear research. 23 There were minor. differences . among the few supporters of the new committee. 24 However, they all agreed on the advisability of keeping the military out of the future committee and warned politicians against an involvement of the 9

m1. 1.itary in. nuc 1 ear a ff airs.. 2 5

Following prolonged pressure on politicians, in the summer of 1952 a Comitato Nazionale per le Ricerche Nucleari (CNRN) was established with the specific task of supervising and promoting "studies and researches concerning nuclear energy and its applications for industrial purposes". To fulfil its mandate, CNRN was entitled a) to do studies, research and experimentation in nuclear physics, b) to promote and encourage development of industrial applications of nuclear energy, c) to maintain relations and develop collaboration with international organizations and foreign institutions dealing with nuc 1 ear researc h . 2 6 CNRN receive. d a start up sum o f 1 Bi . 11'ion Lire.. 2 7

Newly born INFN passed over CNR to CNRN as an independent institute under the umbrella of the new committee.28 In subsequent years, INFN evolved into an autonomous organization and Gilberto Bernardini served as INFN's first president from 1954 to 1959.29

The establishment of CNRN was an important event for the Italian nuclear physics community. With the new committee, "the years of reconstruction" were close to a successful conclusion. The event had also more general political overtones since, by advocating control of nuclear energy development, the Italian government was taking a stand on the energy issue for the first time. 30

After having sponsored nuclear physics developments and on the eve of being deprived of their control, CNR decided to lend an ear also to the claims of those physicists who had been less favoured by fortune. On CNR's initiative, an informal meeting of both nuclear and non-nuclear physicists was held in Rome in June 1952.31 A compromise was reached on an informal basis to the effect that the ratio of ex­ penditures for "classical" and nuclear physics respectively had to be kept at 1 to 2.5. Under the denomination of "classical" physics fell 10

also solid state physics, then in. a nascent state in. !ta 1 y. 32 Dur1ng . the following years INFN provided support for solid state physics as well, bypassing its statute limitations. In fact, the ratio agreed upon informally in Rome always remained rather wishful thinking. A remarkable unbalance between nuclear and particle physics on one side and the other branches of physics on the other (namely solid state physics) was to become a basic feature of the Italian scenario for the years to come. 33

Italian Scenario. Part II

Italian involvement in the European laboratory project was primarily connected with the initiatives of two scientists and science organizers, namely Gustavo Colonnetti and Edoardo Amaldi. Colonnetti gave his high patronage to Italian participation in the European initiative that eventually culminated in CERN, while Amaldi's specific competence was of paramount importance in directing Italian (and possibly also non-Italian) efforts toward the creation of a European laboratory for particle physics.

CNR President Colonnetti was deeply convinced of the need for close collaboration between national research councils as well as of international and European cooperation in any scientific, political or economical enterprise. After his brief exile in Lausanne during the war, Colonnetti never severed his ties with Suisse Romande's cultural and political world. European faith brought him back to Lausanne to attend the meeting sponsored by the European Mouvement from 8 to 12 December 1949. Back in Rome, Colonnetti reported to CNR's Scientific Board on the recently held "Conferenza Europea della Cultura•34 Colonnetti's report dealt with general science administration problems, like the need for further integration among national research councils beyond the level of mere bilateral agreements. In order to establish multilateral agreements among national 11

organizations, a first step was to reduce and possibly to eliminate structural differences existing between them. 35

Colonnetti was well aware of the importance of nuclear physics developments; 36 however, his report did not touch upon the issue of European collaboration in nuclear research raised at the Lausanne meeting.. 37 No direct documentation has so far surfaced providing evidence of a special interest of the CNR president for the idea of a joint European effort in the nuclear realm.

A more direct interest was obviously to be expected from professional nuclear scientists, namely Rome Centro physicists, who had already discussed among themselves the idea of a European collaboration in their own special field. 38 It is not clear from Amaldi's recollections the exact date at which he "became aware that similar problems were discussed in other European countries, in par t icu. l ar i'n Franee ... ", 39 neither when he heard of the European Cultural Conference held in Lausanne in December 1949. No written evidence exists as to how and when he came to know of French dis­ cussions. Unfortunately there remains no written evidence either of discussions and exchanges among Rome physicists "on the idea of setting. up a European laboratory for high energy ph ys1cs . ff , 4 0 although Amaldi is quite positive about them. This brings us to a brief discussion of Amaldi's own contributions to CERN's historiography.

Amaldi wrote articles and gave interviews on the subject of CERN history. 41 His recollections, in both oral and written form, follow a regular pattern, since they are based on the sketchy notes of his diary supplemented by his legendary memory. Before giving an example of the procedure on which Amaldi's recollections are based, a description of Amaldi's Diario is necessary. 42

Amaldi's Quaderno No l is a typical Italian schoolboy notebook of the '40s and '50s. It is filled partly with 12

Ginestra Amaldi's neat handwriting and partly with Edoardo's more scrambled calligraphy. It contains notes of special encounters Amaldi had, of important visitors to his institute and of significant meetings he had either in Rome or during his frequent trips abroad.

Periodically, notes taken on paper slips were assembled and copied down in the Quaderno either by him or by his wife Ginestra. This explains the uniform handwriting of entire pages in Amaldi's diary.

Amaldi took notes for his Quaderno for several reasons. No doubt, those notes were intended primarily for his personal docu­ mentation, in accordance with a well-known trait of his personality, namely his concern of accurate information. However, there is more to it than that. In an interview, 43 Amaldi stated that he decided to keep a diary after he heard of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Allegedly he was so impressed by the devastating results of a certain kind of nuclear research that he wanted to leave written evidence of his complete lack of involvement in any sort of military enterprise. Accordingly, Amaldi's Quaderno shows no evidence of even consulting for military projects.

As stated above, Amaldi's recollections are based on his diary supplemented by his memory. For an example of his procedure, let us consider page one of Quaderno No 1. There we find sketchy notes concerning a visit of Frederic Joliot to Rome:

"October 1949 27 (Thursday). I meet F. Joliet-Curie at his hotel

November 1st Small party at CNR in honour of Joliet and Bernal."44 13

In a set of "Notes for CERN History - from E. Amaldi Diary", compiled later by Amaldi himself, he further elaborated on the episode contributing personal memories of it: "The 27th of October 1949 I had a conversation with Joliot who was spending a few days in Rome and I raised the problem of the creation of a European laboratory. He had completely different ideas. First he did not consider high energy physics as a very important field; he was much more interested in low energy nuclear physics. Second he understood the European colla­ boration as an organization which had the task to send European physicists to work in Paris, essentially under his leadership"45

In a subsequent interview, he added that Joliot wanted to utilize his [Amaldi's] expertise in neutron physics in a future Euro­ pean laboratory for nuclear physics. 46 Amaldi rejected Joliot's offer for both scientific and political reasons. He did not quite like Joliot's particular brand of Europeanism. On hindsight, he went as far as to say that Joliot was a sort of a Gaullist "avant la lettre" as far as European science policy was concerned.47 Joliot was particularly disappointing also because he wanted to push him [Amaldi] into a field (low energy nuclear physics) that in Amaldi's opinion was not exactly at the forefront of nuclear research.

By 1949 the frontier of research had moved to high energy physics and it had become also clear that the principal tools of advanced experimental physics were particle accelerators. Besides nuclear reactors for low energy experiments, big American laboratories (namely Brookhaven and Berkeley) were already endowed with accelerators. Particle physics was claiming the limelight on the American scene, while reactor physics was fading into the background both at Brookhaven and Berkeley. 48 In order to meet "le defi americain" in advanced experimental physics, European physicists needed to find possible ways of building their own big accelerator. In fact, the British were trying a foray into big science on an inde- 14

pendent basis albeit with limited success. Oliphant's ambitious project of building a 1 GeV proton synchrotron in Birmingham was pro­ ceeding at a very slow pace amidst great difficulties. 49

The prospects for European progress in high energy physics

were improved considerably by the intervention of an American 1 Isidor Rabi, at UNESCO Conference in Florence in June 1950.50 Amaldi and Rabi have divergent recollections of this crucial episode. Amal di claims that he was informed in advance of Rabi's speech by Bernardini, who was commuting from Rome University to Columbia University in New York. Amaldi remembered that "during the General Assembly of UNESCO in Florence Rabi went to spend two days in Rome during which views were exchanged about his proposal of 'creating regional laboratories'". 51 On the other hand, Rabi sharply denies having been influenced by anybody before giving his speech in Florence, least of all by a European. 52

Unfortunately Amaldi did not take notes of Rabi's visit or they were not copied down in his Quaderno, so there is no written evidence of his exchange with Rabi, if there was one.

Amaldi also recalled the meeting of the Executive Committee of IUPAP on 7-8 September 1950: "A l'occasion de la reunion du Comite Executif de l'Union Internationale de Physique Pure et Appliquee qui a eu lieu a Cambridge Massachusetts (USA) les jours 7-8-9 septembre, on a parle de la proposition presentee par le Prof. I.I. Rabi a l'Assemblee Generale de l'UNESCO a Florence, au sujet de la construc­ tion d'un Laboratoire Europeen de Physique Nucleaire. Apres quelques discussions, l'Executif a decide de faire preparer deux rapports sur cet argument: l'un devrait etre redige par Rabi, qui devrait preciser aussi bien que possible sa pensee, l'autre par moi ... •53 Those reports, if they have ever been written, have not yet surfaced. It is highly probable that they have never been written. 15

On October 3, 1950, Amaldi wrote to Auger informing him of how things were developing in IUPAP and asking for an exchange of views on the envisaged European laboratory. Among other things, Amaldi wrote to Auger: "A present je viens d'apprendre de Ferretti qu'a !'occasion du Congres d'Oxford54 vous avez provoque et dirige une discussion interessante a ce sujet ... J'ai appris de Ferretti les lignes generales que vous avez donnees a la discussion a Oxford et je suis completement d'accord avec vous•. 55 "Les lignes generales" of the Oxford discussions were summarized by Ferretti in a report to the CNR Scientific Board a few months later.

The Centre Europeen de la Culture called a meeting of its Groupe d'Etude des Recherches Scientifiques for December 12, 1950 in Geneva. Four Italian personalities were invited, namely Colonnetti, Amaldi, Rollier and Senator Alessandro Casati.56 Upon receiving the invitation, Amaldi wrote to Raymond Silva, CEC Secretary General, saying that owing to a previous committment he was unable to attend the meeting. Amaldi suggested that his close collaborator Bruno Ferretti could take part in the conference in his place. 57 Rollier's invitation to Geneva resulted from contacts with Casati, Raoul Dautry and Denis de Rougemont. Apparently Dautry had informed Casati that he wanted to have a meeting with Italian members of Parliament or representatives of responsible circles in order to discuss possibilities of a closer Italian-French collaboration in nuclear research. At that time, Rollier happened to be a private con­ sultant on nuclear affairs to the Minister of Foreign Trade, Social Democrat Ivan Matteo Lombardo. Casati alerted Rollier of Dautry's wish and urged him to write in order to arrange a meeting. Accordingly Rollier wrote to Dautry suggesting that they could meet and discuss together with Casati in Strasburg form 20 to 23 November on the occasion of the meeting of the "Conseil Europeen de vigilance•, to which both Dautry and Rollier belonged.58 Dautry answered suggesting they meet in Geneva instead, on the occasion of the forthcoming conference called by the CEC. Accordingly Dautry wrote to Silva re- 16

59 commending that he invite both Casati and Rollier to Geneva. Upon receiving the invitation, Rollier wrote to the Minister of Foreign Trade informing him of these events. 60 Moreover, shortly before the conference, Rollier wrote a preliminary report to the Minister in which he informed him that both de Rougemont and Silva had the im­ pression that Dautry considered him [Rollier] a "porteparole" of the Italian government in matters of international scientific co­

operation. 61 That was hardly the case, since Rollier had no official position, being simply a consultant to a relatively minor Ministry and he could not speak on behalf of the Italian government.

Casati did not go to Geneva and Colonnetti did not attend the conference due to illness. Thus only Ferretti and Rollier went to Geneva and both reported on the CEC meeting. Ferretti reported at a CNR Scientific Board meeting, 62 while Rollier wrote a report for both Colonnetti and Casati. 63 Both their reports provide source material for reconstructing the events together with the Compte-Rendu by Jean-Paul de Dadelsen of the Centre Europeen de la Culture.64

Ferretti was supposed to report at the CNR Scientific Board meeting of December 18, 1950. Colonnetti was still ill, yet he wrote a letter to Guido Castelnuovo, President of CNR Committee for Mathema­ tics and Physics, on December 13, and sent a telegram to the CNR on December 15. Both the letter and the telegram were read at the CNR meeting before Ferretti's report, so that the letter's content is summarized in the minutes and the text of the telegram is reproduced in full. In his letter to Castelnuovo, Colonnetti referred to the Geneva Conference and its decision to establish an office in UNESCO headquarter in Paris for a preliminary study of a European laboratory. He wrote that a commitment had already been made for Italian participation in such an office and stressed that it was necessary to provide an initial modest contribution. Colonnetti asked his CNR colleages to vote in favour of such a modest contribution, waiting to find other sources for future expenses. In the telegram, Colonnetti 17

announced that Ferretti had the task of presenting his [Colonnetti's] proposal to provide 1 Million French Francs for Italian participation in the Paris office from the CNR budget. Colonnetti urged both the Scientific and the Administrative Board to approve his proposal.

After Colonnetti's letter and telegram were read, Ferretti started his report with a brief history of the project for an "Inter­ national Atomic Center" and a summary of previous discussions on the nature of the future laboratory. Ferretti remarked that two different "tendencies" had emerged. According to the first one, which he ascribed to the French, the future laboratory ought to be equipped not only with big apparatus for nuclear physics, accelerating machines etc., but also with atomic piles.

The second tendency, championed by Bohr, was in favour of accelerating machines," con astensione dalle pile atomiche". Bohr was not in favour of atomic piles because he believed that their "con­ struction implies a complex of economical and political problems escaping scientist's direct evaluation and lying outside their competences".

As explained before, Ferretti had assisted in the discussion at the Oxford Conference in September 1950 on the nature of the future European laboratory and had reported on it verbally to Amaldi, as Amaldi wrote to Auger on October 3, 1950. In his report to the CNR of December 1950, Ferretti did not mention explicitly the discussion held in Oxford a few months before. Apparently he only referred to "previous discussions" in general terms, although he must have had the Oxford discussion on his mind.

In fact, in referring to the Oxford discussions concerning the nature of the future laboratory, Pierre Auger mentioned two tendencies just like Ferretti did. Namely, at page 3 of the "Compte­ Rendu analytique de la reunion du 12 decembre 1950" compiled by 18

Jean-Paul de Dadelsen of the Centre Europeen de la Culture, one reads that "Pour le programme du Laboratoire, M. Auger signale qu'a une recente reunion de physiciens a Oxford, deux tendances se sont mani­ festees:

1. ne pas trap limiter au debut le domaine des recherches;

2. comme le proposait M. Niels Bohr, commencer par creer un grand instrument d'acceleration de particules (d'1 milliard de volts) et se grouper auteur."

Clearly enough the first "tendance" as indicated by Auger ("ne pas trap limiter au debut le domain des recherches") coincides with the "tendenza" ascribed by Ferretti to the French, that is the tendency not to limit the equipment of the future laboratory to particle accelerators. On the other hand, Bohr is indicated by both Auger and Ferretti as the major figure among the advocates of the second tendency", that is the tendency favouring the construction of a big accelerator with the exclusion of atomic piles.

Auger's and Ferretti's summaries of the Oxford discussions of September 1950 were substantially in agreement with each other. The only difference between them stemmed directly from the different attitudes of professor Ferretti and diplomat Auger. Namely, Ferretti provided a neat characterization of the opposite "tendencies" that emerged during the Oxford discussions and clearly emphasized their differences, thus carefully distinguishing black from white, so to speak. In other words, Ferretti's attitude was typical of his profession and therefore showed an inherent tendency toward schema­ tization and conceptualization of different ideas.

Diplomat Auger had perforce to take a different course. No 19

doubt Auger was well aware that the two "tendencies" that emerged during the Oxford discussions were at odds with each other. Moreover, as it will be recalled, the first tendency was ascribed by Ferretti to the French, that is to Auger's own countrymen. Therefore, Auger's rendering of the Oxford discussions had to have a much more diplomatic turn than Ferretti's. In fact, Auger tried somehow to reconcile the two opposed tendencies, by simply listing them one after the other as if they were perfectly compatible, thus smoothing out their differences in a purely fictitious succession. On reading Auger's summary of the Oxford discussions, one does not have at first sight the impression of a disagreement between the two "tendencies", although in fact there was quite a difference between them. As just stated, diplomat Auger simply lists the two tendencies in such a way that Bohr's proposal of building a big particle accelerator appears to be merely the first step toward the creation of a laboratory whose

research program needs not to be too much limited "au d~but", thus leaving room for the hopes and expectations of those who were longing for big reactors.

However, once a big accelerator had been built, the orientation of the laboratory toward high energy physics was likely to be irreversible and could hardly be reversed toward, say, low energy nuclear physics.

In conclusion, by stripping away the "diplomatic" ornament from Auger's rendering of the Oxford discussions, as reported by de Dadelsen, it seems to be clear enough that Auger himself was not a supporter of the tendency ascribed by Ferretti to the French. This fact also explains why Amaldi, himself highly uninterested in reac­ tors, could write to Auger on October 3, 1950 that he was "compl~te­ ment d'accord" with the French diplomat. The only thing on which

Amaldi could be "compl~tement d'accord" with Auger was certainly not the French tendency as characterized by Ferretti, that is the tendency in favour of reactor development along with accelerators. It is much 20

more likely that Auger and Amaldi were "completement d'accord" on Niels Bohr's point of view.

In fact, Ferretti continued his report to the CNR Scientific Board by recalling that IUPAP also took an interest in the project of a European laboratory for advanced nuclear physics and gave Amaldi the task of formulating a detailed plan. Together with Ferretti then, Arnaldi had prepared a summary project that was "essentially in agree­ ment with Bohr's point of view". Ferretti told CNR officials that the plan he concocted with Amaldi was discussed at the Geneva meeting.

Ferretti's report then went on with a rough sketch of Geneva deliberations indicating that the Italian share of expenses for the project was 12.5\. Ferretti stated that he had closely considered the problems of Italian participation together with Colonnetti and that they both agreed on the convenience in participating in the Paris office expenses as well as on the necessity "to take a position with respect to the European Center for Atomic Studies, so that our physicists can play the role they deserve".

Here apparently Ferretti failed to report to the CNR Scientific Board that he himself had been offered a leading position in the UNESCO office in Paris which was in charge of a preliminary study of the European laboratory project. In fact, from Rollier's report one learns that following a suggestion by the Belgian delegate Paul Capron, Ferretti had been appointed to the Paris office together with a "French member". Ferretti did not mention that offer in his report. Concerning the Paris office, he simply informed the meeting that the French government had already decided to give a contribution of 50 Million French francs for its operation, only adding as a personal remark that he considered such an amount of money to be exceedingly high for the kind of preliminary study to be undertaken.

Apparently Ferretti did not emphasize the offer made to him 21

in Geneva because he was reluctant to accept it. He was actually going to turn that offer down and never joined the Paris office. One can only speculate about possible reasons for Ferretti's refusal to work for the study office. Most likely he was not willing to take up what seemed to be a very heavy organizational duty. It is also probable that Ferretti was concerned about the danger of having to abandon active research work, as had been the case with Cacciapuoti's previous appointment with UNESCO.

In the discussion following Ferretti's report, Guido Castelnuovo, then president of the CNR Committee for Mathematics and Physics, declared himself in favour of the project just presented and recommended Italian participation in the European enterprise right from the start. Francesco Giordani, president of the CNR Committee for Chemistry briefly remarked on the extraordinary amount of money that was needed for nuclear research. Giordani said that support for nuclear physics was becoming a problem in every country and that it was impossible to cope with the financial needs of nuclear research with ordinary means. Apparently nuclear physics expenses by far exceeded the budget posibilities of the national research councils. Given the extraordinary situation connected with the nuclear sector, Giordani stated that a new committee had to be established for the promo t ion. an d coor d'inat1on . o f nuclear research alone. 65

Giordani said that he was convinced that the establishment of a European laboratory for nuclear physics was an excellent opportunity that had to be seized, and fully endorsed Colonnetti's proposal to provide 2 Million Italian lire (equivalent to 1 Million French francs) from the CNR budget to cover the Italian share of expenses for the Paris UNESCO office operations. Giordani added as a proviso that it should be made clear to the Italian government that the CNR contribution to the European project had only a "symbolic" character and that it represented the maximum effort CNR could make given its budgetary limitations. Other members of the CNR Scientific 22

Board agreed with Colonnetti's proposal and voted in favour of it. On the same day, the CNR Administrative Board approved the transfer of 2 Million Italian lire (equivalent to 1 Million French francs) to the Paris Office.66

Unlike Ferretti's report, Rollier's had less of an official impact and was addressed personally to both Casati and Colonnetti. Accordingly, Rollier's report lacked any official tone and was written in his typically lively style. Rollier briefly summarized discussions and speeches given by de Rougemont and Auger at the Geneva meeting. He reported that "Auger had recalled the Harwell [Oxford] conference, the acknowledged need of a laboratory for high energy elementary particles for Western Europe, and Niels Bohr's interest for the creation of such a laboratory". When discussions turned to the future laboratory's apparatus and research programme, Rollier reported that "the Commission unanimously adopted Niels Bohr's suggestion", namely that the future laboratory should be equipped for the production of high energy particles and should be centered around a big instrument like a "cosmotron" of no less than 6 BeV. 67 Rollier added that following discussions of the tentative plans and budget presented by Amaldi and Ferretti, and rough estimates by Kowarski, a conclusion was reached over a start-up sum of 5 Million dollars per year for five consecutive years.

Rollier said that a discussion followed concerning the opportunity of publicizing such a figure. He wrote that he himself had insisted that national governments ought to be made aware immediately of the order of magnitude of expenses to be incurred for the European project. Rollier claimed that "his" point of view was eventually accepted by the Commission.

Even before Rollier's report had reached Colonnetti, the CNR President had informed the head of the Italian government on the European initiative and its costs for Italy. 69 On December 18th 1950, 23

Colonnetti wrote to Alcide De Gasperi:

" ... we are on the eve of the creation of a European Laboratory for nuclear physics to which Italy must absolutely participate" (" ... siamo ormai alla vigilia della creazione di un 'Laboratorio Europeo di fisica nucleare' a cui !'Italia non potra assolutamente restare estranea").

In his letter Colonnetti transcribed the text of the Geneva conference deliberations he had received before. Then he indicated that the Italian share of expenses was 12% (as against 12.5% mentioned by Ferretti), which meant a contribution of roughly 300-400 Million lire per year for a five year period. In order to make Italian participation more effective, it was necessary to spend at least an equal amount of money for the construction of local facilities in Italy for the training of personnel.

Colonnetti stated that Italy had to engage in the preliminary stage of the project (that is the establishment of the Paris UNESCO office) while waiting for the government's decision regarding the whole matter. Since there was no "Commissione Atomica", Colonnetti felt that responsibility for Italian participation fell upon the CNR. Therefore he had decided "without hesitation" to provide 1 Million French francs from the CNR budget to cover expenses for Italian participation in the Paris office.

•This is clearly just the beginning ... ", Colonnetti explained, warning that there would be no sequel if his requests of an increase in funds for CNR were to be rejected. Here reference is made to a previous exchange between Colonnetti and De Gasperi concerning CNR's financial situation and the need of major funding especially for nuclear research. 24

Anticipating difficulties for his request of an increase in funds from the treasury, Colonnetti stated that such difficulties were not acceptable, since the "emergency" of the times made absolutely necessary a true "mobilization of science and scientists for national defence purposes, which means that funds for CNR should be considered in this moment an integral part of defence expenses". According to Colonnetti, "this does not happen only in the United States, ... it happens in all countries that are going to face the serious international situation".

Colonnetti's recommendation did not apply only to nuclear physics (which was the specific subject of his letter to De Gasperi), but it also extended to all branches of science and technology, since the "excellent capabilities" of scientists and researchers were in danger of being underemployed. Colonnetti wrote that his personal experience during past wars had taught him that the country had suffered severe damages from the lack of "mobilization" of scientists and technicians. Colonnetti felt it his duty, as CNR President, to warn against a repetition of the same mistakes.

The CNR President was writing this letter at a time of great international political tension, so that he could hardly avoid emphasizing one of his favourite arguments in favour of science. In fact, Colonnetti was convinced that one of the main purposes of scientific research was to serve the country in war time. Colonnetti's idea was that in order to help the war effort, research need not necessarily be confined to strictly military projects, the development of new weapons and the like. On the contrary, the country could be better served in case of war by pointing exactly in the opposite direction, that is by developing and supporting all branches of science independently of their immediate applications. Past experience had taught that even scientific researches having initially no connection whatsoever with war needs later bore results of tremendous 25

military importance. Moreover, industry could only benefit from a strong research effort, thus putting the country in a better position in case of war. 69

Colonnetti's call for a "mobilization" of scientists for national defence was no doubt influenced by analogous calls made at about the same time by several American scientists and politicians in favour of scientists' involvement in defence prograrnmes 70

Apparently, Italian government circles did not take seriously Colonnetti's off er of putting science at work for national defence programmes. 71 Furthermore, Italian scientists like Amaldi or Rollier were strongly opposed to the idea of working for military pro- jects, as explained before. Colonnetti himself was definitely no "hawk", as he might appear to have been from this letter to De Gasperi.. 72 As for the European laboratory pro]ect,. Ita l'ian politicians were more inclined to be convinced of the need to engage in a very expensive research programme by its actual European character, rather than by its remote military returns. In fact, Italian government circles were extremely sensitive to the issue of European collaboration "per se", so that by resorting to his science mobilization proposal, Colonnetti was indeed just trying to force an already open door. 26

N 0 T E S

1. Emilio Segre, Enrico Fermi, Physicist, University of Chicago Press,Chicago (1970).

2. Edoardo Amaldi was born at Carpaneto (near Piacenza) on September 5th, 1908. He graduated in Physics at Rome University in 1929. During the early thirties, Amaldi was associated with Fermi's group and in 1937 he became full professor of Experimental Physics at Rome Univesity.

3. Edoardo Amaldi, "The Years of Reconstruction", in C.Schaerf ed., Perspectives of Fundamental Physics, Harwood Academic Publishers, Chur (1979), 379-461.

4. Bernardo Nestore Cacciapuoti (1913-1979), after graduating at Pisa, joined Segre at Palermo University. In 1939 he moved to Rome to become Assistant to the chair of Experimental Physics. In 1948 he accepted Pierre Auger's offer to become his Adjoint at UNESCO, Paris.

5. CNR was established in November 1923. The great pure and applied mathematician Vito Volterra (1860-1940) can be considered the father of CNR. See E.T. Whittaker, "Vito Volterra",Royal Society Obituary Notices,] (1941), 690-729. For Volterra's political activities, see short essays by G. Israel, A. Rossi and F.La Teana in Atti del III Congresso Nazionale di Storia della Fisica, Palermo, 11 16 Octobre 1982, F. Bevilacqua and A. Russo eds., CNR, Gruppo Nazionale di Coordinamento per la Storia della Fisica, (1983), Vols.1 and 2. Judith R. Goodstein, "The Rise and Fall of Vito Volterra's World",forthcoming in the Journal of the History 27

of Ideas, October 1984.

6. For an historical assessment of CNR's role between the wars, see R. Maiocchi, "Il ruolo delle scienze nello sviluppo industriale italiano", in G.Micheli ed., Storia d'Italia. Annali 3. Scienza e Tecnica nella cultura e nella societa italiana dal Rinascimento ad Qggj,_, Einaudi, Turin (1980), 865 - 999.

7. "Riordinamento del Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Decreto Legislativo Luogotenenziale 1° marzo 1945", published in Gazetta Ufficiale, 29 March 1945, reproduced in Ricerca scientificia e ricostruzione, July 1st 1945, 14 -21.

8. Gustavo Colonnetti (Turin, 1886 - 1968) studied civil engineering and mathematics. In the early twenties, he became dean of Turin's Polytechnic, but was forced to resign for political reasons. A prominent member of Partito Popolare (a pre-war version of Democrazia Cristiana), Colonnetti was a staunch opposer of the Fascist regime. In the fall of 1943 he left Italy and stayed for about a year in Lausanne. Colonnetti's political and organi­ zational activities during his brief exile are discussed in Elisa Signori, La Svizzera e i fuoriusciti italiani. Aspetti e problemi dell'emiqrazione politica 1943 45, Franco Angeli, Milano ( 1983).

9. To quote an estimate, one can safely assume that 1 US dollar was then roughly equivalent to 500-600 Italian lire.

10. "Istituzione di un centro di studio per la fisica nucleare", Ricerca scientifica e ricostruzione, & (December 1945), 667 - 669.

11. Giuseppe Bolla, "Il CISE, Centro Informazioni Studied Esperienze: Suoi scopi, struttura e risultati", Energia Nucleare, 31 December,

19 5 2 I 15 - 20. 28

12. Nationalization of the electricity industry occurred in 1963 in Italy.

13. Emilio Gatti, "Giuseppe Bolla, 1901 1980" I Obituary to be published in Rendiconti dell' Istituto Lombardo di Scienze e Lettere.

14. Gilberto Bernardini, born at Florence on 20 August 1906 graduated in 1928 from Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa. He taught at Bologna University from 1938 until he joined the Rome Institute late in 1947. Bruno Ferretti had been Assistant to Fermi in Rome. In 1947 he became full professor of theoretical physics at Milan Univer­ sity. In the following year (1948), he moved to Rome to fill the chair left vacant by Giancarlo Wick.

15. E. Amaldi, "Recenti progressi e prospettive nello sviluppo delle applicazioni dell'energia atomica", Scienza e Tecnica, 1.Q-11-12. (1949), 240 - 264.

16. Amaldi, "Centro di studio per la fisica nucleare. Attivita svolta durante l'anno 1946", Ricerca scientifica e ricostruzione, j (1947), 391 399; "Centro di studio per la fisica nucleare e delle particelle elementari. Attivita svolta durante l'anno 1947", La ricerca scientifica, 1-1 (1948), 54-60; "Centro di studio per la fisica nucleare e delle particelle elementari. Attivita svolta durante l'anno 1948", La ricerca scientifica, 1 (1950), 269 - 274; "Centro ... Attivita ... 1949 ", La riverca scientifica, 20 ( 1950), 927 835; "Centro ... Attivita ... 1950" La ricerca scientifica, 1 (1951), 1149-1160; "Centro... Attivita ... 1951", La ricerca scientifica, _§ (1952), 1175 - 1185. 17. Letter from Amaldi to M.A. Rollier, 8 August 1950. Rollier Archive, Milan. 29

18. Bruno Ferretti, Memorandum per Ing. Vittorio De Biasi, 8 July 1950. Rollier Archive, Milan.

19. "Decreto del Presidente del CNR, 8 agosto 1951, N.599, Istituzione dell'Istituto nazionale di fisica nucleare", La ricer­ ca scientifica, 1Q (1951), 1813.

20. Draft plan for INFN, no date. Colonnetti Archive, Turin.

21. Verbali del Consiglio di Presidenza del CNR, seduta del 25-7-1952, CNR, Rome.

22. Mario Alberto Rollier (1909-1980) was associated with Milan Polytechnic from 1934 to 1956. His research interests ranged from structural chemistry to radiochemistry. Rollier was active also in politics, participated in the Italian Resistance movement and was among the founders of the European Federalist Movement.

23. Letters from Rollier to Ivan Matteo Lombardo, 8 March 1950, 13 March 1950, 15 July 1950, 16 November 1950; letters from Rollier to Ugo La Malfa, 26 April 1951, 23 June 1951, 12 July 1951. Rollier Archive, Milan.

24. Amaldi had a preference for a committee modeled on the American AEC, while Rollier was more inclined to an imitation of France's CEA. Rollier thought that American expenses for nuclear research were much too high by European standards and that the French model looked more suited to Italian financial possibilities.

25. Letter from Amaldi to Rollier, 11 March 1950; letter from Rollier to Amaldi, 13 March 1950. Rollier Archive, Milan.

26. "Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri, 26 giugno 1952, Istituzione del Comitato Nazionale per le ricerche 30

nucleari", La ricerca scientifica, 1Q (1952), 1882-83.

27. "Comitato Nazionale per le Ricerche Nucleari", La ricerca scientifica, 1Q (1982), 1874.

28. CISE continued to be an independent laboratory. For its subsequent development, see Mario Silvestri, Il costo della menzogna. Italia nucleare 1945-1968, Einaudi, Turin (1968).

29. E. Amaldi, "L'Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare", Notiziario del CNEN, 1 (1963), 9.

30. It took another ten years before nationalization of the electricity industry occured in Italy (1963). However, already in 1952 many saw in the establishment of CNRN intimations of things to come.

31. Verbali del Consiglio di Presidenza del CNR, Seduta del 15-6-1952, CNR, Rome.

32. Luigi Giulotto, "L'avvio della ricerca fisica in struttura della materia in Italia: gli anni '40 e '50 ", to be published by Gruppo Nazionale di Struttura della Materia (GNSM), CNR, Rome.

33. Luigi Giulotto, "Sulla struttura degli enti di ricerca nel campo

della fisica - Disfunzioni e nodi poli tici", GNSM-CNR 1 1976. See also Giulotto's report in "Senato della Repubblica, VI Legislatura, 7 Cornmissione, Indagine conoscitiva sulla ricerca scientifica in Italia, Resoconto stenografico, 10 seduta, Giovedi 13 Febbraio 1975". For the present situation, see Carlo Rizzuto, "Physics research organization, Italian style", Physics Today, J (August 1983), 38 - 43. For a study of "l'essor, dans l'apres-guerre, des organisations syndicales italiennes regroupant les travailleurs scientif iques des centres de recherches 31

extra-universitaires", like CNR, INFN, CNRN etc. see; Alberto Cambrosio, L'emergence du chercheur scientifigue: le cas des centres de recherches italiens de l'apres-guerre,These presentee a la Faculte des Etudes Superieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Philosophiae Doctor (Ph.D.), Institut d'Histoire et de Sociopolitique des Sciences, Faculte des Arts et des Sciences, Universite de Montreal, October 1983.

34. Verbali del Consiglio di Presidenza del CNR, seduta del 13 - 1- 1950, CNR, Rome.

35. An issue raised at the Lausanne conference and brought by Colonnetti to the attention of the CNR Scientific Board was support for the humanities from National Research Councils. At that time CNR did not support moral, historical and philosophical disciplines. The CNR's Scientific Board decided not to adhere to the Lausanne conference recommendation, to extend its activities also to the humanities' sector for financial reasons. The CNR started supporting Geisteswissenschaften as well as experimental and mathematical sciences only from the '60s.

36. See for instance Colonnetti's speech on the occasion of Fermi's visit to Rome in October 1949, reproduced in "La visita di Enrico Fermi al Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche", La ricerca scientifica, 1Q (1949), 1113 - 1116.

37. ~initiatives du CEC, Documents svr les origines du CERN et de la fondation europeenne de la culture, Centre europeen de la Culture, XIVe annee, hiver 1975, Geneve.

38. E. Amaldi, "Personal notes on neutron work in Rome in the 30's and post-war European collaboration in high-energy physics", in C. Weiner ed., History of Twentieth Century Physics, Inter­ national School of Physics Enrico Fermi, LVII Course, Academic 32

Press, New York (1977), 294 - 351.

39. Ibidem, p. 336.

40. Ibidem, p. 336.

41. Amaldi, "Personal Notes ... "; "The Years of Reconstruction", in C. Schaerf ed., Perspectives of Fundamental Physics, Chur, Harwood Academic Publishers, ( 1979), 379 461. Interviews of Edoardo Amaldi on the subject of CERN history by M. Gowing (CHIP-REC 5, CERN Archives) and by L. Belloni (tapes deposited in CERN Archives).

42. A copy of Amaldi's "Quaderno No 1, 27 ottobre 1949 - 31 dicembre 1959" is deposited in CERN Archives

43. Amaldi's Interview by L. Belloni, CERN Archives.

44. Amaldi's Quaderno No.1, page 1, CERN Archive.

45. Amaldi, "Notes for CERN History - from E. Amaldi Diary", (received from Prof. E. Amaldi on 29-1-1981), CERN Archive, p. 1.

46. Amaldi's Interview by L. Belloni, CERN Archive.

47. Amaldi's Interview by M. Gowing, CERN Archive, CHIP-REC 5, p. 10.

48. J. Heilbron, B. Wheaton, R. Seidel, "Lawrence and his Laboratory: Nuclear Science at Berkeley", LBL News Magazine, Vol.6, No.3 (Fall 1981). Robert W. Seidel, "Accelerating science: The postwar transformation of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory", Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, Vol.13, Part 2, (1983), 375-400.

49. Antonio Rostagni, "Laboratori di fisica in Inghilterra", La 33

ricerca scientifica, 2 - ~ (1948), 532. For a very short account of the history of Birmingham PS see "Proton Synchrotron of the University of Birmingham", Nature, Vol. 172 (October 17, 1953), 704-705.

50. Actes de la Conference Generale de !'Organisation des Nations Unies pour !'education, la science et la culture, cinquieme session, Florence 1950, Comptes Rendus des Debats, (Paris, Unesco, Novembre 1950), p.376.

51. E. Amaldi, "Notes for CERN History - from E. Amaldi Diary", CERN Archives, p. 1.

52. Letter from I. Rabi to E. Amaldi, May 20, 1983, CERN Archives.

53. E. Amaldi, "Personal notes ... ", p. 350.

54. This was the International Nuclear Physics Conference held at Harwell, near Oxford, in September 1950 under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Committee of Great Britain.

55. Amaldi, "Personal notes ... ", p. 350.

56. Senator Count Alessandro Casati was at that time the President de la Commission Culturelle et Scientifique de l'Assemblee consul­ tative Europeenne in Strasburg.

57. Letter from Amaldi to Raymond Silva, 28 novembre 1950. Centre Europeen de la Culture Archive, Geneva (Copy in CERN Archives).

58. Letter from Rollier to Raoul Dautry, 7 November 1950. Rollier Archive, Milan.

59. Letter from Raoul Dautry to Raymond Silva, 9 novembre 1950, Centre 34

Europeen de la Culture Archive, Geneva.

60. Letter from Rollier to Ivan Matteo Lombardo, 16 November 1950. Rollier Archive, Milan.

61. Rollier, "Rapporto preliminare sulla riunione del Groupe d'Etudes des Recherches Scientifiques a Ginevra il 12 Dicembre 1950 al Ministro del Cornmercio Estero, Milano, 2 dicembre 1950", Rollier Archive, Milan.

62. Verbali del Consiglio di Presidenza del CNR, seduta del 18-12-1950, CNR, Rome.

63. Rollier, "Rapporto sulla riunione del Groupe d'Etudes de Recherches Scientifiques del Centre Europeen de la Culture, Tenutosi a Ginevra il 12 dicernbre 1950", Rollier Archive, Milan.

64. Jean-Paul de Dadelsen, "Compte-Rendu analytique de la reunion du 12 decernbre 1950", Centre Europeen de la Culture, Departement des Commissions d'Etudes, Geneve, le 18 decembre 1950. CEC Archive, Geneve.

65. Incidentally, Giordani was to become the first President of the Italian national committee for nuclear research (CNRN) in 1952. 66. Verbali della Giunta Amministrativa del CNR, seduta del 18-12-1950. CNR, Rome.

67. Most likely, Rollier would have preferred a reactor for the production of radioisotopes for radiochemistry research to an accelerator for the production of high energy particles.

68. Letter from Colonnetti to Alcide De Gasperi, 18 December 1950. Colonnetti Archive, Turin. 35

69. Colonnetti, Programma per lo sviluppo della ricerca scientifica in Italia nel decennio 1956-65, Parte I, "Il Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche e la sua attivita nell'immediato dopoguerra", para­ graph on "La ricerca al servizio della difesa nazionale", p. 20 23.

70. The US reaction to explosion of the first Soviet atom bomb in 1949 resulted in several such calls by American officials. At a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Henry D. Smyth spoke on December 28, 1950 of "the critical situation" in which the USA were finding themselves and "then outlined means through which he felt scientific manpower could best be mobilized." Smyth proposed "the creation of a Scientific Board responsible to the President, and the establishment of a Student Scientific Corps to provide for the training of new scientists during the 20-year period of international tension and crisis" that he foresaw (from "A Report of the Cleveland Meeting, December 26-30, 1950", Science, Vol. 113, February 9, 1951, p.151). In an open letter addressed to Italian researchers in June 1951 Colonnetti drew attention to the similarities between his and Smyth's proposal. He further remarked that Smyth's proposal had been partially accepted by Mr. Charles Wilson, Head of the Office

for Defence Mobilization, who had announced the creation of a committee for scientific researches bearing on national defence problems.

71. Letter form Colonnetti to Alessandro Casati, 18 December 1950 (unsigned copy), Colonnetti Archive, Turin.

72. See Colonnetti's social and political writings collected in the volume A ricordo di Gustavo Colonnetti, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Istituto di Metrologia "Gustavo Colonnetti", Torino, no date. Time and again Colonnetti complained about the government's 36 excessive generosity toward the military and the scarcity of research funds.