The Evolution of American Army Doctrine

The evolution of American army doctrine

?omju

merican Army doctrine in the al level, which guides tactical battles regional commands throughout the 20th century is not of a piece. to strategie purpose, is the key con- globe following the U.S. 1947 defen- AIn it are clear continuities, yet cept of modern land-war and joint se reorganization that subordinated it has been marked by major, even doctrine. the uniformed services to the Depart- radical shifts. What is the history of The operational level has, however, ment of Defense. Thereafter, the American Army doctrine? What gave long been shrouded in mists. Part of regional unified commanders, under it the cast that it has? Are its critics the problem is semantic. Until late the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assumed right who say it is a firepower doc- into the 18th century, land warfare campaign planning responsibility. trine? Are there other significant generally featured strategie maneuver The effect was to limit Army doctrine strands? by an army to a tactical fight. It was to the realm of tactics. The Korean The focus of this paper about the evo- the advent of the mass and divisible and Vietnam Wars, with notable lution of American Army doctrine armies of Napoleon's time that intro- exceptions, were fought almost enti- will be the operational-tactical levels duced an understood intermediate rely at the tactical level, and NATO's of war, within the context of changing level, delineated as grand tactics. Al- forward-defense strategie line-up per- national policy and strategy. For the though the grand-tactical level of petuated the void in large-unit- purposes of this paper, I want to hold campaign or large-unit maneuver dis- maneuver operational thinking.' Tac- to the definition of doctrine as „the tinguished larger wars after that, so tics were indeed the sole focus of central idea of an army", in J.F.C. too did a confused terminology. every Operations manual - the Fuller's cogent phrase. But before Commonly, „strategy" was the um- Army's basic doctrine, FM 100-5 - presenting an account of the United brella spanned to cover this interme- from the first Field Service Regu- States Army's 20th-century doctrinal diate level. lations of 1905 right up to the Ame- eras and significant episodes, I want The German and Russian Armies' na- rican Army's AirLand Battle doctrine to say a word about the forgotten and ming and adoption of the notion in the of 1982. rediscovered middle level of war. 20th century - the „operativ" and „operational art", respectively, was It is a commonplace view that the not imitated by the western armies. The American American Army, whose armament is The U.S. Army Command and Staff Expeditionary Farces based on the advantages of industrial School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas wealth and technological preeminen- and the Army War College did teach a A starting point for a survey of ce, has preferred and has usually three-level approach to large-unit American Army doctrine is the short prose cuted a predominantly fire- operations in the years between the but consequential experience of the power-attrition mode of war since world wars. World War II would see American Expeditionary Forces in Ulysses S. Grant set the mold 130 differing styles of American combat, the final period of World War I, the years ago. It is the contention of this but the Army's experience in the glo- seedbed of modern mechanized war- paper that that tradition also owes to bal conflict was rich enough in inci- fare. U.S. Army doctrinal unreadiness the American Army's habit of ambi- dence of large-unit operational ma- for that war is well known. The AEF guous regard for the operational level neuver and campaign. in France borrowed British tactical of war. This paper holds to the well- supported premise that the operation- However, the operational level would 1 Clayton R. Newell, „On Operational virtually vanish from the American Art", in On Operational Art, eds. Newell ' Military History Office Army mind for the 35 years following and Michael D. Krause (Washington, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command V-E and V-J Days. The probable D.C.: Center of Military History, United Fort Monroe, Virginia cause was the creation of joint-service States Army (1994), pp. 9-15.

436 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 165 10-96 manuals, adopted French tactics, and Doctrine Development maintained a reserve with the third. fired French artillery. The experience in the Interwar In the triangular division, infantry and of commanding large tbrces was non- a more mobile doctrine meshed.5 No existent in the 1917 Army. Coordi- military figure had more influence on nation of arms and services was at a Like the armies of its Western allies infantry training and doctrine in the basic Ie vel. After declaration of war and unlike von Seeckt's Reichswehr, interwar than George Marshall, Chief in April 1917, it required one and a the American Army of the interwar of Staff after 1939. The assistant com- half years to create a field army. understood too slowly the potential mandant at the Infantry School be- American soldiers tbught with spirit for the open, mechanized warfare that tween 1927-1932, Marshall transfor- and valor, but American amateurism the armament and tactics of the Great med instruction from rote learning to was still evident in the Meuse-Ar- War's final period had pointed to- quick-thinking, practical exercises, gonne offensive in September 1918, ward.4 Isolationist and pacifist politi- and prompted the writing of the influ- as recounted by George Marshall, an cal tides curtailed military expenditu- ential volume Infantry in Battle. officer on the AEF staff, who descri- res sharply. Internally, movement Marshall taught application rather bed the initial phase of that campaign down branch Unes was not integrated. than theory. He wanted to show the as „stumbling, blundering .,. appeals The American Army would come uniqueness of every battle, the need for help, and hopeless confusion. "2 very late to the idea of infantry-tank- to eschew rules, the requirement for Americans fought in manpower- artillery combined arms. commonsense estimate and action.6 heavy, four-regiment „square" divi- Not a student of military theory, sions of 28.000 men by the end of the The U.S. Army embraced Maj. Gen. Marshall was an American pragmatist war. Regimental units were deployed Fuller's Principles of War in training and a tinkerer, who stimulated both in depth for attack and defense, and regulations in 1921 and after. The students, and as Chief of Staff, lea- battalions and companies advanced in 28.000-man division was pared back ders, to think and experiment.' sector direct-on, the components of postwar, but it was not until 1939 that Artillery doctrine evolved markedly. front warfare's attrition machine. a more mobile triangular structure Supplanting sheer firepower volume James W. Rainey makes a case for an was approved. Adapting doctrinal was a new system of division artillery ambivalence of American doctrine in ideas from the Germans, Chief of which could decentralize batteries but 1917-1918 - the rhetoric of the vigo- Infantry Maj. Gen. George A. Lynch mass fires through a battalion fire rous infantry offensive against a discarded obsolete square-division direction center - a primary American recognition of the reality of position tactics and gave each company and advantage in the coming war.8 warfare, and a failure to regard the battalion mortars and machine guns. Armor development proceeded along machine gun and tank as other than The division had at nearly every eche- two lines in the interwar years, one infantry-supporting weapons.' In any lon three maneuver elements plus a under the aegis of the Infantry case, the strategie decisions that base of fire support using direct and Branch, the other, the Cavalry. The brought the armistice cut short any indirect fire. Commanders fixed the National Defense Act of 1920 assig- occasion to apply doctrine beyond the enemy with one maneuver element, ned all tanks to the Infantry, affirming tactical sphere. found his flank with a second, and the period view that the tank supported the infantry's advance behind a rolling barrage. Tactical tests of ex-

2 1 perimental tanks took place at several As cited in Christopher R. Gabel, The Gabel, GHQ Maneuvers, pp. 9-11. posts in the late 1920s. But it was the U-S. Amry GHQ Maneuvers of 1941 6 (1) Paul F. Gorman, General, USA Ret, Cavalry Branch that pushed the armor (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military His- The Secret of Future Victories, Insitute for tory, United States Army, 1991), pp. 4-5. Defense Analyses, February 1992 (Ft. concept, as prompted by Colonel 1 James W. Rainey, „Ambivalent Warfare: Leavenwoprth, Kan.: A Military Classic Adna R. Chaffee on the War De- The Tactical Doctrine of the AEF in World Reprint, U.S. Army Command and Ge- partment General Staff and later bri- War I," 20th Century War: The American neral Staff College Press, 1994), pp. 1-21 gade commander. The Cavalry called Experience, U.S. Army CGSC Combat to 1-29. its tanks ,,combat cars." At Fort Studies Institute Readings, Pub 613, (2) Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939, Knox, Kentucky in the 1930s, a po- 9 ] 85, pp. 88-99. ed. Roger J. Spilier (Ft. Leavenworth, tential combined-arms mechanized See James S. Corum, The Roots of Kan.: U.S. Army Command and General force of cavalry, artillery, observation Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Staff College Press, 1992), pp. x-xi, xiii-xiv. aircraft, and later an attached infantry Military Reform (Lawrence, Kan.: Uni- 1 Gorman, The Secret of Future Victories, regiment, took form. versity Press of Kansas, 1992) for a super- pp. 1-21 to 1-29, II-I, II-3. lative study of von Seeckt's systematic 8 (1) Boy d L. Dastrup, King of Battle: A Procrastination by both Infantry and study and translation of war lessons into Branch History of the U.S. Army's Field Cavalry Branches, however, led rnechanized combined-arms concepts and Artillery (Ft. Monroe, Va.: Office of the Chaffee, George S. Patton,and others doctrine upon which the Blitzkrieg would Command Historian, 1992), pp. 196-99. to propose a separate branch to be based. (2) Gabel, GHQ, Maneuvers, pp. 11,12. General Marshall. Marshall activated

JRG 165 10-96 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 437 the Armored Force in July 1940, brin- taught World War II leaders how to ry, and self-propelled artillery batta- ging all tank units under it. The Chaf- maneuver a field army, and validated lions, with combat commands inter- fee-instigated armored division of or improved infantry, artillery, and mediate between division and batta- 1940 had armored, artillery, and armor doctrine. The chief benefit was lion to act, like the German Kampf- infantry regiments; was fully motori- the leg up the maneuvers gave to gruppen, as temporary task forces. zed, but did not yet attain the idea of combined arms development. The intermediate battle groups. The char- Maneuvers also brought to general- The forceful advocate of using armor acteristic U.S. armored division of the officer rank many World War II lea- in large groups was George Patton. A war would evolve only later.1' ders, including Eisenhower, Simpson, tank commander during the Meuse- and Bradley.10 Argonne, Patton later read Guderian's writings attentively. A pragmatist, hè The 1941 GHQ Maneuvers experimented with tank concepts at Doctrine in World War II the California-Arizona Maneuver In 1941, General Marshall ordered Area and produced his own desert large-scale maneuvers, under General With the German defeat of France in war manual, emphasizing the combi- Headquarters aegis, in the southern June 1940, most American military ned arms, the leader's initiative, and United States to test new doctrine and observers understood that mechaniza- the criticality of dominant fire and equipment. Personally directed by tion had introduced a new era in land decisive movement." However, Ge- GHQ Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Lesley warfare. Yet, the American doctrinal neral McNair was disinclined to orga- McNair, the Louisiana Maneuvers of response was mixed. The mobiliza- nize armor into larger units. The U.S. September and the Carolina Maneu- tion, equipping, and training of a war- armored division, unlike the Panzer vers of November 1941 featured winning mass Army from an almost division, never became the heart of opposed field armies, with full corps fatally late start, an Army that would the army. lts standard use was a com- and division complements. Tested fight in global theaters, was a stupen- bination typically of l armored with 2 among many other things were the dous accomplishment." In 1944-1945, infantry divisions in a corps. McNair new Armored Force along with anti- the American Army was the most also preferred pooling independent tank concepts pushed by McNair. mobile army in the world. That being tank battalions to attach one each to said, such vaunted mobility, as Army infantry divisions, a prejudice which The 1941 GHQ Maneuvers had fun- historian Russell Weigley has argued, produced more independent tank bat- damental influence on American Ar- was achieved at the expense of figh- talions in pools than organic tank bat- my doctrine and force structure. The ting power and high-casualty cost.12 talions in the sixteen armored divi- separation of tanks, infantry, and artil- Following the GHQ Maneuvers, the sions.14 McNair's antitank doctrine lery was revealed clearly as mistaken. Armored Force reduced the interwar did not work. Based on indeterminate The armored corps proved good at emphasis on mobility in favor of hea- GHQ Maneuver results, McNair acti- envelopment, but its shortage of vier tanks and increased combined vated a Tank Destroyer Branch predi- infantry precluded effective combi- arms capability. As evolved by 1943, cated on the doctrine that the high- ned arms operations. The exercises it fielded 3-each tank, armored infant- firepower but thin-skinned vehicles should seek out enemy tanks but avoid slugging matches. Tank des- '' (1) Gabel, „Evolution of U.S. Armor (2) Weigley, „Shaping the American troyers were easily driven to cover; Mobility", 20th Century War: The Ame- Army of World War II: Mobility versus their mobility didn't help. Field com- Power", 20th Century War: The American rican Experience, U.S. Army CGSC Com- manders rejected the doctrine, frag- hat Studies fnstitute Readin^s, Pub 613, Experience, U.S. Army CGSC Comhal 1985, pp. 54-63. Studies Institute Readings, Pub 613,1985, menting the tank destroyer battalions (2) Gabel, GHQ Maneuvers, pp. 22-33. pp. 162-70. into assault guns or self-propelled "' (1) Gabel, GHQ Maneuvers, pp. 1-19, " Gorman, The Secret of Fture Victories, artillery." 177, 188-94. pp. II-6 to II-7,11-27. (2) Gabel, „Evolution of U.S. Armor 14 (l) Gabel, „Evolution of the U.S. Armor In the area of ground support, the Mobility," pp. 171-80. Mobility," pp. 171-80. Luftwaffe 's lessons were not well lear- " The View of Field Marshal Rommel was (2) Gabel, GHQ Maneuvers, pp. 177-80, ned or pervasively applied. Army Air that the effort that General McNair had 188-89. Forces philosophy stressed air superi- supervised surpassed anything the world (3) Gorman, The Secret of Future Victo- ority and strategie bombing. Although had seen. Gorman, Secret of Future Vic- ries, pp. II-6 to II-7. a ground support manual was appro- tories, p. 11-4. 'Ml) Gabel, GHQ Maneuvers, pp. 177, 1 12 (1) Russel F. Weigley, Eisenhower's 191, 192. ved, " there was no direct air-ground Lieutenants: The Campaign of France (2) Gabel „Evolution of Armor Mobility," communication. Air support requests and Germany 1944-1945 (Bloomington, pp. 188-89. were through chain of command. But Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1981), pp. 16 FM 31-35, Aviation in Support of ad hoc ground support doctrine did 727-30. Ground Farces. evolve. Tactical aircraft in the drive

438 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 165 10-96 across France came under one com- also saw wide use of flexible regi- ding mission, the scope of postwar mand, Ninth Air Force, which assig- mental combat teams - usually a regi- demobilization, the surfeit of World ned combat wings to tactical air com- ment of infantry, a battalion of artille- War II military equipment, and the mands, one per field army. IX Tactical ry, a combat engineer company, and popular conviction that the bomb, in Air Command with the U.S. First other units.18 sole American possession, had rende- Army provided continuous direct air Russell Weigley's contention that the red ground war for the United States support to advancing armored divi- World War II American Army's mobi- obsolete - all these factors combined sions using radio Communications. lity was at the expense of an under- to limit Army weapon and tactical Air-ground doctrine thus emerged powered Army of undergunned ma- development in the late 1940s. late - and in the school of war, not neuver elements is a strong one. The Design improvements to the U.S. t'rom the desk of doctrine.17 War Department did not approve a division, however, followed from the In the Pacific war, two fighting styles 75-mm. tank gun (for the M4 Sher- combined arms lessons of the war. In emerged: frontal assault and attrition man) until July 1940, and it was still the late 1940s, armored divisions on the beaches of the Central Pacific, inadequate. Similarly undergunned were heavied-up with an additional and the bypassing of Japanese strong- was antitank weaponry - a 37-mm. armored infantry battalion, and in- points in the Southwest Pacific. The weapon, and later 57-mm., even as fantry divisions were given an orga- two campaigns joined at Okinawa in the Germans moved to 75-mm. and nic tank battalion. Artillery batteries costly, attritive frontal assault. The then the 88-mm. dual-purpose gun. grew from 4 guns to 6. The late 1940s American losses on Okinawa were a The Germans also soon overtook the were the start of a 40-year heavying- factor in the lives-sparing decision to puny U.S. 2.36-inch bazooka, adop- up trend, though for some time the drop the atomic bomb. ting the 88-mm. Panzerfaust, a prized infantry remained the center of the weapon when we captured it. U.S. combined arms team. No large-unit McNair's significant infantry achie- weaponry had been designed for armored formations were contempla- vement was getting the maximum mobility when U.S. strategy was to ted. Tactical doctrine emphasized the number of streamlined divisions out overwhelm the enemy with superior offensive, the envelopment over the of the manpower base, and scotching power. To heavy-up the predominant penetration. Defensive tactics were li- the growth of special division types - American fighting unit of the war, the mited to an area-type defense in depth specifically motorized and light. It infantry division, the field expedient resembling Fuller's archipelago no- was McNair's maxim that infantry led employed - the attached tank batta- tion. Large reserves, especially armo- the war, equipped only with the orga- lion - flouted the organizational red, were a key principle. Although nic materiel it needed most of the logic. tactics had changed little since 1945, time. Other equipment came from firepower had increased. The impro- pools. But in all cases, close coopera- In World War II, a combined arms vements were important, but they dis- tion with the other arms was required. doctrine had evolved, but the structu- guised understrength and underequip- Infantry could not attack without the re to fulfill it lagged. Underpowered ped divisions and a chronic state of aid of tanks, artillery, and air, but neit- in its maneuver elements and large- general unreadiness in 1950 when the her could those arms gain ground or unit organization, the American Army surprise North Korean invasion oc- destroy the enemy's will without the in Europe let the artillery fight the curred.20 aid of the infantry. The infantry war war as much as possible. In the end, U.S. infantry divisions lacked the force design needed to pursue the Korea: Infantery-Artillery Doctrine " Gabel, GHQ Maneuvers, pp. 40-41, power-drive strategy. They did so 179-81, 190. well in 1944-1945 because the Ger- John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, man units in Western Europe were by Forced adaptation characterized Ame- 1

JRG 165 10-96 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 439 response to the night attacks the analysis, and study agencies and tools the redesign, during 1956-1957, of Chinese preferred (that were free of to distill and test doctrine.22 the Army's divisions into dispersed U.N. daytime air control), and to the mobile battle groups dually armed - Chinese ground- giving tactical de- conventional, and tactical nuclear. fense, the U.S. commander General Impact of Massive Despite their reputed mobility, they Matthew Ridgway promoted incre- Retaliation Strategy: posited the ultimate in substitution of ased weapon density and envelop- Pentomic Doctrine firepower for maneuver. Within two ments. In the defense, American sol- years, the Pentomic designs feil of diers used „fight and roll" tactics fol- The post-Korea 1950s, tagged the their own ill concept. Doctrinal im- lowed up by artillery counterattacks. „Pentomic era" by the predominant passe was evident, Combat develop- Rapid massed artillery fire, and tanks operational idea - a mobile five-sided ments experiments at Hunter Liggett used as mobile firepower and moved division on a tactical atomic battle- Military Reservation, California indi- into entrenched positions, were doc- field - presents an errant chapter in cated that, on the atomic battlefield, trinal staples of a predominantly tacti- doctrine history. the Pentomic division was vulnerable cal war dominated by infantry and Early attempts to develop tactical to attack and could not be supplied, artillery. The important doctrinal ef- concepts for the forseen atomic envi- nor could it, as constituted, fight con- fect of the stalemated war was the ronment foundered on the Army's ventionally. growth of American dependence on inability to obtain the tightly-control- firepower and a focus on attrition.21 led nuclear effects data - the specific During the 1950s, doctrine writers An important event just after the effects of blast, heat, and radiation. wrestled with and, to some degree, Korean War that would bear on future The result initially was to treat tacti- wrote around the assumptions of tac- American Army doctrine was the cal atomic weapons yet to be fielded tical nuclear warfare. The fifties saw establishment of a system for combat as „bigger" conventional artillery to the growth of American armor, with developments. Precipitated by Soviet open paths for ground forces. B ut production of new tanks and develop- attainment of intercontinental nuclear after 1953, Eisenhower Adminis- ment of the M113 armored personnel delivery capability, the concept called tration policy transformed this ambi- carrier. Doctrine changes expanded for a systematic and comprehensive guous doctrinal position. „Massive the defense to two types - position pre-development of Army doctrine, Retaliation" was a deterrence strategy and mobile, the latter facilitated by materiel, and organizations. Carried that declared, in Ike's words: „a increases in armor. On the revolutio- out by the Army Field Forces and its major war will be an atomic war." nary battlefield, there was no mas- successor commands - the current The emphasis was Air Force power, sing. Maneuver purported to furnish being TRADOC - the CD mission and a reduced Army was to be relega- the antidote to the effects of atomic employed a range of specialized test, ted to post-strike occupation and fires. order-restoration duties. By the early 1960s, the Pentomic divisions were abandoned along with 21 Doughty, Tactical Doctrine 1946-1976, Against the Eisenhower strategy, their actuating „central idea." Stam- pp. 7-12. Army Chief of Staff General Ridg- peding itself into an unworkable tech- " TRADOC Historical Office paper, A way argued the logic that once Soviet nological fix, the atomic/Pentomic Brief Overview ofHow the U.S. Army Has nuclear parity was achieved, the stra- Army was atomically unusable, and Conducted Organiiational Testing Since tegy would deter Soviet nuclear conventionally seriously impaired. World War II, prepared by John L. attack only and not Soviet-sponsored No plausible operational concept for Romjue, Historical Office, U.S. Army conventional wars that the American two-sided tactical nuclear warfare Training and Doctrine Command, Ft. Monroe, Va., 5 May 1983. Army would be too small and ill- was ever developed. The Pentomic 23 equipped to counter. Rejected by experience was a failed doctrinal (D TRADOC Military History Office 2 Staff Paper, John L. Romjue, „Failed Eisenhower, Ridgway's arguments approach to a technology revolution. ' Approach to a Technology Revolution: ultimately prepared the way for the The Army's Pentomic Experience," 13 „Flexible Response" strategy of Pre- September 1995. This paper draws on the sident John Kennedy. Flexible Response, following studies: A.J. Bacevich, The But while opposed steadfastly to the ROAD Divisions, and Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Eisenhower view of major war as ato- Mechanized Infanttry Korea and Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: mic war, Ridgway did not accept the National Defense University Press, 1986); corollary of a reduced Army role. Though internal studies and experi- John J. Midgley, Jr., Deadly Illusions: Army Police for the Nuclear Battlefield That stance led the Army into studies ments were already turning the Army (Boulder and London: Westview Press, resulting in the testing of hypothetical away from Pentomic doctrine by the 1986). and undemonstrated dual atomic-non- early 1960s, it was the advent of the (2) Doughty, Tactical Doctrine 1946- atomic Army concepts. Those tests, Kennedy Administration that introdu- 1976, pp. 12-19. never realistically evaluated, led to ced a new strategie outlook. „Flexible

440 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 165 10-96 Response" security policy supported by protection and rapid movement. U.S. air cavalry organization by 1961. maintaining a dual-capability doctri- A decisive push by the Kennedy ne, but it reversed the emphasis, now Mechanization widened the fighting Administration that year initiated a placed on conventional warfare and in front, and with better weapons, it dee- major program of studies, tests, and addition, still lower on the spectrum, pened the front as well. The defense field exercises under the direction of on counterinsurgency. now put more emphasis on the de- General Howze, which produced air- The key ideas were upgrading con- struction of enemy forces, less on re- mobility and air assault concepts ventional firepower, more tactical tention of terrain. Post-World War II based on swift heliborne troop lift rnobility and maneuverability, tailo- stress on the offense, at the same with supporting fires, including arm- ring of units, air-transportability, and time, was lessened, even though the ed helicopters. divisional brigades like the armored ROAD divisions had a greatly incre- Howze tested and created a new divi- division's combat commands. The ased capability for the attack. As his- sion type, the experimental llth Air studies culminated in the Reorgani- torian Robert Doughty notes, the Assault Division, which was tested zation Objective, Army Divisions, or Army's perceptions of concentration out in large-scale maneuvers. In June ROAD, studyof 1961. and dispersion had undergone impor- 1965, the division was reorganized as The significant features of the ROAD tant alterations since the early 1950s. the Ist Cavalry Division (Airmobile), divisions were a common division Doctrine had changed as the result of and advanced elements deployed to base, combined with brigades as tac- an accumulation of historical factors Vietnam that year. In Vietnam, the di- tical headquarters commanding flexi- by the early 1960s: the Korean War vision was the organizational heart of ble mixes of maneuver battalion ty- experience, the defensive NATO line- airmobility - the dominant tactics of pes. Regimental headquarters were up in Germany, the longer trend of that war.26 eliminated. The ROAD division type attrition warfare, and the stopgap re- was determined by the mix of batta- liance on tactical nuclear weapons. lion types: infantry, tank, and (brand There was increased confidence in the Vietnam: new) mechanized infantry. Aviation power of the defense.24 Attrition Doctrine assets were doubled, and a division support command established. The Any analysis of American Army doc- ROAD divisions, with changes, were Counterinsurgency trine in the Vietnam War must start Standard for the next 20 years. and Airmobility with the paradox of tactical victory and strategie defeat, and with the fact Offensive doctrine resembled the pre- Briefly in the 1960s, counterinsurgen- of the critical absence of a central Pentomic, while the defense included cy came to the fore, not as a compe- operational plan marshalling tactical mobile and area defenses including ting central idea, but as a prominent engagements to strategie purpose. defense in depth. Doctrine emphasi- collateral doctrine. FM 100-5 doctri- Neither a decisive strategy nor an zed the ROAD units' greater disper- ne as early as 1962 reflected the new operational plan to execute it was pre- sion and mobility. A major factor was interest. Counterinsurgency doctrine, sent. With exceptions, including the creation of the new mechanized in- fraught then as now with a difficult Cambodian incursion of spring 1970, fantry battalions mounted in the new vocabulary, tended to blend into the Vietnam War was fought almost Ml 13 APC. In the armored division, small-unit tactics, and it was never wholly at the tactical level. meen elements supported the advance distinctively or satisfactorily elabora- °f tank elements. In the mech divi- ted as such." As it happened, the The responsibility for the Vietnam sion, vice-versa. Tank doctrine was 1960s conflict in South Vietnam soon failure remains in debate. Was it mili- least affected by ROAD. Artillery graduated from counterinsurgency tarily obtuse political leadership was only slightly affected - it was concepts to larger conventional and geared to crisis-management and at- already mechanizing. The mechani- airmobile doctrinal measures. trition thinking? Or was it an insuffi- zed infantry dismounted to fight, but ciently assertive and perhaps doctrin- a new type of warfare was facilitated Airmobility was a major doctrinal ally unprepared military leadership development of the 1960s which to- that all too easily adopted and prose- cuted the attrition principle? What- 24 day has yet to achieve its revolutiona- Doughty, Tactical Doctrine 1946-1976, ry potential. It developed out of the ever the answers, the outstanding PP. 19-25. 1950s doctrinal ideas of Major Ge- doctrinal fact and lesson was the ab- 25 Ibid., pp. 25-27. nerals James Gavin and Hamilton sence of a strategy to destroy the ene- 26 See Lt. Gen. John J. Tolson, Air- nobility: 1961-1971, Vietnam Studies Se- Howze and others. Tests indicated the my's center of gravity, and an opera- ries (Washington, D.C.: Department of the potential of helicopters for a promi- tional vision to execute that strategy. Army, 1973) for an account of the deve- sing range of combat functions. Con- Tactical victories flowed into no cam- 'opment of the airmobility concept and its cepts for using helicopters in conjunc- paign aim. They were blocks of num- execution in the Southeast Asia conflict. tion with ground forces led to the first bers in the pyramid of attrition.27

JRG165 10-96 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 441 While America's misconceived attri- effective. Heavy reliance on artillery American Army in the 20th century. tion strategy foreclosed the very ope- fire-bases contributed to emergence DePuy presented a conception of how rational planning necessary to win, of a „fire-base psychosis," i.e. infant- the elements of change that were the topography of Indochina - rice ry operating only within friendly artil- sorely needed after Vietnam went to- paddies, triple-canopy jungle, rugged lery range. Air Force ground support gether: weapons, training, leader mountains - conditioned the infantry- was effective and good. development, tactics and doctrine, airmobile war's tactical doctrine. Altogether, firepower was the domi- and force design. Much of what hè Larger-unit tactical operations, such nant characteristic, maneuver being fostered was in place or well in train as Junction City in early 1967, were limited tactically to find and fix. In- when hè left command in 1977. His less characteristics than area-blanke- fantry assault was deemphasized. successors would complete the work ting tactical actions featuring small- Yet, given the lack of strategy and in the next ten years. The key to chan- unit foot patrol and heliborne action. operational plan, massive firepower ge was a revised tactics and doctrine. Helicopters were ubiquitous, employ- probably saved lives; shock and ma- ed in all roles from vertical insertions neuver tactics to no determinate end Not the Vietnam War, however, but large and small to transportation, sup- would have cost even more.28 the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973, was ply, reconnaissance, air artillery, and the laboratory of modern armored the earliest precision guided munition battle in the 1970s. DePuy and his attack by attack helicopter - the latter, The American Army's assistants studied intensively this the final tactical- doctrine phase of a Doctrinal Renaissance short war that was so immensely combat developments experimenta- destructive of tanks and other major tion series originating at Fort Hunter The decade of the 1970s was a critical materiel systems. Featuring the lar- Liggett. period in the defense posture of the gest armor battles since World War II, United States. Even as a deteriorating the 1973 war had produced stark les- Airmobility and better Communica- American Army wracked by serious sons of the stunning advance in the tions also opened up a new stage in morale and drug problems withdrew tempo of battle and in the lethality of unit control, but also over-control, by from Vietnam, a significant expan- antitank, air defense, and other mo- large-unit commanders. Critics speak sion of Soviet military power was dern weaponry. The Mideast war also of a „company commander's war" reaching dangerously threatening le- made plain the essentiality of better and of stacks of helicopters rotating in vels in central Europe, soon to be ac- suppressive tactics, use of terrain, and a vertical chain of command above companied by Soviet power moves combined arms coordination. DePuy the small unit fray. elsewhere. Though the U.S. Army believed it necessary to modernize the Tactical operations were of several had made improvements in helicop- whole body of American tactical doc- types, including search and destroy, ters, antitank weaponry, rocket-assis- trine and training literature to incor- and clearing operations to destroy ted artillery, and other equipment, porate those lessons.2' enemy support bases. Attrition was those improvements were dwarted by TRADOC under DePuy produced a the approach, not holding ground. the Soviet modernization and buildup new edition of the Army's basic war Commanders employed the tactical of those years. U.S. leaders spoke of fighting doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, sequence of find and fix by the infant- a lost generation of modernization du- Operations, in 1976, the first stage in ry, fight and finish by artillery and air, ring the preoccupation with Vietnam. a post-Vietnam revival of doctrinal a tactics of „pile-on". On some terrain Set in motion by Army Chief of S taf f thinking. The new doctrine focused and in absence of effective antitank General Creighton Abrams was a ma- specifically on the critical NATO weapons, mechanized forces were jor modernization and reform effort theater and on the new weapon tech- that would encompass all elements of nology so emphatically demonstrated the Army. An important functional in the Mideast War. It confronted di- 27 See Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., On realignment in 1973 united the Ar- rectly the prime strategie problem the Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Viet- my's combat, doctrine, and training U.S. Army faced: a U.S. force quanti- nam War (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, developments functions into a single tatively inferior in men and equip- 1982) for a vigorous and intluential ana- training and school establishment: the ment on an armor-dominated Euro- lysis of the American strategie defeat Training and Doctrine Command at pean battlefield. The 1976 doctrine based on failure to apply the classic prin- Fort Monroe. General William De- stressed the commander's substitution ciples of war. 28 Puy, the first TRADOC commander, of firepower for maneuver, and the Doughty, Tactical Doctrine 1946-1976, pp. 29-40. was a decorated combat veteran of potential of U.S. weapons to concen- 2* John L. Romjue, From Active Defence World War II and commander of the trate combat power to decisively alter to AirLand Battle: The Develoment of Ist Infantry Division in Vietnam. De- force ratios. A highly-active defense Army Doctrine 1973-1982 (Ft. Monroe, Puy was a determined reformer who characterized the requirement to Va.: HQ TRADOC History Office, 1984), attained reputation as one of the most move forces rapidly from battle posi- pp. 3-4. influential military figures in the tion to battle position, in concentra-

442 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 165 10-96 tion tactics calculated to force the V Corps in Germany, brought a sharp concerted AirLand operation of coor- enemy to vulnerable positions. The appreciation of the force and depth of dinated airpower and ground forces. Active Defense was like the „fight the Soviet follow-on echelons. An updating in 1986 expanded the and roll" tactics of Korea, but now Regardless of how the major corps clarifying idea of the operational level against armor-mechanized forces, and battle on the forward line went, the of war, put into better balance the was similar to Vietnam's „pile-on" enemy's unimpeded follow-on eche- offense and defense, and highlighted tactics. No new attack doctrine was lons would roll over the Active the synchronization of the close, advanced; envelopment was prefer- Defense by sheer force of numbers. deep, and rear battles. With the resto- red.TO Starry's analysts suggested the requi- ration of American strategie perspec- The 1970s Active Defense doctrine rement to fight a separate deep battle tive in the early 1980s, AirLand stirred wide debate. Critics found in it simultaneously with the close-in bat- Battle provided the conceptual basis many flaws. It overemphasized fire- tle. U.S. forces could delay and dis- for an Army reassuming an explicitly power over maneuver. lts concentra- rupt the enemy's echeloned line-up initiative- oriented readiness. The tion tactics posed unacceptable risks and throw off his timetable. General doctrine reforms were the symbol and to flanks and front. The perception Starry's doctrine deputy, Brig. Gen. basis of the 1970s and 1980s moder- was widespread that U.S. doctrine Don Morelli, a small but tough nization of the American Army.'2 The had veered too far toward firepower- American of Italian descent given to 1980s saw, collaterally, the rebirth of attrition." colorful speech, described it this way: light-forces organization and doctri- By the late-1970s, a sharp evolution „You grab the enemy by the neck ne, as well as doctrine for heavy-light had set in that led to a second stage of while you're kicking his ass." employment. doctrinal reform. The doctrine of Further thinking was prompted by AirLand Battle, developed by TRA- Army Chief of Staff General Edward DOC General Donn Starry, came out C. Meyer, who pointed to global con- Doctrine for of the Active Defense debate, but also tingency needs in the 1980s beyond the post-Cold War arose from new concepts and con- NATO. Starry also visualized a more cerns. AirLand Battle was also the „integrated" battlefield—convention- Major shifts in American Army doc- product of the wider historical cur- al, and nuclear and chemical in extre- trine followed the world-changing rents of the time—the impact of the mity—as well as air-land integrated, a events of 1989-1991 that brought to a 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, battlefield of deeper dimension, on close the Cold War. The warming and the opening of the Iranian hosta- which integrated maneuver and fire superpower relations that had prece- ge crisis. Those events changed naive support was the rule, and extending ded 1989 had already begun the plan- perceptions in the Carter Admini- from the U.S. rear area forward and ning process for a general drawdown stration about the Soviet Union and deep into the enemy rear. of U.S. forces. Interrupted only by the an unstable third world and contribu- On this base, the AirLand Battle wri- Gulf War of 1990-1991, the U.S. Ar- ted to the election of the defense-min- ters formulated a broad doctrinal my entered a period of major adjust- ded Reagan Administration the follo- vision that extended beyond the phy- ment. wing year. sical dimension of battle and away In briefest summary, that change en- from a mechanistic approach, to the compassed a rapid strength reduction To sketch only briefly the develop- human and moral dimension of com- and reorientation from the substan- ment of the U.S. Army's AirLand bat. AirLand Battle emphasized ma- tially Europe-based and Europe- Battle doctrine: General Starry, co- neuver and the fundamentals of war, oriented Cold War force to a smaller ming to the task from command of the and distilled the tenets of depth, ini- „force projection" Army based pre- tiative, agility, and synchronization as ponderantly in the United States.33 the heart of doctrine. The basic idea, From total active strength of 780,000 . applicable to offense and defense, and 18 divisions at its peak in the (2) Doughty, Tactical Doctrine 1946- was to throw the enemy off balance 1980s, the American Army has cur- 1976, p. 46. with a powerful blow from an unex- rently reduced to 500,000, going to 10 11 Romjue, AirLand Battle, pp. 13-21 pected direction and to seize and divisions. * Ibid., pp. 23-66. retain the initiative. " For a summary of the major events of Accompanying these events and force 1989-1991 and their impact on the doc- Other significant ideas introduced in- reorientation was the train of U.S. and trinal mission of TRADOC, see John L. U.S.-allied military operations that Romjue, Susan Canedy, and Anne W. to American doctrine in 1982 were Chapman, Préparé the Artny for War: A the German Army principle of Auf- began in 1989: the intervention in Historical Overview of the Army Training tragstaktik, and the operational level Panama, the Gulf War, the Somalia and Doctrine Command 1973-1993 (Ft. of war. AirLand Battle emphasized relief operation, the actions in Haiti Monroe, Va.: HQ TRADOC Office of the maneuver and not only firepower. and Rwanda, and the American com- Command Historian, 1993), pp. 115-23. Air-land cooperation was fused into a mitment to join NATO partners in

JRG 165 10-96 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 443 Bosnia. This range of military actions dynamics was presented. The leading draw the enemy into exposed posi- - a swift unilateral coup de main; a idea was simultaneity of attack in tions, and area defense were retai- major coalition war to protect world depth by tactical, operational, and ned.34 oil supply; multinational humanita- strategic-ranged means and systems Still further ahead lies a potential new rian missions, and missions to halt the to paralyze and destroy the enemy central idea - whether it will trans- 20th century's newest genocides, with overwhelming force. eend the tactical to the operational re- were a dramatic demonstration of the mains to be seen. That is the Force greatly altered, still indeterminate Was the doctrine of overwhelming XXI concept of a „digitized battle- strategie era at hand. power also overweening? Was it but a field," whose units operate from real- deeper-dimensioned version of Ame- time situational awareness of friendly The American Army's first doctrinal rica's traditional power-strategy, the and enemy components. response to the new strategie era head-on application of attrition po- came in a new Operations edition in wer? The doctrine stressed overwhel- 1993. Developed over the previous ming power, but not head-on attritive Indications two years by TRADOC commander power. Simultaneous attack in depth General Frederick Franks, it was the was not grinding attrition, but a si- To sum up and to hazard some indica- Army's first doctrine tbr the post- multaneity of force application that tions and conclusions: Cold War. General Franks' influence made full use of maneuver and fire- was primary. Franks had led the U.S. power, and that transcended the levels Policy and strategy: Dramatic shifts VII Corps deployment from Germany of war and introduced time as a new have characterized U.S. Army doctri- and had directed the maneuver of that battle dimension. And yet, one may ne since the inter-world war period. five-division corps (including the ask how universal in application is the War strategy or national policy has British Ist Armored Division) in the central idea of simultaneous attack in determined and shaped the change in ground war of February 1991. His depth, and how sustainable in the every instance. A corollary is true. impressions of a new dynamic of war, long haul? How long will strategie The global strategie imperative of the as revealed in leading-edge weaponry circumstance certify this doctrine's United States in the 20th century has and the operational experience, de- short-war assumptions? presented Army doctrine with an cisively shaped the 1993 doctrine. In other changes, battle command re- insoluble but unavoidable dilemma. Franks saw that war as both valida- placed the familiar concept of com- American national policy and strate- ting, and rendering obsolete, AirLand mand and control, or C2. Battle com- gy have placed before the Army ran- Battle. mand was an art exercised by the ges of security situations that its doc- commander and not a technology-dri- trine could not anticipate and meet Current American Army doctrine has ven function. The new central notion much of the time. This dilemma sug- been widely briefed. Just to note es- of battle space added, to the comman- gests the need not only for the most sentials: future warfare would be joint der's extended and flexible physical versatile of doctrines, but for a sustai- warfare, likely combined/coalition picture, an imagination-stretching in- ned Army institutional cultivation of warfare as well. A second shift was grediënt. Also emphasized were criti- an objective strategie sense in which away from a primarily forward-de- cal early-entry deployment doctrine, to root its doctrine. ployed, forward-supporting stance to and a more flexible „split-based" lo- a global force-projection readiness gistics. The addition of the tenet of The circumstance of war has had and the strategie sphere. A third chan- operational and strategie versatility decidedly mixed impact on doctrine: ge was the extension of fundamental was significant. Also important was World War II had the very fullest Army doctrine to non-war operations revision of the principle of mass to impact, both in the two-year respite in which it could increasingly expect signify the massing of the effects of before U.S. entry, and in the school of to be involved: peacekeeping tasks, combat power, rather than massing of war troughout its course. The Korean disaster relief, humanitarian assistan- large formations. Doctrine allowed War affected doctrine little; its princi- ce, and so forth, termed collectively, for critical post-conflict activities, pal consequence was to encourage operations other than war. such fts the security and relief opera- attrition solutions. The Vietnam expe- War fighting remained, undiluted, the tions in the postwar „no-fly" zones of rience yielded contributions to airmo- core of doctrine. But a changed battle Iraq. bile and attack helicopter tactics, but the valuable doctrinal lesson of Viet- Tactically, the notions and principles nam was the negative lesson: the self- 11 (1) Romjue, Canedy, and Chapman, Préparé the Army for War, pp. 144-46. of AirLand Battle (sans designator) attrition that results from a limited (2) John L. Romjue, American Army were kept with little change, and the tactical-war vision. The 1973 Arab- Doctrine for the Post-Cold War, TRA- offense remained „the decisive form Israeli War was of fundamental con- DOC Historical Monograph (draft), of war," with flanking the preferred sequence in the lessons that were Chapter V. movement. Both mobile defense, to drawn from it. The Gulf War's sugge-

444 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG 165 10-96 stion of a technological revolution in and 1990s is impregnated with the priority have tended to make firepo- warfare and a new time dimension fundamental conception of Sun Tzu. wer preeminent in the doctrine of its shifted doctrine profoundly. J.F.C. Fuller's Principles of War fra- Army. The American doctrinal record mework has been doctrinally well- in most of this century is a story of Technology has unquestionably been honored. Liddell-Hart's indirect ap- firepower dominance. Paradoxically, of first significance. Major materiel proach, John Keegan's writings on firepower dominance, by discoura- innovations transrbrmed and domina- the human side of war, and more ging the maneuver solutions of opera- ted American tactical and operational recently, Paddy Griffith and the tional art, had high-casualty results. doctrines from the 1930s on, from notion of a technologically-conditio- Tactically adept, the American Army motorization and mechanization to ned empty battlefield have been influ- operationally was negligent in most tactical nuclear technology to deep ential. of its 20th century wars. That weak- battle systems. The United States' ness owed foremost to the missing technological proficiency and pro- Finally, the doctrinal influence of the link of the operational level - a recur- duction richness fostered doctrines fathers of 20th century American ring gap in basic U.S. Army doctrine weighted to firepower, though stri- Army doctrine. We must note here until the 1980s. king exceptions are present: Mac- the long reach of Ulysses S. Grant, Arthur, Patton, AirLand Battle. It is the hard and persevering attrition At the end of the 20th century, Ame- also true that the industrial wealth that master; the armor doctrine develop- rican doctrine is clear about war's translated into mobility and mechani- ment of Adna Chaffee and George interdependent levels of action. Our zation did not nurture maneuver doc- Patton; the mixed contribution of doctrine has achieved at long last a trine equally. Lesley McNair; the operational ge- maneuver-firepower balance. It has nius of Douglas MacArthur, whose crystallized battle command and vi- Institutional mechanisms had signi- example stands to confound attrition sion as a dynamic element of battle. ficant impact on U.S. Army doctrine: advocates; the work of the airmobile American doctrine has outlined the The 1941 GHQ Maneuvers are an theorists, Hamilton Howze and others; emerging technological facet of war example that stands unique. The ato- William DePuy, the reformer of the and produced striking concepts to mic Army tests conveyed a powerful post-Vietnam Army, who raised doc- harness it. negative lesson. The llth Air Assault trine to a new prominence; Donn As the U.S. Army looks ahead, it tests were the most successful examp- Starry, the deep-battle advocate and must forever push the technology en- le of in-division doctrine develop- restorer of operational vision and velope and must tirelessly develop the ment. maneuver. Frederick Franks and the concept-technology mix into new revolutionary doctrine of deep-di- doctrine. But our doctrine must also Doctrinal theory. Only Clausewitz mensional simultaneous attack. spurn technology's attrition tempta- has been of first-order influence on tion. Friction will be alive and well on American doctrine, and primarily in America's industrial might, technolo- the battlefields of the 21st recent decades. Doctrine in the 1980s gical advantage, and lives-sparing century.

JRG 165 10-96 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 445