H-1478J
PROVISION or ENLISTED REPLACEMENTS
ARMY GROUND FORCES STUDY
USA CGSC LIBRARY I • PROVISION OF ENLISTED REPLACEMENTS
Study No. 7
1478x
Historical Section . Army Ground Forces
1946
V 194P
UNO! ASSURED - V - f - t r * *• tf * * 4 *• 1 ? I i The Army Ground Forces
PROVISION OF ENLISTED REPLACEMENTS
Study No. 7
By
Major William R. Keast
Historical Section - Army Ground Forces
1946
v i:1 /\
HEADQUARTERS ARMY GROUND FORCES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
314.7(1 Sept 1946)GNHIS 1 September 19^5
SUBJECT: Studies in the History of Army Ground Forces
TO: All Interested Agencies
1. The history of the Array Ground Forces as a command was prepared during the course of the war and completed immediately thereafter. The studies prepared in Headquarters Army Ground Forces , were written "by professional historians, three of whom served as commissioned officers, and one as a civilian. The histories of the subordinate commands were prepared by historical officers, who except in Second Army, acted as such in addition to other duties.
2. From-the first, the history was designed primarily for the Army. Its object is to give an account of what was done from the point of view of the command preparing the history, including a candid, and factual account of difficulties, mistakes recognized as such, the means "by which, in the opinion of those concerned, they might have been avoided, the measures used to overcome them, and the effectiveness of such measures. The history is not intended to be laudatory.
3. The history of the Army G-round Forces is composed of monographs on the subjects selected, and of two volumes in which an overall history is presented. A separate volume is devoted to the activities of each of the major subordinate commands.
b. In order that the studies may be made available to interested agencies at the earliest possible date, they are, being reproduced and distributed in manuscript form. As such they must be regarded as drafts, subject to final editing and revision. Persons finding errors of fact or important omissions are encouraged to communicate with the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Attention: Historical Section, in order that corrections may be made prior to publication in printed form by the War Department.
BY COMMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS:
rj. L. TARR Colonel, AGD 1 Incl: Acting Ground Adj General Historical Study
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PROVISION OF ENLISTED REPLACEMENTS
Page
Importance of the Replacement Problem 1
Initial Organization of the Army Ground Forces with Respect to Replacements 2
Functioning of the Replacement System in 19^2 4
Administrative Changes, January-March 19^3 6
The Question of the Quality of Overseas Replacements 7
Changes in Training - 19^3 8
Changes in Administration - 19^3 . . 9
Apportionment of RTC Capacity "by Armj and. Specialty - 19^3 11
The Quantitative Crisis of the Fall of 19^3 14
Questions Raised "by the Severity of Infantry Combat 16
The Great Overturn: Exchange of Personnel within AGF - 19^4 18
The Six-Months Training Policy , 19 The 18-Year-Old Policy . 20 Effects of the Overturn 22
The Problem of Numbers in 19^4 • ' • 23
The Crisis of December 19^4 28
Further Questions Raised by the Severity of Infantry Combat ...... 32
An AO* Review of the Replacement Problem 3^
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PROVISION OF ENLISTED REPLACEMENTS
Importance of the Replacement Problem
Mobilization of units has "been treated in Study No. b of the present series, The continuing value and usability of units depended entirely on their receiving replace ments, in adequate numbers and properly trained, to maintain them at authorized strength. As noted in Study No. 9, units were organized with the minimum of personnel necessary for normal conditions. Tables of'organization, especially as revised down ward in 19^3, provided virtually no reserve of personnel within units. For maintenance of efficiency, every individual lost by a unit had to be immediately replaced. The theory of tactical organization in World War II presupposed a continuing stream of re placements, and hence a large non-tactical establishment in which individual replace ments were trained In the necessary jobs and delivered when and where needed to units requiring them.
In World War I, as has been noted in Study No. *+, the replacement system was never developed to the point where all mobilized units could be maintained. It had been nec essary to skeletonize eleven divisions in France. The need of an adequate replacement system was one of the lessons drawn from World War I. For World War II a large re placement training program was therefore projected from the beginning. It proved in adequate to meet the demands for combat replacements. The output of replacement train ing centers was supplemented by conversion and retraining as combat replacements oJ men from other branches. In general the only combat units which, once mobilized, were in activated to furnish replacements were certain tank destroyer and antiaircraft bat talions no longer necessary in 19^ to the prosecution of the war. Other combat units, which it has at first intended to mobilize, were dropped from the mobilization program and never activated. Thus requirements for personnel were held down, and the number of men available for training as replacements was correspondingly increased. Divisions . not ye"U committed were stripped to obtain loss replacements but were filled by various expedients before they had to be deployed. By such measures it was possible in the long run to maintain all divisions and their most necessary supporting units at or near table of organization strength. By the expedients adopted, the worst features of the replacements crisis of 1918 were avoided. But various crises arose in the handling of the replacements problem in World War II. These will be described in the following pages.
For convenience, the history of the replacements problem in World War II, as it developed prior to the end of the war in Europe, may be divided into two periods, In the first period, roughly 19^1-19^3, the replacement organization was shaped to the needs of mobilization. In the second period, beginning at an indefinite time in 19^3; It was shaped to the need for supplying overseas loss replacements. The transition be tween the two periods was gradual, running through the year 19^3 • Initially, the major problem of the second period was the quality of replacement training--whether replace ments received by overseas forces were properly trained. Thereafter, as combat inten sified at the close of 19^3 > the major problem became the quantity of replacements-- whether enough replacements were being sent overseas to enable units to continue in combat. By the close of the war in Europe (more precisely, by 30 April 19^5) approximately 2,500,000 enlisted men had been graduated from replacement training agencies of the combat arm--infantry, cavalry, field artillery, coast artillery, antiaircraft, armored, and tank destroyer. The reported actual enlisted strength of units of these arms at that time, counting only the pertinent elements within divisions, was approximately 1,650,000.2 For every two men in a unit, three had been trained in a replacement agency.
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It is evident that the training of replacements was one of the major activities of the Army Ground Forces .
The Initial Replacement Plan and its Abandonment
The pre-war mobilization plans of the War Department contemplated that replacement training centers should be an integral part of the mobilization process.3 Somewhat de layed by time necessary for construction, replacement training centers were opened in March 19^1> about six months after the launching of Selective Service. For the re mainder of 19^1 the recently inducted civilian received his basic training at a re- 4placement center. Tactical units filled their ranks with men basically trained at the centers. Free from having to give basic training themselves, tactical units concen trated on development of teams, from the company level up to the division, and on participation in field exercises and maneuvers, in which, in 19^1* whole corps and ^armies were engaged. The ground army at this time was in two parts. One part, the field forces, or tactically organized units, was under General Headquarters, of which Lt, Gen, Lesley J. McNair was chief of staff and virtually in command, command being formally vested in General Marshall, whose activity was concentrated elsewhere , GHQ supervised the train ing of tactical units. The other part consisted of replacemenx centers and schools, which were alike in that they trained not units but individuals, Each school was under the control of the Chief of its branch; each replacement training center was under the joint control of the Chief of its branch and the commander of the Corps Area in which it was located. The Adjutant General assigned graduates of replacement centers and schools to tactical units upon requisition. GHQ had no part in the process of keeping its field units filled to authorized strength. [ Late in 19^1 this distribution of functions was radically changed. The War De partment decided in December 19^1 that replacement training centers should not be expanded cojnmensurately with the expansion of the Arniy, and that newly activated divi sions and other units should receive their fillers (i.e., all initial personnel except cadre) directly from reception centers.^ Thus new units became centers of basic training. Older units, which, because well advanced in their training, would be dis commoded by receipt of untrained recruits, were to continue to fill their vancancies ^with graduates of replacement centers. In practice, older units in the following years j frequently received men directly from reception centers. In general, with capacity of j replacement centers closely restricted, units functioned as basic training centers and \ as replacement pools. Large units, such as divisions, found themselves training groups j of men at various levels at the same time. The unity of such organizations was broken; j they could not pass as units through the prescribed cycle of training. Training in \ teamwork and mutual support was impeded, and readiness of the unit for combat indefi- |nitely delayed. At the same time replacement training center output was often in- \ adequate to fill even urgent requisitions, so that trained units had to surrender 1 trained personnel on call, receiving in return (often in driblets) men fresh from re- l ception centers, A vicious circle of turnover and retraining was established. (See 1 studies No. k and 12.) In March 19^2, with the reorganization of the War Department, replacement training centers and schools came under the control of the newly established Army Ground Forces. Thus opened a new phase in what has been defined above as the first period in the history ,of the replacement problem. Initial Organization of the Army Ground Forces with Respect to Replacements
With the reorganization of 9 March 19^2 the Army Ground Forces carried over from its predecessor, GHQ, the responsibility for training tactical units, and took over from the chiefs of the combatant arms, whose offices were suspended, responsibility for
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RESTRICTED RESTRICTED the training of individuals in the replacement centers and schools of the several arms. School and replacement training in the service "branches passed under the Services of Supply, later redesignated the Army Service Forces. Many units of the services, "both non-divisional and within divisions, were activated and trained by the Army Ground Forces. But training of replacements for these units was not controlled "by the Army Ground Forces.
The responsibility of the Army Ground Forces for replacement training was largely delegated to a Replacement and School Command, provided for in the reorganization of March 19^2 as a headquarters directly subordinate to Headquarters Army Ground Forces. Maj. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges, Chief of Infantry when that office was suspended, "became the first commanding general of the Replacement and School Command. Personnel from the offices of the four eliminated chiefs--Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artil-. lery—was distributed between the headquarters of the Army Ground Forces, the head quarters of the Replacement and School Command at Birmingham, Alabama, and the head quarters of the Antiaircraft Command at Richmond, Virginia. The Replacement and School Command controlled the replacement centers and schools of the four basic arms.
The office of Chief of the Armored Force underwent no internal change in the re organization of 9 March 19^-2. Formerly the Chief of the Armored Force had been under GHQ, for tactical training, directly under the War Department for those functions in which he resembled the chief of a legally authorized arm. In both kinds of functions the Armored Force was now subordinated to the Army Ground Forces. The Armored Force replacement center and school remained under the immediate command of the Chief of the Armored Force at Fort Khox, Kentucky.
The reorganization created an Antiaircraft Command directly subordinate to the Army Ground Forces. The new command was formed of elements of the Coast Artillery, in which antiaircraft developments had been concentrated. Training of seacoast defense personnel in the Coast Artillery Corps was placed under the Replacement and School Command, By 19^2 Antiaircraft personnel had become the largest component in the Coast Artillery Corps, and its training, involving a service school, officer candidate school, numerous replacement centers, and unit training centers in addition, was placed under the commanding general of the Antiaircraft Command at Richmond, Virginia.
Late in 19^2 a replacement training center and an officer candidate school were added to the Tank Destroyer Center. For reasons explained in Study No. 9> these ele ments of the Tank Destroyer establishment were made subordinate to the Replacement and School Command, operating through the commanding general of the Tank Destroyer Center.
The Army Ground Forces therefore conducted individual training in effect in seven "arms," although by law the armored, antiaircraft and tank destroyer organizations could not be recognized as such. To supervise these seven arms, AGF headquarters acted through three subordinate agencies, the Replacement and School Command, the Antiair craft Command, and the Armored Force. The Replacement and School Command controlled individual training in five arms, in the four "basic arms" directly, in the Tank Destroyer installations indirectly through the commander of the Tank Destroyer Center. When the Armored Force was reorganized, emerging as the Armored Center in February 19^4, its replacement center (and school) passed to the control of the Replacement and School Command. Thereafter that command conducted all replacement training except antiaircraft, which remained separate under the Antiaircraft Command.
What the Army Ground Forces took over in March 19^2, with respect to replacements, was essentially what the chiefs of the arms had exercised—i.e., authority over the .conduct of training. The War Department announced, on 18 March 19^2, that policies and procedures concerning replacements remained unchanged by the reorganization pf 9 March.5 The War Department retained authority over the number of replacements to be
- 3 - RESTRICTED RESTRICTED trained, i.e., oyer the capacity of replacement training centers. This was essentially a troop "basis matter, involving higher policies of allocation of manpower within the Army. It was the fundamental question in any replacement pro grain, since the success of such a program, the keeping of units at 'T/o strength, depended on the ratio "between number of replacements available and authorized strength of units. Procedures of as signment to and from replacement centers remained unchanged -until March 19^3. The Adjutant General continued in 19^2 to keep replacement training centers filled to ca pacities prescribed by the War Department, by assignment of inductees from reception centers; and to assign graduates of the centers to units and other installations, ac cording to priorities set by the War Department, Units having the necessary priority requisitioned directly on The Adjutant General, except that armored units requisitioned on the Chief of the Armored Force, who, like the commanding general of the Army Air Forces, in qonsequence of an independence won .In 19^1> controlled the disposition of RTC graduates in his arm.
Absorbed in 19^2 in the activation and training of units, especially in the pro gram for infantry divisions, and carrying over the interests and traditions of GHQ, which had concentrated on tactical training, the headquarters of the Army Ground Forces did not at first give much of its attention to the matter of replacements. Supervision of the centers was willingly delegated to the Replacement and School Command and other commands concerned. Officers from AGF headquarters rarely inspected the centers or visited the Replacement and School-Command in 19^2.^ Replacement training proceeded under the impetus given it in 19^1 under the chiefs of the arms.
The Army Ground Forces sought no authority over administrative aspects of the re placement system. Shortly after the reorganization the War Department directed the Army Ground Forces to submit monthly estimates of requirements for .personnel,7 General McNair believed this to overlap functions already performed adequately by War Depart ment agencies. "The Army Ground Forces," it was stated to the War Department on 28 March 19^2, "is primarily a training organization and Its requirements for personnel are limited solely to*those for units to be activated. The actual replacement require ment is limited to that necessary to replace deceased personnel, an almost negligible requirement."S Because of turnover within units mentioned above, the statement In this second sentence proved not to be a correct forecast. But on the ground that the War Department already knew what units were to be activated, and that consolidated esti mates by the Army Ground Forces would therefore be a duplication of effort, the War De partment rescinded its directive that the Army Ground Forces should submit estimates.9
In the supply of overseas replacements the view taken by the Army Ground Forces in 19^2 was that it was the business of the Ground Forces to produce them (i.e., train them), but that their movement to theaters of operations was a function of the Services of Supply.^ Establishment of overseas replacement depots in the United States, for the assembling, temporary storage and final checking of replacements, pending requisi tions from overseas- or availability of shipping, had long been foreseen as necessary by the War Department. The Army Ground Forces insisted in 19^2 that such depots be operated by the Services of Supply. Though the Services of Supply was directed by the War Department in April 19^2 to create two such depots,H one on each coast, none was actually set up until January 19^3•
Functioning of the Replacement System in 19^2
Except for the training of replacements in AGF replacement training centers, treated in Study No. 31 of this series, replacement matters therefore remained in the hands of the War Department. Replacement policy, as has been noted above, was pri marily geared in 19^2 to needs of mobilization. That is, of the total number of re placements to be trained, the proportion to be trained in each arm or service, and in individual, jobs within each arm or service, corresponded not to probable casualties in
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RESTRICTED RESTRICTED various "branches and. various jobs, tut to requirements for the activation of new units, Filling of initial vacancies in units, not replacement of losses, guided, the apportion ment of RTC capacities. Hence, in 19^2, the Quartermaster Corps had as large a ca pacity in replacement training centers as the Field Artillery, the Signal Corps a larger capacity than the Armored Force, the Medical Department half as large a capacity as the Infantry. In the infantry the num"ber of replacements trained as riflemen, cooks and clerks corresponded to the number of men in each of these jobs called for in T/0fs of infantry units, without allowance for the fact that the casualty rate among riflemen would "be higher than among cooks.^
This system was well adapted to the early phase of mobilization, and to a policy under which all fillers received "by units should have had "basic training in replacement centers. It was modified "by the decisions of December 19^1> which provided that re placement training centers should not be expanded commensurately with the Army, and that units should receive fillers direct from reception centers. With RTC output no longer sufficient to fill all the mobilization requirements of units, and with the consequent establishment of priorities in assignment of RTC graduates, it was decided that units overseas or alerted for overseas movement should have high priority in obtaining RTC- trained personnel. . Units forming in the United States were to receive RTC-trained men in proportion as they were available in each arm or service after requisitions of higher priority had been filled. ' . In the number of RTC-trained men that new units could receive under these circum stances the arms and services varied greatly. The War Department announced-in July 19^2 that new armored, engineer, infantry and military police units could expect to. re ceive no RTC-trained men. But new ordnance units could expect to receive 36.1$ of per sonnel in the form of RTC-trained men, new quartermaster units new signal units U8.2The principle was adopted that service units, requiring more technically trained men than combat units, should receive a higher proportion of fillers already branch trained than should units of the combat arms. The War Department adhered to this principle when, on 28 July 19^2, it authorized an addition of 50,000 to the total capacity of all replacement training centers in 19^-3 • Although most of the 5^*000 was allocated to infantry centers and to the armored center, since existing capacities in these arms were insufficient even for high-priority requirements, soiae was allotted to medical, engineer and military police centers, on the general principle that these branches should be brought more nearly into line with the other services.^-3 Replacement centers in the combatant arms--those under the Army Ground Forces-- were therefore intended in 19^2 to fill loss requirements primarily, I.e., vacancies in overseas units, in alerted units, or in cadres or other training installations nec essary to expansion. Loss requirements in 19^2, even in overseas units, were generally due to non-battle causes, and tended to occur in all Jobs and all arms and services alike. Therefore the fact that proportions of men trained in various arms and various jobs bore no relation to casualties, having originated in mobilization requirements, caused no particular difficulty in 19^2, though it was to do so in 19^3. The main dif ficulty was that replacements were not numerous .enough even for high-priority purposes. It is a paradoxical fact that AO1 RTC output was insufficient even for high pri ority requirements in 19^-2, although AGS1 replacement training centers actually gradu ated more men in 19^2, when virtually no battle losses had to be replaced, than in 19^3.^ High priority requirements in 19^2 included the needs not only of overseas and alerted units, but also, as noted, the needs of schools, and requirements for cadres, and RTC trainer personnel. Until September 19^-2, when a 15# overstrength was granted to parent units, Ground Force units furnishing cadres were' authorized to return to their T/O strength by drawing men from replacement training centers. Cadre require ments were very heavy in this period of rapid expansion.' Units alerted in the summer of 19*1-2 for the projected cross-channel invasion of 19^-3 had to be filled with men already basically trained. Some of these units were subsequently de-alerted, but
- 5 - RESTRICTED* RESTRICTED meanwhile a requirement for RTC graduates had been set up. Units preparing for the North African landing had to "be filled. A replacement pool to "back, up this force was likewise created.
The number of RTC graduates available in the ground arms was further reduced by diversion of training facilities in the A® replacement training centers to other needs. With the rapid expansion of service units in 19^2 the output of ASF replacement training centers, though greater than that of AGS1 replacement training centers in pro portion to T/O requirements, was considered to be insufficient. To supply RTC-trained men to service units 16 battalions in infantry replacement training centers, 10 in field artillery and 2 in cavalry were converted to branch immaterial. Between July and October these 28 battalions produced 80,000 men for assignment to service units.^5 Meanwhile the War Department had begun to induct limited service men. The 28 RTC bat talions which had trained men for the services were therefore employed, until'early in 19^-3> to give basic training to limited service men. These were assigned on graduation to the defense commands, from which general service men were assigned in return to the Ground Forces.^
It is probable that the insufficiency of RTC graduates in 19^2 was aggravated by faults in administration, and by the absence of organized depots or pools. While no figures can be supplied, it is probable that RTC graduates if not requisitioned im mediately on graduation for high-priority purposes, were disposed of by assignment to any units that might need them, and that when high-priority requirements appeared, not timed with corresponding graduations at replacement training centers, they were filled by drawing on units as the only available sources.
On 28 July 19^2 the War Department directed the Army Ground Forces, when RTC out put was insufficient, to take overseas replacements from low-priority units in training.1? The Army Ground Forces was ordered to submit monthly lists of low-priority units, with an aggregate enlisted strength of at least 30,000. Activations at this time having proceeded faster than the induction rate, AGS' units were chronically under-* strength. (See Study No. 4.) They could hardly supply replacements without further impairing their situation. To fill units earmarked for Task Force A, intended, for North Africa, the Army Ground Forces depleted three divisions to below 50$ of their strength.1® To fill more earmarked units, "and to create a replacement pool, stripping of more units was in prospect. It was decided that, to avoid stripping divisions and other .units at random, two divisions along with certain smaller units of various arms should be designated as replacement pools. The 76th and 78th Divisions were desig nated.3-9 Receiving and temporarily storing RTC graduates pending requisitions, they acted for several months as depots or pools rather than as divisions in training. The raiding of other, units for replacements was for a time virtually stopped. Administrative Changes, January-March 19*1-5
On 9 November 19^2 the Army Ground Forces, noting that units functioning as pools could not train as units, again urged the establishment of zone-of-interior overseas replacement depots.20 It was still believed by the Army Ground Forces that they should be operated by the Services of Supply.21 Two were established in January 19^3* OIie at Shenango, Pennsylvania, another at Pittsburg, California, for the holding and process ing o'f overseas replacements in all arms and services except personnel of the Air Forces.22 JJI March the 76th and 78th Divisions reverted to normal training.23 The handling of overseas replacements seemed to be, but was not, settled. It was decided at this time to decentralize assignment procedures to the three major commands, effective 1 March 19^-3 • Henceforth the War Department allotted in ductees in bulk to the Army Ground Forces, specifying only how many should go to re placement centers. The Army Ground Forces notified The Adjutant General to which units
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RESTRICTED RESTRICTED or particular replacement centers inductees should, "be assigned within its over-all quota. In practice this constituted no great innovation. The main innovation was that the headquarters of the Army Ground Forces now assigned graduates of its replace ment centers and schools. AGF units henceforth requisitioned on the headquarters of the Army Ground Forces for personnel from all sources. To implement these new proce dures a Classification and Replacement Division was set up in the office of the Adjutant General of the Army Ground Forces. While all higher control remained with the War Department, the headquarters of the Army Ground Forces was now in a position to gather statistics, codify its needs, plan the distribution of its personnel resources, anticipate difficulties or crises, and recommend action to the War Department, The Classification and Replacement Division "became one of the most active and important elements of the headquarters, especially as the main work of the Army Ground Forces, with the progress of the war, shifted from the mobilization and training of new units to the maintenance of its own units at authorized strength, the economizing of man power "by accurate classification and assignment, and the provision of replacements to units in combat.
The- Question of the Quality of Overseas Replacements
Excepting the Philippine campaign of 19^-1-^2, in which losses could not "be re placed, United States Army forces first entered combat in fairly considerable numbers, and hence first obtained experience with battle replacements, with the North African operation launched in November 19^2. Complaints were received from North Africa that replacements were unsatisfactory. It was reported that men reached North Africa as combat replacements who had not had the prescribed thirteen weeks of basic training, or had never fired their primary weapons, or were improperly equipped, or were physically unfit, or were disciplinary cases unloaded by units in the United States. 5
The Army Ground Forces directed its observers in North Africa to look into the re placement situation. General McNair gave it his attention on his visit to Africa in April 19^3, as did officers of his staff who went with him. The conclusion reached at the AOT headquarters was that the supply of replacements- had been unsatisfactory, but that the fault lay not so much in the quality of training as in misconceptions of that training among officers in the theater, and in defects in administration both in the United States and in Africa. It was not fully understood by overseas commanders that replacement centers in the United States were obliged, in thirteen weeks, both to give basic military training and to train men for individual jobs, such as riflemen, anti-tank gunners, clerks and radio operators. Soldiers when- questioned in the theater often stated that they had had only three or four weeks of basic training, when in fact they had had the thirteen weeks prescribed by the War De partment, but had spent much time during the later weeks at their specialties.
Faults in administration lay mostly outside the jurisdiction of the Army Ground Forces, since the Army Ground Forces had in general assumed jurisdiction only over training. It was found that medical examination, issue of equipment and other process ing had in some cases been very cursory at the Shenango Replacement Depot and at staging areas through which replacements had passed before the depots were established. The experience of replacements en route was such as to destroy their morale and undo the effects of their training. Shipped without unit organization or strong command, they were passed mechanically from one agency to another--depot, port, transport and a series of temporary stations in the theater—often spending months between leaving their original organizations and assignment to a unit. In this period they became physically soft, their discipline slackened, and their rapidly acquired skills tended to bB forgotten. What the front-line unit received was not what the Army Ground Forces had produced.
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Assignment of replacements in the North African theater revealed other serious faults in administration. Some men were diverted from the replacement stream to form new units. It was estimated that "by May 19^3 17*000 men, mostly intended as combat re placements, had "been utilized for the activation of new service units, particularly quartermaster and military police.2° Tank replacements were assigned to infantry units. Individual job specialties were not respected in making assignments. Some com manders, eager to get the "best men available, were impatient of the aims and procedures of classification. "One division commander," wrote General McNair, "himself told me that when he needed replacements he went to the replacement depot and chose his men individually, regardless of arm or speciality, "based primarily on their appearance and actions--somewhat as one would "buy a horse."27 Misassignment of thirteen-week trainees, when much of their training had "been de voted to individual specialties, naturally filled positions with men who were "untrained." It was wasteful of training time and of human material. It was not al ways due to indifference or error, "but was frequently made necessary "by the fact that depots had a surplus of trainees in some specialties, and a shortage of trainees in other specialties, usually combat jobs such as infantry rifleman, for which the re quirement was heavy, Misassignment in this case showed that the number of replacements received, the timing of their arrival, and their distribution between arms and in dividual specialties were not correctly geared in Washington to actual theater needs.
Besides revealing, defects of administration, the conditions in North Africa threw doubt on the adequacy of replacement training. There had long been a school of thought in the Army which held that replacements should receive more than thirteen weeks of training, and that they should be trained, not in somewhat formless "centers," but in units resembling the units to which they would ultimately be assigned (see Study No. 31.) Some of General McNair fs staff officers recommended a lengthening of the training program.28 The Committee on Revision of the Military Program, which
Changes in Training - 19^-3 v
The fundamental question was thus raised of whether replacements should be trained in units (as in the German and British armies) or in special centers devoted to the production of individual soldiers. Overseas commanders wanted replacements as in dividuals; i.e., they preferred, instead of replacing a shattered battalion with a new battalion, to rebuild the old battalion with the required number of new officers and
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RESTRICTED RESTRICTED enlisted men. Not wanting to put new men over old, they preferred their enlisted re placements to "be privates and their officer replacement to "be second lieutenants. Training units, organized with personnel of grades appropriate to units, did not meet these requirements as well as replacement training centers, whose graduates were all privates, or officer replacement pools, in which officers of all grades were available, and especially new second lieutenants. In addition, overseas commanders, while wanting only privates as enlisted replacements, wanted men with specialist training. Spe cialists in units usually were not privates. To strip all privates from a unit, as had "been proposed, would not produce the necessary specialists. It would produce the men who, after months in a unit, had "been deemed least suited for.promotion. Replace ment centers were designed to furnish overseas commanders with men who were still privates on reaching the theater, "but who would include a normal number worthy of pro motion, and a normal distribution of the less highly skilled individual specialists.
On the length of the training required, General McNair believed that thirteen weeks should normally enable a private to join an established unit, discharge satis factorily the restricted functions of a private, and learn further soldiering from the more experienced men about him. Thirteen weeks represented more training than most American replacements had had in World War 1.31 It was obvious that more training would produce a better trained man. But the advantages of longer training had to be weighed against other considerations. The annual output of replacements depended on two things: the number in training at a given time, and the number of training cycles in a year. If the training cycle were lengthened, then either fewer replacements would be produced in a given period, such as a month or year, or else more men would hare to be kept in training at a given time. An increase In the number in training would in crease overhead in proportion. Given the fixed ceiling on manpower, it would reduce the number of men available for units. The constant need of economizing manpower made necessary the shortest replacement training-cycle consistent with military effectiveness.
The Army Ground Forces replied to G~3 the War Department on 25 June 19^3 •. Three plans for a six-month training cycle were offered and analyzed, but notr recom mended because expensive in manpower. The belief was expressed that difficulties had been mainly caused by misassignment, misuse of replacements in theaters, and other ad ministrative faults already being corrected, and that the existing training program (recently extended to fourteen weeks) was probably sufficient when properly carried out. In view of the situation, however, the Army Ground Forces recommended a seven- teen-week program, to be given in replacement training centers, and to Include small unit training. It was estimated that to maintain production, an Increase in replace ment training center capacity of 75,000 enlisted men would be required. Even with this increase all replacement training center graduates would be needed as replacements for overseas or alerted units—units In the United States, however advanced in their train ing, filling their losses direct from reception centers. The seventeen-week program was accepted by the War Department, and went into effect in August 19^3.3^ (See Study No. 31.)
Changes in Administration - 19^5
The headquarters of the Army Ground Forces, which in 19^2 had wished a minimum of administrative responsibilities with respect to replacements, progressively assumed such responsibilities in 19^3. The establishment of the Classification and Replacement Division, noted above, was an important step in this process.
Unqualified personnel, physically or otherwise deficient, had often slipped through the examining authorities and appeared as replacements overseas. The Overseas Replacement Depot at Shenango, Pennsylvania, in April 19^3* complained that replace ments sent to it had been inadequately screened by the AGF replacement training centers
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RESTRICTED RESTRICTED from which they came. The Army Ground Forces "believed the main trouble to lie, not in negligence at replacement training centers, -"but in divergence of medial opinion among the various doctors "by whom a replacement was examined in turn. There was a tendency for the interpretation of standards to "become stricter in proportion to nearness to combat. Men passed as physically qualified at a replacement training center might "be considered disqualified at a replacement depot. Men passed "by a replacement depot might "be judged unfit by medical officers in a theater. Opinion varied especially on dental and psychological fitness. It was known that some soldiers, to avoid overseas service, threw away dental appliances with which the Army had provided them. The Army Ground Forces recommended that dental requirements be clarified at a minimum level, namely, "ability to masticate the Army ration/' and that the term "mentally'1 be dropped from War Department Circular 85 (19^3), in which qualifications for overseas service were stated. Further amendment of Circular 85 was requested on 28 July. Specific rec- ommeniations of the Army Ground Forces were not followed, but clarification was achieved with the publication by the War Department, on 1 October 19^3> of "Preparation for Oversea Movement of Individual Replacementsknown for short as POR. This re mained the governing document on the subject, until quantitative demands in made it necessary to compromise the standards of physical quality,33
The Army Ground Forces, at first reluctantly, extended its responsibility* over movement of trained replacements. Reports on administration at Shenango revealed shocking cases of mismanagement and indiscipline.3^ Brigadier General A. R. Boiling, G-l AGS', with a party of Ground Force officers, visited the depot on 17 to 19 May , General Boiling had in the past strongly favored the operation of replacement depots by the Service Forces.35 After his visit he recommended that the depot be taken over by the Army Ground Forces.36 it was decided in conference at the War Department that the Army Service Forces should continue to operate Shenango as a replacement depot for the ASF branches, but that the Army Ground Forces should establish on each coast a depot of its own for overseas replacements in the combat arms .37
.Depots were therefore organized at Fort Meade, Maryland, and Fort Ord, California, with capacities of 18,000 and 8,000 replacements respectively. They were made imme diately subordinate to headquarters Army Ground Forces. Beginning operations in August 19*4-3; they certified that overseas replacements met medical requirements, had done qualification firing of their primary weapons, and otherwise conformed to what was soon known as POR. The depots reported individuals found deficient, with the names of re placement training centers (or^ units) from which such deficient individuals came. The Army Ground Forces thus obtained a check on the work of replacement centers. The depots also issued clothing and equipment as needed, gave inoculations, took blood types and otherwise processed the men in their charge. A training program was devised to prevent deterioration in discipline, morale and physical condition, and to prepare men psychologically for overseas duty. Such training had to be flexible, since men remained in the depots for variable and unpredictable lengths of time, subject to ship ments on seventy-two hours1 notice from port commanders. Men held in a depot over thirty days were reported to the Army Ground Forces for reassignment.3°
Improvement was soon noticeable in the quality of replacements in the ground arms, The Inspector General reported on 30 October 19^3 "that since the establishment of the depot at Ft. Meade, replacements reached the East Coast staging areas better equipped and clothed than before, and with more confidence and eagerness to go overseas, though a few had still not qualified with their primary weapons.39 Reports from Italy re ceived through the AGS' Board were in general favorable.^ The Fifth Army found that replacements were better than they had been in the Tunisian campaign, and that infantry replacements in particular were good, though some had inadequate knowledge of their weapons. Infantry replacements, by the time of the Fifth Army reports (November and December 19^3), had either benefited from the seventeen-week program in replacement centers, or (as will be seen below) had come from units well along in their training.
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That despite all efforts some lacked proficiency with their weapons may "be attributed to difficulties in the training and processing of certain types of specialists.
Over misassignment in the theaters it was difficult for the War Department, and impossible for the Army Ground Forces, to exercise any direct control. Yet misas- signment could instantly nullify the effects of all training, however thorough, and of all methods of overseas movement and delivery, however improved. General McNair "be lieved that the difficulty was fundamentally one of inadequate quantity, that misas- signment in the theaters was unavoidable so long as all possible replacements had to be thrown in indiscriminately to fill losses, and that it would decline when stockage of replacements in the. theaters reached a point where men could be held until needed in their own specialties.^"-*- It was not only a question of gross numbers of replacements in the theaters. The right number for each arm, and for each job in each arm, had to be supplied at the right time. The right number depended on the incidence of battle and non-battle losses; the right time depended on the course of operations. These could not be exactly predicted, but they had to be estimated six months in advance, since about that time elapsed between calls on Selective Service and receipt of re placements by units in the combat zone.
Apportionment of RTC Capacity by Arm and Specialty - 19^-5
In 19^2, as has been said, the apportionment of total ETC capacity among amis and services, and among individual jobs in each arm and service, had been based on needs for initial filling of units, not on anticipation of losses. When combat developed on a significant scale, after November 19^2, the requirement for loss replacements in the combat arms immediately mounted. Replacement needs in the services, except engineers and medical, were little affected by combat. In May 19^3 the War Department took steps to reorient the replacement centers more definitely toward the production of loss re placements, estimating that 655^000 replacements would be needed in the ground arms in 1944.® At a conference on 18 May, between representatives of G-3 WDGS, the Army Serv ice Forces and the Army Ground Forces, it was decided to reduce annual ASF replacement capacity by 1^0,000, and to increase ACF annual capacity by the same amount.^3 The two commands were instructed to determine the actual capacities *(number of men in training at a given time) required by each of their respective arms or services to pro duce the annual totals estimated as necessary for 19Mk Immediate compliance was im possible for the Ground Forces, since the actual capacity needed to produce a given number of replacements in a year depended entirely on the length of the training cycle, which was then in doubt.^ When the seventeen-week training program was adopted, the Army Ground Forces estimated that an actual capacity of 277*800 would be needed to meet requirements estimated by the War Department.^5 This represented an increase of about 75,000 over the capacity currently in effect. Instructions were issued on 25 July to the Replace ment and School Command, and to the Armored and Antiaircraft Commands, apportioning the new capacity to individual replacement centers of the various arms. It was then de cided that replacements returning from pre-embarkation furloughs should report directly to the new AO1 replacement depots instead of to the replacement training centers from which they came. Less housing was required at replacement centers, and the figure of 277,800 was cut by the War Department to 220,000.^6 Before corrective orders could be prepared for the field, the War Department produced new estimates adjusted to the revised Troop Basis of 1 July 19*4-3. The* new Troop Basis canceled ten divisions from the mobilization program. With fewer units for which to plan replacements, the War Department scaled down its earlier estimates, and on 23 August 19*1-3 prescribed an actual trainee strength of 203.000 for the AGS1 replacement centers. ASF centers were drastically reduced to 81,000.^7
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With a trainee strength of 203,000 (to "be in effect "by 1 February I9W-), the actual capacity set for AGF replacement training centers -was almost identical with the actual capacity in effect since the earlier part of 19^3 (see Table I). This capacity, since it turned over fewer times per year under a 17-week than under a 13-week cvcle, was capable of producing annually about 135,000 fewer replacements than before.^*® At the very time when ground operations began in Europe with the invasion of Sicily, and mounting casualties in the ground arms had consequently to be expected, manpower con ditions in the United States, were such that production of replacements in the ground arms was curtailed. The War Department, in its directive of 23 August, observed that replacement center graduates must be used only for loss replacements (not for new units), "to guard against a breakdown of the replacement system." At the same time, theaters were instructed, as a necessary measure of economy, not to carry over 5$ of their total strength in replacements A 9 Hence the growth of a reserve of replacements, prerequisite to accurate assignment, was held in check. Actually, in 19^-* the theaters built up concealed overstrengths of replacements ,5P Restrictions on total numbers made it the more important that distribution of out put between arms and jobs should conform as exactly as possible to the incidence of actual losses. The readjustment of AGF replacement training center capacities in the summer of 19^3; while not enlarging total AO1 capacity, changed the proportion among the arms to meet anticipated combat losses more closely. Infantry suffered the highest proportion of casualties. The proportion of AGF RTC trainees trained in infantry, formerly 37$> was projected in September 19^3 to reach 67$ by 1 February 19^+!(see Table I). But since no clear figures on actual casualties incurred to data by each arm were as yet available to the War Department, these projected capacities were subject to further change.
There remained the question of training the right number of man in individual spe cialties within each arm. As early as 12 March 19^-3 the Army Ground Forces, to clarify replacement planning, had requested the War Department to supply new requirements tables.51 These tables showed, for each arm, the number of enlisted men per 1000 re quired for each job according to specification serial numbers -- SSN's. The SSN rates in current tables followed T/0 requirements, making no allowance for casualties, since the system had been geared to needs of mobilization. Replacements were being trained in the various specialties, such as SSN 7^5 Rifleman and SSN 060 Cook, without regard to the fact that battle losses were far higher in some specialties than in others. According to the oversea replacement procedure as codified by the War Department on 26 March 19^-3> theater comdrs, in requisitioning enlisted replacements, normally spec- ified only the number required in each arm or service without regard to SSN!s.52 The WD, in filling the requisition, included specialists according to rates per 1000 based on T/Os. Riflemen and cooks were replaced on the same basis. If a theater comdr needed more or fewer replacements of certain SSNs than the tables prescribed, and if he knew his needs, he could specify SSN requirements in his requisition. Under this pro cedure, however, it was impossible to train the right .number of men- in the various SSNs in .advance.
The WD was unable to comply with the AGF request of 12 March to supply require ments tables. In June tables were provided for various theaters, but they still took no account of casualties. Gen. McNair believed them inadequate as a basis for guiding replacement' center training.53 On 26 July, in connection with planning the seventeen- week program, AGF again requested new requirements tables.5^ Tables for each theater were desired, and,a weighted consolidated table reflecting the total of overseas needs. Should these not be available, figures were requested on the casualties in infantry and armored divisions in Tunisia, broken down by am or service and by SSN, and on other aspects of the actual losses in North Africa/ It was learned from G-l WDGS that such figures were not iimnediately available.55
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Up to this time, AGFfs efforts had "been directed entirely at securing revisions of requirements tables which would reflect differential attrition ratios for the various specialties. In June 19^3 it was discovered that the preparation of realistic requirements tables, suitable as a basis for planning replacement training, presented another and more fundamental aspect. The crucial fact now noticed was that AGF re placement centers did not train men in all the specialties listed in unit T/Os. Hundreds of different specialties - SSNs - occurred in the T/Os of each arm. Only a small fraction of these - the most basic specialties - were trained by the RTGs. Current requirements tables listed all SSNs used in each arm, giving a percentage re quirement for each. Such tables, even if revised to include up-to-date estimates of casualty rates, would be almost useless in planning replacement training, because there would be no correspondence between the multifarious categories of demand and the re stricted categories of supply. One solution to the problem would have been to bring training into conformity with unit requirements, by instituting in the RTCs training in all specialties found in the tables of organization. For reasons set forth in Study No. 31, such complication of replacement training was undesirable and impracticable. The alternative was to bring requirements into conformity with the types of training being conducted^ by basing re quirement tables on the limited number of SSNs trained. This solution required a scheme of translation by which SSNs required overseas, but not trained in the RTCs, could be regarded as derivatives from the basic SSNs being trained. After much study, involving both a determination of what training was being conducted and an analysis of all T/Os to determine relationships among specialties, groupings of all SSNs of each arm were evolved. Around each basic SSN trained in RTCs were grouped all the other SSNs of the arm, not produced by RTC training, into which a man with the basic training could be expected to develop after appropriate on-the-job training and experience. Thus SSN 7^5, Rifleman, trained in the infantry RTCs, was parent to the following specialties: SSN 50^, Ammunition Handler SSN 607, Mortar Gunner 5O5, Ammunition NCO 651, Platoon Sergeant 521, Basic 652, Section Leader, Gun 566, Duty NCO 653, Squad Leader 585, First Sergeant 695j Orderly 590, Laborer 7^6, Automatic Rifleman 60k, Light Machine Gunner A demand for an orderly, SSN 695, or for an automatic rifleman, SSN 7^6, was, so far as the infantry training centers were concerned, a demand for a rifleman. Similar group ings were constructed for all other SSNs,
Preparation of these SSN groupings, or conversion tables, was carried out during June - September 19^3 by the Classification and Replacement Division, AGF, in collabo ration with representatives of The Adjutant General's Office. On 29 September Army Ground Forces requested new replacement requirement tables, to be based on the SSN groupings, which were now ready.5^ The Adjutant General!s Office declared itself willing to comply, but unable for want of personnel.57 Army Ground Forces detailed one captain, one warrant officer, and six enlisted men to compile data in the office of The Adjutant General.5° Preparation of requirements tables was now a relatively simple matter. Figures were available showing the rate per 1,000 at which men would be needed for each SSN in a combat arm. Adding together the separate rates for all SSNs in a group and the rate for the basic specialty gave the requirement per 1,000 for training in that basic specialty in the RTCs. • By the end of November new requirements tables for infantry were ready. These were soon followed by tables for the other ground arms.59 The machinery was established for planning replacement training in anticipa tion of future needs and in conformity with the training system in effect in the centers.
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In November 19^3 "the SSN groupings discussed above were published "by the War De partment as Circular 283, as a guide to commanders in requisitioning RTC-trained men to fill vacancies in their units.^0
By the end of 19^3; as a result of these measures, not only had the training of replacements been lengthened from 13 to 17 weeks and otherwise made more thorough, but- administrative changes had been introduced to assure that replacements arriving in the theaters should be properly qualified and ready for use, and be divided among arms and jobs in proportion to actual needs of the'theaters. It was hoped thai* they would therefore be assigned to positions for which they were trained. With the adoption of the measures described above, which would be fully in effect by the early months of replacement production in the ground arms may be said to have shifted from a basis of mobilization to a basis of overseas loss replacement requirements. Reports from Italy at the end of 19^-3 stated that replacements were generally satisfactory, ex cept for occasional defects, such as physical softness due to time in transit, which could be readily corrected overseas. It was believed at the headquarters of the Army Ground Forces, in January 19^> that the grounds for earlier complaints concerning overseas replacements had been removed, that replacements were being satisfactorily trained and processed, and that except possibly for the question of supply in adequate numbers the replacements issue was settled. This belief was destined to be abruptly upset.61
Those who held that replacements should have six months of training, including experience in tactically organized units, continued to urge their views. On 11 August 19^3> G-l WDGS suggested withdrawing 1,000 men from each of twenty or more divisions in the United States for overseas replacements, and using replacement center men to replenish these divisions.The Army Ground Forces repeated the arguments against such a system.°3 it was pointed out in addition that the number of men obtained in this way would be only a small fraction of all replacements required in the ground arms, and that divisions in the United States had already suffered from extreme turn over of personnel. G-l was converted; G-3 agreed with the Army Ground Forces.^ As a training policy, the depleting of divisions to obtain replacements was rejected. But what was rejected as a policy became necessary as an expedient. By January I9W- 26,000 infantrymen had been withdrawn by the Army Ground Forces from unalerted infantry divi sions, leaving most such divisions about 2,000 understrength ."5 This was necessary because the productive capacity of infantry replacement centers was insufficient. The Quantitative Crisis of the Fall of 19^3
It so happened that the acceleration of operations abroad, including the landing of the Seventh Army in Sicily in July 19^3 an& of the Fifth Army on the mainland of Italy in September, coincided with a severe crisis in the production of combat replace ments in the zone of the interior. Replacement training centers were unable to meet overseas demands, especially in infantry. This was only in part due to the fact that, with, extension of the training cycle without enlargement of capacities, monthly and annual output was reduced. The main causes of the immediate crisis were more transient.
With the lengthening of the training cycle first to Ik and then to 17 weeks, trainees already in the centers were held some weeks beyond the dates at which their graduation had been expected. Largely for this reason, monthly output of AGF replace ment training centers fell from kQ,000 in June and July 19^3 to 19,000 in August and September (see Table II, col. 5) • This temporary loss due to prolongation of the training of certain individuals must be distinguished from the more permanent loss due to extension of the cycle without increase of capacity. The latter, thougih more permanent in principle, could be, and was, made up by increases in capacity in 19^-. The former, or temporary loss, could never be made up.
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Another temporary condition reduced the volume of the replacement stream in Octo ber and November. The Army Ground Forces had been directed to give "basic military training to men who had qualified for the Army Specialized Training Program "before in duction, (See Study No. 5.) To give this training; facilities for JO,000 trainees were set aside at AGF replacement training centers in June and July 19^-3 • Less than a third of this number appeared as expected. Facilities for over 20,000 trainees in re placement training centers stood completely unused in July and August. Facilities for those ASTP candidates who appeared were used to produce men for assignment to colleges, and hence not available as replacements. Had it not bean for the requirements of the ASTP, 30,000 more men would have entered replacement training in June and July, and been available in October and November to replace battle losses in Italy, Since re conversion of facilities reserved for the ASTP at replacement centers was not completed until December, the net loss in replacements due to the ASTP was estimated, not at 30,000, "but at 1+5,000.66
Room also had to be made at the ETC'a in the fall of 19^3> about 8,000 R0TC students from the colleges, who on completing the ETC course went to officer candidate school, not into the stream of enlisted replacements. Hence 8,000 more potential re placements were lost,67
Not only was the capacity of replacement training centers not being full used to produce replacements, because of these needs of the ASTP and the R0TC, but only half the men entering training as replacements actually became available as replacements at the end of seventeen weeks, The attrition rate, which had always been high, reached 50$ in the second half of 19^3- This was the period of highest attrition in the whole history of the replacement training centers. For August 19^-3 the AGF replacement training centers reported their losses at 20,035* and the number of men available for shipment as replacements at only 19,004 (see Table II, cols. 5 and- 13)* The same ratio of losses to avallables held in September. "Losses'1 included all men not immediately available as replacements, whether lost to the Air or Service Forces, or lost by trans fer to service schools or to the ASTP, from which they might be expected to become available as replacement, but not until some months later.
The loss rare at replacement training centers went up in the latter half of 19^3 for several reasons. Many trainees of the highest intelligence were transferred to the ASTP. This loss of trainees was altogether distinct from the loss of training facili ties caused by ASTP requirements as described above: the facilities set aside had been intended for inductees already earmarked for ASTP and who did not enter the replacement stream: the losses referred to here were trainees who qualified for ASTP after their training as replacements had begun. Others went to the Air Forces as aviation cadets. The number discharged for medical reasons mounted rapidly in consequence of War Depart ment Circular l6l of July 19^3. (See Study No. 5.) Losses for all AGS1 replacement training centers were reported for September as follows (see Table II, cols. 6, J3-13): Officer candidate schools 1569 Enlisted specialist schools 17^9 Army Specialized Training Program 6648 Died or discharged 6332 Others 2123 lBTKl Since officer candidate schools in the ground arms at this time were operating at very reduced levels, "officer candidates" in the above tabulation referred largely to aviation cadets. "Enlisted Specialists" referred largely to parachute volunteers. "Died or discharged" referred almost entirely to discharged men, since few died. "Others" included men transferred to training overhead, etc. The ASTP was the main leak, especially for able-bodied general service men. The total of 18,441 losses equaled roughly half the monthly number of inductees then being assigned to replace ment training centers. It was not the total loss, for in addition about 10$ of
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RESTRICTED RESTRICTED the men reported as available by replacement training centers at this time were "being disqualified at the depots as not meeting the physical requirements for overseas service.
The War Department, which in August had warned against "a "breakdown of the re placement system,, " took action to control attrition in the replacement training centers. It was ordered that not over 5$ ETC graduates should "be sent to specialist schools.69 it was likewise ordered, in November 19^-3* that no trainees should "be transferred in the future from replacement centers to the Air Forces or the ASTP.70 This action was too late to he of much effect, for the ASTP was now recruited to nearly its full strength, and could he expected to maintain itself by earmarking men at recep tion centers; and the Air Forces, since 1 August, had recruited at the reception centers all men who desired to apply for flying training* The result of recruiting at reception centers was that, while losses to the Ground Forces declined, the quality of men received by the Ground Forces declined also. The same results occurred with re spect to physical quality. To stop the wholesale discharges which had followed Circu lar l6l the War Department issued Circular 293 (see Study No. 5). Discharges at re placement training centers for physical reasons became fewer, but the number of poor physical specimens trained as combat replacements correspondingly Increased.
It is difficult to say what constitutes a breakdown of a replacement system. If the purpose of a replacement system is to keep units in combat at full strength, with out having to deplete other units intended for combat later, then this purpose was not fulfilled in 19^3; an& the replacement system broke down. At least it broke down in the infantry. During the last six months of 19^-3 requirements for loss replacements In excess of the number available from replacement training centers were filled by with drawing trained infantrymen from tactical units of the Ground Forces. Nondivisional infantry regiments were broken up. About 26,000 men were taken from the infantry regi ments of divisions by January 19^. By February 35,2^9 ^een taken from combat units as overseas replacements, and 29,521 had been transferred from low priority units to fill vacancies in alerted units within the Army Ground Forces.71 Total net shortage of enlisted men in AGS1 units was 52,625 on 31 January 19^.72
Questions Raised by the Severity of Infantry Combat
As ground forces were increasingly committed to combat in 19^3 > both in Italy and in the Pacific, it became clear that despite all the apparatus of mechanized warfare the infantry foot soldier was having a difficult time. The burden placed on the in fantryman was if anything heavier than in World War I. Infantry divisions remained in contact with the enemy for prolonged periods without relief. In World War I the whole period of engagements of major American forces had not exceeded four months. The Fifth Army had been operating in Italy for four months by January 19^> at which time it seemed likely that the Italian campaign was still only in its initial stages. In January 19^ the Fifth Army, with a T/0 strength of 200,000, of which 77,000 was in divisions, had sustained 80,000 casualties. Only 2k% of these were battle losses, the remainder being cases of sickness, accident or exhaustion, induced in large measure by the gruelling conditions to which combat soldiers were subjected.73
The situation was well described by General Devers, shortly after he became senior United States commander in the North African theater. He wrote to General McNair on b February 19^:^ It has been demonstrated here that divisions should not be left in the line longer than 3° to 40 days In an active theater. If you do this, as has been done in this theater, everybody gets tired, then they get careless, and there a:ce tremendous sick rates and casualty rates. Everybody should know this. The result is that you feed replacements into a machine in the line, and it is like throwing
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good money after "bad. Your replacement system is bound to "break down, as it hati done in this theater. It should "be noted that the replacement system had not "broken down, in the full sense, The 80,000 casualties mentioned above had almost all been replaced; ^t-1,000 men had been returned to units from hospitals, 35^000 new replacements had been supplied.75 In saying that the system had broken down, General Devers apparently had in mind the idea that It was wasteful--that if divisions could be relieved after 30 or ^0 days casual ties would be fewer, fewer replacements would be needed, fewer seasoned men would be lost through carelessness or fatigue, and fewer unseasoned men, among whom the casu alty rate was high, would be constantly present in front line "units,
The solution suggested by General Devers, that enough divisions be kept in the theater to enable them to relieve each other every few weeks, was never feasible during the Italian campaign. Although in January 19^ 57 divisions remained in the United States, ten times as many as were operating in Italy, either they could not be shipped (demands of air and service forces and of aid to allies on shipping to the Mediter ranean being very high), or they had to be reserved for the forthcoming invasion of France or for operations in the Pacific. The number of divisions in Italy always re mained at a minimum, and they continued to be committed for prolonged periods.
A related problem was raised by General MacArthur in January 19^. He. reported that the infantry of divisions engaged in the Pacific were out more rapidly than other divisional elements, and that within the infantry the rifle companies were out more rapidly than headquarters, service, cannon or even heavy weapons companies, so that divisions had to be withdrawn, or at least became useless for offensive action, while- many of their elements were still capable of further effort. To prevent the waste of having these elements stand idle, General MacArthur suggested that something be done to heighten the staying power of infantry, Various possibilities were discussed in the War Department, including an increase in the strength of rifle companies, and the addi tion of a fourth rifle company to the battalion, a fourth battalion to the regiment, and a fourth regiment to the division. Hone of these was much favored, and General McNair was opposed to all of them. It was agreed that these additions, if made, would result in an occupation of wider frontages, not In provision of a reserve, so that the whole problem would remain as before, or would indeed be worse, since the ratio of artillery and other support to infantry would be less.76
Various palliatives were adopted. General McNair was at this time requesting re adjustments in classification procedures, by which more emphasis would be put on physical strength in assigning men to combat units and combat replacement centers. He pointed out that most losses were not direct battle casualties but were cases of sick ness or exhaustion, that such non-battle casualties (like battle casualties) were highest in the infantry, and that if the physically strongest men, with the greatest powers of endurance, were assigned to infantry the infantry casualty rate would decline.77 ge likewise urged that if more men in the higher intelligence groups could be, assigned to infantry than in the past, the alertness of soldiers and the quality of combat leaders would improve, with further saving of casualties.7^ Steps were in fact taken to raise the physical and mental quality of combat troops in 19^ (see Study No. 5); but these were of limited effectiveness, both because the Army was already mobi lized, and because most newly inducted men received by the Army in 19^ were assigned to the Army Ground Forces, so that selective assignment of inductees to combat posi tions was possible only within narrow limits.
Combat soldiers, other than fliers, were too scarce in active theaters to permit a general system of rotation. It was suggested that the strain might be relieved by the granting of periodic four-day passes to front line fighters, and by authorization of small overstrengths to make possible this program without loss of fighting strength. General McNair, while approving this idea, believed that "no method can be set up which
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RESTRICTED RESTRICTED will result In units retaining their fighting effectiveness after excessively long periods in line." Like other measures, this was a palliative, the only adequate cure "being to have larger reserves of combat units in the theaters.79
From the discussion of General MacArthur's problem one distant repercussion ensued. It was decided that units should have improved means of dropping hospitalized personnel from their rolls, so that they might requisition replacements ana fill their T/O strength with effective fighting men. To cover the increased number of men thus charged to hospitals, a large figure (ultimately '115/000) was set up in the troop "basis. To accommodate this figure within the ceiling set on Army strength,; tables of organization of all units except rifle companies were reduced "by 50$ of their basic privates. The net result was that fighting effectiveness of rifle units was somewhat easier to maintain, so long as qualified replacements were on hand in the theater."0
In general, though disadvantages were apparent in the system of maintaining units in action indefinitely through a continual stream of individual replacements, this was the system to which the War Department was committed. Reserves of inactive divisions were difficult to maintain overseas. Temporary unit replacement, with nondivisional infantry battalions or regiments substituting for hard-hit units within divisions, recommended by the Army Ground Forces early in 19^3; had been rejected by the War De partment as not feasible within troop basis limitations. ^ Nondivisional infantry units, fhr from being provided to furnish unit replacements, were steadily inactivated to provide individual replacements in 19^-3 an& 19^ • January and February 19^ G~3> WDGS, observed that use of nondivisional regiments to replace exhausted regiments In infantry divisions would conflict with "our national conceptions as to the sanctity our divisional organization," and that since the United States could deploy only a small number of divisions it was important that they be kept at fighting strength by "a sound and completely efficient replacement system in operation in all theaters."82
In short, the successful outcome of operations projected for 19^j which' it was hoped would be decisive in Europe, depended on the effective functioning of the in dividual replacement system already in effect."
The Great Overturn: Exchanges of Personnel within AGF
Provision of replacements by the Army Ground Forces in 19^ labored under two com plicating necessities: one, the need of obtaining them in sufficient numbers; the other, the need of exchanging them between replacement centers and units in consequence of personnel policies of the War Department. These two necessities are considered in the two sections which follow, the later being discussed first. These two problems arose at the same time and were dealt with concurrently. Their effects cannot usually be distinguished; a single trend, such as the stripping of divisions discussed below (pp 44-^5, 5^-55), must be regarded as the composite result of the interplay of changed personnel policies and of attempts to provide replacements in greater numbers. A degree of repetition is therefore unavoidable in the two sections which follow: it is believed to be justified by the clearer analysis of major policies which separate treatment permits.
The War Department, especially as the extreme severity of infantry combat became apparent, and under potential pressure from public opinion, was disinclined to use as combat replacements the men currently being inducted into the Army. In 19^4 half these men were only 18 years old; many of the remainder were older men with children, most of whom were known in the administrative language of the day as "Pre-Pearl Harbor fathers." It seemed unfair to send these men directly into combat after 17 weeks of training, as individual replacements going overseas without the moral support of be longing to an organized unit, while many men of the Intermediate age levels, or with out family responsibilities, having been inducted two or three years before, remained
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RESTRICTED RESTRICTED in units in the United States not scheduled for, immediate shipment. It was a question not only of fairness, "but of the military value of the men concerned. The majority of informed opinion seemed now to hold, at the beginning of 19^; that the 17-week ETC graduate was a competent soldier. But the opinion of commanders in the theaters was not unanimous on this point. It is probable that some commanders of'overseas combat units, contrasting their'slender resources with the 50-odd divisions still at home, and noting the youth and unavoidable inexperience of their replacements, looked with longing eyes on personnel in the undeployed field forces in the United States. The taking of replacements from tactical units had been thoroughly discussed in 19^3 • ^ had been rejected as a policy, though it had been resorted to as an expedient during the great underproduction of replacement training centers in the later months of 19^3•. The question of policy was reopened in December 19^+3; when General Eise.nhower, in a radio to the War Department, suggested for considerations, without urgently requesting, that replacements for his4 theater be obtained from divisions in the United States, rather than from replacement centers.®3
It was believed at the headquarters of the Army Ground Forces at this time, as noted above, that the replacements question was virtually settled. Although 26,000 men had been taken from divisions, it was thought that this was a temporary measure, and that the undeployed tactical forces and the replacement training system were to remain in principle altogether distinct. It therefore came as a bombshell, when, on 19 January 19^, the Office of the Chief of Staff directed the Army Ground Forces to prepare a plan by which all A® units not intended for early shipment should be used as a source of ' overseas replacements. By the plan as desired, overseas replacements were to be taken from men in units who had had nine months of training, and ETC gradu ates were to be used to fill the vacancies thus created In units.8^
General McNair showed that a nine-months plan as outlined, if adhered to as a con tinuing policy through 19^, would tie up in the United States, as purely training organizations, l6 infantry divisions according to War Department estimates of require ments for infantry replacements, or 26 infantry divisions according to AGF estimates, which at the moment were 50 The Six-Months Training Policy The War Department therefore ordered, on 26 February 19^-j that "the greatest practicable proportion of replacements" supplied for overseas service , in all "thB combatant ground arms should be obtained from units not on the Six Months List.^T Men taken were to have had at least six months' service, with those of longest service taken first. No 18-year-olds or Pre-Pearl Harbor fathers with less than six months training were to be shipped as overseas replacements as long as men were available from other sources. Men were to qualify for overseas service, not under POR, but under the less rigid standards of POM, which prescribed physical requirements for men going overseas as members of units . This relaxation of the replacement standard permitted the sending of somewhat increased numbers . The headquarters of the Army Ground Forces believed that this use of units in the United States, which in many cases amounted to stripping them, was unnecessary for - 19 - • RESTRICTED RESTRICTED military purposes. Major General H. F. Hazlett, Commanding General of the Replacement and School Command, returning from an overseas tour in March 19^4, reported that over seas commanders generally were satisfied with replacements coming directly from re placement training centers with 17 weeks of training. He stated that RTC graduates were satisfactory if they were assigned to positions for which they had "bsen trained; if the training and physical condition achieved at the replacement training center could "be maintained during transit, and if units receiving replacements could absorb them in a continuous small stream/ instead of having to take large numbers at irregu lar intervals. There i were. b till many cases? in the North African theater, General Hazlett reported, of misassignment "by arm and job, of diverting replacements to over head and service functions, of allowing them to deteriorate physically, and of pouring them into units in indigestible numbers a few days before the unit went into combat.88 It was felt at the headquarters of the Army Ground Forces that the real trouble con tinued to lie in these administrative defects and that therefore the stripping of AGF units to provide six-months-trained replacements was not necessary or relevant.^9 Units in the Army Ground Forces were nevertheless stripped as directed after February 19^4. Since 80$ of replacements had to be infantry, it was mainly infantry divisions and separate Infantry regiments that were affected. Consequences for the di visions are explained in Study No. 12. Divisions recouped their losses by receiving men graduating from replacement training centers, or made available through transfers from the Army Specialized Training Program and the Army Air Forces. (See Study No. 4f) In general, in all divisions except those due for earliest shipment, there was an almost complete turnover of infantry privates, and a high turnover of infantry non-commis- sioned officers. Exchange was not always affected in equal numbers. In May 19^4 seven divisions in the Army Ground Forces were short about 4,000 men apiece. Divisions at this time were being stripped not only to provide substitutes for RTC graduates under the six-month policy but also to supply additional replacements needed to build up a reserve of re placements in Great Britain in preparation for the invasion of France. (See below, pp. 5^-55.) &11 average of 48,000 replacements were being shipped overseas each month, while the RTCs were producing only 40,000 available replacements each month. Hence di visions supplying overseas replacements under the six-months rule could not Immediately receive substitutes for them in equal numbers. It was possible to ship a high proportion of six-months trained replacements only until June 19^4. Divisions became unusable as sources of replacements, because they had to be made ready for overseas movement as divisions, for which purpose It was de sirable that they receive their permanent personnel at least four months before sail ing. By June, overseas replacements were again being supplied mainly from RTC graduates with 17 weeks of training. But the War Department, while allowing the six-months policy to lapse, took steps to continue the program, which had to a certain extent been included in the six-months policy, of not sending l8-year-olds into combat as individ ual replacements.* Under the six-months rule it had been ordered that 18-year-olds with less than six-months of training should not be used as overseas replacements in any combat arm as long As replacements were available from other sources. It was now ordered, on 2k June 19^4, as the six-months policy drew to an end, that no man uilder 19 years old should be shipped as an overseas replacement in infantry or armor under any circumstances .91 it was likewise ordered, in consequence, that no inductee less than 18 l/2 years old should be assigned to an infantry or armored replacement training center.92 The l8-Year-Old Policy The disposition of 18-year-olds now produced, in July and August 19^4, an acute administrative problem for the Army Ground Forces* The question had arisen - 20 - RESTRICTED RESTRICTED intermittently since the lowering of the draft age to 18 at the end of 19^-2. At that time, in December 19^-2, the War Department, having considered the matter, decided that combat troops needed an infusion of youth, and that men from l8 to 20 inclusive should "be assigned preferably to combat units and to replacement training centers of the Army .Ground Forces.93 Practically all combat units were then still at home, and only a small minority of RTC graduates went directly overseas. As operations developed in North Africa, more RTC graduates were sent overseas as combat replacements, simulta neously with the influx of 18- and 19-year-olds into the replacement centers after the lowering of the draft age. The Army Ground Forces, to which personnel assignment procedures had just been decentralized, raised the issue in May 19^3 of whether these younger men should be sent into combat with only 13 weeks training, the program then in effect at replacement centers. 9** jt was pointed out that the public had been given to understand that teen-age men would receive a year of training. The Army Ground Forces proposed to the War' Department that 18- and 19-year-old inductees be henceforth assigned to units, and that inductees assigned to replacement centers be men of 20 or over.95 The War Department rejected this proposal as unworkable on 29 June 19^3ob serving that activation of new units was coming to an end, and that henceforth almost all inductees would be assigned to replacement training centers, so that no differ entiation according to age could be made.96 Men therefore continued to be assigned ir respective of age. In December 19^3 General Eisenhower, in suggesting that overseas replacements be taken from divisions at home, gave as one of his reasons the extreme youth of many of the replacements arriving in the North African theater.97 ft was also now evident that combat involved, for the close-in fighter, a high degree of physical and emotional strain. The War Department therefore imposed, first a conditional ban on the use of l8-year-olds as combat replacements, then an absolute ban on their use ae replacements in infantry or armor. The absolute ban, ordered in June 19^4, came at a time when the reasons cited in June 19^3 for the opposite decision had all become far more cogent. In June I9W half the new men being received by the Army were l8-year-olds, three-quarters of all men received by the Army were being assigned to the Army Ground Forces, over 90$ of 3-n~ ductees received by the Army Ground Forces were being assigned to replacement .training centers, and 80$ of men assigned to AGF replacement centers were assigned to the in fantry and armored centers (about 75$ an& 5$ respectively).^ This meant that out of every 100 men inducted, even if the 25 needed by the Army Air Forces and the Army Service Forces were all taken from the l8-year-old group, there would unavoidably be 25 l8-year-olds among the 75 men assigned to the Army Ground Forces, which, having to put 60 of the 75 men (80$) into infantry and armored replacement centers, would be obliged to include at least 10 of its 25 18-year-olds in the 60. This was feasible, because assignment of men l8 l/'2 years old to infantry and armored replacement centers was permitted. But calculations had to be very close. In July and August 19^1+ assignment of newly inducted men came to depend almost ex clusively on age. To find enough men to fill the infantry and armored replacement centers virtually all inductees over 18 l/2 received by the Army Ground Forces were re quired, including the oldest inductees and those who were borderline physical cases.99 Inductees under l8 l/2 were concentrated in the antiaircraft, field artillery, tank destroyer and cavalry replacement centers. Many went to the Air and Service Forces • The Physical Profile Serial System, recently introduced to assure that the strongest physical specimens should go to the infantry, could not be applied. The outcome was in fact the reverse of that intended by physical profiling. Yguth, vigor, and alertness were concentrated in the artillery branches. Infantry and armor, which needed the men with the highest endurance, had to fill out their ranks with the physically least qualified and with older men, including numerous Pre-Pearl Harbor fathers whom it was no longer possible to withhold from the stream of combat replacements. The deterio ration of infantry and armored replacements being perceived, and the difficulties being in any case very great for merely arithmetical reasons, the 18-year-old policy was - 21 - RESTRICTED RESTRICTED rescinded, on 4 August, having lasted less than a month and a half .1^0 Eighteen-year- old inductees were again assigned to infantry and armored replacement centers, from which they "began again to "be shipped as overseas replacements in December, Damage had meanwhile been done. Discharge rates at replacement centers mounted abruptly in September 19^-j and remained exceptionally high until the end of the year, almost reaching the level of a year before (see Tables II 8c III, col. 10). The in crease was in large measure due to losses at infantry centers, resulting from the re ceipt in July and August of men physically unfit for infantry duty. Replacement train ing facilities were thus wasted, and the planned flow of replacements reduced at the very time when replacements were needed to sustain the offensive In Germany. In ad dition, '• many replacements of low physical quality reached the front. It was not only the assignment of inductees that was affected. In June 19^-, when the absolute ban on 18-year-olds was laid, there were currently in infantry and armored replacement centers, undergoing training, about 37,000 men who would be under 19 at graduation. Of these, after attritional losses, about 8,000 graduated at ages under 19 but over 18 years and nine months, but about 22,000 graduated while still under 18 years and nine months. The former were kept in the replacement stream, receiving up to three months additional training (as needed in each individual case), and then be coming available for overseas shipment as individual replacements . For storage and training during the intermediate period, the infantrymen of this group were transferred to certain special n on divisional regiments which had recently begun to train replace ments converted from other arms (see below, p. 56); and the armored men, for whom no similar organizations were available, were attached unassigned to the 13th and 20th Armored Divisions, which were expected to be among the last armored divisions to go overseas. The 22,.000 who left the replacement training centers while still under 18 years and nine months, and who could not be used as overseas replacements for three months or -more, were withdrawn from the replacement stream. They were distributed among fourteen infantry and three armored divisions not intended for immediate overseas movement. To fill the void in the overseas replacement stream, caused by the loss to it of 22,000 graduates of replacement training'centers, divisions to which the 18-year- olds were assigned gave up equal numbers of their own men, who were shipped to the AGS' replacement depots.101 Effects of the Overturn As a result of the six-months and the 18-year-old policies combined, units in the Army Ground Forces experienced a sweeping substitution of personnel in 19^. It will be recalled that in the last months of 19^3 divisions in the Army Ground Forces had supplied some 26,000 overseas replacements. From April to September 19^ they supplied 92,000 more (see Table VI). In 19^3 divisions had been stripped to fill shortages of RTC-trained replacements. In 19^- they were stripped,- not primarily to fill shortages (though partly for this reason), but primarily to implement the six-months and 18-year- old policies, by which divisions took RTC graduates and supplied overseas replacements in their stead. At the height of the policy, In April and May 19^> of approximately 120,000 enlisted men put into AGF replacement depots in those two months from all sources, approximately 72,000 came from T/0 units, and from overhead (a small propor tion) (see Table VTl). The 92,000 enlisted replacements supplied by divisions from April to September 19^ were supplied by twenty-two different divisions (see Table VT). Except for the 10th Mountain and the l^th Armored, every division leaving the Army Ground Forces later than September 19^ was stripped. Two shipped in September were also stripped. Division losses from April to September ranged from 1,652 enlisted men for the 13th Airborne, to 7,071 for the 76th Infantry Division. The average was 4,170. Seventeen infantry divisions lost on the average 3,933 infantry privates apiece. There were only 6,195 privates in the three regiments of an infantry division under the T/0 of 30 June 19^-4. On the average, therefore, two-thirds of the infantry privates in - 22 - RESTRICTED RESTRICTED seventeen divisions were lost and replaced "by newcomers. In some divisions--the 65th, 76th. and 97"th--over 000 infantry privates were exchanged. The effect of this overturn on the divisions concerned is traced in study No. 12. In general, these divisions entered combat with less advanced training than divisions shipped earlier. The effect on the replacement stream was to supply overseas units, for a few months, with a proportion of replacements who had had at least six months of training instead of four (although, as noted above, amount of training was not the chief issue in the replacement problem), and to supply over a short period, in place of l8-year-olds, men who were 19 or over and some of whom were "barely capable of sus tained effort as combat soldiers in the field. Eighteen-year-olds as a class were not greatly affected, since the policy was of short duration, and at most postponed combat service by a few months, or allowed some 22,000 youngsters to enter combat as members of organized units rather than in the more difficult role of individual replacements. The main advantages of the policy seem not to have been military, but rather to have lain in the field of the public relations of the Army, and in considerations of justice to young men scarcely mature. Whether the advantages offset the disadvantage of committing some twenty divisions to battle with imperfect training is therefore one of the imponderable questions . The Problem of Numbers in 19^-4 While policies of exchanging personnel within units of the Army Ground Froces were proceeding as described above, the mere fundamental problem of providing overseas replacements in sufficient numbers had to be met. It has been noted how General McNair believed that inadequacy of numbers underlay the whole replacements problem, affecting not only quantity but also quality. General McNair once more stated his views to the Chief of Staff on k January 19^. Reaffirming that the training of replacements was excellent, he continued:^02 At no stage in our operations, including the present, has the supply of re placements been adequate. Due largely to this condition, overseas theaters have been forced to distribute incoming replacements without regard to the specialties in which they have been trained. There is no question in my mind that this en forced procedure (is the principal cause of dissatisfaction with replacements. In my judgment, the most serious aspect of the replacement situation is not in the replacement agencies, but is lack of manpower. Units of the Army Ground Forces today have a net shortage of 56,000 men. Inductions are little more than sufficient to fill replacement training centers, and the latter so far have been unable to meet overseas demands. The authorized trainee capacity of AO1 replacement training centers in January 19^4 w^s 203,000. It had not been raised since 19^-2. With the shift from a 13 to a 17- week cycle, without increase of capacity, annual output had been curtailed by over 135^*000. Under the 17-week training cycle, and allowing for attrition, the capacity of 203,000 in effect in January 19^ could not be expected to produce much over 400,000 replacements a year.. In May 19^3 the War Department had estimated that 655,000 replacements would be necessary in the ground arms in 19^> both to replace overseas losses and to fill vacancies in units preparing for overseas shipment. The Army Ground Forces, in July 19^3, had determined that an RTC capacity of 278,000 was necessary to produce 655,000 replacements a year.3-03 The War Department, after reduction of the troop basis from 100 divisions to* 90, and after computing new estimates of losses, and in September cut the figure of 278,000 to 203,000.^04 just stated, this could be expected to produce about 400,000 replacements a year. The War Department estimated, in November - 23 - ' RESTRICTED RESTRICTED 19*1*3, that ^31,000 replacements in the ground arms would "be needed in 19^-, both for overseas .and for continental use.105 Fully as important as total numbers, if replacements were to "be used in positions for which they were trained, was the "breakdown of total numbers by "branch. In its estimates of May 19^3* the War Department had anticipated that of the 655,000 replace ments needed in 19^> 380*000, or 58$> should "be infantry. The Army Ground Forces, in planning a total RTC capacity of 278,000 had accordingly planned a capacity of l6l,000 in infantry centers. When total capacity was cut to 203,000 the infantry ratio had "been raised, so that capacity of infantry replacement training centers to be attained in January ISk-b had been set at 137,000, or 67$ of the total (see Table I). Under a 17-week cycle, and allowing for attrition, an infantry capacity of 137,000 could be expected to produce annually in the neighborhood of 275>000 infantry replacements. The War Department estimate of November 19^3 called for 293*000 infantry replacements in 1944, or 68$ of all ground arms replacements. As it turned out, the Army Ground Forces in 19W provided for overseas use alone, not counting replacements assigned to unitB before sailing, 501,038 enlisted replace ments in all arms, of which k0k,kk6, or 80$, were in iilfantry (see Table X). This Vas accomplished by raising the capacity of AGS' replacement training centers in 19^ and by various supplementary measures. On 7 February 19^4 the Army Ground Forces recommended an increase of AO1 replace ment training center capacity from 203,000 to approximately 257,000#1°6 This was im mediately authorized by the War Department. But the increase of monthly output would not occur until July.- - Meanwhile demands arose for overseas replacements beginning in March. These demands had not been foreseen, and no advance provision had been mads. The unforeseen element was the degree to which the European theater would wish to stock a reserve of replacements prior to landing on the French coast. As late as December 19^3 the War Department had estimated that replacement requirements, for all purposes in the ground arms for the months from March through June of 19^+, would rttti to 33,000 a month.10 7 From March through June AGF replacement training centers pro duced an average of 39,800 available replacements a month (Table II). But from March to June 32,000 replacements were shipped monthly to the European theater alone, and lj-8,000 to all theaters combined, not only leaving no surplus from which units preparing to move overseas could fill their vacancies, but making it necessary to create still more vacancies in those units (see Table X). To meet these new demands for replacements in excess of the numbers available froiil planned output of the RTCs, men were withdrawn from divisions in the Army Ground Forces, Men thus withdrawn were in addition to those being taken from divisions at this time to supply replacements with six months training. Vacancies created by the •latter withdrawals, as has beeij noted above, were filled with graduates of the RTCs* To fill the additional vacancies — and to make up shortages from which AGS1 units had suffered since the earlier stripping in the last months of 19^-3 the War Department Virtually dissolved the Army {Specialized Training'Program, transferred 73*000 ASM* trainees to the Ground Forces, and reassigned to the Ground Forces 2^,000 surplus aviation cadets, most of whom had formerly been members of AGF units before their selection for flying training. (See Studies No. b and 5.) The Army Ground Forces ad- signed the approximately 100,000 young men thus obtained chiefly to the infantry of depleted divisions. Used in this way as replacements, though not as overseas replace ments $ they augmented the inadequate output of the replacement training centers. They were assignted to divisions not intended for overseas movement until the following August or later, and so had time to acquire or reacquire infantry training. - 2k - RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Meanwhile the War Department had sharply raised its estimates of replacement re quirements for 19Mf. It had "been estimated in November 19^3 that the zone of the interior would have to produce ^31>000 replacements in the ground arms for the whole of 19W- (above, p. 53). It was now estimated, in February 19^> that the zone of the interior would have to produce 352,000 in the last half of I9W- alone. The estimated requirement for infantry was at the same time raised from 67$ to 73$ 0? ^e requirement for all ground arms. Instead of a need for 283,000 infantry replacements for the full year, a need for 257,000 for the second half of the years was now anticipated.^" It now appeared that the increase of RTC output due to "begin in July would "be insuffi cient. The Army Ground Forces, after receiving the new War Department estimates for the last six months of 19Mf, estimated that AGF replacement training center production, even as increased, would fall short of requirements "by 120,000, and that the infantry shortages would he about 67,000.3-09 With divisions approaching their dates for over seas .shipment, and refilling with new personnel requiring rapid assimilation--ASTP students and aviation cadets, and RTC graduates received under the exchange policy--it was evident that the taking of replacements from divisions could not go on much longer. Antiaircraft and tank: destroyer unite were therefore inactivated at a more rapid rate than troop "basis planning had envisaged.Their personnel were for the most part converted to infantry. A program of voluntary transfer to infantry from other branches was likewise inaugurated. (See Study No. 5) To give infantry training to the transferred .men, whether volunteers or convertees, the Army Ground Forces used nine nondivisional infantry regiments, some of them obtained by transfer from defense commands o» other assignments in which they could now be dispensed with. Each regiment, reduced to a training cadre, functioned ad* a small replacement training center, specializing in the production of infantry riflemen. The transferred personnel being already trained as soldiers, the regiments gave them at first eight, later six weeks retraining in infantry, with some additional training for noncommissioned officers. The regiments were also used, as noted above, to store and give further training to the older group of 18-year-olds graduating from replacement training centers in July and August.m The transfer of ASTP trainees and aviation cadets to the Ground Forces, and the conversion of tank destroyer and antiaircraft personnel to infantry, indicated that the Army was providing replacements not only from newly inducted men but from sources with in its already existing strength. This policy, which was destined to be applied with increasing force, was made necessary by the fact that the total strength of the Army was over its authorized ceiling. In July 19^> while authorized or troop basis strength was only 7,700,000 officers and men, actual strength was approximately 8,000,000. The War Department, intending to cut back to troop basis strength, planned to reduce its calls on Selective Service to 60,000 a month. It was becoming difficult in any case, with requirements of the Navy and ^rine Corps remaining at a high, level, to obtain more than 60,000 inductees a month who were physically qualified. In. August 194^ the capacity of replacement training centers was therefore trimnled slightly downward (see Table I). Capacity of AGF replacement training centers, au thorized in the preceding February to reach 260,000, and attaining the corresponding productive output "only in July, was now to decline by stages until it reached 2^3,000 by 31 December 19^4. Seemingly it was illogical to cut RTC capacities a few Veeks after the launching of major operations in Europe--especially since, according to AGS' estimates, even the capacity of 260,000 would leave a replacement shortage of 120,000 in 1944, In fact it was a perfectly natural step, if only sufficient replacements were procured from other sources. Such other sources were available, both in the excess of 300,000 over troop basis strength, and in units and installations which were in the troop basis, but which, like antiaircraft and tank destroyer units, could be reduced in number in the current stage of the war. For retraining of men procured from such sources the replacement training centers, set up to train recruits, were not the most - 25 - RESTRICTED RESTRICTED suitable agencies. Other agencies were needed, such as the separate regiments already mentioned. Other factors also affected the situation. Casualties -were lighter than had "been expected during the first three months after the landing in Normandy. The European theater had a reserve of replacements "built up since March, and was in fact carrying an overstrength in replacements in excess of the authorized reserve. (See Study No. 4) The War Department had attempted, in a conference of theater representatives in April and "by subsequent directives, to get the theaters to provide more fully for their re placement needs from their own resources, "by converting and retraining as combat soldiers surplus personnel in overhead, service, antiaircraft, and other installations in the theaters.^-2 Conversion in the theaters was slow in reaching significant pro portions, "but it had at least "been initiated. Demand on the zone of the interior for replacements therefore eased slightly in the late summer and fall of 1 The new centers never functioned as at first planned. No pool of RTC graduates ever accumulated. The term "advanced training" proved a misnomer. The centers became altogether absorbed in the retraining of men converted from other branches. Though called infantry advanced replacement training centers (lARTCfs), they gave an ac celerated six-weeks course in the rudiments of infantry weapons and tactics. The course was advanced only in the sense that the trainees, being soldiers already, were not receiving basic training—though it was found that some, having long been at technical or service jobs, were in need of basic training also. The aim of the centers was to produce infantry riflemen as fast as possible. (See Study No. Jl.) This need arose after the Allies were stopped at-the Siegfried Line in September. The campaign in Germany settled down to a period of attrition. Casualties mounted at a time when Ground Force units, at home, about to go overseas, could no longer be drained for replacements, and when expansion of the replacement training - centers, which would involve raising the induction rate, was not feasible, the Army being overstrength and most able-bodied meh of military age being in the Army already. The War Department therefore ordered the transfer to the Ground Forces, first of 5>000 men a month from the Air Forces, then*of 25,000 men from the Air Forces (in addition) and 25,000 from the Service Forces, to be effected before the end of the year. Further transfer from the Air Forces was subsequently ordered. (See Studies No. k and 5*) Men converted from the Air and Service Forces were assigned to the IARTC!s. In November 19^-* the first month of their operation, the IARTC's received kk,668 traineeSr5,936 from AGS1 replacement centers and schools (for advanced training under the original policy), 26,726 from AO1 units (antiaircraft, etc.), 5,606 from the Service Forces, and 5,4l8 from the Air Forces. After November the picture totally - 26 - RESTRICTED RESTRICTED changed. Thereafter -the IARTC's received few men from AGF sources, which were now vir tually exhausted. Most came from the two other major commands. From November 194-4- to May 19^-5> inclusivej 189,206 men were put into the IARTC's. Of these 6j,6lk came from the Air Forces, 31,511 from the Service Forces, and 17,610 from the defense commands. The IARTC's in these months dispatched lllytoo men to depots for immediate use as over seas replacements, and *15,676 to units of the Army Ground Forces, the last of which were then hurriedly preparing for movement to the German front (see Table IV). It may "be proper at this point, before proceeding to the crisis with which the year ended, to estimate the number of ground arms replacements actually supplied by the zone of the interior in 19^- The requirement for 194-4- had been variously forecast by the War Department--in May 194-3 as 655,000, in November I9U3 as 431,000, and in Feb ruary 1944 as 352,000 for the last six months of 1944 alone. The number actually sup plied cannot be stated exactly, because while it was reported that 501*038 enlisted re placements were shipped overseas in 19^4-, no figure can be given for the number as signed to tactical units before they left the United States. It would appear, however, that an approximate figure for total enlisted replacements in the ground arms, supplied by the zone of the interior, can be constructed by adding the following elements.11^ Enlisted Replacements Provided in the Ground Arms in 194-4- Output of AGF RTC's in 194-4, assigned to AGF depots, units and schools, except 0CS (Table II, col. 7) 5^*098 ASTP trainees transferred in A® 73*000 Aviation cadets transferred to A GF 24,0p0 Infantry volunteers and personnel transferred to infantry from AAA., TD, etc., and to AGF from AAF, ASF, defense commands, etc., mostly retrained in separate infantry regiments or in IARTCfs, whose output was as follows: Output of separate infantry regiments in 194-4 to AGS' depots, units and schools, except 0CS (Table V) ^7>^57 Output of IARTC!s in 194-4 to A® depots, units and schools, except 0CS (Table iy) 15.061 Total 701,6l6 The figure of 701,616 is a minimum figure, not Including men who may have been' trans ferred from other branches directly to units without retraining in special regiments or in IARTC's. It is believed that the number of these men was relatively not great. Provision of replacements in infantry varied even more widely from the earlier anticipations. In May 194-3 the War Department had estimated the 194-4 requirement at 380,000 (58# of all ground arms replacements), and in November 194-3 at 293,000 (68^) (above, p. 53)• The number of replacements actually provided in infantry in 194-4- ap pears to have been approximately 5^2,868, or 77$'of 701,616* Output of infantry re placement training centers in 1944, assigned to AGF depots, units and schools, was 385,35O.All sources except replacement training centers listed in the preceding paragraph were used to produce infantry. Adding the figures for these sources as listed above' to 385/350 yields 542,868. - 27 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED The Crisis of December 19*^ The extensive transfers from the Air and Service Forces ordered in the last months of 19^- came too late, even under a six-weeks retraining program, to yield more than a few replacements "before the end of the year. Meanwhile, with the commitment of ever larger forces in Europe, the mounting intensity of combat at the Siegfried line, and the onset of winter, the number of battle and non-battle losses steadily went up. The War Department on 8 November 19^ again notified the theaters that the capacity of the zone of the interior to furnish replacements was limited, and urged them to prosecute their own conversion programs with increased vigor.H6 Each theater was given a specific figure for the number of replacements it could expect to receive from the zone of the interior. Figures given on 8 November 19^-> for the months from December 19^ through April 19^5 were as follows (including officers and enlisted mer): Monthly Average of Replacements to be furnished by Zone of Interior European Medit. Pacific South- Theater Theater Ocean west Total of Opns of Opns Areas Pacific AH ^ground arms k2,060 7,820 5,410 12,514-0 67,830 Inftotry only (35,800) (7,000) (4,900)(11,000)(58,700) All services (except AAF) 1.550 . ??0 k57 810 5,127 Total 43,590 8,150 5,867 13,350 70,957 The War Department estimated at this time that total replacement requirements through April 19^5 would run to 80,000 or 5(0,000 a month, virtually all for overseas replace ments, since few units would rew-ixv in the United States.U-7 The difference between 80,000 or 90^000 and 7°;957 vas to be made up by retraining of rear-area personnel in the theaters. On 7 December G-l and G-3 of the War Department, and the chief of staff, G-l and G-3 of the Army Ground Forces, with other officers concerned, met in conference on the questioii of overseas replacements.The chief of staff of the Ground Forces, asked flatly whether he believed the War Department was producing enough replacements to corry on the war, replied that he did not believe bo, and recommended that capacity of iriSfanti^r replacement training centers be raised by l60,00Q, to produce ^0,000 more infantry"re^acements a month. Reports now indicated a daily loss rate in ET0 of 3,000 per?day in battle casualties alone. Receipts of the Army Ground Forces from reception centers were only 53>000 a month. It was problematical how far this number could be raised without drawing inductees unfit for combat duty. Receipts of con verted Air and Service personnel at the IARTC!s were reported by the Army Ground Forces to *be lagging. Officers at the conference explained that the Service Forces had yirtually no enlisted men left who were of higjh physical quality, and that the Air Forces, if required to produce more men for conversion to infantry riflemen, would be obliged to send sergeants trained in specialties peculiar to the Air Forces. It was decided that the Army Air Forces* and the Army Service Forces must nevertheless meet their quotas, that a request would be made to raise monthly calls on Selective Service to 100,000, and that if necessary the RTC training cycle should be reduced from 17 to 15 weeks, even though such action would produce only momentary relief. The six-week retrainees were agreed by all to have insufficient training for infantry service. But since they would have to be used in increasing numbers, they were to be identified clearly to the theaters as men with only six weeks of infantry training, so that they might receive further training overseas if possible. The War Department, hard pressed to meet his commitments for replacements to the theaters, took steps to force a higher rate of effective output at the replacement - 28 - BESTRICIED RESTRICTED training centers. In the last months of I9W-, out of every 100 inductees put into a replacement training center, only 80 "became available as replacements, an attritional loss of 20$ (see Ta"ble III, col, 12). On 12 December 19^- the War Department ordered that 95 out of every 100 should "be graduated and made available, "by waiver of physical and training standards to the extent necessary with a few exceptions.^9 The Army j Ground Forces pointed out the difficulties of such action.^0 Some of the recent loss was due to transient causes, having gone into the cadre and overhead needed to launch the IARTC's. Some -of it was due to transfers made necessary "by War Department poli cies, which withdrew from the replacement stream conscientious objectors, critical specialists, linguists, men desired "by the Office of Strategic Services, men for train ing in military intelligence, etc. But most of the loss was due to discharge on physical grounds, due in turn to the low physical quality of inductees received "by the Army. This could "be attributed in part to stringency of manpower in the country, in part to the pre-induction recruiting system employed extensively "by the Navy Depart ment, which meant that a large percentage of men reaching induction- age, among whom the highest proportion of physically fit men was found, was pre-empted by the Navy and Marine Corps and never reached the Army at all. Physical quality of men received by the Army Ground Forces was so poor at this time, the beginning of December 19^> that ikfy of trainees in replacement training centers were reprofiled downward after six weeks of training.121 This meant that, in addition to the high discharge rate, many men were retained as combat replacements although they were below desired physical standards for their jobs. The War Department on 15 December modified its directive of the 12th, adhering to the principle of maximum output at replacement training centers, but extending the exceptions to the 95$ ruling.122 Cases of discharge were to be scrutinized closely, with the understanding that men discharged on physical grounds would generally have to be replaced by men who were no better. The discharge rate at infantry replacement training centers fell off abruptly in the following months-- meaning that standards were applied less strictly (see• Table III, col. 10). The German breakthrough in the Ardennes occurred on 16 December 19^> and the ensuing "Battle of the Bulge, " therefore occurred at a time when the replacement system in the zone of the interior was already strained to its utmost, when men with only six-weeks retraining in infantry and men scarcely capable of prolonged exertion in the field were being supplied in increasing numbers—men who for want of physique or training would succumb rapidly on the battlefield, and who therefore would soon have to be replaced in turn. The German advance caused consternation if not alarm. Losses in Europe rose suddenly and enormously. The War Department raised its commitment for replacements. to ET0 for January by 20,000. It was decided not to take replacements from the few divi sions still at home, but to ship all remaining divisions to Europe. To provide an im mediate increase of infantry replacements the training program was shortened to 15 weeks.12 3 For a time immediately following the breakthrough, pre-embarkation furloughs of ETC graduates were cut to five days, and men whose homes were more than '2k hours distant by rail were shipped by air, to the extent allowed by December weather.12^ These measures simply drew on the future to satisfy the present; they did not increase the number of replacements produced. To increase the number, further calls were made on the Air Forces for conversion to infantry, and the Selective Service call was raised to 80,000 for January,125 In general, however, it was felt, both in the War Department and at the head quarters of the Army Ground Forces, that the European theater would have to meet a large part of its replacement need out of its own resources of personnel. The G-l.of ET0 attended conferences in Washington on 23 and 28 December 19^.12^ It was impressed upon him that the zone of the interior was almost depleted; that any increase of ship ment of replacements to ET0 would be largely at the expense of other theaters; that the Army was considerably overstrength and induction calls therefore subject to - 29 - . RESTRICTED RESTRICTED restriction; that combat soldiers must "be furnished "by conversion and retraining within the Army; that most of the Army was now overseas, especially the personnel physically fit for reassignment to combat duty; that most of the overseas Army was in the European Theater of Operations; and, finally, that the process of conversion and retraining for combat duty, having approached its practical limits in the United States, must now "be carried on with at least equal thoroughness in Europe. In addition, retraining in Europe would produce quicker results than retraining in the United States, since time spent "by replacements in furloughs and in transit would "be saved. It was agreed to ac celerate the program of combing physically qualified personnel from the communications zone in ETO, retraining them as combat soldiers, and retraining partially disable men in the theaters to take over the rear-area jobs. General Ben Lear, transferred in January 19^5 from command of the Army Ground Forces to be Deputy Commander of ETO, was charged with the supervision of this retraining program in the theater. In December 19^-j despite the emergency measures in the second half of the month, the number of replacements shipped to ETO was less than the War Department had in dicated on 8 November as forthcoming in that month. Thereafter, and until the collapse of Germany was in sight, the shipment of replacements to ETO greatly exceeded the com mitments of 8 November. Commitments to ETO for February to June were revised upward on 8 January 19^-5> largely balanced by corresponding reduction in commitments to other theaters, as follows:^7 Monthly Average of Replacements to be furnished by ZI ETO MT0 P0A SWP Total All ground arms 5^,874 6,660 4,000 8,570 73,904 Infantry only (48,900) (6,000) (5,600) (7,300) (65,800) All Services (exc. AAT) 1.142 519 711 805 2.977 Total 56,016 6,979 4,711 9,175 76,88l Commitment of 8 Nov kk 43.590 8.150 5.867 13,350 70.957 Difference / 12,426 - 1,171 •• 1,156 •- ^,175 - 5,924 It is evident that the gain in replacements for ETO was obtained mostly by curtailment of allowances to other theaters, but that the zone of interior would still have to furnish about 6,000 more replacements each month than had been intended on 8 November. The gain in numbers was also at the expense of quality; the War Department explained to the theaters, in its letter of 8 January, that "the present exceedingly large over all demands for infantry replacements can be satisfied even in part only by use of men who are not fully qualified physically for infantry duty and by waiver of minor train ing deficiencies." Actual shipment of ground arms replacements to ETO in January 19^5 reached 64,551 (including officers), over 20,000 more than had been allocated on 8 November. In February the figure reached 60,597* °r 17*000 more than had been allocated on 8 November, and 8,000 more than the augmented allocation of 8 January. In March ETO re ceived 58*555 replacements, almost exactly the number allocated on 8 January; in April 46,302; in May, with Germany defeated, only 537. All told, from January to April in clusive, the zone of the interior supplied 230,005 replacements in the ground arms to ETO, of whom 195,912 were in infantry. To all theaters, in these four months, the zone of the interior supplied 369,668 replacements in the ground arms, about 30,000 more than had been anticipated on '8 November (see Table IX). It was the IARTC's that made possible the shipment of such numbers. The RTC's, operating at relatively low levels in December 19^4, limited by the number of men - 30 - RESTRICTED RESTRICTED received from Selective Service, and requiring in any case at least fifteen weeks to train a replacement, reacted slowly to any emergency. They sent 169*897 graduates to the depots from January to April 19^5 (Table II, col. l). In the same months 101,703 six-week retrainees were sent to the depots, 9*7^6 from the separate infantry regiments (Table V), 91,957 from the IARTC*s, which in January were just "beginning to graduate the AAF and ASF men put into them at the end of November (Table IV). In January and February 19^-5 almost ^0,000 additional AAF men, and over 13,000 ASF men, were put into the IARTC fs for conversion into riflemen (Table IV). Had severe fighting in Europe- been protracted much beyond April 19^5> it ie dif ficult to see where the necessary replacements would have come from. Possibilities for conversion and retraining in the United States were virtually at an end. Input into the IARTC Ts began to decline in January 19^5* becoming insignificant by April. After December 19^3 virtually ho infantry re trainees were provided to the lARTC's by A GET units (antiaircraft, etc.), after January 19^5 virtually none by the Service Forces, after February virtually none by the Air Forces. In March, of the greatly reduced in put into IARTC fs, over half came from "other sources'1 than the three major commands-- including miscellaneous scrapings, internal transfers and bookkeeping entries. The # separate infantry regiments used for conversion training tapered off at the same time, producing no graduates after March 19^5. (See Tables IV and V.) Fortunately, the corresponding decline in output did not come until March. Foreseeing the decline of the conversion program in the United States, and antic ipating that virtually all replacements furnished by the zone of the interior after April or May 19^5 would have to come from Selective Service, the War Department in January 19^5 raised the monthly induction call for the spring months to 100,000, and authorized a large increase incapacity of AGF replacement training centers. Author ized capacity of these centers was jumped from 2^6,000 to j60,000, by far the largest increase in the entire history of the war. Capacity of infantry replacement training centers leaped from 197,000 to 312,000, or from 80$ to 8756 of total capacity of the ground arms. (See Table I.) IARTC fs were converted in February and March to normal infantry replacement training centers; that is, facilities used to give six weeks re training in Infantry to men from other branches were redirected to give fifteen weeks of infantry training to inductees .128 The ensuing Increase in ETC output began to make itself evident in May. By that time no more replacements had to be shipped to Europe. With victory in Europe a new restriction on the use of 18-year-olds was imposed, this time by legislation. The Army was forbidden to send any l8-year-old overseas with less than six months training. Since half of incoming inductees were l8-year-olds, and virtually all were assigned to replacement centers, this legislation virtually dictated the replacement training pro gram of the Army. In May almost half the graduates of replacement training centers were assembled in special centers for the completion of six months' training. These centers took the old name of Infantry Advanced Replacement Training Centers. The six- months training requirement for l8-year-olds, while in the long run it did not reduce the number of replacements available, introduced an element of inflexibility into their disposition. It likewise made planning more difficult, by requiring replacement needs to be projected farther into the future. It had proved difficult enough to make advance provision for replacements when only 17 or 15 weeks, or indeed only 6 weeks, were necessary to produce them. Whether, with six months necessary to produce half the replacements obtainable, any accurate forecast of combat requirements could be made, was a question which only the future could decide. It was clear in J"une 19^5 that re placements would be needed in large numbers, even after the cessation of demands from Europe, because replacement shortages had accumulated in other theaters during the crisis in ETO, because operations in the Pacific were rapidly becoming more extensive, and because the discharge policies of the War Department created many vacancies which had to be filled immediately. " 31 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Further Questions Raised "by the Severity of Infantry Combat Early in 19^, as has "been said (pp. 36-^0), the severity of infantry combat had aroused misgivings about the adequacy of the individual replacement system. Battle and non-battle casualties in infantry were so much higher than in other branches that divi sions rapidly lost their full effectiveness, even though non-infantry elements of the divisions were capable of further effort. Long periods of unrelieved combat produced large casualties; these in turn laid heavy demands on the replacement system. Even when replacements were provided promptly, they usually had to be fed into units while actively engaged with the enemy. New Men, under these circumstances, suffered heavy casualties because they were not adjusted to battlefield conditions or acquainted with members of their units. The dwindling stock of veterans was more rapidly reduced be cause these men had to expose themselves more often in providing needed leadership for the large drafts of replacements. The remedy recommended by Army Ground Forces and by General Devers, on the basis of his experience in the Mediterranean Theater, had been to modify the individual re placement system by providing additional units for rotation or replacement. The War Department, in 19^3 early 19^* had thought such, a modification undesirable and impracticable. In October 19^ Army Ground Forces renewed its recommendations for ad ditional infantry units, to replace divisional units withdrawn for r6st, rehabilita tion, and the integration of replacements. For immediate use in Europe it proposed to fill the eight separate infantry regiments then .training loss replacements. For long- term planning of operations in the Pacific, it recommended that one separate regiment be provided for every two infantry divisions scheduled for that theater. The War De partment vetoed the first proposal.because of Troop Basis limitations, and postponed decision on the second until after the defeat of Germany.^9 Meanwhile strong support for a modification of the replacement system had come from the S-Qrgeon General of the Army. A survey of divisions in the Mediterranean Theater, condiacted during the spring and slimmer of 19^> had revealed the heavy cost of keeping divisions continuously in the line.^-30 A significant portion of battle casu alties in divisions in this theater was due, not to deaths, wounds, or capture, but to psychiatric disorders induced by prolonged exposure to danger. Psychiatric casualty rates of 1200 to I5OO per 1000 men per year were not uncommon in rifle battalions, whereas corresponding units of all other branches rarely suffered rates above 30. In general, 15-20$ of all non-fatal battle casualties in the Mediterranean Theater were neuropsychiatric. The front-line soldier, having nothing to look forward to except death or wounds, and having exhausted the reservoir of pride and devotion to his unit, cracked under the strain. The survey found that "practically all men in rifle bat talions who-are not otherwise disabled ultimately become psychiatric casualties." The point at which men wore out occurred, on the average, after 200 to 2^0 days of combat. Men who broke down before this could usually be rehabilitated in the theater'for further combat duty; those who broke down after the maximum period were useless for combat assignments without at least six months of rest. The infantryman's combat use fulness could be increased and losses from psychiatric causes reduced, the Surgeon General reported, if he had a positive goal toward which to work and the only goal worth anything to a soldier in the lines was the prospect of relief. Therefore the Surgeon General recommended that front-line infantrymen, upon completion of 200 (or 2^0) aggregate days of combat, be relieved from combat duty for six months and given the option of serving that period in the United States. Besides recommending provision of enough replacements to attain this end, the Surgeon General proposed changes in the method of training and shipping replacements. Continued effectiveness in combat, it had been found, depended chiefly on the soldier's refusal to submit to the most compelling motives for giving way. The strength of the bond between a soldier and his comrades was the chief element in forcing a man to - 32 - RESTRICTED RESTRICTED carry on. The individual replacement, lacking any strong attachment to other members of the unit, had "been found less effective in resisting combat strain than the man who entered battle with a unit. The Surgeon General recommended that replacements be trained, shipped, and assigned in groups of from 3 "to 9 men, so that they would enter combat with a certain unit esprit. The Army Ground Forces welcomed this careful documentation of the plight of the infantry soldier and used it in November as basis for new recommendations to the War Department. But Army Ground Forces did not at this time believe a limited tour of duty for infantrymen to be the answer: Our whole system of the employment of divisions for long periods and con tinuous replenishment of these divisions by replacements while they are in action has created a vicious cycle with respect to battle fatigue which no system of in dividual relief can overcome. Instead, Army Ground Forces recommended unit replacement at the division level as the best solution: fresh divisions from a reserve would replace divisions withdrawn from the line. It was not contemplated, of course, that unit replacement would supersede the individual replacement system. The two would be complementary: unit rotation would reduce casualties, thereby relieving the strain on the individual replacement system; it would alsd permit new levies to be fitted into units more efficiently, thereby reducing casualties among replacements .^31 No reply to these recommendations was forthcoming from the War Department. After the replacement crisis of December had passed, and when plane for the Pacific War were being formulated, Army Ground Forces renewed its agitation for a fundamental change in the replacement system. Army Ground Forces had come by this time to believe that the individual tour of duty, dismissed as impracticable in October 19^> was both feasible and necessary, and that unit replacement should be instituted at the regimental level, preferably by providing a reserve regiment for each infantry division. As part of its continuing program to improve the effectiveness of the infantry soldier (see Study No. 5), Army Ground Forces in January 19^5 proposed that the War Department institute after Y-E Day a plan for rotating regiments in combat and a tour of duty for infantrymen. It was estimated that provision of one additional regiment for each infantry division to be deployed against Japan would require 155^000 troops; if regiments were supplied in a ratio of one for every two divisions only 79>000 hi®11 would be needed. Army Ground Forces proposed that the tour of combat duty for individuals be 120 days; the cost would be 1*0,000 or 21^,000 additional replacements, depending upon whether the unit replacement scheme was adopted as well. Since it was contemplated to use against Japan only a portion of the ground units then present in the European theaters, Army Ground Forces believed the time had at last arrived when a genuine reserve could be maintained.-*-32 The War Department Troop Deployment of 1 February 19^5 > forecasting the distribu tion of manpower for Pacific operations, made no provision either for additional regi ments or for individual relief. General Stilwell, who had recently assumed command of the Ground Forces, took up the cause. In a memorandum to General Marshall on 13 March, General Stilwell pointed out that casualties in air combat crews and in infantry regi ments occurred at the same rate but that the Troop Basis, while providing for rotation of air crews after a stipulated number of missions, made no similar provision for in fantrymen, who continued to fight on with diminishing chances of survival. The January recommendations were repeated.^-33 By this time the War Department had been won over, and the Chief of Staff approved in principle a plan for both individual and unit rota tion.13b The Redeployment Troop Basis Of 1 June 19^5 included 3^ separate regiments, to be obtained from inactivated divisions, with which to implement the plan.1-35 Whether the changing requirements of the Pacific War would permit the execution of these innovations was uncertain aB redeployment got under way. But Army Ground Forces and the War Department were now agreed that the replacement system under which the war " 33 - ' RESTRICTED RESTRICTED had "been fought to V-E Day was inadequate. To keep a minimum number of divisions al most constantly in contact, refilling them from a stream of individual replacements, resulted in excessive losses, weakened units, and hopeless veterans. The individual replacement system, to function effectively, had to "be part of a more comprehensive scheme of unit and individual rotation. In his memorandum to Army Ground Forces on manpower loss due to psychiatric dis orders, the Surgeon General had recommended that replacements be trained and sent over seas in groups of 3 to 9 men so that they would enter "battle equipped with a degree of esprit not possible when they were handled as so many military ""bodies."136 in Novem ber 19^ Army Ground Forces had regarded this suggestion as desirable "but not feasible. A similar, "but more elaborate, plan looking toward an improvement of the morale and effectiveness of replacements was explored early in 19^5. General Eisenhower, in December 19^> ha& directed that use of the word "replacement" be discontinued in the European Theater and that "reinforcements" be substituted: troops covered by thesa designations, the order declared, were as vital to operations as a reserve regiment in a division.137 General Stilwell, saw in this change an opportunity to integrate re placement training more closely with combat operations and at the same time to improve the effectiveness of the individual loss replacement. He proposed that units in the replacement training centers be designated as training sources for particular divisions overseas. Within these, units individuals would be grouped by platoons, or at least by squads, remaining in these groups throughout their training and during movement over seas. He considered requesting the return to the United States of officers from the respective divisions to accompany the shipments. Individuals would thus be "reinforce ments11 from the outset.-*-3° Asked to comment on the feasibility of this plan, theater commanders and their representatives, agreeing that improvement in morale and combat effectiveness would result, replied that it could not be effected at this stage of the war. Fundamental objection from the theaters was to the rigidity which the scheme would introduce into the replacement process, by forcing assignment of replacements to units and in quantities determined without regard to immediate operational requirements.139 The reaction from theater commanders was so unfavorable that General Stilwell decided to abandon the idea.1^0 Replacements continued to be trained and assigned as individuals, being formed into temporary companies only for disciplinary effect and administrative convenience during actual shipment. An AGF Review of the Replacement Problem The recurrent crisis described in the present study, implying as they did an un favorable judgment on the replacement system of the Army, led to a review of the system after the termination of hostilities in Europe, Two civilian advisers to the Command ing General, Army Air Forces, Dr. E. P. Learned and Dr. Dan T. Smith, were directed by the Secretary of War in June 19^5 to survey the organization of the War Department and its subordinate commands with respect to the provision of replacements and to recom mend improvements that would "make the War Department Personnel Replacement System fully effective in the war against Japan."1^1 The committee found that there had been insufficient long-range planning of per sonnel requirements and resources; that no single War Department agency had adequate responsibility or authority for an integrated Army-wide personnel system; that the major commands and the theaters had not participated extensively enougjh in replacement planning; that in the formulation of strategic plans too much attention had been given to unit and too little to replacement requirements, with the result that the Army had been over-committed; and that Ground Force replacements had been too easily diverted t6 other uses. The committee recommended that G-l, WDGS, be designated as the sole War Department agency responsible for personnel planning, and that its responsibility be . 3V - RESTRICTED RESTRICTED exercised through a personnel resources and requirements "branch. G-l was to maintain a long-range master plan embracing all aspects of personnel procurement and distribu tion, and planning for operations "by OPD, G-3, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to proceed within the limitations which the plan imposed. Detailed planning of replace ment production was to "be decentralized to the three major commands, which would esti mate requirements and resources of personnel on a world-wide "basis, maintaining con tinuous liaison with the War Department and the theaters. All major changes in per sonnel policy were to he discussed and coordinated with the three commands and the theaters before they were issued. The committee recommended that flexibility in the replacement system be secured by producing replacements against maximum requirements, maintaining troop basis limits by increasing the discharge rate when losses fell below those allowed for in planning.1^2 The Army Ground Forces expressed general agreement with these recommendations. It did not favor the establishment, at the current stage of the war, of an elaborate sta tistical control office to balance personnel requirements and resources; rather, it favored continuation of the existing system of requisitions based on requirements tables. But Army Ground Forces was strongly in favor of concentrating replacement operations in a single War Department agency and of permitting the major commands to participate in the formulation of personnel policy. It was thought unlikely, in June 19^5, that the Ground and Service Forces could, during the remainder of the war, in stitute systems of personnel planning extending into the theaters as completely as did that of the Air Forces; but it was felt in Army Ground Forces that any change in cur rent practices should be guided toward equal responsibilities for the three commands. The most important recommendation of the committee, it was believed, was that for se curing flexibility: if replacements were produced against maximum requirements, rather than against constantly revised estimates of minimum needs, Army. Ground Forces as serted, "many of the replacement troubles will disappear.11^3 The "replacement troubles" whose history has been recounted in this study were outlined by Army Ground Forces in a memorandum submitted to the Learned Committpe.l^ Reviewing its experience since 19^2, the headquarters summarized its views, finding four sources of weakness in the replacement system. First, the quality, and often the supply, of men available for training as replacements had been inadequate. Navy re cruiting of 17-year-olds had deprived the Ground Forces of a fair proportion of en listed men of high intelligence and excellent physique; low Selective Service induction standards had allowed men to enter the Replacement Training Centers who had to be dis charged later for physical reasons; Selective Service had frequently failed to provide the number of men for whom replacement training plans had been made. Second, RTC capacity had been consistently inadequate to meet overseas and Zone of Interior demands, with the resultant stripping of units and transfers between branches and commands de scribed above. Third, fluctuations in the length of the training program and In major policies affecting it had been so frequent and so unpredictable that long-range plan ning had been impossible. Four major changes in the length of the program had been directed by the War Department during the preceding two years; training rates had been changed five times in the past eleven months. Similar instability had characterized policies on shipping rates, on handling of 18 and 19-year-old trainees, on rotation of cadre personnel,, etc. Changes in policy had required revision of plans, reorganization of training centers, retraining of cadremen, shifting or procurement of equipment, find usually resulted in a temporary or permanent loss of output. Finally, many important policies with respect to replacements had been too indefinite or uncoordinated to sup port firm plans for replacement production. Army Ground Forces recommended that procurement of enlisted men be made uniform, through Selective Service, for all of the services on equal terms, that physical standards for induction be relaxed only in critical cases, and that induction schedules be maintained at predetermined levels. It proposed that RTC capacity "be set at a high - 35 - • RESTRICTED RESTRICTED level, that the length of the training program be determined once and for all; that training and shipping rates "be stabilized over longer periods of time, and that depot capacity and the availability of shipping be brought into conformity with the flow of replacements. And it recommended that policy on such questions as the training of 19- year-olds, the rotation of limited service and over-age cadremen, and the critical score for discharge, be fixed at an early date, to permit firm plans to be made for the Pacific War. - 36 - RESTRICTED RESTRICTED References 1. By 31 Dec hb, according to the Annual Report of the Classification & Replace ment Div, Hq AGF, of that date, 2,050,000 had been produced by replacement training agencies of the Army Ground Forces. Adding the output of RTC's, IARTCTs and special regiments (see Tables II, IV, & V) for Jan-Apr 45 yields approximately 2,500,000. 2. Strength Reports of the Army (s), Vol II, 3° Apr ^5. 3. Par 33, Mobilization Regulations 3~1> 23 Nov 40. k. WD memo G-3/6^57-^33, 27 Dec ^1, sub: Mobilization Tng Program. In AGO Classified Files, 381(12-27-^1). 5. WD ltr 3^1(3- 11-14-2)EC-C-M, 18 Mar k2, sub: Allocation and distribution of enl repls. In 322.96/306. 6. AG®1 M/S (S), Tng Div to G-3, 20 Oct ^3, sub: Tng of Repls and AA Units. In 353/195(S).. 7. WD ltr AG 3I+I (3-11-1+2 )EC-C-M, 18 Mar 1+2, sub: Allocation and Distribution of Enl Repls. In 322.96/306. 8. ACT1 memo for G-3 WD, 28 Mar 1+2, sub: as above. In 322.96/319. 9. WD D/F WDGCT 319(3-28-1i2) to CG ACT*, 16 Apr 1+2, sub: as above. Ibid. 10. (1) AO" memo for G-3 WD, 10 Apr 1+2, sub: Repl Depots. In 680.1/1+7. (2) AGF memo (C) for G-l WD, 7 Jun 1+2, sub: Plan of Loss Repls for Overseas Forces. In 320.2/130(6). 11. WD Memo (C) WDGCT 320(3-3-1+2) to CG SOS, 26 Apr 1+2, sub: Personnel Replace ment Depots. In 380.1/5(0). 12. (l) WD ltr (C) AG 381(4-1-1+2(EC-GCT-M, 7 Apr 1+2, sub: RTC Capacity and Re lated Matters. In 381/27(0). (2) WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2(7-28-1+2) for CGe AGS', SOS, 28 Jul 1+2, sub: Allocation of add RTC capacity to be provided under the Mobilization Plan, I9I+3. In 320.2/295(S). (3) AGF 1st Ind, 5 Aug 1+2, on preceding to G-3 WD. Ibid. (1+) WD ltr (S). 13. WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2 Gen(7-28-l+2) to CGs AGEF, SOS, 28 Jul 1+2, sub: Allocation of Additional RTC Capacity to be Provided under the Mobilization Plan, 19^-3• In 320.2/295(S). ll+. Annual production of ACT" RTC1 s was: 191+1 - 201,807 19^2 - 573,733 19I+3 - 562,636 1944 - 606,968 Source: p. 56 of Annual Report of the Classification & Replacement Division, Hq. AGS', 31 Dec 1+1+. Figures (C); Annual Report (S). 15. WD memo WDGCT 320(RTC) for CG AGF, 27 May 1+2, sub: Employment of RTC's. With related papers. In 35^-l/56(RTC). See also /69 and /l59• 16. (l) WD ltr (C) AG 220.31(11-10-1+2)0C-E WDGCT, ll+ Nov 1+2, sub: Employment of RTC's for Limited Svc Personnel. In 327.3A(Limited Svc)(C). (2) WD ltr (C) AG - 37 - ' RESTRICTED RESTRICTED 220.3l(l-23-40)OC-E-WDGCT, 28 Aug 43, sub: as above. Ibid. (3) "WD ltr (C) AO 220.31 (2-27-43)0C-E-WDGCT, 2 Mar 43, sub: aa above. IMA. (4) WD memo WDGCT 353(2-11-43), 11 Feb 43, sub: Training of Limited Svc men in RTC's. In 327.3/l68(Limited Svc). (5) AGF memo for G-3 TO, 15 May 43, sub: BI Limited Svc bns at RTCs. In' 327/185 (Limited Svc). 17. WD memo (C) WDGCT 220(7-10-42) for CGs AGF, AAF, SOS, 28 Jul 42, sub: Personnel for Overseas Units. In 34l/l2(C). 18. AGF memo (Top Secret) for OPD, 11 Sep 42, sub: Preparation of Units for Overseas Service. In 370«5/Hj Binder 1-B, Top Secret. 19. (l) Memo of Col Tate, Plans Sect, for DCofS AGS1, 21 Sep 42, sub: Report of G-3 WD Conference on Personnel Matters. In A GF Plans Sect file, #185, Troop Basis 19l*2. (2) A® memo (S) for G-3 WD, 23 Sep 42, sub: Activations, Priorities and ETC Pool. In 320.2/352(S). (3) WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2 Gen(9-25-^2) for CGs AAF, SOS, 25 Sep 42, sub: Replacements of Units for Overseas Service. In 320.2/363(S). (4) A GF ltr (R) to CGs, 2 Oct 42, sub: Replacement Pools, In 320.2/l05(R). 20. AGS' memo (C) for G-3 WD, 9 Nov 42, sub: Replacement Depots. In 320.2/222(C). 21. Memo of Lt Col Banville, Asst GAG, for Col Hyssong, 2 Feb 43, sub: Con ference relative to Decentralization of RTC Asgmts. In 3^1/1024. 22. WD Memo S600-1-43, 8 Jan 43, sub: Establishment of Personnel Replacement Depots. In 320.2/5822. 23. AGS' M/S (C) G-3 to CofS, 8 Mar 43. In 320.2/222(C). 24. See papers in 34l/l024, especially: (l) Memo of Lt Col Banville for Col Hyssong, 2 Feb 43, sub: Conference relative to decentralization of RTC asgmt. (2) Wd ltr AG 220.3l(2-5-if3)0C-E-WDGAP, 13 Feb 43, sub: Decentralization of personnel pro cedure. (3) AGF M/S C&RD to G-3, 13 Feb 43. (4) A GF ltr to CGs, 20 Feb 43, sub: Enlisted personnel requisitions. (5) AGS1 ltr to CGs AAC, R&SC, Arrnd Fee, 20 Feb 43, sub: Reports of EM available for shipment from AGF RTC's and Schs. 25. (1) AGF M/S (S) CofS to G-3, 18 Feb 43, sub: Loss Repl tng. In 354,l/4(RTC) (S). (2) Memo of Col L. L. Williams for CG AGF, 14 May 43. In AGS G-2 Sect file, Observers, #35, to which Genl BullTs rpt is atchd as Tab B. (3) Observers* rpts in 319-1(Foreign Observers) (S) and (C), for example the rpt of Maj Gen W. H. Walker, 12 Jun 43, para 10 in unabridged version, (4) Materials in 353/2(NATO)(C) • 26. Memo (S) of Lt Col H. W. Wilkinson for Mil Pers Div ASF, 28 May 43, sub: Rpt of visit to overseas theaters. In 320.2/7(0verseas Repls)(S). 27. Memo (C) of Gen McTfair for CofS USA, 1 Jan 44, In 000.7/l0l(lnf Program) (0). 28. (1) See note 25(2). (2) Memo (S) of Lt Col Banville for Col Winn, 26 May 43, sub: Loss Repls. In 320.2/6(0verseas Repls)(S). 29. Memo(S) of Cols Maddocks, Chamberlain and Carter for CofS USA, 7 Jun 43* sub: Revision of current mil program;. Tab C: "Problem: to improve the present repl tng system." In 38l/l77(S). - 38 - RESTRICTED RESTRICTED . 30. WD memo (S) WDGCT AG 320.2 Gen(6-12-43) for CG AGF, 13 Jun 43, eub: Loss Repls. In 35^.lA(S). 31. Monograph #8, "Replacement of Personnel In AEF in France," Chap III, P 9t "With the exception of....those taken from divisions in training, the men forwarded as replacements had had, in general, less than one month's training and were in fact recruits and not trained replacements." Typescript in AWC Library, UB 502.5^8 U 581* 32. For this and preceding two pare: (l) AGF memo (S) for G-3 WD, 25 June 4-3, Bub: Lose ReplB. In 320.2/9(0verseas Repls)(S). (2) Col Winn's comments (S) on recommendations of WD Committee, 9 Jul 43. In 38l/l77(S). (3) AGS' memo (S) for G-l WD, 11 Aug 43, sub: Overseas repls. In 320.2/14(Overseas Repls)(S). (4) Gen Lentz' comments when Gen Christiansen first raised the issue of repl tng, AG®1 M/S (S) G-3 to CofS, 20 Feb 43. In 354.l/4(RTC)(S). 33. (1) ACT" memo for G-l WD, 24 Apr 43, sub: Eligibility of EM as overseas repls. In 34l/l059. (2) AGF 2nd Ind, 28 Jul 43, on above to TAG. (3) WD pamphlet AG 210.31(11 Sep 43)0B -S-E-GN-SPGAR-M, 1 Oct 43, sub: Preparation for overseas move ment of indiv repls—short title POR. In 370«5/4l34. 34. Memo (R) of members of AGS' G-3 Tng Sect for CofS, G-3, 12 May 43, sub: Inspection of AGS' repls at Cp Kilmer, N.J., and Cp Shanks, N.Y., May 7-9j Tabs H to N. In 333.1/lMB). 35. (1) Memo of Lt Col Banville for Col Hyssong, 2 Feb 43, sub: Conference relative to decentralization of RTC asgmt. In 34l/l024. (2) See note 29. 36. Memo (C) of Brig Gen A. R. Boiling for CG AGS', 21 May 43, sub: Visit to Shenango pers repl depot. In 353.02/l2(C) Sep file. 37. AGS' M/S, G-3 to CofS,.3 Jun 43, sub: Conference AGS' operating repl depots and 155i pools in RTC's. In 354.l/238(RTC). 38. (1) WD memo WDGAP 322.96 for CG AGS', 22 Jun 43, sub: Overseas Repl System, In 320.2/l(Repl Depots). (2) ACS' ltr (R) to Brig Gen F. B. Mallon, 30 Jul 43, sub: AGF Repl Depot #1 Ft Geo E. Meade, Md. In 320.2/4(Repl Depots)(R). (3) Same ltr to Gen Lockwood, re Repl Depot #2. Ibid. (4) AO" ltr (S) to Repl Depots #1 and 2, 16 Aug 43, sub: Rpts from AGS' Pers Repl Depots. In 319. l/lUCS1 J®D)(S). (5) Rpts from depots in 319.1(AGS' PRD)(C). (6) ACT" ltrs to R&SC, AA Comd, Armd Comd, 23 Aug 43., sub: Analysis of shipment of enl pers to AGS' Pers Repl Depot $1. In 220.3/2(Repl Depots). (7) AGF ltr to Repl Depots #1 and 2, 11 Sep 43, sub: .Tng Directives for AGF Z/l Repl Depots. In 320.2/ll9(Repl Depots). (8) Papers in,;353/1(Repl Depots) showing steps taken by AGS' to assure performance of qualification firing. (9) Papers in 333»l/l (Repl Depots) on liaison of R&SC with depots. 39. (1) TIG memo (C) IG 333-9 Overseas Repl System (AGF) for CG AGS', 30 Oct 43, sub: Caliber of AGS' repls. In 320.2/l(Overseas Repls)(c). (2) AGS' memo for CofS USA, 23 Oct 43, sub: Visit to AGS' Repl Depot #1. In 353.02/249(A®) Sep file. 40. AO* Bd Rpts #86-1, A -89-2, 111-117. In AGS' Be cords. 4l» Memo (S) of Gen McNair for CofS USA, 4 Jan 44, eub: Tng of Repls. In 320,2/101(Overseas Repls)(S). 42. WD memo (S) WDGCT 320 RTC for CGs, AGF, ASF, G-l, G-4, OPD, 12 May U3, sub: Capacity 0/ RTC's. In 35U.I/MS). - 39 - • RESTRICTED RESTRICTED 43. TO memo (R) WDGCT 320 RTC for CGs AGF, ASF, 20 May 43, sub: as above, In 35^.1/17(R). 44. ACT memo (r) for G-3 WD, 15 Jun 43, sub: as above. In 35^.l/l7(R)« 45'. ACT ltrs (S) to R&SC, AA Comd, Armd Comd, 25 Jul 43, sub: Increase in RTC's. In 354.1/4 (RTC )(S). 46. (1) WD D/F (S) WDGCT 320 RTC(28 Jul 43) G-3 to G-l, 3 Aug 43, sub: Addi tional Pers Required for RTC's. In 35^ • l/4(RTC)(S) . (2) WD D/F (S) WDGAP 320.2(29 Jul 43) G-l to CG AGS?, 7 Aug 43, su*b: as above. Ibid, 47. WD memo (S) WDGCT 320 RTC for CGs AGS', ASF, 23 Aug 43, sub: Capacity of RTC's. In 35^.lA(RTC)(S). 48. Estimate of C&RD, A®. 49. (1) WD ltrs (R) AG 320.2(31 Jul 43)PE-A-M-C to CGs AGS?, AAF, ASF, Theaters, etc., 20 Aug 43, sub: Utilization of Pers. In 320.2/255(r). (2) See note 46. 50. See Study No. 4. 51. AGF memo (S) for G-l WD, 12 Mar 43, sub: Supply of Loss Repls. In 341/104(S). 52. WD memo W600-31-43, 26 Mar 43, sub: Oversea Repl System. In 320.2/5990. 53. (1) AGF M/S (S) 12 Jun and 6 Jul 43. In 320.2/l0(Overseas Repls)(S). (2) AGF M/S (S) 5 Aug 43. In 320.2/l3(Overseas Repls)(S). 54. AGS' memo (S) for G-l WD, 26 Jul 43, sub: Overseas Loss Repls, In 320.2/13(Overseas Repls)(S). 55. WD D/F (S), G-l to CG AGF, 28 Jul 43. Ibid. 56. AGF memo for TAG, 29 Sep 43, sub: Computation of loss repl rates. In 220.3/1745. 57. WD Itr (R) AG 220.3(5 Oct 43)OC-A to CG A®, 5 Oct 43, sub: as above. With atchd ACT M/S's. In 320.2/l(Repl Depots)(R). 58. (l) Memo (C) of Gen McNair for CofS USA, 22 Oct 43, sub: Tng of repls and AA units. In 353/l23(C). (2) AGF ltr (R) to CG Pers Repl Depot #1, 27 Oct 43, sub: Revision of allotment of pers to A GF Repl Depot #1. In 320.2/l(Repl Depot)(R). 59. AGO memo (r), C&R Branch for Col Banville, ACT, 23 Nov 43, sub: Theater Inf Requirement Rates. In 220.0l/2(R). 60. (1_) ACT M/S, C&RD to G-l, 26 Oct 43, sub: Suggested directive for in auguration of new requisitioning system. In 34l/ll6l. (2) WD Cir 283, 6 Nov 43, sub: EM—requisition for repls trained by ACT. 61. Statement (C) of CofS ACT to ACT Hist Off, 2 Mar 44. 62. ACT M/S (S) CofS to CG, 11 Aug 43, sub: Overseas repls. In 320.2/l4 (Overseas Repls)(S). - 40 - RESTRICTED RESTRICTED 63. AGS' memo (S) for G-l WD, 20 Aug 43, sub: as above. IMd. 64. WD memo (S) G-l for CofS USA, 18 Sep 43, sub: as above. I11 320.2/l6 (Overseas Repls)(S). 65. WD Gen Council Mln (S), 17 Jan 44. 66. An unused study made "by Lt Col W. S. Renshaw, Control Div, A® G-l, in Jan 44. In G-l Control Div files. 67. IMd, 68. (l) Additional details on losses at AGS' RTC 1 s during Jul-Oct 43 will "be found in Ta"bs A-1 to AGF M/S (S), C&RD to CofS, 11 Nov and 23 Nov 43, sub: AGF RTC !s in Relation to Oversea Shipment. In 354.1/9 (RTC)(S). (2) AGF M/S C&RD to G-3, 14 Oct 43, sub: Losses of EM at AG3T RTCs during Tng Cycles. In G-3 Opns File 800 (Binder 2, 1943). (3) AGF ltr to CGs, R&SC and AAC, 29 Mar 44, sub: Non-production of POR Qualified EM in RTCs. In 341/1220. (4) A® M/S,CofS to G-l, 3 May 43, G-l to CofS, 5 May 43, and G-3 to CofS, l4 May 43, sub: Graduates from RTCs. In 327.3/472. 69. WD memo (R) for CGs AGS1, ASF, AAF, 14 Aug 43, sub: Utilization of Pers. In 320.2/255(R) . 70. WD memo WDGCT 320 RTC for CGs A®, ASF, 15 Nov 43, sub: RTC fs. In 34l/ll73. 71. Memo (S) of Gen McNair for CofS USA, 7 Feb 44, sub: Repl Situation. In 320.2/l06(0verseas Repls)(S). 72. Table, "Comparative-Strength of Army Ground Forces, 31 Jan 44," 23 Feb 44. In 320.2/102 .(Comparative Strength)(S) . 73. Memo (S) of Gen McNair for CofS USA, 1 Feb 44, sub: Inf Strength in the Iirf Div. In 000.7/4(Inf Program)(S) . 74. Personal ltr (S) Gen Devers to Gen McNair, 4 Feb 44. In McNair Correspondence. 75* Par 6, memo cited note 73 above, 76. (l) Memo (S) of Gen McNair for CofS USA, 19 Jan 44, sub: Gen MacArthur on Strength of Inf Units. In 32l/l00(Inf)(S) . (2) WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2(20 Jan 44) for CG AGS', 20 Jan 44, sub: Inf Strength in the Inf Div. In 000.7/4(lnf Program)(S) . (3) WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2(20 Jan 44) for CofS USA, 4 Feb 44, sub: as above. In WD G-3 file 320.2, Vol I (S). (4) Memo (S) of Gen McNair for G-3 WD, 1 Feb 44, sub: as above. In 321/100(inf)(S). (5) WD Gen Council Min (S), 7 Feb 44. 77. (1) See note 87(4). (2) Memo (s) of Gen McNair for G-l WD, 17 Feb 44, sub: Improvement of the Effectiveness of Inf. In 000.7/8(lnf Program)(S) . 78. Memo (S) of Gen McNair for CofS USA, 17 Dec 43, sub: Distribution of Man power. In 327.3/7(S). 79. WD Gen Council Min (S), 14 Feb 44. 80. (1) WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2(25 Apr 44) for CofS USA, 25 Apr 44, sub: Maintenance of Effective Strength of Rifle Companies. In WD G-3 file 320.2, Vol I (S). - 41 - • RESTRICTED RESTRICTED 81. (1) AGF memo (C) for G~3 WD, 8 Mar 45, sub: Request for Additional Inf Bns in 1943 Tr Basis. In 320.2/10 (Tr Basis 43)(c). (2) WD memo (c) WDGCT 320.2 Gen(2-7-^3) f°r CG AGF, 8 Apr 45, sub: as above. Ibid. 82. (1) WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2(20 Jan 44) for CofS USA, 4 Feb 44, sub: Inf Strength of Inf Divs . In WD G-5 320.2, Vol I (S). (2) WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2(19 Jan MO for CofS USA, 22 Jan 44, sub: Gen MacArthur on Strength of Inf Units. Ibid. 83. Rad (S) CM-IN-I7276, Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 Dec 45. Copy in 320.2/169 (Overseas Repls)(S). 84. WD memo (S) WDCSA 520.2(16 Jan 1+4) for CG AGF, 19 Jan 44, sub: Combat Repls. In 520.2/105(Overseas 85. AGS' memo (Top Secret) for CofS USA, 25 Jan 44, sub: Repls. In 520.2 (Overseas Repls)(Top Secret). 86. WD memo (Top Secret) WDGCT 570.5(12 Jan 44) for CofS USA, 19 Feb 44, sub: Repls. In WD G-3 370.5(Top Secret). 87. WD memo (C) WDGCT 200(26 Feb 44) to CG AGF, 26 Feb 44, sub: Repls. In 320.2/l07(0verseas Repls)(C). 88. R&SC ltr (S) GNRSG 319.1(S) for CG AGF, 25 Mar 44, sub: Repls in ET0USA and NAT0USA. In 320.2/l26(Overseas Repls)(S). See also 320.2/ll4(Overseas Repls)(S). 89. Statement (c) of CofS AGF to AGF Hist Off, 2 Mar 44. 90. WD Gen Council Min (S), 29 Mar 44. 91. WD Memo (c) WDGCT 370.5(24 Jun 44) to CG AGF, 24 Jun 44, sub: Repls. In 320.2/107(Overseas Replsj(C). 92. WD D/F (C) WDGAP 220.3 to Mil Pers Div ASF, sub: Repls. In 320.2/107 (Overseas Repls)(C). 93. (1) WD memo WDGCT 324.71(11-12-42) for CofS USA, 12 Nov 42, sub: Use of 18-19 age gp. In AGO Classified files, 324.71(11-12-43). (2) AGF M/S (S) Enl Div to G-l, 1 Dec 42, sub: Conference--use of 18 and 19 year olds in Army. In 527*3/l(S). (3) WD ltr (C) AG 524.7l(ll-12-45)OC-E-WDGCT-M, 5 Dec 42, sub: Asgmt of l8, 19 and 20 year old EM. In AGF Policy File, 527-3/2(0). (4) WD Gen Council Min (S), 7 Dec 42. 94. AGF M/S (C) G-l to CofS, 11 May 43, sub: Advisability of Sending Loss Repls in 18-19 Year Ag^ Gp with 13 weeks Tng. In 54l/l74(C). 95. AGF memo (C) for G-l WD, 4 Jun 43, sub: Overseas Repls within 18-19 Age Bracket. In 327.3/9(C). 96. TAG 1st Ind on above to AGF, 29 Jun 43. Ibid. 97. Rad (S) CM-IN-17276, Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 Dec 43. 98. See Annual Rpt (S), C&RD, Hq. AGF, 31 Dec 44. 99. (1) AGF M/S (C) C&RD to G-l, 5 Jul 44, sub: Physically Unfit Trainees. In 220.5/5(Limited Duty)(C). (2) AGF memo, G-l. Enl Div to CofS, 4 Jul 44, sub: Visit to - 42 - RESTRICTED UN€E-:;SSIFiED Reception Centers. In 220. Ol/35(Physical Profile). (3) Papers in 220.01/29 and. /33 (Physical Profile). 100. TO memo (S) WDGCT 370.5(4 Aug 44) to CGs AGF, ASF, 4 Aug 44, sub: Repls. In 320.2/142(Overseas Repls)(S). 101. (l) AGF Memo (S) for G-3 WD, 21 Jul 44, sub: Inf & Armd Repls under 19 Years of Age. In 320.2/l42(Overseas Repls)(S). (2) AGF Itr (R) to CGs, 20 Jul 44, sub: Asgmt of 18-year-old IRTC Graduates. In 34l/208(R). (3) AGF Itr (R) to CGs, 27 Jul 44, sub: Tng Directive for Sep Inf Regts. In 353/l0l(lnf)(R) . 102. Memo (S) of Gen McNair for CofS USA, 4 Jan 44, sub: Tng of Repls. In 320.2/l0l(0verseas Repls)(S). 103. (1)' WD memo (s) WDGCT 320 RTC(5-12-43) for CGs AGF, ASF, 12 May 43, sub: Capacity of RTC fs. In 354.l/4(S). (2) AO1 ltrs (s) to CGs R&SC, Armd Comd, AA Comd, 25 Jul 43, sub: Increase in RTC's. Ibid. 104. See above, p 26, and Table I. * IO5. Tab A, "1944 Loss Repls by Branch," to AO1 M/S (S), C&RD to CG, l6 Dec 43, sub: Tng Requirements. In 34l/l29(S). 106. (1) Memo (S) of Gen McNair for CofS USA, 7 Feb 44, sub: Repl Situation. In 320.2/106(Overseas Repls)(S). (2) WD memo (S) WDGCT 320 RTC(17 Feb 44) for CGe AO1, ASF, 17 Feb 44, sub: Capacity of RTC's. In 354 .l/l02(RTC) (S) . 107. (1) "Training Requirements, March, April, May, 1944, 1 Nov 43," incl to WD Itr (S) AG C&R Branch to CG AGS', 29 Nov 43, sub: Tng Requirements. In 320.2/710(S). (2)'training Requirements, April, May, June 1944, 1 Dec 43/'. incl to WD Itr (S) AG C&R Branch to CG ACT, 7 Jan 44, sub: Training Requirements. Ibid. (3) Estimates made by ET0, as known to the WD in Dec 43, called for an average of less than 20,000 enlisted replacements a month from Feb through Jul 44. See memo (S) SPGAR/200.3 ETO (24 Nov 43) for CG AGF, 8 Dec 43, sub: Pers for ETO. In 32O.2/15O (ET0)(S). 108. Tab B, "Estimate of Loss Replacements, Six Months (Jul-Dec 44)," to AGF M/S (S), C&RD to CofS, 7 Mar 44, sub: Tng Requirements. In 320.2/710(S). 109. AGS' memo (S) for G-3 WD, 13 Mar 44, sub: Repls. In 320.2/ll4(Over seas Repls)(S). 110. WD Gen Council Min (S), 3 Apr 44. 111. (1) AGF Itr to CGs, 16 Apr 44, sub: Tng Directive for Sep Inf Regts. In 353.01/112. (2) AGF Itr (R) to CGe, 27 Jul 44, sub: as above. In 353/l0l(lnf)(R). 112. (1) WD Gen Council Min (S), 3 Apr 44. (2) WD Itr (S) 320.2(19 Aug 44) AG0C-E-C to CGs of theaters, 23 Aug 44, sub: Repls. In C&RD files. 113. (1) WD memo (S) WDGCT 353(12 Oct 44) for CG A®, 12 Oct 44, sub: Addi tional Temporary Repl Tng. In 353?2l8(s). (2) WD Gen Council Min (S), 15 Oct 44. 114. Figures for output of RTC's, IARTC's and sep regts are given in Tables II, ' IV, and V. 115. C&RD, GAG, Hq A®, Special Rpt D, Jun 45, Incl 1 to Tab C. In AGF Hist Sect files. UNqjl^FIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 116. TO ltr (S) 320.2(30 Oct 44)AGOC-E-C to CGs of theaters, 8 Nov 44, sub: Overseas Repls. In 320.2/l66(Overseas Repls)(S). 117. WD Gen Council Min (S), 13 Nov 44. 118. M/R (S) A® G— 1 Enl Div, 7 Dec if4, su"b: Overseas Repl Requirements. In 320.2/l70(0verseas Repls)(S). 119. WD Memo (S) WDGCT 370.5(12 Dec 44) for CG AGF, 12 Dec 44, sub: Pers Repls for Overseas Serv, In 320.2/l68(0verseas Repls)(S). 120. Draft memo (S) prepared "by AGF C&RD, used as basis of conference with G-3 WD, dtd 14 Dec 44. Ibid. 121. WD Gen Council Min (S), 4 Dec 44. 122. WD memo (S) WDGCT 370.5(15 Dec 44) for CG AGF, 15 Dec 44, sub: Pers Repls for Overseas Serv. In 320.2/l68(0verseas Repls)(S). 123. ACT M/S (S) G-3 to CofS, 21 Dec If If, sub: WD Conference on Repls. In 320.2/172 Overseas Repls)(S). 124. AGF memo (C) for G-3 WD, 11 Jan 45, sub: Movement of Inf Repls. In 320.2/135(Overseas Repls)(C). 125. WD Gen Council Min (S), 2b Dec 44. 126. Minutes of these conferences are on file in 320,2/l73(Overseas Repls)(S). 127. WD ltr (S) 320.2(6 Jan 45)AG0C-E-C to CGs of theaters, 8 Jan 45, sub: Overseas Repls. In 320.2/174(Overseas Repls)(S). 128. (1) WD memo (S) WDGCT 320 RTC(l6 Jan 45) for CG A®,. 16 Jan 45, sub: Capacity of RTC's. In 354.l/l22(RTC)(S) . (2) AGF ltr (S) to CG R&SC, 30 Jan 45, sub: Capacities of IRTC?s. Ibid. 129. (1) AGF memo (S) for CofS USA, 23 Oct 44, sub: Sep Inf Regts. In 320.2/58 (TUB 44)(S). (2) WD memo(S) WDGCT 320 Tr Basis(23 Oct 44) for CG AGF, 7 Nov 44, sub: as above• Ibid. 130. (1) Memo (S) of Office Surg Gen USA SPMC 330.11 for CG AGS', l6 Sep 44, sub: Prevention of Manpower Loss from Psychiatric Disorders. Copy in (kid. Statistics Sect 330.11(S). (2) ASF Monthly Progress Rpt, Sect 7, Health (S), 31 Aug 44, pp 10-14. 131. (1) AO1 memo (S) for CofS USA, 13 Nov 44, sub: Prevention of Manpower Loss from Psychiatric Disorders. In 330.1l/lOl(S). (2) AGF M/STs (S), 25 Sep-13 Oct 44. Ibid. 132. Memo (C) of Gen Lear for Gen Marshall, 6 Jan 45,sub: Improvement of Inf Fighting Power. In 000.7/l2l(lnf Program)(C). Tabs in sep folder, Ibid. 133. Memo (S) of Gen Stilwell for Gen Marshall, 13 Mar 45, sub: Combat Tour of Infantrymen. In 000.7/l2(lnf Program)(S). Tabs in sep folder, Ibid. 134. (1) WD D/F (S) WDGCT 322(10 May 45), 23 May 45, sub: Inf Regts for Rota tion. In 320.2/l4(Redeployment)(S). (2) AGF memo (S) for CofS USA, 10 May 45, sub: as above . Ibid. - 44 - UNCLASSIFIED • *V 135. WD Redeployment Troop Basis (S), 1 Jun 45, p" 96, "line 17M60, "WD Program for Increased Infantry Rotation." In AGS' Hist Sect files. 136. Page 72, note 130. 137. GO #131 (R) ETOUSA, 28 Dec 44, sub: Reinforcements. Copy in 320.2/177 (Overseas Repls)(S). 138. Memo (S) in handwriting of Gen Stilwell to CofS AGS', undated, referring to ETO order cited above. Ibid. (2) Personal ltr (S) of Gen Stilwell to Gen Eisenhower, 21 Feb 45. Xbid. (3) Personal ltrs (S) of Gen Stilwell to Gens MacArthur (CGUSAFE), ; Richardson (CG USAFPOA), and Sultan (CG CBl), 24 Feb 45. Ibid. 139. (1) Personal ltr (S) of Gen Sultan to Gen Stilwell, 9 Mar 45. Xbid. (2) Personal ltr (S) of Gen J. G. Christiansen (then in ETO) to Gen Stilwell, 11 Mar 4-5. IMd. (3) Personal ltr (s) of Gen Richardson to Gen Stilwell, 19 Mar 45, Ibid. (4) Rad (S) Gen MacArthur to WD, 4 Mar 45. In Had File CM-IN-4385. 140. (l) M/R (S) in handwriting of Gen Stilwell atchd to ltr of Gen Richardson cited in note 139(3). IMd. (2) AGS' M/S (S), CofS to G-3, Mar 45, sub: Ltr from Gen Richardson to Gen Stilwell, 19 Mar 45, re Repl System. I"bid. 141. WD memo (R) WDCSA 230(9 Jun 45) for Dr E. P. Learned, Dr Dan T. Smith, et al, 9 Jun 45, sub: Review of WD Pers Repl System. Copy in 320.2/520(0). 142. Memo (C) of Dr E. P. Learned and Dr Dan T. Smith for DCofS USA, 20 Jun 4-5, sub: Review of WD Pers Repl System. In 320.2/520(C). Detailed study atchd. 14-3. AGS' memo (c) for DCofS USA, 29 Jun 45, sub: as above. Tbld. 144. AO" study (by Col J. H. Banville)(s), 13 Jun 45, sub: The Repl System-EM. In 327.3/114(SS)(S). The study was presented to Dr Learned and Dr Smith at a con ference with A GEE1 staff officers, 13 Jun 45. - 45 - ' w u ' t, O * ii t «L- i—^ •••inCOMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY H 3 lbc •lfi h 53b 1 iujijl'l