How the World War II American Army at Kasserine Pass Grew up in North Africa Christopher Eric Jacob Sherwood Sr

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2013 Bloddied but Bruised: How the World War II American Army at Kasserine Pass Grew Up in North Africa Christopher Eric Jacob Sherwood Sr.

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COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

BLOODIED BUT BRUISED:

HOW THE WORLD WAR II AMERICAN ARMY AT KASSERINE PASS GREW UP IN

NORTH AFRICA

CHRISTOPHER ERIC JACOB SHERWOOD, SR

A Thesis submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2013

G. Kurt Piehler Professor Directing Thesis

James Jones Committee Member

Jonathan Grant Committee Member

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and certifies that the thesis has been approved in accordance with university requirements.

To my brothers and sisters in arms who never made it home!!

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to first thank my adviser, G. Kurt Piehler, for the intellectual guidance, encouragement, and moral support that helped to make this thesis possible. I am indebted to him for his infinite patience and support of my career as an Army officer and a scholar. I also thank him for his personal interest in my research and leadership within the field of military history.

I thank Dr. Richard Sommers and Dr. Conrad Crane of the US Army Military Institute at

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania for their insightful comments and bibliographic help. In addition, I thank three archivists, Richard Baker, Shaun Kirkpatrick, and Tom Buffenbarger, also of MHI, who showed extraordinary patience and diligence throughout my research trip.

I thank my parents, Jeff and Brenda Sherwood, for teaching me to become the person I am and for their continual support throughout my entire life.

I would like to thank my fellow graduate students, Sean Klimek, Hillary Sebeny, Kyle

Bracken, and Chis Juergens who proofread my thesis and provided thoughtful and insightful comments. Regardless of any help that I received, I take full responsibility for any errors.

Finally, I could not have done this without the unconditional love and patience provided by my wife, Allyson. She is the backbone of our family that kept the household running smoothly even through my deployments, research trips, and long periods of writing. I thank her from the bottom of my heart for her devotion, sacrifice, and encouragement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures ...... vi Abstract ...... vii 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 2. UNPREPARED ...... 20 3. TRAINING ...... 80 4. CONCLUSION ...... 134 APPENDICIES ...... 142 A. CHRONOLOGY ...... 142 B. BATTLE ORDER ...... 146 C. THE SONG OF THE FIGHTING 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ...... 152 REFERENCES ...... 153 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 162

LIST OF FIGURES

1 Tunisian Front, Mid-January 1943 ...... 16

2 Battle of Sidi bou Zid, 14-15 February 1943 ...... 21

3 Delay and Withdrawal, Sbeitla, 16-17 February ...... 38

4 Citation of 2nd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment following operations in Sbeitla area. LTC Gardiner is in the trench coat near the front of the M4 tank...... 47

5 Battles at Kasserine 19-22 February 1943 ...... 55

6 American tanks of the 1st Armored Division advance to strengthen Allied positions 20 February 1943 ...... 64

7 The tactical solution for a protective front given to General Orlando Ward from the British ...... 104

8 The War Department Pamphlet coving mine and booby-traps ...... 117

9 The War Department pamphlet displays enemy as devils and emplaces Nazi symbols to build hatred for the enemy. Examples of the cartoon type drawings to keep the attention of soldiers...... 119

10 A pictorial display showed the training cycle for the Infantry Replacement Training Center. As the needs of the army changed the training cycle was decreased in 1944 ...... 123

ABSTRACT

The American Army’s first encounter during World War II with the German Army in

North Africa at the Battle of Kasserine Pass resulted in a tactical defeat. Lloyd Fredendall, the II

Corps commander, did not lead from the front and instead preferred to remain at a safe distance in his man-made command post cut into a mountain over one hundred miles from his forward positions. After the Wehrmacht launched its attack on 14 February 1943, the American positions quickly disintegrated and headquarters elements fled to the rear stranding entire infantry units on mountaintops. As the senior leaders were running for their lives, they ordered field grade officers to conduct counterattacks against a superior German armor force. These battalion commanders fought valiantly, but were overmatched and their units became combat ineffective.

Finally, two days into the fight, British General Kenneth Anderson released a substantial reinforcement element to bolster the lines and slow down the German thrust enough to allow the

American 9th Infantry Division artillery forces to be brought 735 miles to eventually stop Field

Marshall Erwin Rommel’s offensive. Following the defeat, General Dwight Eisenhower replaced senior generals who had made glaring tactical mistakes throughout the battle with capable leaders. The new commanders instilled discipline within the ranks which would play a critical role in future battles in North Africa.

Eisenhower realized that the men under his command made mistakes throughout the battle and he was inspired to create changes in combat training. First, lessons had to be collected from the men at the frontlines. “Ike” issued training directives based on combined arms lessons to the units under his command, but he also had a bolder plan to influence the training cycles of basic training and unit predeployment training in the United States. Armed with combat experience, Eisenhower flooded the War Department with recommendations to intensify training

vii to better prepare the units for war. The bureaucracy of the War Department prevented immediate modifications to existing training cycles, but by late summer 1943 training regiments were infused with battle lessons. The ability of the American Army to change training based on the lessons it received from the frontlines of North Africa was decisive to success in the North

African, Mediterranean, and European theater of operations.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The American defenses at Kasserine Pass began to collapse on the foggy morning of 20

February 1943 under a renewed German effort led by Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, Afrika

Korps commander. Throughout the morning the artillery observers fled their positions because they thought, “this place is too hot.”1 Around 1200, the Germans overran the 19th Engineers’ command post. Colonel Alexander Stark, ground commander, was determined to hold out, but by 1700 German grenades were detonating near his command post and he had to crawl out to save his life. Rommel captured Kasserine Pass, but the pass would not stay in the hands of the

Germans for long.

The baptism of fire for the United States Army in the European theater in World War II occurred fourteen months after Pearl Harbor during the Battle of Kasserine Pass in February

1943. This should have been enough time for the army to train the American soldiers for their first battle against the Germans, but the American GIs were inexperienced. The German offensives Frühlingswind and Morgenluft to capture the mountain passes at Sidi bou Zid and

Gafsa were the Germans’ final efforts to reclaim the strategic initiative in North Africa. In spite of German tactical successes, the offensive wavered in the mountains beyond Kasserine Pass and the Axis forces failed to break out of their vulnerable position in Tunisia. The Battle of

Kasserine Pass was a disastrous tactical loss for the U.S. Army. As the historian Charles

Whiting has noted, “Just how ill-prepared the GI Army were and how inexperienced their generals were became horrifically apparent at the Kasserine Pass where the Germans gave the

1 Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943, 1st ed, The Liberation Trilogy v. 1 (New York: Henry Holt & Co, 2002), 372. 1

new arrivals a really bloody nose.”2 The American forces learned valuable lessons and

disseminated them throughout their ranks. Stateside training cycles were changed which allowed

the troops to recover from the tactical defeat and along with British forces evicted the German

forces off the African continent in May 1943.

Literature Review

The Battle of Kasserine Pass emerged as a shocking, massive military loss to Americans

back at home and participating soldiers. Historians wrote about the Battle of Kasserine Pass as a

small portion of the North African campaign where the American Army learned lessons and

leadership changes allowed for future battlefield successes against the Wehrmacht Army.3 This thesis strives to answer the following questions: What did the U.S. Army learn at Kasserine Pass and how were these lessons passed throughout the units. It analyzes the decisions that leaders made throughout the battle. Were they the right decisions? Did that decision cause men to be unnecessarily killed or captured by the Germans? How did the units filter information down the chain of command? Did higher headquarters in the rear make tactical decisions or were they made at the front? This section reviews the literature of notable military historians on the results of this battle based on three principles of war: the preparedness of the soldiers, learning lessons, and the role of leadership.

In the official army history, commonly called the “green books,” George Howe,

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West (1957), reveals the primitive nature of land

2 Charles Whiting, Disaster at Kasserine: Ike and the 1st (US) Army in North Africa, 1943 (Barnsley, S. Yorkshire: L. Cooper, 2003), cover. 3 Rick Atkinson, Orr Kelly, George Howe, and Martin Blumenson all write about the North African campaign and show that Kasserine Pass was the first major battle of the American Army against the German army, but it was just the first of many battles between the two armies. Following the defeat at Kasserine Pass, the American and British Armies engaged the German Army in two months of battle that eventually led to the defeat of German forces in North African. These historians argue that the American army learned lessons following the defeat, but fail to specify the lessons beyond changing basic training length from thirteen weeks to seventeen weeks. Instead these historians focus of the leadership changes that swept through the American II Corps where General George Patton and Omar Bradley took over and lead successful attacks against the Germans. 2 and air tactical coordination by the U.S. Army. For instance, during the early months of the

North African campaign American artillery commanders suggested and implemented a centralized control of gunfire for forward observers, direct, and indirect firing. Howe shows how the lack of resources in communication and labor also constrained the development of adequate military techniques. The air-ground coordination improved slightly after Kasserine. Greater strides were made regarding artillery and infantry coordination when the Americans recaptured

Gafsa in March 1943.4

Martin Blumenson’s article “Kasserine Pass” in America’s First Battles, 1776-1965

(1986), believes the army lost at Kasserine Pass due to the United States’ rampant neglect in updating and becoming proficient on their weaponry after World War I. As a result, the soldiers received a punishment from the Germans because of inadequate training in modern tactics and equipment at the start of World War II.5 Blumenson expands his argument in Heroes Never Die:

Warriors and Warfare in World War II (2002), to include that the soldiers were not trained on the new equipment and tactics after the U.S. entered into World War II.6

During the invasion of North Africa, the American troops had clearly displayed huge limitations in training, experience, combat tactics, maneuver, and skills in utilizing their fighting equipment. Orr Kelly’s, Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa, from Operation Torch to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia (2002), implies that the U.S. troops dispatched to North

Africa against Rommel’s troops underwent a selection process based on availability—not skill, adequacy of artillery, or leadership quality. Accordingly, the most important task during the

4 George F Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1957), 410–412, 574. 5 Martin Blumenson, “Kasserine Pass, 30 January-22 February 1943.,” in America’s First Battles, 1776-1965, ed. Charles E Heller and William A Stofft, Modern War Studies (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 226–227. 6 Martin Blumenson, Heroes Never Die: Warriors and Warfare in World War II, 1st Cooper Square Press ed (New York : [Lanham, Md.]: Cooper Square Press ; Distributed by National Book Network, 2001), 226. 3

Battle at Kasserine Pass was squarely upon the Regular Army units of the 1st Armored Division, the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions, and the National Guard’s 34th Infantry Division.7 In late

December 1942, the Allied forces had postponed their offensive operations in Tunisia citing a number of tactically unsound concerns. These included unpreparedness due to poor logistics, undesirable climatic conditions, poor air and land integration, and long uncovered distances between battlefronts. With the army strung out all over northern Tunisia, Eisenhower marched farther south, where he hoped to launch an additional Allied offensive. He utilized the expansive area between Kasserine and Tebessa to offer the U.S. Army an area of responsibility where they could gain initial combat experience.

No scholar has explored in depth the lessons learned from Kasserine. In fact, there is little scholarship focused on articulating the lessons that were learned, how they were communicated at the frontlines, and changes that were made to training cycles based on feedback from combat experience. The only exception was Michael Doubler in his work Closing with the

Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945 (1994), his case study based on the

European Theater of Operations (1944-1945). He affirms that the soldiers’ ability to learn from the war and utilize improved warfare techniques contributed to their success throughout World

War II.8

Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943 (2002), suggests that the soldiers that were sent to North Africa were green troops and were not adequately trained in their equipment before being sent overseas. Atkinson aims at portraying a U.S. Army that evolved from the amateurs who fought the Battle of Kasserine Pass to notable veterans after the

7 Orr Kelly, Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa, from Operation Torch to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia (New York: J. Wiley, 2002), 7. 8 Michael D Doubler, Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945, Modern War Studies (Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 2. 4

campaign ended in 1943. Indeed, he states that, “no soldiers in Africa had changed more—

grown more—than [Dwight D.] Eisenhower.”9 However, Atkinson failed to specify the lessons

that the soldiers learned at Kasserine and over the course of the campaign in conducting modern

combat. Instead, the author claims that these hard-fought lessons and a change in the corps

leadership allowed for the army to grow up in North Africa and defeat the Germans only two

months after the Battle of Kasserine Pass.10

According to Eisenhower’s biographer, Stephen Ambrose, Ike’s “real problems were

welding these well-equipped Americans into a genuine army, winning the final victory in North

Africa as quickly and as decisively as possible, and in the process holding together the Allied

team, which now included the French.”11 Ambrose also portrays Eisenhower as a commander

who had a unique gift for reconciling differences among leaders of a multinational army.

Additionally, he turned aside the British as they tried to relegate American troops to a secondary

role after the GIs performance following Kasserine. Ward Rutherford agrees in, Kasserine:

Baptism of Fire (1970), by pointing out that one of the harsh lessons the general came to learn:

how to restructure his relationships with civilian and military leaders within the Allied

organization. Operation Torch and the Battle of Kasserine Pass stand out as a training front for

Ike’s military skills.12

A unit during war, like the II Corps, would have a meager or satisfactory performance

based on the role of its leadership throughout the battle. Steven Zaloga, Kasserine Pass 1943:

Rommel’s Last Victory (2006), affirms the most outstanding critique about Eisenhower’s skills

lies in his inadequacy to tackle the mismanagement concerns in the II Corps during the Tunisian

9 Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 533. 10 Ibid., 13–18. 11 Stephen E Ambrose, Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 217. 12 Ward Rutherford, Kasserine: Baptism of Fire (Ballantine Books, 1970), 7. 5

campaign. Despite noticing the weaknesses in Major General Lloyd Fredendall, the II Corps

commander, Eisenhower further questioned his own leadership skills by refusing to sack him.

Indeed, he seemed initially averse in the dismissal of Fredendall. However, the General would

later grow into becoming more skillful in such decision-making situations during future military

campaigns.13

Jörg Muth, Command Culture Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German

Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II (2011), is highly critical of the leadership of Fredendall as the principal reason for the defeat at Kasserine. But Muth also

believes that Fredendall became the scapegoat to cover up the massive problems in the Allied

command structure and unclear strategic direction.14 Blumenson agrees with Muth that

Fredendall was one of the most incompetent generals to take charge of a corps during World War

II. In the view of both historians, Fredendall not only failed to effectively communicate with

subordinates over the course of the battle, but also failed to provide a positive example of

personal leadership. Even worse, they criticize these two basic elements of his questionable

leadership were central to his tendency to govern and his unorthodox relationship with General

Orlando Ward.15

This thesis builds on these previous works to revisit the role of leadership and conduct an

analysis of these leaders. Moreover, it uncovers the complex and dysfunctional German

command structure where major decisions had to be made in Rome. Additionally, it expands on

the unpreparedness of the American soldiers by providing new insights into how the U.S. Army

changed stateside training regimens to provide a steady stream of well-trained men, ready for

13 Steven Zaloga, Kasserine Pass 1943: Rommel’s Last Victory (Osprey Publishing, 2005), 66–67, 90. 14 Jörg Muth, Command Culture Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II, 1st ed (Denton, Tex: University of North Texas Press, 2011), l. 5746. 15 Martin Blumenson, Kasserine Pass (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1967), 31. 6

combat when they arrived. Finding based on extensive research in previously unexploited

primary source materials reveals that Eisenhower’s involvement as Supreme Commander of the

Allied Forces in Europe in collecting lessons played a major role in shaping changes to the

training cycles which created an environment for sustained battlefield success. Ike is generally

regarded as a political general with the ability to hold a coalition of Allied forces together

throughout the war, but he must also be looked upon as the man who encouraged making

significant changes within the War Department. Although the American forces suffered their

first tactical defeat, U.S. Army leaders gathered to debate why they were so decisively

overwhelmed, discussed the lessons that they learned, and what they needed to change in order

to defeat the German army in North Africa and beyond. For these reasons, the Battle of

Kasserine Pass served as a distant victory because radical changes swept throughout the entire

American Army.

The Strategic Background

Before looking at what occurred at Kasserine Pass, an understanding of what brought

these forces together there needs to be addressed. North Africa was a marginal theater of

operations for both the United States and Germany, but their allies coaxed both into military

operations. In Germany’s case, Italy attempted to expand its African colonies in 1940, but the

British swiftly rebuffed that endeavor. The humiliating Italian fiasco in Africa prompted Adolf

Hitler to dispatch Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, the “Desert Fox,” in February 1941 with a

small armor force. The Deutsches Afrika Korps’ victories against the overstretched British

Eighth Army resulted in additional reinforcements for Rommel, but never enough for a pivotal

advantage. Meanwhile, Hitler’s military attention shifted eastwards towards Russia.

The British saw North Africa as vital to maintaining their imperial commitments in

Africa and the Middle East. Control of the Suez Canal was deemed vital in order to provide the

lifeline to India. This was accomplished by maintaining a small army and a large navy, but the

trade off was that Britain could not challenge Germany in North Africa while keeping the bulk of

the army in Britain to guard against a possible Axis invasion. Once the risk of a German

invasion of the United Kingdom abated in late 1940, Britain bolstered its commitment in Egypt

with the purpose of driving the Axis forces off the continent. The desert warfare throughout

most of 1941 and 1942 in North Africa remained at an impasse, with the battle lines shifting

back and forth whenever either country enjoyed temporary advantages in supplies, forces, and

new equipment. In June 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union, so the prospects for

continuous supplies and support for the Afrika Korps diminished. The Russian theater of

operations became the Wehrmacht’s main effort and the balance of forces in North Africa shifted

to Britain’s favor by the summer of 1942.16

Following Hitler’s declaration of war on the United States in December 1941, British

Prime Minister Winston Churchill tried to convince Franklin D. Roosevelt of the benefits of a

Mediterranean strategy. Mark Stoler’s Allies and Adversaries the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

Grand Alliance, and US Strategy in World War II (2003) describes the intense debate Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had in 1942 over the direction of American strategic efforts in

1943 whether to maintain a Germany first or shift to the Pacific. The JCS wanted a Pacific-first strategy against Japan which Roosevelt overruled to emphasize the need of defeating Hitler before shifting emphasis to the Pacific. The U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General George C.

Marshall, objected to an invasion of North Africa and instead strongly favored dedicating resources for an invasion France as early as possible, preferably in 1943. The British were

16 Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 7–8. 8 unwilling to launch such an invasion and the U.S. lacked the resources to insist for a major land campaign in France in 1943. In place of an immediate cross channel invasion of France, the

British progressively influenced Roosevelt to participate in Mediterranean operations after a series of conferences as a means to keep pressure on the Wehrmacht.17 Additionally, Joseph

Stalin also advocated combat action by the Americans to open up a second front because his Red

Army had borne the brunt of German attacks for more than a year and could use some relief.

Roosevelt finally acceded to British pressure and ordered plans drawn up for a North Africa invasion.18

Operation Torch

Operation Torch was the codename for the Anglo-American invasion plans for North

Africa. The aim of Operation Torch was to squeeze the Axis forces out of North Africa from the western side as the British drove the Germans from the east. Throughout the summer of 1942,

Rommel attacked the British Eighth Army, led by General Bernard Montgomery, in Egypt and was only sixty miles from the Nile River when Montgomery stopped Rommel’s advance at El

Alamein in August 1942. Armed with 300 new Sherman tanks recently received from the United

States, Montgomery counterattacked Rommel on 23 October 1942 at the second battle of El

Alamein, and secured a victory that started a 1,500 mile retreat by German and Italian forces through Libya. The Allied landing, Operation Torch, was executed on 8 November 1942 at three locations against the Vichy French in North Africa by a primarily American force. Although there was some resistance in a few locations, by and large the landing took place without serious opposition.19

17 Mark A Stoler, Allies and Adversaries the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and US Strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill, N.C.; London: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 84–86. 18 Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 12–13. 19 Blumenson, “Kasserine Pass, 30 January-22 February 1943.,” 241–243; Blumenson, Heroes Never Die, 426. 9

Hitler’s reaction to the Allied landing was predictable: the Wehrmacht occupied the

remainder of France. Philippe Pétain remained as Chief of State Vichy France, but this left the

situation in the French colonies such as Tunisia and Algeria in doubt. With Rommel retreating

from Egypt, Hitler dispatched a second German contingent under General Hans-Jürgen von

Arnim’s, 5th Panzer Army, to occupy the Tunisian bridgehead. A contest developed to see who would seize Tunisia first—Kenneth Anderson’s British 1st Army, marching from Algeria, or the

5th Panzer Army, arriving in Tunisia by aircraft and ships from Italy. The Germans won the race, and by the middle of December, a stalemate had developed along the Tunisian frontier, with the

Allies still too weak to launch well-organized offensives and the German forces too poorly supplied to drive the Allies back into Algeria. Additionally, bad winter weather bogged forces down and the Allies presumed a major offensive would wait until the spring. Meanwhile,

Rommel disregarded instructions that he stage a defense in Libya and he moved most of the

German units and some of the better Italian units into Tunisia by February 1943, safeguarded behind the French-built Mareth Line.20

Opposing Plans

German plans. With Rommel’s forces on the verge of joining the 5th Panzer Army in

Tunisia, the Germans knew that they could not stay on the defensive. On 9 February 1943,

General Albert Kesselring, German commander of the Mediterranean theater, and General

Vittorio Ambrosio, the Italian Chief of Staff, flew to Tunisia to discuss upcoming plans.

Rommel saw the weakness in the Allied defensive positions and wanted to attempt one last

operation before he returned to the Fatherland to receive medical treatment. The Allied defenses

in Tunisia were still weak and inexperienced American forces held the southern flank. Rommel

dismissed the inexperienced U.S. Army as “Britain’s Italians” and believed that a concentrated

20 Zaloga, Kasserine Pass 1943, 11–12. 10

attack would easily pierce the American lines.21 If the plan succeeded, the supply depot in

Tebessa could be taken and Anderson’s 1st Army would also be threatened.22

Von Arnim argued that Rommel’s ambitious plans lacked the necessary resources and that his more limited offensive, Operation Kuckucksei, would pressure both the Americans and the British lines. After discussing the issue with Kesselring, Ambrosio proposed a compromise on 11 February. Instead of a unified attack directed by Rommel, Ambrosio wanted von Arnim and Rommel to conduct two complementary attacks separately. Von Arnim would drive through the Faïd Pass with Operation Frühlingswind, surging towards Sidi bou Zid and driving the allies off the Eastern Dorsal mountain range. Rommel was given two additional days to reset his forces before he launch the second spoiling attack, dubbed Operation Morgenluft, that would take Gafsa, sixty miles to the south. The Afrika Korps was too weak from their retreat to conduct an attack without reinforcements, so von Arnim would launch his attack and then transfer the 21st Panzer Division back to Rommel for his operations. Ambrosio and Kesselring left open the issue of a further advance into the Western Dorsal until the first phase of the attacks had been undertaken. The precise date of Frühlingswind was left to von Arnim, as the cold, rainy winter weather in early February had been turning the battlefield to mud, inhibiting a

Panzer advance.23

On the Axis side, Rommel has been portrayed as a strong-willed figure who was respected by most of his soldiers. However, Bruce Watson as points out in Exit Rommel: The

Tunisian Campaign, 1942-1943 (1999), his leadership skills raised concern at the Battle of

21 Helmuth Greiner, “Diary Notes Fron 12 August 1942 to 17 March 1943,” n.d., 16 February 1943, The George Howe Collection, Box 7, NARA II, College Park, MD. 22 Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 1st American ed. (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, 1953), 393; Albert Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1989), 149–151. 23 Christopher F Shores, Fighters Over Tunisia (London: Spearman, 1975), 174; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 322; Charles Whiting, Kasserine: First Blood (New York: Stein and Day, 1984), 159. Rommel and Von Armin had first met each other eighteen years earlier and did not care for each other and their relationship had not improved over time. 11

Kasserine Pass due to his indecisiveness in selecting a battlefront following the break through at

Kasserine. Furthermore, Rommel was quick to resign to fatigue and his incapability of working

with von Armin prompted the German-Italian forces to loose their aggressive posture and retreat.

Watson stands out as the only historian who believed the Battle of Kasserine Pass was a German

loss because their offensive was stopped repeatedly on 21 and 22 February 1943 by the Allied

forces.24

Allied plans. After losing the race for Tunisia, General Dwight Eisenhower wanted to regain the initiative. He created an initial plan for the employment of the II Corps dubbed

Operation Satin. The 1st Armored Division would conduct mobile raids towards Sfax and Gabés in order to disrupt Rommel’s supply lines, the Germans’ primary concern. Anderson was skeptical of such a risky venture and convinced Eisenhower to cancel the operation.25

From Anderson’s perspective, the II Corps and the central Tunisian fronts were secondary concerns. His main focus was the British sector and defeating von Arnim’s 5th Panzer

Army in northern Tunisia. Intelligence assessments supported the idea that the offensive would take place in the British sector. The top-secret ULTRA intelligence gathering system intercepted a radio message from the Luftwaffe commander on 31 January which showed von Arnim’s plans for Operation Kuckucksei in detail. Eisenhower’s G-2 intelligence officer, British Brigadier

General E.E. Mockler-Ferryman, concluded that the main German threat would come through the Fondouk Pass and threaten the flank of the British positions.26

On 4 February, Mockler-Ferryman received another ULTRA message about Rommel’s more ambitious attack plans. The G-2 concluded the previous intercept was an approved plan where Rommel’s plan was only a proposal of possible action. Mockler-Ferryman again

24 Bruce Watson, Exit Rommel: The Tunisian Campaign, 1942-1943 (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999), 70–93. 25 Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 270–272, 282–283. 26 Zaloga, Kasserine Pass 1943, 35. 12

misconstrued later decrypted ULTRA messages and these bolstered Anderson’s belief that the

pending German attack would come against his lines. Eisenhower’s British intelligence officer

was fully dependent on the ULTRA intercepts and dismissed the tactical intelligence he was

receiving.27

The Americans on the other hand were out collecting intelligence through more

traditional methods of ground and aerial reconnaissance. The II Corps G-2 estimate stated on 25

January 1943, “Rommel can be expected to act offensively in southern Tunisia as soon as rested

and rearmed and prior to arrival of the 8th Army before MARETH line in threatening strength

and state of supply. Note his superiority in Infantry over II Corps.”28 By 4 February, Colonel

Benjamin “Monk” Dickson, the II Corps G-2, reported that the combat power was building up

behind a screen of Italian forces in the II Corps sector near Gafsa and a strike could occur in

conjunction with an offensive through Faïd Pass. Each day, Fredendall’s intelligence officer

flew over the German position in an observation plane accompanied by four fighters. Dickson

saw that the supply dumps were growing and large armored units were moving towards the

American position.

Finally, Fredendall called Anderson to say that he was convinced that Rommel would

launch the attack through his area within a day or two with an estimated four armored divisions.

Fredendall forcefully requested that his CCB be released to him to meet the very obvious threat.

Anderson replied, “Fredendall, aren’t you getting jittery?” Fredendall said, “Shit” and hung up

the phone, knowing he would not get his men.29 On 13 February ULTRA revealed the attack

would occur the following day and that the 21st Panzer Division was deploying to its forward

position. Again, the intelligence officer decided this information meant the Fondouk attack.

27 Ibid., 35–36. 28 Benjamin Dickson, “G-2 Journal: Algiers to the Elbe,” n.d., 39, The Benjamin A. Dickson Collection, USMA. 29 “A.E. Schanze Papers,” n.d., 24, The A. E. Schanze Papers, MHI. 13

Mockler-Ferryman forwarded this information to Anderson who alerted his units of the threat,

particularly around Fondouk. Furthermore, Anderson thought the Germans might stage feign

attacks so the French and the II Corps were also alerted.30

Leaders and disposition of the II Corps. General Dwight Eisenhower oversaw the allied

strategic situation leading up to the battle from his command post in Algeria. His primary focus

was on the invasion of Sicily, so he left the tactical situation up to his subordinate commanders.

British General Harold Alexander was selected to lead a new command, the 18th British Army, at the Casablanca conference to oversee the Tunisian theater with an assumption of command date of 20 February. In the northern sector, Anderson was temporarily given command of the

Tunisian front. The French, led by General Alphonse Juin, were stationed directly south of the

British. Juin was not under the command of Anderson and instead reported directly to

Eisenhower. The American II Corps, commanded by General Lloyd Fredendall covered the

southern flank, where the Germans’ offensive occurred.31 Under his command was General

30 Zaloga, Kasserine Pass 1943, 35–37. 31 General Lloyd Fredendall is one of the few people who had the distinction to fail out of West Point two times. He first entered West Point on 11 June 1901, but failed out of mathematics course. The following year, Fredendall again secured entrance to the academy and once again failed out due to poor mathematics skills. For the third year in a row Senator Francis Warren of Wyoming recommended entrance but this time West Point denied admission. Fredendall decided to attend Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he improved his mathematics skills. In those days, commissions in the Army could be obtained through passing competitive examinations which Fredendall passed in 1906 to earn his commission. The Casablanca conference was held from January 14 to 24, 1943, to plan the Allied European strategy for the next phase of World War II. In attendance were U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and representing the Free French forces, General Charles de Gaulle, and General Henri Giraud. Premier Joseph Stalin had declined to attend, due to the ongoing conflict in Stalingrad. The conference agenda addressed the specifics of tactical procedure, allocation of resources and the broader issues of diplomatic policy. The debate and negotiations produced what was known as the “Casablanca Declaration,” and what is, perhaps, its most historically provocative statement of purpose, “unconditional surrender.” The doctrine of “unconditional surrender” came to represent the unified voice of implacable Allied will—the determination that the Axis powers would be fought to their ultimate defeat and annihilation. Roosevelt, under the advisement of General George Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, lobbied for a cross channel invasion of Europe. Churchill felt the time was not opportune, and favored an Allied assault on Sicily. Throughout the conference Roosevelt’s attention was prominently focused on the Pacific war front and faulted the British for what he felt was not a full commitment against the Japanese entrenchment. The Italian strategy was agreed upon, a compromise between the two leaders, Roosevelt acceding to the Churchill approach for Europe. Churchill, in turn, pledged more troops and resources in the Pacific and Burma to 14

Orlando Ward of 1st Armored Division, who had four combatant commands (CC), designated by

letters.32

Fredendall was a leader focused on the security of his command post and ordered his

corps level engineers to build a fortified area that was designed to withstand Axis aerial attacks.

The command post was over one hundred miles from the front and drilled into the side of a

mountain. Additionally, the headquarters was located fifteen to twenty feet back into the hole.

Command posts needed to be mobile in tank warfare and near the frontlines; Fredendall’s had

neither of these qualities. He also did not leave his command post often and when he created his

defensive plans for the Eastern Dorsal mountain range it was done with map reconnaissance.

Moreover, the II Corps commander personally placed units down to the battalion level.33

Additionally, Fredendall micromanaged his subordinates and even emplaced units to establish specific defensive positions around Faïd Pass in his 11 February orders. Ward arrived at Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) John Waters, 1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, position with a letter in hand. Ward told the field commander, “Waters, I’ve got a letter from Fredendall and here is where he wants the antitank guns; here is where he wants the tank destroyers; here is where he wants your tanks, and here is where he wants your infantry.” Ward said, “Never have I

reinforce positions. America would provide assistance to the British in the Pacific by supplying escorts and landing crafts. 32 George F Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, “Old Ironsides,” Divisional Series 11 (Nashville, TN: Battery Press, 1979), 108. The four commands under the 1st Armored Division were CCA, CCB, CCC, and CCD which had elements of infantry attached. The 1st Armored Division had been split up and its CCB, led by General Paul Robinett, had been detached to help bolster the French position further north. The 1st Armored Division was a triangular division with CCA and CCB being the tank regiments and CCC organized around the Armored Infantry Regiment which allowed the division to either attack with three prongs or two prongs if the infantry were in direct support of the tanks. The CCD was the divisional artillery that provided artillery support to the other combat commands inline with the division commander’s priorities. 33 Lloyd Fredendall, “Defense of Faid Position,” February 11, 1943, The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 2, MHI; Omar Nelson Bradley and Herman Finkelstein Collection (Library of Congress), A Soldier’s Story, 1st ed. (New York: Holt, 1951), 154; John Waters, “Senior Officer Oral History Program,” n.d., 187–188, The John Waters Collection, Box 2, MHI. 15

seen anything like this before. Here I am, division commander of the 1st Armored Division, and all I have left to command is the medical battalion. Everything is taken away from me, put

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Figure 1 Tunisian Front, Mid-January 1943 [Courtesy of the U.S. Army Center for Military History]

around here, there and everywhere. Combat command here, combat command there, etc.”34

Ward had essentially been stripped of his command and was just a messenger for Fredendall who was in effect commanding the 1st Armored Division for Ward.35 The proper Army technique taught at the Command and General Staff college at Fort Leavenworth was to issue orders to defend a specific sector and allow the subordinates flexibility on how to accomplish the given mission. This exemplifies of one of the flaws of his leadership because Fredendall was micromanaging his subordinate units and from the distance of his sheltered command post.

When recommendations were sent up the chain of command to move positions based on lower leaders’ ground assessment, they were all denied and told to maintain their positions.

Good army leaders need to visit the men at the front in order to have a better understanding of the tactical situation, and also to talk with the men of their units about how they were getting along. Eisenhower left his headquarters late on 12 February 1943, and arrived at the II Corps headquarters in Tebessa around 1200 on 13 February for an inspection of the frontlines. The commander was shocked to discover the fortified command post that the engineers had spent three weeks working to build. Eisenhower asked an engineer working on the structure if they had first assisted in building the frontline defenses. The young staff officer replied, “Oh, the divisions have their own engineers for that!”36 This appalled the commander and remained the only time throughout the war where he saw a divisional or higher command so concerned about their own safety that they built an underground shelter.

Anderson also visited Tebessa to consult with Fredendall and Eisenhower, but he first met with Dickson, the II Corps G-2, who argued that the tactical intelligence pointed to a

German attack coming from Gafsa and possibly Faïd, not Fondouk. Overly confident due to the

34 John Waters, “SOOHP,” 590. John Waters was the son-in-law to General George S. Patton. 35 Lloyd Fredendall, “Defense of Faid Position.” 36 Dwight D Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 1st ed. (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1948), 141. 17

ULTRA intercepts, Anderson dismissed the accounts that the Germans would not attack the

esteemed British and announced, “Well, young man, at least I can’t shake you.” Turning to

Fredendall, he added, “You have an alarmist and a pessimist for a G-2.”37 During the briefing with Ike, Anderson stated that he believed that the attack would come in his sector at the

Fondouk pass. This allied command assumption about the location of the attack was nearly fatal.

Anderson abruptly left later in the day when his staff reported that a German attack in their sector was imminent due to additional ULTRA intercepts.38

A visit by the commander of North Africa to the front lines was ceremonial and subordinate commanders were called back from their men to brief Eisenhower. Waters had been called back to CCA command post on the evening of 13 February to brief Colonel Peter Hains,

1st Armored Regiment commander, and Brigadier General Raymond McQuillin, CCA commander, on the current situation at his position. Earlier in the day, Hains and Waters reconnoitered a back trail leading to Faïd Pass and tried to observe the German side of the mountain. However, German aircraft appeared and chased them off the mountain before getting eyes on the enemy position which further raised suspicions about German activity. The G-2 personnel said, “Don’t worry, there’s not going to be any attack tomorrow morning through Faïd

Pass. The attack’s going to come at Fondouk and Pichon.” Waters said, “okay” and turned to ask, “General McQuillin, suppose I wake up in the morning and I find that an attack is under way from Faïd and it’s an Armored Division of the Germans.” McQuillin responded, “Oh, Waters, don’t suggest that.” With the lack of guidance Waters said, “Okay, General that’s it” and left the command post before Eisenhower showed up to return to his position at the frontlines.39

37 Benjamin Dickson, “G-2 Journal: Algiers to the Elbe,” 40. 38 Lucian King Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 1st ed. (New York: Dutton, 1954), 154; Bradley and Herman Finkelstein Collection (Library of Congress), A Soldier’s Story, 25. 39 John Waters, “SOOHP,” 191–192. 18

After dusk following the briefing, LTC Russell F. (Red) Akers, II Corps G-3 staff officer,

escorted Eisenhower, not Fredendall himself, to the 1st Armored command post to discuss the disposition of their troops and the situation of their reserves. Around midnight, Eisenhower traveled to CCA command post and met with McQuillin, who briefed that his reconnaissance elements had occasionally met with Germans, but had noticed no change in German disposition or patrols. Eisenhower left the front lines around 0300 on 14 February to return to the II Corps headquarters where he planned to talk to Fredendall about the disposition of his troops, as it was not customary to tell subordinates several levels down, but instead use the chain of command.40

It is interesting to note that Eisenhower chose to visit that day, as the Germans on the other side of the mountain were preparing to attack in just a matter of hours.

Eisenhower found a number of disturbing details on the visit that can be attributed to a lack of discipline and complacency of the frontline soldiers. At one point, a commander told Ike that minefields had not yet been emplaced on his front with the excuse that infantrymen had been on the scene for only two days. This commander explained with a sense of arrogance that he had already drawn up a mine emplacement plan on the map and would start on the morning of 14

February. Meanwhile, the Americans had learned that the Germans were able to prepare strong defensive lines, with minefields, within two hours of arrival at a location.41 Obviously, this lesson had not made its way down to the frontline commanders yet and Eisenhower directed that he fixed it immediately. By the time Eisenhower’s group arrived back at the II Corps headquarters that morning, the German assault had already begun.

40 Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 155. 41 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 141–142. 19

CHAPTER TWO

UNPREPARED

In battle, you can do three things—go forward, stop, or fall back. If you fall back,

you are lost; if you stop, you are shot up. You must go forward. If you go

forward, you can envelop or go straight ahead. If you go dead ahead, you will

usually suffer many casualties, probably get turned back and lose the fight, so you

go around and envelop under the cover of fire—fire often and accurately—fire and

maneuver.

—George S. Patton, Jr42

Valentine Day Attack of Sidi bou Zid

Instead of directly commanding the operation, General Jürgen von Arnim selected his

chief of staff, General Heinz Ziegler, to oversee Operation ‘Frühlingswind.’ Ziegler conducted a reconnaissance during the early morning hours of 14 February 1943 to observe Faïd Pass and noticed no activity on the American side. It appeared to Ziegler that the Americans did not have knowledge of the German attack and that their plans had indeed been kept secret. The Germans had scouted the routine of the G Company, 1st Armored Regiment, commanded by Major

Norman Parsons, for a week and observed at the same time everyday these men guarding the pass dismounted their tanks to eat breakfast. This was the designated assault time. On Sunday

14 February the Germans started preparing at 0400 and assaulted through the pass around 0630 with a force of one hundred MKIV Panzer tanks, and MKVI Tiger tanks with infantry and 88mm

42 LTC J. S. Switzer and LTC R. W. Curtis, “Observers Report,” August 22, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 2, MHI. 20

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~~~~~~ ~~ ~~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~ Figure 2 Battle of Sidi bou Zid, 14-15 February 1943 [Courtesy of U.S. Army Center for Military History]

antitank guns in tow, supported by an artillery bombardment under the cover of a dust storm

directly into LTC John Waters’ position.43

When Waters returned from his overnight meeting with Brigadier General Raymond

McQuillin, CCA commander, he ordered Parsons to send a tank patrol out immediately to help cover Faïd Pass and create a listening post. Parsons reported that his men were in position with an established outpost when they were actually three or four miles short of the pass. The

American observation post guarding the pass was quickly overrun, so the men of G Company did not radio or shoot the pre-arranged rocket signal that would have resulted in a preplanned artillery barrage of the pass.44

When General Friedrich von Broich led the 10th Panzer Division tank assault through the

Faïd Pass, the Germans also maintained aerial supremacy throughout the day. The German air

came on station at 0715 onwards, with a combination of Stukas (dive-bombers) and Jabos

(fighter-bombers) “to add to the discomfiture of the new boys”.45 The Allies were only able to scramble four different lines of aircraft missions to try to interdict the German fighters at Faïd, but were outnumbered and did not inflict much damage. The majority of the American aerial fleet was already tasked to conduct normal bombing missions over the Mediterranean Sea where they ran into a large fleet of Axis air transport and were able to shoot down five planes trying to resupply Tunisia.46

43 “10th Panzer Division, War Diary, 14-22 February 1943,” February 1943, 14 February , Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 2, U.S. Army center for military history; Helmut Hudel and Paul Robinett, “The Tank Battle at Sidi Bou Zid,” n.d., B22, The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 2, MHI; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 339; Blumenson, “Kasserine Pass, 30 January-22 February 1943.,” 248–252. 44 John Waters, “Senior Officer Oral History Program,” n.d., 192–193, The John Waters Collection, Box 2, MHI; George F Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1957), 411. 45 Shores, Fighters Over Tunisia, 203; Heinz Werner Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert (London: Harrap, 1951), 197. The Luftwaffe had 371 available planes for the offensive. 46 “10th Panzer Division, War Diary, 14-22 February 1943,” 14 February; Shores, Fighters Over Tunisia, 204. 22

Waters’ listening post failed to report the attack, but the sound of the artillery barrage alerted Colonel Peter Hains, commander 1st Armored Regiment, of activity and he requested information since he could not see because a sandstorm decreased visibility. Hains called

Waters and asked, “what’s going on over in your part of the world? We hear a lot of shooting in that direction.” Waters responded, “I’ve received no reports yet of anything going on. I haven’t heard any fire and I have no reports of anything.” Waters was interested in finding out what

Hains heard, and climbed the hill to see what he could discover. Once Waters reached an observation point he reported, “I can hear some shooting far out there. There is a strong wind blowing, sand is blowing right towards me, a sand and dust storm. I can’t see anything.”47

Waters then tried to raise Major Parsons for an updated situational report; however, the major was not with the tank. “Well, where the hell is he?” screamed Waters. The tanker on the radio replied, “I don’t know. He’s not out here.”48 Waters sent his messenger to Parsons’ tent and found the commander still asleep in his bed and woke him as the German tanks poured through

Faïd Pass. Parsons got in his tank and went out towards his company only to find they had already moved. Parsons’ tank was shot soon afterwards and he failed to provide any intelligence about the attacking force.49

Meanwhile, Waters scaled the hill again to gain a better vantage point and thirty or forty tanks emerged out of the dust to the front and another sixty tanks to the rear. Waters quickly grasped the gravity of the situation and ordered his fifteen light M3 Stuart, Honey tanks, forward

47 John Waters, “SOOHP,” 596. 48 Ibid., 205. 49 “CCA G3 Operational Reports,” February 14, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI. 23 to block and delay, but their 37mm gun did not penetrate the German armor and proved no match compared to the German 75mm and 88mm guns.50

Once past the initial resistance the Germans split into pre-arranged formations to circle the hill of Djebel (DJ) Lessouda.51 As the 10th Panzer Division rounded DJ Lessouda Hill, they took a tactical pause to try and coordinate the encirclement of Sidi bou Zid with the 21st Panzer

Division; however, the 21st Panzer Division was delayed so Broich was ordered to press forward.

In the lead tank, Major Helmut Hudel became nervous and feared he was entering a trap.

Additionally, he was nervous because he knew the Sherman 75mm gun could penetrate the

Panzer III and IV models at 1,500 meters where his 50mm gun shells would bounce off the

Shermans. Soon after the assault was renewed, Oberfeldwebel Graf Augustin destroyed a retreating Sherman with his Tiger tank (Panzer VI) at the range of 2,700 meters during the assault toward Sidi bou Zid.52 The German attack proceeded better than planned, nevertheless they still had not secured their daily objective but did have the Americans scrambling.

At this point, Waters lost radio contact with his entire element except the artillery and higher headquarters. CCA called again and said they heard “vehicles rumbling” toward

Lessouda. Another call reported enemy tanks. Pete Hains called again and said, “There must be something going on. There is an awful lot of firing out there in front of you now. It’s

50 Whiting, Kasserine, 174. The railroads leading into Tunisia were inadequate because they were narrow-gauged and in some parts of the country the tunnels were only big enough to allow the light tank to go thorough and not the medium. The medium tanks had to be driven overland. While other railroad lines were wide-gauge. This created logistical challenges that prevented the Allies from having the proper force in place to prevent the Germans from defeating them at Kasserine Pass. The MK4 panzer tanks had a 75mm main gun while the MK6 Tiger tanks had a 88mm main gun. 51 Djebel means mountain in Arabic and is abbreviated through US documents as DJ. Allied commanders used Djebel since all of their maps used the tem or its abbreviation. 52 “10th Panzer Division, War Diary, 14-22 February 1943,” 14 February; Helmut Hudel and Paul Robinett, “The Tank Battle at Sidi Bou Zid”; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 340; Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, “Old Ironsides,” 148; Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 189; Volkmar Kühn, Rommel in the Desert: Victories & Defeat of the Afrika-Korps, 1941-1943, Schiffer Military History (West Chester, Pa: Schiffer Pub, 1991), 193. Hudel was in a Panzer III, medium tank. This tank was stopped being produced in 1943 since it became obsolete with the lack of fire power provided by the 50mm gun and the lack of armor. 24 increasing.” Waters climbed the hill for the third time and could hear the firing, but the dust again blocked his view. Waters ordered the artillery to open fire. The artillerymen asked, “Well where are they [German tanks]? Well, they’re under our minimum range. We can’t hit them.

They’ve gotten in under us.” Waters told the artillery to move back and said, “If you can’t fire, move back to where you can.”53 Somehow the artillerymen were able to get around the sixty

German tanks and continued fighting, but Waters and the remainder of the infantrymen still on the hill were not so lucky.

Despite the dire situation, Waters unrelentingly kept Hains informed throughout the day; however, he understood that he was in a grim situation with the infantry surrounded in the mountains by 0950.54 Waters told Hains, “The war was over for us. We’ll sit here and do the best we can to report to you what’s going on and try to keep in communication and be a source of information.” All the armored support was gone and the infantry was stranded. Hains replied,

“Well, good luck to you, John.”55 Waters’ was not the only unit in this dismal condition.

Colonel Thomas Drake, 168th Infantry Regiment commander, had his men split between two mountains around Sidi bou Zid. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Robert Moore, 2nd Battalion,

168th Infantry Regiment was on the same hilltop as Waters while Drake and 3rd Battalion, led by

LTC John Van Vliet, were ten miles south on DJ Ksaira which were not mutually supporting positions. As the German tanks flanked around DJ Lessouda, motorized infantry units, approximately a battalion, moved to the base with towed 88mm guns around 0900. These infantrymen started infiltrating throughout the base of the mountain but dug defensive positions when they came within small arms range of Moore. Although surrounded, the men of 2nd

Battalion maintained high levels of morale because they controlled the coveted elevated

53 John Waters, “SOOHP,” 600, 204, 213. 54 “CCA G3 Operational Reports,” 14 February. 55 John Waters, “SOOHP,” 603. 25

ground.56 Waters was surrounded by Germans and wanted to link up with the infantry who were

holding the ground at the top of the hill. He sent his half-track driver to inform Moore of

Waters’ position and that he would join Moore at night. The driver came back and said, “Sir, I

couldn’t get up there and I got shot.”57 The infantry were scared and shooting at any moving

targets.

At 1130, the German infantry attacked G Company on the right flank of Lessouda. An

intense small arms firefight ensued that stopped the assault cold. Additional enemy artillery and

infantry were brought up and another assault occurred at 1400 across a bigger front. This time

the Germans managed to overrun half of F Company and captured one platoon and a heavy

machine gun section before being driven back with heavy losses. In the meantime, Moore had

lost radio contact with the regiment but the last order from Drake was to hold the line at all costs.

Around 1600, a German officer approached the lines with an offer to accept the surrender which

Moore quickly dismissed. The German artillery barrage continued into the night before it

diminished. Concurrently, Drake and Van Vliet spent the day under heavy enemy artillery fire

but did not receive any infantry attacks.58

Meanwhile, civilian Arabs neared Waters’ position and were looking at his half-track.

Waters told Hains, “I’ve got to get – breakoff communications. I’m going to dismantle the radio

and I’ll hide the parts so that if I can get back to it, I’m going to come back to you. I will then go

into the next little ditch and hide out there until dark. Then I’m going to join Brown.” Around

56 “History of the 168th Infantry for Period Novemebr 12, 1942 to March 15, 1943,” n.d., 168, RG 407, Box 9576, NARA II, College Park, MD.; Captain Jack Lake, “The Operations of the 168th Infantry, 2d Battalion (34th Division) Faïd Pass, 12-21 February 1943,” n.d., 16–18, Donovan Research Library, http://www.benning.army.mil/library/content/Virtual/Donovanpapers/wwii/index.htm. 57 John Waters, “SOOHP,” 210. 58 Captain Jack Lake, “The Operations of the 168th Infantry, 2d Battalion (34th Division) Faïd Pass, 12-21 February 1943,” 17–18; “2d and 3d Battalion, 168th Infantry History,” February 3, 1943, 14–16, 21, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 1, U.S. Army center for military history, http://history.army.mil/books/Staff-Rides/kasserine/Vol-I- Part_1.pdf. 26

1600, Waters heard someone walking up the wadi (dry river bed) towards him and thought it was

Captain Jim Fraser, his assistant S-3. Waters stood up to discover that three or four Arabs were

leading a patrol of Germans directly towards him. They were fifteen feet away from Waters and shot a burst from their guns without aiming from the hip and missed. Instead of killing Waters, he was taken prisoner for the remainder of the war.59

As the fighting progressed throughout the morning, Eisenhower arrived at the II Corps

headquarters and was briefed on the attack at Faïd Pass but the information was so vague that the

theater commander had no idea that this was the Germans’ main effort. Furthermore, McQuillin

was preparing a counterattack and there was no other action reported on the front so Eisenhower

thought it was a local assault that CCA could handle. Eisenhower then took a nap for a few

hours before he left to return to his command post in Constantine starting at 1130. Along the

way Eisenhower and Lieutenant General Lucian Truscott, deputy commander in charge of

advanced command post for Ike, stopped to visit the famous Roman ruins at Timgad. When

Eisenhower arrived at the advanced command post by midafternoon he was appalled to learn at

the devastation of the day’s failures.60

McQuillin did not have a clear operational picture of what occurred from his command

post, but was determined to react. He thought a quick counterattack would drive the Germans

back so he ordered LTC Louis Hightower, 3rd Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, to “clear up the

situation” at 0730.61 Hightower moved his battalion, consisting of two tank companies and part

59 John Waters, “SOOHP,” 212. Waters thought the infantry commander was named Brown but it was actually Robert Moore. 60 Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 155; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 142–143. The stop to visit the ruins shows how slowly information traveled to higher headquarters. Five hours after the Germans assaulted through the gap, II Corps did not have the situational awareness to understand that the attack was a large scale German offensive and not a small or minor local attack. If II Corps had the proper situational awareness, Eisenhower would have directed the fight, ordered Anderson to send reinforcements, put his staff to work, and not stop to take in the historic sights on his return trip. 61 Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 341–342. 27

of A Company, 701st Tank Destroyer Company east to resecure Faïd Pass. He parked his tank, named Texas, on top of a small hill to observe the enemy movement around the pass. From this observation point, he noted one hundred German vehicles approached from the east. Hightower reported around 0930 to McQuillin that the Germans decisively outmatched his force and that he could only fight a delaying action. As the day progressed it became apparent to CCA that a second panzer unit, the 21st Panzer Division, came through the Maizila Pass twenty miles to the south with the intent to envelope the Americans at Sidi bou Zid.

Throughout the morning, Hightower and his men fought in a zigzag pattern while moving back towards Sidi bou Zid. Unknown to Hightower, this town served as the primary objective of the assaulting Germans and his tanks received the brunt of their attack. The relentless onslaught of German panzers and anti-tank guns slowly bled Hightower’s battalion, but the skillful maneuvers executed by the battalion allowed McQuillin and the rest of his command to escape

Sidi bou Zid before the Germans encircled the town. Hightower held his ground against the 10th

Panzer Division’s advance from the east, but he was overwhelmed when the 21st Panzer

Division’s lead elements attacked from the south.62

While Hightower created time, McQuillin made a withdrawal of his CCA headquarters to avoid the encirclement, but had left two battalions of 168th Infantry Regiment behind Axis lines.

When CCA retreated from Sidi bou Zid they reestablished their command post at a road

intersection that became known as “Kern’s Crossroads.” Meanwhile, Colonel Thomas Drake

had requested permission to withdraw his position at 1130. CCA sent a situation report to

division that said, “Enemy tanks closing in and threatening both flanks and cut off Drake. Any

orders?” First division stated to “Wait.” Then the orders came down for Drake to “continue on

62 “CCA G3 Operational Reports”; Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, “Old Ironsides,” 143– 165; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 340–342; Howe, Northwest Africa, 411–415; Blumenson, Kasserine Pass, 149– 153; Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 188–191. 28

your mission.” Drake knew he was in a dire situation, but no German infantry threatened his

position yet so he could hold out. Again at 1408 Drake requested to retrograde off the

mountaintops. Division replied, “Too early to give Drake permission to withdraw.” The last

orders to the 168th Infantry Regiment was to “continue to hold your position.”63 The higher

command did not have a well-defined understanding of the tactical situation, but from Drake’s

vantage point he had a clear operational picture that showed the Germans had not just defeated

the Americans, but done so with ease. One of Drake’s flaws as a leader was that he placed too

much faith in requesting and waiting for orders and not in taking battlefield initiative to serve the

welfare of the men under his command.

Meanwhile, Sergeant Clarence Coley, radio operator of Texas, could not contact any of

the remaining tanks of 3rd Battalion, so Hightower recognized the desperate situation and

maneuvered his lone tank into position to engage ten advancing enemy tanks from the south.

Hightower ordered his driver to stop and popped up out of the tank commander’s hatch to spot

his gunner’s shots with his binoculars. The tank crew worked feverishly to destroy the panzers

as they advanced towards their position. Soaked in sweat the loader shoved round after round of

75mm ammunition into the breach of the gun every three to four seconds. Hightower and his

gunner, Corporal Austin Bayer, worked together to adjust their shots. The tank commander

shouted you shot over the turret bring it down! You got him, next tank to the left!64

As the ammunition racks dwindled, Sergeant Coley scrambled to dig additional rounds

out of the hull while German rounds struck the skin of the Sherman. The Germans grew closer

and anticipation heightened among the crew, cramped in their steel box filled with the acrid

63 “CCA G3 Operational Reports”; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 334–346; Watson, Exit Rommel, 77; W. G. F Jackson, The North African Campaign, 1940-43 (London: Batsford, 1975), 339. 64 I am speculating on Hightower’s exact words, but I base this on personal combat experience and the detailed account of the fight by Hightower. 29

smell of spent shell casings, fuel, and sweat. The loader yelled over the rumble of the engine

that a round had gotten stuck in the gun. Defenseless, Hightower ordered the tank to move to a

wadi for protection, but before the vehicle moved, a German shell smashed and penetrated

Texas’ turret. The round punctured the gas tank, leaked fuel all over the crewmen and

ammunition, and ricocheted through the tank barely missing everyone. As the projectile lay

there spinning and sputtering fire Hightower yelled, “Now is the time to git.”65 As Texas erupted

into a fireball the crew sprinted away.66 The Germans secured their objective of Sidi bou Zid and halted their advance for the day while the Americans had suffered heavily with Hightower’s battalion now being combat ineffective with forty-eight of fifty-two Sherman tanks destroyed.

The German units could have attacked the undefended road west of Sidi bou Zid. Field

Marshall Erwin Rommel staged in the south preparing for his thrust, operation ‘Morgenluft,’ towards Gafsa where he advocated to von Arnim to follow up on his tactical success. “At this success, I urged the Fifth Army, which was in charge of the operation, to push straight on during the night, keep the enemy on the run and take Sbeitla.” Rommel further noted in his diary,

“Tactical successes must be ruthlessly exploited. A routed enemy who, on the day of his flight, can be rounded up without much effort, may reappear on the morrow restored to his full fighting power. ”67 Conversely, von Arnim decided not to heed this advice and instead waited for the

65 “Single U.S. Tank Fights 10 Germans: Machine Named Texas Stages Alamo of Its Own to Save 300 Lives in Tunisia,” New York Times, February 21, 1943. 66 “CCA G3 Operational Reports”; “African Campaign--1st Armored Regiment,” July 10, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI; “Single U.S. Tank Fights 10 Germans: Machine Named Texas Stages Alamo of Its Own to Save 300 Lives in Tunisia.” The following titles also have summaries of this action. Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, “Old Ironsides,”; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn; George F Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1957); Martin Blumenson, Kasserine Pass (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1967); Kelly, Meeting the Fox. 67 Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 398. 30

allied counterattack in the morning. Thus, the 21st Panzer Division did not follow up the retreating Americans until the night of 16 February.

American Counterattack 15 February

During the evening of 14 February, the allied command did not have a clear picture of what happened throughout the day. There were serious intelligence failures because CCA had failed to identify the 10th Panzer Division as the unit that advanced through Faïd Pass. In fact, the 10th Panzer Division was not positively identified until 1226, 15 February.68 Thus, General

Kenneth Anderson assumed that this was a feint attack and believed that the 10th Panzer Division would still make the main push in his northern sector which prevented Anderson from ordering reinforcements to the American southern sector. Fredendall pleaded with Anderson to release

CCB for a planned counterattack the next day. At first Anderson did not want to release any of

CCB. Finally, Anderson relented to Fredendall’s appeal and allowed one medium tank battalion to join the morning’s counteroffensive. Anderson was more interested in preventing the

Germans from piercing a soft underbelly gap, as II Corps retreated, into the British sector of the

Maktar valley than in helping the Americans. So he authorized elements from the 34th Infantry

Division to withdraw from Fondouk and Pichon and established a new defensive position at

Sbiba.69 Thus, the Americans were left to fend for themselves on the morning of 15 February.

The loss of the effectiveness of CCA at DJ Lessouda necessitated the immediate

withdrawal of 2nd Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, LTC James Alger, from CCB to report to

Colonel Robert Stack, CCC commander, and conduct a counterattack. On Sunday evening at

2010 Anderson sent Fredendall a message, “As regards action in Sidi bou Zid: concentrate

68 “The 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion G3 Logs 12 to 26,” February 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI. 69 Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 156. 31

tomorrow on clearing up situation there and destroying [the] enemy.”70 By the time the orders

got down to 1st Armored Division, Ward wrote in his diary that “[I] did not like it much,” but he

did not protest the order or firmly request larger reinforcements.71 Instead, LTC Alger, a twenty-

nine year old West Point graduate from Massachusetts, was tapped to lead the assault to retake

the town of Sidi bou Zid, destroy the German armor, and rescue the stranded infantrymen with a

force that was weaker than the counteroffensive the previous day. The only available assets to

Alger were an artillery battalion (minus one battery) and 1st Infantry Battalion, 6th Infantry

Regiment.72 Ward wrote in his diary, “Alger [was] more or less on [his] own [with] many AT

[anti-tank] guns against him.”73

Alger listened to advice from his old boss and readied his men before launching the assault against the entrenched Germans. Before Brigadier General Paul Robinett, CCB commander, released Alger, he “cautioned him against precipitate action or ‘rat racing’ as it was called in the Division; but I [Robinett] doubt that he really understood the power of the enemy’s guns.”74 From approximately 0600 until 1300, Alger prepared his unit for the forward movement and included a two-hour rehearsal. The planned counteroffensive covered thirteen miles of flat open desert terrain with wadis. No prior reconnaissance was conducted. At 1300,

LTC James Alger led the attack, according to then-current Army doctrine, with his tanks advancing in a line across the field with mounted infantry and artillery in support. The Germans had set a trap and expected a larger force so they delayed their response until they knew this small force was the entire counterattack heading their direction. The American maps on hand

70 “First Army to II Corps,” February 14, 1943, RG 331, AFHQ microfilm, AFHQ G-3 Forward, R-100-D, 319.1, NARA II, College Park, MD. 71 Orlando Ward, “Diary,” February 15, 1943, The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 10, MHI. 72 Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 350. LTC Alger’s task force reported to Robert Stack, CCC commander, for this operation. 73 Ward, “Diary.” 74 Paul Robinett, Armor Command (McGregor & Werner, 1958), 157. 32

did not show these obstacles, and Alger was forced to transform his formation into a single

column at the initial obstacle. The Germans started harassing the Americans with aerial

bombardments and after twenty minutes the assault configuration was reestablished and Alger

slowed the rate of travel as they approached the second wadi. Additionally, Alger was waiting

for a promised air attack—that did not come—on Sidi bou Zid which would have provided

updated intelligence on the enemy disposition.75

At this point, the Germans fired airburst artillery rounds above the most likely crossing

points of the wadi to disrupt the advance, thus causing the tanks to “button up.”76 Usually, the

tank commander kept his upper torso exposed to maintain maximum situational awareness;

however, overhead-exploding rounds forced the tanks into greater protection mode. Despite the

limited visibility, Alger’s D Company located and destroyed six hidden German guns positioned

to cause havoc at the crossing site. The tanks clambered out of the second wadi and made for the

third and final wadi before the town.

Alger decided to leave one reserve tank company at the second wadi and traversed the

final wadi before Sidi bou Zid while heavy German artillery continued to rain down. By 1530,

Alger snatched the village after personally destroying two German tanks, the destruction of

numerous gun positions, and continued towards the stranded infantrymen to the east. The

battalion command had accomplished one of his objectives but the success was short-lived.

Subordinate commanders reported to Alger between 1545 and 1555 that enemy tanks were

approaching the town from both the north and the south. With the American flanks exposed, the

75 “10th Panzer Division, War Diary, 14-22 February 1943,” 15 February; “21st Panzer Division War Diary,” February 1943, 15 February, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 2, U.S. Army center for military history; “LTC James D. Alger Papers,” January 10, 1991, The James Alger Collection, USMA; “Historical Record of CCC, 1st Armored Division 23 January to 19 February 1943,” February 1943, 15 February, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 2, MHI. 76 The term button-up refers to a tank crew closing all of its hatches. This posture affords maximum protection for the crew but greatly reduces visibility to the narrow viewing slits. Tank commanders do not like to take this posture unless survival dictates. 33

German tanks launched a surprise assault. The Americans struggled to maneuver and the

Germans killed and destroyed the Americans within their designated kill zone area. At 1651

Colonel Stack asked Alger for an updated situational report and what help he needed. Alger

replied, “Still pretty busy.”77 An enemy round soon severed the radio antenna and this was the last report Alger sent to Stack. By 1808, Colonel Stack ordered a retreat and only the infantry and artillery were able to make it back to the American lines.78 Alger preformed well with his lack of reconnaissance and intelligence on the German forces. Furthermore, Anderson’s insistence on reclaiming Sidi bou Zid without releasing Brigadier General Paul Robinett’s CCB to 1st Armored Division led to an unnecessary, second horrific American defeat in as many days.

The counterattack had failed before dusk, but Fredendall did not call Truscott to report on the operation until the following morning 0800, 16 February. The II Corps commander reported,

“The picture this morning does not look too good…Information is still confusing but G-3 has them [1st Armored Division] on the phone getting the latest information. I will have a full report and will call you back in a few minutes.” A little later, Fredendall called again to pass on the news about the devastating loss of Alger’s battalion.79 Even at the early stages in this battle, the

II Corps commander was not an engaging or involved leader. He did not leave his command post to personally follow up on the counteroffensive or even call 1st Armored Division to request an update before he went to bed for the evening on 15 February. Worse he called higher headquarters first thing in the morning even before he asked his operations staff what occurred during the battle. From the beginning, the II Corps had an ineffective commanding general.

77 “Historical Record of CCC, 1st Armored Division 23 January to 19 February 1943,” 15 February. 78 “LTC James D. Alger Papers,” 9–12; “Historical Record of CCC, 1st Armored Division 23 January to 19 February 1943,” 15 February; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 350–351; Blumenson, “Kasserine Pass, 30 January-22 February 1943.,” 248–252; Whiting, Kasserine, 187–191; Jackson, The North African Campaign, 1940-43, 340– 341; Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 204. 79 Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 157. 34

Around 1700 on 15 February, while Alger was in the middle of a dogfight for his life,

Eisenhower authorized Anderson’s request to move back to defensive positions on the Western

Dorsal. In order to cover the withdrawal the Allies needed to hold Sbeitla at all costs.80 At 1900 on 15 February, General Robinett received orders from II Corps to move at once to Sbeitla and revert to 1st Armored Division’s authority. General Fredendall said, “Move the big elephants to

Sbeitla, move fast, and come shooting!”81 Robinett created two columns to move his troops

sixty-two miles starting at 2130, and the command closed in at Sbeitla at 0830, 16 February.

However, not all forces were pulled back immediately as the withdrawal of the CCA at Kern’s

Crossing would have to wait while the Americans tried a bold plan with their stranded

infantrymen.

At dusk on the night of 15 February, Robert Moore and his trapped infantrymen on

Djebel Lessouda received an aerial dropped message that stated, “Tank destroyers and infantry

will occupy positions T-6363 [Kern’s Crossing] at 2200 hours tonight to cover your withdrawal.

You are to withdraw to position to road west of Blid Chegas where guides will meet you. Bring

everything you can. Signed General Orlando Ward.”82 After reading the message, LTC Moore

called for a conference of his company commanders where he decided to initiate the withdrawal

at 2230 hours. He went over the route, order of march, and to only return fire if the column was

fired upon first. Preparations were started immediately and the men’s demeanor brightened,

even though they faced a fifteen-mile march through the lines of two divisions of German armor

and infantry. All heavy weapons and radios were disassembled and made unserviceable. All

written records and maps were burned to prevent them from falling into enemy hands.

80 Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 217. 81 Robinett, Armor Command, 164. 82 “2d and 3d Battalion, 168th Infantry History,” 17. The order is in all capital letters in the original document. The location T-6363 was known as Kern’s Crossings. 35

At the prescribed time, Moore’s men formed two columns and marched off the mountain with the battalion commander leading the way. Before leaving, Moore took the German prisoners they had captured on 14 February and told them “if they made one false move or noise of any kind to attract attention, that they would be bayonetted on the spot.”83 After only 800 yards at the base of the mountain, the column encountered a battery of four towed 88mm guns digging artillery pits. “So close was the column to the guns that any one individual in the column could have reached out and touched the guns.”84 One crewmember popped his head out of his foxhole and shouted something in German to the column. Moore and his men ignored this man and kept marching. Without thinking twice, the German crewmember went back to work on his foxhole. As Moore continued to march, they encountered a second German line around

0345 near the prescribed rally point. Moore thought this was the Americans and moved towards the voices he heard. As he got closer he realized they were speaking German and had challenged

Moore twice. When Moore did not respond to the inquiry the Germans answered with machine gun fire. Moore yelled, “Scatter and to run like hell!”85 The column quickly moved back toward

DJ Lessouda and dispersed according to plan before starting to infiltrate in smaller units. The plan had worked and at 0500, 16 February Moore had finally reached American lines. His men slowly straggled in throughout the day and of the 904 men he started with on 14 February, a total of 432 made it safely back to American lines on 16 February. The remainder of his unit was either killed or picked up by the Germans over the next two days as prisoners of war.86

83 Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 208. 84 Captain Jack Lake, “The Operations of the 168th Infantry, 2d Battalion (34th Division) Faïd Pass, 12-21 February 1943,” 20. 85 “2d and 3d Battalion, 168th Infantry History,” 18. 86 Captain Jack Lake, “The Operations of the 168th Infantry, 2d Battalion (34th Division) Faïd Pass, 12-21 February 1943,” 19–212; “2d and 3d Battalion, 168th Infantry History,” 17–19; Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 207–210; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 353–354. 36

The big operational picture as seen by General Truscott after two long days consisted of

over one hundred American tanks destroyed, two artillery battalions overrun, and two battalions

of infantry lost and stranded behind enemy lines. Eisenhower was fully briefed on this situation

and decided that he could best serve the fight from his headquarters in Algiers. Upon arrival at

the local airfield the airplane was not ready and Eisenhower decided to return by car. Before

leaving he handed Truscott two hand written notes with his thoughts about the battlefront.

Eisenhower still did not know this was the major offensive but he did understand that any attack

against Anderson’s lines could not be very significant. Hence, Anderson needed to support II

Corps with direct forces, infantry, tanks, and support elements as soon as possible. Additionally,

II Corps must organize their lines with a strong defensive posture including mines and

reconnaissance must be conducted prior to digging in.87 All this damage had been done before

Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, the “Desert Fox,” even brought his forces into the fight.

Battle of Sbeitla and Rommel Enters Engagement

Operation ‘Morgenluft’ was scheduled to begin 16 February but Rommel sent a reconnaissance element early to Gafsa. The Allies had indications that the Afrika Korps was advancing in the south toward Gafsa and Anderson insisted to Fredendall to evacuate that garrison on 14 February. Gafsa was hastily packed up and soon Highway 15, heading northwest, overflowed with army trucks, overloaded refugee carts, and livestock. A rear guard of engineers and rangers stayed in Gafsa overnight to blow up the bridges and the power station.88

Anderson’s decision to shorten the southern flank saved the men at Gafsa from Rommel’s

upcoming offensive.

87 Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 158. 88 Ibid., 156; Watson, Exit Rommel, 77; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 347–348; Jackson, The North African Campaign, 1940-43, 340. 37

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~~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ Figure 3 Delay and Withdrawal, Sbeitla, 16-17 February [Courtesy of the US Army Center of Military History]

Oberleutnant Heinz Schmidt led a company of scouts, 2nd Battalion, Special Group 288,

in a reconnaissance on Gafsa on 15 February and discovered that it had already been evacuated

with the exception of the rear guard of American rangers and Derbyshire Yeomanry. Once the

city belonged to the Germans, they quickly started to search for supplies and were pleased to find

a truck full of cigarettes. The men were happy to have the lavish American rations in their hands

after their long retreat from Egypt. The Germans, under Rommel, would capture operational

vehicles and they would use them to fill their shortages. After one hour of taking the city,

Schmidt and his men were ordered to pursue the rearguard to Feriana but were stopped by

American artillery and allied dive-bombers.89 Meanwhile, the ‘Desert Fox’ thought the

American “command appeared to be getting jittery and they were showing the lack of decision

typical of men commanding for the first time in a difficult situation.”90

Rommel arrived in Gafsa on the morning of 16 February, even though von Arnim did not

send the 21st Panzer Division to the ‘Desert Fox’ as planned for operation ‘Morgenluft’. Von

Arnim figured he could keep the panzer division for his own use since Rommel had already

achieved his objective without them. Hitler’s veteran commander was an aggressive battlefield

leader and he decided to continue moving west to take the abandoned airfields at Feriana and

Thelepte, because his eyes were focused on the bigger objective of the American supply depot at

Tebessa. He sent this plan up the chain of command for approval and had to wait two days

before receiving authorization from Comando Supremo. At the same time, von Arnim sent his

own plans for approval to wheel north to attack the British. The lack of a unified command on

the ground in Tunisia hurt the Germans here. It is interesting to consider the Axis leadership

challenges since they had already been at war for over three years yet still had serious issues of

89 Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert, 198–199, 202. 90 Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 400. 39

command over military operations. Thus proving that conducting war was an inexact science or

more of an art than a science. The Germans had met their initial objectives but were left with the

inevitable question of their next steps. The Allies had lacked security on their radio

transmissions during their retreat so the Germans understood if they pushed their offensive they

would only encounter rear guard elements of a retreat. Instead, von Arnim elected to do mop-up

operations and reconnaissance. Nevertheless, before the day was over, Comando Supremo

ordered von Arnim to strike Sbeitla during the afternoon of 16 February.91

While the Germans waited on orders, the Americans tried to regroup. The II Corps had already suffered the loss of ninety-eight medium tanks, fifty-seven half tracks, and twenty-nine heavy artillery guns. These heavy losses ruled out the possibility of any additional counterattacks.92 Ward finally had the chance to fight as a division now that CCB returned. His initial plan was for CCA to cover the northern sector of the Faïd-Sbeitla road with the remnants of CCC supporting while CCB covered the southern sector about three miles east of Sbeitla. In order to established these new lines CCB displaced forward at 1430 but heavy traffic delayed them establishing their positions until 1830. Meanwhile, CCA still held Kern’s Crossroad and tasked Captain Herman McWatters, G Company, 13th Armored Regiment, to cover CCA’s

withdrawal to Sbeitla. McWatters had worked out a leapfrog plan with LTC Ben Crosby, 3rd

Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, who took up a position on the high ground to the rear of G

Company. Throughout the afternoon the Germans pressed McWatters who had to start falling

backwards. Crosby observed this advance and waited until the German flanks were exposed

91 “Fifth Panzer Army War Diary, 10-17 February 1943,” n.d., 16 February, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 1, U.S. Army center for military history; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 357–359; Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, “Old Ironsides,” 169. 92 “Allied Force Headquarters: Commander-in-Chief’s Dispatch, North African Campaign 1942-1943,” n.d., 35, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 3, MHI. 40

before he attacked with H Company. The Germans were caught by surprise and forced to

withdrawal temporarily.93 McWatters showed poise on the battlefield and allowed the CCA to retrograde in an organized fashion and establish a defensive line around Sbeitla. However, the

Germans did not wait long to strike again. At dusk illumination artillery rounds were fired into the air above the American position to allow the battle to continue throughout the hours of darkness.94

When the 21st Panzer Division renewed their assault at dusk, the scene on the allied side

quickly turned chaotic. Retreats were never orderly, but panic and fear quickly set in with the

soldiers of CCA and CCC. McWatters maintained his position until the last possible minute

when he reported a large armored column heading westward. Crosby finally ordered the

company to fall back to the battalion’s lines to help reinforce for the pending attack. Here the

lack of night training for the Americans was displayed as Crosby tried to resupply his battalion

and infuse McWatters’ company behind his lines at the same time. Confusion quickly ensued

with multiple moving vehicles and some of Croby’s tanks joined other elements of CCA heading

towards the rear. Colonel Stack was trying to restore order through Ward as CCA was quickly

disappearing through his lines. Then at 2030 engineers at Sbeitla blew up the ammunition dump

without any type of warning causing a terrific explosion. The sky was lighted up by “a display

of pyrotechnics beyond the Fourth-of-July dreams of any boy. The ammunition, gasoline, and

other supplies for an offensive operation went up in smoke.”95 The little organization left among

the Americans on the northern flank was now gone as men fled as fast as possible for the rear.96

93 Robinett, Armor Command, 164–165; “CCA G3 Operational Reports,” 16 February 1943. 94 When an illumination round is fired a brilliant white flare lights up the sky to stimulate daytime conditions to allow the battle to continue. This flare is attached to a parachute which allows for a slow descent and maximizes artificial light and minimizes number of rounds to be fired. 95 Robinett, Armor Command, 166. 96 “CCA G3 Operational Reports”; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 360–366. 41

Additionally, the explosion practically invited the enemy to enter Sbeitla and the 21st Panzer

Division continued to press its attack.

Ward would not give up so easily and he determined to fight it out at Sbeitla even though the situation along the frontlines continued to crumble. The soldiers were scared and not used to night fighting. After three days of retreating and being defeated by the Germans, many men lost their confidence and discipline. Although the scene on the Allies’ side was pure chaos, the

Germans had intercepted a message indicating that the Americans were abandoning Sbeitla, so they were surprised to find a tough defense and called off the attack.97 At 2230 16 February

Truscott telephoned the Corps G-3 to seek additional information on the offensive and was told that it had only been a scouting mission to conduct reconnaissance but had since returned east and the front was quiet. The Germans renewed their assault on CCA’s lines at 2245 and immediately the American command post and artillery displaced to the rear. The men were scared but continued to fight until it was reported at 0000 that elements were retreating to the rear without orders. Staff officers had to put their vehicles across the roads and check each vehicle to allow them through or send them to assembly areas by units and later sent back to the front.98 At 0100 on 17 February, Fredendall called Truscott, frantically reporting that an estimated eighty-nine German tanks assaulted their lines by moonlight and he considered the situation “extremely grave, and [was] uncertain of [1st Armored Division’s] ability to hold.”99

Right after finishing the phone call, Truscott was handed a message that reported the Germans were fighting all around Ward’s command post. The situation looked very grave at this point in the battle and the outcome was far from certain but Ward continued to fight. The Americans

97 Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, “Old Ironsides,” 172–173; Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 220. 98 “CCA G3 Operational Reports.” 99 Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 160. 42

were on the verge of suffering another horrific defeat and of losing the last of their armored

capability.

The Americans had finally received a break and Fredendall called Truscott at 0130 to

report good news. Anderson’s chief of staff, Brigadier General C.V. O’N. McNabb, ordered

Sbeitla held “at all costs…for a minimum of at least twelve hours” before a withdrawal was

authorized.100 On the morning of 17 February after Anderson awoke, Fredendall got into an argument about how long to hold Sbeitla. Anderson did not agree with his chief of staff and told

Fredendall “to hold all day at Sbeitla.” The II Corps commander disputed this firmly, as he could not afford to let 1st Armored Division get into “another dog fight” and possibly lose them as a

fighting force. Anderson finally relented and authorized Fredendall to hold until 1100.101 The II

Corps commander finally showed that he had some fight in him by standing up to his superior,

although it would not last. Meanwhile, at the lower level, the ingenuity of the staff officer of

CCA had placed enough manpower back at the front to stop the German advance in their sector

with artillery and tank fire by 0200. With the offensive fizzling out, word came down from

Ward around 0314 that ordered Sbeitla be held at all costs until 1100 on 17 February.102 The

battered men of CCA could finally breathe a sign of relief but were expecting a renewed attack at

daylight.

Marooned 168th Infantry Regiment

While the 1st Armored Division was engaged in a tank fight around Sbeitla, Colonel

Drake was still stranded on Djebel Ksaira and Garet Hadid near Sidi bou Zid. This position was

worse than Robert Moore’s with the Allied lines twice the distance. Drake commanded over

100 Ibid., 161. 101 Ibid., 162. 102 “CCB Operations Report, 15 to 18 February 1943,” March 1, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 2, MHI; Robinett, Armor Command, 166; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 360–364. 43

1,900 men and the American lines were now over thirty miles. The last message Drake reported

at 0953 16 February stated no change to the “situation, besieged, good strength, good morale.”103

In fact, the situation was much worse, as supplies were running low especially food and water.

Fredendall telephoned Truscott and said, “As for Drake over to the east, I have sent him word that he will have to cut his way out. You can’t give him much help. The air [resupply] mission we laid on today could not be flown” due to poor weather and a low ceiling throughout the afternoon.104

Around 1500 on 16 February, CCA sent a radio message to the 168th Infantry Regiment that said, “Fight your way out—time and place yours—air cover will be provided—instructions will be dropped by plane this afternoon!”105 Three American fighter planes came overhead around 1700 and dropped a message four and a half miles from the command point which was not retrieved until 2000. Drake summoned his commanders, came up with an exfiltration plan, and ordered his men to destroy any equipment they could not carry out. Drake’s code word,

“Bust the balloon,” to start the exfiltration was issued at 2130.106

The units made their final preparations but the withdrawal off the mountaintop took longer than expected to start, as there were many causalities. It was decided to leave one enlisted medic with the wounded at the regiment’s ad hoc aid station. In fact, the last soldiers left the hilltops around 0000 on 17 February. As the men marched, off they lacked discipline and left weapons and ammunition when they were too heavy to continue to carry. Additionally, they were talking as they were marching throughout the night. One soldier tossed a hand grenade into

103 “The 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion G3 Logs 12 to 26.” 104 Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 160. 105 “Report of Activities of the 168th Infantry in the Si Bou Zid-Faïd Area 14-17 February 1943,” February 27, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 2, MHI; “2d and 3d Battalion, 168th Infantry History,” 30. 106 “2d and 3d Battalion, 168th Infantry History,” 23. 44

a German scout car which set it on fire until it burned up. Luckily there was a lot of commotion

in the area and the movement was not discovered overnight even as they passed a tank park and

infantry bivouac area.

Before the final fate of Drake and his men became known, Truscott was on the phone

with Fredendall who said, “We are going to have to write Drake off . . . There is no way out. He

is completely surrounded. He had two days’ ammunition and two days’ rations. He had been

out for twenty-four hours. There is no prolonging the agony. We have got to write him off.”107

Although the men of the 168th Infantry Regiment had managed to successfully get off the mountains overnight, Fredendall’s assessment proved true as daylight brought trouble for the regiment.

At dawn, Drake had marched between twenty-two and twenty-six miles but his men were scattered into various size groups over a five-mile stretch. German vehicles from the 21st Panzer

Division soon appeared with infantry and later tanks to encircle Drake and the men he directly led. Always a fighter, Drake deployed his men into a formation and set one truck on fire. Not long afterwards a German officer approached Drake under a white flag and called out, “Colonel, you surrender.” Drake replied, “You go to hell.” The infantrymen were surrounded and outgunned so they finally had to surrender to the Germans. A staff car picked up Drake to take him away where a German general commended Drake: “I want to compliment your command for the splendid fight they put up. It was a hopeless thing from the start, but they fought like real soldiers.”108 Over 1,400 Americans from the 168th Infantry Regiment were captured on the morning of 17 February. The regiment’s executive officer, LTC Gerald Line, managed to evade the Germans and reported to the II Corps on the morning of 19 February as the only officer from

107 Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 162–163. 108 “Commander, 168th Infantry, Report, 7-17 February 1943,” n.d., 20, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 1, U.S. Army center for military history. 45

the regimental headquarters.109 A few other men trickled in on 19 and 20 February, but the 168th

Infantry Regiment was not longer a combat-effective force and would have to be rebuilt and

retrained before going into combat again.

Sbeitla Morning of 17 February

The Germans planned to renew their assault early in the morning on 17 February, but

General Ziegler had to delay his attack against Sbeitla when Drake’s force suddenly appeared

behind their lines. Additionally, von Arnim directed the 10th Panzer Division to break contact and head northeast to strike the Fondouk and Pichon passes recently vacated by CCB.110 This

wild goose chase wasted precious oil resources, exhausted the men on the forced march, lessened

the pressure off the sparsely held American lines, but most importantly gave the Allies additional

time to reinforce positions. The 10th Panzer Division met no troops, just artillery fire and mine

fields which effectively took them out of the fight for the next thirty-six hours. Once again, von

Arnim commanded his units by proxy and again missed an opportunity to annihilate the only

American armor in sector.

Ward and Robinett braced for the impending advance at dawn that did not come.

McQuillin, in typical fashion, started executing a withdrawal from his position at 1130 towards

Sbiba even though his lines were not being engaged.111 There was now a gap in the American

lines with the road leading into Sbeitla unguarded and unprotected. However, when the Germans

109 “Commander, 168th Infantry, Report, 7-17 February 1943”; “2d and 3d Battalion, 168th Infantry History”; “Report of Activities of the 168th Infantry in the Si Bou Zid-Faïd Area 14-17 February 1943”; “21st Panzer Division War Diary,” 17 February; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 352–357; Blumenson, “Kasserine Pass, 30 January-22 February 1943.,” 252; Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 211–214. 110 “Fifth Panzer Army War Diary, 10-17 February 1943,” 17 February 1943; “10th Panzer Division, War Diary, 14- 22 February 1943,” 17 February 1943. Meanwhile the German command was is an extremely vulnerable situation because Kesselring was meeting with Hitler in East Prussia and could not be reached to override von Arnim’s decisions. Rommel was sitting ideal in Gafsa waiting with reconnaissance elements striking at airfields that were southwest of Kasserine Pass. 111 The first elements of CCA arrived at Sbiba at 1730. Orders from General Anderson awaited McQuillin to occupy a defensive position east of Sbiba until relieved by 34th Infantry Division. 46

Figure 4 Citation of 2nd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment following operations in Sbeitla area. LTC Gardiner is in the trench coat near the front of the M4 tank. [Courtesy of the Military History Institute]

resumed their push they did not advance along the same lines as the previous night into CCA’s

abandoned sector but instead headed directly towards Robinett’s well-prepared defensive

position. At 1145 a tank destroyer reported that forty tanks supported by mounted infantry were

attacking them. Robinett ordered him to fight a delaying action, falling back to the right of LTC

Henry Gardiner’s 2nd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment. The fighting intensified and the enemy slashed through the tank destroyers; nevertheless, Gardiner covered their withdrawal and prevented a serious loss of life and equipment. It was a fine exhibition of leadership, comradeship, and initiative by this mid-grade officer on the battlefield.

Robinett continued to fight throughout the afternoon and did not plan on being a speed bump to the German assault as McQuillin had been at Sidi bou Zid. At 1315, Gardiner was frontally assaulted by a superior number of tanks but stood his ground from hull defilade positions.112 Gardiner told his men to hold their fire until they were within the kill zone.

112 A hull defilade position is a defensive position where a tank is behind some type of object that decreases the visibility of the tank to the turret. However the crew can still view the battlefield without over exposing their tank to the enemy before an engagement starts. When the tank commander wants to fire he has the driver pull forward to allow the gunner to shoot unhampered at his target. 47

Gardiner finally opened fire when he said, “Boys, let them have it!”113 The heavy, accurate fire immediately knocked out or disabled fifteen panzer tanks. The Germans were temporarily studded by the volume of fire but soon continued their attack.114

Robinett was holding the line, but some of his men were not as confident. LTC George

Wrockloff, artillery commander, came to the rear upset and saying that his lines had been broken and the battalion was overrun. Robinett did not believe the report and took him to an observation point to clear things up. On the way up, Robinett reminded him of General William Tecumseh

Sherman’s advice, “When things are going badly at the rear, go to the front—they are always better up there!”115 From the observation post it was obvious that the battle was well in hand and the Germans had not broken the lines. Wrockloff quickly recognized that his command post was too far in the rear and his artillerymen were displacing in an orderly fashion. This provides an example that learning did take place at all levels of command and the first step to fixing a problem is recognition of a shortcoming. Ward ordered Robinett to prepare to retrograde to

Kasserine Pass while covering the withdrawal of the other units. CCB held Sbeitla until 1500 which allowed all remaining forces to move back with very few losses. After the battle,

Hightower confided to General Omar Bradley that, “At SBEITLA it was the tanks that bothered us more than the anti-tank guns. There were just too many . . . The Mark VI [Tiger tank] is the

113 Robinett, Armor Command, 168. 114 “21st Panzer Division War Diary,” 17 February. 115 Robinett, Armor Command, 169; William T Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman / (New York,, 1875), 407, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/yale.39002009162026. The quote Robinett gave Wrockloff during the battle was not exactly correct but he conveyed Sherman’s meaning. This quote is reflective of Robinett’s writing. Sherman’s memories state, “I never saw the rear of an army engaged in battle but I feared that some calamity had happened at the front—the apparent confusion, broken wagons, crippled horses, men lying about dead and maimed, parties hastening to and fro in seeming disorder, and a general apprehension of something dreadful about to ensue; all these signs, however, lessened as I neared the front, and there the contrast was complete—perfect order, men and horses full of confidence, and it was not unusual for general hilarity, laughing, and cheering. Although cannon might be firing, the musketry clattering, and the enemy’s shot hitting close, there reigned a general feeling of strength and security that bore a marked contrast to the bloody signs that had drifted rapidly to the rear; therefore, for comfort and safety, I surely would rather be at the front than the rear line of battle.” 48

main threat. A 75 against the front will not hurt.”116 The CCB had fought with great skill and

courage against a superior force to cover the withdrawal of the American forces. In his journal

Rommel noted that the Americans had skirmished “skillfully and bitterly” at Sbeitla.117

Meanwhile, the Americans and Fredendall were doing everything in their power to bring whatever available forces to the front to try stopping the German advance. At 1045 Truscott asked the II Corps commander what resources he needed in order to win the fight. All

Fredendall could think of at that time was a replacement battalion for the 18th Field Artillery that

had lost its guns at Sidi bou Zid. Then Fredendall replied that he would take a “survey [of] the

situation and take inventory and would let [Truscott] know.”118 This demonstrates that the battlefield commander was clueless as to the current situation of his command. They had been fighting and losing for three days and were in desperate need of additional armor, infantry, engineer, and artillery assets. Finally after getting some advice from his staff, Fredendall reported to Truscott at 1330, “I am holding a lot of mountain passes against armor with three and one-half battalions of infantry. If they [Germans] get together [at] any place [with] a couple of infantry battalions, they might smoke me out . . . I haven’t got a damn bit of reserve. I need a combat team of infantry worse than hell.”119 Truscott told the II Corps commander that the

artillery from 9th Infantry was moving to the front but it would take them a couple days to arrive.

Truscott recommended that Fredendall appeal to Anderson again for infantry help or additional

reinforcements. So with the Germans on the outskirts of Kasserine Pass, it would be up to

Fredendall and Anderson to piece together the defense with whatever units they had available.

116 Omar Bradley, “Observers Report,” March 1, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 144, NARA II, College Park, MD. 117 Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 398. 118 Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 162. 119 Ibid., 164. 49

Kasserine Pass 19 February

The morning of 18 February was generally a quiet day except for some minor

reconnaissance skirmishes.120 The Allies identified Kasserine Pass as the strategic gateway to the whole front.121 During a phone conversation with Truscott, Fredendall said, “We are a little bit thin but if they [Germans] will just reconnoiter for awhile, we’ll be all set. The longer they let us alone, the better we’ll be set.”122 He got his wish as once again delays in the German decision-making process gave the Allies extra time to prepare defenses around Kasserine. But would Fredendall use the much-needed time to emplace a stout defense?

The 1st Armored Division had taken the brunt of the German offensive up to this point so the II Corps commander, in a puzzling move, gave them the mission to block the route to

Tebessa, the Bahiret Foussana Valley, and not to hold the key terrain of the Kasserine Pass.

Instead, the defense of Kasserine Pass was left to whatever units Fredendall could scrap together.

At this point in the battle, 1st Armored Division had already lost 117 tanks and over 133 other vehicles but still maintained enough combat power to continue fighting.123 The division had not been defeated; instead they had been simply misused by Fredendall who did not understand time and space of mobile warfare and the importance of logistics.

On 18 February, Ward, in a questionable command decision, sent the CCA from Sbiba through Thala to the Tebessa area which took the majority of the day to complete. Meanwhile, the CCB covered the road headed north to Thala from their withdrawal after Sbeitla and had to countermarch over land back towards Kasserine Pass to this newly assigned area, only to be ordered on 20 February to move again back towards their original position to establish a

120 “21st Panzer Division War Diary,” 18 February 1943. 121 Philip Furneaux Jordan, Jordan’s Tunis Dairy (London: Collins, 1943), 200. 122 Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 165. 123 Ibid. 50

defensive line. The CCC was ordered to detach 3rd Battalion, 6th Infantry to the British 26th

Armored Brigade holding Thala and the remainder of the command was dissolved to become

part of CCA.124 These two units passed each other to get into their assigned position instead of

being given the sector closest to them and maximizing time to conduct a reconnaissance and

establish a defensive position.

The relationship between General Fredendall and Ward had become totally dysfunctional

and the two barely talked or displayed confidence in the other. This was the main reason that the

1st Armored Division was given a support role instead of the main effort. Fredendall called

Truscott to demand that Ward be relieved of command and asked if this matter could be brought up to Eisenhower. Truscott believed both generals had made mistakes throughout the battle but agreed something had to be done. Eisenhower decided to bring Major General Ernest Harmon, commander of the 2nd Armored Division, from Morocco to further evaluate the situation between the generals but it would take a few days before he could arrive at the frontlines.125 The battle would not pause while the Americans tried to sort out the command relationships, and a battle at

Kasserine Pass was eminent.

Instead of the battle-hardened 1st Armored Division, the green 1,200 men strong 19th

Combat Engineer Regiment, commanded by Colonel Arthur Moore, was given the mission to defend Kasserine Pass. The regiment was not fully trained before arriving in North Africa and had not yet seen combat. In fact, they had spent the last six weeks mostly doing road construction. Fredendall also reinforced Kasserine Pass with 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry

124 “CCA G3 Operational Reports,” 18 February; Robinett, Armor Command, 172; “Historical Record of CCC, 1st Armored Division 23 January to 19 February 1943”; “CCB Operations Report, 20-25 February 1943,” March 1, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 2, MHI; “CCB Operations Report, 15 to 18 February 1943.” 125 Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 169; General Hamilton H. Howze, Senior Officer Oral History Program, interview by LTC R. T. Reed, February 5, 1973, 56, The Hamilton Howze Collection, Box 1, MHI. 51

Regiment from 1st Infantry Division. With a shortage of manpower at Kasserine Pass,

Fredendall had requested all the mines in North Africa. About 20,000 mines were flown in and delivered by fifty-two planes.126 Unfortunately, the infantrymen of the 1st Infantry Division did not know how to emplace the mines and untasked engineer support was limited. Around 2000 on

18 February, the II Corps commander called Colonel Alexander Stark, commander of the 26th

Infantry Regiment, to take command of Kasserine Pass and get there that night. “Alex, I want you to go to Kasserine right away and pull a Stonewall Jackson. Take up over there.” Stark hesitated. “You mean tonight, General? Yes, Alex right away.”127 It would take Stark twelve hours to reach the pass throughout the night and Fredendall had wasted the opportunity he had been given by creating a collection of various forces, without a single commander, who arrived throughout the day and night instead of giving the defense to 1st Armored Division and supplementing them with these additional available forces.

The tactical situation to the northeast of Kasserine at Sbiba was much more organized since CCA had vacated the area. The 34th Infantry Division, led by Major General Charles

Ryder, started moving into the area throughout the evening of 17 February spent the entire next day strengthening their positions.128 Luck struck the Americans as the upcoming thrust would strike hardest at Ryder’s lines and not Stark’s.

Meanwhile, the battle weary Americans at the frontline surely wondered why the

Germans did not continue their offensive. Soldiers must have speculated if they had whipped the

Axis enough around Sbeitla to made them have to lick their wounds. Or maybe their defensive position in the mountain pass was so strong that the Germans did not want to face another

126 Blumenson, Kasserine Pass, 232. 127 Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 369. 128 “34th Infantry Division, Report of Operations, Sbiba-Sbeitla Gap, 16-22,” February 1943, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 1, U.S. Army center for military history. 52

slaughter. In fact it was none of these, but instead a power struggle with a very dysfunctional

Axis chain of command.

Rommel had men of the Afrika Korps at the foothills of Kasserine as the Americans were

trying to establish a defense after their withdrawal from Sbeitla that was the extent of his

command at this point. Rommel could no longer sit around watching and waiting as von Arnim

continued to mismanage the battle. Time was of the essence because of the low supply levels

and the threat of facing the enemy on two fronts, Montgomery to the south and Fredendall to the

west; Rommel had to take greater risk than he usually would. At 1420 he sent an operational

proposal to Albert Kesselring and the Italian High Command, Comando Supremo, for an

immediate thrust towards the American supply depot of Tebessa, the II Corps headquarters, and

requested that the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions be put under his operational control.129 Von

Arnim later expressed his concerns to Kesselring and Comando Supremo with Rommel’s plan because he planned to use those two divisions within the next few days in a renewed assault against the British underbelly at Fondouk and Pichon passes. The ‘Desert Fox’ continued to press his bold plan as a possibility to force the withdrawal of the British lines without a direct confrontation if he could cut their supply lines. Kesselring agreed with Rommel’s plan and took it to the Comando Supremo that evening for a final decision. Finally at 0130 on 19 February the plan was approved; however, the Comando Supremo changed the objective from Tebessa to Le

129 The Comando Supremo was just another name for the Italian High Command. The political situation inside Italy was becoming unstable so Adolf Hitler gave operation control of the North African campaign to Benito Mussolini with a hope that military victories would improve the Italian situation. Hence, all decisions for large-scale military operations were made in Rome. Kesselring was stationed in Rome acting as an ad hoc liaison, in addition to his job as commander in chief of the southern theatre, to help expedite military decisions. Thus, there was no overall military commander on the ground in Tunisia. 53

Kef. Although the general did not agree with the orders, he knew speed was the most important

aspect of this operation. So he deployed his troops instead of arguing.130

At 0330 Rommel issued orders for operation “Sturmflut” to begin at 0800 which told the

Afrika Korps to attack Kasserine Pass, the 21st Panzer Division to strike Sbiba, and recalled the

10th Panzer Division to meet the ‘Desert Fox’ at Sbeitla to receive follow-on orders to exploit whichever pass had the weakest resistance.131 The Germans had an issue with the timely dissemination of orders. The divisions did not have much time to prepare for their respective offensives and did not even know until several hours later that they would fall under Rommel’s leadership.

The night of 18 February passed quietly for the men of the 21st Panzer Division until an urgent radio message came in at 0445 from 5th Panzer Army stating, “Get ready to march

immediately. Probable time of departure 0800 h. under Rommel in directions of 5372 [Sbiba].

Order for starting follows.” At 0634 the division received the following order, “The 21st Pz. Div.

comes under the orders of Rommel effective at once. The division will leave…at 0800 h. 19

Feb.”132 Bad, muddy roads held up the 21st Panzer Division and they encountered heavily

defended minefields covered by artillery support. The bad weather prevented the Allied

airplanes from supporting, which would have been devastating in the confines of the valleys.

This was an advantage for the Germans that they were not able to exploit.

130 Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 400–402; “Fifth Panzer Army War Diary, 18 to 23,” February 1943, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 2, U.S. Army center for military history. Tebessa was located in a generally western direction from Kasserine where Le Kef was more northwest and a British supply depot. This new objective shortened the internal allied lines and allowed for allied reserves to be emplaced quicker. 131 Erwin Rommel, “Fernspruch,” February 19, 1943, Microfilm, T313 reel 475, MHI. Rick Atkinson incorrectly stated that Rommel issued his orders at 0450 based on when the Afrika Korps received their orders and not when they were first issued. Atkinson also did not say the name of the operation. Martin Blumenson, Kelly Orr, and Charles Whiting did not state either what the operation was called or the time that Rommel issued his orders. 132 “21st Panzer Division War Diary,” 19 February. 54

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~~~~~~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ ~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ Figure 5 Battles at Kasserine 19-22 February 1943 [Courtesy of U.S. Army Center for Military ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ History]

Once the 21st Panzer Division reached Sbiba they were met by a strongly reinforced position of British and American forces. The initial attack by the Germans was repulsed and then the British responded with a small counteroffensive resulting in a draw. When Rommel arrived, he advised concentrating the tanks in a forward movement because there was no infantry support in the hills and the Luftwaffe was grounded due to low clouds. Throughout the day, the

American artillery fire was accurate and devastating. At 1710, LTC Dirk Stenkhoff reported to

21st Panzer Division “our tank attack is at a stand sill as a result of barbed wire obstacles, mines and antitank guns, and also because of enemy artillery.”133 The division commander decided to call off the assault for the day and refit the tanks for another thrust the next morning.134 At the

end of the day on 19 February, Sbiba gap remained firmly in allied hands but the situation at

Kasserine Pass was much more volatile.

When Colonel Stark arrived at Kasserine on the morning of 19 February, he only found a

hastily established defensive position. The 19th Engineers occupied the low ground on the south

side of the pass while 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment maintained the northern flank with one platoon on the high ground and the rest in the valley. LTC Verdi Barnes’ 33rd Field Artillery

Battalion was in support. Even with an entire day to prepare defensive positions, Stark discovered they had barely been started and enemy probing attacks were already beginning. The commander quickly shifted an additional platoon from 1st Battalion to bolster the high ground and ordered 19th Engineers to take the high ground if that was still possible.135 Although the

Americans were ill prepared, the initial reconnaissance attack by the Afrika Korps at Kasserine

133 Ibid. 134 Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 401–403; Watson, Exit Rommel, 85–86. 135 “A Factual Summary of the Combat Operations of the 1st Infantry Division in North Africa,” n.d., Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 2, U.S. Army center for military history; “26th Infantry Unit History, 18-24 February 1943,” n.d., Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 1, U.S. Army center for military history. While Stark was fighting for his life to hold Kasserine Pass, Fredendall issued an order for four specific soldiers to be pulled from the line and report directly to II Corps headquarters without delay for the purpose of taking an examination on 1 March 56

Pass was repelled. After observing the fight, Rommel wrote in his diary, “The trouble was that

they had gone the wrong way about it. After fighting so long in the desert, the officers had

suddenly found themselves confronted with terrain not unlike the European Alps.”136 The hills

and mountains on both sides were about 5,000 feet and were occupied by American infantrymen

and artillery observers. The mechanized German troops (armor and infantry) were not prepared

to fight in the mountains because the mobility of their equipment significantly decreased and

they also lacked recent training in mountain warfare tactics.137

During a renewed assault on Kasserine at 1100, Oberleutnant Heinz Schmidt attacked the right flank. He had to dismount his vehicles due to wadis and climbed the mountain using rocks as cover from artillery fire. When Schmidt reached the crest they came upon an American machine gun nest only 30 yards away. Schmidt sent a troop leader to flank and lay down suppressing fire and this machine gun nest withdrew. The Germans now had men controlling the high ground. One of Schmidt’s men noticed that a bridge cut the road through the pass and he decided to try and take it.138

As dusk approached, Schmidt succeeded in capturing this bridge behind allied lines.

When the first allied truck approached, the commander sent his men onto the bridge to stop it,

but the American truck opened fire and drove away. Schmidt learned his lesson and opened fire

on the next approaching vehicle. After two more vehicles were shot up, his men set up a

roadblock and captured more Americans. Regimental headquarters radioed Schmidt for his

current location which he told them. Headquarters could not believe the reported coordinates

1943 for admission to West Point. The commanding general’s priorities clearly were not on fighting and winning the battle at hand. See “Special Order 26,” February 19, 1943, RG 407, Records of the Adjutant General’s Officer, WWII Operations Reports, 1940-48, II Corps, Box 2616, NARA II, College Park, MD. 136 Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 403. 137 Donald S Detwiler, Charles Burton Burdick, and Jürgen Rohwer, eds., World War II German Military Studies, vol. 9, 24 vols., Garland Series: World War II German Military Studies (New York: Garland Pub, 1979). 138 Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert, 203–205. 57

because they were behind allied lines and asked for him to confirm his location again.

Regimental headquarters did not understand that Schmidt had cut the road behind the allied

defense at Kasserine.

Soon afterwards, a column of five tanks approached and Schmidt was upset that he had

left his anti-tank guns behind with their vehicles. The lead tank commander pulled up, stopped

his tanks, and asked, “Why this barricade?” Previously, Schmidt passed an order to his men not

to engage the tanks, but he forgot to ensure that his order was passed to the far side of the wadi.

The machine gun crew on the flank opened fire on the tanks. The tanks shot wildly into the

mountains and pushed through the barrier and continued down the road. Without any anti-tank

weapons Schmidt had nothing that could defeat the tanks. The next hour was tense as Schmidt

was expecting a counterattack that never came. When the same tanks re-crossed the bridge

without stopping, Schmidt ordered a withdrawal. They left the wounded men under the care of

one officer and marched back over the mountain throughout the night. Upon arrival at the

regimental headquarters, Schmidt handed the prisoners over and his men went to sleep.139 After a full day of fighting, the Germans controlled and seized the most important terrain feature, point

1191, a ridge on top of the DJ Semmama but still had not broken the American lines.

As difficult a time as the Americans were having defensively against the Germans, fresh replacements continued to arrive from American and British armies despite several days of rain that made travel slow. Two British tank regiments arrived to reinforce CCB and the 1st Infantry

Division, commander Major General Terry “Terrible Terry” Allen, moved to strengthen the II

Corps lines. Allen met Fredendall along a road twenty-four miles northeast of Tebessa to outline the latest developments. Fredendall was “cheerful and optimistic” and directed that the 1st

139 Ibid., 205–211. 58

Infantry Division must be prepared to counterattack where needed. Allen’s area of responsibility

was the southern most position along the Bahiret Foussana Valley, west of Kasserine Pass.140

Additionally, Brigadier General Charles Dunphie, 26th Armored Brigade (British) was

placed under II Corps control around Thala. After learning the situation, Dunphie visited Stark

at his command post at 1630 which by now was under direct small arms fire. Although Stark

claimed to have the situation under control, when Dunphie returned to Thala he reported the

situation to General Anderson and was granted permission to restore order. Dunphie quickly

assembled one infantry and one armored battalion, called Gore’s Force, to head for Kasserine,

which delayed the Germans from pushing through the gap until the evening on 20 February.

Although all tanks were lost, this was exactly what the Allies needed to continue moving their

forces into positions behind Kasserine.141 Dunphie’s initiative and Gore’s Force tactical success in the delaying operation on 20 February contributed to the overall outcome of the battle.

Heavy fog hung on the valley floors on the morning of 20 February thus decreasing visibility, but Rommel insisted the attack must press forward. The forces at Sbiba were identified as British, who the Germans gave “a combat value considerably higher than that of the

American troops” thus the ‘Desert Fox’ shifted his main effort to Kasserine.142 At 0635 on 20

February the II Corps G-2 reported that the “situation [vicinity Kasserine Pass] was well in hand” but his prediction was way off.143 At 0700 on 20 February, the ‘Desert Fox’ left Sbeitla to oversee the operations at Kasserine Pass. The general became upset that von Arnim had released

140 “A Factual Summary of the Combat Operations of the 1st Infantry Division in North Africa.” Here the Germans introduced a new weapon system, the Nebelwerer, literally translated means fog thrower, that became known by allied forces as “screaming meemies” or “moaning minnies”. The Nebelwerer was a six-barrel mortar that would shoot six 75-pound high explosive rounds at the same time. 141 “II Corps, Report of Operations 1 January-15 March 1943,” May 2, 1943, 9–10, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 2, U.S. Army center for military history; “26th Infantry Unit History, 18-24 February 1943”; Blumenson, Kasserine Pass, 249. 142 “Fifth Panzer Army War Diary, 18 to 23,” 121. 143 “The 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion G3 Logs 12 to 26.” 59

only half of General von Broich’s forces and the 10th Panzer Division was moving slowly. When the ‘Desert Fox’ inquired why there was a delay in the attack and the status of the motorcycle battalion, Broich stated that he did not designate the motorcycle battalion for the assault, but instead to exploit after the breakthrough. Valuable time was being wasted. Rommel “was extremely angry and ordered the commanders to take themselves closer to the front where they could get a proper view of the situation.”144 The German commander ordered the motorcycle battalion to the front and designated them as the assault force. From 1200 onwards, tough hand- to-hand combat ensued, and progress was slow. By 1700, the pass belonged to the Germans.

After taking the pass, Rommel stated, “The Americans were fantastically well equipped and we

[Germans] had a lot to learn from them organizationally. One particularly striking feature was the standardization of their vehicles and spare parts.”145 This was a lesson that the Americans

had learned from the British.

Meanwhile on the southern front, General Bernard Montgomery sent a screening force to

the Mareth line. A larger attack would occur later, but Rommel knew that his window for the

decisive victory was closing quickly.146

The allied tactical situation continued to improve but command structures remained

complex. After the efficacy of Gore’s Force, Fredendall paid a visit to Dunphie on the afternoon

of 20 February and placed him in overall control of the tactical situation of British and American

forces in the greater Thala area. This included CCB but not 1st Infantry Division. Once again,

General Ward had his command cut out from under him and would not play any role in the

remainder of the battle. While on the road, Robinett met Fredendall who gave an oral order:

“The British will cover Thala. Head your column off at Haidra and move southeast…assume

144 Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 404. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid., 414; Blumenson, Kasserine Pass, 250. 60

command of all troops south of Oued [river] El Hatab in the Foussana Plain, stop the enemy

advance in that sector, drive him out of the valley, and restore our position in Kasserine Pass.”147

After Robinett indicated that he understood the new mission, Fredendall said in a bantering tone of voice, “It’s no use Robbie. They’ve broken through; you can’t stop them now.” The brigadier replied, “Dammit, general we’ll go down and try.”148 The corps commander responded, if you stop the Germans this time, Robbie, “I will make you a field marshal!”149 Once again the II

Corps commander was not coordinating his subordinate unit commanders but instead telling them they were in charge and wishing them good luck.

Meanwhile, Anderson ordered Brigadier General Cameron Nicholson, 6th Armored

Division (British), to overtake battlefield command to prevent any rank issues with Robinett and

Dunphie.150 A conference was set up at Thala post office at 0200 on 21 February to discuss and

coordinate the defensive plans between Robinett, Dunphie, and Nicholas although Allen was not

invited. Several days of rain made rivers unfordable and communications impractical except by

traveling the roads around mountains. Thus, due to travel time, Robinett had to leave before

Nicholas arrived at 0245, beforehand Nicholas’ chief of staff decided upon the plan of action that

Dunphie and Robinett discussed. The plan called for Robinett to restore the situation towards

Tebessa while Dunphie was to defend in depth, by fighting and falling back to another defensive

line to once again fight, until 1800 where the 2nd Battalion, 5th British Leicester would replace

147 Robinett, Armor Command, 176. 148 Martin Philipsborn, Jr. and Milton Lehman, “The Untold Story of Kasserine Pass,” Saturday Evening Post, February 14, 1948, 106. 149 Robinett, Armor Command, 176; Martin Philipsborn, Jr. and Milton Lehman, “The Untold Story of Kasserine Pass,” 106. 150 BG Robinett and BG Dunphie both commanded a similar size element. Military protocol would be for the man who got promoted to the rank of Brigadier General first to take overall command of the operation. However, military men of the same rank do not always follow this rule thus making command and control extremely difficult. BG Nicholas was also the same rank; however, he commanded a division size element and would have “date of rank” on the other generals. Because Nicholas commanded a division he could more easily assert this authority over Robinett and thus prevent any type of command infighting. Anderson did not have much faith in the abilities of Fredendall so he wanted his own man to have command of the situation. MG Allen was also in the area but not given overall command. 61

him south of Thala.151 In addition to these changes, a new overall commander took charge of the

tactical situation.

At the Casablanca Conference on 14 January 1943, it was agreed upon that once the

British Eighth Army, commanded by Bernard Montgomery, entered Tunisia from the east,

Harold Alexander would assume responsibility of the entire Tunisia battlefield as Ike’s deputy in

command of the Eighteenth Army Group. Alexander was scheduled to take command on 20

February but due to the chaotic situation he cabled Eisenhower on 19 February stating he would

assume command immediately.152 One of the first orders that Alexander issued was “that there

will be no withdrawal from the positions now held by First Army. No man will leave his post

unless it is to counterattack.”153 It was doubtful that this order had any effect on what would occur over the next few days on the battlefield because the previous withdrawals were caused by poor terrain being held and overwhelming German forces. Now the restrictive terrain favored a defensive position and the German forces had to assault multiple passes.

Rommel had finally broken through the American lines, but then broke one of the cardinal rules of warfare by dividing his attacking force instead of using a concentrated, overwhelming force against the staggering Allies. The weather on 21 February had became worse during the night with rain softening the dirt roads, creating limited access up the mountainsides. Hitler’s veteran commander had decided to divide his forces again after taking

Kasserine Pass, with some forces in a feign operation west towards Tebessa and his main attack north toward Thala. Rommel believed that, “by deploying troops at several danger spots I hoped

151 “II Corps, Report of Operations 1 January-15 March 1943.” 152 Harold Rupert Leofric George Alexander Alexander of Tunis, The Alexander Memoirs, 1940-1945 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), 41; “Minutes, Meeting of the General Council,” February 22, 1943, MHI; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 375–377. The 18th Army Group had never existed before and Alexander got the idea to call it the 18th because it would comprise the 1st British Army, commanded by Anderson, and the 8th British Army, commanded by Montgomery. 153 “CCA G3 Operational Reports.” 62

to split the enemy forces far more than our own.”154 Additionally, the ‘Desert Fox’ thought the

Allies would stay on the defensive so he ordered the 21st Panzer Division to continue attacking at

Sbiba in order to prevent those forces from reinforcing at Thala.155

Just as the Americans needed reinforcements throughout the battle, so did the Germans.

Unlike the Allies, however Rommel’s chain of command was not very successful at providing replacements. Before the Thala offensive, the ‘Desert Fox’ requested von Arnim send nineteen

Tiger tanks from the 10th Panzer Division. Arnim falsely claimed the Tigers were all under

repair so he could not send them to Rommel and Kesselring once again failed to interject in this

dispute between the commanders.156 The rifts in the German command structure continued to

cause the ‘Desert Fox’ to take unmitigated risks during the offensive.

After spending the morning inspecting destroyed American tanks in Kasserine, Hitler’s

veteran commander visited Broich, near Thala, to speed up the attack. At this point in the battle,

Rommel understood he was in a race against the allied reinforcements and every delay allowed

the Allies to bolster their defensive lines. The commander also wanted to make his own

assessment of the battlefield situation and found the lead scouts in a cactus grove pinned down

by artillery fire. Rommel moved back to a hilltop to establish a better observation point and soon

ordered Broich to continue pressing forward.157

Opposing the 10th Panzer Division’s assault towards Thala were Dunphie’s tank forces

that were supported by artillery fire. Dunphie beautifully fought the planned defense in depth.

This strategy slowed the German advance until the British withdrew to the final defensive line.

The Germans had captured an operational British Valentine tank earlier in the campaign and as

154 Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 405. 155 Watson, Exit Rommel, 94; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 378–379. 156 Detwiler, Burdick, and Rohwer, World War II German Military Studies; Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 406. 157 Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 405–406. 63

Figure 6 American tanks of the 1st Armored Division advance to strengthen Allied positions 20 February 1943 [Courtesy of the Military History Institute]

dusk approached, this captured tank drove through the British lines followed by German tanks

and infantry. The fighting was intense but burning gas cans illuminated the ground enough for

tanks to identify friends and foes and engage. Additionally, the allied infantry used sticky bombs

on the German tanks. Close quarters combat ensued until exhaustion set in, and both sides

pulled back about 1,000 yards.158 Unknown to the Germans at the time, but if the Axis forces could break through at Thala, they would have an unopposed approach to Le Kef.

158 “II Corps, Report of Operations 1 January-15 March 1943,” 10–11; “Tankers in Tunisia, Kasserine Pass Doctrine and Lessons Learned Volume II Part 4,” July 31, 1943, 50, U.S. Army center for military history, 64

On the thrust west toward Tebessa, the Afrika Korps ran into Robinett’s CCB and Allen’s

1st Infantry Division. The roads toward Tebessa were flanked by forest so the tanks had to stay

on the road. At daylight the Germans aggressively attacked the 1st Infantry Division and after considerable close hard fighting the Germans attempted to withdrawal to the north only to run into the CCB. Robinett had learned an important lesson, that he should put his tanks in a concealed position and allow the enemy to come into the kill zone before firing. He employed these tactics and they worked exquisitely. The Americans were able to mass their artillery with heavy and concentrated firepower and allied air support was extremely effective. The restricted terrain caused the German tanks into a single file formation which allowed the American and

British bombers to strafe their targets with ease even though the ceiling was low. However, the

Allies did not exclusively dominate the air situation and the Luftwaffe harassed the forces on the ground too. The CCB shot down two enemy aircraft on the afternoon of 21 February, causing

German planes to take evasive maneuvers and lessening the effectiveness of their dive- bombers.159 The American will to stand and fight stopped the German advance towards Tebessa over 21-22 February.

The Germans conducted a night march on 21 February to try to outflank Robinett, but ended up further south than expected and again ran into Allen. Confusion quickly erupted because the lead German infantry elements wore previously captured American and French uniforms to allow for easier infiltration. A battery from 33rd Field Artillery Battalion was

overrun and German tanks followed up the infantry’s success. The fight was far from over but

http://history.army.mil/books/Staff-Rides/kasserine/Vol-II-Part_4.pdf; Howard Marshall, Over to Tunis, the Complete Story of the North African Compaign (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1943), 72; Watson, Exit Rommel, 94; Blumenson, Kasserine Pass, 259. 159 “A Factual Summary of the Combat Operations of the 1st Infantry Division in North Africa”; Watson, Exit Rommel, 97; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 379; Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, “Old Ironsides,” 192. 65

the 1st Infantry Division issued warning orders for withdrawal. Allen would not give up so easily

and first ordered local counterattacks where the coordination between the infantry and artillery

was exceptional. Furthermore, it was not until the 16th Infantry Regiment launched a large-scale counterattack at 1530 that the Germans broke and ran. Over 400 prisoners were captured and

CCB followed this success with another counteroffensive.160 For the first time, the tactical situation seemed to be going well for the Americans, but unless they could stop Rommel’s main effort around Thala, the strategic situation would remain shaky.

Meanwhile in the Thala area, LTC William Westmoreland’s 34th Field Artillery Battalion

was the lead reinforcement element of 9th Infantry Division’s artillery to arrive and bolster the

thinly held lines. The artillerymen had endured a four-day 735 mile forced march through snowy

and icy mountain passes and stopped only long enough to maintain vehicles which allowed them

to arrive at the battlefront just in time to play a decisive role in the outcome of the battle. When

Westmoreland arrived, he found General Nicholas in a basement of a building looking at a small

map. He asked, “What have you got in the way of troops?” Nicholas replied that he had “three

platoons of British infantry, a battery of 25-pounders and five tanks and that was all.”161

Westmoreland got to work emplacing his artillery into positions while General S. LeRoy Irwin,

9th Infantry Division Artillery commander, directed the other units into sectors of fire. By 0500

on 22 February all the artillerymen were in position and they waited for daybreak to conduct gun

registration.

160 “1st Infantry Division, Summary of Activities, January-March 1943,” March 8, 1943, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 2, U.S. Army center for military history; “CCB Operations Report, 20-25 February 1943”; “16th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, Operations Report 19-26,” February 1943, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 2, U.S. Army center for military history; Robinett, Armor Command, 185–186; “Deutsches Afrika Korps, War Diary 19-24 February 1943,” n.d., 21 to 22 February, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 2, U.S. Army center for military history. 161 General William Westmoreland, Senior Officer Oral History Program, interview by Colonel Raymond Funderburk and Colonel Duane Cameron, 1978, 88, The William Westmoreland Collection, Box 69, MHI. 66

The remnants of 10th Panzer Division advanced at 0700 and interrupted the artillery registration so instead the gunners fired at German targets of opportunity all morning with heavy, devastating artillery fire. In a major gamble, General Nicholas sent a small detachment of tanks to counterattack under the heavy barrage from the 9th Infantry Division. The Germans thought this was in preparation of a large-scale counteroffensive thus delaying their push. After a couple of hours the Germans realized the Allies were not going to counterattack and resumed their assault without much success. The veteran German leaders would have most likely identified three battalions of artillery at Thala and they understood that translated into support for an entire infantry division. Additionally, the skies finally cleared enough for the allied air support to take part in strafing and bombing runs for an entire day during the operation.162 The combined effort of the American and British artillery stopped Rommel’s attack at Thala with almost no infantry present. It was now up to the Germans to decide what their next move would be for their overstretched forces.

Rommel made his final front-line inspection on Sunday morning at Thala where he decided the Allies were too strong and the offensive needed to stop. Kesselring had a long meeting with the ‘Desert Fox’ at his Kasserine field headquarters at 1300, where he found

Rommel in a “very dispirited mood.”163 The general’s heart was no longer in the operation and the lack of support with resources from the inefficient chain of command inspired little confidence in the field marshal. The ‘Desert Fox’ saw the offensive as a defeat and Kesselring knew the thrust through Thala could not have been continued (if a break through occurred)

162 “10th Panzer Division, War Diary, 14-22 February 1943,” 22 February; “9th Infantry Division Artillery, Narrative of Events, Thala Engagement 21-24 February 1943,” March 4, 1943, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 1, U.S. Army center for military history; General William Westmoreland, Senior Officer Oral History Program, 89–91; Shores, Fighters Over Tunisia, 176; Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 246–247; Blumenson, Heroes Never Die, 432; Watson, Exit Rommel, 94. 163 Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring, 151. 67

without additional fuel and without captured allied trucks. Kesselring then traveled to talk with

von Arnim who had no grasp of the strategic significance of the German commander’s offensive

and instead talked about a planned attack in his sector. Finally Kesselring agreed to Rommel’s

plan to withdrawal after arriving at his own headquarters back in Rome.164

Rommel had ordered a retreat on the night of 22-23 February to return to the original

German positions on the Eastern Dorsal. His men blew up the bridges and planted more than

43,000 mines. Around 2100 on 22 February a report was intercepted at Thala for the 10th Panzer

Division to pull back through Kasserine. This was the first indication the Allies had of general

retreat by the Germans.165 This report was discounted at the time and the Allies were still

rushing replacements towards the frontlines.

General Ernest Harmon received an urgent telegram to move from Morocco and report

immediately to General Eisenhower’s headquarters in Algiers for “limited field duty.”166 Upon

arrival, Eisenhower explained the command relationship challenges between Fredendall and

Ward and charged Harmon to either take command of the II Corps from Fredendall or the 1st

Armored Division from Ward, whichever Harmon deemed necessary. In astonishment Harmon

blurted out, “Well, make up your mind, Ike, I can’t do both.” Eisenhower replied, “That’s right

but right now I don’t know what is to be done down there. I’m going to send you as deputy

corps commander. Your first job is to do the best you can to help Fredendall restore the

situation. Then you will report direct to me whether you should relieve Ward or Fredendall.”167

Harmon then set out for Tebessa and arrived around 0200 on 23 February but was unable to find

164 Detwiler, Burdick, and Rohwer, World War II German Military Studies, 9:D–125 10; Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring, 151–152; Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 407. 165 Janusz Piekałkiewicz, Rommel and the Secret War in North Africa, 1941-1943: Secret Intelligence in the North African Campaign, Schiffer Military History (West Chester, Pa: Schiffer Pub, 1992), 221; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 389. 166 Ernest Nason Harmon, Combat Commander; Autobiography of a Soldier (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 111. 167 Ibid., 112. 68

the headquarters because it had moved. After a II Corps staff officer drew a map, Harmon

finally arrived at II Corps headquarters around 0300.

“We have been waiting for you to arrive,” said Fredendall. “Shall we move the

command post?” “No, sir,” Harmon replied, “right here will do fine.” “That settles it,” said

Fredendall.168 Harmon was handed an envelope stating, “Here it is. The party is yours.”169 The telephone rang and Fredendall was talking to Ward’s operations officer, LTC Hamilton Howze, when an argument broke out over tanks. Harmon said, “If I am in command, I’ll handle this.”170

Harmon told Howze to get the tanks to Thala by dawn because if the Germans managed to take

Thala then his tanks would not be able to catch Rommel. Howze protested again before promising to carry out the order.

Harmon then left the command post to visit the battlefield commanders with his first stop to see Robinett. CCB still had forty-eight operational tanks and Robinett seemed to have the unit in good order and felt that he could hold against any renewed attack. Harmon agreed and ordered Robinett to hold on 23 February and counteroffensive the following day before he moved on to Thala to meet Brigadier General Nicholas. The Germans were still shelling the city when Harmon arrived to get an update on the situation. Nicholas stated, “We gave them a bloody nose yesterday and we are damned ready to give another one this morning.”171 Harmon repeated his orders to hold today and counterattack on 24 February, when General Irwin rushed into the office cursing that Anderson had ordered him to pull his artillery back to Le Kef immediately. In his memoirs Harmon firmly stated, the “hell with that. I would take responsibility with the First Army and the 9th Division Artillery would stay there…We were

168 Ibid., 114. 169 Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 171. 170 Harmon, Combat Commander; Autobiography of a Soldier, 115. 171 Ibid., 117. 69

going to stay and stop the Germans if it was the last thing we did and we knew we could do

it.”172 The Germans conducted their normal morning artillery barrage, but on 23 February it was

disturbing light because only a small detachment was left to cover the general withdrawal.

Furthermore, the Americans did not know this and Harmon reconnoitered the artillery positions

until the tanks arrived from 1st Armored Division at 1000 led by LTC Hightower.

The men that Hightower led were not the same outfit that charged into battle at Faïd Pass.

Instead, most of his men were a collection of available bodies that had never fired a tank gun

before and had not yet bore-sighted the tanks. Harmon was not going to waste any time and told

Hightower to put the tanks up on the hillside. Then Harmon got on top of the tank said, “You

can bore-sight to beat hell. There’s nothing in front of you but Germans to shoot at.”173 Now

that the line was set Harmon took off to plan the counterattack of Kasserine with Ward. Once it

became apparent that the Germans had withdrawn, Harmon gave up command and returned back

to Eisenhower’s jubilant command post to brief the commander on his assessment of the

generals. Harmon did not do anything magical during his trip as the II Corps deputy but instead

played the role of an active corps commander coordinating the defensive positions and visiting

the frontlines. Harmon had really just done Fredendall’s job.174

Eisenhower personally met with the II Corps commander during the evening of 23

February to tell him that the Germans were no longer capable of any offensive actions and it

would be perfectly safe to launch counteroffensives to regain contact with the withdrawing

forces. Fredendall disagreed and stated that the German still had, “one more shot in his locker”

and would spend the next twenty-four hours strengthening his lines instead of counterattacking.

Eisenhower was so confident in his evaluation that he said that he would “assume full

172 Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 171. 173 Harmon, Combat Commander; Autobiography of a Soldier, 118. 174 General Hamilton H. Howze, Senior Officer Oral History Program, 8. 70

responsibility for any disadvantage that might result from vigorous action on his part.”175

Fredendall declined to order an offensive and Eisenhower did not demand one so contact was lost.

The Battle of Kasserine Pass was over, but the decisive blow to the Allies had eluded the

Wehrmacht. In fact, the entire operation terminated in a stalemate with heavy losses in personnel and equipment, both to the Germans and to the Allies. Rommel saw several reasons why his objectives were not meet: the failure to exploit initial success, Commando Supremo ordering to attack the Allies’ flank instead of their supply lines, the tough defense at Thala and

Kasserine passes, the delayed and partial arrival of 10th Panzer Division from von Arnim, and the clumsy leadership of some of the German commanders. The ‘Desert Fox’ then praised the

Americans in his journal, “Although it was true that the American troops could not yet be compared with the veteran troops of the [British] Eighth Army, yet they made up for their lack of experience by their far better and more plentiful equipment and their tactically more flexible command…The tactical conduct of the enemy’s defense had been first class.”176 Meanwhile, the

Americans regrouped and continued to rush replacements to the frontlines to fill shortages caused by battle causalities. The II Corps had barely survived the German offensive, based on the lackluster performance of their leadership and questionable command decisions. Eisenhower was still a timid battlefield commander, but that would soon transform when he directed sweeping leadership changes. Hanging onto ineffective leaders for extended time periods was a mistake he did not repeat throughout the remainder of the war.

175 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 145. 176 Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 407–408. 71

Leadership Changes

From the American perspective, the Battle of Kasserine Pass exposed the need for better

command and control of combat units. Eisenhower knew that not all of the senior leaders under

his command had performed up to standard throughout the battle, and he planned to replace the

ineffective leaders. First to go was his intelligence officer, Brigadier General Mockler-

Ferryman, whom Eisenhower believed depended too heavily on the top-secret ULTRA

intelligence radio intercepts. Sweeping changes within the 1st Armored Division were up next when Robert Stack, CCC, was relieved on 2 March and followed by Raymond McQuillin, CCA, soon afterwards. General Alexander wanted to replace Anderson but Montgomery would not allow a replacement to come from his organization, so Anderson stayed in command throughout the rest of the campaign.177 General Anderson met “Monk” Dickson one evening after the battle and said, “Well, young man, you were right.” After Dickson left the room, Anderson told

Fredendall “that the whole defeat was his fault and that he could not sleep at night because our dead and wounded preyed on his conscience.”178 Anderson’s leadership style included

micromanaging Fredendall. We can conclude that Anderson was as much at fault for the fiasco

as the II Corps commander. But the elephant still hung in the room as to what to do about Ward

and Fredendall.

Throughout the battle the American commander rarely left his command post and

commonly bypassed Ward with orders. Major Red Akers, assistant G-3, II Corps, was given an

order by Fredendall and told, “I want to send this order by Ward, to the troops on Lessouda and

have them dispose their units in this manner.”179 This was a complete violation of military

protocol. The command college at Fort Leavenworth taught leaders to issue orders to your chain

177 General Hamilton H. Howze, Senior Officer Oral History Program, 17; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 399. 178 Benjamin Dickson, “G-2 Journal: Algiers to the Elbe,” 47. 179 John Waters, “SOOHP,” 202. 72

of command not bypassing them and issuing orders directly to lower units. Eisenhower was not

fully convinced yet of Fredendall’s ineffectiveness and heeded the advice of General Truscott

and Harmon before making his final decision.

After Harmon’s limited field time with the II Corps was completed, he spoke frankly to

Ike about his assessment of Generals Fredendall and Ward. The 1st Armored Division commander had preformed well but Fredendall had treated Ward wrong by not allowing him to command the division and sending orders directly to subordinate units. Eisenhower asked,

“Well what do you think of Fredendall?” Harmon replied, “He’s no damned good. You ought to get rid of him.”180 Eisenhower offered command of the II Corps to Harmon. This was the opportunity of a lifetime, but Harmon believed it would be ethically wrong to recommend firing a commander and then take over that job. Instead, he recommended bringing General George

Patton from Morocco to take command.

Truscott also talked to Eisenhower about Fredendall. His opinion was that the men of the

II Corps had lost faith in their commander, and would not fight well under his command anymore. Truscott also believed that Fredendall disliked and distrusted the British. Truscott also recommended to Eisenhower that George Patton take over the II Corps.181 Eisenhower decided to go with Truscott’s recommendation and replaced Fredendall with General Patton on 7

March.182

Patton, as the new commander of the II Corps, wisely elected to make his presence felt as dramatically as he could throughout the command and his ideas were entirely acceptable because the corps needed a new and vibrant personality to lead them. He instituted fines for anyone

180 Harmon, Combat Commander; Autobiography of a Soldier, 120. 181 Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 173. 182 Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 400. Eisenhower shared the responsibility of the loss because he did not want to place the entire burden of loss on the shoulders of Fredendall. Ike recommended to Marshall that Fredendall receive an Army command in the states where he was promoted to Lieutenant General. 73

caught outside without a helmet. Additionally, he rushed to the various units’ frontlines to make

the soldiers know there was a new commander and also so he could gain a better tactical

understanding of the area.183

General Ward survived the first rounds of cuts but would not last long. Ward wrote to his wife Edith, “Fredendall is trying to knife me.”184 After the change of command at the II Corps,

Patton gave Ward a fair chance to command the 1st Armored Division yet by 1 April Patton decided to replace Ward with Harmon.185 Harmon brought his own management crew with him and Howze was fired as the division G-3 and took the demotion of becoming the 13th Armored

Regiment S-3. Lawrence (Bob) Dewy replaced Howze. Also Maurice Rose took over as division chief of staff.186 Harmon was shaking up the management team within the division similar to many corporate executive officers when they take over.

The Americans tasted their first major engagement and suffered about 5,500 casualties, but had only inflicted about 2,000 causalities on the Germans. Additionally, over 151 medium and 84 light American tanks were destroyed nevertheless replacements were already available.187

Philip Jordon, a British staff officer working for Eisenhower, said, “It would be easy to exaggerate the importance of the enemy’s drive . . . But the truth is that they have been worth while. Men can learn to be soldiers only in battle; and defeat is a sharper lesson than victory.”188

The Battle of Kasserine Pass had gone a long way in teaching green American troops that it

183 General Hamilton H. Howze, Senior Officer Oral History Program, 9–10; Robinett, Armor Command, 198–199. 184 Orlando Ward, “Orlando Ward to Edith Ward,” March 3, 1943, The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 11, MHI. 185 Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 451. 186 General Hamilton H. Howze, Senior Officer Oral History Program, 11. The staff officers at a division or above organization have a “G” before their office number which stands for General Staff 3, for example. A staff officer at the combat command level and below would have a “S” before their officer number which stands for Staff 3, for example. 187 Evelyn Monahan, And If I Perish: Frontline U.S. Army Nurses in World War II, 1st ed (New York: Knopf, 2003), 82; “Minutes, Meeting of the General Council,” March 1, 1943, 6, MHI; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 148; “II Corps, G-1 Periodic Reports January 1943 to March 1945,” n.d., 14–22 February 1943, RG 338, Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations (World War II and Thereafter), Box 1, NARA II, College Park, MD. II Corps personal reports from 14 to 23 Feb had 192 killed, 2624 wounded, and 2459 missing. 188 Jordan, Jordan’s Tunis Dairy, 196. 74

would take better equipment and better-disciplined soldiers if they were going to defeat the

veteran combat troops of the Wehrmacht. With these hard-fought lessons in hand and with the

ability to communicate these lessons to organizations throughout the army, America would not

stay down for long after the tactical defeat. “The German is skillful, ruthless and a master of

deception. He can be beaten . . . The myth of the invincibility of the German Army and its

equipment has been exploded.”189 Eisenhower said, “Our troops are rapidly becoming battlewise

and their future operations are certain to bring discouragement to the ranks of our enemies.

Front line units now have the urgent task of replacement, rehabilitation, and training…Let us

make sure that the new men coming up quickly absorb the lessons that the front line units have

learned.”190 Rejuvenated with new leadership and the knowledge of how to tactically defeat the

German tanks, the Americans would not only rebound from their defeat at Kasserine, they would

help to clear North Africa of all German forces by May 1943.

While the senior American leadership needed sweeping changes the field grade officers

preformed well throughout the battle. Two excellent examples were Hightower and Gardiner.

Robinett wrote in an after action report about the battle of Faïd Pass: “only for the determined

action of the Battalion Command, Lieutenant Colonel Louis V. Hightower, there is no question

but that the entire Combat Command [A] would have either been killed or captured.”191

Hightower faced horrendous odds of success in his counterattack by a battalion against an entire

panzer division, but he managed to instill confidence in his men and lead them into battle.

Although the Germans won that clash, the American had a hard charging determined officer on

their hands that was not afraid to fight. At the end of the battle, Hightower had been refitted with

189 War Department, Lessons From The Tunisian Campaign (Government Printing Office, 1943), 37. 190 “Message of Commendation,” March 4, 1943, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 2, U.S. Army center for military history. 191 Helmut Hudel and Paul Robinett, “The Tank Battle at Sidi Bou Zid,” B25. 75

a unit comprised of cooks and other non-tankers yet he was able to rally and motivate them to

arrive at Thala after an almost impossible night march.

While Hightower led his men in an offensive operation, Gardiner oversaw a key

defensive operation around Sbeitla that prevented the Germans from capturing the town by

several hours. Gardiner understood that mobile warfare only works if the entire team worked

together which was why he covered the withdrawal of the tank destroyers. Conducting this task

in a spontaneous fashion takes a battalion commander who communicated extremely effectively to get all his tanks lined up and also to prevent fratricide. Gardiner again preformed well as the

Germans renewed their assault against his position by not only providing heavy fire, but also being able to move his positions backwards to establish another line without his men going into full retreat mode. With successful field grade officers like Hightower and Gardiner the

American Army had good men at the frontlines leading their men into battle bravely and gallantly. Leaders like these two provided a solid base that allowed new senior leaders to take over commands and have success because the field grade officers could execute their orders.

American and German Leadership Challenges

Eisenhower, as any good army commander should, accepted responsibility for the in

place command structure at the front which allowed the Germans to exploit and push the

American back over eighty miles. When Ike reflected on the battle, he saw that the II Corps was

overextended and that the southern lines should have been shortened to allow the Americans to

concentrate their forces instead of covering every pass. Additionally, Ike realized that the French

troops should have been under Anderson’s command and not reporting directly to Eisenhower’s

headquarters.192 While the command structure in place was totally Eisenhower’s fault, even if

192 “Allied Force Headquarters: Commander-in-Chief’s Dispatch, North African Campaign 1942-1943,” 50; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 146; Harry C Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower; the Personal Diary of 76

the French had been under Anderson’s command the outcome of the battle would have been the

same. Anderson did not take into account any of the reports from the Americans after the thrust

through Faïd Pass and the French did not have a significant role in the entire battle. Meanwhile,

Alexander’s arrival at the frontlines and the establishment of 18th Army Group fixed the complex command structure for the remainder of the North African campaign. Although it did not have any real impact on the result of the battle because the reinforcements that stopped Rommel had already been ordered to the front before he took command.

On the German side, the command structure was just as complex as the Allies. The political situation inside Italy was becoming unstable so Adolf Hitler gave operational control of the North African campaign to Benito Mussolini with the a hope that military victories would improve Mussolini’s political control in Italy. Hence, all decisions for large-scale military operations were made in Rome. Kesselring was stationed in Rome acting as an ad hoc liaison, in addition to his job as commander in chief of the southern theatre, to help expedite military decisions. Thus, there was no overall military commander on the ground in Tunisia. Rommel and von Arnim constantly disagreed on courses of action and the long lines of communication delayed decisions and allowed the Allies to reinforce positions. After the initial success at Faïd

Pass, von Arnim refused to heed Rommel’s advice to follow up his tactical success and instead chose to wait for a counterattack. The road to Sbeitla was lightly defended and if von Arnim had continued his assault, that city would have fallen into German hands much easier and earlier.

Overall, von Arnim’s inability to aggressively follow-up success, coupled with his lack of battlefield presence, was one of the root causes for why the Axis did not achieve their stated objectives.

Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR, Naval Aide to General Eisenhower, 1942 to 1945 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 265. 77

Rommel, on the other hand, did not press for command until he was sitting at the gates of

Kasserine Pass. Kesselring had waited for the ‘Desert Fox’ to take control of the situation

instead of asserting his authority and appointing Rommel as the overall commander. Kesselring

claimed that the orders from the Comando Supremo gave Hitler’s veteran commander the

flexibility to assault Tebessa before taking Le Kef through the Thala corridor. However,

Kesselring failed to directly tell this to Rommel and once again showed he was a deeply flawed leader. Once the ‘Desert Fox’ had command, he aggressively attacked, but the change of terrain and the lack of having control of the entire 10th Panzer Division doomed his plans from the

beginning. After securing Kasserine, Rommel broke from doctrine and divided his force into

three prongs of attack. He gambled on this strategy and lost. Instead, he overstretched his lines

of communication, supply, and support and found his men facing superior allied forces who had

shorter internal lines to move British reinforcements to the fight. The ‘Desert Fox’ had been

given every disadvantage, including von Arnim not sending nineteen Tiger tanks with the 10th

Panzer Division, and still managed to secure tactical victories. He blamed the overall failing to

meet the objectives on the strategic level on von Arnim, Kesselring, and Mussolini. After the

German withdrawal Kesselring put into effect a new command structure by placing Rommel as

overall commander of the entire African theater.193

In a report on the North African campaign, Eisenhower said, “The turn of the tide at

Kasserine proved actually to be the turn of the tide in all of Tunisia.”194 As Ike reflected back

upon the campaign, he understood that the battle became so important in the grand scheme

because the American army learned how to fight throughout the eight day battle. More notably,

Eisenhower started an initiative to collect lessons learned from the men at the battlefronts and

193 Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring, 151–152; Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 407–408. 194 “Brief of General Eisenhower’s Report on the North African Campaign,” April 15, 1944, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 3, MHI. 78 disseminated those lessons throughout his ranks. Finally, to go one step further, Ike wanted changes made in the stateside training regiments of the combat arms soldiers. This remained why the Battle of Kasserine Pass was an eight-day tactical defeat on the battlefield, but in the long run it proved to be a strategic victory for the new commanders that oversaw the defeat of the Germans in North Africa in May 1943.

CHAPTER THREE

TRAINING

He who knows not, and knows not that he knows not, is a fool. Pity him.

He who knows not, and knows that he knows not, is ignorant. Show him.

He who knows, and knows that he knows, is wise. Follow him.

–Unknown

Overview

The U.S. Army encounters with the German Army during February 1943 in North Africa

afforded Americans a chance to gain practical experience in the combat arts and learned similar

lessons firsthand that their Soviet and British Allies had already gained. On a strategic level, the

overall doctrine of combined arms overcame a shaky beginning and improved from contact with

the Wehrmacht. Although, the full potential of American combined arms would not be fully

realized until the summer of 1944, a good basis was created in North Africa.195 The ability to

communicate these lessons throughout the army and change stateside training cycles helped

improve the army and allowed them future tactical successes in the European theater of

operations.

American soldiers throughout the ranks learned valuable lessons after the defeat at

Kasserine Pass; however, if they did not share these lessons then it was equivalent to nothing

being learned. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commanding General, European Theater of

Operations, was interested in improving his troops and changing army training to produce well-

trained replacements. The bureaucracy of the War Department prevented an immediate change

in the training cycle at basic training centers as the lessons were vetted before recommended

195 Michael D Doubler, Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945, Modern War Studies (Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 7. 80 changes were instated. The war was not going to stop and wait for the Americans to catch up with the Germans so immediate measures had to be created within each leader’s area of responsibility to improve his organization. The first task was to collect the lessons from the soldiers and leaders at the front lines through appointed observers who reported back to the War

Department or Eisenhower. While those lessons were being filtered up to the War Department, commanders changed their standard operating procedures within their formations in order to win the next fight. Frontline soldiers and replacements received additional training on battle-focused tasks. Informal channels were established through long-standing, private, semi-official professional journals to disseminate information to leaders and fellow officers. The War

Department issued official publications in the form of training circulars to bridge the knowledge gap and distributed lessons to stateside and frontline units. Meanwhile, before training regiments changed their curriculum, lessons needed to be validated through the War Department’s bureaucratic process before implementing a change. Finally, the army formally changed stateside training throughout 1943 generally in line with the desires of combat commanders.

Eisenhower was a central figure in accumulating battle lessons and also disseminating them throughout his command and the U.S. Army. Eisenhower believed, “all that we can know and learn from those who have had this ultimate of all training will contribute to the great task of preparing men and units for battle.”196 Although Ike was a major driving force, his command was not the only organization that actively tried to improve training. Lieutenant General Jacob

Devers, Chief of the Armored Force, ordered his assistant commanding general, Brigadier

General T. J. Camp, to the frontlines of Tunisia to talk to the new combat veterans of 1st

Armored Division. Once Camp arrived in North Africa, Eisenhower fully endorsed him which

196 G-3 Training Section AFHQ, Training Notes from Recent Fighting in Tunisia (Government Printing Office, 1943), i. 81

allowed unrestricted access to the men. General Camp compiled and published a pamphlet

called, Tankers in Tunisia, to the armored recruits going through training so these men could

hear the lessons learned or best practices from the frontlines.

Although this was a good start, Eisenhower was not done gathering lessons. He sent

officers to the front in March 1943 to collect best practices and published training guidance in a

booklet called, Training Notes from Recent Fighting in Tunisia. Furthermore, after the North

African campaign ended, he ordered all subordinate units to submit their experiences and lessons. Eisenhower published Lessons from the Tunisian Campaign to his command and helped convince the War Department to disseminate across the entire U.S. Army.

Finally, the War Department took all the lessons from the frontlines and after vetting infused them into training cycles. This remained an extremely complex process because the training centers only have a specific time period to train their recruits on all the tasks. In order to add a course on the subject then other parts of the curriculum had to be removed from the training calendar. For example, in August 1943 the Armored School deleted destruction of equipment and reduced tank principles classes in order to add theory technique and tactics of screening smoke, tank company (light and medium) maneuvers, employment of reconnaissance and tank platoons during the tactics course.197 The War Department was the approving authority for changes to all training cycles so the armored and infantry school had to go back and forth over weeks or months with the operations division of the War Department depending on how much the two sides disagreed before changes were finalized. Eventually, the War Department decided to extend the basic training cycle from thirteen weeks to seventeen weeks, which allowed lessons to be applied more freely in the schoolhouses. The final and slowest step in the

197 “Changes in Training Program,” September 13, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park, MD. 82

process was to create and disseminate training circulars infused with lessons to combat

commands worldwide.

Lessons Learned

Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, commanding general of the Armed Ground Forces,

had the foresight to know that the army had fallen into disarray between the world wars and that

training was sacrificed to rush units into the invasion of North Africa. However, McNair was in

a position to correct training deficiencies and sent over forty officers to North Africa to observe

and report back on their observations of combat operations with items they believed needed to be

stressed or taught on prior to deployments. The officers ranked from major to major general and

generally spent about thirty days with specific-type of units. Observers covered all major

combat units, infantry, armor, field artillery, and tank destroyer while others looked at staff-level

operations and logistics. Reports were submitted to the Armed Force Board at the Army War

College and copies of the memos were distributed to commanders from army to corps level and

to all training centers.198 Additionally, General Eisenhower occasionally ordered some of his

men to submit reports to the observer board. Major General Omar Bradley was sent to the front

after the Kasserine campaign ended to collect lessons. Furthermore, before General Fredendall

was relieved of command from the II Corps he had to submit a report on lessons his unit learned.

Eisenhower and McNair had brilliant foresight to employ this unique method during World War

II to collect lessons by including observers from the very beginning of operations in the

European theater of operation.

Tankers in Tunisia. Other organizations wanted to improve the characteristics of their

training in order to produce high quality replacements. Lieutenant General Jacob Devers, Chief

198 n.d., The Observer Board Collection, MHI. General Bradley was on General Eisenhower’s staff at that time. General Bradley would become General Patotn’s deputy commander and later the commanding general of II Corps in North Africa. 83 of the Armored Force, ordered Brigadier General T. J. Camp to travel to Tunisia to “get firsthand information. Get the story at the front. Go to the enlisted man. See what he knows.” The

General further ordered Camp to “find out if our replacements are in condition and are trained right for battle. Check them all the way from General Headquarters to the units and from the gang plank to the battlefield.”199 Once General Camp was in North Africa, General Eisenhower appointed Camp as his personal representative and visited all American armored units whom had been in combat. Camp asked soldiers and leaders what they had learned in combat that they would like the new tankers to know before arriving at the front lines.200 Upon Camp’s return to

Fort Knox, he compiled the pamphlet Tankers in Tunisia and distributed a copy to each man that came through the Armored replacement training center.

The focus of Tankers in Tunisia was not the “big picture” operational history of the war, but instead “little tricks” men discovered that saved lives at the frontlines. The overarching theme was the need for “exact discipline” while the rest of the book was divided into the following sections: leadership, reconnaissance, tank tactics, tank gunnery, and individual protection.201 The general officers believed that discipline went further than just obeying direct orders, it also meant having integrity to do what was right when nobody was looking and men undertaking the basics they had been taught without orders. The non-commissioned officers

(NCOs) were responsible to supervise soldiers to ensure orders were executed. However, an

NCO could not physically and directly supervise every task that each of his four or five soldiers had to do throughout the day. So soldiers needed discipline to conduct maintenance on their tracked vehicle every time the tank stopped. In the pamphlet, Eisenhower said, “Discipline is

199 “Tankers in Tunisia, Kasserine Pass Doctrine and Lessons Learned Volume II Part 4,” July 31, 1943, I, U.S. Army center for military history, http://history.army.mil/books/Staff-Rides/kasserine/Vol-II-Part_4.pdf. General C. L. Scott replaced General Devers as the Chief of the Armored Force before Tankers in Tunisia was published. 200 Ibid., 11. 201 Ibid., 1. 84 vital. A possible fifty percent improvement in value of men results from making them tough and well disciplined. See that orders are carried out exactly… Great nervous energy is required of commanders. They must meet requirements and exact discipline and obedience.”202 General

Charles Sawbridge went a little further about armored replacements when he wrote in the booklet, “Replacements generally lack fundamental discipline. They have not learned initiative or to act for themselves. They wait for a non-commissioned officer.”203

The frontline NCOs agreed with the generals that discipline was a necessity in combat operations. Staff Sergeant Seaborn Duckett said, “At Kasserine Pass I know we lost some men by going to sleep. You got to be awake all the time. We lost men by wanting to go to sleep.

They seem to get the idea that they should have rest more than anything else. They don’t get scared until it is too late.” The Germans were astute and discovered Americans who had inadequate concealment. Duckett continued, “Up at Kasserine Pass a man didn’t carry out orders that he should have, orders to move to the top of the mountain, and some of those that went to sleep didn’t come out. It is necessary to obey orders.”204

Leadership. Toxic leaders can turn the best units into bad units and vice versa for good leaders. As we have seen, General George Patton quickly transformed the II Corps by instilling discipline after he replaced General Lloyd Fredendall. Additionally, unlike his predecessor

Patton led from the front and the men of II Corps knew their commander had a grasp on the situation at the battlefront. Battlefield success boasted confidence in leaders but sometimes it was the behind the scenes actions that gave men confidence in their leaders. Following the defeat at Kasserine Patton ordered that guards over watch the cemetery to prevent the Arabs

202 Ibid. 203 Ibid. 204 Ibid., 17. 85

from digging up and pillaging the bodies.205 Small initiatives can have a great impact on the morale of a unit and their willingness to fight.

A higher headquarters remained only as good as a combination of its lower elements.

Good leadership had to start at the bottom with the junior officers and NCOs. Major General

Ernest Harmon, Commanding General, 2nd Armored Division, claimed, “The division will succeed only as well as the platoon succeeds.”206 A well-trained platoon does not have to wait for their platoon leader or company commander to issue orders before they reacted to enemy contact. Sergeant Lawrence Butler, I Company, 1st Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Division, understood that he had to operate as part of a platoon but he used initiative when the opportunity presented itself. Bulter said, “One must act on his own a great deal of the time. You can’t wait to be told when to fire or where to fire. When you see something which you think worth firing upon, take the chance. The function of the officer is to keep the men together and tell them what is going on. The soldier has to use his individual judgment.”207

Another important aspect of leadership was effective communication and leading by example instead of simply issuing orders and waiting in the rear for reports. LTC Elton Ringsak,

6th Armored Infantry, 1st Armored Division, noted, “Frankness with your subordinate leaders is the biggest thing in leadership. The officer should be truthful. If he doesn’t know, he should admit to the noncommissioned officers that he doesn’t know all the answers and that they must

205 Franklin J. Schaffner, Patton, DVD, Biography, Drama, History, War, 1970, sec. 7, 10, 11. 206 “Report on Combat Experience and Battle Lessons for Training Purposes, 1st Armored Division,” June 13, 1943, 2, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI. General Harmon was the commanding general of 2nd Armored Division during Kasserine Pass battle. He was sent by General Eisenhower to help General Fredendall restore order at the end of Kasserine Pass battle. General Harmon replaced General Ward as the 1st Armored Division Commander in April 1943. 207 “Tankers in Tunisia, Kasserine Pass Doctrine and Lessons Learned Volume II Part 4,” July 31, 1943, 40, U.S. Army center for military history, http://history.army.mil/books/Staff-Rides/kasserine/Vol-II-Part_4.pdf. 86

work it out together.”208 Platoon leaders learned that fighting required them to lead from the front. Lieutenant H. F. Hillenmeyer, H Company, 1st Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Division, recalled that he learned the importance of physically leading his men into battle and not just issuing orders. “When you get out in front, they’ll follow you easily.”209 Exceptional leadership at the bottom allowed for the II Corps to transform into a combat unit that would win many future battles in North Africa.

Reconnaissance. Tank warfare depended on the same basic principles as General Terry

Allen’s philosophy; however, due to the mobility of tracked vehicles, reconnaissance was the most important aspect to prevent enemy tanks from flanking positions. “A reconnaissance of the field, if you are lucky enough to be able to make it, is the most important thing I can think of,”

LTC Luis Hightower, commander 3rd Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Division, remembered from the battle of Sidi bou Zid. “In tank fighting nothing is more important than expert reconnaissance of your routes of advance and withdrawal.” During the counterattack at

Faïd Pass, Hightower thought they had a clear route, only to find a dry wash blocking the way which forced the tanks to funnel through choke points where they could cross.210

One of the failures at Faïd Pass was the lack of effective reconnaissance prior to the

German assault. In order for the reconnaissance men to successfully complete their mission, they had to accurately report information to higher headquarters in a timely manner. Sergeant

John Mahoney, 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, 1st Armored Division, wanted “every man…in the battalion [to] be able to operate the radio.”211 However, one deficiency of Sergeant

208 “Tankers in Tunisia, Kasserine Pass Doctrine and Lessons Learned Volume II Part 4,” July 31, 1943, 45, U.S. Army center for military history, http://history.army.mil/books/Staff-Rides/kasserine/Vol-II-Part_4.pdf. 209 Ibid., 25. 210 Ibid., 19. 211 Ibid., 10. 87

Mahoney’s men was they all could not read a compass or a map.212 If Mahoney’s men could have reported enemy activity they would have likely submitted bad intelligence because the location would have been wrong. Colonel Mitchel Talbott’s, commanding officer, 2nd Battalion,

1st Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Division, reconnaissance men trapped on Lessouda

Mountain observed German tanks slowly moving for hours on 15 February without creating a

dust trail which allowed the Germans to be in position to assault the flanks of the American

counterattack.213 By this point in the battle, communications with the trapped men was very

sporadic and Colonel Talbott could not pass this vital information along to 1st Armored Division.

This failure to pass along critical intelligence resulted in LTC Alger’s counteroffensive being

launched without knowing the enemy’s disposition and it led to an unnecessary defeat.

Tank tactics. Tactics are based on doctrine but are always evolving—similar to a game

of baseball where the pitcher and hitter continue to change approaches throughout the game to

keep each other off balance. While discussing tank tactics with Camp, Hightower stated,

“Generally they [the Germans] try to suck you into an antitank gun trap. Their light tanks will

bait you in by playing around just outside effective range. When you start after them, they turn

tail and draw you in within range of their 88-mm guns.”214 The artillery fire distracted tankers’

attention and soon concealed antitank guns on the flanks were attacking. One common

technique was to designate a tank to look out for the 88mm anti-tank guns. Hightower than

added, “Take it very slowly. Germans do it that way all the time. Do not shift gears once you

start, particularly in the dust, because the backfire will give you away… In this country, too,

212 Ibid., 43. 213 Ibid., 37. 214 Ibid., 20. 88

we’ve learned to move slowly so as not to reveal our position. You can’t boil up to battle at high

speed without broadcasting your coming in a big cloud of dust.”215

Once the Americans learned German tactics, they practiced ways to defeat the enemy

next time they met in battle. Lieutenant Harry Holtzman, D Company, 1st Armored Regiment,

1st Armored Division, recommended teaching tactics over a terrain board. Following Rommel’s

withdrawal he made a terrain model of the Sid bou Zid battle and reviewed the actions of both

sides. He gave platoon leaders objectives and let entire crews come up with possible

solutions.216 By reviewing the battle actions, Holtzman’s company was better prepared to face

the enemy in future battles. After talking about locating and maneuvering against the Germans,

General Camp’s booklet turned to the importance of effective shooting to destroy and disable

enemy tanks.

Tank gunnery. When a tank gunner pulls the trigger, the round will go where the tube is aimed; however, if the sight and the tube were not aligned prior to the engagement the gunner would always miss. While LTC Hightower discussed tank gunnery with Camp, he said, “Bore sight to beat hell but don’t let the boys try to do it at 1,000 yards so the Axis of sight and tube coincide, because when you are shooting at 6,000 yards there is no telling where it will hit. Keep your sights parallel. Bore sight on a distant object the more distant the more effective.”217

High-ranking officers bring great insight; however, the enlisted men and NCOs do most of the fighting and understand the German tendencies better. Sergeant James Bowser, H

215 Ibid., 4. 216 Ibid., 37. A terrain model is something that a person creates based on a map or physical reconnaissance of an area. There is no specific standard on how to create on except to use anything possible to make the most useful model. Mountains, cities, wadis, avenues of approach, etc. are all placed into a sand table representation of the land. Friendly and enemy positions and vehicles are added at the end. One method is to move the vehicles around the sand table in order to see what happened and expose weaknesses. This is an excellent training tool that supports dialogue to discuss tactics, sustainment and improvements for future engagements. 217 Ibid., 24. Bore sighting is similar to zeroing a rifle but on a tank it aligns the gun sights, that the gunner is looking through, to the target the tube pointed towards. 89

Company, 1st Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Division, added, “there’s just one thing you must remember when you’re fighting Germans. When you shoot at them they stop and try to kid you into thinking you knocked them out. Then when you turn your back on them, they open up again. Sir [General Camp], we shoot until they stop and then keep shooting until they burn.”218

Hightower learned from his men that if you shoot a highly explosive tank round low it will ricochet and kill the crew in the turret or disable the German tank.219 Meanwhile, Sergeant

Bower discovered to always check his ammunition. “Once I had to climb out of a tank during an action to ram a bent shell case out of my gun and then hurry back in before the machine guns got me.”220 Sergeant Warren Lasley, G Company, 1st Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Division,

believed in having every soldier in the tank actively search for enemy targets. Sometimes the

driver or assistant driver would find tanks that the gunner could not see.221 Sergeant Frank

Sabin, 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, 1st Armored Division, added that the “driver should

be ready no matter what happens. Should know all guns…I had a hard time when I was first in

the front lines. I was gun shy, scared.”222 Tank platoons needed to be able to shoot, move, and

communicate to effectively engage and destroy the enemy on the battlefield. However, all those

skills would be insignificant unless the men knew how to properly identify friendly and enemy

vehicles and also actions to protect themselves while they were stopped or outside the tanks.

Individual protection. The white star painted on tanks as an identification system was

not effective in the desert because it commonly got covered with dirt. When Hightower’s radio

went out, he “heard [his] own tanks turning their guns on [him]—and really sweated out that

approach. At dusk it’s always hard to tell which vehicles are really friendly, and we’re always

218 Ibid., 27. 219 Ibid., 23. 220 Ibid., 27. 221 Ibid., 39. 222 Ibid., 10. 90 afraid to shoot until they’re right on top of us.” The Germans shot rockets and different colored smoke to mark their positions when Stukas were overheard to prevent the airplanes from bombing their own frontlines.223

German airpower and artillery demoralized men because it was difficult to see the enemy’s incoming rounds and they would land near positions at all hours which made foxholes worth their weight in gold. Sergeant Frank Sabin, 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, 1st

Armored Division, said, “Dig good foxholes. We learned in Sbeitla Valley that foxholes offered smaller area and less chance of getting hit by bombs and shrapnel.”224 Sergeant William Etritge,

I Company, 6th Armored Infantry, 1st Armored Division, had three main points that he thought were important: first always keep you weapon clean and the bolt sand free so they fire. Stay under cover. Stay quiet, especially at night otherwise mortars and machine gun fire will come your way.225 Staff Sergeant Fred Erdwins, 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, 1st Armored

Division, recalled that he had “never seen a man killed in a slit trench, but I did see three men killed who did not start digging as the others. Entrenching tools are very valuable and almost as necessary as a man’s arms.”226 Sergeant George Cleland, D Company, 6th Armored Infantry, 1st

Armored Division, wanted replacements better trained in digging foxholes. Additionally, a concealed position was extremely important but if a soldier was careless and left tin cans around his position uncovered the sun will reflect and give away the position.227

The Germans had aerial superiority through the majority of the Kasserine Pass battle which allowed the Americans to refine their anti-aircraft techniques. When asked about enemy aircraft, Hightower responded, “The .50 caliber machine guns, however, will keep them high.

223 Ibid., 21. 224 Ibid., 41. 225 Ibid., 14. 226 Ibid., 47. 227 Ibid., 42. 91

German pilots seem to despise the stuff.”228 Although Hightower’s men struck down several enemy airplanes, they consistently had trouble with leading the target because they aimed at the target instead of where the target was expected to go, thus missing. Hightower told his men

“you’ve got to shoot planes as you would ducks.”229

First aid training. Hightower and other combat leaders quickly realized how important

effective first aid was to combat soldiers. Medical personnel were not always going to be

available at the front lines and the first aid that a soldier could give while waiting on additional

care could be the difference between life and death. Hightower said, “We’ve also learned that

it’s important for everyone to know what to do with wounds, especially shock… I’ve also seen

our men save almost 500 causalities by prompt treatment of their wounds with sulpha drugs and

proper treatment of shock. Most of the sulpha drugs were administered by the men

themselves.”230 Lieutenant Holtzman further suggested to General Camp, “Try to arouse interest

in learning first aid. The most valuable asset when a tank is hit is to know the use of sulpha

powder and pills and the treatment of burns, puncture and laceration wounds.”231 Treating an injured man reduced overall causalities but the wounded still needed to be collected from the battlefield before receiving treatment.

General Camp had the opportunity to sit down with an unnamed, seasoned British

General who gave some interesting suggestions that helped save lives. The Sherman tank had an escape hatch in the bottom to allow the driver to get out in case of an emergency, but the British discovered another use for the hatch. Causalities could be collected without exposing men to

228 Ibid., 20. 229 Ibid. 230 Ibid., 20. 231 Ibid., 37. 92

enemy gunfire by driving over causalities, opening the escape hatch where the assistant driver

could pull him into the tank to prevent men from being unprotected.232

Eisenhower’s actions. As the North African campaign came to an end, General

Eisenhower realized the “value of combat experience and battle lessons to current training is of utmost importance.”233 He desired to help mold the training of all army units in the United

States by infusing appropriate lessons and experience from the North African campaign.

Eisenhower knew that time would diminish the lessons and experience so he ordered them compiled while they were still fresh and vivid in the minds of the participants.

One of the first steps that Eisenhower took was to send an extensive group of inspectors across the front lines of II Corps from 18 to 30 March 1943 to collect frank statements during informal conferences with inspecting officers. The role of these inspectors was similar to

McNair’s inspectors except they reported back to Eisenhower instead of the War Department.

Ike wanted to know what was going on at the frontlines but more importantly how he could help fix the issues at the front through training. The men of II Corps had recently received the ultimate phase of military training—actual combat experience. Eisenhower designed and distributed a pamphlet on 15 May 1943 called Training Notes from Recent Fighting in Tunisia that he hoped would be used by individuals and units who were preparing for their own overseas deployments. The pamphlet would be a success if just one person read and learned from it.

The pamphlet was designed to break down lessons that were common to all branches and also specific combat arms branches. Every soldier needed to know how to properly dig a foxhole, camouflage, concealment, and cover. As we saw at Kasserine Pass, mine warfare needed to be known by all troops, not just the engineers. The infantry wanted their replacements

232 Ibid., 57. 233 “Reports on Combat Experience and Battle Lessons for Training,” May 14, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 2, MHI. 93

well versed in scouting, patrolling, and night operations. Furthermore, they desired to have their

men mentally hardened to the sights and sounds of war so they would not hesitate at the first

sound of artillery fire coming towards their position. Axis and Allied armored vehicle and

aircraft recognition needed to be improved to prevent fraternization and enemy vehicles slipping

through the lines at dusk. In addition to the above tasks, the armored men also wanted their

soldiers to focus on gunnery skills and the use of smoke to screen their movements. Finally,

combined arms training needed to be conducted to ensure that the artillery, armor, and

infantrymen could operate in unison instead of as individual units.234

As the fighting in Tunisia ended, Eisenhower ordered his subordinate units on 14 May

1943 to create reports on combat experience and battle lessons for training purposes which was

key to the learning process. The substance of the reports was designed to either validate or

provide recommendations to the War Department for all branches of the army.235 Each branch

was responsible for analyzing the soundness or weakness of present tactical doctrine, techniques,

and organization based on lessons and experience. The combat arms wrote about offensive,

defensive, retrograde movements, special operations, and cooperation by support and

observation aviation.236 Other miscellaneous lessons that could be applied to all branches included mine warfare and booby traps, night operations, camouflage, concealment, cover, communications, defense against air attacks, defense against tanks, and reconnaissance.

Weapons and equipment were criticized with frank and constructive opinions based on experience as to deficiencies in quality, sustainability, capabilities, and quantity. Also, similar

234 G-3 Training Section AFHQ, Training Notes from Recent Fighting in Tunisia (Government Printing Office, 1943), ii–v. 235 The army divides its officers into branches of service while enlisted personnel have a military occupation specialty. For example an engineer officer could be responsible for construction and repair of roads, fortifications and mine operations. Where an enlisted man’s job would only be mine operations. The branches in the final reports consisted of the following: infantry, artillery, armored forces, tank destroyer units, cavalry, anti-aircraft artillery, engineers, signal corps, quartermaster corps, medical corps, and ordnance department units. 236 Combat arms units are limited to artillery, cavalry, armored, infantry, engineer, and anti-aircraft units. 94

assessments about weapon systems that worked effectively were welcomed. These reports were

sent up the chain of command to Eisenhower’s level and also sent unabridged to the War

Department. This method showed war planners that many different organizations believed

changes to the training cycles were necessary.237

The lessons that Eisenhower ordered had more than one intention. First, he attempted to

make major changes in the training of soldiers before they left for combat theaters. Additionally,

he wanted to ensure that the men directly under his control knew the lessons and trained on them

until they became second nature. Once the information was collected, Eisenhower’s staff had to

shift through it and complete a training memorandum based on the major themes to distribute to

the men under his command. Additionally, the major combat arms training schools of the

Armed Ground Forces were sent a copy.238

The War Department fully understood the importance of communicating lessons

throughout their commands. Once the operations division within the War Department reviewed

the training memorandum, they immediately realized the impact that the document could have on

training men for combat. It was sent to the Government Printing Office to create a pocket-sized

book that soldiers could easily carry around. The dissemination was restricted to people in the

“service of the United States” and “undoubted loyalty and discretion who were cooperating in

Government work.”239 In order to ensure further distribution, General George C. Marshall, Chief

of Staff of the U.S. Army, authorized a version of the training memo to be published by the

newspaper Army and Navy Register over a two-week period.240 The newspaper was only for

237 “Reports on Combat Experience and Battle Lessons for Training,”. 238 “Training Memorandum 44,” August 4, 1943, RG 407, WWII Operations Reports, 1940-1948, II Corps, 202-0.4- 202-0.12, Box 2609, NARA II, College Park, MD.; “Training Memorandum 44,” August 4, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 2, MHI. 239 War Department, Lessons From The Tunisian Campaign (Government Printing Office, 1943). 240 Army and Navy Register, 11 December 1943.; Army and Navy Register, 18 December 1943. 95 sale to people associated with the U.S. military, so Marshall believed the minor risk of the information getting out beyond the military community was worthwhile in order to ensure wider dissemination of the lessons.

Frontline

Replacement training. Although the Americans had lost tactically at Kasserine, one of their strengths had been their ability to replace causalities and equipment from the United States.

For example, the 3rd Battalion, 168th Infantry Regiment had to be totally replaced since the entire unit was captured at Faïd Pass. Throughout the battle, whole units were shifted to help plug the gaps, and after the German withdrawal, replacements were brought in from 2nd Armored

Division.241 The ability of the Americans to rapidly replace men and equipment proved to be a decisive action in the final defeat of the Germans in Africa.

However, just because the Americans could get a new individual replacement up to the frontlines did not mean that he was fully qualified in combat skills. This caused three out of four

(or seventy-five percent) of the causalities to be the new replacements. Thus it was important to ensure that replacements were well trained before deploying them on the frontlines.242 When replacements showed up at the frontlines, they were generally put under the command of a combat NCO. The NCO and other combat veterans were responsible for teaching these new soldiers as quickly as possible so that they might survive their first contact with the Germans.

The Americans witnessed German tactics in action at Faïd Pass, which included shooting the tracks off of vehicles to immobilize them in place so that they would become “sitting ducks.”243

241 “Company K-50 Years Ago,” Gene C. Mallette Papers, Coll. #00.0116, The Institute on World War II and the Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. 242 Ibid. 243 “World War II-A Soldier Remembers,” Henry Loewenthal, Jr. Papers, Coll. #00.0122, The Institute on World War II and the Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. 96

At the frontlines, the NCOs also taught the new men about the German 88 millimeter

artillery pieces that engendered fear to all who encountered them. The flat trajectory allowed soldiers to hear the round whistle just before it exploded. The replacements quickly learned to hit the ground and find cover when they heard whistling because the round would soon explode.

If the NCO himself was a replacement then he had to learn these lessons extremely fast because he had to turn around and teach his men about them.

The American troops learned fast, since rapid learning was necessary for survival. Those that did not take the time to figure out new equipment right away did not survive long. For example, Colonel Thomas Drake’s 168th Infantry Regiment received six truckloads of bazookas on the night of 12 February but the initial training was not scheduled until the morning of 14

February. These weapons could have been used by the infantrymen in the defense of Faïd Pass but instead the lack of training made them no better than a paperweight against the German tanks.244 So it became very important that troops learned to use equipment that anyone in the unit carried. In war causalities occurred and some else needed to be able to pick up and use equipment against the enemy.

“Replacements” showed up and had to be integrated with the “old timers.” Experienced soldiers developed a “sixth sense” (or survival techniques) as the war progressed. They learned when to move or not move and where to go or not go.245 Sergeant Leland Sutherland, 6th

Armored Infantry, tried to teach his men how to stay down when under enemy fire; however,

244 Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943, 1st ed, The Liberation Trilogy v. 1 (New York: Henry Holt & Co, 2002), 323. 245 “Company K-50 Years Ago,” Gene C. Mallette Papers, Coll. #00.0116, The Institute on World War II and the Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. In Tunisia the first replacements came from units that were currently stationed in North Africa around Casablanca like 2nd Armored Division. Once new replacements arrived they were backfilled into the now skeleton units. The reorganization helped infuse these basically brand new units with combat experienced leaders to train the men. 97

Sutherland harped and preached but the new soldiers did not listen to him and three were killed

in one night.246

The 9th Infantry Division reorganized during the Tunisian campaign as an experiment to

see if there was a better technique for infusing replacements. The army decided to move officers

between units—who had not yet seen action—to provide a mixture of combat experience

alongside officers and NCOs fresh from the replacement training centers. James Leopold

learned from his North African experience that once a commander goes down in battle, killed or

wounded, the executive officer must step in immediately and take command. Delay in taking

command led to disaster.247 This important message was passed along in Eisenhower’s report on combat experience in May 1943, in Tankers in Tunisia in July 1943, and The Army and Navy

The War Department sent Lieutenant William E. Everett to North Africa as a replacement officer to evaluate the effectiveness of equipment. Before going to the front, he attended a week- long local replacement-training called “Lion Mountain” in North Africa. Then he moved into the desert to a British-run training site for additional training in mine warfare and unexploded bombs. The British training was better than what Lieutenant Everett had received in the States and covered basic battle drills which consisted of fire and maneuver tactics, movement

246 “Tankers in Tunisia, Kasserine Pass Doctrine and Lessons Learned Volume II Part 4,” July 31, 1943, 16, U.S. Army center for military history, http://history.army.mil/books/Staff-Rides/kasserine/Vol-II-Part_4.pdf. 247 James G. Leopold, interviewed by Jack Sigler, transcript 16 July 2003, Coll. #WWII-1555, Reichelt Program for Oral History, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. A copy was provided by the Institute on World War II and the Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. 248 “Reports on Combat Experience and Battle Lessons for Training,” May 14, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 2, MHI; “Tankers in Tunisia, Kasserine Pass Doctrine and Lessons Learned Volume II Part 4,” July 31, 1943, U.S. Army center for military history, http://history.army.mil/books/Staff-Rides/kasserine/Vol-II-Part_4.pdf; “Tunisian Campaign Lessons,” Army and Navy Register, December 11, 1943, MHI. 98

formations, establishing defensive positions, etc. The “very concentrated training” lasted two to

three weeks.249

1st Infantry Division training program. Major General Terry “Terrible Terry” Allen,

Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, was concerned with the quality of replacements that he received following Kasserine. He decided that instead of placing these men directly into frontline units to be used as cannon fodder to charge machine gun nest and die by the hundreds,

Allen would create an internal replacement training battalion for 1st Infantry Division even though the division was still engaged in frontline operations. The replacements received supplementary training in rifle marksmanship, at least one supporting weapon system (machine gun, mortar, anti-tank gun), physical conditioning, day and night scouting and patrolling, and small unit tactics. This was a significant drain on the division manpower, but Allen believed it to be worthwhile in preparing his men for combat.250

Allen’s training program was not an uncommon occurrence in North Africa. 1st Armored

Division decided to follow suit and ordered LTC Elton Ringsak, 6th Armored Infantry, 1st

Armored Division, to also run a training center for replacements with the supply trains before

sending the men up to the front.251 Additionally, a training center was also established in Algiers for new signal replacement soldiers.252 These training centers provided to be worth the resources in manpower because the units were having greater success in combat.

249 William E. Everett, interviewed by David Gregory, transcript 30 May 2000, Coll. #WWII-983, Reichelt Program for Oral History, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. A copy was provided by the Institute on World War II and the Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 250 “Letter to General Marshall from General Terry Allen,” June 7, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI. 251 “Tankers in Tunisia, Kasserine Pass Doctrine and Lessons Learned Volume II Part 4,” July 31, 1943, 44, U.S. Army center for military history, http://history.army.mil/books/Staff-Rides/kasserine/Vol-II-Part_4.pdf. 252 Robert Schoen, interviewed by Jack Sigler, transcript 5 August 2002, Coll. #WWII-1434, Reichelt Program for Oral History, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. A copy was provided by the Institute on World War II and the Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. 99

On the evening of 21 February 1943, the German night march in the vicinity of the key

terrain of the Bou Chebka Pass was a disaster because the unit had gotten lost and was unable to

outflank the 1st Infantry Division’s position. Allen took note and understood that in order to

successfully defeat the Germans, his units would have to become proficient at night operations.

Allen created a standard operating procedure directive called “Night Attacks” to provide training

guidance to his men. The commanding general compiled this document from extracts of War

Department manuals and documents. The keys to effective night assaults required disciplined

troops with proficiency in map reading, night orientation, night patrolling, and who were trained

to execute cross-country movements at night without noise or confusion. In order to be

successful, Allen emphasized employing the following basic essential skills for maximize

capacity: “detailed reconnaissance, careful preparations, and skill in maintaining direction and

control, combined with secrecy and vigor of execution.”253 By using these latest lessons, Allen

successfully trained the men within his sphere of influence in current tactics, techniques, and

procedures that allowed them to defeat the Germans in battle.

While Allen saw night operations as the key element to his division’s success, he also

understood that his men had to become proficient at day and night operations. Allen knew that

reconnaissance and intelligence drove operations so he collected these lessons. Now that the 1st

Infantry Division had complied lessons, it was time to inform his men. Allen issued a combat training directive to ensure that his guidance was clearly disseminated throughout the division.

Furthermore, he sent a copy of the directive to the War Department for informational use with the hope that some of the lessons would be incorporated into stateside training cycles. Allen

253 “Night Attacks,” ND, The Terry Allen Collection, Box 5, the U.S. Army Military Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The documents that General Allen used included field service regulation 100-5, rifle platoons and rifle companies 7-10, heavy weapons company 7-15, infantry battalion 7-20, rifle regiment 7-40, combat lessons, number 1, and lessons from the Tunisian campaign. 100

called his philosophy “FIND ‘EM, FIX ‘EM, and FIGHT ‘EM.”254 The enemy had to be found

through reconnaissance and intelligence. Once contact was gained, it had to be maintained,

otherwise the foe would move and have to be found again. Artillery reconnaissance was

important and only effective in conjunction with the use of infantry and armor.

Allen stressed that infantry units needed to be mutually supported by artillery in order to

fix the enemy in place. Properly coordinated artillery fire supported by infantry machine gun

pits would pin the enemy in their position, thus allowing the infantry to maneuver against them.

Close teamwork between the artillery and infantry units was essential for combat effectiveness.

Mutual confidence and a full understanding of capabilities and limitations had to exist between

the units in order to be successful. Now the units were ready to fire and maneuver on the enemy.

Throughout the Kasserine campaign starting at Faïd Pass, the II Corps did not withhold a

reserve force. Allen stressed that commanders always must keep a reserve force to meet later

developments as the battle progressed. He said, “The strength of the initial reserve was

influenced by the enemy situation, the terrain, and the distance to the objective.”255 Allen emphasized to the War Department in closing, “aggressive, extensive reconnaissance, effective security, prompt supporting fires, and skillful use of fire and maneuver are all essential in the attack. All commanders and all units must be imbued with an aggressive, offensive spirit.”256

Realistic and repetitive training made actions on contact second nature to the men. In

keeping with General Allen’s philosophy, Sergeant Vincent McKinney recalled that his unit, 16th

Infantry, trained in patrolling, firing at the range, roving patrols like military police in Oran while

254 “Brief of 1st Division Combat Directive,” September 29, 1943, 1, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040-1945, 353 27 August 1943 to 25 September 1943, Box 2666, NARA II, College Park, MD. 255 Ibid., 6. 256 Ibid., 8. Underlined in the original document. Fire and maneuver tactics refers to a common tactics understood by soldiers of combat arms units. This term means to use suppressive fire against an enemy position while another friendly unit maneuvers to the left or right to outflank the enemy force. 101

they waited to be sent to the front in February 1943.257 Allen’s leadership and his focus on

training transformed his unit into a force who would continually defeat the Germans throughout

the rest of the African campaign.

Unit level changes. After being surrounded during the opening battle at Faïd Pass and

suffering many causalities and captured the 168th Infantry Regiment became combat ineffective.

When the Germans retreated back through Kasserine Pass, LTC Gerald Line, executive officer,

wasted no time in retraining his men in infantry tasks for six solid days starting on 26 February

1943. The men needed the supplementary preparation for the upcoming Allied offensive to

regain contact with the Germans. The immediate attention was on squad level offensive tasks

that included fire and maneuver, anti-tank 37mm operations and range estimation, displacement

of crew served machine guns, combat patrols, and 81mm mortar actions. LTC Line wanted his

men to have realistic training so he ordered the exercise include “practical work in movement

covered by fire of adjacent squads.”258

Next, the 168th trained on defensive operations and reinforced range estimation. The

instruction was realistic because half of each platoon played the opposing force in the field to

give the men moving targets to observe. Additionally, reporting and radio operations were

emphasized. Meanwhile, six NCOs from each company received ‘train the trainer’ instructions

on mine operations, while vehicle drivers attended a mechanic course, and mortar men practiced

gunner tests until they became proficient.

By training a small batch of NCOs from each unit, the regiment was able to quickly train

all their men. Another method would have been to send engineers to each company to educate

257 Vincent McKinney, interviewed by Robin Sellers, transcript 21 December 1998, Coll. #WWII-579, Reichelt Program for Oral History, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. A copy was provided by the Institute on World War II and the Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. 258 “Training Memorandum, 168th Infantry Regiment, 34th Infantry Division,” N.D., RG 407, WW2 Operations Reports, 1940-1948, 34th Infantry Division, Box 8283, NARA II, College Park, MD. 102

the soldiers thus allowing the instruction to be done by technical experts. However, the selected

method caused a lower level of instruction because the NCOs could not remember everything

they were taught by the engineers. It did serve to reinforce mine operations because NCOs were

forced to know enough to effectively teach subordinates.

After the men of the 168th conducted additional individual training, they were ready to

practice larger movement operations. The last phase was collective or unit training that

cumulated with full platoon-level patrolling operations. The final training objectives went back to reinforce individual level tasks of map reading, forced marches, marksmanship, and machine gun drills.259 Just days after suffering a humiliating defeat, 168th Infantry Regiment was retrained and ready to get back into the fight with the Germans; however, they were not the only unit that actively sought out ways to improve.

Orlando Ward, Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, also wanted to improve his division. After the battle Ward wrote a memorandum to his command stating that the lessons learned at Kasserine must be passed along. “Lessons learned through our costly mistakes in this campaign must not be forgotten. They should contribute immeasurable to the wisdom and skill necessary for success in future operations…The importance of having all ranks know the basic

plan of the tactical maneuver and its objectives can not be over-emphasized.”260 Knowing the

basic plans helped cause the men not to panic when they faced the Germans under fire.

Unlike the infantry units—who now had many units who encountered the Germans in

battle—1st Armored Division was the only American tank unit with any real combat experience.

In a brilliant move, Ward turned to the British for help since they had been fighting tanks in the

desert since 1940. British Brigadier George Roberts had a wealth of battle experience and had

259 Ibid. 260 Ward, Orlando, “Memorandum to the Men of 1st Armored Division,” February 27, 1943, The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 2, MHI. Underlined in original document. 103

produced a pamphlet called Battle Drills.261 Ward understood that his frontline commanders had little spare time, so he read through the book and condensed it into extracts to produce the most

“obvious lessons” for his leaders and any outside unit that was interested.

Control was the most significant principle for an armored force in combat, which Ward did not have during Kasserine due to Fredendall’s micromanaging leadership style. In order to

Figure 7 The tactical solution for a protective front given to General Orlando Ward from the British [Courtesy the U.S. Army Military Institute]

261 Roberts was a British General and considered to be an expert on tank warfare. He was an instructor at the Tank Driving and Maintenance School from 1933 to 1937. He was again posted to Egypt for 1938 and 1939 before battling the Germans throughout the North African campaign. He was given a division command of 11th Armoured Division in 1944. Every American Armored Division except 1st Armored Division received tank desert warfare training prior to overseas service. However, 1st Armored Division was the only armored unit to partake in desert warfare during World War II. 104

achieve and maintain control, it remained necessary to have these two essentials: good

communications and sound battle drills.262 Wireless communication required good radio discipline, short concise messages, and effective listening by officers and radio operators. A battle drill was designed to become a natural reaction to a specific combat situation conducted by tank commanders without being ordered by superiors. The drills must be simple and fluid and are designed to rapidly maneuver tanks. They should be known by every tank commander to ensure that he understands what exactly his vehicle was to do and where it was to go. Every officer and NCO must know the battle drills, and the goal remained for every man within a tank unit to also know them. To achieve this level of proficiency, practice was necessary. Ward selected three drills he wanted his men to be competent in: close formations to be used in darkness, sandstorms, or moving over difficult terrain; open formations for when contact with the enemy remained probable; and a protection front while in a defensive or guarding position.263

All the training in the world would be trivial if weaknesses of German equipment were not discovered and exploited. The Americans captured German Tiger tanks at Kasserine and conducted tests to find the vulnerabilities of the tanks. Weak spots were found around the tracks and in the armor where the turret meets the hull. The intelligence (G-2) channels passed this information in February 1943 to the lowest level through so that the gunners could exploit and inflict greater damage.264 The ability of the intelligence community to quickly find flaws

German armor created an environment for tank guners to thrive against the Wehrmacht.

262 A battle drill is a maneuver, based on doctrine, that is to be conducted when a units encounters a specific situation. 263 “Memorandum to all units and separate organization commanders from 1st Armored Division, 6 March 1943,” The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 2, the U.S. Army Military Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 264 “G2 Notes on German Equipment,” N.D., The Martin M. Philpsborn Collection, Box 2, MHI. The G2 is the intelligence officer staff officer in an organization that is commanded by a general officer. In a unit commanded by a colonel or lieutenant colonel their intelligence officer would be called a S2. It is unknown who conducted this testing on the German tanks but the ordnance branch probably conducted it. The captured tank was destroyed in the testing so future testing would come when additional tanks were captured. 105

However, the capability to disseminate this very important to the operator level proved to be a

decisive aspect of the success for the Americans throughout the rest of the African campaign.

Informal

Professional journals. The Army supported the use of longstanding, professional, branch-specific journals as additional method to help keep officers informed during the war through the Field Artillery Journal, Cavalry Journal, and Infantry Journal. The combat arms

published select articles, including unclassified lessons, several months after they were

concluded. Although these journals served the purpose of disseminating past operations and

lessons they also served as American propaganda for the troops. The field artillery journal

circulated operational information, beginning in August 1943. Major Evert Strong discussed the

importance of reconnaissance that allowed the field artillery units to be properly emplaced

overnight on 21-22 February 1943 at Thala. The British lines were extremely weak, and without

American reinforcements, the 21st Panzer Division would have likely broken the line. In fact, the tanks and infantry played very minor roles during the final German push at Thala and the artillery finally stopped Field Marshall Erwin Rommel’s, commander Afrika Korps, offensive.

Major Strong showed other artillery officers that the German army could be defeated and that accurate and concentrated artillery fire played the decisive role in stopping the Germans.265 An

article like Major Strong’s boosted artillerymen’s morale and provided confidence in U.S. Army

doctrine and equipment.

Colonel Hamilton Howze published an article in October to demonstrate combined arms

tactics based on experience. He demonstrated how tanks and artillery had to work together at

Mateur in order to have a successful battle. Howze stated, “tanks can not penetrate an organized

265 Evert Strong, “Thala Engagement: February 21-24,” Field Artillery (August 1943): 573. 106

enemy position without prohibitive losses, except with overwhelming artillery support.”266 The artillery branch must be commended for their outstanding articles and their ability to print current trends without disrupting operational security.

The Cavalry also published its first article in August 1943 followed by a three part series on the operational history of the 81st Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Armored Division. This reconnaissance unit had more battlefield experience during the North African campaign than any other unit. The 81st made mistakes, but they became instantly aware of the errors and actively took steps to correct them. Charles Hoy’s overarching message to his fellow officers was training had to be continuous. They believed the most effective training occurred when tactical walks were conducted under combat conditions. In fact, they compared campaigns to football seasons and battles to an individual football game. “The football team trains between games, keeping in condition, correcting mistakes, and perfecting new plays.”267 The army needed to have the same philosophy if it wanted to have continued success on the battlefield.

Two weak aspects of the 81st were the areas of information and communications. The job of a scout is to provide timely and accurate information to the commander. Hoy stated,

“Remember, no matter how much information is collected if it is not transmitted back to higher headquarters it has little or no value.”268 Too often the scouts did not know their proper location, which resulted in false reporting. Additionally, scouts guessed instead of reporting something as unidentified. It took lots of training to be able to quickly and accurately identify vehicles, weapons, personnel, and aircraft, both allied and enemy.

266 Hamilton H Howze, “Artillery Tank Support,” The Field Artillery Journal 33 (October 1943): 779–780. 267 “Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in Tunisia,” October 19, 1943, 1, The Martin M. Philpsborn Collection, Box 4, MHI. 268 Ibid. 107

Next, the scouts had to be able to perfectly and concisely report the information to higher

headquarters without tying up the radio network. For example, an observation post reported that

a German 88mm gun had been abandoned. Upon examination, it was found that the gun was

prepared for destruction with a pull-type igniter. If this observation post had reported “enemy

88mm captured” this would not have been complete information. Instead the report should have

stated that the gun was abandoned, prepared for destruction, but not yet destroyed. This would

have told higher headquarters that the German’s morale or discipline was low because they had

not followed orders to destroy the gun before abandoning it. If a reconnaissance unit could

provide accurate information and timely reporting, they would have successfully completed their

mission.269

The slowest branch to disseminate lessons through journals was the infantry. It was not

until June 1944 that lessons from the North African campaign appeared in the Infantry Journal.

As we will see, predeployment training had already been changed. Major Robert Cullis

continued to stress the need for map reading and obtaining the dominating piece of key terrain.

Cullis emphasized that if these skills were neglected, units would suffer losses as heavy as had

occurred in Tunisia.270 Once the infantry realized the benefit outweighed the risk of operational

lessons being published in journals, they quickly corrected their deficiencies. In September,

Major James Carvey published an article on the Battle of Faïd Pass. Carvey showed how

intelligence failures led to the German surprise attack and how the units were improperly placed

269 Charles Hoy, “The Last Days in Tunisia,” Cavalry Journal 53 (February 1944): 8–12; Charles Hoy, “Mechanics of Battlefield Reconnaissance,” Cavalry Journal 53 (June 1944): 24–29; Charles Hoy, “Reconnaissance Lessons from Tunisia,” Cavalry Journal 52 (December 1943): 16–21. 270 Robert E. Cullis, “We Learn in Combat,” Infantry Journal LIV, no. 6 (June 1944): 31–35. It is unknown why the Infantry Journal delayed in publishing lessons. 108 to mutually support each other. Infantry units could not be left unsupported on mountains because they would become easily enveloped and quickly find themselves behind enemy lines.271

Conferences. The professional journals were used to widely disseminating lessons but they were not able to quickly distribute information because of the processes that go into publishing a journal. Another method used to speed up the information flow was having guests from the battlefront come to training environments and give talks in a conference setting. One of the benefits was the ability for trainees to ask questions directly to the speaker so that they would be more prepared when they went overseas.

After the conclusion of the fighting in North Africa, General William Palmer, G-2,

Armored Ground Forces, hosted a conference at Fort Knox, Kentucky on 16 June 1943 and had

Brigadier General Robert Maraist and Colonel Peter Hains as guest speakers. General Maraist had been an artillery commander in 1st Armored Division since January 1942, and Colonel Hains had commanded 1st Armored Regiment. The officers in attendance were from the Armored

School and Replacement Training Center at Fort Knox and were interested in hearing lessons from North Africa and asking questions. General Maraist talked about getting defeated, but the experience gained showed that artillery pieces could be double purposed used as indirect fire and also anti-tank weapons. Including replacement equipment, about 125 percent of his guns were lost throughout the North African campaign. A tactical lesson that Maraist learned about the

Germans was that their plans consisted of limited objectives and if commanders could see past the fog of war there were chances to strike at the enemy’s flank.272 For example, during the battle as the Germans drove towards Kasserine and Sbeitla, their supply lines were exposed to a

271 James Carvey, “Faïd Pass,” Infantry Journal (September 1944): 8–12. 272 “Conference on North African Operations,” June 16, 1943, 1–2, The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 2, MHI. 109

flank attack from the north. The inexperienced Allied command was too focused on getting

reinforcements into position to stop the drive instead of assaulting the unprotected flank.

Maraist stressed successful battles had preplanned coordinated firepower and used

combined arms tactics of employment of artillery, tanks, and infantry mutually supporting each

other.273 Headquarters believed that tasking artillery, anti-tank guns, and tank destroyers out individually to support an element was a flaw in the tactical application by leaders rather than the

overall doctrine. This tactic did not work and left elements exposed. Instead, an entire platoon

of three or four guns needed to be kept together in order to properly support their assigned

element.274 Maraist concluded that the training practices for field artillery were suitable but repetitions of gun drills needed to be increased so crews became proficient before they went overseas.275

Colonel Hains knew that the American positions were overextended before the Germans attacked through Faïd Pass, but he was unable to influence a reorganization of the lines. Once the Germans assaulted, 1st Armored Regiment learned many lessons. Tank commander causalities were horrific which caused many junior officers to suddenly find themselves in command of a company.276 With these new, inexperienced leaders in charge, proper reporting and the chaos of battle caused higher headquarters to be ill informed about the tactical situation.

Furthermore, reinforcements sent were delayed providing relief against the Germans. Maraist stressed that higher commanders must personally go to the front to collect information instead of waiting for information to come back to the command post.277

273 Ibid., 4. 274 Ibid. 275 Ibid., 6. 276 Ibid., 8. 277 Ibid., 3. 110

Some skills and best practices that were taught before overseas service proved to be

worthless in the combat zone, especially the combat load carried in a tank. During stateside train

up, the 1st Armored Regiment spent significant time practicing loading equipment into tanks that

included extra clothes and non-essential combat supplies. Once the bullets started flying the men

did not use any of the non-essentials and the next day stripped the tanks to load extra fuel and

ammunition. This conference cannot be directly connected to any formal changes to the training

cycles, although by communicating these lessons to the officers in training, Hains provided

important information to the leaders that would not be found in any army documents but would

save lives in future battles.

The officers asked about techniques to deal with mines and Hains stated that they put

sandbags on the floors of vehicles. These saved soldiers’ lives but not the vehicles. Another

officer asked about tank battles. The best advice was to watch the German tanks in operation

and then modify the approach. The Germans moved slowly, without dust trails which to an

untrained eye the tanks would appear standing still. At Kern’s crossing Hains had eight tanks

left out of two battalions. They established a defensive position and awaited the assault at

daybreak. The Germans were only five miles away but did not attack until three in the

afternoon. All day, it appeared that the tanks remained in their original position and then

suddenly they appeared on the northern and southern flanks. The Germans had developed this

forward movement all day.278 With the question and answer session, Maraist and Hains were able to pass along hard fought lessons to the young officers currently going through training.

These lessons allowed them to be better prepared to face the Germans when they met.

Throughout the summer of 1943, the army continued to hold conferences as a method for infusing tactical lessons into organizations that had not yet seen action at the frontlines. General

278 Ibid., 11. 111

Brehon Somervell, Army Service Forces, hosted a conference in Chicago for all the commanding generals of service commands in July 1943. The major theme was the importance of leadership.

Films were shown and later delivered to the posts where each service was based to allow every officer within the command to watch. Leadership needed to find creative ways to direct the men in order to achieve desired results. One tool used was the creation of informational films that showed their operations, posters, pamphlets, and radio presence to enlisted soldiers to boast morale of the unit.279

Ingenuity of soldiers. One of the strengths of the U.S. Army was that individual soldiers could come up with a solution to a problem and with the help of the chain of command it could be implemented on a large scale. Sergeants H. F. Kameen and Elwood Tkoes, 88th Glider

Infantry, discovered that the projectile for the M-69 60mm mortar round could not be extracted after it was fired. These men thought outside the box and drilled a hole through the fin assembly and punched out the expended cartridge to create solution. Not only did this save time but allowed the fin to be reused, thus saving time and money.280

Furthermore, the 47th Armored Medical Battalion (AMB) quickly found out that they could not provide adequate field medical care to soldiers with their issued equipment and invented a surgical truck—a complete operating room mounted on a two and one-half ton truck.

These mobile operating rooms could be set up and broken down in fifteen minutes. In fact, they were so successful in the Tunisian campaign that they soon were adapted as standard equipment in every armored division. The 47th AMB also invented a “rolling drug store” on a truck platform that carried a complete stock of medical supplies and a dental truck with the capability

279 “Indoctrination and Orientation of Army Service Forces Troops,” July 22, 1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040-1945, 353, 19 June 1943 to 5 August 1943, Box 2668, NARA II, College Park, MD. 280 “Letter from SGT H. F. Kameen and Elwood Tkoes,” June 27, 1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040- 1945, 353, 19 June 1943 to 5 August 1943, Box 2668, NARA II, College Park, MD. 112

of bringing dental care into the field—the first time this occurred outside an established

hospital.281

Formal changes

New equipment. As new equipment became available in Africa it was fielded, including new tank destroyers—the M10s. These were a vast improvement over the half-tracks with

37mm guns attached to the rear of a half-track vehicle. The M10 mounted a navy three-inch gun that could pierce 250mm of armor plate at 1,000 yards and was mounted around an armor plate to protect the gunner. The M10 could move twenty-five to thirty miles per hour, which was fast during World War II. However, the high profile of the M10 made it an easy target.282 While in

Casablanca, Private Raymond Carter’s unit, 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion, fielded new M10 tank destroyers. They had never seen the M10s before and had only trained on half-tracks.

Carter trained on the new equipment and was shipped inside the vehicle to Tunisia by railcars.

During the movement the men become more familiar with the equipment.283

Many soldiers desired better tank sights so the Tank Destroyer Board, a stateside unit that

was responsible for overseeing tank destroyer equipment improvements, tested three and four

power sights. After careful comparison testing, the three-power sight was selected as the

standard. Current light and medium tanks in production were being outfitted with the three

power direct telescopic sight. However, the Ordnance Branch was not satisfied, so they

developed a six power periscopic telescopic sight to be developed and tested later in 1943.

281 “1st Armored History 05-1AR,” 1945, 62, MHI. 282 “World War II-A Soldier Remembers,” Henry Loewenthal, Jr. Papers, Coll. #00.0122, The Institute on World War II and the Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. 283 Raymond Carter, interviewed by Steve Brewer, transcript 10-15 October 2002, Coll. #WWII-1457, Reichelt Program for Oral History, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. A copy was provided by the Institute on World War II and the Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. 113

Gunners were extremely satisfied with the new three-power sight. Tankers were full of envy as

they waited for an updated sight.284

The army was in need of a more effective tank diesel engine over the current unleaded gasoline. Thus, the 40-tank test was inaugurated in March 1943 to test various models of engines and to determine the best model. The test included the engine and power train and how it operated with different types of track, communication equipment, ammunition racks, turrets, and other equipment. Based on the results, the test concluded that “the production of the Ford

Tank Engine, Model GAA-V-6, be expedited to the utmost.”285 Although the combat troops wanted the less flammable diesel model tanks and the research test selected a gasoline engine without seriously considering a diesel replacement.286 Other items tested included ammunition, communications equipment, gas masks, flame-throwers, fire-aid kits, goggles, tanks, half-tracks, and other armored vehicles.

284 “Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff,” April 24, 1943, 2, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI; G-3 Training Section AFHQ, Training Notes from Recent Fighting in Tunisia (Government Printing Office, 1943), 55, 60; Major Allerton Cushman, “Observer Report,” May 3, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI; “Report on Combat Experience and Battle Lessons for Training Purposes, 1st Armored Division,” June 13, 1943, 13, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI; “Combat Experience and Battle Lessons, 1st Tank Destroyer Group,” June 12, 1943, 10, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI. The sights that the Tank Destroyer Board tested varied in the magnification each sight provided over the naked eye. The three and four power sights sat in a location on the tank that was equal to the gunner level. This sight cause the tank turrets to become more exposed in order for the gunner to actively scan for enemy targets. Meanwhile, the periscopic sight, similar to what is used on a submarine, allows the tank to stay in a defilade position, or concealed, while searching the battlefield for enemy activity. 285 “Testing and Equipment: The Armored Force Medical Research Laboratory,” N.D., The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 2, MHI. Unleaded gasoline is more combustible than diesel. Many tanks caught fire throughout the Kasserine Pass battle due to the gasoline catching fire. Some men claimed that it was actually the ammunition that caught fire first. This could have occurred on several occasions but the fuel would quickly catch on fire afterwards causing the tank to burn. Hence the army needed a tank that would be less susceptible to blaze after being hit by enemy rounds. Diesel is more difficult to ignite and became the solution. 286 Nicholas Molnar, “General George S. Patton and the War-Winning Sherman Tank Myth,” in The United States and the Second World War: New Perspectives on Diplomacy, War, and the Home Front, ed. G. Kurt Piehler and Sidney Pash, 1st ed, World War II, the Global, Human, and Ethical Dimension (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 137. 114

When the Germans started using anti-tank mines as they retreated after Kasserine, the

Armed Force Board was directed to test adequate means for clearing minefields. The equipment

provided for testing proved a complete failure for the plan to drag weights suspended from a

boom in front of a tank. The T3 (scorpion) used by the British in the African campaign with

considerable success, was declared by the board to be “the most effective device for exploding

mines.” The T3 used the technique of flailing the ground with many chains suspended on a

rotary device out in front of a medium tank. As a result of tests at Fort Knox, thirty medium M4

tanks were modified with the scorpion and sent abroad for use by Americans at the frontlines in

May.287 Additionally, over half a million non-metallic anti-tank mines with chemical fuses were

being procured and expedited to the front.288

The traditional mission of tanks was to close with the enemy and destroy him by direct fire, but combat experience revealed a secondary use of tanks shooting indirect fire. Meanwhile, the tank destroyer mission was not to close on the enemy but instead to destroy enemy tanks from concealed positions by direct-fire guns. However, tankers realized that if they were not directly involved in the conflict the tank or tank destroyer could be used to provide indirect fire.

This, of course, required additional training of the tank and tank destroyer crews in the new gunnery technique.289 In order for the tankers to provide accurate, indirect fire the tanks required a gunnery quadrant to allow the gunner to properly aim the gun on target. These quadrants were in high demand once it was discovered the tanks could provide this additional firepower to the

287 “Testing and Equipment: The Armored Force Board,” N.D., The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 2, MHI; “Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff,” April 24, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI. 288 “Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff,” 1. 289 “Employment of Tanks and Tank Destroyers as Field Artillery,” March 11, 1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040-1945, Box 2664, NARA II, College Park, MD. 115

battlefield.290 The War Department rushed the equipment to the front with 232 gunners’

quadrants arriving and installed on tanks in theater in April 1943. Four hundred more were

ready for shipment and rushed to the combat zone.291

Training documents. As a bureaucratic organization, the War Department had to find ways to issue clear training guidance to units worldwide in a quick and efficient manner.

Soldiers’ lives on the frontlines depended on training during lulls in the fighting and well-trained replacements. Training circulars became the short-term solution that were printed and distributed by the War Department to bridge the gap until training centers could rework their training schedules. The circulars were infused with lessons from the battlefront on different training solutions. Sometimes these pamphlets were written instructions and other times they were graphic aids. One of the first to be issued after the defeat at Kasserine was a graphic aid focused on rifle marksmanship and scouting. Frightened soldiers had fired without aiming during the battle and going back to the basics of marksmanship allowed the soldiers to become more proficient with their personal weapons. The aids were large enough to instruct a company- sized element but the intent was to emphasis groups the size of a platoon or smaller in order to receive better instruction.292

While units used NCOs trained by engineers to teach mine clearing and emplacement at the front, the War Department looked to create a more standardized training platform. The solution became a pocket-sized pictorial training aid that covered from the basics of why it was important to learn about mines and booby traps to more technical information and specifications.

290 “Training Circular--Fundamentals of Gunnery for High Velocity Artillery Type Weapons,” December 14, 1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040-1945, 353, 13 Novemeber 1943 to 31 December 1943, Box 2663, NARA II, College Park, MD. 291 “Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff,” 2. 292 Training Circular 75, 28 May 1943; RG 407, Army AG decimal file 1940-1945, Box 2669, NARA II, College Park, MD. 116

Figure 8 The War Department Pamphlet coving mines and booby traps. [Courtesy National Archives]

117

In order to keep the soldiers interested while viewing the pamphlet, there included cartoon-type

funny pictures conveyed essential information. Additionally, the message within the book was

simplified to a middle school education-level so that every soldier would understand how mines

and booby traps could affect them. “What sets them off? You Do! Here’s HOW…You PULL

Things. You LIFT things. You CUT things. You MOVE things.”293 After the basics were covered extremely detailed pictures of mines were displayed with exact size specifications. This allowed the soldiers to see exactly how an uncovered mine looked and where exactly the triggers for each mine along with the necessary poundage to set them off.294 The last part dealt with how to discover and defuse mines. If a soldier was inside an unmarked minefield, he needed to prod the ground with his bayonet and pull out any mines with ropes from a safe distance and inside a foxhole. The War Department’s ability to keep a soldier’s attention and entertain them while teaching about mines and booby traps was a brilliant design to pass the message to the troops.

It was important for soldiers to be well versed on mine recognition, emplacement, and removal; however, they also needed to be trained on barbed wire obstacles. Sometimes the

Germans would place barbed wire before, inside, or after mine fields, and the soldiers needed to

293 “Mines and Booby Traps, War Department Pamphlet No 21-23,” N.D., 11–16, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040-1945, Box 2664, NARA II, College Park, MD. All the original words in the work were capitalized. The words capitalized in this paper were of a larger font to emphasize to the reader. This is why only the stressed words are capitalized in this paper. 294 Generally speaking, the Germans employed three kinds of mines—the anti-tank mine, the anti-personnel mine, and the booby trap. The anti-tank mines, or Teller mines, were placed on roads, gaps in barbed wire, in towns and open spaces which might be utilized by armored vehicles. Often the Teller mines were laid just off the roads and in roadside ditches. The Germans often laid their mines in pairs, one above the other or upside down, in order to increase their effectiveness and make their removal more difficult. The anti-personnel mine were employed in great numbers and were very effective. These mines were blown out of the ground and would explode approximately three feet in the air. They were often placed on trails, tracks through foliage, and around urban areas. Another German technique was to place them in ditches of well travel roads where they were very effective at inflicting casualties when troops were seeking shelter from air attacks during convoys. The Germans would double stack anti- personnel mines less often than anti-tank mines. German booby traps used both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. They were connected to windows, doors, chairs, toilets, and any object that might arouse the curiosity of a solider. Once the object was disturbed the mine would explode. See Major General Walton Walker, “Report of Visit to North African Theater of Operations,” June 12, 1943, 6, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI. 118

know how to tackle these obstacles. Hence, the War Department published a thirty-nine page

graphic training aid that showed the type of obstacles the Germans generally created and the

Figure 9 The War Department pamphlet displays enemy as devils and emplaces Nazi symbols to build hatred for the enemy. Examples of the cartoon type drawings to keep the attention of soldiers. [Courtesy National Archives]

recommend method of breaching. Additionally, the training aid showed how to properly

emplace a fortified barbed-wire obstacle around defensive positions.295 As we saw, the men at

Faïd Pass did not create an active minefields or barbed-wire obstacles around their positions, which allowed the German offensive unabated access to their poorly defended positions.

The War Department knew that changes to publications and their timely dissemination held the keys to victory. Major General Ray E. Porter, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, War

Department General Staff, was charged with overseeing this task. As the lessons started flowing

295 “Graphic Training Aid 5-9, Barbed-Wire Obstacles,” November 23, 1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040-1945, 353, 13 Novemeber 1943 to 31 December 1943, Box 2663, NARA II, College Park, MD. 119

in from the African and Pacific campaigns, changes were directed to field manuals, training

circulars, and other publications from the operations (G-3) division.296 The army estimated that

23,000 employees worked full time to post changes to manuals. At first the average time it took to revise and print the new manual was seventy days, though some took about ninety days.297

However, as more information came in from the front, General Porter had a difficult time keeping up that rate of production and called a conference on 22 October 1943 to discuss recommendations to speed up the process. Acting under the authority of Secretary of War

Henry L. Stimson, Porter took drastic steps to curtail printing and other forms of reproduction throughout the army. The Government Printing Office, field plants, and other plants had reached astronomical proportions due to ridiculous requirements like printing and distributing pamphlet- size manuals on “how to drive a nail, how to saw a board in two, etc.” Porter ordered a fifty percent reduction in printing which would be accomplished by stopping one hundred percent of extraneous and non-essential material.298 Although changes and printing still took a substantial time to produce, General Porter’s ability to influence the printing by allowing only printing material that was essential to the war effort proved critical to disseminating lessons and training changes to soldiers.

While there remained a large focus on fixing the Allied camouflage issues, the engineer section of the Allied Force Headquarters worked on a camouflage bulletin to help soldiers identify German camouflaged positions. There was no evidence that the Germans used any special camouflage techniques that the Allies did not know or that they possessed any superior or special camouflage equipment. Instead, the Germans were simply more disciplined at covering

296 The G-3 section of a staff encompassed all operations, training, organization allotments, and schooling. 297 R. A. Menedith, “Training Literature,” October 12, 1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040-1945, Box 2664, NARA II, College Park, MD. 298 Ray E. Porter, “Training Literature,” October 24, 1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040-1945, Box 2664, NARA II, College Park, MD. 120

up their posts and vehicles. The engineers described the German camouflage systems and

showed pictures to help soldiers with identification.299

To address the training shortfalls in vehicle and aircraft recognition, the War Department

published a bimonthly journal called U.S. Army-Navy Journal of Recognition. This publication

was devoted to help soldiers, airmen, and sailors recognize enemy armored vehicles, ships, and

aircraft was first issued in September 1943. By classifying the journal as restricted, this allowed

wide dissemination to the soldiers almost immediately. The journal showed how quickly Allied intelligence gained information about new Axis weapons. Additionally, new Allied equipment was included to help prevent soldiers from conducting fraternization through familiarization.300

By selecting to publish this information in a journal format, the War Department was able to disseminate the information more quickly than waiting to include it in field manuals or other training aids.

At first combat commanders were confused on how to properly use tank destroyer units and quickly learned to mass their fires for the most effective results. The tank destroyer was improperly used at Faïd Pass but effectively at Sbiba. The War Department agreed to clarify the proper application of tank destroyer units and issued a training circular rather quickly in June

1943. In a defensive position the tank destroyer would be placed in a location to protect a hostile breakthrough and the flanks. A properly emplaced tank destroyer team would force an enemy tank into their kill zone and either be destroyed or force a withdrawal.301

299 “Lessons of the Tunisian Campaign Camouflage Bulletin #4,” August 16, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 2, MHI. 300 “Army Navy Recognition,” September 1943, vii–viii, MHI; “Training Circular 131,” December 14, 1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040-1945, 353 27 August 1943 to 25 September 1943, Box 2666, NARA II, College Park, MD. 301 “Training Circular 88, Employment of Tank Destroyer Units,” June 24, 1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040-1945, 353, 19 June 1943 to 5 August 1943, Box 2668, NARA II, College Park, MD. 121

Changes to training schools. Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, commanding

general of the Armed Ground Forces, was charged with training and preparing the U.S. Army for

overseas service. As the lessons and requests for changes to training schools came back from the

frontlines, it was General McNair’s job to oversee the changes to the training of all branches.

One of McNair’s goals was to standardize common core training for branch immaterial tasks.

These replacement-training centers (RTC) of the Army Ground Forces had the primary mission of training basic and specialist replacements of all areas within the maximum training period allowable. RTC changed the training cycle from thirteen weeks to seventeen weeks.

There were nine infantry centers, three field artillery, two antiaircraft, and one each for cavalry, armored, and tank destroyer. Replacement depots had a three-fold mission of processing personnel from RTCs and units to staging areas, checking to ensure each individual had completed the prescribed training; correcting any essential training deficiencies prior to shipping; and maintaining physical and training standards. Fort Meade, Maryland was the depot for all

European bound replacements. The schools were another important agency for training purposes with the dual mission of furnishing specialized training of officers and enlisted men and training officer candidates. School capacities were studied continually to ensure the needs of the army were meet and not excessive.302

Acting on orders from Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Major General Ray Porter,

assistant chief of staff, G-3 ordered for the basic training period to be extended from thirteen

weeks to seventeen weeks starting 1 October. Additionally, the replacement training centers and

unit training programs were also prolonged to seventeen weeks to include four weeks of small

302 “Army Ground Forces, Replacement Training Centers, Depots and Schools,” ND, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, Army Field Forces HQS, General Staff, G-3 Section Training Group Schools Division, Classified Decimal File 1942-1948, Box 142, NARA II, College Park, MD. 122

Figure 10. A pictorial display showed the training cycle for the Infantry Replacement Training Center. As the needs of the army changed the training cycle was decreased in 1944. [Courtesy National Archives]

unit training and field exercises.303 The Armored Replacement Training Center had no

difficulties expanding their training schedules to seventeen weeks seeing how they already

conducted two weeks of field training in their current thirteen-week schedule.304

303 “Inquiry Re Length of Basic Training,” October 12, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, Army Field Forces HQS, General Staff, G-3 Section Training Group Schools Division, Classified Decimal File 1942-1948, Box 142, NARA II, College Park, MD.; “Inquiry Re Length of Basic Training,” September 29, 1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040-1945, 353 27 August 1943 to 25 September 1943, Box 2666, NARA II, College Park, MD.; “G3 Logs, Activities, Schools & Replacement Training Branch, Miscellaneous Division,” August 14, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, Army Field Forces HQS, General Staff, G-3 Section Training Group Schools Division, Classified Decimal File 1942-1948, 319.1 to 322, Box 141, NARA II, College Park, MD.; “Replacements for 1st 123

In addition to extending the training cycles, the War Department published guidance to

establish minimum training requirements before a unit was classified as ready for overseas

service. All individuals had to complete basic training and follow on technical training.

Furthermore, all soldiers had to be exposed to close overhead artillery fire on a mental

conditioning course. The unit had to be filled to at least seventy-five percent of authorized

personnel and equipment before its training cycle could begin. Units had to complete seventeen weeks of training together if their basic and technical training occurred at the unit level. If the basic and technical training occurred elsewhere then the unit only had to train for eleven weeks together before being certified as fully trained.305

Combat veterans were employed in 1943 by the War Department to bolster training schools as cadre.306 This allowed for the instructors to teach the trainees the small things that would keep them alive without having to devote additional time on the training schedules. For example, during field time a cadre member could teach and show the trainees how leaving a tin can outside their foxhole could reflect in the sunlight and be observed by enemy lines. These small but vital lessons that combat veterans brought to the schoolhouse paid dividends when the recruits arrived at their units.

Armor. General Charles L. Scott led the Armored Force Replacement Training Center

(AFRTC) at Fort Knox, which had a shortage of tanks to train the men on before the war.

Additionally, personnel shortages persisted until February 1943, when officers assigned were

Infantry Division,” July 17, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI. 304 “Visit to Armored Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky,” July 30, 1943, 3, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park, MD. 305 “Army Service Forces Circular Number 60,” September 27, 1943, 6–7, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040- 1945, 353 27 August 1943 to 25 September 1943, Box 2666, NARA II, College Park, MD. 306 “Training of Enlisted Men at Replacement Training Centers Other Than Trainees or Overhead,” December 24, 1943, RG 407, Army AG Decimal File 1040-1945, 353, 13 Novemeber 1943 to 31 December 1943, Box 2663, NARA II, College Park, MD. 124 required to have an armor background in order to be assigned as a trainer. The Armor Branch wanted to continue improving their training from example, when General Camp traveled to

Tunisia to get lessons from the frontlines.307 Beginning in March 1943, all specialists were given a minimum of six weeks basic training followed by two weeks of driver training and vehicular familiarization before attending one week of battle training. Battle training focused on exposing soldiers to the sights and sounds of warfare in an attempt to season the soldiers prior to being on the frontlines. Whistle bombs, smoke, tear gas, barbed wire, demolitions, and overhead firing of machine guns all played a part in teaching coordination under fire. The battle training was divided into six phases: combat driving, tank crew training, tank crew firing, close combat firing, booby traps and grenades, and reconnaissance.

On 10 March 1943, Scott recommended that the school training be extended to fifteen weeks in order to allow for additional battle training. His executive officer Colonel Harvie R.

Matthews personally went to Washington and secured approval in May 1943. The two weeks were spent on demolitions, obstacles and mines; decontamination and camouflage; tactical supply distribution; battle field vehicle recovery; dismounted reconnaissance and terrain appreciation; battle driving, dry fire runs and movement; live fire exercises; sub-caliber firing; self-preservation; infiltration and close combat drills; crew drills; tank vs. tank problems; how to use “K” rations; bivouac, night security, and night movements. Lieutenants were required to attend an additional month of battle training after graduating in order to enable them to become more seasoned so that they would not mentally break as easily under fire at the frontlines.

Among the highlights of the training at the center was the institution of a “Nazi platoon” to

307 The Armored Force was overall responsible for all training of tankers, reconnaissance, and specialty jobs associated with the armored branch. The training mission was divided between the AFRTC and the Armored Force School. The mission of the AFRTC was to provide filler and loss replacements trained in the fundamentals of their respective arms, ready to take their place in units as privates. While the Armored Force School was responsible for training individual who would go to a unit that was stateside and preparing for overseas service. 125

stimulate alertness among the trainees. They wore German uniforms and were made up of

officers that were fluent in German which added to the realism of the training.308

Even with the focus on battle training, there remained a dire need for additional tank- gunnery practice. So the Armored Command increased its ammunition allowances for replacement training. Medium tank crews with 75mm guns and also light tank personnel with

37mm guns would shoot twenty additional rounds. Furthermore, the crews would shoot familiarization firing on the opposite weapon system to allow them to have a basic knowledge of both weapon systems.309

One idea that Major General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., Chief of the Armored Force, wanted to adopt was the use of 20th Armored Division as the training element because he believed that it would give an added value to the graduates of the AFRTC. Using a full division to play the opposing force would add more realistic elements to practice tactics, reports, observation, and camouflaged techniques. General McNair did not believe that a tactical unit should be used to train soldiers as that was the job of the replacement training centers and the men assigned to those units. Thus, McNair denied Gillem’s request and ordered that 20th Armored Division be made combat ready as soon as possible for shipment overseas.310 Gillem was further stymied when McNair informed him that a recommendation to increase the time of training was sent to the War Department for approval. In the mean time, Gillem said, “with the possibility of changes of one kind or another, it seems best that your particular methods remain unchanged.”311

308 “Training A.F.R.T.C.,” N.D., The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 2, MHI. 309 Ibid. 310 Letter from LTG Lesley McNair to MG Alvan Gillem, June 21, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park, MD. 311 Letter from LTG Lesley McNair to MG Alvan Gillem, July 5, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park, MD. Although McNair did not want to use the 20th Armored Division as a training element his orders were to keep using the 20th until future orders are received from the War Department. The 20th Armored Division retained the training mission until they were sent overseas in October 1944. 126

The AFRTC trained 732 soldiers per battalion cycle, but effective 27 June 1943 the

trainees per cycle was bumped up to 786. There were a total of nine battalions training

simultaneously at different points in their training cycle to allow for effective use of the land.312

The increases of personnel created a dilemma at Fort Knox, Kentucky of insufficient office and

billeting space. Previously, the Armored School was training seventy percent tankers and thirty

percent reconnaissance scouts. With the expansion of the training mission focused on tankers,

the numbers changed to eighty percent tankers and twenty percent reconnaissance scouts.313

Still, with the increase in training output the AFRTC and Armored Force School could not meet the requirement for overseas shipment of personnel. In fact the shortage was 1,039 per month or

12,468 per year.314

With the Armored Forces RTC operating at maximum authorized capacity and the substantial shortage of replacement requirements, it was time to look for various solutions.

During a command visit from Colonel Ronald Shaw, G-3 staff officer, the Armed Ground

Forces, asked, “where should replacements, specialists and officers of the assault troops, the reconnaissance troops and the support troops be trained?” The Armored School recommended that assault gun personnel should be trained at Fort Knox due to the similarity of their platform to tanks. They believed the reconnaissance troops should be trained at Fort Riley and the tank personnel trained at Fort Knox.315 Colonel Donald Tibbets, G-3 staff officer, Armored Force

School, recommended moving the reconnaissance training—a subsection of armor—to Fort

Riley, Kansas. He also endorsed moving the tactical units off Fort Knox to free up the necessary

312 “Production Rate, Armored Replacement Training Center,” June 29, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park, MD. 313 “Visit to Armored Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky,” July 30, 1943, 1, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park, MD. 314 “Production Rate, Armored Replacement Training Center.” 315 “Visit to Armored Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky,” 2. 127

office space, training area, and housing to prevent cuts to the number of personnel being trained.

The reconnaissance center was moved but the tactical units stayed at Knox to conduct their

training.316

The men at the front lines wanted additional first aid training, and the Army Ground

Forces (AGF) agreed by telling the armored command that the time allotted for “First Aid,

Personal and Sex Hygiene, Camp and Field Sanitation” was insufficient. General McNair said that additional time could be allotted during the two-week field exercise to properly cover this subject.317

The AGF’s goal was to make replacement training on core subjects uniform at every center across the United States. There was too much variation between the training given at the

AFRTC and training given to tactical units, which resulted in replacements not fitting into tactical units without additional training. While comparing the armored training schedule to others, Colonel Shaw identified the time allotted to “Special Battle Courses” as excessive. Other

replacement centers had ten hours devoted to this subject with a breakdown of two hours in an

infiltration course, two hours in close combat course, and six hours devoted to combat in cities.

General McNair told the armored school to conform their schedule.318

During a command visit, Colonel C. C. Higgins, G3 staff officer, the Armed Ground

Forces, noticed that the armored center had changed how weapons firing was implemented based on feedback from the battlefront. The marksmanship included a dry run of weapons mounted onto vehicles prior to allowing the soldiers to shoot live ammunition. Upon completion of the

316 Telephone conversation, Col Shaw, HQ AGF and Col Tibbets, Armd, Fort Knox, July 3, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park, MD. 317 “Headquarters Army Ground Force to Commanding General Armored Command,” August 3, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park, MD. 318 Ibid. 128 dry and live fire exercises the trainers conducted a critique to the gunners in order to enhance the instruction.319 In order to maximize training opportunities, trainees fired the .30 caliber machine gun against moving tanks. This accomplished a dual purpose of making training realistic and creating an occasion to mentally condition the tankers to know the sights and sounds of being fired upon by someone.320 General McNair thought the risk associated with shooting live bullets at crews in training was worthwhile to create a realistic training situation. He accepted the possibility that soldiers inside tanks could become possible causalities during training exercises.

General Scott believed that there was a complete difference between training of radio operators and radio repairmen. A specialty course on radio operations was already being taught, but this was limited to changing batteries, radio etiquette, inputting and changing radio frequencies. The radio operators did not know how to troubleshoot or fix a radio once it broke.

Thus, the unserviceable radio would have to be sent well behind the frontlines to the maintenance personnel to fix. The headquarters requested authorization and got approval to start a radio electrician course so radios could be fixed at the front without hampering operations more than necessary.321

The quota for trained specialists from the replacement armored school was increased from 380 to 500 per month in September.322 After graduating from tanker school, men were selected and sent to specialty schools based on their individual skills. The Armored School continually had around fifty percent excess personnel in all radio operator and mechanics classes.

319 “Visit to Fort Knox,” September 17, 1943, 1, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park, MD. 320 Ibid., 2. 321 “Radio Electricians Course,” June 24, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Ground General School to Med School, Box 149, NARA II, College Park, MD. 322 Ibid., 6. 129

However, they ran a deficit in clerical positions, radio electricians, and gun mechanics all of which required more highly skilled men.323

The men at the frontlines wanted better trained officers so the Armored school created an eight week company officers course running every two weeks and a six weeks battalion commander course starting every four weeks. These courses were designed to help fill officers knowledge gaps before they were deployed. However, the courses were not filled to capacity because men were not recalled from overseas duty to attend these courses. These courses were not established overseas because the teachers resided at Fort Knox, the course was too long to run overseas, and transportation to Europe was difficult. The company grade had a shortage of about fifty officers per class and the battalion commander course had a shortage of eighty per class. The Armored school wasted precious manpower to resource these classes without meeting the quota. The courses taught valuable information to officers but in order to meet all training requirements, the capacity dropped the average class size and the frequency was reduced to every four weeks for company grade and every six weeks for battalion commanders.324

The excess facilities and manpower from the officer’s course allowed the Armored

School to create a new twelve week enlisted tactics course with a capacity of fifty students starting every week. The basic tactical principles taught to the enlisted men were the elements of an armored battalion, operations of individual combat vehicles, section and platoon tactics, duties of an NCO, field engineering to include demolition, anti-tank defense, field expedients,

323 Ibid., 7. 324 Ibid., 8. Originally the authorization for company grade officers was 125 and reduced to 75. The battalion commander course also originally held an authorization of 125 and was reduced to 45. A company grade officer is either a captain or a lieutenant. Battalion commanders generally hold the rank of lieutenant colonel but majors were often thrust into the position due to causalities at the frontlines. 130

map reading, gunnery, tank crew drills, and communications.325 This new course helped create a

better-trained force with the reallocation of assets already located at the Armored school.

The War Department scrutinized the Armored Officer Candidate School training

schedules and questioned why thirty hours were devoted to administrative time. General Patrick

Lentz said that the material taught during the administrative time was largely theoretical and was

learned by doing, not listening to lectures.326 The Armored School fought the War Department

to maintain the administrative hours. They believed these hours were necessary because many

candidates had zero knowledge of the subject coming into school. The Armored School bent but

repurposed one hour to censorship training in hopes of keeping their training intact.327 After

deliberation, General Lentz decided to reduce the amount of company administrative time from

thirty hours to sixteen hours, which was more in line with infantry and field artillery training.328

Infantry. General Terry Allen recommended that each infantryman be trained on at least

one supporting weapon system. Army regulations had already authorized ammunition for

instruction but it had not been used by July 1943. General McNair ordered that courses of

instruction be added for these weapons systems. Additionally, ammunition allowances were

increased to provide additional weapons proficiency and familiarization prior to deployment. A

weapon that any infantryman would commonly carry, like the .30 caliber rifle, would be shot in a

familiarization, qualification, and combat environments. Other infrequently used weapons like

325 Ibid., 8–9. 326 “Increase in Length of Officer Candidate School Courses,” May 28, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park, MD. In 1943 every individual branch had its own Officer Candidate School (OCS). Men could volunteer for OCS but that practice was terminated in the summer of 1943. Additionally, the cadre for basic training and replacement training centers could nominate individuals to attend OCS upon completion of the specific school. 327 “Headquarters Armored Force School to Chief of the Armored Force,” July 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park, MD. 328 Telephone conversation, LTC Jeter, Schools and Replacement branch, G-3, and Colonel Shallene Replacement and School Command, July 14, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Armored Center & School to Command & General Staff College, Box 147, NARA II, College Park, MD. The administrative hours needed to include instructions on mess management and supply operations. 131

tear gas would be taught only in an instructional mode. The army learned from Colonel Thomas

Drake at Faïd Pass. His men received anti-tank bazookas, but did not know how to operate them

and soon training centers started shooting rocket launchers. Furthermore, mines and various

engineer explosives were added to the allowance tables for trainees to practice.329

The Infantry branch struggled with their armored brothers to provide trained radio technicians that could fix radios at the frontlines. General McNair approved a radio electrician’s course to be taught at the Infantry School. However, McNair did not want the infantry to reinvent the wheel and denied the length of nine weeks. Instead, McNair stated that the Field

Artillery School and the Tank Destroyer School already had a similar course of four and eight

weeks respectively. The Infantry School needed to reach out and get the training schedules from

those other organizations to provide uniformity of training throughout the Army Ground Force.

Furthermore, the Infantry School had to figure out how to train more recruits with fewer

resources because no additional overhead or cadre soldiers were authorized to teach the new

class.330

The Infantry School was much more efficient than the Armored School in making

changes to their program of instructions with the War Department. In order to accommodate a

major change to bolster cannon instruction, map maneuvers, and attack of a fortified position, the

Infantry School reduced physical training by twenty-two hours and forced the trainees to

329 “Ammunition Allotments Inclosure 2,” N.D., RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, Army Field Forces HQS, General Staff, G-3 Section Training Group Schools Division, Classified Decimal File 1942-1948, Box 142, NARA II, College Park, MD.; “Replacements for 1st Infantry Division,” July 17, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Department’s Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI. AR 775-10 authorized ammunition for instruction with the automatic rifle, carbine, rifle, anti-tank rocket and 60mm mortar or 81mm mortar. 330 “Radio Electricians Course,” June 24, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Ground General School to Med School, Box 149, NARA II, College Park, MD. 132 workout on their own during their limited free time.331 Again, when the Infantry School sent up requests for changes, the War Department saw the compromises as reasonable. Mounted zone reconnaissance was deleted and two hours in anti-tank gunnery, courses in aircraft identification, and military censorship were added.332 Training an infantryman was much less technical than teaching a man to operate a tank and thus allowed the Infantry School greater flexibility in its training schedules.

331 “Program of Instruction for Officers’ Advanced Course, The Infantry School,” July 21, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Ground General School to Med School, Box 149, NARA II, College Park, MD. 332 “Program of Instruction for Officers’ Advanced Course, The Infantry School,” September 7, 1943, RG 337, Hq Army Ground Forces, 352, Ground General School to Med School, Box 149, NARA II, College Park, MD. 133

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

Although the Allies expected an attack on 14 February 1943, British General Kenneth

Anderson did not anticipate General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim unleashing his units through Faïd

Pass towards Sid bou Zid. The Axis venture resembled the later offensive known as Operation

‘Wacht am Rhein’ (Battle of the Bulge) in that it attained operational surprise and was the last

effort of a desperate enemy to isolate the Allied armies from their supply base.333 Like the 1944

offensive, the Kasserine offensive failed because there was not enough German combat power or

clear management to accomplish its stated goals.334

Meanwhile, Allied intelligence had come to depend on the ULTRA intercepts, especially

after their clear value during the El Alamein battles, but the messages seldom revealed the whole

picture. Eisenhower’s intelligence officer, British General Eric Mockler-Ferryman,

misinterpreted the raw data to support the theory that the German attack would come at the

Pichon and Fondouk passes. On the other hand, frontline units and staffs including the II Corps

G-2 believed that a German offensive would come through Faïd.335 Neither Anderson nor

Eisenhower appreciated that Mockler-Ferryman’s assessment was wrong and that tactical

intelligence contradicted his interpretation of the incomplete ULTRA assessments. This

assumption prompted Major General Lloyd Fredendall, the II Corps commander, to take action,

but fault lay in how he emplaced units and his lack of frontline leadership.

333 The Battle of the Bulge (14 December 1944-25 January 1945 was a major German offensive launched through the densely forested Ardennes region of Belgium on the Western European front. The battle achieved tactical surprise and the American forces were overwhelmed and retreated. Controlling the city of Bastogne was key because all the roads ran through the city. American paratroopers were sent forward as reinforcements and prevented the Germans from seizing Bastogne. 334 Ralph Francis Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 1941-1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989), 200. 335 George F Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1957), 401. 134

Scared for his life, Fredendall spent a significant portion of his time worrying about the security of his command post from a German airstrike. Thus, he ordered his corps engineers to build a fortified headquarters inside the side of a mountain one hundred miles from the frontlines. The corps commander barely left this structure to visit the soldiers under his command and gain a better perspective of the land that he was defending. Instead, Fredendall hung a map of the battlefield on the wall of his command post and made troop disposition decisions based on his map reconnaissance instead of listening to input from his subordinate commanders. With the lack of a personal assessment, Fredendall did not understand that the

Germans held a strong defensive position around Faïd Pass and the Americans held an indefensible position on two mountaintops with open terrain to the rear. A more experienced combat leader than Fredendall would have seen the Western Dorsal, not the Eastern Dorsal, as a defensible position where a well established observation post system could effectively cover the open terrain to prevent a surprise German attack.

At the beginning of the offensive, the Americans reported to General Anderson quite accurately the strength and disposition of the German offensive through Faïd Pass. However,

Anderson brushed-off these reports as exaggerations of green and untried troops because he firmly believed, based on G-2 intelligence that the offensive would only come against the British

Army. The result of this intelligence and leadership misconception allowed the penetration to gain tremendous steam before Anderson understood the situation and could send reinforcements.

Inexperience ran throughout the chain of command starting with Eisenhower. During

Ike’s visit to the frontlines just prior to battle, he should have made on the spot corrections for glaring deficiencies. When Eisenhower arrived at the II Corps headquarters on 14 February, he planned to talk to Fredendall about his observations on the disposition of forces. Instead, the

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commander was briefed that the Germans had attacked through the Faïd Pass and the CCA was

planning a counteroffensive. As the battle progressed, Ike knew about the serious deterioration

of the command relationship between Fredendall and Orlando Ward, but he debated with himself

and sought advice about what leadership changes to make. As Eisenhower toiled with replacing

one of the generals, the Germans continued to push their offensive. Finally after the battle was

over, Ike decided to replace Fredendall with George Patton. The lesson that the Allied

commander learned and implemented throughout the remainder of the war was that he could not

hesitate to replace ineffective generals.

Fredendall’s leadership style included micromanaging his subordinate commanders while

staying in his command post. Instead of giving the 1st Armored Division a mission and a sector to defend, Fredendall ordered the exact placement of battalion size elements to cover a specific

area. This was completely against army doctrine. Throughout the battle, Fredendall seldom left

his fortified headquarters and never visited the frontlines. The II Corps commander did meet

with some of his generals on the side of the road a few times, but after issuing vague orders to

stop the assault Fredendall returned to his headquarters.

Another example of an ineffective leader was Brigadier General Raymond McQuillin

who was responsible for the defense around Sidi bou Zid during the opening stages of the battle.

LTC John Waters asked McQuillin the night before the attack what was expected if a German

division attacked in the morning. Instead of offering an answer, McQuillin dismissed the

question and told Waters not to bring that issue up anymore. Then at Sbeitla, McQuillin ordered

a withdrawal without coordinating with his adjacent units which left a large section of the front

exposed and unprotected. However, the German attack that day went against the prepared lines

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and not McQuillin’s vacant position. These episodes reveals the thoughtlessness of another

senior leader that soldiers depended upon to make sound decisions.

While the senior leaders ranks were filled with ineffective leaders, field grade officers,

like LTC Luis Hightower and LTC James Alger fought valiantly during the Axis offensive.

These two officers were given missions that were nearly impossible to successfully complete and

suffered heavy losses of men and equipment, but they also displayed to the Germans that the

Americans planned to fight and not hastily retreat at first contact. LTC Henry Gardiner also

performed exceptionally as he covered the withdrawal around Sbeitla which allowed the

Americans to retreat and reestablish positions in a orderly fashion. The field grade officers formed the fighting nucleus that allowed Patton to quickly transform the II Corps after taking command.

On the offensive side of the battle, the Germans had a command structure that was just as flawed as the Allies even though they had already been at war for over three years. Rommel drew up the original plans, but he had to send the request back to Rome for final approval. The

Comando Supremo changed the plan and ordered two mutually supportive thrusts without naming an overall on the scene commander. This divided chain of command resulted in a failure to follow up initial success with the Americans retreating hastily. Rommel was finally given command of the entire operation five days after the assault started and requested Tiger tanks.

Von Arnim did not want to release this asset and lied to Rommel that every requested tank was under repair. Although Rommel led the main effort, he still had no command authority over von

Arnim and appealed to Rome for help to no avail. The lack of a unified Axis command throughout the Battle of Kasserine Pass caused the Germans to miss an opportunity to truly

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massacre the American Army. The Allies were given enough time to regroup, send

reinforcements, and eventually stop the Axis offensive.

The American Army showed great resolve in North Africa after being defeated by the

Germans at Kasserine Pass. After suffering this crushing rout, Eisenhower spearheaded learning

from this tactical defeat in order to overcome the Germans in both North Africa and the

European theater of operations. Without Eisenhower’s vision and leadership, the army would

not have been able to communicate lessons learned throughout their ranks. In fact, after the

fighting ended in Africa, Eisenhower ordered his men to continue training in order to keep their

skills sharp for upcoming battles. Private Raymond Carter, 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion, conducted his training in Algiers where he “chased camels with tanks.”336 Meanwhile, in Oran,

Leonard Travaline, 166th Field Artillery Battalion, and Robert West, 91st Reconnaissance

Squadron, could only train for half a day due to the heat.337 Eisenhower’s focus on learning lessons started early into the war in North Africa and continued on throughout operations in

Sicily, Italy, and France.

The first step in learning was collecting the hard fought lessons from the men involved in the battle. Captain Arthur Moore, 1st Armored Division, said, “Rommel was my best teacher of tactics.”338 When the Allies invaded North Africa, the War Department sent observers along with the units to provide recommendations for improvement in training for follow-on units before their overseas service. This method proved so successful to the War Department that

336 Raymond Carter, interviewed by Steve Brewer, transcript 10-15 October 2002, Coll. #WWII-1457, Reichelt Program for Oral History, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. A copy was provided by the Institute on World War II and the Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. 337 Diary. No date, Leonard Travaline Papers, Coll. #00.0522, The Institute on World War II and the Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. Robert L. West, interviewed by Robin Sellers, transcript 20 August 1998, Coll. #WWII-493, Reichelt Program for Oral History, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. A copy was provided by the Institute on World War II and the Human Experience, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. 338 Captain Arthur R. Moore, “WW2 10; 205,” N.D., 2, World War II Veterans Survey, 1st Armored Division, Box 1, MHI. 138 observers stayed throughout the North African campaign. Furthermore, Eisenhower sent

General Omar Bradley to the front to collect battle lessons from the men of the 1st Armored

Division following the defeat at Kasserine Pass. The lessons that these men compiled were submitted directly to the War Department. The Army Ground Forces, as the training extension of the War Department, forwarded these observer reports to the commanding generals at every active army group, corps, and training center. The reports were furnished for information only, but the War Department understood that these reports could informally change training while changes to training doctrine were vetted and staffed for official publication at a later date.

Men still fighting at the frontlines implemented changes within their organization to put these lessons into practice. General Terry Allen, 1st Infantry Division, created pamphlets for his men so that they knew and understood his training philosophy. Others like General Orlando

Ward, 1st Armored Division, asked his British Allies for lessons they had learned in their two years of desert warfare. Ward then sent these lessons to his men where they were put into application.

Throughout the North African campaign, Eisenhower continued to collect lessons. He sent inspectors to visit all the units of the II Corps and created a pamphlet to disseminate the training notes. At the end of the campaign, he asked all his subordinate units for battle experience and created a training document that the War Department valued and decided to publish Army-wide.

The War Department promoted the use of professional journals so that branches could communicate branch specific material to officers throughout their ranks without the desired success. All the combat arms used these journals to disseminate lessons, but the information was not always published within a timely manner. Although the speed varied by branch, major

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operations were already underway before the lessons were published. There was risk involved if

these magazines fell into enemy hands but General George Marshall decided the possibility was

worthwhile in order to effectively pass information along to subordinate commanders. While the

use of professional journals was a good idea it was not used effectively during World War II. In

fact, the Infantry Journal first printed lessons from Kasserine Pass while the GIs were busy storming the beaches of Normandy.

Eisenhower has not received the recognition due for his creative initiatives to collect and publish lessons learned. General Marshall also played an important role in overseeing the changes within the War Department which supported the greater cause of improving the army.

Marshall approved sending officers to be observers to collect lessons and recommend changes, but without Eisenhower’s support these officers would not have had unfettered access to various

units or leaders to complete their mission. The most important impact from collecting and

disseminating lessons were the formal changes enacted by the War Department. The training

cycles of basic, replacement, and entire units was extended from thirteen to seventeen weeks.

This additional time allowed for more field experience, where recruits were taught to refine their

skills as soldiers. In addition, new classes were added to training schedules to allow for more

weapons training, mine operations, camouflage indoctrination, and various other offensive and

defensive operations. Without Eisenhower’s actions the U.S. Army would not have had

continued success against the Germans throughout the rest of World War II.

After World War II ended, the U.S. Army demobilized and reduced its end strength from

ninety divisions to sixteen active divisions.339 During the Korean and Vietnam wars, the military

once again ramped back up and rebuilt fighting forces before hastily putting them into battle. As

339 John Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades, Army Lineage Series (Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1998), 207, http://www.history.army.mil/books/Lineage/M- F/index.htm#contents. 140

those wars concluded the force structure of the army was once again reduced and lessons learned

in those conflicts were lost. By the mid-1980s, the senior army leadership realized there was no

formal system within the army to collect and disseminate lessons from their training centers.

Operation Urgent Fury (invasion of Grenada 1983) brought this flaw to the forefront. The Army

Chief of Staff, General John Wickham approved creating a unit charged with capturing lessons

learned, familiarizing units with current training trends, and disseminating lessons. The Center

for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) was stood up on 1 August 1985 at Fort Leavenworth,

Kansas. Combat training centers were established at Fort Irwin, California, Fort Polk, Louisiana,

and Hohenfels, Germany to expedite infusing lessons into unit training exercises.340 The CALL received the first combat lessons from Operation Just Cause (invasion of Panama, 1989) which helped enhance preparedness for Desert Storm in 1991. The first extended warfare the army conducted since Vietnam was in Afghanistan and Iraq and the CALL has played a major role in keeping soldiers informed about current tactics, techniques, and enemy procedures. These included evaluating damage to vehicles from insurgent attacks that led to supplementary armor added for further protection. Additionally, the ability of the army to learn lessons has allowed soldiers to quickly adapt to changes in enemy tactics. The capability to learn lessons in combat, disseminate current information in a timely fashion, and change training regiments proved to be a critical element to sustain battlefield success during extended warfare.

340 “Center for Army Lessons Learned Mission,” n.d., http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/mission.asp, accessed October 6, 2013; “333: The Center for Lessons Learned” (The American Life, May 25, 2007), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/333/transcript; “History of the Army’s Lessons Learned System,” n.d., 6 October 2013, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_97-13_history.htm; Greg Slabodkin, “Army Lessons Learned,” FCW: The Business of Federal Technology (July 17, 2006), http://fcw.com/Articles/2006/07/17/Army-lessons-learned.aspx?Page=1. 141

APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY

08 November 1942: Allies invaded North Africa.

09 November 1942: German troops occupied Tunis and Bizerte.

24 December 1942: Eisenhower announced loss of “race for Tunisia” and Allies took

defensive posture.

30 January 1943: Germans took Faïd Pass.

11 February 1943: Transfer of responsibility from Faïd Pass was given to 1st Armored

Division (- CCB).

14 February 1943: Battle of Kasserine Pass started with German attack through Faïd Pass on

Sidi bou Zid.

Gafsa was evacuated during night.

15 February 1943: American counterattack at Sidi bou Zid repealed.

Lessouda Force escaped during the night.

16 February 1943: Allies decided to withdrawal to Western Dorsal.

Battle of Sbeitla started.

168th Infantry Regiment attempted escape during night.

17 February 1943: Battle of Sbeitla; Germans take town.

The II Corps completed withdrawal to Western Dorsal.

Feriana and key airfield at Thelepte were evacuated.

19th Engineers prepared defense of Kasserine Pass.

18 February 1943: Both sides reorganized.

Germans probed east entrance of Kasserine Pass.

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French XIX Corps adjusted line west to encompass Sbiba.

19 February 1943: Rommel took complete command and authorized to attack towards Le

Kef.

Artillery stopped German advance at Sbiba.

Germans launched attack on Kasserine Pass.

20 February 1943: 21st Panzer Division attack on Sbiba defeated and eastern prong of

German offensive stopped primarily by artillery.

Attack on Kasserine Pass was resumed; 10th Panzer Division was

committed.

Germans secured Kasserine Pass before dusk.

Combat Command B moved to Djebel El Hamra on Tebessa road.

Gore Force committed to delay on Thala Road.

21 February 1943: Artillery stopped Afrika Korps attack along Tebessa road.

26th Armored Brigade pushed back with heavy losses at Thala.

With Thala up for grabs, 9th Infantry Division Artillery arrived after 800-

mile march.

22 February 1943: Germans reached high-water mark of offensive.

Major Afrika Korps attack broken up primarily by devastating artillery fire

on Tebessa road; Germans retreated.

The 9th Infantry Division Artillery opened up on German tanks

concentrating for an attack.

Rommel concluded Allies were too strong and called off offensive.

23 February 1943: Germans broke contact; secretly withdrawing during the night.

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Allies started reconnaissance forward.

24 February 1943: Americans and British advanced very hesitantly amidst heavily mined

approaches to Kasserine.

25 February 1943: Kasserine Pass recaptured without a fight.

Germans escaped without losses in very successful withdrawal.

26 February 1943: The 168th Infantry Regiment started a six day retraining cycle following

their poor performance in combat.

1 March 1943: General Omar Bradley visited the 1st Armored Division to collect lessons.

2 March 1943: Robert Stack relieved of command from CCC.

7 March 1943: Lloyd Fredendall relieved of command from the II Corps and replaced by

George Patton.

18-30 March 1943: Eisenhower sent officers to the frontline to collect lessons from units with

combat experience which became Training Notes from Recent Fighting in

Tunisia.

1 April 1943: Orlando Ward relieved of command from the 1st Armored Division and

replaced by Ernest Harmon.

13 May 1943: The North African campaign ended with the unconditional surrender of

the last Axis units.

14 May 1943: Eisenhower directed units to compile and submit reports on combat

experience and battle lessons for training purposes.

15 May 1943: Training Notes from Recent Fighting in Tunisia was printed and

distributed.

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9 June 1943: The War Department issued training circular on the application of tank

destroyer units.

13 June 1943: Reports on combat experience and battle lessons for training purposes due

to Allied Force Headquarters and the War Department.

16 June 1943: Conference hosted by Armored Ground Force command at Fort Knox.

22 July 1943: Conference hosted by Army Service Force in Chicago.

31 July 1943: Tankers in Tunisia was printed and distributed to soldiers going through

Armored school at Fort Knox.

August 1943: Field Artillery Journal and Cavalry Journal printed first articles on

lessons from Kasserine Pass battles.

4 August 1943: Lessons from Tunisian Campaign printed and distributed by Allied Force

Headquarters as Training Memo #44.

September 1943: The U.S. Army-Navy Journal of Recognition was first issued.

1 October 1943: Basic training cycle was changed from thirteen weeks to seventeen weeks.

15 October 1943: Lessons from Tunisian Campaign was printed by the Government Printing

Office and disseminated by the War Department.

13 December 1943: Part 1 of Lessons from Tunisian Campaign was printed in Army and Navy

18 December 1943: Part 2 of Lessons from Tunisian Campaign was printed in Army and Navy

June 1944: Infantry Journal printed first article with lessons from Kasserine Pass.

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APPENDIX B

BATTLE ORDER

Battle of Sidi bou Zid 14-15 February 1943 U.S.: II Corps—Major General Lloyd Fredendall 1st Armored Division—Major General Orlando Ward 81st Reconnaissance Battalion Combat Command A—Brigadier General Raymond E. McQuillin 1st Armored Regiment (-2nd and 3rd Battalion)—Colonel Peter Hains 168th Infantry Regiment (-1st Battalion)—Colonel Thomas Drake Battery B, 68th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105mm, SP) 91st Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105mm, SP) 2nd Battalion, 17th Artillery Battalion (155mm, towed) Platoon, 701st Tank Destroyer Platoon, C Company, 109th Engineers C Company 109th Medical Battalion 39th Cannon Company Enemy: Fifth Panzer Army—General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim, Commanding; General Heinz Zeigler, Officer in Tactical Command, Frühlingswind 10th Panzer Division—General Fritz von Broich 21st Panzer Division—General Hans Georg Hildebrandt Counterattack of Sidi bou Zid 15 February 1943 1st Armored Division—Major General Orlando Ward Combat Command C—Colonel Robert I. Stack 2nd Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment—LTC James Alger 6th Armored Infantry (-1st and 2nd Battalion) G Company, 13th Armored Regiment 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion (-A and C Companies) 68th Field Artillery Battalion (-A Battery)

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1st Platoon, D Company, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion 1st Platoon, 443rd Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion (SP) Detachment, B Company, 13th Armored Regiment A Company, 47th Armored Medical Battalion Battle of Sbeitla 16-17 February 1943 U.S. 1st Armored Division—Major General Orlando Ward Combat Command A—Brigadier General Raymond E. McQuillin 1st Armored Regiment (-1st Battalion) 1st Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry 3rd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion (-) 91st Field Artillery Battalion Battery, 68th Field Artillery Battalion C Company, 16th Engineer Battalion 5 guns, 106th Coast Artillery Battery, 213th Coast Artillery (90mm guns) Combat Command B—Brigadier General Paul M. Robinett 13th Armored Regiment (-1st and 3rd Battalion) 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry 27th Field Artillery Battalion 601st Tanks Destroyer Battalion (-C Company) A Company, 16th Armored Engineers Platoon, B Battery, 443rd Coast Artillery (AA) (SP) Combat Command C—Colonel Robert I. Stack 3rd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry 1st Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment (-) 68th Field Artillery Battalion (-) 16th Engineers Battalion (-) Elements 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion Company, 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion

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Kasserine Pass Forces 18-20 February 1943 1st Armored Division—Major General Orlando Ward (vicinity El Ma el Abiod) Task Force Stack (Starkforce)—Colonel Alexander N. Stark, Jr. (18-20 February) 26th Infantry Regiment (-2d and 3d Battalions) 19th Engineer Regiment (Colonel Arthur T. W. Moore) 33d Field Artillery Battalion 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion (20 February) Battery, French 6th African Artillery (75mm) 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry (19 February) 3d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry (20 February) Gore Force—Lieutenant Colonel A. C. Gore (20 February) C Company, 10th Rifle Brigade C Squadron, 2d Lothians F Battery, Royal Horse Artillery Troop, 93d Anti-tank Regiment, Royal Artillery Enemy Forces: Panzer Army Group—Field Marshall Erwin Rommel Kampfgruppe Deutches Afrika Korps—Major General Karl Buelowius German: 33d Reconnaissance Battalion Panzer Grenadier Regiment Afrika 8th Panzer Regiment Group Stotten (1st Battalion, 8th Panzer Regiment) Italian: Centauro Armoured Division 131 Tank Battalion 5th Bersaglieri 7th Bersaglierri (20 February) Sbiba Gap (19-22 February) Friendly: 6th British Armoured Division—Major General C.F. Keightley

148

1st Guards Brigade (78th British Division) 16th/5th Lancers (6th Armoured Division) 2d Hampshires Elements, 72d Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery Elements, 93d Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery 34th Infantry Division—Major General Charles W. Ryder 18th Infantry Regiment (1st Infantry Division) 133d Infantry Regiment 135th Infantry Regiment 151st Field Artillery Battalion Enemy: Field Marshall Erwin Rommel 21st Panzer Division—General Hans Georg Hildebrandt 5th Panzer Regiment 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment 580th Reconnaissance Battalion 609th Flak Battalion Thala Road 20-22 February British: Nick Force—Brigadier General Cameron G. G. Nicholson (21-25 February) 26th Armoured Brigade—Brigadier Charles Dunphie (minus 16/5 Lancers) (20-23 February) 2d Lothians 17/21st Lancers 10th Royal Buffs 2d Battalion, 5th Leicestershire Regiment (46th Division) (20 February) 450th Battery, 71st Field Regiment, Royal Artillery 90th/100th Battery, 23d Army Field Regiment, Royal Artillery F Battery, Royal Horse Artillery 229th Battery, 58th Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery (-troop) Detachment (one gun), 93d Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery

149

Canon Company, 39th (US) Infantry (6-37mm guns) 2 sections, 86th Chemical Warfare Company, Royal Engineers (4.2-inch, mortars) Gore Force—Lieutenant Colonel A. C. Gore) 19-20 February C Company, 10th Battalion, Royal Buffs C Squadron, 2d Lothians (7 Valentines, 4 Crusaders) F Battery, 12th Royal Horse Artillery One Troop, S Battery, 93d Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery Stark Force (remnants) after 20 February 9th Infantry Division Artillery—Brigadier General S. LeRoy Irwin (22 February) 34th Field Artillery Battalion—Lieutenant Colonel William Westmoreland (155mm) 60th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm) 84th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm) 47th Canon Company (75mm) 60th Canon Company (75mm) Enemy: Field Marshall Erwin Rommel 10th Panzer Division—General Fritz von Broich Battalion, 7th Panzer Regiment 86th Panzer Grenadier Regiment 10th Motorcycle Battalion Foussana Valley-Bou Chebka (21-24 February) II Corps—Major General Lloyd Fredendall; Major General Ernest Harmon (23-24 February) CCB—Brigadier General Paul Robinett 2d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment I and G Companies, 13th Armored Regiment Reconnaissance Company, 13th Armored Regiment 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion 27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion 68th Armored Field Artillery Battalion 7th Field Artillery Battalion

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33d Field Artillery Battalion 2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry Company D, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion Maintenance and Supply Companies, 13th Armored Regiment Detachment, 16th Medical Battalion Detachment, 49th Medical Battalion Composite (straggler) unit, 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry Elements, 443d Coast Artillery (AA) (SP) Elements, 105th Coast Artillery Battalion (AA) 1st Infantry Division—Major General Terry Allen (-18th and 26th Infantry) 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry Enemy: Field Marshall Erwin Rommel Kampfgruppe Deutches Afrika Korps—Major General Karl Buelowius 33d Reconnaissance Battalion 580th Reconnaissance Battalion (21st Panzer Division) (21 February) 1st Battalion, 8th Panzer Regiment Panzer Grenadier Regiment Africa Centauro Armoured Division (-)

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APPENDIX C

THE SONG OF THE FIGHTING 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION

Kasserine Pass

The Dutchmen broke through KASSERINE And occupied the brush When we took over they took off And left it in a rush From what we saw of C C B This fact we do observe It’s us they leave to beat the krauts While they go “in reserve” The gals in blue from the Forty-Eighth And the Ninth Evac Were ordered up to hold the line While Second Corps fell back While we had a company left As a matter of course Second Corps would split us up And form another “force” A certain man has gone at last For which we tank the Lord A few more weeks of the sonofabitch And we would have faced a board Our Provost Marshal’s left us To go to Second Corps He’ll probably get a medal And never see the war

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REFERENCES

Manuscripts

Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania:

1st Armored Division official histories A.E. Schanze papers Army and Navy Register Army Navy Recognition Chester B. Hansen collection Foreign Military Studies: Kurt Liebenstein Hamilton Howze papers John Waters Oral History Martin Philipsborn papers Microfilmed Records from the War Department Operations Divisions Minutes of meetings of General Council Observer Board Collection Orlando Ward papers. Paul Robinett papers Robert C. Baldridge papers Robert Stack papers Roger Cirillo papers Terry Allen papers William Westmoreland Collection WWII Surveys: 1st AD, 1st ID, 34th ID, 9th ID

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James W. Lockett papers Margaret Beau papers Lelia Kehoe papers William Everett Oral History George Kass papers Roland E. Murphy papers Robert Schoen papers John W. Mettner, Jr. papers Carmen A. Bellanca Oral History Raymond Carter Oral History Dorothy C. Errair Oral History Francis J. Gudis papers Edward Dudics papers Elmer L. Popejoy papers John Duffy papers

Donovan Research Library, Ft. Benning, Georgia: World War II Monographs Collection

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Carr Jr., Vincent. “The Battle of Kasserine Pass: An Examination of Allied Operational Failings.” M.A. Thesis, Air Command and Staff College, 2003. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi- bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA424990.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Christopher Eric Jacob Sherwood, Sr. was born in Davenport Iowa. He earned a Bachelors Degree in History from Sam Houston State University in Huntsville, Texas in 2004. Upon receiving his degree Chris was commissioned into the United States Army. In 2012 he entered Florida State University’s history program to pursue a Masters Degree in War and Society. Upon graduation he will return to active service in the Army.

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