CGSOBBE itou A
Subject: Activation of Service Units,
Activation of service units, by Lt Col E, C. Hudgins. CGSC. 1947-48.
This Document IS A HOLDING OF THE ARCHIVES SECTION LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS DOCUMENT NO. N-2128.127 COPY NO.
Army—CGSC—P2-1798—7 Mar 52—5M
Prepared by student officer, Lt. Col. Ernest C, Hudgins. ARCHIVES CGSC F t UAVENWOftfH KAN
DIG 1 0 1962 COMMAND AHD GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE Fort Leavenworth, Kansas ACCESSION NO__ SCHOOL OF LOGISTICS PO RfcGlSTKV • "
6-7 (Subject No.) 26 May 1948 (date)
SUBJECT: Activation of Service Units* PURPOSE: To prepare a study recommending action which should be taken now to assure proper provision of Service Unit8 In the event of war. SCOPE : a. Study the historical background in WW II, the concept of VUDGS and la ter by ASF, and the results in WW IX, b» Study current plans by AGF and the Technical Services for activation and training of service type units, in the event of an emergency. e* Recommend a plan which should be adopted now to insure adequate service units in the event of war
(Assumed by the students This Is a directive received from the Chief of Staff, who, in turn, gave it to the Director of the Logistics Division to make a staff study. The 'student is a member of the Logistics Division, GS, USA.) 4021 School G&GSC 6-7 26 May 194x
COMMAND mt> GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
SUBJECTS Activation of Service Units. TO : The Director of The Logistics Division, GS, USA,
I, PROBLEM.-<*To assure adequate Service Units in the event of war. 2* DISCUSSION* a. Background (1) The experience gained in the use of Service Units in World War II has shown the need for long-range planning to insure that the United States will be adequately prepared in the event of a World War III. (Annex 1) (2) Steps are being taken, but additional steps are necessary in the event that this Nation should enter another National emergency. (Annex 2) (3) Current and future problems of the Department of the Army as to proposed organizations and utilization of Service Units are based on the following: (a) organization of a standard type Field Army; (b) reenactraent of Selective Service; (c) enactment of the Universal Military Training Program; (d) lack of Congressional approval of a "National Defense Program." (Annex 3) b. Current Considerations.-*'The effect on the type Combat and Service Units required to support an operation in case of a National Emergency is based on current and future economic conditions. The difference in the type units used in World Wars I end II, as compared to those which will be used should there be a World War III, Is the concept of "total warfare" and the feet that experiments and studies point toward an even more highly developed technological warfare* Experience in World War II, including the use of the atomic bomb, and the potential use of atomic energy in a future war, means that many changes must be made in all type units and that all available personnel, including the civilian population, will be needed to fill these units or must be employed in some form of National Defense. Even total mobilization will not meet the requirement unless sufficient numbers of technically trained personnel are available prior to the attack by any aggressor nation. c. Plans*""-Plans for activating Service Units must include! (1) type and number of units required; (2) time element involved in training of personnel In necessary specialties; (3) utilization of civilian population in a "total war." 5. ACTION RECOMMENDED* a. That the^Selectlve Service Program" be immediately reenacted. b. That the "Affiliation Program" be continued with tho utmost support. c. That, rather than Universal Military Training, compulsory military training be enacted in all high schools. d. That, if paragraph c. is disapproved, Universal Military training be enacted. e. That, in conjunction with paragraph d*, high schools having a student body of five hundred or more have compulsory military training. f. That the attached letter to the Chief of Staff of the Department of the Army be approved, signed and dispatched. (Annex 4)
(Signature) (Rank) Ernest C, Hudgins, Jr. Lieut. Colonel, Inf. Student Officer AHKEXESs 1 - Concept of the Utilization of Service Units in times of national Emergency. 2 - Steps required to expand Service Units in event of another war. 3 - Current and future problems of the Department of the Army aa to proposed organizations and utilization of Service Units. 4 - Letter to The Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, for approval, signature, ami diap&tciu 5 - Bibliography
CONCURRENCES* ANNEX 1 CONCEPT OF THE UTILIZATION OF SERVICE UNITS IN TIMES OP NATIONAL EMERGENCY
1, Immediately following World War I, the United States, as well as Europe, passed through an "economic revolution" which leaned toward prosperity. Large scale industry made great Improvements in civilian living conditions and present and potential future productive capabilities. This trend may be termed as strategic guidance. In other words, this was a result of the efforts of men with a broad vision and creative and relentless energy. As a result of the pendulum swinging from one extreme to the other, if a National conflict should occur it is inevitable that this influence will have its effect on the concept of any future war* (D 2# This trend of National affairs meant that new developments were being inaugurated daily which required more highly skilled and technically trained personnel* Unfortunately, it was thought (as is thought today) that sufficient technically trained personnel could be obtained from civilian life to fill the requirements of the Army in case of a future war» A shortage of Service Units and personnel in this era was first brought to the attention of the War Department when General Pershing, in the spring of 1918, dispatched a cable to the War Department as follows:'2' "Cable NO.1426-S AGWAR, Washington GHQ, July 7, 19&8 Paragraph 1-P/ In order to organize salvage units, laundry units, mobile gas treatment units, postal express service, renting requi sition and claims service, headquarters battalions, and companies for the Services of Supply, casual and replacement depots, organi zation and training centers, labor bureaus and leave areas, conva lescent camps, permanent camps, orthopedic camps, rest camps, guard companies, prisoner of war companies, garden companies^ etc., there should be allowed to the Army Expeditionary Forces in France for the Army Service Corps a total of 4,000 officers -and 100,000 enlisted men of such grades provided by law for the Army at l^rge as may be ordered by the Commander-In-Chief, ASP in addition to organizations transferred as above. Sub-paragraph G/ If this be approved proposed tables of organizations will be submitted from time to time covering such units as will h&ve to be organized in the United States. For units that willhave to be formed from personnel already in France, and to meet local conditions, the question of organization should be handled locally, for example the administrative personnel of a leave area. Pershing."
(1) Arthur Meier Schleslnger, "Political and Social History of United States." (2) Hagood, "Services of Supply", page 320. This request was approved and additional units end personnel had to b© provided from time to time to meet the increased demand for logistical support. Even as late as 15 September 1918, three Infantry divisions were turned over to the Services of Supply to be utilized as labor troop3 where most needed* 3« The deficiencies in logistical support experienced in World War I were not entirely forgotten in World War II* It was recommended by the Services of Supply that in any future National conflict plans should be made previously and training of technical personnel should be completed; that a "mother organi zation", capable of administering Service Units, be included in the peace time troop basis*'2' (This might be termed as the Logistical Division in its embryonic stage,) 4* No steps were taken to organize or include within the Army a unit such as a Logistical Division. In 1930, the pendulum began swinging in the opposite direction* The world entered one of the moat trying depressions in its history, As a resuU-tof the depression, many people were unable to receive the education and live up to the standards previously maintained in the United States. One of the many steps taken by the Federal Government in an attempt to brin^, the United States out of the "slump" was the organization of the Civilian Conservation Corps, Approximately 2,600,000 young men were employed as a result of this program. Even though this personnel were not subjected to strict military discipline or training, the following specialists were trained:w/ Auto Mechanfea 88,500 Carpentry 82,500 Truck Driving 75,000 Photography 26,000 Cooking and Baking 23,000 Surveying 21,500 Radio 17,500 Blacksmlthing 13,500 Welding 13,000 Electricity 12,000 Drafting 12,000 Company Clerk 8,500 Supply Steward 5,000 Mess Steward 5,000
tm ^^ ^^ ^^ ^u gj0 «• *j» mm
^^ ^j^ 40H 4^ ^B ^H 40 160 4M (1) Army Service Gircular 123, dated 1943• (2) M-N 1101, "Distribution of Military Personnel, dated n 1 Sept 39-1 Sept 45, "Military Personnel Division, ASF# order from the adjutant General, upon requisition of the Commanding Generals of the Major Commands and/or Chiefs of Technical Services. , The early lack of centralized control over the assignment of personnel was reflected in the summer of 1942 at which ttyn© the Service Unit activation program was accelerated. There was no balancing of training against present or future requirements • Therefore, if a particular specialist was requisitioned, the requisitioning agency had to wait until sufficient personnel became available to fill this vacancy. 8. The War Department was reorganized in March 1942 at which time an "Army Service Force" was conceived. One of the branches under the Army Service Forces was the Military Personnel Division. This branch was given the responsibility of institut ing the follow-up procedures and of making certain that the required number of officers, warrant officers and enlisted personnel arrived at the assigned place at the designated time in the "Military Occupational Specialist"(MOS) desired. This procedure was to be coordinated with the Operations Division, War Department General Staff* (D Unfortunately, the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces were responsible for activat ing, training and Preparing for Overseas Movement (POM) like units; that is, Depot Companies were under control of Army Ground Forces whereas Base Depot Companies were under control of Army Service Forces. This situation caused several embarassing incidents. For example, under the supposed centralized control, the Operations Division, War Department General Staff, issued a directive for the movement of two Quartermaster Truck Regiments to the European Theater, believing that the units had had six months unit training. When the directive was put in the form of a movement order, it was learned that neither of the units had more than a cadre. As a result of this incident, a directive was dispatched to the Army Service Forces, an extract of which stated: "The Military (1) ASF Circular 121, dated 1944. - 4 Personnel Division will institute the necessary follow-up procedure to make certain that the required personnel arrive at the designated place at the designated time."*1) ^ This directive also Included a statement to the effect that certain information as to the status of training of each unit would be submitted every two weeks In order to keep the Deputy Chief of Staff informed. 9» In an attempt to correct deficiencies previously recognized, a program was Initiated by the Army Service Forces, and approved by the War Department General Staff, called the "pre-activatlon program*" Regardless of the troop basis, personnel received Individual and unit training for a particular type unit prior to the activation of that unit. Theoretically, tfols was a good Idea in that all Military Occupational Specialties would be filled when the unit was activated* This plan was approved by the War Department General Staff and placed in effect which later caused many "tears" due to the fact that personnel were trained in certain specialties (Military Occupational Specialist). However, the requirements of overseas theaters were constantly changing which frequently meant that personnel training in a particular specialty were no longer needed. During the build up for "Bolero" (build-up of United States Forces in England) it was realized that more logistical support had to be used in any amphibious operation whether It be cross-channel or elsewhere. Such a demand for Service Units in that theater was placed on the War Department that both Service and Combat Units were shipped In "current status of training." This meant that during the "August Blitz, *45" many units were filled with personnel regardless of Military Occupational O9 <• m*—_ •_ • •,_•A *•^ M• ^^mm ^^m* ^m M ^*^m ^m^^ ^*^m ^^«» ^^•» ^^4W a^^ * «** mm mm «•» «* •• «• •• «• •» nm mm mm^^ mm 4M ^^ (1) Memo SPOPU 020, dated 4 July 42, (2) "Responsibility for the Procurement of Personnel for Newly Activated Units", OPD 370.5, (29 Nov 42). - 5 Specialty (BIOS) and shipped to the requesting theater* The Adjutant General criticized the Army Service Forces stating that, In his opinion, the entire personnel classification system had been undermined,'*' This difference of opinion was ironed out by the War Department General Staff by the initiation of the Army Service Force Training Center Plan. 10. Projected requirements for Combat Units went from bad to worse due to the critical shortage of manpower in June 1944. All physically qualified personnel (except critical specialists and those who had served overseas for 12 months at a fixed or in an overhead installation) were to be assigned to units destined for overseas shipment.**' This again reduced capability and flexibility of the Army Service Forces to activate new units end reorganize going units in that its "bulk allotment" was further reduced to comply with the War Department directive. The result of this directive was a circular Issued by the Army Service Forces stating that "enlisted men in overhead assignments, who were physically qualified for combat duty, would be replaced by civilians, WACS, and limited service personnel or returnees from over seas." (4) 11. In order to prevent history from repeating itself In the event of another total war, civilians, including women, should be utilized within the Zone of Interior. Limited Service personnel who are physically qualified to serve in the Zone of Interior should be used in Service Units as far forward in the Theater of Operations as a Corps. (1) ASF Circular 121# dated 1944 - ASF Circular 104, dated 1944. (2) ASF Circular 104, dated 1944# (3) Memo, WD OPD 230.5 (14 Jan 44) "Utilization of Manpower based on Physical Capacity." (4) ASF Circular 26, dated 1944. * 6 ANNEX 2 STEPS REQUIRED TO EXPAND SERVICE UNITS IN EVENT OF MOTHER WAR 1# Steps have been taken to prevent a repetition of a situation such as existed in the beginning of World War II when the drastic shortage of Service Type Units was so prevalent. In the latter part of World War II there was organized in Germany a Loglstioal Division which formed the background or nucleus for logistical support for units in the combat zone. This division was used during the Redeployment Program in redeploying units from the forward area through the Communication Zone, thence to the Zone of Interior and/or tfc the Pacific Theater of Op orations• 2, Subsequent to cessation of hostilities, steps were taken to draw up a T/OScE for this type unit. One of the major obstacals in mobilization is that of obtaining personnel who are properly trained in the specialties needed. Therefore, the apoption of an affiliation program has been pushed to the utmost. It Is evident that there are a lot of weaknesses in this program* For instance, the officers and agencies carrying on the Depart ment of the Army's directives In activating, organizing and (2) training these type units are unable to exercise a fres hand. 3« Some form of compulsory military training; Universal Military Training or Selective Service, and/or both, has received considerable encouragement by the President of the United States. Selective Service will furnish the Armed Forces with personnel who can fill a "three fold purpose"; i.e# , Regular Army Units, National Guard Units, and, if necessary, xrnlts Army of the United States ^Univepaal- Military (1) Ltrs. Hqs. Fifth Army, date d9 Oct 47, 5 Nov 47, 19 Jan 48, Ltr. Office Senior Instructor, ORC, dated 8 April 48, (Appendix 1) (2) Ltr. date d13 Nov 47, from QM & TC Instructor, OR, Mo, to Office QH General, Office Chief of Transportation, through Channels, (Appendix 2) - 1 actually, nothing more than a "minor training unit*" It has its a d van tag es and disadvantages* Its primary advantage is that personal will receive basic military training* It3 primary disadvantage jia that its personnel will be more or less segregated from the Rep^la* Anay—far more so than were the Civilian Military Training Cpf^s and the Civilian Conservation Corps* 4. /a ^n alternative, the following discussion is submitted: Throughout tjne United States there are schools which are termed I. "tin soldie^j1 schools* The Government supports these schools to some extentjL| They are: ROTC, Junior ROTC and 55C. The ROTC Units are recognized colleges; the Junior ROTC schools have personnel ^ariging in age from 11 to 18 years* This type school, according fto (Army Regulations, has a Regular Army officer assigned as pltS&T. I The 55C schools have a Reserve officer, not necessarily on-active duty, as its PMS&T* It, too, has personnel ranging in age from il to 18 years* The 55C schools are partially supported P the Government in that equipment, such as arms and certain ^training glides are furnished by the Department of the .Army* However, the PMS&T is paid by the school and personal equipment such as uniforms, eto* must be furnished by the student* 5* An individual's future is easily influenced during adolescence. If high schools were to have compulsory military training, with a Regular Army officer or Reserve officer on active duty to sponsor this training, the Nation would gain personnel who ere: (1) better disciplined, (2) more efficient, (5) who have at least completed basic military training* Universal Military Training is a means to accomplish a form of military training. However, the personnel taking Universal Military Training are not totally under military control* Furthermore, some youngster who has ambitions other than making military his career will think that the year spent in compulsory - 2 military training la a wasted year and a delay In completing his education* If he can finish high school or junior college at the age of 18 and can continue his education or go into business, and at the same time have had four years of basic military training, not only has he gained but so has the Government* 6* Unfortunately, as an Individual grows older, he may become physically Incapable of serving in the military service* Such physical limitations may develope just as the individual becomes eligible for Universal Military Training* Had he been required, during high school, to take four years of basic military training he would be more inclined and better qualified to support a National Defense Program, either as a soldier or In any way possible, giving his energies toward National Defense* It might be added that dur&g this training period certain technical training, such as handicraft, radio maintenance, etc* Is taught which is undoubtedly of value not only to the Nation but to the individual In civilian life* 7* Turn back to the beginning of hostilities, 7 December 1941, and trace the importance of Service Units and the logis* tical support of an operation, regardless of whether it may be one the siae of North African, Sicilian, Italian or Cross- Channel • Very few officers in the Army at that time realized the importance of logistical support* On 8 December 1941, when war was declared on the Axis, the United States was not prepared loglstically to support a war* Fortunately, the pendulum swung from the pacifist extreme to that of war* 8> The necessity for reorganizing the War Department was foreseen* Reorganisation took place In March 1942* The General Staff Divisions consisted of the Operations Division, (ML, G«2, G-3, and G-4. The Special Staff consisted of Army Service Forces, Civil Affairs Division and those now common to the Department of the Army* 9. The new War Department orgeniBat ion, still in its infancy, did not take steps to activate Service Units which were necessary to support world-wide military operations* More attention was given to the activation and training of the combat soldier and combat units* Few of the high ranking officers realized that an Army could no longer live "off the land11 as did Vapoleon's Army or as was done in the War between the States* This fact was brought home when the Combined Chiefs of Staff planned for the cross-channel invasion* It was realised that a croaa-channel Invasion could not be supported logistically, pri marily due to the lack of landing craft* At the same time. Russia was taking a shellacking and the British needed help in Africa* Therefore, the invasion of North Africa was staged, delaying the oross*»channel operation approximately one and a half years* It may be repeated that again the reason for this delay was the lack of logistical support* 10* At that time, the Army Ground Forces included not only combat type units but also many service type units* In other words* the Service Units were divided Into two types*** Ground Type Service Units and Army Service Force Units. In all War Department publications reflecting troop lists, these units were divided accordingly* Depot Companies were a responsi bility of the Army Ground Forces for activation, training and shipment* whereas Base Depot Units were an Army Service Force responsibility* Units such as Medical Ambulance Companies were under control of the Army Ground Forces for activation, training and operation* • 4 • 11• Prior to the organization of the Transportation ^orpa, there were two type truck companies, then called Quartermaster Truck Companies—Light and Heavy* Light Truck Companies, though being Quartermaster Units, were under control of the Army Ground Forces for activation and training* Heavy truck companies were the responsibility of the Army Service Forces* ^' This system caused endless confusion, not only to the Communication Zone but also to agencies of the «»&r Department General and Special Staffs and the agencies responsible for the training and allocation of the personnel. 12* When personnel were inducted and completed basic training many, many, times they were not assigned according to their moat appropriate capabilities based on their civilian vocation* Had the Army had the same system there is today of breaking down into Combat Units, Service Units and Air Force Units, other than common user type units, there could have been activated many Service Units which could function more efficiently and much more quickly than some of those which were actually sent to Theaters of Operation* 13. Even as late as the spring of 1944, the Army was in dire need of Service Units, for example, Engineer, Medical, Signal and Ordnance Unit a. There were lnany units of all types which had received only 13 weeks of training prior to shipment overseas* For instance, General Hospitals had to be shipped in current status of training, less doctors, less nurses, less technicians* This lack of training was definitely not good for the morale of the individual because a unit had not been together long enough to create e3prit de corps. The officers, in many cases, were not properly trained, to oay nothing of the enlisted personnel who, having had only 13 weeks training, were not specialists in the jobs which they would have to do supporting a Division, Corps, or Army in combat* (1) TLOS WDGS 1942. -5 14* In order to ship this personnel and these units, the War Department laid down regulations in a pamphlet called "POM", (Preparation for Overseas Movement)• The Army was getting ouch adverse publicity as a result of committing individuals and units to combat without proper training. In an attempt to overcome this publicity, the Chief of Staff directed that for every operation which necessitated the shipment of units in current status of training, a staff study must be prepared, based primari ly on the Inspector General's report, which was to be presented to the Deputy Chief of Staff by its author explaining in;detail the necessity for the unit's shipment* 15• The cross-channel invasion was launched* But* it is now the Informed opinion that Germany could have been defeated months earlier had the Army been capable logistically of- support* ing the operation* The Army was in such need of Servioe Units that in 1944 and early 1945, Coast Artillery Units were inacti* vated and the personnel were utilized to activate various types of Service Units and then shipped overseas shortly thereafter while still in a current status of training* 16* Another point to bring out to show how badly Service Units were needed to logistioally support our operation, a Corps, consisting of two Infantry Divisions and an Armored Division, was dismounted and the personnel thereof utilized.as truck drivers for a period of approximately two months to haul supplies from the beaches as far as Liege* 17. One of the most important steps taken since cessation of hostilities in Europe was by the Fifteenth Army which was designated by the Chief of Staff to make a detailed study of the utilization of all*type units, beginning with the planning stage and continuing through the entire European Campaign* This study brought t6 light the lack of logistical support throughout the entire campaign* Many recommendations have been adopted to correct the faults uncovered in this study of the European Campaign, For instance, activation of a Logistical Division and support of the Affiliation Program* 6 HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY OFFICE OF TIIE COLKAirDITJ'a GENERAL 1660 E KYD1D Pi^RK BLVD CHICAGO 15, ILLINOIS 9 October 1947 AG 322 OR^ ALPaG (3 Oct 47) SUBJECT: Affiliation of ORC Units TO : See Distribution 1, It is apparent that in some instances affiliation agreements have been concluded for ORC Units which It is now determined cannot be activated due to lack of personnel to Meet activation requirements. 2, State Senior Instructors, Orgsnized Reserves, are directed to exert all possible influence on representatives of Technical and Administrative Services to assure that, prior to completion of affiliation agreemtns, key or cadre personnel are available within the sponsoring organizations to meet unit activation requirements, 3, In the event affiliation agreements are negotiated by representatives of Technical or •••dminis trative Services without such assurance, you ivill notify this headquarters of same without delay, 4, Upon notification that an affiliated unit is released for activation, the appropriate State Senior Instructor, Organized Reserves, will take steps immediately to effect an sctivation request for that unit, BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALKER: W. F. SMITH Lt. Col., AGD Asst Adjutant General DL 13-TKRE»Fr:;M, -s ini'eated 0 HEADQUARTERS PIPTH ARMY OFi-ICE OF THE COMTJANDING GENERAL 1660 E HYDE PARK BLVD CHICAGO 16, ILLINOIS AG 322 ORC ALPGG (23 Oct 47) 5 November 1947 SUBJECT: Affiliation of ORC Units TO 5 All State Senior Instructors, Organized Reserves, Fifth Army Area, !• Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, AG 322 ORC ALPGG (8 Oct ^7), subject as above, 9 October 1947. 2. It is desired that State Senior Instructors, Organized Reserves, make an immediate survey of all ORC Units released to their respective states for activation under the affiliation plan prior to the receipt of reference 1 above, to determine which units cannot be activated immediately. 3. This survey will cover the following point3 for each ORC affiliated unit which cannot be activated: a. Total number of male personnel employed by the sponsor. b. Number of Reserve officers employed by the sponsor. o. Number of enlisted reservists employed by the sponsor. d. Number of former officers employed by the sponsor, exclusive of paragraph 3b above. e. Number of forrn-3r enlisted men employed by the sponsor, exclv.sive of paragraph 3 c, above, f. Number of employees eligible for appointment in Officers Reserve Corns under- the provisions of V'.'ar Department Circular 101, 1947. g. Uumber of employees not having prior military service but who are desirous of enlisting in the ERC provided such direct enlistments are subsequently authorised. 4. Special attention is invited to note pertaining to "Remarks" on the attached inclosure. The "Remarks" column will likewise indicate whether or not eligible personnel of other comparable industrial organizations are available and acceptable to the- sponsor for assignment to the affiliated unit, 5. The results of these completed studies will be submitted on the attached forms so as to reach this headquarters not later than 30 November 1947. Reports Control System is ALPGG-OT-16, ?Y COM^.NP OP LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALKER: /s / W. P. Smith 1 Incl ' W. P. SMITH Form, Survey of affiliated Lt. Col, AGD Units (20 Copies) Asst Adj Gen DISTRIBUTION: DL14-TWO-5, a s i ntfi ca t ed THREE-N, as indicated COPY HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY OFFIUE OP THE COMMANDING GENERAL 1660 E HYDE PARK BLYD CHICAGO 15, ILLINOIS AG 322 ORC ALFGG 19 January 1948 (16 Jan 48) SUBJECT: Activation, Organization, and Training of /ffilia ted Units TO State Senior Instructors, Organized Reserves, Fifth. Army Area; Other Addressees indicated in Distribution. 1« Many complaints have been received from sponsors of affiliated units stating that subsequent to the signing of affiliation agreements, little or no contact is maintained by the Army or its representatives with the sponsored organizations. 2, State Senior Instructors, OR, will give their personal attention to continual contact with sponsoring organizatiotis to effect immediate activation, organization, and training of affiliated units. Normally, it is expected that within ten days of the signing of the affiliation agreement an activation request for the affiliated unit will be forwarded to this headquar ters. 3. During the intervening period between submission of the activation requests to this headquarters and publication of Fifth Army's activation orders, continuing contact must be made by the Senior Instructor with the sponsoring organization to assure the sponsor of the Army's interest and to initiate a sound organization and training program for the unit immediately upon activation. Where feasible, affiliated units should hold at least one, if not two, inactive duty drill periods during this intervening period, in the same manner as if the unit were activated. BY X>:':MAKD OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALKER: /s/ Vir. F . Smith W. P. SMITH Lt. Col, /GD Asst .ttdj Gen DISTRIBUTION: DL 1B-0NE-B TWO-F, as indicated THREE-M, as indicated COPY OFFICE SENIOR INSTRUCTOR ORGANIZED RESERVES, MISSOURI 12th & Spruce Streets St. Louis 2, Missouri GJK/ab/mlc 8 April 1948 AG 326.21 ALFGC SUBJECT: Officer's Biographical Brief TO % Officer in Charge, Det #1, 5257 ASU, Jefferson City. Mo. Det #2, 5257 ASU, Kansas City, Mo. Det #3, 5257 ASU, St Joseph, Mo Det #4, 5257 A SIT, Springfield, Mo. Suboffice Cape Girardeau, Mo. Unit Instructor, St Louis Area 1. Reference is made to letter, Headquarters, Fifth Army, AG 322 ORC ALFGG, subject: Assignment of Organized Reserve Corps Unit Commanders Subsequent to Initial Unit Activation" 3 December 1947, as amended by letter, Headquarters Fifth Army,AG 322 ALFGG, same subject, 19 January 1948. 2. The revised officer's biographical brief form will b e prepared by your office, and submitted to Headquarters Fifth Army in the following ins tances: a. Proposal of changes in commanders in irrade °£ Colonel or higher in OR Divisions. b. Nomination of commanding officers of composite groups. c. Nominations of commanding officers of affiliated units in the grade of Lt. Col. or higher. d. Nomination of any other unit commander not included in paragraph 2 a, 2 b and 2 c above, for assignment to a position for which the grade of Colonel, or a higher grade is specified. BY ORDER OF COLONEL 3IGEL0W: /s/ William S. Clarke WILLIAM S. CLARKE Captain, Infantry Adjutant 1 Incl Hq 5 AG Form 112 (25 cys) COPY EWM/ADW/jb 13 November 1947 SUBJECT: Recommendations to Expedite Personnel Procurement and Unit Progression in Organized Reserve Units to be Organized Under War Department Affiliation Plan D8ted 28 April 1947. THRU : Channels TO : The Office of the Quartermaster General The Office of the Chief of Transportation 1. References: a. Letter, Headquarters Army Ground Forces, file .326/215 (6 Jun 46) GNGCT-11, Subject? Training and /administration of the Civilian Components", dated 6 June 1946. b. Letters, Headquarters Fifth,.^rmy, file AG 326 (Tng and Adm CC) (ALFGG), Subject: Training and Administration of the Civilian Components"7 dated 26 and 28 September 1946, respectively. c. War Department affiliation Plan, dated 2 8April 1947. d. Letter, Headquarters Fifth Army, file AG 322 OKC ALPGG, Subject: "Affiliation of ORC Units", dated 9 October 1947. 2. Scope: Problems in brief as found in steps taken to activate and progress affiliated Units from Class n C" after signed agreement has been completed by Field Representative of the Chief of Service. Undersigned officer has worked with affiliated units in all stages and with the field representatives of the Chiefs of Service since August 1947. a. Majority of Affiliated Units in this atate fall in categories where officer and cadre personnel are not available from reserve pools. For example: Graves Registration Company, Bakery Company, Refrigeration Company and 17 Laundry Detachments, Hospital, etc, (l) Skilled personnel is available and willing to enroll in the reserve program but present machinery is incomplete. War Department Circular 101, dated 19 April 47, states in paragraph c (2) Section II Part Three the proposed procedure on direct commission awards. All phases of the processing are clear and operative with the exceptions as described by Circular 101, which promises this at a later date. No further steps can be taven to activate approximately 22 units of company and detachment size in this state until further clarification is received. All of these units have been contacted and personnel tentatively selected. Problems of procurement of personnel have been discussed with the sponsors. In the most part sponsors are eager and aggressive to assist in activation and progression of their units to an A or B basis but will become progressively discouraged by passivity or inquiries answered evasively. Inability to answer questions or slowing down progression from the pace set by the Field Representative of the Chief of °ervice acts as s. ps' chological block to these sponsors who in the main are heads of active industry. Their time whioan can be devoted to selection and interesting of potential officer and cadre personnel to head up and staff these units is understandably limited. (2) Units are scattered over the state which results in duplication of effort because calls by organizing officer fall over a considerable period of time. The same material must be presented over snd over to various key personnel but cannot be brought to any climax or conclusion. (3) Most specialist personnel will fall into the 30 to 40 year age groups. No appreciative objections have been encoimtered from these people to commissions in company f.rade as they feel the plan important enough to rate the effort without too great regard for compensation, however, a great discrepancy lies in the comparison between the procurement of officer and v ey enlisted personnel. For example in a plant, the plant super1 in-ten&arit and his chief assistant may be interested in heading up a unit or detachment calling in its Table of Organization for an officer of company grade and an enlisted specialist of the first three grades to assist him, I'heir military job and title and its description are usually very similar. The officer performs only additional supervisory and administrative functions The operptions necessary to perform thei^1 primary mission call for like technical background. This like technical background is parallel also in their civil employment. One may have longer service in industry or a slightly higher civil position but their basic knowledge is recognized by all in the industry to be similar. This knowledge is usually attained by 5 to 20 years training in the industry. The majority of these men have no military background, so thus the problem results where the one is eligible for a direct commission in company grade and his chief enlisted assitant must, however,,even if the T/0 position for which he is the best and only one qualified to fill, calls for a first three grader, enlist as a private in the Unlisted Reserves. No provisions are made for his promotion to T/0 grade in less than 3 or even 4 years. In many cases his qualification will be identical with the unit commander and only the sponsors' choice has made the difference. In many cases present age prohibits enlistment in the Enlisted Reserves although physical condition is excellent. It is not the intent of this office to make the ridiculous recommendation that all enlistments without prior service be made in Non Commissioned grades but only to recognize highly qualified specialists in service functions (leundry superintendents, morticians, bakery foremen, chief warehousemen, truckmasters, refrigeration foremen, etc.) which parallel in experience radio, radar, ex-ray and laboratory experts needed"in key enlisted ?/r OSls and normally obtained from the professional or semi-professional classes. These men cannot be induced, even if eligible" under present regulations, tp participate in a plan which needs them so vitally, because of their vast experience, unless several changes are made in current regulations. 3. Summary: a. It is recommended that the action be taken to release to the State Senior Instructors the lists of specialists needed by the ^hiefs cf Services under Circular 101, dated 19 April 47. b. It is recommended the a.rr eqn.irements for these specialists be secondary to their ability to ptss the usual medical examination and that waivers be granted in certain cases as seen fit by the burgeon General. c. It is recommended that a list of key enlisted specialists be prepared to bring into the military services, active and reserve, by the offering of direct non-commissioned warrants in grades appropriate, as selected by the Adjutant General, to recognize only their high degree of skill and experience and reduce the gan between ratings for officers and enlisted "specialists." FOR THE COMPANDING OFFICER: /s / Arthur D. Williams ARTHUR D. WILLIE!S Sap tain, QJiffC QM - TC Instructor, OR, Mo COPY AUNEX 5 CURRENT AND FUTURE PROBLEMS OP THE DEPARTMENT OP THE ARMY AS TO PROPOSED ORGANIZATIONS AND UTILIZATION OF SERVICE UNITS. 1« The Department of the Army la endeavoring to correct auoh deficiencies as the lack of trained personnel readily available to fill units in the event of another National emer gency* The following steps have been taken: a* Plans for a "Standard Type Field Army,11'1' b* Support of the "Affiliation Program*"(2) o* Activation of the "Logistical Division*n'5' d* Continuation of the "Organized Reserve Program."(Note) e« Continuation of the "National Guard Program*" (Note) 2* The Department of the Army has "in the making" plans for a "Standard Type Field Army*" The unit is designed to sponsor an expansion of the Army in case of a National Emergency* This means that civilian components will be administered by this type unit in event of a "M-Day" and thereafter throughout an emergency. ' 3* As has been stated by many commanding generals of past wars* a successful campaign is based on logistical support* Prior to the cessation of hostilities in World War II a "Logistical Division" was activated in tiie European Theater*'5' The mission of this unit had a two-fold purposes (a) to support the combat forces* and (b) to administer the Service Units in ... .__ _. j^ —_, .^ ^_ ^ ^m ^m ^ ^ .^ ^m *M ^ *« *m *M «w *^ *M *m *ab ttm flto Mb (1) Type Field Army Tentative (2) Ltrs* Hq* Bth Army, dated 9 Oot 47f 6 Nov 47* 19 Jan 48. Ltr* Senior Instructor. ORC# dated 8 Apr 48 (Refer to Appendix 1. Annex 2) - Ltr* QM & TC Instructor. OR. Mo* dated 13 Wov 47# to Office of QM General and Office of Chief of Transportation (Refer to Appendix 2, Annex 2) (3) Draft Field Manuel "The Logistical Division" proposed by the Command and General Staff College. May 47* (4) Same as Reference (1) above* (5) Same as Reference (3) above* (lotei Already a part of the National Defense Program) - 1 their "areas.n An attempt to organize or activate logistical divisions in the civilian component of the Array has been made; however, this has not been too successful to date. If a Standard Field Type Army is adopted this will enable the Department of the Army to plan more in detail the type units required for proper logistical support. This statement is based on the fact that T/O & E combat units to be supported will be known prior to commitment to an operation. 4, The "Affiliation Program" can furnish the i*rmy with many highly technical trained specialists and units; however, such a program must be supported wholeheartedly by the public and by the Army. The value of these units was proven by the Medical andTransportation Units utilized in World Wars I and II. An attempt on the part of the Department of the Army is being made to encourage this program (Appendices to Annex 2). 5» The ''Organized Reserves" and the "National Guard" took a most important part in World War II. The primary source of manpower for any future National emergency will come from these sources. Since World ^Tar II, steps have been taken to organize the Reserve components into numerical.ly numbered units so that the integrity of the organization will be maintained, thus boosting unit esprit de corps. If Congressional approval for a National Defense ^ct is disapproved there will be only three sources from which trained personnel can be obtained, and these are: (1) National Guard, (b) Organized Reserve, and possibly the (c) Affiliated Units. - 2 ANNEX 4 MEMORANDUM SIGNED BY THE DIRECTOR, LOGISTICS DIVISION, OS, USA, TO THE CHIEF OP STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY* SUBJECT: Activation of Service Units. TO i The Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, !• In compliance with directive, file number 6*7, subjects "Activation of Service Units", dated 11 October 194x, received from the Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, a detailed study has been made by the Logistics Division* 2* Recommendations resulting from this study to prevent a shortage of trained personnel to fill units in event of a National emergency are as follows: a. That the "Selective Service Program" be reenacted at the earliest possible date* b« That the "Affiliation Program" be supported* o* That Compulsory Military Training be initiated in high schools having a student body of 500 or more, d« That, if paragraph c. is not favorably,considered, a "Universal Military Training Program" be approved, 3* It is further recommended by this Division that the recommendations set forth in paragraph 2. above be favorably considered and forwarded to Ihe Secretary of the Army for appropriate action* (Sinned) Director, Logistics Division, GS, USA ANNEX 5 BIBLIOGRAPHY Date, Document No* and/or author Title Sub.ject Matter Arthur Meir "Political and Social Economic trend follow- Schlesinger History of the U.S." ing World War I. Hagood, P 320 "Services of Supply11 Utilization of techni P 196 cally trained personnel. Ibid 61:74-7, October 40 "CCC find Defense of Effects of CCC Training. National Education ASP Circular 123 Flexibility of a dated 1943. Troop Ziasls. M-N 0-1, 1 Sept 39, "Distribution of Data pertaining to 1 Sept 45• Military Personnel" the Army Specialist "Milit ary Pers onne1 Division, ASP." ASP Circular 121, Organization of nSF dated 1944. in 1944. Memo SPOPU 020, Procurement of Personnel dated 4 July 42. for newly activated units OPD 370.5(29 Nov 42) "Responsibility for Procurement of Personnel Procurement of Perso- for nevirly activated nnel for Newly ncti- unl ts • vated Units." ASP Circular 104, Personnel Classification dated 1944. System. Memo Vi'DOPD, 230.5 'tilizction of Man- Utilization of Manpower dated 14 Jan 44. power based on physical Based on Physical capacity." Capacity. ASP Circular 26, Utilization of civilian dated 1944. and limited service personnel. Ltr.Hq. 5th Army, "Affiliation of ORC ) 9 Oct 47,5 Nov 47, Unita"-"Actication, ) 17 Jan 48. Organisation, Training) Affiliation Program Ltr. Office Senior of Affiliated Units. ) Insturdbr,OH,G Apr 48 "Officer's B i o: r a ph1 cc.l) Brief," * ) Ltr.fr.QM $ TC "Hecommendations to Expedite Personnel Procurement Ins true tor, OR Mo, and Unit Progression in Organized Reserve Units 13 Nov 47. to be Organized Under War Department affiliation Planjdated 28 April 1947. TLOSTOGS, 1942 Troop List of Su Type Field Army Tentative. Draft Field Manuel "The Logistical Division" May '47. Proposed by C:\GS College.