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The United States Army Replacement System in the European Campaign, 1944–1945

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The United States Army Replacement System in the European Campaign, 1944–1945 THE ARMY’S ORPHANS: THE UNITED STATES ARMY REPLACEMENT SYSTEM IN THE EUROPEAN CAMPAIGN, 1944–1945 ________________________________________________________________________ A Dissertation Submitted to The Temple University Graduate Board ________________________________________________________________________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSPHY ________________________________________________________________________ by Eric William Klinek May 2014 Examining Committee Members: Dr. Gregory J. W. Urwin, Advisory Chair, Department of History Dr. Jay Lockenour, Department of History Dr. Beth Bailey, Department of History Dr. Dennis Showalter, External Member, Colorado College ii © Copyright 2014 by ___Eric William Klinek___ All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT Military historians have been debating the U.S. Army’s World War II replacement system for decades, but no one has completed a detailed study of the War Department’s policies and practice. Authors have focused primarily on how combat units overcame the system’s limitations, but they have not conducted an in-depth examination of its creation, structure, and function. Nor did they question why infantry divisions had to devise their own replacement policies in the first place. The extant literature is too celebratory of the army and utilizes ultimate victory as a measure of efficiency and effectiveness. Such a myopic view has prevented these earlier studies from evaluating how the replacement system affected the overall course of the European war. This dissertation breaks new ground by presenting a comprehensive overview of the replacement system—from the War Department down to the squad, and from the last days of World War I through the post-World War II years. It will elucidate a process of failed administration and implementation at the highest levels of the War Department and army, but it will also relate a “grassroots” story of success at the divisional level and below. The War Department’s managerial approach to the utilization of military manpower was both inefficient and wasteful. The army largely overlooked the impact of individuality, morale, psyche, experience, and training on a soldier’s performance. Its insistence on rushing men to the line once combat operations began meant that it often neglected to train, orient, and equip replacements in a manner conducive to their favorable and effective integration into combat units. The GIs at the front, both veterans and replacements alike, suffered for this oversight. iv To Corporal Albert A. Vaccaro, (1914 – 1942), Company B, 803rd Engineer (Aviation) Battalion, who made the ultimate sacrifice in the service of his country. And to Louis “Sonny” Trebino, (1923 – 2011), 24th Naval Construction Battalion (Seabees), who spent nearly three years serving his country in the South Pacific. v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Researching and writing are often lonely endeavors. Hours have passed in which the only “person” with whom I engaged was a long-deceased general or G.I. It was all too easy to lose track of the contemporary world and be transported back to the time and place about which I wrote. I was extremely fortunate, therefore, to have a great support group of family, friends, and advisors sustain me during my journey. Dr. Timothy Nenninger of the National Archives pointed me in the right direction at the beginning of this project. After poring through countless boxes of divisional papers over the course of several years, I was unsure where to focus next. I e-mailed Dr. Nenninger, briefly introduced myself and described my project, and asked if he would be willing to meet with me when I visited College Park in late June 2008. I assumed he would direct me to the proper finding aids and send me on my way. Much to my surprise, and great pleasure, Dr. Nenninger had pulled all of the relevant files and set them aside for me prior to my visit. He provided me copies of finding aids and documents, and he checked in on me every day to see what I had uncovered. He saved me countless hours and helped ensure that I obtained everything that I needed to get this dissertation off the ground. Rick Atkinson was also extremely kind and generous to me. We met at the 2008 Society for Military History Conference in Ogden, Utah, where I first gave a paper on the subject of replacements. He told me to drop him a line whenever I liked, and I took him up on that offer. And I’m glad that I did! He not only put me in touch with Dr. vi Nenninger, but he also sent me a list of all replacement-related materials that he had uncovered in the archives. For this, I am ever grateful. The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center (USAHEC) staff, especially Michael Lynch, has always been extremely friendly and welcoming. Mike was one of the first graduate students I met at Temple. If I ever needed anything from USAHEC, Mike would tell me where to find it and how to get it. If he uncovered anything that he believed would be of use or interest to me, he sent it along without my having to ask. Research is not only time consuming, but it can be quite expensive as well. I was very fortunate to receive financial assistance from several organizations. The United States Army Center of Military History (CMH) awarded me a 2009–2010 Dissertation Fellowship, which made extensive research trips to College Park feasible. I am particularly grateful to Dr. Mark Bradley, my liaison at the CMH, for coordinating all aspects of the fellowship, for arranging my visits and talks, and for periodically checking in on me. Drs. Jeffrey Clarke and Richard Stewart, also of the CMH, were very giving of their time as well. In spring 2008, I received three research and travel awards that permitted me to visit the archives and present my findings for the first time at the Society for Military History Annual Conference. Temple University’s Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy (CENFAD) granted me the John F. Votaw Research Award, Temple University’s College of Liberal Arts provided me the Graduate Student Travel and Research Award, and the Society for Military History awarded me the Russell F. Weigley Student Travel Grant. I remain indebted to these organizations and the great people who run them. vii I found that one of the best ways to receive feedback on my project was by presenting my findings at conferences and lectures. With every critique or question also came an invaluable suggestion or insight. In the spring of 2010, Paul Zigo and Dr. Laura Neitzel, of the Center for World War II Studies and Conflict Resolution, Brookdale Community College, invited me to participate in their lecture series. They were very gracious hosts, and the positive reception to my talk gave me confidence that I had selected a topic that could hold the attention of a diverse audience. One of my best professional experiences, however, was the 2010 West Point Summer Seminar in Military History. The best way to describe it is military history fantasy camp. I am especially grateful to Dr. Jason Warren (Major, United States Army), one of the co-directors of the program that year. It was at West Point that Dr. Dennis Showalter agreed to serve as outside reader on my dissertation committee. The seminar has also resulted in collaborations and conference panels, as well as numerous friendships. It really is the finishing school for the military historian. As Cicero said, “Life is nothing without friendship.” I could not have asked for a better group of friends with which to share my graduate school experiences. Though some of my buddies from the earliest days of graduate school, particularly Brady King, Holger Löwendorf, Kristin Grueser, and Jay Wyatt, have all scattered to different parts of the country, we still remain in constant contact and visit each other whenever possible. They really were my older siblings who looked out for me those first few years. And then there’s the “Temple Mafia”—the guys who always lend support, give advice, and will read a chapter and provide feedback on a moment’s notice. Josh Wolf, Martin Clemis, Earl Catagnus, Chris Golding, Jean-Pierre Beugoms, and Dr. Jason viii Smith—I could not ask for a better group of friends. Dr. David Ulbrich was the pathfinder for the Temple Mafia. He is extremely generous with his time and wealth of knowledge, and he is always willing to help a fellow Temple Owl. Dr. Michael Dolski spans the divide of friend and mentor. Though he was once a grad school colleague, he is now my boss at the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC). But he is more than that. He truly is an older brother. He made my transition to Hawaii and JPAC as easy as possible. He is always there to lend advice or talk me back from a ledge. He read my entire dissertation, cover to cover, and offered invaluable feedback. He even held a mock defense for me the week before my real defense. Words cannot describe all that Mike has done for my career, both educational and professional. I am eternally grateful. Dr. Julian Saltman, my friend and colleague at JPAC, also participated in the mock defense and offered very insightful suggestions. Dr. Gregory J. W. Urwin has been more than an advisor to me. He has been a constant supporter, and he pushed me to the limits of my capabilities. His comments, suggestions, and, at times, criticisms, made my dissertation that much stronger. He taught me what it takes to be a historian, and I know the personal joy he experiences when one of his students has a professional success. I have had the privilege of working with Dr.
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