“Sherman” Tank in World War Ii

WAR-WINNER: A RE-APPRAISAL OF THE M4 “SHERMAN” TANK IN WORLD WAR II by Kevin D. Smith A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in History Middle Tennessee State University 2013 Thesis Committee: Dr. Amy Sayward Dr. Bren Martin I dedicate this work to the veterans, both civilian and military, of the M4 tank. May your experience and sacrifice in the Second World War serve as an example to future generations in the preservation of liberty. ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Dr. Amy Sayward for her kindness, patience, and guidance in producing this work and in giving me a chance to fulfill a goal. She gave me a second chance when I did not deserve it and represents the best qualities of a teacher. I would also like to thank Dr. Bren Martin for his willingness to assist me in this process even though we had never worked together before. I would also like to thank my mother, Cathi, for never doubting that I could do this. Most importantly, I would like to thank my wife, Jenny, who supported, encouraged, and enabled me to finish my goal. She believed in me even when I did not believe in myself. Finally to my son, Alex, I pray that my study of the past makes me a better father to guide you to a better future. iii ABSTRACT The M4 tank was one of the principal armored vehicles used by the United States during World War II. The U.S. also supplied the M4 in large numbers to its allies; it became the most important Allied tank of the war. In spite of this widespread use, historians, veterans, and post-war commentators frequently denigrate the M4 as a weapon and claim that it was a mistake to employ it against the Axis powers. The critics’ argument is that the M4 was cheaply designed for easy mass production as part of the American strategy to overwhelm the Axis powers through the quantity rather than the quality of its weapons. These critics point to the technical inferiority of the M4 to late- war German heavy tanks as proof of this claim and argue that by employing the M4 the Americans wasted thousands of lives and delayed the end of the war. This argument is flawed and does not portray an accurate story of the M4 in World War II. Interior Army disputes over the role of tanks in battle and the resulting doctrine developed to defeat the German army were the primary determinants of the M4’s design; ease of production was not the overriding factor. The record of the M4 in combat from 1942 to 1945 was exemplary when it was used as it was intended. Additionally, the 1944 modifications to the M4 demonstrated the soundness of its overall design. The M4 struggled (but still occasionally succeeded) in duels with the heavier German tanks, a task it was not designed for. Considering its overall war record, the M4 was an invaluable resource for the Allied powers and must be considered a successful tank. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION………….……………………..…………………………………...….1 CHAPTER I: ARMOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD: A PRECURSOR TO THE M4 "SHERMAN"..………………..………..…….8 CHAPTER II: THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE M4……….…..…...…35 CHAPTER III: THE M4 IN COMBAT, 1942-1943……………….……………………66 CHAPTER IV: THE M4 IN COMBAT, 1944-1945………………….…..……..………90 CONCLUSION………….……………………..…………………………………..…...125 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………130 APPENDICES: ………………………………………………………………………...142 APPENDIX A: ANNOTATED ORGANIZATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT…………………………………………………….143 APPENDIX B: KEY GERMAN & AMERICAN TANK DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION, 1940-1945……………………......……………….145 APPENDIX C: AMERICAN MEDIUM TANKS, 1940-1945……………...………146 APPENDIX D: BASIC ARMY STRUCTURE………………………………...……149 APPENDIX E: SIMPLIFIED U.S. ARMORED DIVISION ORGANIZATION, 1944……………………………………………..……………...……150 APPENDIX F: SELECTED ARMOR AND GUN COMPARISION…..……...……152 v 1 INTRODUCTION World War II was a mechanized war in which motorized vehicles were decisive to the outcome of the conflict. All major and minor powers utilized these machines extensively; anything that could be, was equipped with an internal combustion engine for the purpose of increased mobility. In the air and on land, the new machines revolutionized warfare, and one of the principal icons was the tank. The tank--with its firepower, armor, and off-road capabilities--proved to be one of the decisive weapons of the war. Every major land battle of the war included tanks, frequently as the key weapon in offensive and defensive operations. For the United States and its allies, the primary tank of World War II was the Medium Tank M4, commonly called the M4 or “Sherman.” It operated in every theater of the war and participated in every major battle in which the United States fought. The other major Allied powers--including Great Britain, France, China, and the Soviet Union--also used the M4 extensively in combat. From its introduction in 1942, this tank played an essential role in the battles and campaigns the Allies planned and conducted. Despite its widespread use and significant role, historians, veterans, and commentators have decried the use of the M4 ever since 1944; for them, the M4 was a failure as a tank and a weapon. However, the critics’ argument is flawed; first, it is based on a false premise, and secondly, the criticism is myopic regarding the M4’s performance. Contrary to the criticism, the M4 was an excellent tank that was fully capable of performing the role it was designed for, and moreover, its capabilities made it a vital asset in every theater where it fought. The M4 had limitations to be sure, but a full analysis of its history and record show that its merits significantly outweighed its deficiencies. 2 Critics of the M4 make a flawed comparison with late-war German tanks and misrepresent the design history of the M4. Without a doubt, the M4 was technically inferior in some aspects to the late-war German heavy tanks, the Panzerkampfwagen V “Panther” and the Panzerkampfwagen VI “Tiger” and “King Tiger” tanks. These panzers had more powerful guns and thicker armor than the M4; in a duel, the M4 was at a distinct disadvantage. To critics, the inadequacies of the M4 resulted in unnecessarily high losses in both tanks and crews for the Allies. Historians such as Stephen Ambrose and Max Hastings have argued (implicitly and explicitly) that the M4 caused excessive and unnecessary casualties.1 Veterans such Omar Bradley and Belton Cooper have made similar accusations; Cooper referred to the M4 as a “deathtrap” in the title of his book.2 This extremely negative image of the M4 persists even in popular culture; one program on the History Channel labeled the M4 an “engineering disaster.”3 From 1944 until now, scholars, soldiers, and laymen have questioned why the United States, with all of its industrial prowess and ability, was unable to produce a tank superior to those of the Germans. Moreover, why did the United States continue to use such an “inferior” tank without developing a replacement? The aforementioned critics have asserted that the 1 Stephen Ambrose. Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany, June 7, 1944-May 7, 1945 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 63; Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 190. 2 Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), 41; Benton Y. Cooper, Death Traps: The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War II (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998, 2000). 3 History Channel, “Modern Marvels S10E49 Engineering Disasters 12,” YouTube Web site, MPEG, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WM- w6Bnk_bI&list=WLF195F8E78D1C6DBD (accessed January 30, 2013). 3 United States sought to win the war by overwhelming its enemies through sheer numbers rather than skill; they offer the M4 as evidence of this interpretation. Moreover, critics point to the M4 as an example of the failure of the U.S. Army to prepare adequately for war, which resulted in “poor” performance in the Mediterranean and European theaters-- an ironic view when one considers that the Allies won. Likewise, critics argued that the British and Soviets did not use the M4 because it was an excellent tank; they used the M4 because it was available and their own tank production was inadequate to meet their needs. Subsequently, the sole value of the M4 was that it was easily manufactured in large numbers and therefore “won” by overwhelming its opponents, regardless of its quality as a weapon. However, this argument does not hold up to historical scrutiny, especially when one examines the origin of the M4 and its combat record. The M4 was the product of the limited experience of the U.S. Army in the interwar years (1920-1939) with tanks and the resulting internal debates over the role of the tank. Prior to the German invasion of Poland, which featured tanks prominently, American army officers debated the role of tanks in future battles without ever reaching a consensus. The Infantry branch favored using tanks to support foot soldiers and therefore pushed designs that focused on heavy armor and armament. The Cavalry, on the other hand, wanted light and fast tanks for quick strikes and raiding behind enemy lines. The interwar years were lean budgetary times for the Army, and it could not accommodate both branches’ wishes. Limited funding for research and development hampered the Army’s ability to experiment with tank tactics and designs. Consequently, the Army had little experience designing and building tanks; the small number of tanks produced was wholly inadequate to practice and develop tactics that could be developed into a doctrine.

Load more