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Congressional Research Service Report RL32506 The Proposed Authorities of a National Intelligence Director: Issues for Congress and Side-by-Side Comparison of S. 2845, H.R. 10, and Current Law Alfred Cumming, Foreign Aﬀairs, Defense, and Trade Division

October 5, 2004

Abstract. Congress currently is considering two principal bills, S. 2845, introduced by Senators Collins and Lieberman, and H.R. 10, introduced by Representative Hastert, that would establish the NID position. [For a comprehensive comparison of all recent NID legislative proposals, see CRS Report RL32600 and CRS Report RL32601]. http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 Side-by-Side ComparisonofS.2845,H.R.10,and Congressional Research Service Intelligence Director:IssuesforCongressand The Proposed Authorities ofaNational CRS ReportforCongress Specialist inIntelligenceandNationalSecurity Foreign Affairs, Defense, andTrade Division

The Library ofCongress Received throughtheCRSWeb Updated October 5,2004 Order Code RL32506 Current Law Alfred Cumming http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 Summary replace the currentpositionof security challenges States willneedtocounterterrorism,and adequatelydirect resources to and buildthe intelligence capabilities that the United government, U.S. and questionedwhetherthe criticized the U.S.Intelligence Community’s (IC)fragmented management structure shift the balance of control awayshift thebalanceofcontrol fro natural powerbaseand, as a joint intelligence work;and a weak capacity toset priorities and move resources. domestic intelligence divide;structural intelligence capabilities; lack of common standards and practices across the foreign- Senators CollinsandLieber specific subjects of interest —including Intelligence(NID) Director whowouldoversee national intelligence centers on position ofthe NID anditsauthority. This warfighter. Thecongressional roleincl leadersh of strong, centralized absence the at theCIA, theDCIfi alsolackshiring, President’s chief intelligence advisor, and dojustice toany Other than jobs. the of Supporters argue thattheDCI cannotmana RL32601]. recent NID legislative proposals, that wouldestablishtheNID position.[F SchlesingerJames in1971firstbroachedtheNID concept. when arguments forstronger IC authority began surface.OMBdeputy director to the latestcontributiontoanIC structural Commission’s recommendationtostrengthen to oversee the day-to-daythe operations Central of Intelligence Agency (CIA). The further influence. TheCommission recomme light ofconcernsth in recommendation onSeptembe testimony beforeCongress in Chairman Vice Commission the President, ofthe Office Executive the in located the IC’s 15 agencies. Although theCo the agencies thatcontributetoit;and have — across the U.S.government, manage the national intelligence program; oversee Intelligence: IssuesforCongress,andSide-by-Side Comparison ofS.2845,H.R.10,andCurrentLaw The ProposedAuthoritiesofaDirectorNational The Commission madeanumberofr Commission The 11,2001, the attacksofSeptember The 9/11Commission,initsrecentreporton Opponents counter that anNID would lose Reactions to the concept ofanNID concept the to Reactions Congress currently isconsidering two in the decadesahead. the in man, andH.R.10,introduced result, influence. They also contend that an NID will NID an result, influence.Theythat alsocontend Director ofCentralIntellig see CRS Report RL32600 and CRS Report ReportRL32600see CRS CRS and m DOD,risking intelligence supporttothe mmission recommended thatthedirectorbe mmission a NationalCounterterro ring and budgetand authority. Theyring argue that barriers that underminetheperformance of barriers hiring,budgetary firing, and authority over reform debate that dates at least to 1955, least reformdebatethatdatesat ip has resulted indi udes deciding whether to establish the udes deciding whether toestablish r 7,2004,withdrewthatportionofthe at theNID wouldbesubjecttoundue reportwillbe updated to addressthebroade or a comprehensive comparison ofall comparison or acomprehensive ecommendations, oneofwhichwasto have been mixed sinceitsinception. mixed have been principalS. bills, nded thatadeputy NID beestablished ge theIC, theCIA the as andserve and theIC, inparticular,isorganized management authorityover the IC is day-to-day controlovertheCIA, a ence (DCI)ence withaNational byHastert, Representative vided management of 2845, intr rism Center(NCTC) r range ofnational as eventswarrant. oduced by http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 Appendix 1. Selected NID Legislation Compared to Current Law ...... 12 History ofArguments OfferedinOppositi RecommendationsArguments to Centralize Offered In and Favor Strengthen of Establishing IC Leadership an NID ...... 4 .....7 Congressional ProposalsConcerning NID Position Contents Comparison ofS.2845,H.R.10,andCurrentLaw ofTables List The 9/11 InquiryThe Joint Into September11TerroristAttacks CommissionScowcroft Commission,2001 Specter/Combest, 1996 ...... 10 Aspin-Brown Commission,199 Boren-McCurdy, 1992 Turner Proposal,1985 Branch Orders,1976-1981 Executive Charter Legislation, 1978 Clifford/Cline Proposals,1976 Pike Committee,1976 Church Committee,1976 Murphy Commission,1975 The Schlesinger Report,1971 Second HooverCommission,1955 Collins/Lieberman (S.2845)andHaster DCI Budget-Related Responsib NID ...... 4 National Security Actof1947Ar ...... 9 ...... 9 ...... 8 ...... 10 ...... 8 ...... 8 on toEstablishing anNID ...... 8 ...... 10 ...... 7 ilities andAuthoritiesUnderthe 6...... 9 ...... 8 ...... 7 e Seenby SomeasLimited ...... 9 t (H.R.10)WouldEstablishan ...... 2 ...... 12 ...... 5 ...... 10 ...... 3 http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 1 level ofquality a recommending,strongDCI“a instead, whocould bring intelligence toan adequate establishm the considered Schlesinger collection systems, and the failure to absence ofstrong central IC leadersh offo the IC’sbehest management atthe Budget’s (OMB) Deputy Director R. James President HerbertHooverma manage theCIA sothattheDCI couldfocusattentionontheIC. to benamed officer” an“executive that recommended IC,the commission the efforts tocentralize and strengthen IC leadership]. In examining ways tostrengthen push forstronger IC centralized authority. branchin organization oftheexecutive Intelligence Director (NID). authority and,in structural reorganization. ha branches, orlegislative executive Since then, at least 19commissions, committees and panels, created by either the (IC) wasstatutorily establishedbypa the surface almostassoon the management Intelligence Director:Issuesfor Congress and 1949-2004 of theCRSreportis ReportRL32500, Study, House Permanent SelectCommittee on Intelligence, July, 2004update 1996.(The Reorganization, 1949-1996,” in See Richard A. andH. SeeRichard Best, Andrew Jr. Boerstling, “ProposalsforIntelligence Eighteen years andcommittees, severalcommissions, and panels after former The so-called SecondHooverCommission,es theUnitedStatesIntelligencereorganize CommunityProposals to began to The ProposedAuthoritiesofaNational S. 2845,H.R.10,andCurrentLaw , by RichardA.Best.) Side-by-Side Comparisonof nd responsiveness.” some cases, the establishment of the position of National Several oftheproposalsurge de hisrecommendations, the OfficeofManagement and IC21: Intelligence Community inthe21 IC21: Intelligence ip for “unproductively duplicative”intelligence 1

1953, becamethefirst independent panel to ve madenumerousrecommendationsfor rmer President Richard Nixon, blamedthe rmer PresidentRichardNixon, ssage oftheNational coordinate theallo structurefortheIntelligence Community ent ofanNID,ent backedaway, but Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, Proposals forIntelligence Schlesinger (later aDCI), (later Schlesinger studying after [See page 7forahistoricalreviewof [See tablished by the tablished law toexamine d stronger centralized IC centralized d stronger Security Actof1947. cation ofresources. st Century , Staff http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 United States Committees. the DepartmentofDefense(DOD) and McCurdy failedtowina funds. Theirlegislation alsowouldhavecr NID positionandgivingthe thepositionth Permanent Select Committee onIntelligence (HPSCI), intr of the Senate Selectchairmen Committee onIntelligence (SSCI) and House actions, the Committees didnotreport the respective bills. opposition totheoveralllegislation, whichal presidentially selected deput the created proposals, onethatwouldhave charter House (1977),Congress considered co oversightthe creationofintelligence intelligence. of theNID. TheNCTCwouldbeacente of Office would beplacedintheExecutive ofaNationalC recommended thecreation Foreign Intelligence todirect the CIA’s day-to-day operations. The Commissionalso Commission recommendedtheestablishmen Commission intelligence program and overseenational the agenciesThe that contribute toit. U. subjects acrossthe of specific interest a National Intelligence Director whowouldoversee national intelligence centers on that thepositionofDCIrecommended 2004, July shouldbereplacedby 22, on 4 3 2 Director ofNational Intelligence, orNID. Thispaper will usethe“NID” nomenclature. Congress. Historically, however, various proposalsgenerally have theposition named do thetwo principal legislativetoo, so, bills —S.2845andH.R. 10—being consideredby future attacks. CommissionThe providemandatedto wasalso 2001 terroristattacks, including preparedness fo to prepareafullandcomplete accountofth of PresidentGeorge W.Bushinlate 2002 United States,was createdby Attacksthe Upon The9/11Commission recommendations referto a National Intelligence Director, orNID; 9/11Commission SeeThe Report, 9/11Commission, The formallyCommission known onthe Terrorist astheNational Congressional ProposalsConcerningNIDPosition In 1992, Senator DavidBoren andRepres In oneofthemostrecentiterations There havebeenavariety of 3 , July 22,2004,p.403. , July ywould havemanaged theCI doption oftheirlegislation intheface of oppositionby proposalsconcerning theNID National Commissiononthe Te CRS-2 (P.L. 107-306, Nov. 27,2003).It waschartered e circumstances surrounding theSeptember 11, S. government, andwouldmanage theU.S. and the congressional Armed Services Armed and thecongressional of the NIDof debate,the9/11Commission r for joint operational planning andjoint operational r forjoint mmittees intheSenate(1976) and in the position of anNIDposition tomanage theIC. A recommendations designed toguard against eated aseparatedirector of CIA. Boren ounterterrorism Center(NCTC),which congressional legislation andthesignature r and theimmediate responsetothe attacks. e authority toprogram andreprogram the President, andbeunderthecontrol the President, legislation thatincluded,among other so includedlanguage governing covert t ofthepositiondeputy NID for entative David McCurdy,entative respective oduced legislation creating oduced legislation A. Confrontedby strong rrorist Attacks Upon the rrorist AttacksUpon 4 position. Following 2 http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 appropriation fortheNFIP agencies, includi by beaffected would IC that Moreover,the suchatransfer. element the of head personnel during theyear ofbudget executi ICfor eachofthe agencies personnel responsibilitiesneeded recommended thattheNID begranted the director benamedto separate and thata Sena level anewcabinet that recommended Limited the NationalSecurity Act of1947Are Seenby Someas Authorities Under and Responsibilities Budget-Related DCI Activities Before andAftertheTerro 8 7 6 5 under theDCI’scontrol. National Security (b)]. U.S.C.403-4] Act,seeSec.104.[50 agencies comprising the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) also stipulatesthatthe National Security Act,seeSec.103.(c)(1 DCIthe tofacilitatethe enough topermiteffective two jobsshouldbesplit,andwhether is toobusy to doeitherjobwell.Second,th IC the both CIA, DCI heading andthe because the dual-hatted, they is he maintain by First, flaws. two they to anincoherence attribute characterized is structure management structurethat budget authoritiesarelimited.From thei Intelligence recommendations inDecemberunclassi 2002, andan Intelligence Community, agencies, including theCIA, whichcomprise theIC. errata printaccompanying report,Recommendation No. 1,pp.2-3. After The Terrorist Attacksof September11,2001 Committee onIntelligence, into theSeptember 11 See Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States National The Foreign Intelligence Program isanaggregation ofthebudgets ofthe15 See U.S. Senate Select Committee onIntelligence andU.S. Permanent House Select The Senate andHouse congressional oversight committees in2002initiateda inquiry joint In December In December More than85%oftheintelligence budget regardWith tobudget authority, the Any discussion of theNID conceptinvariab NID the ofestablishing positi Proponents , March1,1996, P.xix. 2002, the Congressional Joint Inqui Congressional Joint 2002, the th , 2001terroristattacks ontheUnited 8 DCI prepare and approve all budgets foreachoftheIC all approve DCI prepareand Although theDCI hastheau Preparing forthe21 Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Joint InquiryInto development ofanannualintelligence budget [1947 comprising theNFIP, heor management oftheIC. lacks directionandfocus. to make the entireIC opera CRS-3 current DCI budget authoritiesarestrong )(A) [50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(1)(A)]. Theact U.S.C.403-3(c)(1)(A)]. )(A) [50 manage theCIA. Inquiry TheJoint also National Securityauthorizes Actof1947 rist AttacksofSeptember11,2001 te-confirmed NID positionbeestablished, full range ofmanagement, budgetaryand ey argue thattheDCI’ on withouttheagreement oftheagency on contend IC current the management , however, is executed by executed agencies, however,is not (H.Rept.107-792 andS.Rept.107-351), ng the CIA, isgiven directly tothe r perspective,theresultisanIC st CenturyAnAppraisal of theU.S. ly leads to a debate overwhetherthe lyto leads fied report of itsfindingsreport inJuly, 2003. fied ry Into Intelligence Community Community ActivitiesBeforeand she cannottransferfundsand thorityto approveallbudgets States. The inquiryStates. The issuedits te asa coherent whole. s hiring, firing and 7 [1947 5 6 , http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 and serving as the President’s intelligence intelligence President’s and serving asthe to the IC, DCIs historically have devoted the bulk oftheir time tomanaging the CIA have assertedthat,in part because of across IC agencies atany timeduring theyear withcongressional ofexecution concurrence oftheDCI); andtheauthority heads forthethreecombatsupportagen IC Secretary agency principal the ofDefenseselects Defense Secretary (currently, now lacks:theauthority tohireandremove C. Kindsvater, Vol. 47,No.1,2003,P.34. Vol. C. Kindsvater, Intelligence Community, 9/11Commission Report Establish an NID Collins/Lieberman (S.2845)and Hastert (H.R. 10)Would DCI budgetThe is leftwithexclusive Secretary the each answersto ofDefense. and operations, of Defense(DoD)combat Secretary ofDefense,whothendisburses 12 11 10 9 established ifthe IC istobe effectively managed. byunburdened jobs, andthatanNID, theneedtomanage theCIA, mustbe CIA,principalthe intelligence asserves and advisor tothe President, has toomany 1fora side-by-sideAppendix comparison ofNID authorities inbothbills. CIA, andwouldbeprohibitedfromserv separate Senate-confirmed Director ofCe separate intelligence agencies, including the CIA. Both billsalso wouldestablish a positionof Senate-confirmed establishapresidentially-nominated,establish theNID position.Both billswould Representatives Dennis Hastert, have separately introduced legislation that would Agency (NGA). National ReconnaissanceOffice(NRO)a Agency the (NSA), Security NFIP’s National agencies largest the —the three Intelligence i.e. mapping. The NGA was formerly known as the National Image National Agency. Mapping known and formerly the as was NGA mapping. i.e. The and theNationalGeospatial-Intelligence Agen Reconnaissance Office designs, buildsandoperatesthenation’sreconnaissance satellites; The National Security Agency isresponsibleforelectronicintercepts; theNational National The Arguments OfferedInFavor ofEstablishinganNID See Studies inIntelligence, See the National Commissionthe onTerrori See andCapabilities ofthe United States SeeRoles Report oftheCommission the on They also argue that an NID mustbeDCI empoweredtheauthorities withtwo Supporters of the NID concept argue that Supporters oftheNIDargue concept Senators Susan Collinsand Lieberman, Joe and Speaker ofthe House of , March1,1996,P.xix. 9 Eachofthoseagencies, among , July, 2004,p.409. , July, Preparing forthe21 The Need toReorganizetheIntelligence Community NID, whowouldserveastheheadofIC’s 15 the DCI’s relatively weakpositionwithrespect execution authority execution onlyCIA.the over CRS-4 cies — NSA, NRO,andNGA—withthe cies —NSA, the funds to the vari the fundsto ntral Intelligence, whowouldmanage the tomovefunding andpersonnelwithinor IC agency heads inconsultation withthe nd the National Geos National nd the cy (NGA) pr advisor, rather than overseeing the IC. overseeing the than rather advisor, st Attacks Upon theUnitedStates, ing simultaneously ing as the NID. See the DCI, whomanages theIC andthe st Century An Appraisal oftheU.S. CenturyAnAppraisal othertasks,s 12

ovides geospatial intelligence, ous agencies, including upports Department patial-Intelligence , by Larry 10 Some The 11 http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 need foranNID. integratedand thecorresponding lackofan are protected.” common goals, establishpriorities,knockh joint inquiry,commun stated,“Theintelligence personnel. authorityinformation —the infrastructure power toset and standardsIC’s forthe the Secretarythe of Defense. including authority overthoselarge porti NIDempowered with clearstatutory end- Activities BeforeandAftertheTerroristAttacks recommendation. butincludeintherecommendaconcurrence, Defense Secretary stillmay presenthisrecomme DCI doesnotconcurinthepersonnelrecomme heads, Sec.106(a)oftheNationalSecurityAc 47,No.1,2003,Ibid. Vol. P.36.Withregard totheselectionofagency Kindsvater, C. Committee onIntelligence, Community.” CIA Seecongressional orthe Ladin...We areatwar...I wantnore effort against Bin our in direction tohisdeputies:“Wemust now enteranew phase embassiesCent inEast Africa,of Director Miami Herald errata printaccompanying report,Recommendation No. 1,pp.230-234. After the Terrorist AttacksofSeptember11,2001 9/11Commission Report approval. 17 16 15 14 13 position ofNID impact,marginal willhave anda only assert that had thischange joint intelligence work;and a weak capacity toset priorities and move resources. domestic intelligence divide;structural intelligence capabilities; lack ofcommon standards and practices across the foreign- hiring, firing andbudget authority willl See U.S. Senate Select Committee onIntelligence See U.S.Select Senate andU.S. House Permanent Select In December 1998,following theAugust bombings earlierthatyear oftwo American Attacks UpontheUnitedStates, SeetheNationalCommission onTerrorist See Studies inIntelligence, SeeDavies, Frank, “Graham, 2Allies Introduce Overhaul ofU.S. Inte Some opponentscounterthatalthough pe They citeDCI George Tene with NID empowered an establish to failure ofproponents, prospective the From 13 14 Someproponentsaddwhatthey Arguments OfferedinOppositionto , August 1,2003. 17 To accomplish that goal, NID s NID goal, that Toaccomplish 16 SenatorBob Graham,aco-cha , July 2004, p.410. , July Joint Inquiry IntoIntelligence Joint Establishing anNID The Need toReorganizetheIntelligence Community t’s 1998“declarationofwar” sources or people spared inthiseffort,eitherinsidethe people sources or CRS-5 ral Intelligence George Tenetgave the following barriers thatunderminetheperformanceof to-end IC budget andpersonnelauthorities, ons oftheNFIP budget nowcontrolledby eave theIC of withdividedmanagement eads and ensure that the American people ensure thattheAmerican and eads tion that the DCI does not agree with the tion thattheDCI doesnotagree with Joint InquiryIntoIntelligenceCommunity IC responseasaclearindicationofthe t [50U.S.C.403-6 (a)stipulatesthatifthe ndation by theSecretary ofDefense,the ndation tothe President without theDCI’s

of September11,2001 (H.Rept.107-792 andS.Rept.107-351), ity needsaleaderwiththe clout to set rhaps agood idea, establishing the characterize asathirdessential characterize irman ofthe9/11congressional Community ActivitiesBeforeand upporters argue, requires an 15 on Osama Bin Ladenon OsamaBin , pp5-6. lligence,” , by Larry The The http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 report isCRSReportRL32500, Andrew Boerstling. ofthe Seeupdate page 35ofthatBest/Boerstling CRS report.(The 1949-1996 Reorganization, Proposals forIntelligence line betweenforeign anddom Housemoredirectcontrol give theWhite President. They contend that doingintelligence, soriskstheof politicization would ofthe office NID executive ofthe office the the in locate to recommendations authority, butsimply havec the faceofDODopposition.Inwords, other budgetsreprogramming andcontrolbudget hist authority. They may argue thattheDCI’s NID isnotgranthe if further weakened States. United the attack to threaten of bureaucracy, layer and risksdisruptionat a time when terrorists continue to counternarcotics. over U.S.governmenthas agencies littlecontrol management engaged in and thatanNIDCzar,” Drug the “wouldbelike Deputy DCI director, said DCIsthat andNSA rely CIA effectiveness onthe fortheir the NID willloseinfluence,according to NID wouldloseday-to-day control over th w establishment ofanNDI wouldactually influence. In contrast,other critics of retain mostofitsroles under the commissi much influence overtheICtoo to shift privilege. ofexecutive issue the proximitybecause oftheNID totheWh greaterthat Congress diffi willexperience Community in the21 Post Chronicle people throughout theIC. They attacks. 9/11 suggest im amore that Qaeda,a Al way with the dealt U.S. the been madepriortothe September 11 attack 20 19 18 Richard A.Best.) SeeStaffStudy, Permanent SelectCommittee onIntelligence, SeeRichard A. Clarke, “Now For SeeWalterPincus,“9/11 Panel’sPl , July 29,2004, p. 6. , July Somecritics have voiced concern a areCritics likely toalso assert that centralized managementbe control will thatassertskeptics establishingOther the positionofNID willonlyanother add Other opponents contend that rather than rather Other opponentscontendthat Some critics contendthatthe9/11 Some critics , July 28,2004. , July st Century 18

hosen not to exercise it. hosen nottoexercise , 1996, P. , 1996,P. Proposals forIntelligence Reorganization, 1949-2004 estic covertoperations. the Punches the 9/11 Commission Pulled,” the Punches9/11 an WouldReduceInfluenceCIA,” of the NID concept oppose itbecausethey believe the Defense Department,becauseDODwould CRS-6 335, which335, includes an out-of-print CRS report, opponents.AdmiralBobby Inman,Former nd certainly wouldnothavepreventedthe Commission’s conceptoftheNDI would portant stepwouldbetohiremorecapable over covert operations, relatively robustaut ted meaningful hiring, firing andbudget on’s proposal and,they say, standtogain e CIA, a natural power base. Without it, Without e CIA, base. anaturalpower eaken IC management. Theyeaken an assert s, itwouldnothave culty inconducting oversight oftheIC ite House will more frequentlythe ite Housewillmore raise strengthening controloverthe IC, the criticssay, theDCIs havehadthe orically havegone largely unusedin 19 a positionthat critics have argued bout the9/11Commission’s , by RichardA. BestandHerbert 20 They concern express also horities toapproveIC significantly altered and wouldblurthe IC21: Intelligence Washington Houston , by http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 Reorganization, 1949-2004 update to the CRS report isavailable inCRSReportRL32500, Reorganization, 1949-1996 P. 335,whichincluded anout-of-print CRSreport, NSA, Satellites,Imagery From Pentagon,” Select Committee onIntelligence, dollars that fund them, given thatthen fund dollars that than Secretary rather the ofDefense, that affecting tactical military operations. It, therefore, isentirely appropriate, they argue, NGA —arecombatsupportagencies that They warfighter. the IC’s argue the than empowered NID were tofavor providing more intelligence topolicy makers rather NID couldbesostrengthened authorities 22 21 perspective.” “consider therelationshipbetweencost could deficiency IC the ofastrong,that central lack onthe leadership blaming responsiveness.” Schlesinger criticizedth and intelligence productionto control in theendrecommendedthat“astrong DC of creation an the considered NID, report his DCI, andin future effort headedthe but Deputychanges intheIC’s organization. The SchlesingerReport,1971 IC. onthe DCI the focusattention sothat could officer,” “executive Herbert Hoover,recommended also knownasthesecondHooverCommissi 1955 Second Hoover Commission, those ofpolicymakers whogenerally are more interested instrategic intelligence. strengthening IC leadership. ordersandlegislation thathave executive followingCommission in1955.The liststhoseCommissions,reports,individuals, See Pincus, Walter“Intelligence Shakeup WouldBoost CIA; Panel Urges Transferof Foramore comprehensive treatment ofIC reforms 1949-1996, seeStaffStudy, Permanent President Nixon tasked the Office of Office the tasked Nixon President The Commission on Organization Branch oftheGovernment, of theExecutive The ICissue ofcentralized leadership History ofRecommendations toCentralize andStrengthenICLeadership , by RichardA.Best.) , by Andrew Richard Boerstling. A.Herbert Best and (An 22 IC21: IntelligenceCommunity inthe21 that management of the CIA be turned over toan over that management oftheCIAturned be eeds ofmilitary commandersoftendifferfrom CRS-7 Washington Post three largest agencies — NSA, NRO and NRO largest agencies —NSA, three andsubstantiveoutputfromanational I who could bring intelligence costsunder the DCI, control these agencies DCI, andthe these the control was firstaddressed Budget and Management torecommend Budget andManagement addressed the issue of centralizing and ofcentralizing issue addressedthe thatDODinterestsmight suffer, ifan OMB Director James R.Schlesinger,OMB Director James a e IC’s resources, failuretocoordinate collectanddisseminateintelligence an adequateleve on and chaired by formerPresident on andchaired , November 8,2001,P.A-1. Proposals forIntelligence Proposals Proposals forIntelligence by theSecondHoover l ofquality and st Century , 1996, 21 http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 Church Committee,1976 Murphy Commission, 1975 did notreport the respective bills. legislation, which alsoincl deputyselected wouldmanage CIA. In among otherthings, wouldhavecreatedan Senate (1976)andintheH Charter Legislation,1978 given cabinet rank and broad supervisory authorities over the IC. and thataseparateCIA recommendedGeneral that a newof Intelligence positionofDirector be established whohadearlierparticipatedindr Johnson Clifford/C the DCI shouldhavebudget authority. from intelligence agenciescomprisingcommunitythe but didnotindicate whether exclusively theCIA.said Commission The recommended thattheDCI shoul Pike, Pike Committee,1976 IC by relieving himofday-to-d considerati that recommended definingDCI instatute reprogramming authorities. The Committee also bybe strengthened appropriating intelligence dollars directly tothe DCI and by Frank Church, didnotrecommend establishing an NID buturged that DCI authorities to Intelligence Activities,knownastheC to the large part ofthe intelligence community that lies outside the CIA. the Commissionsaid itwas neither possible nor IC overthe But asawhole. rath influence noted that the DCI exercised direct control over had the only CIA but limited Deputyformer D.Murphy,by Secretary Robert ofState Foreign Policy, chaired Following the establishment ofthe intelligence oversight committees inthe DCI the Ray Deputy aformer be that CIA,recommended of the Cline, Director Clark Clifford,aformerSecretar The House Selecton Intelligence, Committee chaired by Congressman OtisG. The Senate Select Committee toStudy Governmental Operations with Respect The CommissionontheOrganization theConductof oftheGovernmentfor line Proposals,1976 director beresponsible ouse (1977),Congress considered uded language governing c on begiventh toenhancing ay management oftheCIA. CRS-8 y ofDefenseunderPresidentLyndon B. the face of strong oppositiontotheoverall er change, than astructural recommending hurch Committee and headed byheaded Senator hurch Committeeand the DCI shouldreceivebudget proposals NID to manage the IC. Apresidentially d manage theIC asawholeandnot afting legislation establishing theCIA, legislation afting desirable to extend theDCI’sextend desirableto control for managing theCIA. overt actions,the Committees e DCI’se management of the charterlegislation that, http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 Intelligence Community, Executive BranchOrders,1976-1981 23 one tohelpmanage theIC a time tomanage the IC. The Commission recommended the creation oftwodeputies, should notbealtere Defense of Secretary Les Aspin andHaroldBrown) Community (known asthe Aspin-Brown Aspin-Brown opposition fromDODandthecongressi faceof the in legislation Boren andMcCurdy oftheir adoption win to failed authorityprogram andre to on Intelligence (HPSCI), introducedlegisla of the Senate Select Committee onIntelligence (SSCI) and House Permanent Select Boren-McCurdy, 1992 operations toaseparate establishing an NID tooverseetheIC, a Turner Proposal,1985 authorityexplicit overthedevelopment, imp today,effect granted theDCIin more Order12333,whichremains Executive 12036), whichdetailedthe role community responsibilitiesandauthorities, foreign liaison. budget, tasking, intelligence review,coor more clearly defining the DCI’sareas relating community-wide tothe in authority primary intelligence advisor respons (E.O.)11905naming theDCIOrder asthePresident’s 1976 issuedExecutive Intelligence See Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities ofthe United States See Report of theCommissionCapabilities on theRoles and The Commissiononthe Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence CongressmanSenator DavidBoren and Admiral StansfieldTurner,former oftheDCI’s President RonaldReagan in1981continuedtheexpansion President Jimmy in1978issuedE.O.12036(superseding Carter E.O.11905) In offfurthercong anefforttohead , March1,1996, pp.xix-xx. Commission, 1996 directorofCIA. Preparing forthe21 program funds,andcreating a nd theothertomanage theCIA. concludedthattherela s, responsibilities,missions ible fordeveloping theNFIP. CRS-9 nd leaving responsibility for CIA day-to-day DCI underPresidentCarter,recommended onal ArmedServicesCommittees. Commission, afteritsrespectivechairmen ressional action,Presid d, butthattheDCI should begiven more dination, intelligence disseminationand dination, intelligence tion creating the positionofanNIDwith lementation, andevaluationoftheNFIP. issuing E.O.12333(superseding E.O. David McCurdy,David chairmen respective st CenturyAnAppraisal of theU.S. tionship betweentheDCI and separate directorofCIA. , andactivitiesoftheIC. 23

ent GeraldFord in http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 to the President. NSA, Satellites, Imagery From Pentagon”, errata printaccompanying report,Recommendation No. 1,pp. 2-3. After TheTerroristAttacks ofSeptember11,2001 Committee onIntelligence, Reorganization,” November 2,1996. production respectively. di individuals nowserving asassistant SenateAdministration has forconfirmationthe chosen the to submitto names of administration havebeen administration deputy intelligence director forcommunity management and the assistant director for analysis,administration. and overseecollection, to for community directors assistant management andthree settled formore modest reform, agreeinga toestablish new positionofdeputy DCI But facedwithintenseoppositionfromthePe appointments ofchiefsde by givingDCI himmorecontroloverthe sought toincreasethecloutof HPSCI, SSCI andthe the of LarryCongressman chairmen respective Combest, Specter/Combest, 1996 26 25 24 of apresidentiallyestablishment appoint The 9/11Commission authorities. the NID begranted fullIC budget named tomanagedirector be theCIA. cabinet level Senate-confirmed NIDposition be established and that a separate and AftertheTerroristAttacksofSe Attacks InquiryThe Joint 11Terrorist September Into Secretary ofDefenseDonald Rumsfeld. to never madepublic,thereport,according DOD’s threelargest intelligence operations thatthePentag recommended reportedly Chairman ofPresidentIntelligence George W.Bush’s Foreign Advisory Board, Commission,2001 Scowcroft See Pincus, Walter “Intelligence Shakeup WouldBoost CIA; Panel Urges Transfer of See See U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence See U.S. andU.S. Senate House Select Permanent Committee Select The 9/11 Commission, inareportissued inJuly, 2004,recommendedthe The 9/11Commission, The CongressionalInquiry Joint Into Intelligence Community ActivitiesBefore byA presidentialchaired commission retired Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, the In the wakeofAspin-Brown Commi Congressional QuarterlyWeekly 26

Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Joint InquiryInto confirmed. Neither the C fense-related agencies andth 24 Although each weretobe CRS-10 ptember 11, 2001, recommended thatanew ptember 11,2001,recommended , “Defense & Intelligence Policy: Intelligence The Joint Inquiry TheJoint furtherrecommendedthat execution andpersonnelprogramming execution 25 Washington Post ed, Senate-conf The report never was formally Thereportneverwas presented rectors for collection andanalysis and forcollection rectors on shouldcedetotheDCI controlover media reports,wasstrongly opposedby —NSA,NRO,andNGA.Although ntagon andits congre ssion report, Senator ArlenSpecterand report, ssion (H.Rept. 107-792 andS.Rept. 107-351), Community ActivitiesBeforeand linton nor George W. Bush linton norGeorge W. irmed National Intelligenceirmed National , November 8,2001,P.A-1. e budgets of those agencies.e budgets ofthose Senate confirmed,only Senate the ssional allies,they http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 (CIA). established tooversee the day-to-day operations of the Central Intelligence Agency NID be deputy a andthat President ofthe Office Executive the in be located director the that recommended authority IC’sover the 15agencies. TheCommission oversee theagencies thatc interest across the U.S.government, intelligencenational manage program, the whowouldoverseeDirector national intelligenceof centers onspecific subjects ontribute to it, andhavehi it, to ontribute CRS-11 ring, firing andbudgetary http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 intelligence-related activities. budget forintelligence and NID shall Submission Budget NID Budget Responsibilities security functions. enforcement powers orinternal have nopolice,subpoena,orlaw provision —CIA Retains currentstatutory Internal Security Responsibilities —CIA Director (NIP). National Intelligence Program —Directandoversee the Noprov simultaneously asCIA Director. —Prohibitedfrom serving intelligence advisor. —President’sprincipal —HeadIC. General NID Responsibilities No provision. Membership NID Cabinet NID. appointed, Senate-confirmed headed by aPresidentially Authority, whichwouldbe Branch theNational Intelligence Establishes within theExecutive National IntelligenceDirector (NID) on 9/22/04.) CommitteeGovernment Affs. Senate bythe amended, (S. 2845,approved,as Collins/Lieberman Appendix 1.SelectedNIDLegislationCompared to determine Director shall Comparison of S. 2845, H.R. 10, and Current Law Comparison ofS.2845,H.R.10,andCurrentLaw theannual intelligence-related activities. budget forintelligence and NID shall security functions. enforcement powers orinternal have nopolice,subpoena,orlaw provision —CIA Retains currentstatutory enactment may benamed NID. Director preceding bill’s —Individual serving asCIA —Manage andoversee theNIP. simultaneously asCIA director. —Prohibitedfrom serving intelligence advisor. —President’sprincipal —HeadIC. NID. appointed, Senateconfirmed branch apresidentially Establishes within theexecutive (H.R. 10) Hastert Current Law so. Noprovision. ision. develop CRS-12 Director shall anannual intelligence-related activities. budget forintelligence and development DCI security functions. enforcement powers orinternal police, subpoena,orlaw CIA Directorshallhave no —HeadCIA. intelligence advisor. —President’sprincipal —HeadIC. Community (IC) andtheCIA. heads boththeIntelligence Central Intelligenceof Stipulates thatthereisa Current Law shall facilitate theshall facilitate of anannual who Director http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 personnel transfers. reprogramming, andfunds NIP budget execution, NID shall manage andoversee Authority Execution Budget NID For Specific Activities (TIARA). Intelligence (JMIP) andRelated Military Intelligence andTactical included intheNIP (Joint intelligence programs not annual budgets formilitary development by theSecDefof shall participateinthe those IC elements thatdonotand that receive NIP funding andto guidance tointelligence elements NID shallprovide budget Development Budget on 9/22/04.) CommitteeGovernment Affs. Senate bythe amended, (S. 2845,approved,as Collins/Lieberman issued procedures. except inaccordancewith NID- without NID priorapproval, reprogrammed ortransferred No NIP fundsmay be Reprogramming Budget intelligence programs. the annualbudget for military the development by theSecDef of NIP. NID wouldparticipatein each IC agency notwithin the shall provide budget guidance for NID hasapproved budget. NID not beprovided Presidentunless agency withaportionofNIP may within theNIP. budget The of the budget foranIC element NID shallapprove any portionof Approval Budget Authorities Budget NID NID shall NID shall JMIP andTIARA budgets. development by theSecDefof shall participateinthe those IC elements thatdonotand that receive NIP funding, andto guidance tointelligence elements NID shallprovide budget (H.R. 10) Hastert reprogramming JMIP funds. before transferring or SecDef shallconsult with NID with NID-issued procedures. approval, exceptinaccordance reprogrammed withoutNID prior No NIP fundsmay be the JMIP andTIARA. the SecDefofannualbudgets for participate inthedevelopment by not withintheNIP. NID shall guidance tothoseIC components NID shallprovide budget comprise components oftheNIP. heads oftheIC elements that containing IC elements andtothe guidance toheadsofdepartments NID shallprovide budget execution ofNIP funding. facilitate related activities. NID shall intelligence andintelligence- execution ofthebudget for management and ensure CRS-13 effective budgets. annual JMIP andTIARA development by theSecDefof DCI shall participateinthe Current Law with DCI-issued procedures. approval, exceptinaccordance reprogrammed withoutDCI prior No NFIP fundsmay be incorporation intotheNFIP. (NFIP) budgets beforetheir Foreign Intelligence Program DCI approves allNational No provision. http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 would develop procedures. NID andaffectedagency heads non-NIP fundedprograms, the personnel transfersinvolving develop transferprocedures; for programs, theNID would place within NIP-funded For personneltransferstaking Procedures Transfer Personnel No provision. Transfer may Transfer bemade without No provision. Transfers andPersonnel Fund to Objections Agency Heads such transfers. ceilings establishedinlaw for does notexceedapplicable Contingencies oftheCIA; and transferred toReserve for priority; doesnotinvolve funds made ishigher intelligence activity towhich transferbeing transfer may bemade only if another IC element. Sucha personnel from oneIC element to transfer non-NIP funded NID andaffectedagency heads, agreed uponproceduresbetween and, inaccordancewith mutually from oneIC element toanother; transfer NIP-funded personnel NID-developed procedures, to theNIP; inaccordancewith reprogramming ofnon-NIP funds or disapprove thetransferor between NIP programs; approve transfer orreprogram NIP funds With OMBapproval, NID may Transfers andPersonnel Funds on 9/22/04.) CommitteeGovernment Affs. Senate bythe amended, (S. 2845,approved,as Collins/Lieberman personnel transfers. procedures governing IC agency headspersonneltransfer NID requiredtodevelop with concurrence ofagency head. limitations provided NID has regard to$1million and5% not terminate program. amounts available toagency; and than $1million; lessthan5%of Contingencies oftheCIA; beless transfer offundstoReserve for circumstances andnotinvolve a activity, basedonunforeseen to ahigher priority intelligence Fund/personnel transfermust be appropriations actprovisions. year transfer IC personnel department heads,NID may procedures developed with NIP; inaccordancewith transfer NIP fundswithinthe With OMBapproval, NID may (H.R. 10) Hastert , and subject to , andsubject CRS-14 for up to a upto for agency heads. transfer procedureswithaffected Requires theDCI todevelop objection inwritingobjection tothe DCI. transfers, provided they state DCI-initiated fund andpersonnel Permits agency headstostop funds orpersonnel. not involve atransferofFBI Reserve for Contingencies; does funds transferredtotheDCI’s requirements; doesnotinvolve priority; basedonunforeseen occurring ishigher intelligence activity towhich transferis transfer may bemade only if of affectedagencies. Sucha developed by theDCI andheads in accordancewith procedures NFIP and transferpersonnelwithinthe transfer fundswithintheNFIP With OMBapproval, DCI can Current Law for periodsuptoayear for , http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 concurrence. concurrence butmust notenon- recommendation withoutSecDef NGA. NID may makethe NSA,NROand for nominees SecDef inrecommending NID shallobtainconcurrenceof and NGA DoD Concurrence/NSA,NRO Director. nomination toserve asCIA President anindividual for NID shallrecommend tothe Recommendation Authority Hire andFire direct jurisdiction. Authority andbeundertheNID’s to theNational Intelligence NIP fundswould Direct Appropriation FBI’s Office ofIntelligence. funds/personnel toandfrom the NID authorized totransfer Transfers Personnel & Funds FBI on 9/22/04.) CommitteeGovernment Affs. Senate bythe amended, (S. 2845,approved,as Collins/Lieberman

be appropriated CIA Director Guard. Homeland Security andCoast Energy, Treasury, FBI, departments of Defense,State, intelligence positionsatthe appointments tocertain the NID with regard to Agency headsshallconsult with President (asthecasemay be). recommendation made to may notbefilledor does notconcur,thevacancy NGA.IfNSA, NROand NID recommending nominees for concurrence inappointing or position shallobtainNID having over jurisdiction the Head ofdepartment oragency and NGA NID CIA and Director. nomination toserve asDeputy President individuals for NID shallrecommend tothe and CIADirector Recommendation/Deputy NID funding totheNID. Budget shallapportionallNIP Office ofManagement and FBI’s Office ofIntelligence. funds/personnel toandfrom the NID authorized totransfer (H.R. 10) Hastert Consultation/Other Agencies NID Concurrence/NSA,NRO, CRS-15

concurrence. proceed, butmust noteDCI non- may SecDef NGA,but NRO and concurrence onheadsofNSA, SecDef shallobtainDCI and NGA DCI Concurrence/NSA,NRO No provision. components. the FBI’s nationalsecurity General receives thefunding for Attorney NRO.The NGA, and intelligence agencies —NSA, for theCIA andthenational SecDef receives appropriations FBI funds/personnel. DCI is Current Law not authorized totransfer http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32506 collection andanalysis tasking. NID shallissueandmanage NID Analysis and Collection Tasking President. and reportnon-concurrence tothe concurrence ofdepartment head of thedraftbill,butmust seek individual covered inthissection President thetermination ofany the to recommend may NID Termination NID’s non-concurrence. must notetothePresident the without NID concurrence, but Dir. Agency headmay proceed DIA; andtheFBI’s Exec.Asst. Information Analysis; Director, Sec. Homeland Security for of Defense forIntelligence; Asst. the positionsofUnderSecretary appointment toindividuals tofill appointing orrecommending for NID concurrencebefore Other agency headsshallobtain Concurrence/Other Agencies on 9/22/04.) CommitteeGovernment Affs. Senate bythe amended, (S. 2845,approved,as Collins/Lieberman national intelligence. production, anddissemination of tasking of,collection, analysis, NID shallmanage anddirectthe (H.R. 10) Hastert Termination CRS-16 Noprovision. to thedirectionofPresident. agreed with theSecDef pursuant assets, exceptasotherwise levied onnational collection conflicts incollectedpriorities collection priorities,andresolve requirements, determine elements. Approve collection of nationalintelligence by IC priorities togovern thecollection DCI establishesrequirements and No provision. Termination Division. the FBI’s National Security fill thepositionofAsst. Dir. of Director’s recommendation to timely noticeDCI oftheFBI agency headdecides.FBI shall DOE intelligence units,but on directorsofDIA, INR, and Agency headsshallconsultDCI Consultation/Other Agencies Current Law