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The American Press, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Cold War

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The American Press, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Cold War “A Rising Clamor”: The American Press, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Cold War Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By David Putnam Hadley, MA Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2015 Dissertation Committee: Peter L. Hahn (co-advisor) Robert J. McMahon (co-advisor) Jennifer Siegel Copyright by David Putnam Hadley 2015 Abstract This dissertation examines the development of relationships between the U.S. press and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Cold War, from shortly before the official creation of the CIA in 1947 to the major congressional investigations of the CIA in 1975-76. This dissertation seeks to answer four related questions. First, what was the nature and origin of the relationships that developed between the press and the CIA? Second, to what use did the CIA attempt to put such relationships? Third, what was the actual impact of press/CIA relationships on reporting? Finally, how did the CIA’s relations with the press affect the development of the agency? The efforts to answer these questions involved two main methods. The first method was an extensive examination of the product of domestic newspapers and journals from 1945 to 1976 that examined the activities of the CIA and the development of the U.S. intelligence system. The second method was archival research in private and institutional collections. I conclude that there was no single relationship formed between the CIA and the press. The CIA did have a program of operationally using reporters, though details remain difficult to determine. More important than paid relationships, though, were personal connections that ranged from casual contact to collaboration with the CIA to achieve CIA goals. These positive relationships depended heavily upon a shared ideological worldview. The CIA sought to use these relationships both to conceal information and also, at times, to promote itself and secure a strong position within the hierarchy of the U.S. governmental bureaucracy. While early reporting on the CIA was often positive, and the CIA was successful in ii keeping its activities out of the press when desired, the positive press environment of the late 1940s and 1950s was more the result of the Cold War consensus environment than the result of deliberate CIA action. Even at their most positive, relationships between the press and the CIA did not succeed in preventing entirely criticism of the CIA, or the publication of some details of CIA activities. As U.S. society and views on the Cold War changed, the press atmosphere became more challenging for the CIA. Ultimately, the press played an important role in the development of the CIA, both in the agency’s early years as the press was more helpful and in later years as the agency struggled to adapt to a changing political environment. iii Acknowledgements This dissertation was made possible in part by generous grants from the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation and the Ohio State University Department of History. I would also like to acknowledge and thank the staffs of the New York Public Library’s Manuscript Division, Princeton’s Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, the Marshall Foundation, the Robert McCormick Center, the Library of Congress, the Special Collections Library at Georgetown University, and the Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America for their patience, friendliness, and assistance. Hugh Wilford, David Culbert, Kevin Boyle, and David Stebenne provided valuable feedback on various parts of this dissertation. Finally, I would like to thank my committee, Drs. Peter Hahn, Robert McMahon, and Jennifer Siegel, for their support and guidance. iv Vita May 2009………………………………………………B.A. History, Gettysburg College November 2011………………………………………..M.A., History, The Ohio State University 2009 to present………………………………………..Graduate Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State University Publications “‘A Constructive Quality’: The Press, the CIA, and Covert Intervention in the 1950s,” Intelligence and National Security, published online 13 January 2015. “America’s ‘Big Brother’: A Century of U.S. Domestic Surveillance,” Origins 7:3 (December 2013). “October 2013: Middle East Remains Unstable 30 Years after Attacks on Peacekeepers in Lebanon,” Origins 7:1 (October 2013). Fields of Study Major Field: History v Table of Contents Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………...ii Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………..v Vita………………………………………………………………………………………..vi Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..1 Chapter 1: ‘Times Like These’: The Postwar Intelligence Debate and the CIA………...23 Chapter 2: “A Constructive Quality”: Allen Dulles and Covert Intervention…………...78 Chapter 3: “A Goldmine of Stories”: The Increasing Public Profile of the CIA……....119 Chapter 4: “Rising Clamor”: Growing Criticism of the CIA and the Agency’s Response………………………………………………………………………………..161 Chapter 5: “The Cause”: The Clash of Intelligence Advocates and Critics.…...……....207 Chapter 6: The Year of Intelligence…………………………………………………….259 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………….......310 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………318 vi Introduction Surveying the state of U.S. military preparedness in May 1946, New York Times military editor Hanson Baldwin stressed the country’s need for a strong, civilian intelligence system. Baldwin invoked the memory of Pearl Harbor, as he argued that the disaster there had demonstrated clearly the necessity of a civilian intelligence service financially, organizationally, and politically independent from the intelligence services of the different branches of the armed forces. Such an agency could collate and distribute vital world data and offer some possibility of warning against potential threats. The wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS), dissolved soon after the war, had been “eminently sound,” in Baldwin’s estimation, but its record was mixed because of its short existence; time was needed to develop a proper intelligence agency and so such an agency had to be established before, not after, the next war broke out. Baldwin realized that the creation of a civilian agency would be opposed by military intelligence services’ jealous protection of their turf. He thus stressed that, “Public support for [central intelligence] must be firm and unwavering, for today, not the Air Force, not the Navy, but an efficient intelligence service is the first line of defense.”1 The treatment of the U.S. intelligence establishment by the press played an important role in garnering that public support. While the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Hanson W. Baldwin, “Wanted: An American Military Policy,” Harper’s Magazine 192/1152, May 1946, 407, 408; author’s italics. 1 did not initially draw considerable attention, its creation was public. Even though it enjoyed a relatively low profile in its early years, the press covered its 1947 creation. As such, intelligence reporting developed alongside the agency. Journalists’ decisions on what intelligence-related stories to investigate and report, and which to ignore, helped determine what activities the CIA could conduct. Decisions by some members of the press to cooperate with the agency helped promote the CIA’s desired image to the American public - capable, trustworthy, and thoroughly professional. As some members of the press began to question and challenge the CIA’s activities, however, the agency found it increasingly difficult to navigate safely the political environment. Baldwin is illustrative of the challenges and changes in such intelligence reporting in the three decades between the contested efforts to build a peacetime intelligence agency after World War II and the congressional investigation of the CIA’s activities that began in 1975. A former naval officer, Baldwin had established a reputation as an authority on military affairs. He was a part of an influential group of men in and out of government, centered around the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), which considered U.S. military policy and included important figures in intelligence like Allen Dulles. Baldwin grew to reflect the arguments of such men in his articles on U.S. intelligence arrangements, lending his prestige to calls for an active, coordinated, civilian intelligence agency. At the same time he advocated his vision of intelligence, however, Baldwin stressed the need for wariness.2 While Baldwin met with intelligence officers, he refused to perform tasks for the CIA. “Intelligence didn’t jibe with a newspaperman’s mission,” he 2 Hanson Baldwin, “Inquiry for Intelligence,” New York Times, 7 April 1947, 8. 2 explained, and “I wouldn’t [perform tasks] for the CIA or anything, I wouldn’t mix newspaper work and intelligence work. It just isn’t right or doing justice to either one.”3 Baldwin was both a champion of the ideal of central intelligence and a cautious communicator of intelligence issues. Baldwin also remained extremely cautious about publishing on sensitive subjects, fearing that he might negatively affect U.S. national security. Baldwin’s cautious reporting and support for U.S. intelligence, once widely- shared, marked Baldwin as a deeply conservative reporter by 1975. Fewer members of the press, especially at his old publication, were willing to respect national security arguments against reporting, especially with regard to the CIA. As The New York Times investigated U.S. intelligence, Baldwin looked
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